A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick

Permanent WRAP URL:

http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/148840

Copyright and reuse:
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.
Please scroll down to view the document itself.
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to cite it.
Our policy information is available from the repository home page.

For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk
The Other Within: Securitising Muslim group identity in Britain

Shahnaz Akhter

Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for a Doctor of Philosophy in Politics and International Studies in Politics and International Studies conducted in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick

Supervised by Doctor Steven Kettell and Doctor Trevor McCrisken

March 2019
Chapter 7: Quilliam Foundation. Hiding in Plain Sight

7.1 Central Aims ................................................................. 146
7.1.1 Central Aims ................................................................. 146
7.2 The Quilliam Foundation ................................................. 151
7.2.1 Islamism ................................................................. 154
7.3 War on Terror .............................................................. 157

Chapter 6. We Never Claimed to Speak for Everybody ........................................ 109

6.1 Historical Relationship with Government ........................................ 111
6.2 Overall Analysis of Press Releases 2005-2013 ........................................ 113
   6.2.1 Organisation Aims ...................................................... 113
6.3 The War on Terror .......................................................... 118
   6.3.1 Prevent ................................................................. 124
6.4 Islamophobia ............................................................... 126
6.5 Religious Engagement ...................................................... 131
   6.5.1 Women and Religion .................................................. 132
6.6 Foreign Affairs .............................................................. 134
   6.6.1 Israel-Palestine ........................................................ 135
6.7 Political Engagement ........................................................ 138
6.8 Securitisation and the MCB ............................................... 141
   6.8.1 Acts of Resistance ....................................................... 142
6.9 Conclusion ................................................................. 144

Chapter 5: Islamic Engagement in Britain .................................................. 104

5.1 Historical Relationship with Government ........................................ 109

5.1.1 Central Aims ................................................................. 112
5.1.2 Post Copenhagen School .............................................. 113
5.1.3 The Audience .............................................................. 116
5.1.4 The Insecuritisation of Islam ......................................... 120
5.2 Historical Markers ............................................................ 123
   5.2.1 The Empire .............................................................. 126
   5.2.2 Muslims in the World War ......................................... 127
   5.2.3 Citizens of the Commonwealth .................................... 129
5.3 The South Asian Model of Islam .............................................. 132
   5.3.1 The Global Ummah .................................................... 134
5.4 Blair’s Britain ................................................................. 137
   5.4.1 Multiculturalism ........................................................ 139
   5.4.2 The War on Terror ...................................................... 140
   5.4.3 Islamophobia ........................................................... 141
5.5 Blair’s Speech ............................................................... 142
5.6 Conclusion ................................................................. 144
Table of Figures

Table 1 - Breakdown of Overall Press Release by Numbers ................................................................. 115
Table 2 - Yearly Breakdown by category ................................................................................................. 116
Table 3 - Numerical Analysis - Breakdown by Top Frequency ................................................................. 117
Table 4 - Percentile Analysis - Breakdown by Top Frequency ................................................................. 118
Table 5 - Secular vs Religious Language Yearly Breakdown ............................................................... 120
Table 6 Overall Breakdown Secular vs Religious Language (War on Terror) ......................................... 120
Table 7 - War on Terror /Islamophobia Press Releases 2005-2013 .................................................... 127
Table 8 - Frequency in which Countries are mentioned........................................................................... 135
Table 9 - Total Number of Press Releases - Yearly Breakdown ............................................................... 151
Table 10 - Yearly Breakdown by Category .............................................................................................. 152
Table 11 - Numerical Breakdown Highest Frequency ........................................................................... 153
Table 12 - Percentage Breakdown Highest Frequency .......................................................................... 153
Table 13 - Foreign Affairs Press Releases vs Overall Press Releases breakdown by year .................... 172
Table 14 - Breakdown by Category ........................................................................................................ 191
Table 15 Breakdown by Year .................................................................................................................. 192
Table 16 - Percentile Breakdown by Category ....................................................................................... 192
Table 17 - HBT breakdown by country .................................................................................................. 207
Table 18 - Proportion vs Total Minority Output ..................................................................................... 248

Figure 1 - Group Identity ......................................................................................................................... 227
Figure 2 - Oil Reserves model reproduced from HBT website (HBT, 2010h) ........................................ 237
Acknowledgements

This journey would not have been complete without my supervisor Steven Kettell. I could not have asked for a more supportive and dedicated supervisor. This thesis would not have been completed without the belief, the encouragement and guidance that Steve has provided. I will forever be grateful for the support you have offered in all circumstances, some tougher than others. Thank you for giving me the freedom to explore new ideas, often spontaneously and for guiding the PhD back to its course when needed. It has been a privilege to be supervised by you and to leave each supervision session with an excitement to continue.

To Trevor, thank you for all your support, both in my PhD and in widening participation, for allowing me to pursue ideas without limits.

To Matthew Watson, thank you for all your help in setting up colonial hangover, which remains one of the proudest achievements of my time here. The kindness and generosity you have shown in the giving of your time and discussing new ideas show me the kind of academic I aspire to me. There are too few women of colour in academia, and I am grateful to be in a department with Shirin Rai, who has led the way and made academia an easier place to navigate and for always being there to provide encouragement and words of advice. I thank you for your strength, and for being one of the most inspiring women I know. On that note, I must also thank my 'brother' Sahil Dutta for being a cheerleader and for encouraging me in both academia and widening participation.

There are some unspoken heroes of academia, and I am truly thankful for Sue and Jade, for both their support in Widening Participation and my PhD this year. This PhD would not have been completed without you both. Thank you for your tireless support and encouragement To Kay, thank you for all your help and friendship over these last years, and for the support, you have shown in all circumstances. I must also thank Jackie for all her support these previous years and
in my W.P. journey. To Gary and Jill, for always providing a place to escape to and words of wisdom. Finally, to Daz and Kieran for your patience and kindness these last years.

I have been privileged to work with some fantastic undergraduates on the Colonial Hangover journey, Taznema, Jonas, Ben and Alex who have inspired me to do better, and from whom I have learnt so much. Thank you for laughter, W.P. journeys and for being my Colonial Hangover family.

To the ‘third supervisor’ Tom Hiddleston, I promised the many amazing widening participation students I have worked with, you would be mentioned. I thank you for the memories of shared laughter and gossip in what has been one of the joys of my PhD journey, teaching widening participation students and for helping to create a space, where I am continually awed at the students, I have had the privilege to teach.

Along this journey I have found my academic family, Fran, Katie, Jason, Joe and Sarah (and of course Bramble and Ralph) thank you firstly for your friendship and support these last years. For discussions on ontological security and the sharing of ideas and words of encouragement. For laughter in unexpected moments and of course, tea.

To Melina and Miriam, thank you both for your friendship, support, humour and for being such great office mates. On that vein, thank you to the E1.04 crew, Ben, Mara, Bashilla and James.

To Robin Phelan, this journey could not have begun without you, and thank you for giving me the courage and support to leave banking and enter academia. Thank you for making a difficult decision so much easier with your generosity. To Julia and Chris at Theatre Absolute, thank you for inspiring a love of writing and for being so supportive.

To my amazing friends who believed, I could do this even before I did. Maria, Nayna, Daniyah, Farakh and Jasmine. Thank you for providing moments of lightness away from the PhD, for outing up with an absent friend and for always being there.

And finally, to my family- my amazing siblings, Nasreen, Shaheen, Siede, and Serena. Thank you for supporting me through this journey, for giving up time so that I could write and for listening
patiently and for keeping me going these last few years. To my brilliant nephews Junaid and Rehan, love and hugs. To dad, who taught me to follow my path. And finally, my biggest debt of gratitude goes to my mum, the strongest women I know- thank you for supporting me always and teaching me to believe.
Declaration: This thesis is entirely my own work and neither the thesis itself nor any part thereof, has been submitted for examination at any other university.
1. Introduction

“This is England. The Bridge we living in. A kicharee simmering. Women in hijabs, syringe popstar.”

Riz Mc Enlistan (Ahmed, 2016)

Though there has been a long history of portraying Islam as the ‘Other’, the rise of the Islamist movements in the 1970s and the onset of the War on Terror following the September 11th, 2001, Trade Centre terror attacks would see a renewed emphasis on Islam as the Other. Within the U.K., the London July 7th, 2005, bombings would see academics and policymakers turn their attention to British Muslim communities as it was revealed that the perpetrators of the attack were British born citizens. In the days following the attacks, Tony Blair set out measures for dealing with the threat to the U.K. Blair’s declaration that “British Muslims should understand that they are our partners in getting this done,” would frame the British Muslim community as the ‘Other’ within (Blair, 2005).

The period following the July 7th bombings would thus see the ‘British Muslim’ community subject to a new securitisation process, one which was centred on New Labour's visions of British values. This new scrutiny would manifest itself through the introduction of new legislation and be reinforced through a broader 'elite' which included media, popular culture and think tanks. The ‘British Muslim’ community were cast as a radical/oriental ‘Other’, continuing the Good Muslim/Bad Muslim paradigm which had been pushed forward by George W Bush and Tony Blair following the September 11th trade centre attacks.

The relationship between the state and its Muslim citizens had been brought into focus before this, with protests surrounding the publication of Salman Rushdie's Satanic Verses and its depiction of the Prophet Mohammed [PBUH]. These protests saw the emergence of new Muslim organisations such as the Muslim Parliament of Britain and the U.K. Action Committee for Islamic Affairs (Lewis, 1990). The emerging political voice of Muslim communities in the U.K. reflected changes in the political and academic discourse which altered from viewing minority
communities through the prism of race to religion. The multicultural project of the 1980s and 1990s designed to accommodate the different needs of its minority citizens would see the rise of a new racism, which continued to other ‘British Muslims’.

Throughout the process, the broader discourse viewed the ‘British Muslim’ community as a homogenous entity with a voice, rather than multiple voices. The three organisations whose public discourse form the basis of this thesis, the Muslim Council of Britain, the Quilliam Foundation and Hizb-ut-Tahrir arguably reflect the dominance of the British Pakistani community within the U.K. This thesis further examines how ‘British Muslim’ communities are often viewed within the lens of the British Pakistani community. It further examines how these groups have been subject to the securitisation process and how this has impacted their public discourse and group identity. It will further show that within the microcosm of British Muslim communities, the group’s public discourse mirrors the broader securitisation process. This creates an internal securitisation process which relies on an ‘other’ resulting in some British Muslim communities subject to a double securitisation.

The first part of this introduction will briefly examine the role of Islam as the other and the literature on both Islam and British Muslims. This will then be followed by an overview of the analytical framework and the key theoretical concepts that underpin this thesis. It will then set out the research questions and the original contribution that this thesis wishes to make to the literature. The introduction will then conclude with a brief overview of the proceeding empirical chapters.

1.1 Islam as the Other

The study of Islam within the field of political studies can be viewed through the writings of differing schools of thought which seek to analyse the role of Islam in society today. Examples of these include those who view Islam through an Oriental lens, such as Huntington’s clash of civilisations and more recently within the expanding security studies field, authors such as Gilles Kepel and Olivier Roy, focus on extremist Islamist groups and Post-Islamism in Islamic countries.
(Huntington, 1996) (Kepel, 2006; Roy, 2004). While security studies had initially focused on global jihadist networks, the London July 7th bombings saw focus shift within academia and government policy (with campaigns such as Prevent) to Muslims in the U.K.

Studies which centred on the role of Islam in secular society have been further confused within this period by the growing voice of radical Islamist movements whose aims included the implementation of Sharia Law within European states. Huntington’s clash of civilisation premise was seen to be highlighted through several high profile events such as in 2005 when the Danish newspaper Jyllands –Posten published cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed [p.b.u.h], where objections from within the Muslim community were seen as an attack of the newspaper’s freedom of expression. Another example can be seen in the Trojan Horse claims surrounding Park View Academy in Birmingham, where the school was accused of attempting to implement strict religious teachings (Elkes, 2014). The school governors were cleared, and the affair was described as an example of false narratives surrounding Islam (Holmwood & O’Toole, 2018). Thus, debates surrounding Islam, both politically and academically, have often been framed against the backdrop of Islamist political groups.

This section will focus on the area of literature to which this thesis hopes to contribute, that which focuses on the role of Muslims in the U.K. This forms part of a more extensive body of research which examines minority Muslim communities within Europe. That literature which looks at Muslims in the U.K. can be split into two broad areas. Firstly, there is a cross-disciplinary set of writing which looks at the evolving history of Muslims in the U.K. This includes work by authors including Ron Greaves and Sophie Gilliat Ray (Gilliat- Ray, 2010; Geaves, 2017). This set of literature has historically been concerned with the socio-economic conditions of Muslims in the U.K. Authors such as Abbas and Seddon focus on the changing discourse towards Muslims in the U.K. from race to religion viewing this through sociological factors such as housing and unemployment (Abbas, 2011; Seddon, 2004). They further examine the changing discourse by looking at issues of Muslim identity and a growing Muslim political voice which emerged after the
publication of The Satanic Verses and in opposition to the military campaign in Iraq as part of the war on terror.

Secondly, there is a growing body of literature which focuses on Muslims in the U.K. through the lens of state responses to the war on terror. This set of research sought to examine the tension between security concerns following the July 7th London bombings and the need to balance this against community cohesion. This reflected the dual aims of the Prevent policy, which authors including Toby Archer and Tariq Modood argued resulted in the government working with select groups (Archer, 2009; Ahmad & Modood, 2007). The emphasis on universal values by Tony Blair in his August 2005 speech following the July 7th London bombings, saw further focus placed on how the war on terror had impacted multiculturalism (Blair, 2005). It is this body of literature that this thesis aims to contribute to, by using the Post Copenhagen model of securitisation set out by Croft in Securitising Islam to examine the impact of the July 7th terror attacks on the 'British Muslim' communities.

1.1.1 Ontological Security

This thesis aims to add to this body through the lens of the conceptual framework which uses a Post Copenhagen model of securitisation set out by Croft, to examine the public output of the three organisations. Ontological security focuses on the relationship between narrative and security and is achieved through the creation of a series of relationships performed through everyday routines and practices. Croft uses ontological security and Post Copenhagen theory to explore the insecuritisation of British Muslims post-July 7th, 2005. Central to the idea of ontological security, is biographical continuity and here Croft builds on Giddens work and argues that “ontological security is brought when humans are able to trust that they can bracket off all sorts of possibilities; that they can, therefore, rely on a social normality, a predictability, which then structures their practical everyday interactions as natural, normal and commonsensical” (Croft, 2012b, p. 227). This biographical continuity works only if it is robust and able to withstand significant changes and is dependent on the reliability of those narratives to create a sense of
ontological security. Key to Crofts’ claims that ontological security as a means of how collective identities are developed and might come into conflict with each other is the concept of securitisation – where security is understood through the term through which dominant power can decide who should be protected and who should be feared. He does this by using a relaxed version of the Copenhagen School, which examines speech act as means of securitisation. That is by taking issues out of the realms of every day and repositioning this as a security issue. Croft’s use of the Post Copenhagen model includes both visual images and expands on how governments can carry out securitising acts.

In the case of British Muslims post-July 7th, the policies which were introduced as part of Labour and consequent government’s policies affected the identity of British Muslims. Croft argued that Tony Blair’s speech given shortly after the bombings with its emphasis on universal values interrupted a sense of biographical continuity for British Muslims. Additionally, the setting out of British Muslims as a radical/oriental other resulted in the promotion of some groups and schools of thought as a model for ‘moderate Islam’. While Croft’s work examines how British Muslims are regarded as the ‘other’ by both the state and broader elites, this thesis will explore how securitisation at the subaltern level within British Muslim communities positioned the groups as the elite. It will further address issues of Muslim identity, to see how the groups were impacted to securitising processes and the way these were mirrored to create a hierarchal other within.

1.2 Double Securitisation

This thesis aims to make several contributions to the literature on British Muslims through both its theoretical framework and its empirical analysis. It does so firstly through a review of the public discourse of the three groups, the Muslim Council of Britain, Hizb-ut- Tahrir and the Quilliam Foundation between 2005 and 2013. Kettell writes that "a public discourse of religion is necessarily based on a mutually shared interpretation of the main problems and challenges that such objectives face, as well as the most appropriate and effective method of dealing with them"
Public discourse thus comprises a range of arguments that serve to provide a narrative of a group and to examine how these groups deploy these to seek a more significant role in public life or to influence debates. Tollefsen states that these "are not simply issues of policy to be 'solved' by appeals to prudence, or efficiency, or pragmatism. Rather they are issues calling for public principles, the sort of principles whose recognition shapes a people's moral character (Tollefson, 2009)." Analysis of religion in political science remains limited, in particular, studies looking at the role of Muslim groups in the U.K. outside the prism of security studies. This thesis will aim to contribute to this field through a discourse analysis of these groups. It will analyse how the three groups frame and present issues and arguments to shape the context of political debate.

It will secondly contribute to the literature through the application of its conceptual framework to the discursive analysis of the groups through the use of Stuart Croft's post-Copenhagen school theory set out in Securitizing Islam (Croft, 2012b). This allows us to examine the impact that the securitisation process of British Muslim communities, by the government had in the period following the July 7th London bombings. It will first explore how the public discourse of these groups has been impacted by their relationships with the government as a result of the securitisation process. It will secondly use the conceptual framework to examine how multiple models of Muslim identity have emerged as a result of this, albeit based on a Sunni model of Islam.

While there has been work on ontological security within International relations, exploring this from the level of the state, this thesis builds on research which examines ontological security from the level of the individual. Building on Croft's post-Copenhagen model and develops this to show how double securitisation, based on hierarchal othering occurs within the microcosm of the British Muslim community.

### 1.3 Research Questions

While this thesis is concerned with the public discourse of the three British Muslim groups and how they shape their public output to influence policy, the underlying research question is
concerned with constructions of identity and its relationship with the 'Other'. The overarching research question asks, "Is there a mutually constitutive relationship between the British Muslim identity and the insecuritisation of British Muslim communities?". This will be examined through a series of sub research questions.

1) How have changes in U.K. government policy affected the public discourse of these groups?
2) To what extent is the public discourse of these groups affected by their status as a minority group?
3) How does the emergence of discourse about British values in this period impact group identity?
4) Does the rise of a Muslim consciousness reinforce a Sunni orthodoxy?

This thesis will aim to answer these questions through both its empirical framework and the application of the conceptual framework. The public discourse analysis will be based on the public output of the three organisations, the Muslim Council of Britain, Hizb-ut- Tahrir and the Quilliam Foundation within the specified period 2005-2013. This period was selected not only due to the effect that the July 7th London bombings would have on Muslim communities but how this is reflective of a specific Islamist terror threat. Within this period, this was perceived to be Al Qaeda and the influence that Saudi Wahhabism had on the movement. This thesis will use discourse theory as part of its analytical framework and as such focus was given to print interviews and press releases. Through the use of critical discourse theory, the thesis analyses these using five broad areas identified through a reading of the press releases. These are; the war on terror, foreign affairs, Islamophobia, public engagement and religious engagement. Using critical discourse theory allows us to analyse how the groups attempt to influence the discourse of and about British Muslim communities. In the category of foreign affairs, the organisations focus on events which impacted Muslim communities. The ongoing Israel –Palestine conflict featured prominently within the press releases in this category for all three organisations. This
thesis shows that though the organisations focus on foreign affairs reflects a global Sunni orthodoxy; it does not reflect the ethnoreligious composition of British Muslim communities.

In addition to the public output of the organisations, the emphasis was also given to the speech made by Tony Blair on August 5th, 2005 (Blair, 2005), which Croft argues positions Muslim communities in the U.K. as a separate community (Croft, 2012). The conceptual framework is then applied to answer the latter two of the four sub-research questions which focus on the construct of Britishness and the dominance of Sunni orthodoxy within British Muslim communities. Using Croft’s Post Copenhagen framework, this thesis will first examine how the securitisation process has affected the public discourse of the three organisations and how they respond to changes in legislation and media (re)securitisation. It will further use the framework to examine insecuritization within the microcosm of British Muslim communities and explore how this has led to a hierarchal framing of the relationship between the organisation and different Muslim communities.

1.4 Key Findings

In seeking to answer the central research question, the sub research questions outlined in the previous section help us to examine whether there is a mutually constitutive relationship between insecuritization and Muslim identity. Several key findings emerged throughout this thesis which will be briefly outlined here.

In the first instance, this thesis is about the public discourse of the groups. One of the principal areas of focus for all three groups was the war on terror, and here the groups attempt to shape the debate in this area and the impact that this has on Muslim citizens. This is evident in the group’s focus on the legislation introduced, such as the proposed extension to the pre detention period (King, 2005). Further emphasis was given to the impact of (re)securitisation, as the groups sought to negate coverage which presented Islam as the other and shape the conversations and perceptions of Muslims in the U.K. There were also attempts to influence the broader political discourse through issues such as civil marriage. Here we see the MCB working with the Church of
England to influence the legal definition of marriage. The groups further sought to influence the government’s policies on foreign affairs, particularly where this focused on Muslim countries. We can see this within the period of this thesis, with commentary on events in Palestine and Libya.

The group’s ability to shape the debate within this period was further influenced by their relationship with the state. These differed amongst each group and impacted the framing of their discourse. This can also be seen as an example of the multiple voices of the British Muslim community. In the case of Hizb-ut-Tahrir, who the government attempted to proscribe following the July 7th bombings, this would lead to a deletion of all previous public output. Its discourse in this period emphasises their non-violent ideology as they worked with different groups to oppose the proposed ban. For the MCB, its discursive strategy on events such as the National Holocaust Memorial Day, combined with its opposition to the Iraq War, would see its relationship with the government wane. Of the three groups, the public discourse of the Quilliam Foundation can be seen to be symbiotic with the state. Within this period, we see the Quilliam Foundation, who received initial funding from the government, echo some of the government’s legislation. Chapter 5 highlights the synergies between the organisation’s discourse and the Prevent strategy. We further see that the proximity of the Quilliam Foundation to the state has allowed them to shape the broader political context which can be seen in the example of Maajid Nawaz’s influence on David Cameron’s ‘end of multiculturalism’ speech.

This thesis also focuses on the way that the construct of Britishness has created multiple identities within the British Muslim community based on their position as radical, or oriental other. This was a continuation of the good Muslim, bad Muslim conversation that had emerged post-September 11th, and which linked the ‘radical’ to Islamist groups and conservative schools of Islam such as Wahhabism. By focusing on the historical relationship between Muslims and the U.K., we can see those perceptions of the Islamic/Muslim other have their roots in the British Empire with this era laying down the foundations for modern-day Islamophobia, built on the fear of the Muslim other. Thus, by applying Croft’s conceptual framework to the public discourse of
these groups, we can then see how the groups construct their identity in relation to emerging debates about ‘British values’. The identity of the groups can further be linked to the schools of Islam that the organisations identify with, with the government favouring schools of thought which they believe to be more compatible with British values.

An example of this will be explored in Chapter 9 with the establishment of the government-backed Sufi Council. This thesis will show that in attempting to promote a model of moderate Islam, the government casts conservative schools of thought, i.e. the Deobandi movement as a radical other. Thus, the identity of these groups is impacted first, through their relationships with the state and second, through the positioning of different Islamic schools of thought as radical/moderate.

Finally, this thesis turns its attention to how the Sunni orthodoxy is reinforced through the group’s public discourse. While the literature review will focus on the body of work which shows how commonwealth migration resulted in Pakistani Muslims being the largest ethnoreligious group, this is also reflected in the public output of the three groups which focus on Sunni schools of thought. This orthodoxy is further reinforced in the silences of the output of the organisations which often excludes minority Muslim communities such as the Shia community and those of Afro Caribbean descent. By building its own set of values based on their Sunni identity, the groups create a double insecuritisation based on a hierarchical other.

1.5 Chapter Overview

This thesis will be split into five different empirical chapters. The first of these will examine the historical construction of the Muslim/Islamic other, leading up to the July 7th London Bombings. Within this chapter, this will explore how the changing narratives surrounding British Muslim communities have impacted their ontological security. This chapter will set out the conceptual framework that underpins this theory by setting out Croft’s Post Copenhagen theory. The focus will be given to how Croft sets out the role of biographical markers and the role that such
identities play in establishing a sense of ontological security for individuals. This chapter will follow Kundnani’s work in analysing the historical construction of the Muslim other by using the British Empire as a starting point and the way provides the foundation for modern-day Islamophobia. It further analyses how, through its relationship with the empire, the South Asian cultural and theological model of Islam came to be associated with the British Muslim community. Thus chapter 5 will explore the dominance of the Pakistani Muslim culture and Sunni schools of thoughts in the literature. Chapter 5, ‘Creating a Suspect community’, will further examine the emerging political voice of the British Muslim community, by examining the events surrounding the publication of The Satanic Verses and the subsequent protests. The latter sections of this chapter analyse the changing discourse of the state encompassing the British Muslim communities from race to religion, by examining multiculturalism as a prelude to the mutually constitutive relationship between the insecuritization of British Muslims and identity. Using Barker’s theory of new racism, we can analyse how the accommodation of differences championed by multiculturalism, also lead to questions being asked about the construct of Britishness. Finally, this chapter sets the scene for the discursive analysis of the next three empirical chapters by analysing the securitisation process set into motion by Tony Blair’s speech.

Chapter 6 will look at the Muslim Council of Britain who Modood writes have come to “be accepted as a, if not the voice of Muslims by the government and other bodies” (Modood, 2011). The MCB is the only one of our organisations who has discourse available before the July 7th bombings. This chapter will examine the historical relationship with the government, focusing on its waning relationship with the government following the Iraq war. While the war on terror continued to be one of the MCB’s most significant areas of focus, and this chapter shows that the MCB’s output in the areas sought to combat the securitisation of the British Muslim community and the reproduction of this narrative in the media. We see this in two spheres; firstly, the MCB sought to oppose some of the proposed legislation such as an extension to the pre-detention period. Secondly, within this period, the MCB released several press releases pertaining to how
the British Muslim community were portrayed both within popular and factual media. The chapter will also show how the MCB have sought to resist securitisation and the construct of the Muslim community as a radical other, through religious engagement and political discourse. This chapter will further show how the MCB sought to create a new basis for ontological security for British Muslims, by showing that the values of the British Muslim communities were not separate to but were British values. Finally, this chapter explores the dual role that the MCB has within the community. Firstly, as an organisation with over 500 affiliates as a gatekeeper, and secondly how positioned them as an elite within British Muslim communities.

Chapter 7, ‘The Quilliam Foundation: Hiding in Plain Sight’ analyses the Quilliam Foundation’s discursive strategy through the lens of their relationship to the government and the organisation’s role as a counter-extremism think tank. The only of our organisations to have been set up after the July 7th London bombings, this chapter examines how the Quilliam Foundation co-opts the securitisation process. The chapter examines the organisation’s key aims to fight counter extremism by challenging Islamism. It, therefore, starts with an analysis of how the Quilliam Foundation views Islamism, and the factors it believes can lead to individuals joining radical groups. This chapter shows that through this model, a synergy emerges with the Quilliam Foundation’s discursive strategy and the government’s securitisation process. The chapter further demonstrates that the Quilliam Foundation’s relationship to the government positions them as both an elite within the British Muslim community and within the broader political elite. The organisation’s aim focuses on promoting a pluralist model of Islam, with these further establishing synergies between the Quilliam Foundation’s and the government’s aims. For the Quilliam Foundation, as with the MCB, the war on terror both within the international and domestic sphere were the major areas of focus. This chapter further interrogates Sabir and Miller’s claims that the Quilliam Foundation “is arguably an attempt by government to use an ostensibly unofficial think-tank to engage with the Muslim community in a bid to win influence” (Miller & Sabir, 2012, p. 26). It does this by focusing on the Prevent legislation. Within the sphere of Foreign Affairs, this chapter examines how we see echoes of the securitisation process in its
discourse and through the Quilliam Foundation's work in Pakistan, where it set up a sister organisation, Khadi. This chapter further focuses on the Foundation's religious engagement and how it campaigned for a reform in Islam to allow it to be compatible with British values.

Chapter 6 examines Hizb-ut-Tahrir's discursive strategy within this period. The chapter begins by examining the roots of the organisation globally and its aim of creating political unity amongst the Muslim ummah through the restoration of a caliphate state. This call for a caliphate based governing systems underpins much of its public discourse in this period. While the organisation has been established in the U.K. since the 1980s, it deleted all its prior public output before the July 7th bombings as a “considered response to the legitimate proposition that people who read it out of its context might see it as offensive”. As with the other two organisations featured within this thesis, the War on Terror forms the principal area of focus for the organisation. Many of its early press releases in this period focused on their opposition to the government’s proposed proscription of them. As part of its role as a transnational organisation, the organisation’s focus on foreign affairs, and the international war on terror, was centred on countries where the organisation has a presence. The chapter focuses on the organisation’s discourse on Pakistan as an example of this. In Pakistan, where the organisation was banned, the organisation accused the government of colluding with the colonial powers of the U.S. and U.K. This, the chapter will show is indicative of much of its discourse on foreign affairs. It additionally provided a blueprint for running Pakistan based on its aims for a state based on a Caliphate model. Finally, this chapter focuses on the way that Hizb-ut- Tahrir, rather than oppose its status as an ‘other’ has accepted this and used how it has been (in) securitised to create a new basis of ontological security for the organisation based on its resistance not only to the securitisation process, buts its call for a Caliphate state. This caliphate state forms not only part of Hizb-ut-Tahrir’s new identity, the idea also provides a new conception of home, and new trust structures which used Islam a vector.

The final chapter in this thesis, Colonial Hangover, examines the idea that a moderate model of Islam, can only occur through the creation of an internal hierarchal other within the Muslim community, resulting in a double securitisation for some British Muslims. The chapter starts with
the proposition that the relationships that three organisations have had with the broader elite, can be viewed as a microcosm for the British Muslim community. It argues that there has been a transformation of the British Muslim community with the arrival of new migrant communities, and contestations in religious identities. The chapter will further show that some Muslim communities are ‘othered’ twice, firstly through the overall securitisation process and secondly through the construction of a new securitised Muslim identity which others these groups through the silences of their discourses. This chapter then examines how through the construction of a British Muslim community, which is reliant on the group’s relationship with ‘Britishness’ allows us to view British Muslim identity and the insecuritisation of British Muslims as a mutually constitutive relationship. Through this construction of an ‘imagined’ British Muslim community, we can see the way the groups attempt to define moderate Islam in the U.K., and the way a mainstream Muslim community is constructed. This chapter will further use Croft’s Post Copenhagen model, to identify a set of British Muslim values which have emerged in reaction to the construction of British values in this period.
2. Literature Review

"Sceptics and cynics alike have said that the quest for the moderate Muslim in the 21st century is akin to the search for the Holy Grail (Anwar, 2010)"

Studies within political science focusing on religion remain limited, with only 3% of articles in political science journals analysing religion as a topic within its own right (Kettell, 2012). Kettell states: "Where political science publications have engaged with religious issues, these articles have also focused on a limited number of subject areas and have been concentrated in specific disciplinary subfields" (Kettell, 2012). That literature which has analysed the effects of religious discourse on public policy in the U.K. has primarily focused on Christianity and its discursive strategy on issues (typically of public policy) where it appears to stand in opposition to secular thought such as abortion and embryology research. This has included work by Patricia Jung, Hoffman and Johnson on attitudes towards abortion in Christian communities (Jung, 1998) (Hoffmann & Mills Johnson, 2005). Kettell further writes on the debates surrounding the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill (Kettell, 2009).

The 2011 census figures on religion revealed that 2.6% of the population identifies as Muslim. 60% of these are British born. Muslims are thus, the largest minority group in Britain. In recent years, focus on British Muslim communities within both academic and media discourse has shifted from viewing Muslims as part of ethnic groups to a separate religious group. Abbas states that the focus on minority communities within the U.K. changed from race and ethnicity to "religion in the present climate, with Islam having the most exposure" (Abbas, 2011). The growing political voice of Muslim communities in the U.K. emerged through events such as the publication of Salman Rushdie's Satanic Verses and subsequent protests by members of the Muslim community in Bradford.

Further focus emerged after the September 11th, 2001 terror attacks in the USA and the subsequent military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. Focus on British Muslims intensified
following the July 7th London bombings in 2005. Rehman wrote that: “The July 7th London Bombings in London has also invigorated the debate on multiculturalism in Britain, with a considerable focus on the position, role and perceptions of Muslim minorities (Rehman, 2007).” The existing literature thus reflects these changes and this chapter will review the changing discourse of British Muslim communities in the U.K.

Traditionally, the literature on British Muslim communities has been the preserve of anthropologist and sociologists. This body of work examines the history of Muslim communities in the U.K., the growth in migration following World War 2 and centres on issues of immigration and multiculturalism. Research from within the political sciences has further focused on how British Muslim communities can be framed as the ‘Other’ as the research has sought to examine the impact of the growing Islamist terrorist threat on both the international and domestic spheres.

This chapter is not an exhaustive review of all the literature on British Muslim communities. It focuses on those areas which relate to the role of Muslims in the U.K. as a ‘minority community’ highlighting the changing discourse surrounding British Muslim communities. While the work of sociologist writing on Islam will be explored in the thematic review that follows, the work of anthropologist on Islam has sought to examine the different values attached to Islamic concepts. In "Knowing one another’, Wyn Davies researches different Islamic concepts and seeks to produce alternative categories more akin to traditional anthropology. In his book "A New Anthropology of Islam", Bowen looks at differences in Muslim practices among countries such as Indonesia and Pakistan, exploring the cultural impact on these practices (Bowen, 2012). Thus, anthropology provides a useful tool for analysing the Islamic concepts and practices in different communities.

The review begins by firstly providing a brief overview of the study of Islam in political science, the field in which this thesis sits. It will then use a thematic approach to analyse the existing literature on British Muslim communities. Firstly, it will engage with the changing view of Muslims in the U.K. to being viewed from the prism of race and then religion. It will then look at
how some British Muslims are framed as the other, particularly within the context to the war on terror. This section will also engage with the literature which examines state responses to the war on terror, focusing on the research which looks at the impact of legislative interventions such as Prevent and the research on suspect communities. Finally, this review will focus on that literature which examines Muslim organisations in the U.K., particularly those with a political focus.

2.1 From Race to Religion

Following Abbas’s assertion that academic focus had changed from viewing British Muslims as part of an ethnic group to a religious group, this section focuses on that literature which examines the evolving discourse. This section begins with an overview of that work which viewed race and ethnicity as central to its discussion. This work provides an understanding of how the research further sets the tone for how South Asian Muslims in particular, those from Pakistan, and the South Asian model of Sunni Islam came to be used as a synonym for the overall Muslim population in the U.K. in academic research. The literature within this area uses sociological markers such as housing, employment, and education to understand the conditions in which British Muslim communities formed and to understand how in particular, the political voice and identity of the South Asian Muslim communities emerged.

One of the central themes of the literature is the focus on the historical context of the relationship between British Muslim communities and the state. Thus, much of the analysis inevitably begins with the increase in immigration of Muslims from commonwealth countries. Post-world war two, saw Britain look to citizens from former colonies such as Pakistan and India to fill the labour demand, which was occurring in the declining industrial cities of England. Abbas states that “Factors such as British labour market needs, dispersion from the country of origin and family
reunification have been the main propellants for much of the Muslim migration to Britain and similarly in other western European nations” (Abbas, 2011, p. 44).

The introduction of the Commonwealth Immigration Act in 1968, reduced the rights of citizens of commonwealth nations, by only allowing freedom of entry to those with at least one parent or grandparent born in Britain. The act was symbolic of the racialised way in which immigration and the right to citizenship were regarded in the U.K. The Act was introduced as a reaction to the possibility of an exodus of Asians from Kenya; the emergency legislation ended the rights of Asians commonwealth citizens but not white settlers from East Africa. A growing Muslim student body saw a second wave of immigration from Muslim countries such as Iran, Iraq and Malaysia in the 1960s and 1970s. The next sections will explore how academic writing on Muslim communities continued to focus on the South Asian Muslim community.

Despite these changing immigration patterns, in ‘Changing Ethnic Identities’, Modood et al. look at race relations in the U.K. (Modood, 1994a). The book was a comparative study of South Asian and Caribbean’s communities in Birmingham and London “which sought to challenge those who think of those terms British – Alien or Black White” (Modood, 1994a). The book focused on minority ethnic and religious assertiveness within these communities, focusing on Pakistani Muslims as one if its ethnoreligious groups. The authors argued that a new form of Britishness was required which would allow “minorities to make a claim upon it and be accepted without having to conform to a narrow cultural norm” (Modood, 1994a).

Examining the conditions in which Asian Muslims found themselves, Abbas writes “Asian Muslim immigrants were placed at the bottom of the labour market, disdained by the host society, and systematically ethnicised and racialised in the sphere of capitalist accumulation” (Abbas, 2005, p. 9). These “were more likely to be living in the most inferior housing stock, possess the poorest health and underachieve in the labour market” (Abbas, 2005, p. 9).

Mohammed Sedden and Parveen Akhter further built on the work by Abbas on examining the socio-economic conditions of the South Asian Muslim community (Sedden, 2004; Akhter, 2013).
Their research shows that this community tended to live in areas exemplified by inferior housing, low academic achievements and higher rates of unemployment. Akhter's work focuses on the Pakistani Muslim community in Birmingham and examines the influence of Pakistani kinship networks known as Biraderi.

Akhter's work examines the social conditions in which these networks emerged and further analyses the gendered aspect of both policy and the Biraderi system itself. Akhter's analysis demonstrates that South Asian Muslim women form the smallest proportion of women engaged in regular economic activity, a statistic mirrored in the male group. Akhter states “Pakistani women lacked visibility in the public sphere and as such a number of stereotypes emerged around them. In policy discourse, they were seen primarily as dependents of male migrants” (Akhter, 2013, p. 46). Their role in the labour market was mostly limited to working from home as machinists, or in packaging. There remains a limited focus on Muslim women within the literature in examining the impact of socio-economic conditions on this group. The effect of the kinship networks and socio-economic activities on an emerging Muslim identity is discussed in the next section.

2.1.2 Identity

Focusing on identity, in ‘Religion, Politics and Identity’, Lewis writes that "Muslim communities in the U.K. have been very successful in reproducing much of their traditional and social-cultural world" (Lewis, 2002, p. 18). He further states that the chain migration in this period allowed for village and kin networks to be reproduced in Britain. He argues that within the "Muslim community, “identity is constantly renewed and revitalised by ongoing links with South Asia focused on modern communications” (Lewis, 2002, p. 19) Werbner further addresses this changing discourses in "Imagined Diaspora among Manchester Muslims". The book examines the Muslim community in Manchester, which consist of a large Pakistani community, which while retaining strong links to Pakistan, has also redefined itself as part of the Muslim diaspora.
Werbner writes “To invent a Muslim diaspora against the grain has entailed a refocusing on the Islamic peripheries – on Muslim communities often persecuted and displaced (Werbner, 2002).

For Muslims living in economically stagnant conditions, Abbas further argues that it is common for individuals to look for a collective identity which enables them to improve their conditions (Abbas, 2011). He further suggests that Islam can provide a vector against people's social conditioning, offering alternate methods of social or political actions. Islam is appealing to individuals because it provides a structure of individual lives at a time when they feel their life chances are determined wholly by external forces over which they have no control. Abbas’s writing can also be viewed within the lens of ontological security. Ontological security occurs when people can trust that they can bracket all sorts of possibilities in their everyday life. Abbas’ work can be read to suggest that Islam can be used as a vector against situations which can cause anxiety or fear, which can threaten ontological security. The relationship between ontological security and religion will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.

Sedden builds on this growing use of Islam as a vector in in 'British Muslims between Assimilation and Segregation (Sedden, 2004). His book examines the generational changes in the way British Muslims define their identity. In 'British Muslims between Assimilation and Segregation, he makes two distinct observations (Sedden, 2004). Firstly, second and third-generation British Muslims have multiple identities which move from their parents specific ethnic and cultural origins. These identities incorporate a broader feeling of being British. Seddon argues that this signifies them beyond a mere singular political definition. Secondly, Seddon states that there is an intensified sense of religiosity amongst a large number of young British Muslims. This new religious identity merged with a new sense of Britishness and is removed from the localised and more traditional forms of expression manifest by their migrant parents. As the typology on Islam in the language increases, young Muslims feel able to interpret and express their sense of religion within the cultural context of their new identities and environment.
Thus in examining the socio-economic conditions in which British Muslims communities emerged, the literature charts the emergence of religion, as opposed to race as the lens to explore these communities. These, however, still focus on the whole on the South Asian and in particular the Muslim community. The next section will examine the change in academic and policy analysis from race to religion by analysing multiculturalism.

2.2 Multiculturalism

While the study of multiculturalism within the social sciences can be traced back to the 1960s, events such as Salman Rushdie affair and the events of September 11th, 2001, saw focus within this field shift from issues of race to Muslim identity and integration. This section will focus on two sets of academic literature. First, it will begin with an overview of the literature on multiculturalism. Secondly, it will review the research which focuses on the relationship between Muslim identity and multiculturalism. Finally, it will examine the impact the September 11th, 2001 terror attacks had on this relationship.

The 1990s saw a shift in the political discourse of South Asian communities as they sought to create an identity away from the political blackness of earlier decades. Political blackness had emerged from the U.S. as an ideology to counter racism, with the term black often used to denote both the African Caribbean and largely south Asian communities. Modood argued that ‘colour’ alone was too narrow a definition for finding accommodation. He stated that: “An emphasis on discrimination against ‘black’ people systematically obscures the cultural antipathy to Asians (and, no doubt, others) how Asian cultures and religions have been racialised, and the elements of discrimination that Asians (and others) suffer” (Modood, 2006, p. 67). Modood further argued that a division based on black/white was complicated by issues of cultural racism and Islamophobia.

In their review of multiculturalism in Britain, Ashcroft and Bevir describe multiculturalism in Britain as multifaceted. They write: "It is implicated in a wide range of contemporary debates, including those over modes of dress, language policy, race relations, religious freedom, education
policy, court procedure and immigration” (Ashcroft & Bevir, 2018, p. 2). While it encompasses several issues, they identify some key themes which show how “the presence of members of a minority group presents a challenge to the understandings and practices of a previously dominant group” (Ashcroft & Bevir, 2018, p. 3). This can be viewed within the lens of ontological security, as the minority group challenge the everyday routines and practices which contribute to the individuals’ sense of security. Multiculturalism is further linked to the idea that minority communities should be given rights which protect their distinct characteristics. These rights can be around religious symbols or languages. The multicultural policy thus became entangled in costs and benefits, and specific funds were sought for community groups.

The 1990s would then, continue the advancement of the multicultural politics of the 1980s, which had begun the implementation of equal rights for minority groups and introductions of policies which outlawed discrimination. Graham Levey focuses on the critical authors within this period; Tariq Modood, Nasar Meer and Varun Oberoi referring to these as the “Bristol School of Multiculturalism.” He argues that multicultural political theories “are a response to the presence and claim-making of cultural communities […]. They begin from a set of principles or values and then determine what kind of minority cultural rights or accommodation follow” (Levey, 2019, p. 204).

He identifies several fundamental principles which define the school and which form the groundwork for much of the work in this area. They begin with the premise that “minorities need and have every right to be assertive of their cultural interests and that multiculturalism, rightly conceived, establishes a politics and political order that are suitably responsive in kind” (Levey, 2019, p. 206). Some of the key principles on which the 1990’s multicultural model are based are summarised below:

---

1 In the Crisis of Multiculturalism in Europe, Rita Chin provides a detailed account of the history of multiculturalism from its roots in the US in the 1940’s to the popularity of the term in the social sciences in the 1960’s and its growth as policy in the 1980’s and 1990’s. (Chin, 2017)
1) A notion of equality which took into account distinctions based on background differences: For example, the right of Sikhs to wear turbans in activities from which they may have been previously precluded, i.e. the right to wear a turban while riding a motorbike. There is a recognition that equal treatment did not necessarily mean an equitable outcome. Different groups should be able to organise according to their interests. For example, all Muslims should not have to follow the Muslim majority.

2) Multiculturalism should include religious groups. This principle was particularly important for groups who faced a double exclusion in both race and religion.

3) The importance of belonging in society: This is particularly relevant in the case of British Muslim communities. While in principle, the communities have access to equal opportunities and protection under the law, this does not necessarily equate social acceptance. Levey states “All formal, liberal rights-based versions of multiculturalism are subject to this limitation” (Levey, 2019, p. 209).

Nasar Meer examines the impact that multiculturalism has had on Muslim identity and examines this through the lens of citizenship. Meer analysed the subjective nature of multicultural policies and argued that these underemphasised the support that Muslim communities needed to fulfil “the greatest challenge facing British multiculturalism, i.e. the inclusion of Muslim ‘groupings’ and accommodations of Muslim claim makings” (Meer, 2010, p. 30). Meer suggests that instead ‘Muslim consciousness’ has risen in contrast to the universal cultural values of New Labour’s multiculturalism. This resulted in Muslims in the U.K. looking to build a distinct social group with Muslim values based on religion as opposed to race. He bases this rise of Muslim consciousness on Mandaville’s concept of universal Islam, which identifies more with a global ummah\(^2\) as opposed to one centred on their ethnoreligious identities. This idea of a universal Islam sees a

\(^2\)Mandaville contends that arguments about authority and authenticity in Islam have resulted in the emergence of a community which “can be seen to possess a form of interstitial identity which fully participates neither in the politics of the majority non-Muslim society nor in the politics of the country of origin” (Mandaville, 2001, p. 3).
search for a religious identity which transcends the localised versions of Islam that were
practised and recreated by first-generation Muslims. “This ‘village Islam’ as many saw it, was
mired in a past that had little relevance to the challenges of daily life in twentieth-century
globalising Britain.” (Mandaville, 2010, p. 145)

This section has set out the changing lens through which Muslim communities were viewed from
a lens of race to religion as part of the multicultural model. The next sections will focus on its
impact on Muslim identity under New Labour and the subsequent War on Terror.

2.2.1 Multiculturalism and the War on Terror.

The War on Terror saw questions of state responses to multiculturalism and the accommodation
of Muslim identity now analysed within the context of international security. The rise in an
identity based on religion and its impact on multiculturalism was the subject of Stephen Lyon’s ‘
Shadow of September 11th: Multiculturalism and identity politics., Stephen Lyon uses an
anthropological approach to examine issues of ‘British values’ vs religious identity in his analysis
of multiculturalism and identity politics. He explores Muslim identity through a series of
interviews which focus on the “different approaches by two British Muslims examining ways in
which multiculturalism can be achieved” (Lyon, 2005, p. 78). Lyon uses the interviews to examine
how Muslims can promote “notions of cultural blending and ‘melting’ in the face of a fundamental
difference in the values of post-enlightenment Europeans and revivalist Islamist populations
around the world” (Lyon, 2005). He further argues that post 9/11, the Labour government sought
to introduce a version of multiculturalism which tried to impose a set of values and behaviours
on ethnic minority communities by defining these as universal as opposed to western. This
redefining of values took place within a broader political debate which sought to establish
“constituted acceptable values” (Lyon, 2005, p. 80). Lyon identified an issue with the universal
values of Labour’s multiculturalism project, stating: “The problem inherent in such positions do
not apply to British South Asian Muslims migrants of course: it is dubious whether one can indeed talk of British and American understanding of these values as one and the same thing. These concepts are suspiciously prone to reinterpretation and manipulation within a single culture group" (Lyon, 2005, p. 81)"

The July 7th London Bombings would lead to an increased academic focus on the rise of Islamist ideology in the U.K. and domestic terror groups. Further emphasis was placed on the impact that government legislation introduced in response to the bombings would have on Muslim communities. The literature, which included work by Rehman, Fetzer and Soper and Toby Archer, explored the tensions within state policies which had the dual aim of addressing security concerns raised by the terror attacks, while subsequently seeking to encourage community cohesion from within the British Muslim community (Rehman, 2007; Archer, 2009; Fetzer & Soper, 2003).

Rehman writes of the July 7th bombings in London, that it "invigorated the debate on multiculturalism in Britain, with a considerable focus on the position, role and perceptions of Muslim minorities" (Rehman, 2007). Further emphasis was placed on the ideas of universal values and community cohesion which built upon earlier multicultural initiatives which had emerged post-September 11th, 2001. Within parliament, the government introduced anti-terrorism and anti-radicalisation policies such as PREVENT (developed as part of CONTEST) in 2007 to work with Muslim communities to "isolate, prevent and defeat violent extremism (Home Office, 2001). These policies had a dual purpose, to prevent the rise of homegrown Islamist ideology and to work with Muslim communities in the U.K. to embrace universal values.

Fetzer and Soper further analysed this relationship between the state and Muslim communities in Europe. They argued that in addition to the changing identity and position of Muslims the new legislation also affected "European attitude towards state accommodation of Muslim religious practices" (Fetzer & Soper, 2003, p. 248). This has been demonstrated through several debates on issues seen to be symbolic of Muslim identities, such as the Swiss minaret ban and the French
ban on the wearing of the niqab (Davies, 2010). In addition to new regulations which appeared to limit Muslim practices and symbols, legislation was also introduced, which sought to increase the protection of religious groups. Spalek and Imtoual explore this paradox through Prevent. They write:

Firstly, the implementation of anti-terrorist laws that can be used disproportionately against Muslims leading to the potential for their increased surveillance and control and thereby serving to reduce Muslims’ trust of institutions while secondly at the same time pursuing approaches that acknowledge and stress the importance of the involvement of British Muslim communities in helping to combat extremism (Spalek & Imtoal, 2007, p. 191).

The effectiveness of the dual nature of Britain's anti-terrorism policies has been questioned by Toby Archer and Tariq Modood, respectively. Archer argues that within the U.K., threats to national security had to be weighed up against the rights of its population under a multicultural society. "As a result, rather than just policing and intelligence activities in attempts to stop terrorism, ‘community cohesion’ has become the central frame for mediating state – Muslim relations in the U.K.” (Archer, 2009, p. 330). This view is also supported by Modood in ‘Multiculturalism’, who argued that the success of the policies was limited as they “often concentrated on a few social groups and coupled with mosque leaderships which remain unrepresentative of Muslims” (Modood, 2007a).

Though the research produced in this period focuses on the impact of legislation introduced on multiculturalism and community cohesion, it primarily treats the Muslim community as a single entity. Thus, the effect that the legislation had on the different ethnicities and identities that make up British Muslim communities are not accounted for in the literature. It is to this field that this thesis intends to add, by continuing to examine the construction of the values put forward by the New Labour government and examined how these positioned Muslim communities as a
radical/oriental other. The next section discusses how Muslim communities in the U.K. have been constructed as the other.

2.3 Framing Muslims as the Other

This section seeks to examine the literature which charts how Muslims have been constructed as the other within academic and policy discourse. It firstly explores the research which shows the historical roots of this construction. Secondly, it examines how a moderate-radical Muslim couplet has emerged within both academic and policy, which questions whether there is a contradistinction between facets of Muslim identity and British values. While chapter 5 examines this in further detail, this section reviews that literature which shows how authors have sought to distinguish a differentiation between the ‘radical’ and ‘moderate’ Muslim.

That literature which focuses on Islam in political science can be seen to be reflective of changing attitudes towards Islam. Firstly, as a threat to Christianity and latterly as “a foil for authors who championed Enlightenment principles and virtues” (Esposito, 1999, p. 44). In Sophie Gilliat-Ray’s book, Muslims in Britain: An introduction, she traces an active Muslim community within the U.K. to the early 16th century and the Lascar community (Gilliat-Ray, 2010). Gilliat Ray examines the historical representation of Muslims in the 16th and 17th century as the ‘other’. She argues that early biased translators of the Quran “saw the importance of their work as part of the wider missionary effort to refute Islam and to promote as far as possible the conversions of Muslims to Christianity (Gilliat-Ray, 2010, p. 20).” There remains a limited body of work by authors such as Hilary Carey and Aziz K which examines the relationship between colonial Britain and its Muslim subjects, and the role that this played in constructing Islam as the other (Carey, 2011; Aziz, 1963).

Kundnani further expands on this in The End of Tolerance as he examines the historical roots and the ‘othering’ of Muslims. He writes on the historical relationship between the empire and the

---

3 In his book The Islamic threat, Myth or Reality, Esposito provides the example of Voltaire’s Fanaticism and Mohammed the Prophet. And also that of Ernest Renan who argued that Islam was incompatible with Science.
Islamic world: "The Islamic world of the ‘East’ was demonised by a monstrous realm, needing to be captured by Christendom and transformed according to a God-given mandate" (Kundnani, 2007, p. 11). The empire thus became a lens for the British public to view events in Africa and Asia. Still, the lens also "blocked out the actual experiences of the people living under British rule, thus allowing the demonisation of those same people when they settled in Britain" (Kundnani, 2007, p. 13).

Within the political sciences, this construction of ‘other’ emerged with the different typologies which were used to describe Muslim groups. In their work on Islamist groups, Kepel and Roy focus on the revivalse school and reflect the Orientalist tradition of viewing Islam as the ‘other’, analysing Islam within the socio-political context of the Middle East, North Africa and Pakistan (Kepel, 2002; Roy, 2004). Kepel and Roy explained the growth of Islamist movements and their links to terror groups, arguing that the growth of Islamism was a reaction to changing conditions in recently independent countries. Kepel focused on different groups such as a younger educated demographic and a god-fearing bourgeoisie. He writes: “All these social groups, with their different ambitions and world views, for the space of a generation found in the political ideals of Islamism an echo of their frustrations and a reflection of their hopes and dreams” (Kepel, 2002, p. 57).

2.2.1 Constructing the Other

In Securitizing Islam: Identity and the Search for Security Stuart Croft examines the way that British Muslim communities have been securitised through the construct of the ‘jihadi other’ (Croft, 2012b). His work which will inform the theoretical framework of this thesis uses the construct of Britishness and British values to examine the way some sections of British Muslim communities have been othered. It is thus it is essential to understand the dichotomy that emerged within the literature, which fed into the construction of some Muslims as the radical other and those who were considered as ‘moderate’ and feeding into British values. That literature which focuses on issues of defining moderate Islam encompasses two areas: the
theological and the political. The latter, which is the focus of this review, sits within the social sciences, with authors seeking to distinguish between ‘radical’ and ‘moderate’ forms of Islam. While this thesis does not aim to define the term ‘moderate’ ‘(which has been criticised for being elusive, contentious and politicised), the discourse surrounding British Muslims often seeks to make a distinction between ‘radical’ and ‘moderate’ Islam.

While there has been an increased focus on political Islam, this has been primarily on Islamism. Though the literature in this area makes a distinction between Islam and Islamism, it focuses on Islamism as an ideology and its relationship with Islamic terror movements. Peter Mandaville sets out a typology for examining Islamism by distinguishing between the revivalist and reformist schools of thought (Mandaville, 2007). Summarised briefly, reformist schools of thought seek to integrate modern principles of state and call for an interpretation of the sources which allow for a return to the use of *ijtihad.* A distinction here is made between Sunni schools of thought and different denominations. The *Oxford Encyclopaedia of Islam* states that: “Sunni’s believe *ijtihad* is fallible since more than one interpretation of a legal issue is possible. Islamic reformers call for a revitalisation of *ijtihad* in the modern world”. The revivalist schools (e.g. Wahhabism) call for a literal interpretation of the Quran and hadiths and are associated with conservative movements in Islam. It is these schools of thought which are related to the idea of Islamist movements and the construction of the ‘jihadi other’ in academic discourse.

*Modood and Ahmad* examine issues of defining ‘moderate Islam’, a term which they argue is “a difficult, indeed, controversial term (Modood & Ahmad, 2007, p. 191).” Starting with the fundamental premise that a moderate Muslim is one who supports “anti-terrorism (whether in the name of Islam or otherwise) and [is] opposed to the invocation of Islam in militant political rhetoric” (Modood & Ahmad, 2007, p. 191). In seeking to define the term ‘Moderate Muslim’,

---

4 In Islam there are considered to be four sources of Islamic law: The Quran, the Hadiths (sayings of the prophet) *ijma*, the consensus of opinion and *Qiyas* (analogy).
5 *Ijtihad* is the Islamic legal term for independent reasoning.
Modood and Ahmed begin by viewing this as a relational term, one which only makes sense when considered in contradistinction to radical Islam. To define the term, they propose a typology based on how the participants of their study interpreted Islam. They identified four positions for expressing Muslim identities in Britain. These were traditional Islam, modernist Islam, philosophical Muslim and existential Muslim. The definitions offered by Modood and Ahmed for the first two approaches are reflective of Mandeville's revi\textquoteleft{\textacute{\textipa{\textumlaut{\textrm{val}}}}}l\textacute{\textipa{\textumlaut{\textrm{alist}}}}/reformist dichotomy. Summarising traditional Islam, they state that this represents “reasoning from the faith and first principles but doing so in the way of the traditional 
\textit{ulema} or more likely, in a way not opposed to traditional Islamic learning” (Modood & Ahmad, 2007, p. 194). They define modernist Islam as “reasoning from faith and first principles but doing so in ways that draw upon modernist ideas within an Islamic methodology (\textit{ijtihad})” (Modood & Ahmad, 2007, p. 194). The literature thus argues that moderate Islam is defined by those who wish to move away from literalist interpretations. The use of \textit{ijtihad} in the radical/moderate couplet by the authors can be seen as perpetuating a focus on key, often Sunni Muslim schools of thought.

2.2.2 The Good Muslim

The war on terror resulted in an increased political focus on moderate Islam, producing the emerging ‘good Muslim, bad Muslim’ paradigm. The political discourse on this is highlighted by Mamdani, with: “the political leadership of the anti-terrorist alliance, notably George Bush and Tony Blair [who] speak of the need to distinguish ‘good Muslims from Bad Muslims’” (Mamdani, 2002, p. 766). Mamdani’s argument centres on the fact that discussion of these terms is often viewed within the prism of western culture, and questions how Islamic culture is viewed in “political and therefore cultural terms” (Mamdani, 2002, p. 767). He further discusses the need to trace the constructs of these terms back to colonial projects, viewing cultural projects within the prism of historical and political modes. Mamdani states: “Rather than see contemporary Islamic politics as the outcome of an archaic culture, I suggest we see neither culture nor politics
as archaic, but both as very contemporary conditions, relations and conflicts (Mamdani, 2002, p. 767).”

Sunaina Maira builds on this scholarship by applying a feminist lens to the ‘good Muslim, bad Muslim’ paradigm by analysing the relationship between gender and orientalism. Using case studies from the United States, Maira writes: “In the post 9-11 period, too, notions of assimilability of Muslim women and men are intertwined with gendered discourses of neoliberal citizenship and imperial nationalism that are couched in rhetoric’s of Western modernity, democracy, and the “American way of life (Maira, 2009, p. 632).”

Frans Wijsen further builds upon the ‘radical/normal’ dichotomy in his analysis of Islamic extremism discourse and the struggle to define what can be termed as ‘normal’. He writes of “the struggle between dominant and peripheral voices about what is considered to be ‘decent’ behaviour and ‘civilised’ society, or a struggle to dominate the definition of what is considered to be ‘normal’. (Wijsen, 2013, p. 83).” Here the inference is that it is the dominant power, the state, which defines who is considered to be ‘normal’ and therefore, who belongs to this society.

Sara Silvestri further focuses on the role that states play in attempting to institutionalise ‘moderate Islam’. Her paper focuses on the role that public policy in Europe has emerged in response to increasing visible Islamic movements and symbols of faith. Silvestri argues that this had elicited a reflection “on the implications for Muslim believers and the future of ‘European values’, democracy and secular- driven notions of tolerance and multiculturalism (Silvestri, 2010, p. 46)”. Discussing the role that securitisation has in defining moderate Islam, she argues: “In short, Muslim communities are implicitly expected to adopt and adapt to the existing patterns of relationship between the state, ethnic and religious communities in order to engage with the social and political context of where they live (Silvestri, 2010, p. 49).”
2.4 Muslim Groups

The growth of Muslim communities in the 1960s was linked to a growing Muslim student population, many of them who would stay in the UK. This period also saw the establishments of the first Islamic societies on campus's which reflected the formation of several Islamic movements in the UK. Examples of these included: The UK Islamic Mission (1962), The Muslim Students Society (1962), The Union of Muslim organisations (1970), The Islamic Council of Europe. The focus of these societies was centred on issues of aid and finance. That literature by authors such as Philip Lewis and Tahir Abbas which examines the impact of these societies politically remains limited, with the organisations viewed from a historical vantage point only (Abbas, 2011; Lewis, 2002).

The publication of the Satanic Verses and the subsequent protests saw the emergence of organisations such as the Muslim Parliament of Britain and the UK Action Committee for Islamic Affairs (UKACIA) which was established in 1998 to advocate for the banning of The Satanic Verses. The book was a fictional portrayal of a character which was seen to be based on the Prophet Mohammed (PBUH). The book attracted controversy as the representation was seen as derogatory to the Prophet. Modood argues that the protests resulted in Muslim activists "simplifying the range and political values into a simple oppositional, political Islamism so that the very term 'Muslim' becomes identified with their own political causes (Modood, 1994b, p. 868)." Using Bradford as a case study, Philip Lewis cautioned that the "variety of national Muslim organisations and the avowed sectarian diversity of groups in Bradford (Lewis, 2002, p. 26)", made it challenging to use Islam as a category to define these groups. He continued, "a straight line can be seldom be drawn from Islam to social and political policy (Lewis, 2002, p. 26)." The Satanic Verses affair and its implications for the Muslim community will be analysed further in Chapter 5.
The evolution of Muslim groups can be traced back to the Satanic Verses affair and in particular 1997, when the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) was established. While Philip Lewis examined these from a historical vantage, this section will focus on that academic research which is focused on the engagement of Muslim political groups post-September 11th 2001. This period saw governments seeking to engage more with Muslim communities. Spalek and Lambert write that while community groups have always been as part of active citizenship participating in civil society in matters such as local crime, the post-September 11th 2001 world was framed by anti-terror measures. These “encouraged internal community surveillance so that the responsible Muslim citizen is expected to work with the authorities to help reduce the risk of terrorism” (Spalek & Lambert, 2008, p. 257). Community engagement in this period was, therefore, often linked to counterterrorism policies such as Prevent. We have seen in the previous section that engagement with the Muslim community was based on fostering an idea of a moderate Muslim. Spalek and Lambert write that government policies on community engagement were underpinned by the “broader questions and debates around what sort of Muslim identities should be encouraged in the UK, a form of identity building, and what kind of Muslim identities should be actively discouraged/suppressed” (Spalek & Lambert, 2008, p. 261).

In *Muslims in Western Europe*, Jorgen Nielsen set out three types of organisations. These are: extensions on organisations and movements from the country of origin, those related to government engagement and the final group came from within the community. These were focused on issues such as anti-discrimination (Nielsen, 2004). The three groups which form the basis of this thesis can be seen to reflect these groupings. Hizb-ut-Tahrir is an extension of an international group which has emerged from movements from a country of origin. The Quilliam Foundation can be seen as a group whose activities are related to government engagement, and the MCB were set up in the first instance to focus on achieving more representation for Muslim groups.
Sadek Hamid builds on in his overview of Muslim organisations in the last 50 years. His work focuses on the way that theological concerns and internal diversity have shaped the way Muslim organisations developed. The importance of theological thought, in particular the schools of thought which are associated with different ethnic regions, became a crucial part in how mosques and community organisations developed. Hamid further focuses on the politics of representation, linking this to the multicultural policies pursued by successive governments. He writes; “As faith minorities grew in size the state began to identify the importance of recognising formal relationships that provided the degree of governmental oversight and addressed the challenge of how to integrate faith-based representatives in wider frameworks of governance” (Hamid, 2017, p. 67). The first of these organisations was the MCB who were seen as the main representatives for British Muslim communities under New Labour. This relationship ended due to their stance on the Iraq war and the refusal to attend a Holocaust Memorial Day.

The July 7th bombings saw a change in the way the then Labour government engaged with Muslim community groups, with engagement now framed through a Preventing Violent Extremism lens. This new policy also saw a reflection of the ‘good Muslim’ ideology being transferred to government engagement. Most notable was the endorsement of the Sufi Muslim Council (SMC) in 2006. Hamid writes that the SMC “became noted for its aggressive denunciation of the MCB and enthusiastic endorsement of government claims that Muslim organisations have not done enough to counter violent radicalisation in their communities” (Hamid, 2017, p. 68). Hamid further references the Quilliam Foundation as an example of the government’s attempts to engineer a moderate Islam. The Quilliam Foundation, Hamid states, were “almost universally rejected by British Muslims for its criticism towards mainstream Muslim institutions, government backing and for its proximity to neo-conservative funders in the US” (Hamid, 2017, p. 69).

In her book on Muslim Identity Politics, Khadijah Elshayall examines the growth of Muslim political activism. As with Hamid, Elshayall focuses on the relationship that Muslim groups had with the government after September 11th. While Elshayall uses securitisation to examine the
policies that were introduced after the attacks; her focus remains on the impact that these had on the government’s relationship with groups such as the Muslim Council of Britain.

Elsyhayall sets out the evolving relationship between the MCB and the government. She states that the September 11th terror attacks had sparked an interest in Islam. The MCB, with its media proficiency and access to the government, was able to fulfil this role. “The established and organised channel of communication that both Muslim activists and the government had so long desired seemed to have finally found its calling and come into its own” (Elshayyal, 2019, p. 120).

While the MCB condemned the terror attacks, Elshayyal points to the silences in their public output on the war on Iraq and changed foreign policy. The MCB had to balance attempts from Blair’s government for support against growing opposition from Muslim communities and organisations. The MCB’s eventual decision to publicly oppose the war would then result in the organisation being frozen out of relationships with the government. The government would also learn that it was “important not to ‘put all its eggs in one basket’ by relying solely on the MCB as the official representative of the Muslim community and its channel of communication with it” (Elshayyal, 2019, p. 157). The changing relationship between the government and the three organisations will be further discussed in the respective empirical chapters on them. The thesis aims to add to this field by analysing the way that securitisation impacted the organisations’ public discourse. It will further seek to examine the way the pushing of a ‘good Muslim’ narrative reinforced narratives that have been embedded as a result of the prominence of the Sunni Muslim majority in the country.

This thesis then seeks to build on the work of Elshayyal and Hamid through a study of the public output of the Muslim Council of Britain, the Quilliam Foundation and Hizb-ut Tahrir. It will examine how these groups discourse and identities have changed as a result of new legislation introduced post-July 7th. It aims to show through its analysis, how multiple identities have emerged as a result in opposition to the global Muslim consciousness suggested by the research. As such to reflect these multiple identities, and to address critiques raised within this chapter,
that the discourse has used British Muslim community to denote the South Asian community, this thesis will use the term British Muslim communities to reflect these different identities. The thesis wishes to add to the field of research on British Muslim communities by examining how the organisation’s relationships with the government have been used as a basis for new ontological security.
3. Theoretical Review

The public discourse of religion is essential in understanding the intersection between religion and politics. Kettell argues that "a public discourse of religion is necessarily based on a mutually shared interpretation of the main problems and challenges" faced by the groups that seek to use it (Kettell, 2009, p. 422). As the public discourse of the groups that are the focus of this study (Hizb-ut- Tahrir, Muslim Council of Britain and the Quilliam Foundation) attempts to influence public debates, this theoretical review begins with an analysis of discourse studies. This thesis examines how organisations use their public output to pursue various lines of argument to persuade and gather support, firstly in response to the securitisation that occurred within the timeline of this thesis and secondly in an attempt to create a new sense of ontological security. This chapter will thus firstly examine the work of discourse theorists, focusing on critical discourse analysis. It will then focus on those authors who look at ontological security, beginning with an overview of Anthony Giddens’ work on ontological security. It will then using Stuart Croft’s Securitising Islam (Croft, 2012b) as a route to examine the way that ontological security has been used within the political sciences to discuss events such as the September 11th terror attacks. Finally, this chapter will focus on the relationship between ontological security and securitisation, where issues are moved from the realms of normal politics to that of security.

3.1 Discourse Theory

In 'The Discourse Reader’, Jaworski and Coupland open with quotes from different theorists seeking to define the term discourse and emphasise the interdisciplinary approach that has come to be associated with the term. They state that "it falls squarely within the interests not only of linguists, literary critics, critical theorists and communication scientists, but also of geographers, philosophers, political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists, social psychologists, and many others” (Jawroski & Coupland, 2006, p. 3). This section will take the definition of discourse offered by Christopher Candlin as its starting point: "Discourse[.] refers to language in use, as a process which is socially situated.[.] However, we may go on to discuss the constructive and dynamic role
of either spoken or written discourse in structuring areas of knowledge and the social and institutional practices which are associated with them” (Candlin, 1997, p. ix).

This section will begin with a brief overview of the linguists, whose analysis of language has influenced the theoretical development of discourse theory. The section will then review the work of writers such as Norman Fairclough (Fairclough, 2003) and Teun Van Dijk (Van Dijk, 2003), who seek to analyse the relationship between discourse and ideology. The latter sections of this review will examine critical discourse theory, focusing on the work of Laclau and Mouffe and the Essex School (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001).

3.1.1 Comparative Linguists

In ‘Discourse Analysis: An introduction’ (Paltridge, 2012), Paltridge attributes the first usage of the term discourse analysis to Zellig Harris, who used it to describe the study of speech and writing. Paltridge quotes Harris who states that “connected discourse occurs within a particular situation – whether of a person speaking, or of a conversation, or of someone sitting down occasionally over the period of months to write a particular kind of book in particular literary or scientific tradition” (cited in Paltridge, 2012, p. 2). Paltridge draws from Harris to examine how language is understood in its different social contexts. While the study of discourse analysis emerged within academic circles in the 1970s, the roots of the discipline lie within the work of linguists whose emphasis was on the nuance of language and speech alone. Chilton further acknowledges the influence of linguists on discourse theory. He writes: “Analysing political discourse does not merely address issues concerning either politics or language or the language of politics: it offers practical analysis of actual specimens of political text and talk” (Chilton, 2004, p. xiv). Thus, while political discourse lends itself to different disciplines, it has evident roots in the field of linguists and the analysis of language (including the work of authors such as Ferdinand Saussure, Roman Jakobson, Roland Barthes, Michael Foucault, Charles Levi Strauss and Jacques Lacan).
Criticism of linguistic analysis has come from within the field itself, predominantly on the synchronic approach offered by Saussure, which analyses language at a given point in time. This static approach prevents the reader from viewing language within the context of the changing relationship of words. For this thesis, using the synchronic approach to analyse the public discourse of the organisation in the specified period (2005-2013) would prevent analysis of the different connotations that words can have at different points in time.

The emphasis on the written word and its context can be seen in examples of reactions to the book The Satanic Verses, by Salman Rushdie. In his blog entry, 'The Shadow of the Fatwa', Malik argues that Rushdie's claim that the novel was about the vilayet (the Hindi and Punjabi word for Britain) was rejected by Islamists, who used the written word of the book as the "weapon to be wielded ... in their wars with each other, with secularists and the west" (Malik, 2014). Linguists such as Saussure emphasise language as a separate institution which is dependent on social factors for acknowledging different psychological responses to words. These earlier approaches were divorced from social contexts and did not allow for an analysis of various social responses to either the written or spoken word. This issue was taken up by theorists from CDA. This chapter will now examine the approach of authors within the field of critical discourse analysis, focusing on the work of authors such as Van Dijk and Laclau and Mouffe to establish the framework for the discursive analysis of the public output of the three organisations.

3.1.2 Critical Discourse Theory

Van Dijk describes critical discourse analysis (CDA) as a "type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context" (Van Dijk, 2003, p. 352). He further sets out that CDA must begin with the acknowledgement that it is a value-based approach, stating that "theory formation, description, and explanation [...] are socio-politically

---

7 Saussure departed from earlier linguist by adopting a synchronic approach which analysed language as a given point in order to see rules and patterns. His model of semiotics was built on viewing language as a series of signs.
‘situated’ whether we like it or not” (Van Dijk, 2003, p. 352). Moving on from the emphasis on the textual and spoken analysis of the linguists, CDA focuses more on social problems and political issues. Fairclough and Wodak build on Van Dijk’s work by establishing a set of critical features of CDA (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997). These include seeing power relations as discursive, viewing discourse as not only encompassing society and culture but also as historical.

Underlying the study of CDA are themes of language and power, with critical discourse analysts focusing on both the spoken word and the written text. CDA further departs from linguistic analysis through the inclusion of mediums such as television and cultural artefacts. Those within the field of CDA also emphasise the relationship between ideology and language. Fairclough acknowledges the area’s linguistic roots stating; “In using the term ‘discourse’ I am claiming language use to be imbricated in social relations and processes which systematically determine variations in its properties, including the linguistic forms which appear in texts” (Fairclough, 2013, p. 58). Language is therefore seen as an element of ideology, while ideology also influences language. This idea was further developed through work which looked at language as part of social structures and has been extended by critical discourse analysts to cover different visual art forms, including photography. Fairclough further looks at the concept of power and describes this as conceptualised both in terms of asymmetries between participants in discourse events, and terms of unequal capacity to control how texts are produced, distributed and consumed in particular social contexts.

In setting out his framework for CDA, Van Dijk focuses on the social power of groups and institutions and how they use this power base to control other groups. This concept of social power presumes that those groups with power control the wealth, knowledge, social culture and therefore the public discourse within a given society. Van Dijk additionally discusses the ambiguity surrounding the term political discourse and the difficulty in defining who the main

---

8 Fairclough, like Critical discourse analysts such as McHoul and Grace use Foucault's concepts of power and his notion that language/discourse constructs and regulates social relations and power.
actors in the field are. He writes although politicians are crucial in CDA “as actors and authors of political discourse ... [they] are not the only participants in the domain of politics” (Van Dijk, 1997, p. 12). He further adds that we should include “the various recipients in political communicative events, such as the public, the people, citizens, the ‘masses’, and other groups or categories.” (Van Dijk, 1997, p. 14). He describes this, as "the overall term that categorises complex, long–term sequences of political actions. Governing, legislation, opposition, solidarity, agenda-setting and policies are among the prototypical aspects of such political processes" (Van Dijk, 1997, p. 14).

The use of CDA also allows an analysis of the role of different movements such as feminism and sexual identities within political discourse. Using CDA allows this thesis to include the three groups as part of the political process and to examine their discursive strategy in a socially embedded way.

3.2 The Essex School

While the previous section analysed how the concept of power is used within political discourse, Laclau and Mouffe used Gramsci’s concept of hegemony to develop their socialist strategy. They write;

> If our intellectual project in this book is post-Marxist, it is evidently also post-Marxist. It has been through the development of certain intuitions and discursive forms constituted within Marxism, and the inhibition or elimination of certain others, that we have constructed a concept of hegemony which, in our view, maybe a useful instrument in the struggle for a radical, libertarian and plural democracy (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. xxiv).

Their book develops Gramsci’s theory of hegemony which argues that rather than divide society into the traditional class-based Marxist model, these groups are instead established as part of the discursive political policies. Thus, the hegemonic struggle can now include discourse on issues such as gender and race. This opening of the term hegemony allows Laclau and Mouffe to develop their theory of discourse. They define discourse as; “an attempt to dominate the field of
discursivity, to arrest the flows of difference to construct a centre” (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 112).

3.2.1 Articulation

As part of their theory of discourse, Laclau and Mouffe developed the concept of articulation. This involved “any practise establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice. The structured totality resulting from the articulatory practice, we call discourse” (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 105). Language also continues to form a crucial part of critical discourse in their model. They argue that the language of the crisis cannot be separated from the actual crisis, “as both the extralinguistic and linguistic elements are material and always already have a constituting effect on each other” (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 4).

The theoretical framework provided by Laclau and Mouffe centres on the theme of hegemony, language and articulation. Their work formed the basis of the Essex school, which further developed the theory to include media politics. Dahlberg and Phelan draw upon Laclau and Mouffe’s work to argue that crises can be interpreted as a signifier. Examining the signifier as a material event, they used the Irish financial crisis of 2010 as an example of articulation. They argued that the discourse on the Irish financial crisis was reproduced and contributed to, through the media, government and academic commentary and consequently rearticulated to establish a discourse (Dahlberg & Phelan, 2011).

Thus, to analyse the discourse in the period of this thesis, it becomes not only necessary to view the crisis presented by the July 7th London bombings as a signifier, but also to consider the media’s role in producing and reproducing social occurrences. For Dahlberg and Phelan, the media is a tool to reproduce key ideologies and provide a function to challenge or reinforce cultural hegemony. Providing the example of Fox News and its right-wing leanings, they note that within critical media politics, "ideology can also take place via a countervailing emphasis on, and extension of relations of difference, rather than equivalences to the point that we seem to be left
with a single space of equally recognised differences without an explicit enemy” (Dahlberg & Phelan, 2011, p. 28). Examining signifiers\(^9\) as material events give Dahlberg and Phelan the scope to further move away from both the traditional Gramscian model of hegemony and the model developed by Laclau and Mouffe. Critical media discourse thus allows the reader to see the way certain discourses are rearticulated through the media. Applied alongside the range of discourses highlighted by Van Dijk, it will enable us to examine the political discourses of the three groups of this thesis as both recipients of political communication but also authors of political discourse.

3.3 Ontological Security

The psychologist R.D Laing first used the term ontological security, stating: “A basically ontologically secure person will encounter all the hazards of life, social, ethical, spiritual, biological from a centrally firm sense of his own and other people’s reality and identity” (Laing, 1990, p. 39). Laing set out to describe the ontologically insecure person as “precariously differentiated from the rest of the world so that his identity and autonomy are always in question” (Laing, 1990, p. 42).

Croft writes that for Giddens,

\[\text{Ontological security is brought about when humans are able to trust that they can bracket of all sorts of possibilities; that they can, therefore, rely on a social normality, a predictability, which then structures their practical everyday interactions as natural, normal and commensensical (Croft, 2012b, p. 21).}\]

This section will, therefore, begin by providing an overview of Giddens work on ontological security. Giddens builds on the psychological aspect of ontological security, bringing it into the sociological in Modernity and Identity, where he unpacks central features of ontological

\(^9\) The signifier refers to the expressive dimension of language. Saussure developed by using the word Sign to represent the concept, sound-image relationship and using the terms signified and signifier to replace respectively the individual terms of concept and sound-image. This was the basis of his theory of semiology, “a system of signs that express ideas”.

53
insecurity, dread and anxiety (Giddens, 1991). As with Laing, Giddens describes ontologically secure people as actors who “take for granted existential parameters of their activity that are sustained, but in no way ‘grounded’ by the interactional conventions that they observe” (Giddens, 1991, p. 37). The ontologically secure person is also able to show, “Trust in the existence of the existential anchoring's of reality in an emotional, and to some degree cognitive, sense rests on confidence in the reliability of persons” (Giddens, 1991, p. 38).

Having set out his parameters for the ontologically secure individual, Giddens turns his focus to dread. He writes:

The chaos that threatens on the other side of the ordinariness of everyday conventions can be seen psychologically as dread in Kierkegaard’s sense: the prospect of being overwhelmed by anxieties that reach to the very roots of our coherent sense of ‘being on the world’ (Giddens, 1991, p. 37).

The ontologically secure individual can bracket off this sense of dread through the everyday routines which cause these anxieties “because of their constitutive role in organising an ‘as if’ environment in relation to existential issues” (Giddens, 1991, p. 37). The focus on dread feeds into how the ontologically insecure individual may react to a critical situation. The impact of crisis/critical situations will be examined in the latter part of this section, considering how the September 11th terror attacks impacted ontological security.

Giddens further focuses on the role of anxiety, which he argues has to be “understood in relation to the overall security system the individual develops, rather than the only as a situationally specific phenomenon connected to particular risks or dangers” (Giddens, 1991, p. 43). Giddens distinguishes anxiety from fear which he states occurs in relation to a specific threat. He states that while anxiety constitutes part of “the generalised state of the emotion of the individual” because anxiety lacks a particular object to which to focus on, “we should understand anxiety as an unconsciously organised state of fear” (Giddens, 1991, p. 44). Instead, anxiety is seen as a threat to the security systems of the ontologically secure actor. Here Giddens draws on Harry Stack Sullivan who emphasises that the need for security emerges early in childhood. If the child's
early security system derives from their parent’s approval, then anxiety occurs through the child’s perceived sensing of disapproval. Giddens views anxiety as a cosmic experience “related to the actions of others and to emerging self-esteem. It attacks the core of the Self once a basic security system is set up, which is why is it difficult for the individual to objectify it” (Giddens, 1991, p. 45). Anxiety can thus threaten an individuals’ self-identity, where anxiety obscures the way the individual relates to the ‘object world’ and their sense of security.

Having explored the way in which Giddens developed his writing on ontological security, the next sections within this chapter examine the way the growth of ontological security in International Relations, particularly in the way securitisation becomes a means for the ontologically insecure relies on a discourse of others to reassert a sense of self-identity.

3.3.1 Developing Ontological Security

The literature on ontological security identifies several key papers which were instrumental in the development of the theory within the field of International Relations. These include work by Jef Huysmans, Jennifer Mitzen, Brent Steele and Caterina Kinnvall. A comprehensive review of these works has been outlined in papers by Croft (Croft, 2012a), Rumelili (Rumelili, 2015) and Croft and Vaughan-Williams (Croft & Vaughan-Williams, 2017). While the intention of this section is not to reproduce these, it will focus on those papers which Croft identifies as part of his model: Jeff Huysmans ‘Security! What do you Mean? From Concept to Thick Signifier (Huysmans, 1998) and Kinnvall’s “Globalisation and Religious Nationalism and the Search for Ontological Security (Kinnvall, 2004). These papers further build on the framework of this thesis, with their emphasis on discourse theory and nation and religion, respectively.

Huysmans work begins though an examination of the assumption that if we label an issue as a security question, we can then start to view it within a traditional IR lens. Huysmans asks: “Does labelling migration as a security question organise it in a similar way to military questions” (Huysmans, 1998, p. 228). For Huysmans, security “articulates a particular understanding of our relation to nature, other human beings and self” (Huysmans, 1998, p. 228). Huysmans proposed
moving away from seeing security as a defined concept towards viewing it as a ‘thick signifier’, building on Saussure's work reviewed in the previous section. Huysmans paper allowed for a move away from the conceptual vs definition view of analysing security and enabled the reader to bring in the history and social relations of a situation.

Huysmans further explains that by defining security it "condenses meaning into a statement [...] This act locates the text within a particular research agenda and identifies it by separating it from other understandings of security" (Huysmans, 1998, p. 230). The conceptual analysis approach moves on from this by exploring what characterises the security policy or debate. "Itformulates a common denominator which expresses common conceptual distinctions underlying various conceptions of security" (Huysmans, 1998, p. 231). The thick signifier builds upon the conceptual definition and "brings us to an understanding of how the category ‘security’ articulates a particular way of organising forms of life" (Huysmans, 1998, p. 231). Huysmans’ thick signifier acts as a performative force organising social relations into security relations both relative to itself and other humans into what Huysmans describes as a ‘discursive symbolic order.

For Huysmans, daily security and ontological security are separate. On daily security, Huysmans explores the construction and the management of a threat. He refers to ontological security as a "strategy of managing the limits of reflexivity - death as undetermined – by fixing social relations into a symbolic order and institutional order" (Huysmans, 1998, p. 242). While Huysmans considers ontological security at the level of the state, he examines the ways this is achieved through the function of creating a particular order, He writes

those ‘elements’ which cannot be classified, which are ambivalent, and thus have a capacity to render problematic this ontological function of the state system, have to be eliminated, possibly through enemy construction (Huysmans, 1998, p. 242).

Huysmans views this as an interesting framework for IR to consider issues such as the securitisation of migrants in Europe, and how groups can be presented as ‘disturbing strangers’ or ‘enemies’ who can be perceived as a threat to societal order. Huysmans argues that
International Relations has ignored ontological security in the literature on how states ‘manage’ enemies. He claims that there is a link between daily and ontological security, where daily security “orders social relations - introduces a level of certainty - by objectifying the abstract fear of death through enemy construction” (Huysmans, 1998, p. 243). He further argues that multiple ‘threat’ experiences can “translate into an experience of chaos and Angst” (Huysmans, 1998, p. 243).

Existential angst, Gidden argues, is “in its most profound state, the antithesis of trust” (Giddens, 1990, p. 100). In terms of securitisation, we can see that this angst can form part of anxiety concerning the “existence of other persons” (Giddens, 1991, p. 50). If therefore the state plays a role in creating a societal order, it adopts the ‘caretaker’ role that Giddens argues helps create as “an emotional inoculation against existential anxieties” (Giddens, 1991, p. 39). It allows the ontologically secure person to trust in the state’s capacity against the perceived threat of the refugee, or the other.

Catarina Kinnvall builds on Huysmans work looking at ontological security through the lens of globalisation post-September 11. Kinnvall argues that the destabilising effects of globalisation challenge definitions of who we are and traditional structures which “has engendered the growth of new local identities in response to the effects of the global market” (Kinnvall, 2004, p. 743). She further argues that: “Nationalism and religion are two such causes or ‘identity-signifiers’ that are more likely than any other identity constructions to provide answers to those in need” (Kinnvall, 2004, p. 742). Religion and nationalism are thus able to convey a sense of security and stability.

Kinnvall argues that the state’s decreasing involvement in the economic and welfare state has been undermined in some states, “creating an authority vacuum in which new groups and leaders have emerged as a response to individuals desire for security and welfare” (Kinnvall, 2004, p. 743). She further states: “The extent to which migrants, asylum seekers and refugees are now framed in terms of security threats provides further evidence of the relationship between globalisation and security” (Kinnvall, 2004, p. 744). Kinnvall argues that going back to an imagined past by using reconstructed symbols in response to this is an attempt to recreate a sense
of lost security. Here, security in terms of a collective identity which reaffirms “traditions of who
we are and where we have come from” in response to the securitised identity of these
communities (Kinnvall, 2004, p. 745). It is an attempt to recreate the structures of communities
which had been stabilised by the effects of globalisation. Here Kinnvall quotes Giddens who talks
about how the individual feels bereft as they lose the protective framework of community and
traditions and “lacks the psychological support and the sense of security provided by the more
traditional settings” (Giddens, 1991, p. 33). The attempt to recreate this ‘identity can be seen as a
way of controlling the anxiety that comes from the lost sense of security.

Kinnvall looks at (in)security as a Thick Signifier, stating that by viewing security as a signifier, it
allows us to examine the role of the of the individual and the broader discourse in which it is
placed. As she writes, viewing “security as a thick signifier means unmasking those structural
relations through which security discourses are framed. These structural relations reflect the
division and inequality of power between those involved and affected by the discourse” (Kinnvall,
2004, p. 745). Those who produce the discourse surrounding a situation have the power to
reinforce their readings of a situation. These often position people as the ‘other’ and “into
structures of marginalisation” (Kinnvall, 2004, p. 745). Thus, by analysing security as a thick
signifier, Kinnvall argues that we can examine how structural conditions of insecurity, are linked
to “the emotional significance of identity mobilisation” (Kinnvall, 2004, p. 745).

Kinnvall uses the example of the rise of movements based on identity and nationalism after the
Second World War within emerging Arab countries. The rise of nationalist movements is similar
to the growth of Islamism highlighted in the literature review. Kinnvall draws on work by
Esposito, writing that the growth of nationalist movements has “been framed as a response to a
combined socioeconomic and religious reality for many people who experience the effects of
politics of at home or as exiles” (Kinnvall, 2004, p. 745).

Kinnvall links ontological security to the category of home, claiming that this is something that
“is maintained when home is able to provide a site of constancy in the social and material
environment” (Kinnvall, 2004, p. 747). She builds on this through the idea of homesteading as a means of dealing with homelessness linking this to diaspora communities such as Sikhs in Canada. Homesteading is “making and shaping a political space for oneself in order to surpass the life and contradictions and anxieties of homelessness” (Kinnvall, 2004, p. 747). Focusing on the nation, Kinnvall further provides the example of the rise of Hindu Nationalism as a way of maintaining ontological security.

By using security as a thick signifier, Kinnvall is able to analyse the means with which communities create this new narrative of Self. Kinnvall does this through an analysis of the structural reasons for the insecurity and the emotional response to the resulting ontological insecurity. Kinnvall writes: “As their ontological insecurity increases, they attempt to securitise subjectivity which means an intensified search for one stable identity (regardless of its actual existence)” (Kinnvall, 2004, p. 749). She further states: “Securitising subjectivity, always involves a stranger-other, because the self is not a static object but is part of a larger process of identity construction” (Kinnvall, 2004, p. 749).

Kinnvall uses the process of securitising subjectivity to understand how Hindu nationalism provides ontological security for some Hindu communities. Kinnvall states that "hate becomes the link among the present, the future and the recreated past" (Kinnvall, 2004, p. 755). It is the mythologising of a past event which becomes part of the process of creating new ontological security. The past is reinterpreted as either a ‘chosen trauma’ or a chosen glory. For Hindu nationalists, Babri Masjid is seen as a chosen trauma, “the mental recollection of a calamity that befell a group’s ancestors and includes information, fantasised expectations, intensified feelings and defences against unacceptable thought” (Kinnvall, 2004, p. 755). The Babri Masjid is portrayed by Hindu Nationalists as an example of Mughal and therefore Muslim subjection. Hindu

---

10 The Babri Masjid was a mosque in Ayodhya which was one of the largest mosques in Uttar Pradesh. The mosque has been the site of dispute between Hindu Nationalists and Muslims. Hindu Nationalists believed that the Mughals had destroyed a structure marking the birthplace of Rama, a claim Muslims have denied.
Nationalists have used the destruction of the Babri Masjid as a way of ‘othering’ Muslims in India and part of restoring the Hindu identity of India.

Further prominence is given to nationalism and religion as identity signifiers. Kinnvall links this both to chosen traumas and glories. In the case of Hindu Nationalism, the trauma has been used to call for a Hindu ethnic nation, and this can be seen in the othering of Muslims. They are linked to the Mughal invaders and the destruction of Hindu temples and allows for younger generations of Hindus to identify with past trauma. Kinnvall argues that by turning religious revelations into national shrines, “religious miracles become national feasts, and holy scriptures are reinterpreted as national epics” (Kinnvall, 2004, p. 756). Chosen trauma or glory thus becomes part of a group’s identity and their definition of Self and other. Giddens points to the dual influence of religion, stating that while religious beliefs and practices can “provide a refuge from the tribulations of day-to-day life, they can also, as noted, be an intrinsic source of anxiety and mental apprehension” (Giddens, 1990, p. 107). Here Giddens refers to the work of Erikson on the role that religion plays in trust mechanisms and how it can provide a daily social, natural narrative. He further refers to religion as helping to create a trusted figure to which people can be anchored and sees faith as an “institutional safeguard in organised religion” (Giddens, 1990, p. 103). It is this concept, which is used by Kinnvall, and later Croft, in which the search for ontological security for some communities increases the insecurity of others which forms the basis of the theoretical framework of this thesis.

3.3.1.2 Ontological Security and Conflict

Croft further draws on the work of Eli Zaretsky, who used ontological security to examine the response to the September 11th terror attacks, and as an example of how critical situations can

---

11 Erik Erikson saw Religion as a basic sign of trust. Erikson described trust as being developed in the maternal presence. He described the child’s interaction with its mother as ritualised. It is at this point that Erikson began his work on the life cycle and religious beliefs. Erikson saw religion as providing an ideology which would at different stages in the life cycle to guide people through crisis and help navigate issues around identity.
be disruptive to ontological security. Critical situations are circumstances which radically disrupt accustomed routines of daily life. Giddens describes these as instances that “threaten or destroy the certitudes of institutionalised routines” (Giddens, 1984, p. 62). These situations result in the ontologically secure individual questioning their everyday routines and practices and trust in experts and in the case of the September 11th terror attacks, trust in strangers. Ontological insecurity occurs then when the ‘protective cocoon’ of everyday routines are ruptured. These situations require the state/ontologically secure actor to choose their response. It is these responses which lead to the processes of securitising subjectivity which Kinnvall’s work discusses. Zaretsky states that the sheer randomness of the September 11th terror attacks resulted in:

a transformation of everyday life into a scene of fear and destruction, by the introduction of terror into a vast region that had previously seemed impregnable. The September 11th terror attacks “irrevocably disrupted the ontological level that the nation-state framework had taken for granted” (Zaretsky, 2008, p. 101).

The attacks, he argues, were “an event whose impact does not occur at the level of consciousness and which therefore tears open the fabric of everyday existence in a way that consciously experienced acts do not do” (Zaretsky, 2008, p. 99). His paper examines the way the September 11th terror attacks changed the relationship of trust. We have seen in the previous section how Giddens outlined the importance of trust and how this for the ontologically secure actor “rests on confidence in the reliability of persons” (Giddens, 1991, p. 38).

Zaretsky argues that an increasingly globalised world has seen an increase in the reliance and trust on strangers, away from traditionalist localised societies. He states: “just as the requirement of trust changed, so did the dangers that trust was meant to allay” (Zaretsky, 2008, p. 100). Within the context of America, the strangers were from different cultures. Zaretsky provides an example of Arab oil producers. Threats were taking place, elsewhere, away from the idea of ‘impregnable’ America. The nature of trust had changed. Zaretszky argues that processes that had made progress occur (i.e. labour, trade) had also made it more vulnerable. Thus, the deeper the trust,
the more damage a break in that trust will do. The subsequent securitising processes enacted by
the USA were a response to the threat to the disruption to routines that the attacks had caused.
This next section will examine the development of ontological security in IR, exploring the
relationship between securitisation and ontological security and issues of desecuritisation.

3.4 Securitisation and Ontological Security

In her paper, 'Identity and desecuritisation: the pitfalls of conflating ontological and physical
security', Bahar Rumelili describes securitisation as “political processes, discourses, and practices
entailed in the production of certain issues as security issues: posing imminent threats to survival,
legitimising urgent and extraordinary responses and justifying extraordinary responses and
justifying exceptional politics” (Rumelili, 2015, p. 61). This definition will be the starting point for
the proceeding overview for that literature which further explores the relationship between
ontological security and securitisation within the field of international relations.

Rumelili’s paper reflects the literature on securitisation theory which inevitably traces the area’s
roots to the Copenhagen School and the writings of Ole Weaver and Barry Buzan. The Copenhagen
school will be explored in the proceeding chapter, which examines this in further detail as it
charts Croft’s use of Post Copenhagen theory to analyse how British Muslim communities are
subject to securitising processes. This section then seeks to examine the relationship between
securitisation and ontological security by firstly examining strategies of desecuritisation and the
impact that this can have on ontological anxieties through an examination of Self and other. This
is done through an overview firstly of the work of Bahra Rumelili. Secondly, it will look at the
work by Christopher Browning and Perti Jonenniemi to further examine the relationship between
ontological security and the securitisation of identity.

Desecuritisation then removes “issues out of the emergency mode and into the normal bargaining
process of the political sphere” (Buzan, et al., 1998, p. 4). Rumelili uses desecuritisation as a
means of examining how ontological security can be achieved in the absence of securitisation. She writes: “How does Self move from a securitised to a non-securitised relation with the Other while its very identity depends on its relation to the other?” (Rumelili, 2015, p. 53) Rumelili’s work examines the conditions in which desecuritisation can take place by distinguishing between physical and ontological security. She states that the conflation between “ontological security to constitute a distinct self” and “physical security defined as the freedom of a pre-constituted Self from harm, threat or danger” conflate the way the construction of identity plays a dual role in both enabling and limiting desecuritisation. Thus, Rumelili argues that theories of desecuritisation need to incorporate processes of identity reconstruction and transformation.

Rumelili sets out a matrix which analyses ontological security and physical security as two distinct but interrelated layers. The matrix has a dual purpose; it highlights the link between identity and ontological security and undermines the association between identity and the construction of the other as a threat to physical security. Beginning from the assumption that “actors in international security seek both ontological and physical security” she defines three states of security, “asecurity, insecurity and security, but disaggregate(s) the ontological and physical dimensions” (Rumelili, 2015, p. 58). Physical security occurs when an actor is concerned about an imminent threat/danger but considers themselves adequately protected. Physical insecurity occurs when the actor does not feel adequately protected from an imminent threat. By taking issues out of the realms of security and into normal politics, “we arrive at a state of physical asecurity where the Self does not experience concern about imminent harm, threat or danger” (Rumelili, 2015, p. 58) Rumelili’s table is reproduced below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Physical asecurity</th>
<th>Physical (In)security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ontological insecurity</strong></td>
<td>Self experiences instability and uncertainty of being/does not experience concern about physical harm</td>
<td>Self experiences instability and uncertainty of being/experiences concern about physical harm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontological security</td>
<td>Self experiences stability and certainty of being/ does not experience concern about physical harm</td>
<td>Self experiences stability and certainty of being/ experiences concern about physical harm (Rumelili, 2015, p. 59)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These distinctions highlight two issues, firstly that it is possible to achieve ontological security in a state of physical/aphysical security. Secondly, physical asecurity can be coupled with ontological security/insecurity. Having set out this distinction, Rumeli turns her focus to explore moving from a state of securitisation to desecuritisation. She argues that the two-layered conception of physical security/ontological security allows for the desecuritisation of issues such as minority rights, by ending the reproduction of a minority groups distinctiveness “through the representation of the majority as a threat” (Rumelili, 2015, p. 63). The Self can differentiate from the Other, without constructing the Other as a threat. While desecuritisation can also lead to a state of ontological security, it does by moving issues back into the realms of normal politics and “necessitate that parties recognise each other as legitimate counterparts” (Rumelili, 2015, p. 63).

The two-layered framework further highlights the way the stability of identity can impact desecuritisation processes. The ontologically insecure actor can engage in practices which reestablish identity distinctions to ensure stability, while simultaneously triggering physical insecurity through accentuating perceptions of threats. It is the challenge to the freedom to constitute a distinct self that the insecurity may be compensated through securitisation. “It emerges that the success and sustainability of securitisation/descuritisation processes depend on whether they are able to preserve the ontological security of the actors concerned or construct an altered state of ontological security” (Rumelili, 2015, p. 65).

In their paper “Ontological Security, self-articulation and the securitisation of identity” Browning and Joenniemi critically analyse the presumption that securitisation enhances ontological security, while desecuritisation undermines ontological security. The article sets out that these issues are problematic since securitisation entails shifting subject positions and can, therefore,
also induce anxieties. The article does this by setting out three steps. They begin by arguing that IR accounts of ontological security have been conflated with identity, with identities and selves being presented as interchangeable terms. This then reduces ontological security to issues of identity preservation. They argue that the conflation “is problematic because attempts to reinforce an established identity can actually at times undermine the actor’s sense of ontological security” (Browning & Joenniemi, 2017, p. 32). Drawing from Giddens, they state that while routines are understood in helping create a sense of stability, Giddens makes the distinction that “routinisation and the subsequent aspiration to achieve identity stability can go too far” (Browning & Joenniemi, 2017, p. 35). They argue that what is needed is the ability to cope with change. It is the characteristics of basic trust, which becomes a capacity for reflexivity and allows the individual to move forward and deal with issues of anxiety. Studies in IR have focused on issues where basic trust and reflexivity are absent. The focus on identity has limited “ontological security analysis to instances when singular identities have become manifest and therefore, also rigid and constraining in nature” (Browning & Joenniemi, 2017, p. 36).

Browning and Jonniemi secondly argue that the conflation of Self and identity, reduce ontological security to issues of identity preservation which has resulted in a focus of the securitisation of identity as a means of achieving ontological security. They state that scholars such as Croft have used identity for connecting ontological security to the Copenhagen school’s emphasis on the securitisation processes. Browning and Jonniemi argue that in Securitising Islam, Croft frames British identity and ontological security through the construction of a radical other. The focus on how the securitisation of identity can lead to the securitisation of subjectivity is seen as an example of how “selfhood and subjectivity have been collapsed into the prioritisation of a particular issue” (Browning & Joenniemi, 2017, p. 37). In this process, the creation of a securitised identity is seen as central to ontological security. They argue that the idea that ontological security only matters to actors when it is perceived as lacking is problematic. Ontological security is never secure, and they state “the positioning of self is always potentially fragile and has to be something that has to be continually worked as a part of what Giddens terms the ‘ongoing reflexive project
of the state’” (Browning & Joenniemi, 2017, p. 40). They argue that there is a need for ontological security studies to not only explore issues of closing down of identity but also cases of opening up in order “to understand the ways in which potential ontological securities have been managed without slipping back in radical othering by replacing amorphous anxieties with identifiable objects of fear” (Browning & Joenniemi, 2017, p. 45).

This thesis aims to add to the field of securitisation by looking at everyday securitisation by analysing how, through security processes, ontological security is created as a response to securitisation processes. It will further add to this field of scholarship by viewing these groups as a subaltern elite by using Post Copenhagen theory. It will also examine how these groups as securitised identities, construct new securitisation processes which create a double securitisation. The double securitisation in this thesis refers to the process where the groups recreate the securitising processes within the microcosm of British Muslim communities. This issue is examined in the following chapter, Colonial Hangover, which examines the way the three organisations reproduced the securitisation process.
Chapter 4. Methodology

This thesis sets out to analyse the identity of British Muslim groups between the period 2005-2013. It seeks to examine the way that the securitisation process has become a mechanism through which British Muslim communities were othered as a radical/oriental other following the July 7th London bombings. It further seeks to analyse how a mutually constitutive relationship has emerged through this process, leading to a double securitisation as the groups seek to establish new ontological security. This double securitisation will be examined through the empirical chapters, and thus this chapter will focus on the discursive element of this thesis. It will begin by an acknowledgement of the positionality of the author and the possible implications of the research and discourse analysis. It will then set out the rationale behind the three groups whose public output informs this thesis, the Muslim Council of Britain, Hizb-ut-Tahrir and the Quilliam Foundation. The proceeding sections will set out why critical discourse analysis was used to analyse this output and how the five categories were chosen.

4.1 Positionality

Merriam et al. write of positionality; "The notion of positionality rests on the assumption that a culture is more than a monolithic entity to which one belongs to or not" (Merriam, et al., 2010, p. 411). In examining positionality, they draw upon different researcher's experience (including the author's own) to explore how positionality is viewed as relative to the "social and cultural characteristics of a heterogeneous population" (Merriam, et al., 2010, p. 411). The insider/outside status can also change depending on social characteristics such as race, gender education and time set within the community, with these factors impacting the researcher positionality. While the paper draws on the researcher's experience in fieldwork, it draws upon a typology which establishes different researcher positions based on the assumption that researchers live in a diverse society and are thus socialised within different racial and cultural communities. Following the author's assertion that a black woman, interviewing black women would be an indigenous insider, as a British Pakistani Sunni Muslim, it is this category which defines the
The author of this thesis positionality on the research. Merriam et al. cite Banks as describing this position as "one 'who endorses the unique values, perspectives, behaviours and beliefs, and knowledge of his or her indigenous community' and 'who can speak with authority on it (Merriam, et al., 2010, p. 412)." For this thesis, the positionality of the author is relative to the multiple communities within the British Muslim population. It is also relative to the schools of thought followed by the groups.

Thus, some consideration must be given to possible subjectivity within this thesis. This methodology will draw on Lorraine Code’s chapter 'Taking Subjectivity into account' which argues that a researchers' subjectivity "could conceivably be discovered only for a narrow range of artificially isolated and purified empirical knowledge claims, which might be paradigmatic by fiat but are unlikely to be so 'in fact’" (Code, 1993). Therefore, whilst an acknowledgement is made of possible subjectivity due to the author’s positionality, the thesis will use an inductive coding method to perform the discourse analysis to prevent bias.

4.2 The Groups

This thesis takes 2005 as its starting point to highlight the impact that the July 7th, London bombings 2005 had on the British Muslim group identity. While the literature review highlighted the effect that this had on the overall political and academic discourse, this thesis further examines the impact that the event had as a crisis in disrupting the ontological security of British Muslim communities. Giddens describes critical situations as "circumstances of radical disjuncture of an unpredictable kind which affect substantial numbers of individuals, situations that threaten or destroy the certitudes of institutionalised routines" (Giddens, 1984, p. 62). The theoretical chapter expanded on how critical situations can impact ontological security. We can further argue that the July 7th, bombings constitutes a critical situation which created a crucial moment which required a response from the state, but also as an act of critical disjuncture for
the British Muslim community who were presented as a radical/oriental other. This thesis also aims to show that the discourse surrounding the attacks was ontologically destabilising. 2013 was selected as an end date, due to the change in academic and political discourse on Islamist/jihadist groups with the emergence of ISIL as a global threat in 2014.

While this thesis sets out to examine how each group attempts to create a British Muslim identity in an attempt to create an ontological security process, it will follow Croft’s post-Copenhagen model which allows for the securitisation process to play a key role in reconstructing identity. It will explore how legislation introduced following the July 7th London bombings favoured a model of a moderate 'British Islam' whose values were similar to British values. The use of the Post Copenhagen model, which is explored in the proceeding chapter, shows that for the securitisation process to work, the discourse must be reproduced by wider elite groups. Thus, while the act of working with a community group does not constitute an exceptional act, the reproduction of the securitising discourse through these groups contributes to the impact on the group's identity.

4.2.1 'Moderate' Islam

The aim of this thesis is not to define moderate Islam in Britain, and any analysis will be informed by the definitions discussed in the previous chapter. This thesis will instead focus on the impact that state attempts to shape conversations on Islam in the UK post-July 7th through securitising processes would have on the groups public discourse. As the definitions offered by the authors were grounded in theological traditions, this thesis will use as its starting point, any group that has not been proscribed by the government under the Terrorism Act 2000. The Act is a crucial part of the securitisation process as its very nature allows it to justify exceptional measures against those prosecuted. Its definition of a terrorist organisation further enables it to interpret its four defining characteristics of a terrorist organisation and can move acts from the realm of politics to security. The Act states:

"For the purpose of the Act, this means the organisation:
• Commits or participates in acts of terrorism.
• Prepares for terrorism.
• Promotes or encourages terrorism (including the unlawful glorification of terrorism)
• Or is otherwise concerned in terrorism” (Gov UK, 2013).

The thesis will examine the public discourse of three groups: the Muslim Council of Britain, Hizb-ut–Tahrir and the Quilliam Foundation12. A brief description of each group is provided below.

• The Muslim Council of Britain is a national representative Muslim umbrella body with over 500 affiliated national, regional and local organisations, mosques, charities and schools. The MCB website states that they pledge to work for the common good of society. It further encourages Muslims and Muslim organisations to play a full and participatory role in public life.

• The Quilliam Foundations describes itself as the world's first counter-extremism think tank, "set up to address the unique challenges of citizenship, identity and belonging in a globalised world. Quilliam stands for religious freedom, equality, human rights and democracy" (Quilliam Admin, ND).

• Hizb-ut- Tahrir is an international Islamic movement, whose primary aim is to restore the caliphate state for Muslims.

The Muslim Council of Britain were chosen in their position as the largest umbrella organisation of Muslim groups in the UK. The MCB has historically been involved in broader political discourse and its relationship with the government can be seen as a microcosm for the relationship between government and the Muslim community following the July 7th London bombings. The Quilliam Foundation and Hizb-ut-Tahrir were chosen to represent the 'good Muslim, bad Muslim' dichotomy in Mamdani's paper, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim explored in the literature review (Mamdani, 2002). Seen within the prism of the radical -moderate couplet identified by Modood,

12 Due to the scope of this thesis, several key groups were left out. Organisations linked to a single issue such as IMAAN
which argued that one could only be defined in relation to the other. This can be exemplified through the respective relationships that Hizb-ut-Tahrir and the Quilliam Foundation have with the government. Within the period of this thesis, two attempts were made by successive governments to proscribe Hizb-ut-Tahrir, who is a conservative Islamist movement. The Quilliam Foundation can arguably be seen to have a position on the opposing end of the couplet, having worked with the government to promote a pluralistic model of Islam compatible with British values.

Kettell states that "a public discourse of religion is necessarily based on a mutually shared interpretation of the main problems and challenges that such objectives face, as well as the most appropriate and effective method of dealing with them (Kettell, 2009, p. 423)." This thesis will examine the public discourse of the three organisations for the period 2005-2013 to analyse how the groups attempt to shape and frame the public debate on key topics. The public discourse in this period represents a reaction to securitisation as the groups attempted to create a new basis for their ontological security. The analysis is based on an examination of press releases, information on the groups detailed on their respective databases and key reports. One thousand three hundred fifty-five press releases and reports from 2005 and 2013 were analysed as part of this thesis. These were all gathered from the organisation’s websites. These will be examined alongside relevant speeches made by politicians in this period which relate to the securitisation process. Two speeches, in particular, are pertinent to this process; a speech made by Tony Blair following the July 7th London bombing and one by the then community secretary Ruth Kelly (Kelly, 2006).

While all press releases were initially copied to a database, during the period of this thesis, changes were made to both the websites of the Muslim Council of Britain and the Quilliam Foundation. The thesis references where available all the original links to press releases. After an initial overview of the database of press releases, several methodological considerations were made. Firstly, generic press releases such as yearly Ramadan greetings were excluded from the
analysis. While analytical software such as Nvivo was considered, its reliance on keywords prevented analysis across the three organisations due to differing interpretations of keywords from the three organisations. The decision was made to perform a qualitative content analysis of the data gathered. An inductive coding method approach was used to avoid imposing arbitrary dynamics on the material. Once analysed, several key topics were identified based on the frequency of which they appeared and their relevance to the securitisation process.

4.3 Key Topics

The key topics which were selected using the methodology mentioned above were: The war on terror. Islamophobia, Foreign Affairs, Religious Engagement and Public Engagement.

- The War on Terror. The War on Terror can be viewed within the context of this thesis as a 'critical situation' crises or events that create a fundamental moment, and which require a response. Croft argues that "critical situations emphasise the fragility of ontologically secure entities; that established everyday routines that allow a foundation to life can be interrupted (Croft, 2012, p. 25)." While this thesis treats July 7th as the crisis point at which the analysis begins, it places this within the broader context of the war on terror. It will follow academic focus on the war on terror, through the inclusion of military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. The press releases in this category will also include press releases relating to Pakistan. For the purposes of this thesis, it will also include attacks in this period which are classed by state actors as terrorist attacks and subsequent legislative changes made as a response to this.

- Islamophobia: The Runnymede Trust defines the term Islamophobia as an "unfounded hostility towards Muslims, and therefore fear or dislike of all or most Muslims (Elahi & Khan, 2017)." Tell Mama, an organisation that monitors anti-Muslim attacks, builds on this classifying Islamophobic attacks as "any malicious act aimed at Muslims, their material property or Islamic organisations and where there is evidence that the act has anti-Muslim motivation or content, or that the victim was targeted because of their
Muslim identity (Tell Mama, n.d.)." While these definitions will inform this thesis, Islamophobia will be viewed in the context of its place within the securitisation process due to the 'othering' nature. Further to this, Islamophobic acts can be considered to be an ontologically destabilising act, causing anxiety and fear for victims of these acts. The organisation's discursive strategies on Islamophobia will be analysed within the context of the securitisation process, which will be explored in further detail in the proceeding chapter.

- Foreign Affairs: This category is based on international events which impacted the Muslim community. The press release takes into account ongoing international conflicts such as the ongoing dispute between Israel and Palestine. Additionally, it also focuses on those groups where the countries have an active presence. Chapter 8 highlights the role of Hizb-ut-Tahrir in Bangladesh within this context. In the case of Pakistan, both the Quilliam foundation and Hizb-ut-Tahrir discursive strategy focuses on internal political conflict. These analysed within the theoretical framework allow us to see how the groups attempt to shape a model of Islam based on their identity. Finally, this category includes acts of securitisation in other countries, which have arisen as a response to events in this period, i.e. the banning of minarets in Switzerland.

- Religious Engagement: This category is based on those rights afforded under Article 9 of the Human Rights Acts, which covers personal and religious beliefs. The act states.

"Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or personal belief and freedom, either alone in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance (Equality and Human Rights Commission, n.d.)."

The press releases in this category thus relate to not only those press releases which seek to combat negative perceptions of Islam but also those that seek to shape public opinion on a model of Islam in the UK. For all three organisation's the press releases were aimed at both British Muslim communities and the broader political communities. However, as Chapter 5 will explore, the organisations were also attempting to appeal to the 'audience'
those who have to be convinced to accept the exceptional procedures. Here the organisations sought to resist or co-opt the securitising measures as part of their public output.

- Public Engagement: This category is based on Van Dijk's definition of the political process which he describes as "the overall term that categorises complex, long term sequences of political actions. Governing, legislation, opposition, solidarity, agenda-setting and policies are among the prototypical aspects of such political process" (Van Dijk, 1997, p. 12). Thus, this category will include those issues on which the organisations attempt to engage and influence broader political topics based on Van Dijk's definition.

This thesis will then analyse all the public output of the three organisations based on the identified categories. The analysis will be used to examine not only the discursive strategies of the organisations but also within the context of the Post Copenhagen model set out by Stuart Croft in Securitising Islam. This model will be examined in further detail in Chapter 5. Finally, the thesis will also highlight where possible, cases where original links to press releases have been deleted. This will allow us to examine the group’s response to the securitisation process and how this has created multiple Muslim identities within the UK which seek to co-opt or resist securitisation. It is through this analysis that this thesis aims to answer its key research question: whether the insecuritisation of British Muslims has led to a double securitisation for some Muslim communities.
Chapter 5: Creating a Suspect Community

The July 7th, 2005, London terror attacks and the knowledge that the perpetrators had been Muslims of British descent brought the discourse surrounding British Muslim communities to the forefront, both within academic research and through government policy. This reflected a continued change within narrative surrounding Muslim communities which had emerged through events such as the Salman Rushdie Satanic Verses affair, the September 11th attacks and the subsequent war on terror. This chapter will use securitisation theory to examine the historical construction of the British Muslim community as the 'other'. It analyses how this historical construction has formed the foundation for the modern-day securitisation, which occurs in the period of this thesis. By exploring the intersection of securitisation and Islamophobia, we can see the early development of a mutually constitutive relationship between the insecuritization of British Muslims and Muslim identity. The chapter then analyses the way a South Asian model of Islam would come to influence policy and become associated with a cultural view of British Muslims, and how this would lead to a double insecuritization within British Muslim communities, creating a hierarchal other within.

The proceeding sections will first seek to examine how biographical markers have emerged as a result of the British Empire. It will analyse how the British Empire has been used as part of the construction of 'othering', and for how some communities this, "helps to provide social solidity to the identities that are at the heart of the biographical narrative(s) that ontologically secure individuals have" (Croft, 2012a, p. 228) . By using the construct of Britishness as a marker, it examines its roots in colonisation and how this sets the tone for modern-day Islamophobia. It further allows us to analyse how the British Muslim community has attempted to define itself in relation to this marker, through its historical relationship with the Empire.

The latter sections of the chapter will examine how multiculturalism can be seen as an early indicator of the mutually constitutive relationship between the insecuritisation of British Muslims and identity. They further consider how, while the introduction of multiculturism
policies was an attempt to recognise and accommodate differences, the period would also see the emergence of a new form of racism. Here the chapter builds on the theories of new racism where "immigrants were seen to be threatening to the very existence of 'British-ness'" (Allen C., 2010, p. 230). It is within this context that we can then examine the discourse surrounding the Salman Rushdie affair, the September 11th terror attacks and the securitisation of Tony Blair’s speech on August 5th 2005, where he set out the groundwork for the insecuritization of British Muslims.

5.1 Ontological Security

This section will examine how British Muslim communities have been securitised using the framework set out by Stuart Croft in Securitizing Islam. By examining how the construct of Britishness has been used to securitise Islam, we can explore how British Muslim communities have been 'othered' as part of this process. We can then analyse the impact that this has had on the three organisations who are the focus of this thesis, Hizb-ut-Tahrir, the Muslim Council of Britain and the Quilliam Foundation. Croft states that "Ontological security at the level of the individual – routines and narratives that are themselves constructed intersubjectively – is crucial in understanding collective processes of securitisation" (Croft, 2012b, p. 16). It is within this context that Croft uses securitisation theory to understand how the "discourses and practices of 'Britishness' have led to the securitisation of Islam" (Croft, 2012b, p. 16). Key to our understanding of how these practices are used to securitise is biographical continuity. Here Croft builds on Giddens work and argues that "ontological security is brought when humans are able to trust that they can bracket off all sorts of possibilities; that they can, therefore, rely on a social normality, a predictability, which then structures their practical everyday interactions as natural, normal and commonsensical" (Croft, 2012b, p. 21). This biographical continuity works only if it is robust and able to withstand significant changes, as it is dependent on the reliability of those narratives to create a sense of ontological security.
Central to Croft’s work is the premise of Britishness and how "the contribution of 'Britishness' to the ontological security of some has necessitated the ontological securitisation of others, specifically those known as 'British Muslims'" (Croft, 2012a, p. 220). In his construct of Britishness, Croft builds on the work of Benedict Anderson, who defined the nation as an "imagined political community and imagined as both limited and sovereign (Anderson, 1991, p. 6)". Anderson’s work states that communities are built on shared narratives of the past and its values. Croft argues that this could partly be achieved through a process of securitisation, which allows people to remain confident that other British citizens shared their ‘British’ way of life. It also for the individual to “intersubjectively reassess with my fellow in-group who does and does not share my Britishness” (Croft, 2012b, p. 93).

Britishness as an imagined community is “an institution that provides a structure for individual self-identity which helps to play into a sense of biographical coherence, comprehended by the individual and communicable to others” (Croft, 2012b, p. 37). Part of the ontological security offered by the construct of Britishness is that it “offers to individuals a contribution to the achievement of their ontological security” (Croft, 2012b, p. 38) It is further dependent on the othering of different communities, in this case - Islam. The process of insecuritisation has for many British Muslims precisely interrupted that sense of biographical coherence.

Croft uses Tony Blair’s speech following the London 7 bombings in 2005, which was “purportedly to create a distance between the ‘British Muslim community’ and ‘extremists’”, to demonstrate that “in temporal terms, this imagined ‘mainstream Muslim community’ is shown still as a separate entity” (Croft, 2012a, p. 227). He quotes Blair as saying that, “British Muslims should understand that they are our partners in getting this done” (Blair, 2005). By portraying the British Muslim community as partners, and separate to the mainstream community, Blair’s speech contributed to the constitution and marginalisation of a distinct British Muslim community. By building on this portrayal of the British Muslim communities as the other, we can use this as a starting point to examine how the three different organisations attempted to construct what it
means to be a British Muslim, both as a response to the dominant power and in line with their public discourse.

5.1.2 Post Copenhagen School

In 'looking beyond the Copenhagen school', Croft uses “securitisation in a post-Copenhagen sense, in which a number of the key elements of the school’s concepts are relaxed, and a number of new elements are added” (Croft, 2012b, p. 78). This section will begin with an overview of the Copenhagen School and then set out how Croft’s use of the Post Copenhagen model relaxes the pillars on which securitisation theory is built. The Copenhagen school emerged under the subfield of critical security studies with a “key ‘brand’ concept, securitisation, focusing on the way in which states construct security issues beyond the realm of normal politics (Croft, 2012b, p. 76)”. It’s approach to security encompasses three main pillars, securitisation, sectors and regional security. The school defines securitisation as “the discursive process through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat” (Buzan & Waever, 2003, p. 491).

The Copenhagen school uses the term securitisation in its strictest form where security is performative and applied Waever’s initial conceptual idea into a broader theory of securitisation. The securitisation process is dependent on a speech act which takes an issue from the realms of politics and into security, thus creating an existential threat. Stritzel writes that for the Copenhagen school, “security needs to be read in the context of a ‘state of exception’ which leads them to the claim that that security threats are always existential for the survival of a particular referent object” (Stritzel, 2014, p. 15). These are not limited to issues of state only, but can also be linked to issues of environment, culture and markets. Crucially, security is “characterised in terms of a distinct modality marked by utmost urgency, priority of action and the breaking free of ‘normal rules’ of politics” (Stritzel, 2014, p. 15). The process includes the introduction of extraordinary actions to protect the referent object. This is the ideal that is being threatened and
needs to be protected. An additional crucial element of securitisation theory is the role of the audience who must be persuaded to either accept or reject securitising moves. The role of the audience will be examined in further detail in the next section.

Croft departs from this definition of securitisation and adds several elements to it, where he moves on from the “constraints of the theory in four key areas, and from there add on a greater focus in three additional areas – identities, spatiality and temporality” (Croft, 2012b, p. 79). Croft’s use of the Post Copenhagen model begins with the amendment to securitisation theory that suggests that in addition to speech, security mean can also be communicated by a variety of texts. He states “More significantly; this meaning changes the conceptual frame from (purely) intersubjectivity to intertextuality” (Croft, 2012b, p. 80). The second amendment examines who the securitising actor is. This moves on from the state only being able to carry out securitising moves and focuses instead on the role of “all socially powerful agents both in producing and in reproducing securitisations (Croft, 2012b, p. 80). This then now includes media, thinktanks, NGOs and crucially for this thesis, religious organisations. The third amendment focuses on the Copenhagen School claim that the securitising actor calls on the support of the audience by asserting the threat to the survival of the in-group. The Post Copenhagen framework relaxes this and focuses on the role of the audience. Here the audience does not just accept the securitising moves; it instead performs roles which become part of the securitisation process. “A successful securitising move will see the audience reconstructed (re) dividing into categories called for by that securitisation” (Croft, 2012b, p. 80). Here the audience is also able to carry out acts of resistance. Finally, the Post Copenhagen framework turns its attention to the implications of the successful securitisation. Here the extraordinary measures are not enacted by the government also, but as a product of more extensive performances through society, where the audiences “co-produces the new social reality which, as a consequence, allows for a reconstitution of collective memory” (Croft, 2012b, p. 85).

These are summarised below.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Copenhagen School</th>
<th>Post Copenhagen School</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pillar One:</strong> Securitisation as a speech act: This pillar focuses on the performative nature of speech: An issue can be moved from the realms of politics to security</td>
<td>A move away from a focus on speech acts only. The relaxation focuses on a variety of texts, and security meaning can be communicated through non-language: i.e. image. Croft argues that this “changes the conceptual framework from (purely) intersubjectivity to intertextuality” (Croft, 2012b, p. 80).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pillar Two:</strong> Any actor with necessary capabilities can securitise, although in practice this is the state</td>
<td>They were extended to a broader elite which can include Think Tanks, NGO’s Religious Bodies, Media and Novelists. “Securitising moves then, can be made from any direction and will reflect wider elite discourse” (Croft, 2012b, p. 82).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pillar Three:</strong> Securitising moves work by raising the prospect of the survival of the in-group</td>
<td>While elite groups create securitisation discourse, the broader (in-group) society also plays a role in either reproducing or resisting the securitisation discourses. Both the elite and broader communities must accept a successful securitisation. “Crucially the audience is not fixed - as in, for example, the category of the electorate’ - but itself may be reconstituted by the securitising act” (Croft, 2012b, p. 83). Securitisation can now play a crucial role in reconstructing identity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pillar Four:</strong> Securitisation moves can lead to extraordinary measures to ensure the survival of the in-group</td>
<td>New legislation must be re-enacted through everyday performative actions, through humour, employment and expressions of identity in sport. The audience now also has to perform the new identity constructions, and now reinforce this through everyday practices and routines.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Post Copenhagen model put forward by Croft, thus allows us to extend our definition of securitisation and move away from the focus on a speech act alone. This relaxed definition of who is considered an elite allows us in later chapters to reimagine the three groups, the Muslim Council of Britain, Quilliam Foundation and Hizb-ut-Tahrir as elites within British Muslim communities. It further allows us to examine the role that the media, through factual programmes and popular culture, can play in reinforcing messages of securitisation. Furthermore, considering the addition of temporality and spatiality, it allows us to examine securitisation as a process in

---

13 Examples of this can be seen with Tom Brady, the New Patriot Quarterback who can be seen to reinforce the securitizing policies of the Trump Administration through his wearing the MAGA cap (Make America Great Again)
which the construct of Britishness and the definition of the ‘other’ change over time. Securitisation thus occurs when the “dominant power can decide who should be protected and who should be feared” (Croft, 2012b, p. 83)”

5.1.3 The Audience

Further consideration should also be given to the role of the audience in the Post Copenhagen framework. The Copenhagen school refers to the audience as “those the securitising acts attempts to convince to accept the exceptional procedures” (Buzan, Waever, & de Wilde, 1998, p. 41). McDonald argues that in the original Copenhagen definition of the audience, security as a speech act is referred to as “a form of linguistic representation that positioned a particular issue as an existential threat” (McDonald, 2008, p. 566). This places emphasis on the audience in ‘backing up’ speech acts, where securitisation occurs through audience consent. McDonald’s work examines the issues of securitisation and the role of the audience beyond the Copenhagen school. McDonald argues that in the Copenhagen school, the role of the audience is under-specified. He argues that the “work is done by the articulation itself rather than the result of a negotiation between the articulator and the audience at whom the articulation is directed” (McDonald, 2008, p. 572). Language is then only part of the construction of security, which relies on this negotiation between the ‘elite’ and the audience.

McDonald argues that the inclusion of images and visual representation in the construction of security requires a new framework in which we analyse the role of the audience in a post-Copenhagen framework. An extension of the Copenhagen school’s focus on speech, such as that set out by Croft, thus requires a new focus on the role of the audience. Cote analyses the role of the audience in securitisation in empirical studies and makes two key observations. Firstly, that “securitising actors and audiences engage in repeated, contextually situated situations”. Secondly “that audiences always engage in the securitisation process” (Cote, 2016, p. 548). Even when the audience disagrees with the securitisation, the intersubjective relationship which McDonald sets out is still evident. Like Croft, Cote also states the ‘who’ the audience is can change. Cote puts
forward to suggestions as to how audience engagement work. The first is active participants in securitisation, who are capable of independent action which can produce 'tangible security effects. Seen this way, “securitising actors must now engage with audiences that can challenge their threat interpretations and shift security understandings” (Cote, 2016, p. 551). Thus, the securitisation act must convince the audience of a threat to their ontological security so that securitising processes can be enacted. Secondly, Cote moves away from the linear relationship of the speech act and audience and reimagines this as “deliberation between actor and audience”. He writes "securitisation success comes via the construction of shared security meanings produced through these repeated deliberative interactions, with past interactions affecting the nature of future interactions" (Cote, 2016, p. 552). Securitisation moves away from the speech act alone and becomes dependent on the audience, who can also contribute to shared security movements and legitimised actions.

This thesis will use the constructions of the audience offered by Cote to in its use of the securitisation processes set out by Croft in the above table to explore the impact that this had on British Muslim communities. It will understand the audience as an active participant in negotiating the securitisation processes. In the final chapter, which focuses on the role of organisations as actors, it will revisit the idea of audiences in looking at silences in their discourses.

5.1.4 The Insecuritisation of Islam

For British Muslims, the securitisation process put the collective identities of Muslim and the construct of Britishness in conflict with one another. The insecuritisation of British Muslims occurred not only through the securitising processes of government policy but through this idea of the other being reproduced with the portrayal of Muslims in the media. Croft refers to this as 'media (re securitisations)' and argues that "media organisations might conduct a securitising move through the development of a story that can be used to securitise" (Croft, 2012b, p. 210). An example of the way in which the media reproduce the securitising move can be seen within
the development of the school girl niqab trial (EWHC 298, 2007). The case involved schoolgirl X taking her school in Buckinghamshire to court in 2007 over her right to wear a niqab. The schoolgirl argued that her sisters had previously worn the niqab at school, while the school’s case centred on changed circumstances and maintained that because “security concerns’ had been heightened”, the practice of wearing niqabs had now been banned at the school (Glendinning, 2007).

The idea that the niqab is at odds with the concept of English liberal identity was also reinforced via an article in the Guardian by Jack Straw, then Labour leader of the House of Commons. Discussing his unease at speaking to a constituent who was wearing a niqab, he wrote, “In part, this was because of the apparent incongruity between the signals which indicate common bonds - the entirely English accent, the couple’s education (wholly in the UK) and the fact of the veil” (Straw, 2006). The media (re securitisation) of the niqab can also be seen in TV dramas such as Spooks. An episode in Series 2, “Nest of Angels”, featured a plotline which centred on a mosque in Birmingham, where a radical mullah trained a young suicide bomber. The episode reinforced through its association of religious fundamentalist characters in religious clothing, the trope of the radical other within. The episode was shown “despite appeals from Muslims for it to be cancelled on the grounds that it could incite religious hatred” (Leonard, 2003), and resulted in around 1000 complaints.

Thus, while securitising processes are implemented through ‘speech acts’, “in democratic societies, securitisations cannot simply be declared by central government (Croft, 2012b, p. 83)”. Different groups must reproduce these ideas. The post-Copenhagen framework used by Croft is reliant on the broader society in its role as the audience to reproduce the enactment of securitisation. This as the above summary shows can be through, humour, employment practices and sport identity. It further enables the reader to see “the audience performing resistance to that securitisation” (Croft, 2012b, p. 83). This process can be seen in the changing discourse surrounding British Muslim communities, which, as has been shown in the previous chapters,
changed in the wake of the September 11th attacks from issues of ‘race’ to ‘religion’. The discourse further altered with the securitisation enacted through legislation, the media and the portrayal of some Islamic schools of thought such as the Deobandi School as the ‘radical other’.

In 2007, the *Times* newspaper ran an article on the Deobandi school which claimed that "almost half of Britain’s mosques are under the control of a hard-line Islamic sect whose preachers loathe Western values" (Norfolk, 2007). The article revealed that the Deobandi movement ran 600 of Britain’s 1,350 mosques. It argued that "while some Deobandi preachers have a more cohesive approach to interfaith relations, Islamic theologians say that such bridge-building efforts do not represent mainstream Deobandi thinking in Britain" (Norfolk, 2007). It continued that in these Deobandi preacher sermons, "intended for a Muslim only audience, they reveal a deep-rooted hatred of Western society" (Norfolk, 2007). However, Gilliat-Ray offers another view of the Deobandi movement, stating that, "the well-organised system of Deobandi education for young Muslims, relying upon a carefully constructed curriculum, appears to provide a bulwark against the influence of more ‘radical’ groups" (Gilliat-Ray, 2010, p. 88). The MCB commented on what it termed a "Trial by Media" in a press release in response to the *Times* article, claiming, "The Deobandi movement has been at the forefront of interfaith work in this country to build bridges with other faiths. It is a matter of deep regret that today’s sensationalist reporting in the Times obscure this fact" (MCB, 2007). A press release from the Quilliam Foundation also supported the portrayal of the Deobandi movement as supportive of the interfaith movement. As they put it:

More than 20 prominent British Muslims have signed a joint letter denouncing recent anti-Semitic attacks in Britain and calling on Muslims to help prevent attacks on Jews in the UK The letter is being circulated widely and has been sent to the majority of British mosques. The letter comes as Jewish organisations in the UK and throughout Europe report a significant rise in anti-Semitic attacks on Jewish individuals, Jewish-owned property and synagogues in recent weeks. The letter's signatories include internationally renowned Imams, writers, academics and community activists. The signatories also include members of all major Islamic groupings, including Deobandis, Barelwis, Salafis, Shias and Sufis (Quilliam Foundation, 2009).
A further example of the media (re) securitisation of British Muslims as the other, can be seen in coverage of the issue of halal meat in the UK press. This topic is frequently set within the framework of the discourse surrounding animal welfare. In 2018 the Daily Mail ran an article on the consumer’s right to know whether they were eating halal meat, titled: “Big Brands shops and restaurants face being forced to label halal food as row grows over ritually slaughtered meat on sale in the UK” (Poulter, Adams, Ledwith, & Chorley, 2018). The article read:

In conventional slaughterhouses, cows, sheep and chicken are stunned, usually with an electric shock, to ensure they are unconscious before their throats are cut. This minimises suffering but in most Muslim countries halal animals are not stunned. This technique has been condemned as cruel by experts on the Farm Animal Welfare Council, the Humane Slaughter Association and the Federation of Veterinarians of Europe (Poulter, Adams, Ledwith, & Chorley, 2018).

Despite the similarities between Kosher and Halal meat, the article decision to focus on Halal food continued to ‘other’ practices associated with Islam. The proposed labelling of halal food was critiqued by the MCB who argued that:

We fully support the labelling of Halal food, and consumers should know how the meat was slaughtered. But it is discriminatory to only label un-stunned meat for consumers to make a choice on animal welfare grounds. Consumers also have a right to know if their meat was slaughtered by one of many different stunning methods prior to slaughter, i.e., by one of the legal methods of slaughter that includes mechanical stunning with a captive bolt, gassing, electrocuting, or any of the other approved methods (MCB, 2013).

While the discourse surrounding halal, food was placed within the context of animal rights, the headlines formed part of an overall ‘creeping sharia’ narrative within the media. These

---

14 Creeping Sharia was a term used in the press and social media, which described the so-called ‘Islamification’ of the UK. These often referred to the call for Sharia courts, accommodation for Halal food, and new mosques being built.
portrayed a subversive use of 'Sharia law' which the British public was being made to accept, placing practices such as halal meat as an 'alien' way of life and were depicted as an antithesis to British values.

The extension to powerful agents in societies set out in Croft's Post Copenhagen model (to include NGO's, pressure groups and think tanks) thus enable us to analyse how the three organisations hold a dual role within the securitisation process. As part of the audience, they perform acts of resistance; however, their position within British Muslim communities defines these organisation as elite power groups, who use their identity and public discourse to securitise each other as well as the wider Muslim community. The proceeding sections will look at the historical way in which British Muslims have been securitised through processes of colonisation, and through critical points within British Muslim histories, such as the Salman Rushdie affair and the July 7th London Bombings.

5.2 Historical Markers

In the introduction to Tariq Modood’s “Not Easy being British”, Robin Richardson states that a hyphenated identity is required (i.e. British-Muslim) and argues for the need to “to explore and develop the concept of commonality” (Richardson, 1992, p. xi). This section discusses that this search for commonality, lead to attempts to create an ontological security based on shared values. Paradoxically this search for a hyphenated identity post-July 7th would also contribute to the insecuritisation of British Muslims. For British Muslims, this hyphenated identity must first be understood within the context of the West’s relationship with Islam, and specifically, the relationship that Muslims have with the construct of ‘Britishness’, from the Empire to post July 7th. The proceeding sections examine how the biographical markers, ‘British’ and ‘Muslim’ have evolved historically and the way that this has been incorporated into the narratives of Hizb-ut-Tahrir, the Muslim Council of Britain and the Quilliam Foundation.
5.2.1 The Empire

This section will follow the model used by Arun Kundnani in “The End of Tolerance”, which uses the Empire as a starting point to explore the roots of modern-day racism, to understand the origins of the development of ‘British Islam’ and the insecuritisation of British Muslims. Kundnani writes that “England’s eighteenth-century domination of the slave trade carried with it the beginning of the mass diffusion of the modern concept of racism” (Kundnani, 2007, p. 11). Britain in the Empire was “constructed as racially homogenous and rigidly distinct from its colonial subject ‘races’ and alien immigration” (Kundnani, 2007, p. 12). Issues of Empire would leave “deep marks on the texture of English/British culture, producing a selective collective memory, a repertoire of mutually supporting racisms-based on culture, religion, fantasy, science or history” (Kundnani, 2007, p. 12). The identity of the Empire was thus reliant on a set of markers which othered its subjects. The very act of creating ontological security based on a shared narrative was dependent on excluding others from this identity. Within the Empire, it was the Muslim community who were the other, and Kundnani argues that it is in this period that we can see the roots of Islamophobia and the use of Muslim fanaticism to other the Muslim community. He writes, “Thus, in the nineteenth century, as the British Empire faced the challenge of an Islamic-oriented resistance to colonialism to India and Africa: the idea of a specifically Muslim fanaticism was at hand to ‘explain’ these disturbances” (Kundnani, 2007, p. 13). As with Croft, Kundnani acknowledges that this relationship between the West and Islam can be traced further back to the Crusades. While the nature of the Christian civilising mission was used in the justification of imperial expansion, Croft writes, “for many in the West, that firm sense of ontological security was provided by Christianity, of whichever hue: that there were answers to the meaning of life, and that there were practices to be performed to continue underlying that faith (Croft, 2012b, p. 22)”. The imagined British community was further dependent on the idea of the superiority of the white Christian community.
While Christianity played a role in the justification of the imperial expansion, the relationship between the Empire and India was routed through the governance of the East India Company (EIC). Carey writes that the EIC was “generally opposed to religious interference in their fields of operations” (Carey, 2010, p. 58). It was not until Charles Grant that the company allowed “missionaries and chaplains to serve in India and improve the moral conditions of its people” (Carey, 2010, p. 58). These chaplains were initially for the Irish soldiers who had been stationed in India, themselves subject to colonial rule.

Within this period, literature was also used as part of the insecuritization process. Using the work of authors such as Joseph Conrad, Rudyard Kipling and John Masefield, Jonathon Hyslop analyses the portrayal of Lascars, sailors from the subcontinent. He contends “that British constructions of British and Afro-Asian sailors were mutually dependent on each other; the lascar was constituted through his differentiation from the British sailor and vice versa” (Hyslop, 2014, p. 213). He further highlights the role of doctors whose “investment in biological racism meant their views frequently reinforced the construction of the lascar as ineffectual” (Hyslop, 2014, p. 213).

For the Muslim Council of Britain, the Empire and the First World War provide a historical route to show that British Muslims were a part of the history of the Empire and thus had a set of shared values. On their page ‘British Muslims’, a section header reads “British Muslims are rooted in British History” (MCB, N.D). The page uses the history of Muslims in the UK to show a shared narrative, writing that Muslims in Britain were part of its history “from shops offering sherbets in Shakespeare’s London to Muslim soldiers responding to the call to arms” (MCB, N.D). This latter statement connects to a construct of Britishness based on its roles in the world wars. It refers to the Empire as a period of “a deepening relationship with Muslims” (MCB, N.D).

Gilliat Ray, however, writes of the outsider status of Muslims in Britain in this period, one ignored by the MCB account of the history of Muslims in the UK. She writes, “They were outsiders, not only because of their origins and visible racial difference but also because they were regarded as being part of a migratory Labour underclass” (Gilliat-Ray, 2010, p. 31). While this period saw the
establishment of Muslim communities and the building of the first mosque in Britain, these were often outside the parameters of British civil society. This also laid down the foundations of the relationship between 'British Muslims' and the elite as the other within. Therefore, the Empire can be seen not only as of the starting point for modern-day racism but also as the beginning of a construct of Britishness whose roots lay in the exclusion of others from the idea of a white, Christian Empire.

5.2.2 Muslims in the World War

As subjects of the Empire, Muslims from the subcontinent would play a role in both World Wars. For both Hizb-at-Tahrir and the Muslim Council of Britain, the role of Muslims as Imperial subjects shaped their output and would influence their attempts to create ontological security based on their relationship with the Empire. While the MCB use the history of Muslims in the Empire to highlight shared values, for HBT the portrayal of the Empire would focus on the legacies of colonisation, with focus on Palestine. This section will examine the development of the identities of the two organisations, with the former focusing on a narrative based on Islam as part of the history of Britain and the latter promoting Islam, specifically the idea of a Caliphate state.

Kinnvall writes, "At an individual level, ontological security is provided by the belief that the story (the discourse) being told is a good one, one that rests on solid ground" (Kinnvall, 2004, p. 746). The MCB's focus on the role of soldiers in the World Wars was built on a narrative of Muslim soldiers' contributions to military efforts. In its public discourse relating to the relationship between Muslims and the Empire, the MCB focuses on "the enduring contribution made by Muslims of Britain exemplified by the hundreds and thousands who took part in the First World War" (MCB, N.D). Here the MCB uses the First World War as a route to emphasise shared British values. Discussing the contribution of Muslim soldiers to the First World, they write, "Honour-izzat was very important to Muslims; it was deeply embedded in these soldiers psyche; one wrote 'you did things which were right in your point of view even if it meant death'; the British tradition of absolute loyalty to the regiment dovetailed with the value of izzat; loyalty to the regiment was
paramount” (MCB, 2014a). MCB’s history of this relationship ignored both the treatment of Muslim soldiers and the economic impact of war on the colonies. “India, for instance, contributed £146 million to the British war costs between 1914 and 1920 and supplied products such as cotton, jute, paper and wool” (Koller, 2008, p. 112). In the war, the ontological security derived from the war was built on portraying colonial soldiers on “modified images of infantile and devoted savages” (Koller, 2008, p. 114). Those soldiers who did try defending their cultural identity, and fulfil religious obligations “went on to suffer despair and resignation” (Koller, 2008, p. 127).

In her paper on ‘Globalisation and Religious Nationalism’, Kinnvall looks at how past events are used as a means of ‘othering’ people, “both structurally (e.g. immigrants as ‘bogus’ asylum seekers) and psychologically (by turning the stranger into an enemy), a discourse of exclusion is constructed” (Kinnvall, 2004, p. 754). This process of creating a discourse which turns the ‘stranger’ into the enemy is “an attempt to securitise subjectivity in times of uncertainty” (Kinnvall, 2004, p. 755). Kinnvall goes on to discuss the way “chosen trauma and their opposites, ‘chosen glories’ […] provide comforting stories in times of increased ontological insecurity and existential anxiety” (Kinnvall, 2004, p. 755). As she writes,

In this process of securitising subjectivity, hate becomes the link among the present the future and a recreated past. In this sense, it serves as a social chain for successive generations as a particular event or trauma becomes mythologised and intertwined with a group’s sense of self (Kinnvall, 2004, p. 755).

The use of ‘chosen trauma’ and ‘chosen glories’ can be used to contrast the different ways the MCB and HBT have revisited the Empire in an attempt to create ontological security for British Muslim communities based on their relationship with the Empire. For the MCB, the relationship with the Empire was used to create an identity based on these shared roots. They formed this through the role of Muslim soldiers in the war, emphasising the contribution of the ‘volunteer army’. This relationship can be viewed as a chosen glory. For HBT, Muslim soldiers were likely
“ignorant of the wider imperial plans. Yet they became pawns in the war that gave birth to the chaos, bloodshed and oppression of the modern Middle East” (Wahid, 2014). From this view, the war is seen as a way of creating a ‘racist hegemony’” (Wahid, 2014). For HBT, the Empire is the trauma, which has become a part of the groups’ ‘sense of self’. Its public discourse still uses the language of imperialism, and focuses on the legacies of colonialism, with output relating to the Balfour agreement and Palestine.

5.2.3 Citizens of the Commonwealth

The migration of citizens from Commonwealth countries in the 1950s would lay down the foundations of the ‘British Muslim’ community today. This period would influence both the ethnic makeup of British Muslims and how British Muslim communities would adapt as a minority religion. In ‘Not Easy Being British’, Modood sets out the difficulties in identifying as British, both as a Muslim and as a member of a minority group within the UK. He writes, “It is not easy to be recognised and accepted fully by other people who are British; not easy to establish and protect public policies and laws which recognise and rejoice that there are many different ways of being British, with sources of strength in different continents, religions, histories and languages” (Modood T. , 1992, p. xi).

Within this period, newly arrived immigrants were initially othered through their race, as opposed to religion. Abbas writes, “These British South Asian Muslim migrants were, in effect, placed at the bottom of the labour market, disdained by the host society and ethnicised and racialised in the sphere of capital accumulation” (Abbas, 2011, p. 46). This ghettoisation of Muslim communities would continue as Muslim communities developed in declining industrialised cities. The literature review focused on the work of authors such as Tahir Abbas and Tariq Modood, who have written on the socio-economic effects that this ghettoisation had on the British Muslim community. This section will focus on how these communities were securitised and seen as existing on the periphery of mainstream society, apart from the imagined British community.
Croft writes that “securitisations, of course, do not occur from nothing. They emerge from particular incidents that are socially constructed as a crisis or crises” (Croft, 2012b, p. 249). For British Muslim communities, these incidents principally centred on the Salman Rushdie affair and the September 11th terror attacks. Kundnani argues that “Anti-Muslim discourse in Britain preceded 9/11 and emerged, in particular, in the wake of the Salman Rushdie affair” (Kundnani, 2007, p. 126). The publication of Salman Rushdie’s book *The Satanic Verses*, in 1988, was the focus of condemnation from Muslim groups. The book was based partly on the life of the Prophet Mohammed (p.b.u.h) and was met with controversy, with the book’s contents being accused of blasphemy. The book reimagined verses from the Quran, which purportedly saw the Prophet’s first revelation of Quranic verse, to be in favour of the old polytheistic deities. Equally controversial to Muslims was the portrayal of the Prophet’s wives as prostitutes. The book was met with widespread controversy, with protests and an eventual fatwa from Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989.

The Salman Rushdie Affair would see the emergence of some of the first organised Muslim groups which would lay down the foundations of the MCB. The Salman Rushdie affair would see the securitisation of British Muslims centring on questions of what it meant to be British. Werbner described the period as a clash involving “a relatively benign sense of gradual integration of Muslim immigrants into British society to what seemed for a moment an almost cataclysmic Kulturkampf and the ensuing struggle for multicultural citizenship which the encounter has generated” (Werbner, 2002, p. 7). The publication of the *Satanic Verses* would see the objections of the British Muslim community being portrayed as a threat to freedom of speech. In a retrospective article which focused on the impact of the book’s publication, Ian McEwan wrote: “Slowly, the intelligentsia [for want of a better word] found its ground and rediscovered the terms of debate around freedom of expression-terms that dissident writers in the Soviet bloc had furtively refined over the years” (McEwan, 2012). McEwan securitises British Muslim

---

15 Examples of these include UKACIA (The UK Action Committee for Islamic Affairs), Young Muslims, The Muslim Parliament of Britain.
communities through this association with the USSR. In the 1980s the Soviet Union was constructed as the ‘other’, with its principles positioned as contrary to British Values. By placing the Salman Rushdie affair in the context of the former USSR, we can see a spatial reconstruction of this episode.

Internationally, legacies of colonisation were seen, as the publication of the *Satanic Verses* book was tried in courts in India and Pakistan on charges of blasphemy, using a law which had been introduced by the British Empire. Geoffrey Robertson QC, who represented Salman Rushdie, wrote that “The crime of blasphemy has now been abolished, although this wretched legacy of English law still permits courtroom persecutions in Pakistan and some other countries of the Commonwealth” (Robertson, 2012).

While the Salman Rushdie affair would see the beginning of an organised Muslim political discourse, it would be the September 11th, 2001 terror attacks which would begin the insecuritisation process, we see in the period of this thesis. Croft writes that “It was the way in which the attacks on the United States in September 2001 were constructed that was important in allowing the securitisation process that had occurred in the United Kingdom during the first decade of the twenty-first century” (Croft, 2012b, p. 249). The September 2001 attacks and the subsequent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan would see opposition from Muslim groups including the MCB and the Muslim Association of Britain and a rise in the political discourse of these groups who called for more protections for Muslims under the law. Abbas draws on the work of Vertorec, asserting that while these political movements had success in “achieving institutional accommodation and modes of public recognition”, these had “led to a growth in Islamophobia and suggests that the rise in both these phenomena are interpreted through a kind of linked and circular operation” (Abbas, 2013, p. 28).

5.3 The South Asian Model of Islam

"Islam as a religion and civilisation has embedded itself as in six distinct linguistic and geographical zones: Arab; Black African, Persian, Turkic, South Asian and Malay” (Lewis, 2007, p.
Within the UK, it is the South Asian community, whose physical and theological roots emerged within colonialism, which forms the dominant linguistic and geographical group, at 64% of the total British Muslim population. While theologically, within the South Asian school, it is the Sunni, Barelvi and Deobandi schools (both originating from the Sunni Hanafi school of thought) which are the most prevalent, the focus of this section will be on the Deobandi School. This focus allows us to further interrogate the roots of British Islam as a construction of its relationship with colonisation. Additionally, this section will argue that the rise of Muslim consciousness in the UK reflects the theological dominance of Sunni schools, and thus lays down the foundations of a double insecuritisation within the British Muslim community based on a hierarchical other.

The relationship between the Deobandi movement and colonialism reflects the influence that the construct of Britishness has had on schools of thought in Islam, whether historically or in current debates around British values and Islam. Historically, the movement formed in 1867, has been portrayed as an anti-colonial movement. Gilliat Ray writes that its followers saw themselves as morally superior to the British. “To indicate their distinctiveness, the founders stressed that the students at the Deoband daru'l-ulum should not dress like Englishmen, and should wear traditional Islamic attire” (Gilliat-Ray, 2010, p. 86). Despite its anti-colonial attitude, Amir Ali argues that the Deobandi model was a factor in the “emergence and creation of British Multiculturalism” (Ali, 2016, p. 47). The colonisation of India resulted in a loss of political power for the Muslims of India. This loss was coupled with the “prospect of having to live as a numerical minority and contend with the possible loss of religious and cultural identity in the face of the larger non-Muslim majority” (Ali, 2016, p. 42). The Deobandi School came up with a solution, which would prevent India being seen as dar-al-hab, the land of war, by creating the model of the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College, which Ali argues would become a way of life. He writes that this model was “thus constituted by the Muslim side accepting the reality of British political authority”. In contrast, the British allowed the Muslims “a distinct domain where Muslim religious and cultural practices could be carried out unhindered (Ali, 2016, p. 42)".
The Deobandi movement is now considered to be more conservative than their Barelvi counterparts. Abbas writes, “It needs to be emphasised that Barelvi’s are pious and peaceful Muslims whose devotion to spiritual and moral frameworks transcends their worldly constraints. The Deobandi movement, on the other hand, was formed as a direct response to the 1857 ‘uprising’ and, it could be argued, is stricter because of its more counter-ideological manifestations” (Abbas, 2011, p. 33). Lewis explains that the movement’s anti-colonial roots equipped their religious leaders for a new jihad. He writes that the “Deoband has generated pietist and activist streams” (Lewis, 2007, p. 2), and cites their stance on music as an example of their more conservative attitude. He writes that the movement “shares the Ahl-i-Hadith and Wahhabi view that music is prohibited”. Providing further examples, he examines the movement’s approach to women, as “socially subordinate to men”, as being “problematic in twenty-first century Britain” (Lewis, 2007, p. 45). This view of a more conservative movement is reflected in policies introduced post-2005. The support of initiatives such as the Barelvi-inspired Sufi council was seen as an attempt to counter conservative schools of Islam that were seen to be incompatible with British values. While the Deoband movement emerged to protect Islam in India under colonial rule, in Britain today, its followers are seen as seeking to “protect Islam from the threat of secularisation” (Abbas, 2011, p. 33).

5.3.1 The Global Ummah

By examining the role of the global ummah using Nasar Meer’s concept of Muslim consciousness, we can see that the changing discourse towards Muslims and a retreat from multiculturalism would also result in a move away from the model of village Islam that had been imported into Britain in the 1950s and 1960s. Here, identity was “constructed upon juxtapositions between geographies of ethnic origins and localities of birth” (Meer, 2010, p. 55). This can also be seen in the academic discourse, with Meer focusing on a social anthropological gaze which focused on “family, kinships or biraderi and transnationalism, among South Asian groups in particular” (Meer, 2010, p. 56). Meer uses Muslim consciousness as a way of “tracing the genealogical shift
from race to the emergence of religion as a salient marker of difference in specifically understanding how expressions of British Muslim identity have developed" (Meer, 2010, p. 55).

The rise of a Muslim identity can be seen following the Salman Rushdie affair, with the securitisation process emerging in reaction to a new Muslim political voice, which called for accommodation and protection under the law. In conceptualising Muslim consciousness, Meer first looks at the difficulties in defining Muslim identity. He begins with the question of whether “Muslim identity [is] a prescriptive religiosity?” Meer asks whether Muslim identity can be “derived from doctoral subscription to the shahada”, and builds on the work of Katherine Bullock, who looks at the Quran linguistically and the importance of different interpretations of the Quran (Meer, 2010, p. 60). Bullock work asserts that there are many different interpretations of the Quran, and the Deoband school is an example of this. Meer argues that Bullock’s work implies that the Quran, like any other text, is open to interpretation. “Hence, competing accounts of religiously informed Muslim identities can simultaneously be held without invalidating one another” (Meer, 2010, p. 62). Meer argues that, rather than a religiously informed identity, Muslimness is viewed as a quasi-ethnic sociological formation which allows for ethnic and religious boundaries to interact. This, he argues, could be a preferred way “of operationalising Muslim identity because it includes opportunities for self-definition” (Meer, 2010, p. 63). Here, self-identification is a more useful way of viewing Muslim identity, as this sociological categorisation helps differentiate between race and ethnicity. Meer further states that self-identifying as a Muslim brings its own sets of challenges, i.e. whether you were born into a Muslim family, close adherence to faith or even rejection of Muslim identity. He writes,

What is instead being argued is that when a Muslim identity is mobilised, it should not be dismissed because it is an identity of personal choice, but rather understood as a mode of classification according to the particular kinds of claims Muslims make for themselves, albeit in various and potentially contradictory ways (Meer, 2010, p. 238).

---

16 The shahada is the belief that there is only God, and that Mohammed [p.b.u.h.] is his messenger.
Using these ideas, we can build on self-identification as a way for Muslims to define themselves and move away from traditional labels of race. The first step in this formation of a new Muslim consciousness was to move away from a homogenous model of Islam. Traditional markers based on geography, such as Mirpuri, were replaced with schools of thought, predominately the Hanafi School. This lent itself to an overall Sunni model, which, when coupled with colonial ideas of race, marginalised minority Muslim groups. We can thus begin to see how the hierarchical structure within the British Muslim community emerged post-2005, and how a double securitisation has been used to influence Muslim identity. The next section looks at how the Muslim community in the UK has been securitised using Croft’s use of Post-Copenhagen model. It further builds on this idea by looking at the impact of securitisation in the aftermath of the September 11th terror attacks.

5.4 Blair’s Britain

Using the models set out by Kundnani and Croft in the preceding sections, we can trace the historical context of securitisation to the British Empire, with Islam being portrayed as the other. Discussing the construct of Britishness, Croft talks about the root dilemma which surrounds the term, “when is it is Britishness, and when Englishness?” (Croft, 2012b, p. 14) This section aims to look at the relationship between Britishness and Muslim identity, which was created through the securitisation process leading up to the July 7th London bombings. This section will investigate the emergence of a mutually constitutive relationship between securitisation and Muslim identity, through the two biographical markers identified in the previous sections, ‘British’ and ‘Muslim’. The securitisation process took part in an environment which was debating not only how Britishness should be constructed, but also around the role of multiculturalism. This section begins firstly by analysing multiculturalism under New Labour as the starting point from which to examine the contradistinction between a growing Muslim identity which sought accommodation for religious beliefs and an entrenched construct of Britishness. It will further

17 Reflecting the area of Pakistan from where a lot of migrant communities emerged
engage with the literature on Suspect Communities to use Hillyard’s definition to see whether securitising processes contribute to British Muslim communities being turned into suspect communities.

5.4.1 Multiculturalism

Modood writes that “Muslim identity politics was virtually created by The Satanic Verses affair”. He continues that the Muslim community made demands for recognition from “a polity that was struggling to recognise gender, race and ethnicity within the terms of citizenship but was not even aware that any form of civic recognition was due to a marginalised religious group” (Modood T., 2010, p. 119). The polity was not only struggling to recognise minority rights but also in its definition of Britishness. For New Labour, Britishness became a focal point as they attempted to create “a process within which various identities, national, regional, religious, secular, could be directed towards a progressive political direction (Croft, 2012b, p. 176)”. It was against this backdrop that a new discourse around multiculturalism emerged. Multiculturalism, Modood writes, “Gives political importance to respect for identities that are important to people, as identified in minority assertiveness, arguing that they should not be disregarded in the name of integration or citizenship” (Modood T., 2010, p. 112). He further argued that multiculturalism was a project where differences were not eliminated but were instead recognised. This section will adopt Modood’s assertion that “though ‘multiculturalism’ can have diverse meanings in different parts of the world, in Britain and, and Western Europe generally, it has come to mean the political accommodation of post immigration communities of non-European descent, primarily from former colonies and cheap sources of labour” (Modood T., 2010, p. 111). Using the markers set out in the methodology, with a focus on the war on terror and Islamophobia, we can examine the conditions which would lead to the insecuritization of Muslims following the July 7th London bombings. This period is used to highlight two crucial events. Firstly, the September 11th terror attacks, which formed part of the securitisation process. Secondly, the emergence of
a globalised ummah which would reflect the Sunni dominance, resulting in the creation of a double securitisation based on a hierarchal other.

5.4.2 The War on Terror

September 11th, 2001, terror attacks saw a critical change in the discourse surrounding multiculturalism, with Muslim identity replacing race. Meer argues that “This is partly due to the disrupting heterogeneity of ethnic, regional and linguistic backgrounds that have historically made up the constituency of Muslims in Britain, and how a Muslim-consciousness for itself has become ascendant more recently than racial and ethnic self-identification” (Meer, 2010, p. 56). This changing identity would be impacted by how the Muslim and British identities were being constructed in response to the securitising acts which followed the September 11th attacks. These newly constructed identities also provide another way in which we can analyse the mutually constitutive relationship between Muslim identity and securitisation. The securitisation process in the first instance would put boundaries between the state and HBT and the Muslim Council of Britain. The literature review discussed how the relationship the MCB had with the government changed because of their opposition to the Iraq War and the subsequent War on Terror. Meer writes that “it faced considerable public criticism from both government and civil service bodies (particularly of the centre-right) for allegedly failing to reject extremism clearly and decisively” (Meer, 2010, p. 90). For Hizb-ut-Tahrir, the war in Iraq resulted in a change in the way their public strategy was operationalised. Akhtar states that September 11th “was the turning point; that was when participating within the mainstream political system became delegitimised” (Akhtar, 2005, p. 149). This period would see the emergence of the discursive strategy that would be developed after the July 7th London bombings and which will be explored further in the chapter on Hizb-ut- Tahrir.

One of the initial acts by the UK government following the September 11th terror attacks would be the introduction of the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001. This was an amendment
to the Terrorism Act 2000 which was designed to "make further provision about terrorism and security; to provide for the freezing of assets; to make provision about immigration and asylum; to amend or extend the criminal law and powers for preventing crime and enforcing that law; to make provision about the control of pathogens and toxins; to provide for the retention of communications data" (Home Office, 2001). This act, along with other legislation introduced during this period such as the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 would be seen by some as a "war on civil liberties",\(^\text{18}\) with the debate focusing in particular on the proposed extension to the pre-charge detention length for terrorist suspects to a maximum of 42 days. These new legislative measures were part of a securitisation process which would coincide with what Ali terms the "retreat of multiculturalism" (Ali, 2016, p. 29). These new measures were part of a new securitisation process which would ‘other’ the British Muslim community within the prism of the international war on terror, which focused on radical Islam and which sought to protect ‘western values’.

Tony Blair made two significant speeches after the attacks. These speeches, like his post-July 7th speech, would foreshadow the way the securitisation process would rely on the construct of the other. His speech to the Labour Party on October 2nd, 2001, talked of the events of September 11th marking a turning point in history. This highlighted the differences between the regime of the Taliban in Afghanistan (believed to be sheltering terrorist leaders) and the global world. As he put it, "There is no sport allowed or television or photography. No art or culture is permitted", and as he continued, "Women are treated in a way almost too revolting to be credible, first driven out of university, girls not allowed to go to school, no legal rights (Blair, 2001)". Here we can see the beginnings of the securitisation process. Here, the regime is not presented as a threat to the British way of life and therefore as a source of fear causing ontological insecurity but shown in opposition to British values of equality in areas such as women’s rights. Blair continued that the war on terror was "not a fight for freedom. And I want to make it a fight for justice. Justice is not

\(^{18}\) This was criticised both the opposition in the House of Commons and by civil liberty groups such as Liberty and Statewatch.
only to punish the guilty. But justice to bring those same values of democracy and freedom to people around the world (Blair, 2001)"

The discourse surrounding the September 11th attacks and the securitisation we see within this period would set the context of the insecuritisation of British Muslims following the July 7th bombings. Muslim identity within this period began to be framed within the “language of the ‘war on terrorism” (Jackson, 2005, p. 61). While Jackson referred explicitly to the terrorist other, Croft’s framework allows us to analyse the way in securitisation reinforces the language, both through the elite and through media (re) securitisation. The September 11th terror attacks can thus be read as a crisis which became the “social mechanism through which the British Self has come to securitise the radical other” (Croft, 2012b, p. 107).

The legislation introduced in this period, which contributed to the securitisation processes can also be seen within the context of the suspect community literature. While Hillyard did not provide an actual definition of the term suspect community, here it is understood as the following. If a piece of anti-terrorism legislation as this discussed within this section, impacts on specific minority groups, distinguished by race or religion, more than any other group, this can turn these minorities into a suspect community (Hillyard, 2003). While Hillyard based his work on the Irish community, Pantazis and Pemberton argue that recent counter-terror legislation has turned British Muslim communities into suspect communities. They argue that the war on terror and the emphasis on Islamic fanaticism have turned British Muslims into a suspect community. (Pantazis & Pemberton, 2009, p. 646).

While we can argue that the introduction of Anti- Terrorism and Crime Act and the change in discourse set out by Jackson and Croft within this section, turned British Muslims into a suspect community, Greer sets out a note of caution. He argues that the claim “that anti-terrorist laws have turned some Muslim communities in Britain into ‘suspect communities’ presents a hypothesis open to empirical verification/falsification only if we know to which ‘Muslim communities’ it refers” (Greer, 2010, p. 1178). Consequently, when positioning the Muslim
community as members of the suspect community, it is necessary to distinguish whether the
securitising processes that contribute make the distinction between the moderate/radical other
dichotomies which emerged.

5.4.3 Islamophobia

The Salman Rushdie affair resulted not only in the growth of an anti-Islamic discourse but also
the emergence of 'new racism' which would further feed into the 'othering' which occurs as part
of the overall securitisation process. New Racism “became largely rooted in the frames of
inclusion and exclusion, specifying who and what may legitimately belong to a particular national,
ethnic or other population as well as determining what these particular norms might be” (Allen
C., 2010, p. 231). The use of Barker's new racism in analysing the way in Islamophobia has
become part of political discourse will allow us to examine, in later chapters, how the frames of
exclusion are used to create a hierarchical other within the British Muslim community.

The period following the September 11th terror attacks would see Islamophobia began to
manifest itself as part of the overall discourse as further questions emerged around the success
of multiculturalism, with the discourse changing from accommodation to assimilation. Tropes
surrounding Islamophobia, such as "Islam's adherents use their faith to gain political or military
advantage, Muslim criticism of western cultures and societies is rejected out of hand", began to
manifest themselves into the political and media discourse surrounding British Muslims (Abbas,
2004, p. 29). Abbas writes about how Muslims were portrayed in the media, referring to a "new
racist discourse" (Abbas, 2004, p. 30). Abbas refers to how the language of the war on terror
reinforced a narrative, where "newspaper reporting is symptomatic of the increased fear of the
Islamic terrorist since the 9/11 attacks" (Abbas, 2004, p. 30). The preceding sections discussed
examples of this in the TV series Spooks. Chris Allen further provides the example of the Daily
Mail and their coverage of the Islamist, Abu Hamza. Allen shows how Hamza’s image was used on
subsequent days (15th, 17th, 18th, 20th and 21st of September 2001). He argues that “This
repetitious use of Abu Hamza’s face and his subsequent words have brought about a situation where those reading this and who are ignorant of the Muslim community, must begin to believe he is a significant and largely representative other (Allen C., 2001). This can also be seen as an example of the media (re)securitisation set out in the Crofts interpretation of a Post Copenhagen model, where the media play a role in reinforcing securitising speech acts and constructing the Muslim community as a radical other.

The intersection between Islamophobia and securitisation can be further seen in political statements from the government after September 11th, 2001. The emphasis that New Labour placed on community cohesion can be seen as the groundwork for the Prevent legislation introduced after the July 7th London Bombings. Abbas writes that “Blair’s Britain is defining a new ethnicity – Englishness as opposed to Britishness - in an era of globalisation and devolution” (Abbas, 2004, p. 31). Using the example of a speech made by the then Home Secretary, David Blunkett, in which he highlighted a report examining inner-city violence, Abbas states that Labour’s community cohesion can be seen as an “illustration of Islamophobia in politics” (Abbas, 2004, p. 31). In the speech, made in 2001, Blunkett stated that while he believed everyone was of equal worth and dignity, “people should have the wherewithal, such as the ability to speak English, to participate fully in society. This is not ‘linguistic colonialism’ as my critics allege – it is about opportunity and inclusion” (Blunkett, 2001). He went on to argue that “Citizenship means finding a commonplace for diverse cultures and beliefs, consistent with the core values we uphold”. Blunkett’s speech implied that the accommodation of diverse beliefs could only occur if they fit within the ideal of British values.

The period following September 11th, saw a rise in attacks against Muslims in Britain, resulting in a proposed amendment to the Religious Hatred Offence Act in December 2001. While the proposed amendment was passed (Ayes 322, Noes 215), the preceding debate shows opposition to the bill being framed within the language of British values. In the parliamentary debate, John Gummer asked Beverly Hughes, who had proposed the amendment whether she would “help the
House, by explaining how she would draw the line between proper discussion of the influence of Islam on the treatment of women in many countries and what she feels would be an offence under the law" (Hansard, 2001). Diane Abbot further argued that “I believe that 99 per cent of what is fashionable to describe as Islamophobia is either an offence under racial hatred legislation or a straightforward public offence” (Hansard, 2001). She further linked the call for the amendment from the Muslim community back to the Salman Rushdie affair stating that:

The House needs to reflect on the genesis of the demand from the Muslim community for protection against incitement to religious hatred. I know what the genesis was because I was in the House at the time. The genesis of that powerful demand was the debate around Salman Rushdie. It is all about the issue of freedom of speech (Hansard, 2001)

The language of parliament reinforced ideas of Muslims as an ‘oriental’ other in this case. For John Gummer, Islam was not always compatible with values of equality, particularly when it came to women. For Abbot, linking the call for the amendment to the Salman Rushdie affair, echoed earlier debates which had brought to the fore the issues such as freedom of speech, the integration of immigrant communities, in this instance Muslims into a British Society.

5.5 Blair’s Speech

This section will examine how Hizb-ut-Tahrir and the Muslim Council of Britain reacted to the securitisation process that followed the July 7th bombings. This period forms the basis of this thesis. In his initial statement to the House of Commons following the attacks he declared that “People know full well the overwhelming majority of Muslims stand foursquare with every community in Britain. We were proud of your contribution to Britain before last Thursday. We remain proud of it today. Fanaticism is not a state of religion but a state of mind. We will work with you to make the moderate and true voice of Islam be heard” (Blair, 2005). This opening speech is arguably supportive of British Muslim communities. The address to parliament also
promoted the idea of a moderate model of Islam. This would be reflected in policy introduced which sought to encourage schools of thought such as Sufism over conservative schools of thought such as the Deoband portrayed as an ‘other’ whose values were incompatible with the construct of Britishness.

The speech also reflected a discourse we saw in the MCB’s statement regarding Muslim history in the UK, emphasising Muslim communities’ contributions to the country. His secondary statement in August 2005, would not only establish a radical other but “also sought to construct a particular identity for post-bombing Britain” (Croft, 2012b, p. 94). Croft creates the below table to show the differentiated signs in speeches such as Tony Blair’s. Using this allows us to look at the way that securitisation processes have affected our organisations and the British Muslim community (Croft, 2012b, p. 96).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Linked Signs – British Self</th>
<th>Differentiated Signs- Radical Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peaceful</td>
<td>Violent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supports the citizen</td>
<td>Murders the innocent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>Anti-democratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainstream, tolerant</td>
<td>Extreme, marginalising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic (homely comforting)</td>
<td>Foreign (strange, alien)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decent values (unspecified)</td>
<td>Anti-British way of life</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to the legal objectives set out in the speech, such as the use of control orders, the following excerpt from Tony Blair’s speech, discussing how people could acquire British citizenship, can be analysed using the differentiated signs set out by Croft. In his speech, Blair stated:

“We will review the threshold for this to make sure this is adequate, and we will establish with the Muslim community a commission to advise on how consistent with people's complete freedom to worship in the way they want and to follow their own religion and culture, there is better integration of those parts of the community presently inadequately integrated. (Blair, 2005)
Within this section of Blair's speech, we can see the inference that parts of the Muslim community are not fully integrated into the British way of life and that these are part of a differentiated 'other'. This was further extended to clerics, as Blair proposed that the government would “consult with Muslim leaders in respect of those clerics who are not British citizens to draw up a list of those not suitable to preach and who will be excluded from our country in the future” (Blair, 2005). In addition to Islam being portrayed as the radical other, we can here see the move to a model of Islam being promoted that would fit within British values.

Within Tony Blair’s speech, we also see the framework for the creation of a suspect community. The legislation which he introduced, in particular, Prevent can be seen to be targeting Muslim communities. This is particularly evident in the linking of Prevent to community funding groups as outlined in the literature review. The impact of the legislation on the organisations will be explored in the next chapters. In his research on suspect communities, Awan, however, argues that “British Muslims and young British men, in particular, feel a sense of alienation and resentment towards Prevent programs and counterterrorism legislation” (Awan, 2012, p. 1163).

While Awan shows that the amount of arrest and stop and search going on, this has a gendered element and most of the arrests made were on males. Furthermore, we can see from Croft’s table, using his linked/differentiated signs, attempts to differentiate between the radical and those Muslims whose Islam fitted into the British model of Islam. Therefore, while we can see the creation of elements of a suspect community, the definition, as suggested by Greer, does not allow for the label to be applied across the different British Muslim communities.

The proceeding chapters will explore how this would be used to create a double securitisation within the British Muslim community. Croft further focuses on Tony Blair’s statement that “British Muslims should understand that they are partners in getting these done. Croft writes, “A mainstream Muslim community is imagined and given this particular and identifiable and tolerated space in Britain” (Croft, 2012b). By creating an imagined Muslim community, and thus
securing the British Muslim community, the securitisation process would in the period of this thesis, impact the discourse of the three organisations.

5.6 Conclusion

This chapter sought to examine the conditions which led to the political environment that provides the timeline for this thesis. It firstly examined how the securitisation of British Muslim communities is formed within the UK. By following Stuart Croft’s relaxed Post Copenhagen model, it discussed how the British Muslim community had been securitised by setting two biographical markers against one another, ‘British’ and ‘Muslim’.

It further examined the construction of Britishness in its relation to Islam as the other. By tracing the relationship between the construction of Britishness and securitisation back to colonisation, the chapter examined the conditions leading up to the present practices of securitisation. This becomes particularly important when exploring the intersection between securitisation and Islamophobia, whose roots this chapter has shown lies in the construct of Islam of the other. The impact of colonisation and how it affected patterns of migration, in particular from Pakistan, allows us to understand how the current dominant model of Sunni Islam in the UK has emerged. It further allows us to begin to understand the double securitisation that occurs within the British Muslim community.

The next sections examined how the political discourse of Muslims in the UK had emerged, reacting firstly to race, secondly to multiculturalism and then finally to the War on Terror. The evolving discourses traced the mutually constitutive relationship between Muslim identity and securitisation. The Salman Rushdie affair allowed us to examine this, as Muslims in reaction to the publication of the Satanic Verses began to ask for more freedoms. While multiculturalism, can be seen as an attempt to create a new imagined community, one which accommodated different beliefs and culture, this also led to new racism. The discourse further changed with the September 11th terror attacks, the aftermath in which saw the advent of a new securitisation process, both through legislation and through the media. These two crises can be seen to run parallel to the
emergence of a new global ummah, one which this chapter has shown was based on a South Asian Sunni model of Islam. This would lay down the foundation for the double securitisation examined within this thesis and the creation of hierarchal other.

Finally, this chapter examines the securitising processes which occurred following the July 7th London Bombings. Using Croft’s model on linked and differentiated signs, it examined the way Tony Blair’s speeches following the attacks, created the conditions in which British Muslim communities were separated from the ‘in-group’ and seen as the radical/oriental other. The proceeding chapters will examine how each of our three groups reacted to this new securitisation policy and how this impacted their discursive strategy.
Chapter 6. We Never Claimed to Speak for Everybody

The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) defines itself as “an umbrella organisation dedicated to the common good, to the betterment of the community and the country” (MCB, 2002a). The organisation was established in 1997 in response to a call from the then home secretary, Michael Howard, for a single Muslim organisation that the government could work with. The MCB has over 500 affiliate members at a national, regional and local level. These include charitable foundations, groups with an international focus and individual members. Moodod writes that the MCB has come to “be accepted as a, if not the voice of Muslims by the government and other bodies” (Modood, 2011). The prominence of the MCB has grown to such an extent that a study into media reporting by the Henry Jackson Society found that the most prolific spokespeople over the last decade were the Muslim Council of Britain, with the report finding that of “3,945 religious claims identified, Muslims participated in 31% of these (a total of 1216). The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) was the most frequent of all the religious actors, with 410 items (7% of the total output)” (Ahmed & Stuart, 2012). The report defines claims as religious groups as either a response or a request to the government, state or public institution.

This chapter will set out to examine the discursive strategy of the MCB in the period following the July 7th bombings through an analysis of their public output. The output consisted of a combination of press releases, public reports and relevant newspaper articles. This chapter examines the way in which the MCB’s discursive strategy has emerged in response to the securitisation that occurred following the July 7th London bombings. The chapter argues that in response to this, the MCB has attempted to find a universal position, working with other civil groups on campaigns such as opposing an extension to the pre-detention time limit for terrorist suspects. Within this period, the MCB’s discursive strategy (particularly in the area of the War on

---

19 The report identifies a request for the government, state, or a public institution to act or a and a response as support for, opposition to, or criticism of the government, state, or a public institution or policy.
Terror) can be read as a reaction to policies introduced by successive governments and the subsequent securitisation that the previous chapter has set out.

This chapter will firstly focus on the historical relationship that the MCB had with the government prior to July 7th, 2005. The proceeding sections will use the different categories identified in the methodology to analyse the discursive strategies in the following areas: the war on terror, Islamophobia, religious engagement, political discourse and foreign affairs. While the war on terror formed the most significant single area of focus for the MCB in this period, the overall discursive strategy worked to address the ways in which policies introduced by the New Labour and coalition governments impacted on British Muslim communities through securitisation and media (re)securitisation. The chapter then analyses the way in which the MCB has worked with different civil groups such as the TUC to combat growing Islamophobia. Within the area of foreign affairs, the section will focus on acts of Islamophobia in other countries and issues such as the Palestine-Israel conflict. Within this area, the intertextuality of the MCB’s silence on critical issues will be examined.

The final sections on religious engagement and political discourse will further examine the way that the MCB has attempted to resist the securitisation of British Muslims and the construct of Muslim communities as an ‘other’. These sections focus on the campaigns which seek to highlight the contribution to British Muslims to the UK within the context of British values. Finally, this chapter explores the dual role that the MCB has. First, as an organisation, the MCB has been subject to securitisation processes. Secondly, while the MCB has shied away from being referred to as a gatekeeper organisation, its position within British Muslim communities repositions the organisation as an elite group. This then allows us to analyse the way in which they have sought to define the parameters of being a British Muslim.
6.1 Historical Relationship with Government

The advent of the Iraq war would see a change in the relationship between the MCB and the government, as the group registered their opposition to the conflict. The MCB evolved from a movement established during the Salman Rushdie affair and initially enjoyed a good working relationship with the government. At its inception, the MCB was conceived as an organisation which would have the ability to influence policy and "operated with the assumption that the mere fact of access to power would bring concessions" (Abbas, Muslim Britain: Communities under Pressure, 2005, p. 100). While the MCB enjoyed a close relationship with the New Labour administration, its critical stance on the war on terror, the government's invasion of Iraq and incidents such as the boycott National Holocaust Day, saw its influence start to wane (Meer, Citizenship, Identity and the Politics of Multiculturalism: The Rise of Muslim Consciousness, 2010, p. 90). The MCB's relationship with the government can be read as a microcosm for the ties that Muslim communities have had with the government, feeding into the 'good Muslim, bad Muslim' dichotomy. The relationship is also reflective of the evolving discourses that surrounded British Muslim communities following two crisis points, the September 11th terror attacks, and the July 7th London bombings.

The change in the MCB's relationship with the government can be seen as one of the group's earliest acts of resistance and would set the tone for their discursive strategy, which sought to co-opt British values. The MCB statement on its opposition to the military campaign in Iraq reads: "The Muslim Council of Britain reaffirmed its opposition to the war against Iraq stating that a pre-emptive strike against Iraq and a forceful 'regime change' would be illegal and could have catastrophic consequences for international peace and security" (MCB, 2002b). The MCB's

---

20The MCB boycotted the Holocaust Memorial Day under Iqbal Sacranie stating that it did not mention non-Jewish victims of genocide. It ended the boycott in 2007 stating that whilst it had always sought a more inclusive title such as Genocide Memorial Day to reflect earlier concerns, "there was a growing recognition amongst our affiliates that non-attendance of HMD was inadvertently causing hurt to some in the Jewish community (Dodd, Muslim Council ends Holocaust Memorial Day Boycott, 2003)."
opposition to the war, alongside Muslim MP’s and peers, was seen as an “unprecedented move
[which] put the prime minister on a collision course with the most senior elected representatives
of Britain’s 1.8 million Muslims (Dodd & Vasagar, 2003)”. An article in the Guardian, which
focused on Muslim MP’s opposition to the military campaign quotes Mohammed Sarwar, the first
elected Muslim MP, as saying “the terrible misery of war would be [followed] by the acceleration
of the radicalisation of the Muslim population in the UK and around the world” (Dodd & Vasagar,
2003). It further quoted an MCB warning that “the war would breed bitterness and conflict for
generations” (Dodd & Vasagar, 2003). Both the MCB and Sarwar argued that the war would affect
the relationship between British Muslims and the government, with the war being seen as a
possible cause of radicalisation. For the MCB, the securitisation processes and the War on Terror
would necessitate a need for them to provide an alternative discourse to an emerging dominant
narrative around British Muslim communities.

This period also saw the MCB begin to challenge the way in which the media recreated narratives
around the Iraq war. In November 2004, a press release discussed the lack of coverage on a report
in the Lancet which focused on the impact that the war had on civilian mortality in Iraq. They
stated:

At the same time, the Muslim Council of Britain is disappointed that much of the British
media are once again failing to truly convey the full horror of what is occurring in Iraq. The
low-key coverage given by our media to the astonishing report last week in the scientific
journal, The Lancet, which estimated that more than 100,000 Iraqi civilians have died than
would have been expected had the invasion of Iraq not occurred, is truly regrettable (MCB,
2004a).

It is within this context, with the MCB challenging both the government and media narratives,
that the securitisation of British Muslims and the MCB’s resistance to this would emerge post-July
7, 2005.
6.2 Overall Analysis of Press Releases 2005-2013

While the MCB is seen as one of, if not the leading Muslim organisation in Britain, its relevance to Muslims in the UK has been questioned. An article in the Guardian claimed that in 2015 only 6% of Muslims felt that the MCB represented their view (Saner, 2015). Its relationship with wider Muslim communities can be seen through its list of affiliates, whose fees provide the core funding for the organisation (MCB, 2002a). While the organisation argues that its members are illustrative of the different Islamic sects, the affiliate list, for the most part, consists of mosques and Islamic organisations, the majority of which are Sunni. While seeking to be representative of all Islamic sects in the UK, the MCB does not represent any Ahmadi Muslim groups. The MCB questions the Ahmadi interpretation of Islam, arguing, “The MCB reflects the clear theological position expressed across Islamic traditions; namely the cornerstone of Islam is to believe in One God and the finality of the prophet of the Messenger Muhammed, peace be upon him” (MCB, 2006a). Here we see an example of the dual role that the MCB plays, using a theological position to create an ‘other’ within the British Muslim ‘community’, one which is separate to an imagined mainstream British Muslim ‘community’.

The religious identity of the MCB further influences its aims and organisations and creates a focal point based on shared interests and beliefs. This will also be analysed in Chapter Nine, where the double securitisation of British Muslims through the creation of a hierarchal other is explored. The analysis of press releases within the category of religious engagement reveals how a Sunni model of Islam impacts not only their religious identity but is also used as a part of how they construct the idea of moderate Muslim communities in the UK.

6.2.1 Organisation Aims

The MCB lists its aims as an organisation as:

- To promote cooperation, consensus and unity on Muslim affairs in the UK
• To encourage and strengthen all existing efforts being made for the benefit of the Muslim community
• To work for a more enlightened appreciation of Islam and Muslims in the wider society.
• To establish a position for the Muslim community with [the] British society that is fair and based on due rights
• To work for the eradication of disadvantages and forms of discrimination faced by Muslims
• To foster better community relations and work for the good of society as a whole (MCB, 2002a).

The MCB sets itself out as a community-based organisation whose focus is on the rights of Muslim communities. It further seeks to increase the integration of British Muslims into the wider society and to challenge discrimination faced by British Muslims. As an organisation, it aims to challenge the ‘othering’ that occurs within the period of this thesis and to show that the values of British Muslim communities are not only compatible with but are British values. The MCB further strives to provide an alternative discourse to the one which emerged as a result of the securitisation process. The press releases as such are aimed not at its Muslim affiliates but are intended for the ‘in-group’ and other social elites in society. Where the MCB wishes to communicate directly with British Muslim communities, it uses the method of the Friday Khutbah. The section on political engagement will show how messages to British Muslim communities are summarised for press releases only.

Table 1 (below) represents the breakdown of press releases issued by the MCB from 2005 - 2013 based on the categories identified within the methodology.
In the period between 2005 and 2013, the MCB released a total of 358 press releases. In descending order, the largest of these categories (with a total of 78) is the ‘War on Terror’, followed by ‘Islamophobia’ (73 press releases). The category of ‘Religious Engagement’, listed on the organisational aims listed by the MCB as an area of focus, consisted of 19.5 % of overall outputs with 70 press releases relating to this category. ‘Political Discourse’ and ‘Foreign Affairs’ made up the remaining 137 press releases at 68 and 69 respectively. A breakdown of these figures by year is shown in Figure 2 below.
Table 2 shows that the category, the war on terror was a principal area of focus for the MCB in the period of this thesis, with press releases on this topic amounting to 22% of its total output. Analysing these categories in descending order shows that religious engagement forms only 19.5% of the MCB's total output. The yearly breakdown reveals that it is not until 2012, that religious engagement emerges as the largest category.

From the two tables above, we can begin to identify trends within the different categories. Similar patterns occur in the categories; the war on terror and Islamophobia in terms of the frequency they appear yearly. Plotting this throughout the period of this thesis shows a clear correlation between the two areas. The foreign affairs category reveals (apart from consistent reporting on the Israel-Palestine conflict, and Islamophobia in different countries) that the MCB’s discursive strategy is responsive to unfolding events such as the war in Lebanon, and the Syrian crisis in 2012. Here the discursive strategy is understood to be how the MCB attempted to shape the public conversation and policy around the two events.
In the categories of political discourse and religious engagement, we can see the areas in which the securitisation policies of successive governments both impacted the organisation and the acts of resistance that the MCB perform as part of the audience. Here we also see their dual role emerge as they lay down the foundations for the double securitisation in their role as an elite group within the British Muslim community. These categories also see the MCB place emphasis on engaging with different civil groups within the UK (particularly within England). It is within these latter two categories that we see the only press releases which deal with Muslim women. With just 3 out of 358 press releases focusing on women, this represents only 0.8% of the overall press releases. The below tables compare the top 10 areas highlighted from both a numerical and percentile view.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>W.O. T</th>
<th>Islamophobia</th>
<th>Foreign Affairs</th>
<th>Political Discourse</th>
<th>Religious Engagement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>78</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 3- Numerical Analysis- Breakdown by Top Frequency*
Table 4 - Percentile Analysis - Breakdown by Top Frequency

If we analyse the Top 10 areas highlighted in the numerical and percentile tables, the key areas of focus remain similar. The primary areas of difference are the categories of political discourse and religious engagement, which as a percentile feature within the top 10 areas of focus within this period. The numerical analysis also reveals that despite the proportional difference between the areas of Islamophobia and religious engagement, the overall variation of just three press releases shows that both of these areas have had almost equal representation from the MCB. The proceeding sections will analyse the discursive strategy of the MCB relating to these five categories in further detail.

6.3 The War on Terror

An analysis of the public output of the MCB reveals that the war on terror forms the largest category. Within this category, the MCB’s discursive strategy focuses on the international war on
terror, its domestic impacts and policies introduced by the government in the wake of the July 7th bombings. The previous chapter highlighted the way in which these events, seen as crisis points, contributing to the securitisation of British Muslims in this period. The July 7th bombings had once again changed the temporal and spatial nature of what it meant to be British and the attempts at redefining ‘Britishness’ are essential to understanding the MCB's discursive strategy within this period. As the Commission for Racial Equality stated: "There are a number of potential bases for a unifying national identity; a common lifestyle, culture, or values, a shared history or founding myths; shared political institutions; [and] a constitution" (Commission of Racial Equality, 2005). Croft further argues that under New Labour Britishness would be a critical focal point, "creating a process within which various identities – national, regional, religious, secular – could be renegotiated towards a progressive political direction" (Croft, 2012b, p. 177).

It is within these two constructs of what a new Britishness may look like, that we can analyse the MCB’s discursive strategy. This strategy sought to move discussions of policy away from a community-focused approach towards one based on shared principles of human rights. This focused on legislative arguments as opposed to arguments based on the principles of the Quran and Sharia. Here the use of secular language in their public discourse allows the MBC to co-opt the language of ‘British values’ and allows for a renegotiation of identity which builds on notions of shared history and a common legal system. The use of secular language allows the alternate discourse of the MCB to engage with the overall political construction of both British values and the portrayal of Muslims as the other.

The below tables (5 and 6) show the extent to which the MCB’s press releases relating to the category of the war on terror were centred on secular as opposed to religious language. Table 6 reveals that 69% of the press releases in this category were secular in tone, emphasising issues of international law and human rights. In contrast, those statements which used religious
arguments\textsuperscript{21} as part of their language focused on condemning acts of terror, such as the July 7th bombings and the Lee Rigby murder, attempting to move the image of the ‘radical other’.

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{war_on_terror.png}
\caption{WAR ON TERROR}
\end{figure}

Table 5-Secular vs Religious Language Yearly Breakdown

The discursive strategy of the MCB in this area becomes apparent in early statements concerning the war on terror. Discussing the return of detainees from Guantanamo Bay, the MCB writes that

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{war_on_terror_2.png}
\caption{WAR ON TERROR}
\end{figure}

Table 6 Overall Breakdown Secular vs Religious Language (War on Terror)

it “continues to call upon the UK government also to abide by the decision of the Law Lords who in December 2004 ruled that the indefinite detention of foreign terrorism suspects without trial in Belmarsh prison violates human rights” (MCB, 2005a). Another example of this can be seen in its response to an attack on a mosque in Iraq by American forces in 2004, which occurred in retaliation to the killing of four American civilians by Iraqi insurgents. In an open letter to Dan Sreebny, the then US Minister Counselor for Public Affairs in the US, the MCB condemned the killings of the American civilians “as against the clear teachings of Islam” (MCB, 2004b). It continued, accusing the US government of having “been not only in clear violation of the Geneva Conventions governing the obligations of an occupying power but in attacking a mosque, a place of worship, it was also violating the religious sanctity and deep sensitivities of Muslims the world over” (MCB, 2004b). Here we see the MCB attempt to separate the teachings of Islam from the killings and to frame its opposition within an international legal framework, by referencing the Geneva Convention. This discursive strategy is later repeated, with the MCB arguing that the government had “an obligation to protect the lives of its citizens, but it also has an obligation to respect their liberties and freedoms. The cornerstone of our justice system is that it should be open and transparent” (MCB, 2004c). Here we see one of the possible unifying principles identified in attempting to define a new Britishness and a new national identity – namely, shared legal principles – being used to frame the MCB’s opposition.

This discursive strategy can also be seen following the July 7th bombings in response to the wave of new legislation that was introduced following Tony Blair’s speech. In the immediate months after the attacks, the government introduced several measures designed to “tackle support for, and the promotion of violent Islamist ideologies within British societies” (Stevens, 2009). These measures included the 2006 Terrorism Act and a proposed ban on Hizb-ut-Tahrir (and its successor organisation Al Mujahiroun, both described by the government as being violent extremist groups).22 These measures also included the introduction of the new anti-terror

22 Al Mujahiroun was banned in 2006 as a result of this legislation.
framework – Prevent. Its aims included increasing engagement with Muslim communities in addition to “the training of imams and the role of mosques; community security and police relations; and finally tackling extremism and radicalisation” (UK Home Office, 2005).

The MCB was resolutely opposed to the new-anti terror legislation, and similarly, their opposition to the Iraq war, framed their critique using the language of liberty and justice. As they put it: “the Government’s attempt to criminalise non-violent organisations, groups and individuals for supporting legitimate causes around the world and expressing political opinion will result in a loss of trust between the Muslim community and the Government” (MCB, 2006). In response to the government’s proposed Terrorism Bill, for example, the MCB questioned not only the government’s definition of terrorism but further advised: “MP’s to reflect upon the serious ramifications of introducing legislation which severely curtails fundamental civil liberties and affect community cohesion” (MCB, 2006b).

The emphasis on civil liberties can also be seen in the MCB’s opposition to the use of secret evidence in the trials of terrorist suspects. Welcoming a ruling by the Law Lords that secret evidence could not be used in such cases, the MCB claimed that: “The use of secret evidence in obtaining sanction for restriction on one’s liberty offends fundamental norms of civilised justice”, and further argued that while they were “supportive of bringing the full rigour of the law to bear on those who engage or plan to engage in terror”, the proposed legislation had the ability to restrict civil liberties (MCB, 2009a).

In March 2007, the MCB called for a review of the terrorism legislation focusing on fears that “the legislation [was] being used indiscriminately and disproportionately” (MCB, 2007a). While the statement focused on a review of the legislation, it also revealed the securitising impact that this

---

23 The Terrorism Act 2006 used the definition of terrorism from the Terrorism Act 2000 which stated that “Terrorism” means the use or threat of action where: 1. The action falls within subsection (2), 2. The use or threat is designed to influence the government or an international governmental organisation or to intimidate the public or a section of the public. 3. The use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause. [https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-terrorism-act-2006](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-terrorism-act-2006) This was extended to include specific actions (defined by the bill against international organisations such as the UN.
had on Muslim communities. The statement explored how extraordinary measures, required as part of the securitisation process, introduced as part of the terrorism legislation, had impacted on the Muslim communities. The press release highlighted the fact that of all the arrests made under the terrorism legislation, only 3% of these led to a guilty verdict. The then, Secretary General Abdul Bari, further highlighted the role that the media had played within this securitisation process, arguing that: “Given the media circus that arrests attract carried out under terrorism legislation it is now manifestly obvious that this legislation has blighted the lives of more than a thousand innocent individuals and their families” (MCB, 2007a). The statement also highlighted the difference in publicity, when individuals were found to be innocent, emphasising the role that the media (re)securitisation had in portraying Muslims as the radical other. This is another example of Allen’s claim that the continued representation of Muslims in this way, to those not familiar with Muslim communities, will reinforce them as the radical other. The statement continued:

We urge the government to ensure that political pressure and the much-repeated mantra of a ‘war on terror’ not drive our law enforcement agencies into overzealous conduct. We are appalled that some Muslims are involved in terror plots. In this context, the MCB has acknowledged that within the Muslim community in the United Kingdom, there is a problem. The MCB reiterates that a Muslim cannot and must not engage in an act of violence that kills or has the potential to kill innocent people. Just as the Muslim community has the duty to articulate its repulsion for acts of terror, and against the perpetrators of such acts, the government has a responsibility to address the causes for such acts. The government can only discharge that responsibility if it holds a public inquiry to find the true reasons for such acts, as the MCB has repeatedly stated. We repeat that call (MCB, 2007a).

If we view these securitising processes as ontologically destabilising acts, we can explore how they feed into feelings of anxiety for some British Muslims. Anxiety can threaten the individual’s sense of self-identity and obscures the way they view the world (Giddens, 1991). The war on terror and the securitisation processes acted as a crisis point for Muslims, an act which interrupted their daily routines. The disruption to routines caused by securitisation will be explored in the next section. The assertion of British values and the positioning of British Muslims
as radical/oriental other, would also for some Muslims challenge their concept of home. Kinnvall stated that ontological security is something that is maintained “when home is able to provide a site of constancy in the social and material environment” (Kinnvall, 2004, p. 747) For some British Muslims the social constancy was challenged as their practices and routines were presented as a threat to British values. The MCB statement sought to combat this, by differentiating between ‘Muslim community’ and those who were involved in terror plots.

6.3.1 Prevent

The previous chapter highlighted the securitising measures which were introduced in a series of speeches following the July 7th bombings aimed at tackling the threat of domestic terrorism. The measures introduced sought not only to change counter-terrorism legislation but also focused on the role of imams and mosques, with Tony Blair proposing the ability to shut down places of worship found guilty of promoting terrorism. Blair’s speech and the subsequent legislation continued to take British Muslim communities out of the audience (which Croft defines as the in-group) and repositioned them as a radical/oriental other causing ontological insecurity. Within these securitising acts which also targeted places of worship, sites of daily worship for some Muslims, we saw an interruption to the daily routines of some British Muslims. We explored in Chapter three, how trust in the ability to bracket of all sorts of possibilities was an essential part of ontological security. Here, the interruptions to routines caused by these securitisations (in the case of stop and search at times physical) can be seen as ontologically destabilising act. As explored in Chapter five, Tony Blair’s speech in temporal terms positioned British Muslims communities as a separate other, interrupting their biographical continuity, which is central to ontological security. Here then can see examples of how securitisations have led to ontological insecurity for British Muslims.

The MCB’s discursive strategy in this category can thus be seen as an act of resistance as it sought to combat these securitising moves and as part of an attempt to create a new ontological security.
The organisation’s initial response to Prevent was tentatively positive. It welcomed the efforts of the government to work with grassroots groups as a means of tackling extremism and referred to the plan as “clearly sensible proposals designed to protect us all” (MCB, 2007b). It cautioned, however, that the government “must choose its partners with care and good sense, ensuring that it is properly engaged and representative bodies are enlisted for support” (MCB, 2007b).

The MCB further focused on the impact that the proposed legislation would have on the Muslim community. Prevent was seen to be turning Muslims into a ‘suspicious community’, and as an attempt by the government to “engineer a moderate form of Islam” (MCB, 2010a). This highlights a tension within the MCB’s dual role: Firstly, being subject to securitisation, and therefore finding itself as part of the ‘other’ with their access to the government limited in favour of groups such as the Sufi Council. Secondly, in their role as an elite group within British Muslim communities, in choosing to highlight/exclude schools of thoughts in Islam, the MCB positioned themselves as one of the groups who could help set the tone for moderate Islam in the UK.

Following the proposed introduction of CONTEST 2 in 2009, the MCB argued that the plans would not only affect the “the already fragile state of community relations but will also contribute to a self-perpetuating climate of fear” (MCB, 2009b). As they put it:

> In recent years, we have endured a policy that has been at the mercy of a handful of cynical ideologues that have appeared out of nowhere, but are now the benefactors of a massive stimulus package to the ‘prevent economy’. They have sought to portray British Muslims as a policy problem through the narrow focus of security and demanded that only those who sign up to their own undefined set of values be considered part of British society (MCB, 2009c).

In their view, the government was “in danger of adopting misguided notions of extremism as dictated by xenophobic commentators who profit from creating a hostile atmosphere from which bigots can draw” (MCB, 2009d).
A vital part of the new counter-terrorism legislation was the attempt by New Labour, under both Blair and Brown successively, to extend the pre-charge detention period for terrorist suspects. In response to the first proposed extension by Tony Blair in 2005, the MCB expressed “alarm at the prospect of the extension in detention from 14 to 90 days” (MCB, 2005b). In 2007, the MCB again opposed a second attempt by the government to extend the detention period from 28 to 56 days, claiming that it had no support across the political spectrum. They stated that: “Its opposition is not driven by any dogma but by a stark lack of evidence in support of the need for extension” (MCB, 2007c).

The MCB further opposed the proposed prohibition of groups such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HBT), releasing a statement which argued that HBT was a non-violent group, and reaffirmed findings from a joint Home Office/Foreign Office report which had noted that HBT “considers violence or armed struggle … a violation of the Islamic sharia [law]” (Leigh, 2005). It condemned the proposed ban, stating: “If there are groups that are thought to be contravening our laws, then they ought to be prosecuted in courts of law, not driven underground. Our democratic values need to be upheld, not undermined” (MCB, 2005c). Here we see the MCB framing their argument within the context of shared democratic values built on a shared legal system.

6.4 Islamophobia

The previous chapters highlighted the intersection between Islamophobia and securitisation and showed that Islamophobia draws upon issues of race, culture, and belonging. It is, therefore, not just linked to religion alone but also stereotyping and political conflicts. The public output for the MCB within this category refers both to the war on terror and the role the media played in the securitisation process with its portrayal of Muslims as the radical other. As the MCB stated in the wake of the 9/11 attacks: “leading columnists and politicians are using inflammatory language which can only contribute to feeding anti-Muslim feelings” (MCB, 2002c). In their public output regarding Islamophobia, the MCB reflected the discursive strategy displayed in the category of
the war on terror. The press releases continue to be an act of resistance against Islamophobic acts of speech and violence.

The discourse in this category focuses on Islamophobic acts within the international and domestic arenas and attempts to links these to broader conflicts. While the MCB does not set out to prove a causal relationship between the war on terror and Islamophobia, the below graph shows that a clear pattern of correlation in the MCB’s press releases on these themes can nevertheless be established.

![Graph showing correlation between War on Terror and Islamophobia press releases (2004-2014)](image)

*Table 7-War on Terror /Islamophobia Press Releases 2005-2013*

For the MCB, the focus was not only on acts of Islamophobia but also on acts committed by the US-UK government as part of the war on terror which were themselves explicitly Islamophobic. In response to a Newsweek article in May 2005, which exposed the desecration of the Quran in Guantanamo Bay as part of ‘interrogation methods’, the MCB attributed the responsibility to the United States government itself. They stated that: “The United States' ill-concealed contempt for international law has created a culture where some of its officials feel able to denigrate the faith of Islam and the sensibilities of Muslims with impunity” (MCB, 2005d). While this article was later retracted, with Newsweek issuing an apology, the MCB released no further press release to acknowledge this. A new press release in April 2010 referred to the news that replica mosques
were being used as part of the firing practice in training sessions in Catterick (BBC, 2010). The MCB stated that: “this totally unacceptable and worrying practice of using replica mosques as firing targets plays into the very hands of those on the far right who take aim at mosques” (MCB, 2010b). In both these press releases, the MCB stressed that there was no institutional Islamophobia at play by the wider military. While the incident was seen as a consequence of the war on terror, there was no suggestion that the war on terror itself was an Islamophobic endeavour.

In the period preceding the London July 7th bombings, the MCB’s discourse regarding Islamophobia began to focus on the role of the media and the negative portrayal of Muslims both within popular culture and factual news programmes. An early example of this can be seen in 2005 when the MCB registered a complaint with OFCOM over the drama serials ‘24’, arguing that it had an “unremittingly hostile and unbalanced portrayal of Muslims” (MCB, 2005e). The press release went on to reference the ITC programme code which states that: “No programme should be transmitted which is intended to stir up racial hatred, or taking into account the circumstances, is likely to do so” (MCB, 2005e). This concern about the stereotyping of Muslims within the media would set the tone for the discourse surrounding portrayals of Muslims in the UK, which the MCB argued perpetuated negative stereotypes of Muslims and promote sectarian division.

In 2007 Channel 4’s Dispatches aired the programme, Undercover Mosques which looked at extremist speakers in British mosques. The programme showed clerics promoting jihad and punishing girls for not wearing the hijab. In an article about the programme, the Guardian stated that: “Many of the preachers are linked to the Wahhabi strain of Islam practised in Saudi Arabia, which funds a number of Britain’s leading Islamic institutions” (Doward, 2007). It further stated that the programme showed the deputy headmaster of an Islamic high school, which the paper describes as a Dar-ul-alum, disagreeing with the word democracy. He is quoted as saying that “They should call it ... Kuffrocracy, that’s their plan. It’s the hidden cancerous aim of these people” (Doward, 2007). The programme can be viewed as an example of media (re) securitisation.
through its focus on the Wahhabi sect of Islam, and the use of the Deobandi term, Dar-ul-alum. In its portrayal of the mosque as contrary to British values of democracy and equality, the programme perpetuated views of some Muslims as the ‘radical other’. An association was thus indicated between the radical ‘other’ and the aforementioned schools of thought.

The MCB argued that the programme was a further example of the “continuing demonisation of British Muslims”, and an “attempt to foment sectarian divisions among British Muslims” (MCB, 2007d). The documentary focused on three groups, which it claimed to have links to Islamist groups and accused them of inviting speakers with anti-Shia sentiments. The MCB statement defended the three groups featured in the documentary, Markazi Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith, the London Islamic Cultural Centre and the UK Islamic Mission, who were all affiliated with the MCB and referred to them as “leading UK Islamic institutions” (MCB, 2007d). We can see this response again in the reaction to another Dispatches programme in March 2010, titled Britain’s Islamic Republic, which examined the newly elected mayor of Tower Hamlets, Luftur Rahman, and his links to the Islamic Forum of Europe. The MCB argued that the programme fed into “shrill anti-Muslim discourse, which perpetuated the idea of an Islamic Republic of Britain. The programme by Andrew Gilligan called into question the influence of institutions such as the Islamic Forum, which it accused of having “undue and pernicious influence over the politics of our country” (MCB, 2010c). The MCB’s statement argued that while British Muslims were encouraged to take part in civic and democratic life, the Andrew Gilligan documentary had echoes of “the rhetoric of far-right extremists, that British Muslims are somehow foreign, alien, extremist and imposing their way of life on the others” (MCB, 2010c).

This discursive strategy is further evident in response to an article featured in The Times newspaper in 2007. This article claimed that “almost half of Britain's mosques are under the control of a hard-line Islamic sect whose leading preacher loathes Western values” (Norfolk, 2007). The MCB responded to the allegation through an article in the Guardian, by the then media secretary, Inayat Bunglawala which protested that the programme was an example of the
“ongoing trial by media of mainstream British Muslim organisations and Movements” (MCB, 2007e).

The development of the war on terror also saw a rise in high-profile Islamophobic attacks, with Tell MAMA reporting that the immediate period following the July 7th bombings saw a 573% increase in Islamophobic incidents. The tenth anniversary of the September 11th attacks saw threats from a pastor in America to publicly burn a Quran, which the MCB described as a “deliberate provocation” (MCB, 2010d). A statement by the MCB condemning the plans ended with a call to Imams and community leaders to “play their part in illustrating the isolated nature of this case and redouble our efforts to strengthen ties” (MCB, 2010d).

The attempt to place Islamophobia in a broader context and link this to the work of other groups can also be seen in 2012 with the MCB convening a workshop which brought together several academics, community activists and researchers. The workshop sought "to address the 'disconnect' evident between debates within the academic community and developments at both grassroots level and policy planning" (MCB, 2012a). The role of policy-makers and their role in combatting Islamophobia was a recurring theme, with the MCB arguing for a change to religious incitement laws, highlighting that "there was a growing disenchantment at the lacklustre response by our political leaders to speak out against anti-Muslim hatred" (MCB, 2010e). Such was the rise of Islamophobia during this period that the MCB echoed Baroness Warsi’s concerns that Islamophobia was not only on the increase but:

that Muslim communities in Britain have been viewing with consternation the gradual build-up of incidents, ranging from clumsy references to Muslim practices in the media (e.g. the recent references to the 'Islamification' of Britain because of conversions), the sensationalist headlines ('Why are 36% of our universities training Muslim terrorists?' – in a recent Sunday paper) and finally the intimidation outside mosques, physical damage to mosques and cemeteries and bodily attacks (MCB, 2011a).

While the MCB remained concerned at the increasing attacks on Muslims, there was also concern at the perceived inertia from the government in dealing with Islamophobic events.
6.5 Religious Engagement

Despite the secular language of its discourse relating to the war on terror, one of the significant areas of focus for the MCB in this period remained religious engagement, with the MCB seeking to promote an alternate view of Islam to that of the radical/oriental ‘other’ and advocating for religious rights for Muslim communities. Reflecting one of their key aims as an organisation, for the MCB, its religious engagement took several guises. These included advocating for greater religious freedoms, increasing awareness of Islam and highlighting the contribution of Muslims in the economy. This reflected the attempts by the organisation to highlight the way in which Islam augmented British life, and this category sees further examples of the MCB emphasising the ‘good Muslim approach’. Seen within the prism of the Post Copenhagen theory, we can see as an attempt from the MCB to portray Muslims as part of the ‘in-group’.

One of the ways in which the MCB sought to do this was through the creation of educational packs. These were implemented with several LEA’s over 2006 and 2007 and were designed to promote a basic understanding of Islam. A further ‘Books for School’ campaign was launched in May 2010 aimed at delivering a better understanding of Islam in primary schools. Sponsored by Muslim Aid, the move was designed to “increase public understanding and confidence in the way religious education is delivered in schools” (MCB, 2010f). This reflects one of the discursive strategies seen in the section on Islamophobia, that of working with other civic groups to spread awareness of Islam. In choosing to work with elite groups such as trade unions and LEA’s, the MCB was able to co-opt the ability of the ‘audience’, those who could resist securitising acts which impacted British Muslim communities.

In addition to civil rights organisations, the MCB also chose to work with different religious groups to advocate for the right of Muslims to follow their beliefs, and this formed the basis of several campaigns by the MCB. One of the most prominent of these was the Freedom of Conscience campaign, which supported the Catholic and Anglican Churches in their objections to the Sexual Orientation Regulations (SOR). SOR was introduced in 2007 as part of the Equality Act
and outlawed discrimination on the provision of goods, facilities, services and education on the grounds of sexual orientation. The MCB argued that the “right to practice one’s faith, or the freedom to have no belief, is a cornerstone of our society as is the right of all to live free from unfair discrimination and harassment” (MCB, 2007g). This press release would see the MCB combine religious and secular arguments, arguing that as “homosexuality is forbidden in Islam”, the laws designed to prevent discrimination on sexual grounds would restrict the right of some Muslims to practice their faith (MCB, 2007g). They argued that the idea that the Sexual Orientation Regulations would have no exemptions based on religion “was absurd and inconsistent with domestic as well as international legal precedents” (MCB, 2007g). The MCB’s stance on homosexuality was again emphasised in its condemnation of a group from Derby calling for violence against gay men. As they put it: “In Islam, there is no allowance for inciting hatred and violence against any people, even if any of their practices are religiously disapproved. While vigorous dialogue and debate around issues of controversy is certainly constructive, this must always take place in the context of mutual respect and tolerance” (MCB, 2012b).

Similarly, the MCB would again draw on a shared campaign to argue that definitions of marriage should remain the same. In their opinion: "Like other Abrahamic faiths, marriage in Islam is defined as a union between a man and a woman. So, while the state has accommodated for gay couples, such unions will not be blessed as marriage by the Islamic institutions” (MCB, 2012c). While the MCB condemned discrimination, it also argued for exemptions and changes in the law which went against its underlying message that in Islam, homosexuality is forbidden.

6.5.1 Women and Religion

Although there is limited fieldwork on the gendered aspect of securitisation, the niqab and jilbab have become symbols of oppression in securitisation processes. Despite the focus on women's groups as part of CONTEST, the MCB’s public output on women in this period remains very limited, amounting to less than 0.8% of their overall public output. These are overall, found within the category of religious engagement.
While the MCB acknowledged a report from the Equality Opportunities Commission in 2007, which looked at the progression of ethnic minority women in the workplace, and echoed calls for a policy shift in this direction, this made no specific reference to Muslim women. The MCB focused instead on the increasing diversity of British Mosques, pointing out that 15% of all mosques now featured women as part of their management committees (MCB, 2006c). It followed this up with recommendations centred on increasing the involvement of women in mosques, as well as the need to include facilities for women as part of their Voices from the Minaret Report.

Where the MCB discusses Muslim women, the focus is centred on their role on the committees of Muslim faith organisations, and their right to wear religious garments. On the latter, the MCB provided comment in the high court decision to deny a schoolgirl the right to wear a jilbab at school in a 2004 case (BBC, 2004). The MCB defended the right of women to wear the jilbab, arguing that the Muslim community was diverse, in terms of interpretation and its understanding of faith and its practice. As they put it, within this broad-spectrum, those that consider the jilbab to be part of their faith requirement for modest attire “should be respected” (MCB, 2004d).

6.5.2 The Green Vote

A recurring theme within the category of religious engagement has been that of encouraging the Muslim vote. The Muslim turnout for general elections is traditionally smaller than that from the overall population, at 48% compared to 65% (Akhter, 2013). The MCB was instrumental in encouraging voting in this period, encouraging Imams to use the Friday *khutbah* to encourage Muslims to vote as a means of getting involved with, and making a positive influence on issues that affected their communities. They stated: “There is a lot of pressure on the government to tackle vital issues that affect us all, such as youth unemployment, high crime rates, lack of affordable housing and congested transport. Muslims should exercise their judgement and use this opportunity to vote for candidates who will make a positive difference” (MCB, 2010g). The MCB also used theological arguments to support campaigns encouraging Muslims to vote, stating that: “Imams from Islam’s diverse theological traditions, say that Muslims have an obligation to
join hands with others to elect those who will seek the common good” (MCB, 2010g). The MCB issued a further statement calling for Muslim voters to engage in a forthcoming election in 2005, citing the opinion of Islamic scholars. They stated: “Our Islamic scholars are convinced in their opinion that British Muslims must increase their engagement with the wider British society with a view to fulfilling the Qur’anic commandment to “enjoin the good and forbid the wrong” (MCB, 2005g).

While the MCB sought to remain a non-partisan organisation, where they felt that the electoral outcome might have an overall negative impact on Muslim communities, it did offer a stance on the alternative vote. On the issue of the referendum on adopting the alternative vote system, they urged voters to vote yes, arguing that: “The BNP are campaigning for a No vote because they know what a YES vote means – that racists who won’t reach out have no future” (MCB, 2011b).

6.6 Foreign Affairs

While the overall discursive strategy of the MCB in this period, focused on events within the UK, 19% of the total press releases focused on developments in the wider international community. The press releases analysed within this period reveal that the MCB’s discourse is based on responses to events which affected international Muslim communities, or events which occurred in Muslim countries. These included international incidents of Islamophobia, conflicts which affected Muslim communities and acts of terror. In the press releases analysed in this category, we can find no parallels or relationships with the overall foreign policy of the UK for this period. Those countries which are the focus of the public output in this category do not reflect the ethnic makeup of British Muslim communities but instead reflected a broader desire on the part of the MCB to express solidarity with oppressed Muslims around the world. The below table reveals the different countries that are mentioned by the MCB within this period. From this, we can see that the main focus is on events within the Middle East, in particular the Israel–Palestine conflict and developments in Iran.
6.6.1 Israel-Palestine

One of the consistent areas of focus in this period for the MCB was the Israel/Palestine conflict. The issue of Israel and Palestine is often included in discussions of Islamic revivalism as “providing the impetus for such movements” (Abbas, 2011, p. 126). Bowen argues that one of the reasons for the MCB’s waning influence was its stance on the Palestinian conflict. She states that when in 2006, Ruth Kelly, the Communities’ Secretary, announced that she would work with different groups such as the Sufi Muslim council, “she praised the condemnation of ‘terrorism in all its forms’, a comment perhaps intended as a subtle rebuke of the MCB for its refusal to disown Hamas” (Bowen, 2014, p. 93).

The year 2006 saw several press releases focused on the ongoing conflict, with the MCB highlighting what it called the “the abject misery of the Palestinian people” (MCB, 2006d).
Referring to the decision taken by the EU to suspend direct aid to the Palestinian Authority, the MCB argued the decision would “send the message to the Palestinians and other peoples across the region that democracy in the Muslim world is only acceptable when it produces results that please the West” (MCB, 2006d). The statement went on to urge that the EU should “respect the democratic choice of the Palestinian people” (MCB, 2006d). The MCB also referred to a conflict in June 2006 where the Israeli government targeted bridges as “illegal acts of collective punishment” (MCB, 2006e). Following the general trend, these press releases continued to frame the issues in terms of secular language, focusing in this instance on international law, condemning the “annexing [of] yet more Palestinian land through a unilateral border declaration, which contravenes numerous UN resolutions and continually defies international legality” (MCB, 2006d). This discursive strategy can also be seen in later press releases, in which the MCB referred to a blockade of Gaza in 2008 as a “gross violation of international law” (MCB, 2008a).

The public output relating to the Israel-Palestine issue also saw an apparent attempt by the MCB to influence government policy relating to Israel’s actions, with the organisation arguing that “Britain is continuing to adopt a policy of partisan support for Israel” (MCB, 2008b). In 2009, the MCB called for a direct meeting with the foreign secretary “to discuss our country’s stance on the conflict” (MCB, 2009e). 2009 would be a significant year, not only within the conflict itself, but in the way in which the MCB’s stance on Israel would influence its relationship with the government, and further remove the MCB from the ‘in-group’ of the audience. A press release requested “three things: an immediate end to Israel’s military assault on Gaza, an immediate end to the blockade and siege on Gaza and an end to Israel’s violation of International Law” (MCB, 2009). This current campaign saw a further attempt to influence events in Gaza and would lead to a deterioration in the MCB’s relationship with the government. Daud Abdullah, the then deputy secretary-general, signed a declaration in support of Hamas and military action. The declaration of 90 Muslim leaders across the world, called for “the Islamic Nation to regard the sending of foreign warships into Muslim waters … as a declaration of war, a new occupation, sinful aggression, and a clear violation of the sovereignty of the nation. This must be rejected and fought by all means and ways”
Bowen argues that seen with the context of Prime Minister’s Brown’s offer of Royal Navy resources to the Israeli government, “this was then taken as a call to attack British troops should such an operation take place” (Bowen, 2014, p. 93). In a letter to the MCB, the Communities’ Secretary, Hazel Blears, wrote: “Whilst your investigation is ongoing, and the matter remains unresolved I feel that it is only appropriate for us to suspend our engagement with the Muslim Council of Britain pending its outcome” (Dodd, 2009).

The MCB referred to the allegations as ‘outrageous’. The Secretary-General, Abdul Bari, said: “This is an incredible claim which we utterly reject. All the MCB’s office bearers without exception stand resolutely against all forms of indiscriminate violence. We are completely opposed to all forms of prejudice, including Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia” (MCB, 2009f). The MCB’s discursive stance in this instance reflected not only the prominence to the Israel-Palestine conference to British Muslim communities, but also further demonstrated the MCB’s changing relationship with the government. The Israel–Palestine issue can be read as one of the critical factors which took the MCB out of the in-group and was therefore increasingly subjected to the securitisation process. The signing of the declaration by Daud Abdullah saw the government position the MCB as a ‘radical’ other, who had threatened British troops.

The 2011 census revealed that of the 2.7 million registered as Muslims in the UK, over 82% recorded their ethnicity as Indian, Bangladeshi or Pakistani. Of these, the Pakistani community is the largest ethnic group at 32%. Despite the prevalence of these communities in the UK, the frequency in which these countries appeared in this period, did not reflect events which occurred in the countries. They further do not indicate at the influence that these countries have on Muslims in the UK through sects such as the Deoband’s and the presence of Imams trained in the subcontinent in UK mosques. Those press releases which do refer to these countries respond to specific events such as the Mumbai shootings in 2008, which the MCB condemned stating: “The

---

24 A statement by religious scholars and proselytisers (du’a) of the Islamic Nation (ummah) to all rulers and peoples concerning events in GAZA Feb 2009 accessed via Hurry Up Harry (Harry’s Place, 2009)
The brutal murder of Indians and foreign nationals is unacceptable, there is no excuse for such acts, whatever the cause" (MCB, 2008c). Of the four press releases relating to Pakistan, these refer only to humanitarian crises, and the shooting of Malala Yousafzai, with the MCB commenting that: “The horrific attack on Malala Yousafzai is to be condemned, and has rightly been done so by Pakistan’s responsible political and religious leaders. You don’t see such a unified response every day in a nation in turmoil from violence” (MCB, 2012d).

The discourse relating to these countries is significant in its silences relating to the biggest conflict in that region: Kashmir. In contrast to the MCB’s public discourse on Israel and Palestine, only one press release in this period relates explicitly to Kashmir. This refers to demonstrations in Kashmir in 2008, which led to curfews and economic sanctions. The MCB referred to this as “reign of terror”, and urged “the government of India to immediately lift the curfew and the economic blockade, withdraw its troops from all civilian areas forthwith and allow the people of Kashmir to exercise their democratic rights to assembly and free speech” (MCB, 2008). This suggests an unwillingness on the part of the MCB to create a discourse which relates to the ethnic backgrounds of much of its members and a high proportion of the Muslim population.

6.7 Political Engagement

The MCB’s public output relating to the category of political engagement retains the secular language that is evident in the other threads. The critical areas of discourse here relate to several issues designed to increase the voice of the British Muslim communities in the overall discourse of British public and political life. Within this sphere, we see the MCB seek to engage with political routes such as the general elections and continue to work with different civil actors as with their campaigns on the war on terror and Islamophobia.

One of the consistent areas of focus in this category was both national and local elections. An early example of this was the general election of 2005 where the MCB ran campaigns designed to increase the participation of British Muslims. The involvement of the BME and Muslim community in elections has traditionally been low.
The 2005 Ten Key questions for the general election (this would be repeated in subsequent elections) contained several questions which were designed not only to increase the participation of British Muslims but also to highlight issues which would affect British Muslim communities. As they put it: “The issues covered by the MCB Voter Card range from legislative equality measures such as a call to prohibit Incitement to Religious Hatred to underachievement in schools by Muslim pupils to a call for a more just and fair foreign policy” (MCB, 2005f). Support for the labour party, however, fell in 2005 among Muslim groups. Meer discusses the idea of a Muslim vote in the UK, and points to the MCB's 10-point campaign, stating that: “it is clear that Muslim organisations in that general election campaigned on a distinctive equality agenda that drew attention to the ways Muslims have become the subject of anti-terrorism campaigns and related Islamophobia” (Meer, 2012, p. 160).

This emphasis on religious obligation was again emphasised in the 2010 general elections, where they stated that: “The statement, signed by imams from Islam's diverse theological traditions, says that 'Muslims have an obligation to join hands with others to elect those who will seek the common good'. The joint statement observes that the forthcoming General Election is an ideal opportunity for voters to reconnect and hold to account their representatives” (MCB, 2010h). While it again emphasised the need to vote on those issues which concerned the Muslim vote, this was sent out in an internal communication to mosques.

The emphasis on how political parties viewed Muslims can also be seen in the MCB's response to a Conservative Party report released in 2007 – Uniting the Country and its final version “An Unquiet World”. The report's remit was to "examine all aspects of the UK's national security, from both a domestic and international perspective" (Neville-Jones, 2007, p. 2). One of the key aspects of the report argued that: “Security is also a matter of trust between government and public and loyalty citizens feel to each other” (Neville-Jones, 2007, p. 7). It further stated that: "Intercommunity relations have been strained and British Muslims are disquieted (Neville-Jones, 2007, p. 7)". Here again, the British Muslim community is presented as separate to the main
community, away from the in-group. This report as with Blair's speech links this to British values: “The identity of the British people needs to be rebuilt to include minority communities on the basis of shared values and active equal citizenship” (Neville-Jones, 2007, p. 7).

On the former, the MCB argued that the report “does very little to help unify this nation but plenty to try and further divide and fragment British society. It is a poorly researched exposition by authors more intent on serving cynical ideological goals” (MCB, 2007f). While the MCB acknowledged the report’s comments on women and integration, it commented that ‘An Unquiet World,’ “is adamant on pursuing a McCarthyite track to cast aspersions on our patriotism and our commitment to an integrated British Muslim community” (MCB, 2007f). Here, as with Blair’s 2005 speech, the MCB rejected the inference that the British Muslim community was a separate entity to a mainstream British community and emphasised that they were “interested in engaging and ensuring that all British Muslims are part and parcel of our liberal democratic traditions” (MCB, 2007h).

The framing of their discursive strategy emphasising values of liberal democracy can be seen in their communications on local council elections in 2009. The MCB here used the Friday Khutbah to “learn about the registration process. The participation in the elections is an important form of active engagement in civil society, a basic duty in Islam. Muslims are greatly underrepresented in politics at all levels, and it is vital that we address and rectify this situation” (MCB, 2009g) The London Mayoral election in 2012 saw the MCB encourage Muslim voters to focus on broader political issues such as “youth employment, high crime rates, lack of affordable housing, poor pay, congested traffic and crime hotspots” (MCB, 2012f). This can be contrasted with the issues of foreign policy and the war on terror which were highlighted in the public output which related to the 2005 election. The focus on the broader political discourse can be seen with the MCB seeking to promote Muslim concerns on several issues such as healthcare and the economy. This included commenting on the national economy, with press releases relating to key events such as the G20 summit. The MCB again worked with different religious groups in a campaign to tackle poverty,
joining Bishops in a march “past Parliament and Downing Street in a call to cut extreme global poverty by 2015” (MCB, 2008d).

The MCB further focused on promoting Islamic systems of finance. In 2006 the MCB promoted the UK as a gateway for trade with Muslim countries stating that: “There are over 256 Islamic financial institutions worldwide, with assets of more than US$250 billion and with an annual growth rate of around 15%” (MCB, 2006f). The promotion of Islamic finance continued with the MCB discussing the possibility of issuing a Sukuk – a ‘sharia-compliant bond’. While the MCB participated in a government consultation on this issue, it urged a note of caution stating: “Muslims are rightly concerned that the proceeds of any Sukuk issuance must not be used to fund activities that are not Shariah-compliant” (MCB, 2008e). They further organised a conference that year “to discuss the potential and opportunities presented by Islamic and ethical finance in the current financial crisis” (MCB, 2008f). While the MCB promoted the alternate financial system, it remained aware of the dichotomy between economic systems in the UK and Islamic finance, and it positioned itself as a gatekeeper between the government and the Islamic finance world. While the language used in the category of political engagement sought to position itself within the parameters of liberal democratic values, it also sought to emphasise issues of commonality between British Muslims and broader society, i.e. healthcare. Within this category, we see elements of a discourse which is based on Islamic principles, with theologians using Quranic verses, and hadiths to encourage greater political engagement.

6.8 Securitisation and the MCB.

For the MCB, the impact of the securitisation process was reflected both in its discursive strategy post-2005 as it sought to advocate for a British Muslim community repositioned by Tony Blair’s speech as the ‘other’ and in its waning access to the government. It sought not only to counter critique of the organisation but also of the portrayal of other Muslim groups in the media, challenging programmes and documentaries which perpetuated notions of Muslims as the other.
While they shied away from claims that they were attempting to speak for all Muslims, as an organisation with over 500 affiliates including mosques, and FOSIS, the MCB remain one, if not the largest Muslim umbrella organisations. As such, they sought to challenge legislation and discourse from both the government and the media, which portrayed Muslim communities as a suspect group. They often partnered with different organisations to promote their campaigns, an example of which we have seen with the joint TUC campaign, aimed at combatting Islamophobia in the workplace. Here we saw the MCB working with groups who under the relaxed Post Copenhagen framework could be considered as part of the elite. In working with the TUC and other organisations, the MCB was able to ensure that their campaigns also reached those who were part of the dominant group. The organisation further advocated for Muslim interests, with campaigns to promote Islamic finance and how this would benefit the British economy and religious affairs such as same-sex marriage and gambling. These were often framed within a secular discourse with the emphasis being placed on the law as opposed to religious ideals. Each of these campaigns sought to address concerns within the parameters of British values.

6.8.1 Acts of Resistance

For the MCB, acts of resistance were centred in the aim of combatting securitisation processes which emerged during the war on terror. The previous sections have highlighted the MCB’s narrative towards government policies such as PREVENT, but also their concern on how the elite, particularly the media, were reproducing these messages. We can see this within the section on Islamophobia, and the use of its public output to address these messages can be read as acts of resistance. Its additional acts of resistance can be seen within its discourse surrounding religious communities. The timeline of this thesis saw the organisation increasingly work with other Muslim groups to what the organisation perceived to be discriminatory policies against the Muslim community, whether this was centred on the right to wear a jilbab or the same-sex marriage act. Its acts of resistance can be seen to centre on those acts which would provide ontological security for British Muslims, the right to practice their religion in a way which is not
discriminated against, and for Islam in the UK to be treated the same as other minority religions. This seen within the context of the race relations act, in which Muslims were not initially included, is indicative of the historical insecuritization of Muslims in the UK.\textsuperscript{25} Here the routines and practices of Islam are used as a vector against securitising acts, with religion being used as Gidden terms it “a refuge from the tribulations of the day to day life” (Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 1990, p. 107). Religion here thus becomes a means to reassert a self-identity. As Kinnvall stated, religion is one of such causes which “are more likely than any other identity constructions to provide answers to those in need” (Kinnvall, 2004, p. 742).

On the Marriage (Same-Sex Couples Act) the MCB argued: “The Muslim Council of Britain is appalled to see the utterly discriminatory provision of the new gay marriage legislation proposed by the government. [...]’We find it incredible that while introducing the bill in the House, culture secretary Maria Miller could keep a straight face when offering exemption for the established Church while in the same breath claiming, ‘fairness to be at the heart of her proposals’ (Mend, 2012). The MCB’s discourse acknowledged the ’other’ status of Islam in the legal system. On the issue of the veil, the MCB framed its opposition to debates emerging around the niqab within the framework of British values. It argued that: “Minister Jeremy Browne calls for a national debate on the niqab, yet we have been debating this for over ten years now -- if not more. And every time we discuss the niqab, it usually comes with a diet of bigoted commentary about our faith and the place of Islam in Britain” (MCB, 2013a). It goes on to argue that “Nevertheless, this is a personal choice. In Britain, we cherish our right to freedom of religion. I would like to remind those who call for a ban to heed the warning of Minister Damian Green, who said that introducing such a ban would be ‘un-British’. To do so would involve embarking on a slippery slope where the freedom to wear religious attire of all faiths would be at risk” (MCB, 2013a).

The right to be treated equally to other minority religions can be seen in addressing media claims that Muslims wanted sharia courts. The MCB resistance to this was framed within the context of

\textsuperscript{25} Muslims were eventually covered in a 2005 amendment of the legislation
equal representation under the law. Addressing allegations made in the Express and the Telegraph, the MCB released the following statement: “We do not wish to see a parallel system or a separate system of judiciary for Muslims”. They go on to write: “British Muslims would wish to seek parity with other faiths, in particular, followers of the Jewish faith” (MCB, 2008g). This echoed a call from the Muslim scholar, Faiz-ul Aqtab Siddiqui, who argued: “that informal Shariah courts should now follow the example of the Beth Din courts” (Birt, 2008). The Beth Din courts in the UK are used to resolve civil disputes such as divorce and business. Any civil dispute resolved by Beth Din is binding. “English law states that any third party can be agreed by two sides to arbitrate in a dispute, and in this case, the institutional third party is the Beth Din” (Tarry, 2008). The MCB advocated for this model as it allowed for ‘Sharia courts’ such as the one ran by Birmingham Central mosque to make decisions on civil disputes, in particular marriage and divorce. Under the current legal system, Islamic marriage and divorce are not ratified under English Law. These examples both present different ways in which the MCB have resisted the securitising process and have resisted narratives which portray them as a separate radical/other within. For the MCB, this was providing an alternate discourse as an act of resistance to the securitisation process by using the language and institutions that reinforce British values.

6.9 Conclusion

The MCB was born out of movements which had emerged as the discourse surrounding Muslims in Britain began to shift from race to religion. The relationship between the MCB and the UK government can be seen as a microcosm for the way in which the British Muslim community has been viewed. In the period preceding the timeline of this thesis, the securitisation process began to impact the MCB following the September 11th terror attacks, the subsequent military campaign in Iraq and introduction of legislation such as the Terrorism Act 2000. The MCB’s opposition to the military campaign and some of the new legislation, in particular the pre-detention charge, would set the tone for the discursive strategy shown in this chapter. The MCB
thus went into 2005 as the largest Muslim organisation in the UK with over 500 affiliate organisations, advocating for an increasingly insecuritised British Muslim community.

While the MCB framed itself as an umbrella Muslim organisation, its output in this period was presented within a secular framework, and the organisation shied away from overt religious statements, advocating for all sects, bar the Ahmadiya Muslim community, which it did not recognise. It was through this framework that they challenged the government over the war on terror, in particular on the legitimacy of its actions in Guantanamo Bay, the proposed extension to the pre detention charge period and the introduction of Prevent. They challenged these using the language of the law, and values of human rights and democracy in addition to the impact that this would have on the British Muslim community.

The broader impact on the war of terror could be seen within the reproduction of securitising moves which presented the British Muslim community as the ‘other’ in both factual media and popular culture. Here the MCB’s resisted this narrative through press releases which rebutted the portrayal of Muslims in the media as terrorists, reinforcing the notion of the radical other. The rise of Islamophobia in this period was a further key area of focus for the MCB as it set out to work with organisations such as the TUC to combat discrimination against the British Muslim community. The examples of Islamophobia highlighted in this chapter, show how the MCB sought to resist this manifestation of Islam being constructed as the other, in contradistinction to British values. It emphasised that British Muslims, were active contributing members of the British community, with campaigns focused on increasing voter turnout amongst British Muslims, and highlighting the contribution Islamic financial systems such as Sukuk, could have on the British economy. Thus, while the MCB advocated for Muslim interest, it did so within the framework of British values in which securitisation was built.
Set up following the July 7th London bombings, the Quilliam Foundation was one of several new organisations established with support from the government as part of its CONTEST strategy. From the offset, the identity of the Quilliam Foundation was tied to its co-founders, Ed Husain and Maajid Nawaz, whose experience as Islamists, and time spent in an Egyptian prison were used to inform the early identity of the organisation. Arenes writes that "the main credentials of the organisation could be found in the very identity of its leaders, who embodied what a successful process of de-radicalisation could be" (Arenes, 2014, p. 64). As former members of Hizb-ut-Tahrir, Nawaz and Husain set up the Quilliam Foundation as a counter-terrorism organisation to challenge the growth of Islamism in Britain. Arenes further argued that the Quilliam Foundation was in "favour [of] the emergence of a Western Islam" (Arenes, 2014, p. 64).

While both Husain and Nawaz sought to promote a pluralist model of Islam, the Quilliam Foundation itself does not offer a working definition of pluralist Islam. This chapter will use instead the argument set out by Ed Husain, in an article discussing moderate Islam in the Wall Street Journal, to inform its analysis of the Foundation's discursive strategy. Husain writes that: "Normative Islam is inherently pluralist. It is supported by 1,000 years of Muslim history in which religious freedom was cherished. The claim, made today by the governments of Iran and Saudi Arabia, that they represent God’s will expressed through their version of oppressive Sharia law is a modern innovation" (Husain, 2010).

7.1.1 Central Aims

One of the key aims of the Quilliam Foundation focuses on its objective to fight counter extremism by challenging Islamism. Nawaz defines Islamism as "the desire to impose any interpretation of Islam over society by law" (Quilliam Admin, 2012a). This definition underpins the Foundation's counter-narrative approach. As Carpenter et al. write, "addressing local grievances is also critically important, in their view, to ensure that the terrorist and extremist global narrative does
not resonate in individual's psyches" (Carpenter, Levitt, & Jacobson, 2009, p. 306). The Quilliam Foundation's website further states that, as an organisation, they aim "to challenge extremist narratives whilst advocating pluralistic, democratic alternatives that are consistent with universal human rights standards" (Quilliam Admin, ND).

This discursive strategy of "addressing local grievances" can be seen through some of the Foundation's early publications and outreach work which focus on both Islamism and counter-radicalisation policies (Quilliam Admin, ND). The Quilliam Foundation website identifies four key contributors which it argues can lead to individual radicalisation. Summarised, these are:

1) A range of perceived grievances,
2) Where an individual encounters an ideology (i.e. Islamism) which creates a narrative around history and current affairs,
3) Leading on from the second factor, where an individual encounters a group or individual who can help the individual relate this ideology to their life
4) If an individual comes to doubt their sense of British identity or their sense of belonging, Islamism can provide an alternative identity.

In all these factors we see the idea that Islamism can be used a vector through which the individual can create ontological Security which allows them to deal with the anxieties around a sense of belonging and home which we see in these factors. Mitzen states that "a psychological need for home in an ontological security approach to subjectivity" (Mitzen, 2018, p. 1374). While her work focuses on the feeling at home in the EU after Brexit, Mitzen's paper focuses on the different narratives and approaches attached to the idea of home. As she writes; "Whether invoked politically or in banal ways, home imagery facilitates imagining ourselves as belonging to groups, especially nations and states, which are linked to homelands, the places we live" (Mitzen, 2018, p. 1374). Returning to Kinnvall, we can bring in her argument that the draw of nationalist movements such as Islamism can be "framed as a response to a combined socioeconomic and religious reality for many people who experience the effects of politics of at
Chapter 5 outlined how narratives of chosen traumas and chosen glory used by nationalist movements contributed to a sense of self (Kinnvall, 2004). While Browning looks at the impact of Brexit in "Brexit, existential anxiety and ontological (in)security", his comments on British minorities are salient to understanding how anxieties of home can influence the individuals’ sense of belonging. Discussing the aftermath of Brexit, he states “At stake here is whether fellow citizens deem their citizenship legitimate – i.e. as even belonging to the we – or as conferring equal status as subjects sharing equal rights” (Browning, 2018, p. 346). He argues that two elements of subjectivity are relevant to this which can be linked to ontological Security. The first element examines the link between the individual’s ontological security and intersubjectivity and recognition dynamics. The second point focuses on the “appraisal of others' with positive appraisals contributing to ontological Security. Browning continues that these positive approvals are dependent “upon meeting contextually relevant criteria, with individuals failing to meet that criteria at risk of feeling shamed, inadequate, lacking a sense of belonging and home and therefore potentially ontologically insecure” (Browning, 2018, p. 346). We can see then, the impact that the sense of a lack of belonging and not identifying as an ‘equal’, and questioning of their British identity, could contribute to their ontological insecurity.

The Quilliam Foundation further argued to Parliament that radicalisation could occur when society fails to "address the complex identity issues stemming from a failure to access a shared British identity, a failure which leaves some people vulnerable to radicalisation" (Communities and Local Government Committee, 2010). Here we can see how the Quilliam Foundation had not only begun to co-opt the language of securitisation, a pattern which would inform their discourse. The statement also provides an analysis of a problem which we have seen draws on issues of ontological Security.

In its first two publications, 'A brief history of Islamism', and 'Unlocking Al Qaeda', the Quilliam foundation address how Islamism is used as a legitimising ideology, and as a means of extremist
recruitment. In Unlocking Al Qaeda, which focuses on the radicalisation of Muslims, using British prisons as a case study, James Brandon writes that: "Throughout many British Muslim communities, Islamist movements and conservative Muslim organisations are becoming more popular – particularly amongst young people" (Brandon, Unlocking Al Qaeda, 2009, p. 78). The report identified several factors which are said to contribute to the radicalisation of prisoners. They argue that: "Islamist extremists are able to make political capital out of almost any issue which concerns or distresses ordinary Muslims" (Brandon, Unlocking Al Qaeda, 2009, p. 78). The report focuses on perceived grievances from within the prison system, such as hostility from prison staff. It argues that those who have suffered from prejudice, "are more likely to be susceptible to Islamist ideologies that argue that non-Muslims are innately hostile to Islam and Muslims" (Brandon, Unlocking Al Qaeda, 2009, p. 78). This breakdown of trust in the institution and perceived grievances and hostilities, which can impact the prisoner's everyday routines contribute to a sense of ontological insecurity for some prisoners.

The report went on to make several recommendations which included a de-radicalisation centre based on the Egyptian model. Gunaratna and Bin Ali state that this model emerged from the "the ideological revision of the two principal Islamist militant groups in Egypt, the Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiyya and Al-Jihad Al-Islami", who renounced violence to work within the political process (Gunaratna & Bin Ali, 2009, p. 277). Thus: "Egyptian authorities and security experts realised that terrorism has to be fought with a broader strategy in which the political issues that fuel extremism are dealt with. This includes a re-education program to bring back the terrorists to the correct path of Islam" (Bin Ali, 2018, p. 50). Here we see the Egyptian authorities propose a 'correct' model of Islam to provide a vector to encourage an alternative self-biography, one which relies on new social relations and routines as a basis for building ontological Security. These publications are essential to our understanding of the Quilliam Foundation's narrative as they can be seen as an early reflection on its discourse on counterterrorism and how the organisation interacted with the securitisation process.
This chapter will also analyse the discursive strategy of the Quilliam Foundation within the context of its relationship to government. It aims to show that the organisation’s close access to the government positions Quilliam as an elite NGO not only within British Muslim communities but also the broader political process. While the organisation does perform acts of resistance, it does so as an organisation who can engage with those who are part of the dominant discourse. The engagement work carried out by the Quilliam Foundation reflects not only their theological aim of a pluralist model of Islam but also echoes the dual policy introduced by the government which focused simultaneously on counter-radicalisation and community cohesion.

The organisation has received over £2 million in funding from the government. In Parliament, Damian Green revealed that Quilliam had "received the following total annual amounts of Home Office funding as follows; in 2008-09, it was £665,000; in 2009-10, it was £387,000; and in 2010-11, it was £145,000". He further advised Parliament that since 2008, Quilliam has received a total of £2.7 million from the British government "for all its work in the UK, Pakistan and elsewhere" (Quilliam Admin, 2011a). The organisation received further funding from the government via the then Education Minister, Michael Gove, whose book, Celsius 7/7, shows similar views on Islamism and religious conservatism to those promoted by the Quilliam Foundation (Cook, 2014). The following statement from Jonathon Russell infers that the subsequent removal of government funding had allowed Quilliam to pursue its own non-partisan agenda. In an interview for the BBC’s religion and ethics programme, Russell indicated that the removal of Prevent funding had allowed Quilliam to "remain ideas-focused, non-partisan and continue its own pursuits. Quilliam’s ideas, projects and output are all made possible by the support of private donations from Muslims and non-Muslim individuals and foundations based in the United Kingdom and all around the world" (Russell, 2013). Thus, while the overall funding model used in the creation of the Quilliam Foundation has changed, Russell infers that this has not changed the group’s identity. The funding was removed from the Quilliam Foundation over concerns that “the funding of a think-tank by the Home Office and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office will inevitably contribute to a perceived lack of plurality of voices heard by Government on how best to combat
extremism” (Hansard, 2011). The next sections will show that, as with the MCB, the Quilliam Foundation's discursive strategy is a combination of reactive press releases and those which focus on the organisation's role as a counter-extremism think tank.

7.2 The Quilliam Foundation

The Quilliam Foundation released a total of 307 press releases in the period 2008-2013. The press releases include reports, comments and press articles which consist of comments from Quilliam staff on current affairs or profiles of Quilliam's work. Table 9 below shows the breakdown of press releases by year. For this chapter, press releases which reproduce articles featuring commentary on the Quilliam Foundation's counter-extremism work have been included, where appropriate, in the category of the War on Terror.

![Total Number of Press Releases](image)

### Table 9: Total Number of Press Releases - Yearly Breakdown

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A breakdown of these categories by years can be seen in Table 10 below. In descending order, the largest of these categories is the War on Terror, with 132 press releases, followed by foreign affairs at 113. These areas are critical to the Quilliam Foundation's discursive strategy of focusing on Islamist movements. The category of religious engagement consists of 32 of the overall press
releases, while Political Discourse and Islamophobia make up the smallest categories with just 7 and 19 occurrences respectively.

Table 10 shows that using the parameters set out in this thesis, in all years, except for 2012, the War on Terror is one of the principal areas of focus, followed by Foreign Affairs. The increase in a discussion on foreign affairs reflects critical events that occurred in Libya, Egypt and Syria, with the emergence of Islamist groups in these countries. The focus of Islamophobia in 2013 was as a result of a new emphasis on far-right groups as the Foundation helped to facilitate Tommy Robinson’s departure from the EDL. Though the Quilliam Foundation describes itself as a counter-extremism organisation, the period between 2009 and 2013 saw an average increase in their public output relating to religious engagement. This category focuses on religious ideology, centring on the impacts this had on integration, and as a possible cause of extremism.
The above tables reveal the top ten areas of focus from both a numerical view and as a percentile. In both tables, 2008 was taken out to prevent distortion due to the low number of units in the sample. While the top two areas remain the same (War on Terror and Foreign Affairs), the analysis of the press releases by percentile reveals a greater focus on Islamophobia in 2009 and Religious engagement in 2010. The Foundation’s reactions to Nick Griffins (the then BNP leader) appearance on Newsnight and its attempts the decision to stands in the European Election informed the increase in reporting on Islamophobia in 2009. In 2010 the Foundation ran several events on Islamism and alternative models in the Northwest and party conferences. These figures will inform our review of the Quilliam Foundation's press releases.

Consideration must also be given to the role of the audience for the Quilliam Foundation audience. As this chapter will explore, the Quilliam Foundation, more than the other organisations, is part of the social elite. We saw in Chapter five, how the post -Copenhagen framework now included...
think tanks and as such, we can include Quilliam Foundation as part of this. This is reflected in their audience as its reports and concept papers seek to influence legislation. Their press releases show an engagement with the press as they use the media as part of their securitisation processes.

7.2.1 Islamism

Their work on Islamism underpins much of Quilliam Foundation's engagement in this period, and this underpins their discursive strategy regarding the War on Terror. In both the category of the War of Terror and Foreign Affairs, there is a focus on the theology which, it argues, underpins Islamist ideology. This emphasis on the doctrine which underpins Islamist groups can be seen with the launch of their concept series in January 2010 with the publication of 'A Brief History of Islamism'. The booklet was promoted as an "accessible introduction to key Islamist movements and their ideas" (Quilliam Admin, 2010a). The pamphlet focused on the emergence of Islamist movements and showed how their political ideology when combined with puritanical Saudi Wahhabism, helped to create modern Jihadism. It further stated that: "Future publications will highlight the diversity of political thought among Muslims today as well as discussing the assumptions that underpin much of Islamist ideology" (Quilliam Admin, 2010a).

The booklet echoes the work of Giles Kepel and traces the origins of Islamism to the writing of Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb and Hasan Al Banna. It further reflects the emphasis that the organisation places on the role of Islamic ideology, mainly Saudi Wahhabism in the part of Islamism. This again echoes the securitisation process set out in Chapter five, which showed how some Islamic schools of thought are portrayed as a radical other. The work by Gilliat-Ray and Mandaville has shown this perspective to be orientalist, often overlooking the anti-colonial roots of conservative schools of thought. Mandaville's reformist/revivalist typology discussed in the literature review further challenges the assumption that conservative schools of thought = radical other. Thus the securitisation process set out in the booklet, in associating the schools with the jihadi other,
present them as a threat to the British way of life, associating them with crisis points such as the September 11th terror attacks.

The booklet traces the roots of the thinking of Al Banna, Qutb and later Bin Laden, to time spent in Saudi Arabia and their introduction to the work of Abdul Wahab. On Wahhab they write:

He sought to rid Islam of the traditional practices that he viewed as heretical innovations and corruptions such as mysticism, the visiting of tombs and Shi’ism. He viewed anything that did not come out of Arabia proper as 'un-Islamic' and sought to restore what he viewed as a 'pure Islam' informed by Bedouin Arab culture alone. He pursued his vision with a puritanical zeal and deadly violence, which included the murder of rival scholars, the destruction of Islamic holy sites and the extermination of entire villages" (Ghaffar, 2010, p. 10).

The perceived link between Saudi Wahhabism and extremism can be further seen in press releases highlighting the relationship between UK Muslim organisations, and Saudi Wahhabi-inspired extremism. Discussing a speaker who was scheduled to speak at Green Lane Mosque, they write that the organisation "will host two extreme Wahhabi clerics who bolster al Qaeda narratives by advocating: Taking up arms against the enemies of Islam in order to spread Wahhabi Islam " (Quilliam Admin, 2009a). The linking of the Wahhabi sect to Jihadism underpins much of their public output relating to the war on terror. In March 2009, the Quilliam Foundation argued that: "The British government should not support Wahhabi groups or individuals until it can guarantee that their teachings will not lead towards violence and intolerance of others" (Quilliam Admin, 2009b). This is key to our understanding of the Quilliam Foundation’s discursive strategy for two reasons. Firstly, we see the Quilliam Foundation echo the securitisation policy of the government, in portraying some sects of Islam as a radical other, and also in their focus on mosques. Again this focus on certain sects creates a supposed link between these sects and specific mosques and the idea of a radical other. The inference that Wahhabi equals radical indicate causation is not proven. Secondly, we see the foundations of the double securitisation where a hierarchal other was created. It should be noted though that hierarchies and relations of otherness does not require securitisation to exist.
The proceeding sections will, therefore, include a focus on one strand of the Quilliam Foundation's discursive strategy, that of using theological tools such as fatwas to challenge Islamism, alongside legislation. The construction of the Islamism vs moderate Islam debate constructed a discourse which focused on a moderate interpretation of Islam which followed the British values model set out by successive governments. In 2010 the Quilliam Foundation publicised the work of Minhaj ul Quran, who they refer to as a 'moderate' Muslim group. Referring to Dr Tahir ul Qadri's fatwa against terrorism, they state that: "Unlike many previous 'denunciations' of extremism, Dr Tahir-ul-Qadri condemns terrorism and extremism 'with no ifs and buts' and also critiques the Islamist concepts of the Caliphate and of making a single interpretation of the Shari’ah into state law" (Quilliam Admin, 2010b).

This promotion of a Sufi scholar sees echoes of the Labour government's policy of the promotion of Sufism, with initiatives such as the Sufi Muslim Council. The report's launch was supported by Labour ministers, including the then communities and government minister, Ruth Kelly. She stated that: "We must work together to protect our young people from recruitment to violence and help them reject forces that seek to destroy our wonderfully diverse society. That is why we are looking to organisations and individuals across the Muslim communities to be vocal and challenge the ideology of extremists" (Casciani, 2006). The Sufi council, created by Haras Rafiq, had been critiqued by Muslim groups, including the MCB as being unrepresentative of Muslims in the UK, and "as obscure and unknown" (King, 2006).

We can further see an attempt to influence political discourse with Quilliam speaking at a Progress event, where they stated that: "Islamism is a problematic ideology which contradicts key Labour values." (Quilliam Admin, 2010c) The statement went on to argue that the previous Labour government had made mistakes in its policy towards Islamists. It further, added: "that the Labour Party needs to engage with Islamists on some level in order to challenge this ideology".

---

26 Haris Rafiq, was formerly a member of the government's counter extremism task force in 2005, and would go on to co create the Sufi Muslim Council. He later joined the Quilliam Foundation.
(Quilliam Admin, 2010c). The relationship between the government and the Quilliam Foundation in tackling extremism will be further explored in the next section.

7.3 War on Terror

The first two press releases relating to the war on terror in 2008 are indicative of the critical area of focus for the Quilliam Foundation. These focused on the conviction of Bilal Abdulla, one of the terrorists behind the 2007 attack on Glasgow International airport and the death of Jean Charles de Menez, a Brazilian man killed by officers in London after being suspected of being one of the July 7th bombers. The latter reflects their discursive strategy regarding the relationship between British Muslims and the state arguing that: "This tragic incident has played into the hands of those who wish to portray the British state as being anti-Muslim" (Quilliam Admin, 2008a). The former press statement looked at the perceived link between foreign policy and Islamist ideology in the UK. Nawaz stated that: "Although British foreign policy undoubtedly helped push Bilal Abdulla towards violence, anger at foreign policy is rarely – if ever – the sole cause of terrorism. Abdulla's decision to attack a nightclub and an airport was caused by an Islamist ideology that taught him that he was obliged to attack innocent civilians" (Quilliam Admin, 2008b).

This section will firstly focus on the Quilliam Foundation’s discursive strategy towards counter extremism in the UK. It will further focus on the Islamist/Wahhabi ideology that it argues underpins terrorist movements. Within the lens of the domestic war on terror, it will analyse the focus on counter-terrorism legislation and how the Quilliam Foundation echoed the government’s securitisation policy. It will lastly discuss the foundations work on the international war on terror, with particular focus on Pakistan where the Foundation has a sister organisation called Khudi.
7.3.1 Legislation

In 'Counter-terrorism as counterinsurgency in the UK’s "war on terror"', Sabir and Miller look at the government's counter-terrorism policies since the July 7th attacks. Focusing on the Pursue and Prevent elements on the CONTEST strategy, they write of the Quilliam Foundation that: “Quilliam is arguably an attempt by the government to use an ostensibly unofficial think-tank to engage with the Muslim community in a bid to win influence” (Miller & Sabir, 2012, p. 26). This section will interrogate the claim by Sabir and Miller and analyse whether the public output of the Quilliam Foundation reflects government policies concerning preventing extremism. The press releases in this section also reveal how the Quilliam Foundation's discursive policy attempt to shape future policy, positioning them as an elite group.

In 2009, the Guardian quoted Ed Husain as arguing that: "The government should be spying on Muslims even if they are not suspected of committing crimes, in order to hunt down terrorists before they strike" (Dodd, Spying Morally right says think tank, 2009). He further stated that: “gathering intelligence outweighed civil liberty concerns that prying into the political and religious beliefs of people was a dangerous move towards a police state” (Dodd, Spying Morally right says think tank, 2009). The Quilliam Foundation refuted this, stating that: “Quilliam does not support indiscriminate ‘mass spying’ on British Muslims nor a ‘police state’. Ordinary Muslims are our first line of defence against Islamist terrorism and our allies against extremists. We condemn any efforts to conduct mass spying operations on innocent Muslims through the Government’s Prevent programme” (Quilliam Admin, 2009c). These conflicting statements can be seen as indicative of the Quilliam Foundation’s discourse on the domestic war on terror, which reflected government policy. It sought to combat Islamic extremism, but also to engage with the Muslim community. In its discursive strategy, we see the Quilliam Foundation use legislation to counter Islamism and seeking to work with ‘ordinary Muslims' to integrate into the broader community.
Alongside this, we also see acts of resistance, with the organisation critiquing any legislation which targeted all Muslims. This can be seen in a 2010 press release relating to passenger profiling, in which Quilliam stated that: "Islam is not ethnically or geographically centred – nor is terrorism. This, coupled with the fact that a large number of converts have been involved in Islamist terrorist plots, makes ‘identifying’ Muslims and profiling people by religion an impossibility” (Quilliam Admin, 2010d). It further reads: “Profiling also risks alienating Muslims who are visibly devout but who reject the ideologies that lie behind terrorism. Distrust between visibly devout Muslims and the government risks endangering cooperative efforts to combat Islamist extremism and root out violent extremists” (Quilliam Admin, 2010d). While the Foundation argued publicly against targeting ordinary Muslims, an article by Vikram Dodd in the Guardian claimed that the group had compiled a secret list of Muslims for targeted surveillance, which it had passed on to British security officials (Dodd, 2010).

For the Quilliam Foundation the critique of legislative powers, particularly those surrounding control orders, were tempered with the view that they were a ‘necessary evil’. This can be seen in a press release which focuses on the use of control orders. Here, Nawaz writes that:

> The system of control orders established by the previous government was seen to be an imperfect but necessary evil, and it is, therefore, right that it has been reviewed. It is good news that the Coalition has recognised the problems of the old control orders system while also recognising that, in the absence of any alternatives, scrapping the system altogether is not feasible and may increase the risk of terrorist attacks (Quilliam Admin, 2011b).

For the Quilliam Foundation, any critique of government legislation had to be viewed within the prism of combatting terrorism.

---

**7.3.1 Prevent**

It is within the press releases about the Prevent strategy that we see further synergies between the Quilliam Foundation’s discourse on the war on terror and the government’s securitisation
policies. In addition to the focus on moderate Muslim groups, such as the Sufi council outlined earlier in the chapter, this section will focus on the Quilliam Foundation's press releases relating to other critical aspects of the Prevent strategy, centering on community groups and counter-extremism in prisons. As part of Prevent, the government provided "£5.6 million of direct funding to the National Offender Management System to operate a 'counter-extremism programme' with offenders" (Kundnani, 2009). This focus on offenders can be seen in a report launched by the Foundation in 2009. "Unlocking Al Qaeda: Islamist extremism in British Prisons" focused on the perceived failure of "government measures to stop Islamist radicals in prison" (Brandon, 2009). The report stated that prisons were used by extremists to recruit Muslims. It read: "extremists [are] being empowered by the prison service. Extremists are often seen by prison staff as 'go-betweens' between the prison service and ordinary Muslims" (Brandon, 2009). The report claimed that some Muslim prisoners were being radicalised through programmes on some Islamic TV channels. They write: "Faraj Hassan Al-Saad, a Libyan detainee then fighting extradition to Italy on terrorism charges, used prison call boxes to appear live on the Islam Channel, comparing British prisons with Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib, and describing British courts as a 'fascist courts-martial'" (Quilliam Admin, 2009d). The report's author, James Brandon, argued: "It is time for the British government to consider serious long-term measures to tackle prison radicalisation. The most important of these is to create a specialised de-radicalisation centre which can 'de-programme' existing extremists as has been done in Middle Eastern countries such as Egypt and Yemen" (Quilliam Admin, 2009d).

The idea that prison is used as a recruitment ground for extremism is also the focus of the ICSR report, 'Prisons and Terrorism, Radicalisation and De-radicalisation in 15 countries'. The report claims: "Many Al Qaeda affiliated prisoners ... see it as their duty to propagate their faith and political ideology (Dawa). They realise that prison constitutes a potentially fruitful place for conversion and radicalisation" (Neumann, 2010). The Quilliam Foundation's work on prison draws on Nawaz and Husain's own experiences in prison. Nawaz would expand on this in an article building on earlier statements by the Quilliam Foundation, which had claimed that the
number of Muslim men in prison should be of concern “especially as British prisons have been the forcing houses of Islamist extremism”. He further stated that: “Young men, plunged into prison, find that safety lies in adopting an aggressive Muslim identity. I was told that ‘no one messes with the Muslims in here. The brothers run things’” (Nawaz, Prison is turning angry young men into fanatics. I was told: "No one messes with the Muslims in here", 2012). This claim was refuted by the-then Prisons and Probation Minister, Crispin Blunt, who wrote in response that to describe “prisons as ‘forcing houses of Islamist extremism’ is sensationalist and not backed by evidence” (Blunt, 2012).

While their public output in this area reflected the government’s focus on prisons, through legislation and a focus on Islamist orders, a double securitisation of the Muslim communities would emerge as the Foundation continued to stress the importance of engaging with ‘moderate’ Muslim groups. We can see this further in their work on community groups in the next section.

7.3.1.1 Challenging Islamist Behaviour

One of the critical areas of focus for both the broader war on terror and the CONTEST strategy was engaging with Muslim communities to challenge Islamist thinking through policy and community engagement. The 2008 Preventing Violent Extremism programme set out several key areas of focus which can be seen within the Quilliam Foundation’s public output. The Community Leadership Fund, funded by Prevent, focused on the “need to support communities and to broaden the position of citizenship education”. This focus is reflected in the Quilliam Foundation’s discursive strategy in its engagement with community groups and by focusing on access to Islamist thinkers via Islamic channels and the internet. The strategy was first introduced in October 2009, with a series of events held in mosques, community centres and universities which aimed to help “local communities debate national issues, as well as to inform Quilliam’s own thinking” (Quilliam Admin, 2009e). The event focused on extremism, posing questions such as “How can we bridge the generational gap in our communities?” And “What should an integrated Britain look like?” (Quilliam Admin, 2009e). These themes can be seen to be both reflective of the
Prevent strategy, and appear to echo the core claim made in Blair’s August 2005 speech discussed in Chapter Five, which inferred that ‘British Muslim’ communities were separate from the mainstream and should integrate more and adopt British values.

Section 10.1.5 of the Prevent programme argues that: “faith institutions have an important role in the preventative activity. They can lead the challenge to an ideology that purports to provide theological justification for terrorism” (Home Office, 2011, p. 65). We see this again reflected in the Quilliam Foundation’s focus on the theological underpinnings of extremism. Quilliam supported an anti-extremism weekend project, writing that: “This event will give young Muslims the confidence and the theological tools to go back to their own communities across the UK and root out the virus of extremism and intolerance” (Quilliam Admin, 2010b). The Prevent strategy also highlights “The setting up of a National Resources Unit for the development of curricula in madrasah/mosques and Islamic centres” (Home Office, 2011, p. 80). It further suggests the development of a “British Muslim Citizenship toolkit” which would “articulate a new vision for a British Islam and equip university Islamic Societies. Mosques/imams, parents and youth to deal with violent, fanatical tendencies” (Home Office, 2011, p. 80). These areas of focus continued to be the cornerstone of the discursive strategy of the Quilliam Foundation in this period.

7.3.2.1 Universities

Brown and Saeed write that: “Because of the prevalence of higher education among Western extremist groups and individuals who have participated in terrorist attacks in the UK and USA a simple assumption has been made: that university is a significant meeting point, trigger or birth point of radicalisation” (Brown & Saeed, 2014, p. 1952). This focus on universities can be seen within both the government’s relaunched Prevent strategy in June 2011 and the Quilliam Foundation’s output. Quilliam welcomed the renewed focus: “on tackling pro-terrorist ideologies and on challenging extremism in schools, universities and on the internet as much needed and long overdue” (Quilliam Admin, 2011c). Several synergies can be seen within the Prevent strategy and the Quilliam Foundations’ discursive output on universities. The Prevent Strategy 2011
section 10.67 states that: “We also judge that some extremist preachers from this country not connected to specific extremist groups, have also sought to repeatedly reach out to selected universities and Muslim students” (Home Office, 2011, p. 73). Section 10.79 (referring to FOSIS) further states “that there are several examples of students engaging in terrorism or related activities while members of university societies affiliated to FOSIS” (Home Office, 2011, p. 75).27 In its initial response, Quilliam stated that: “It is also right that the government has acknowledged the problem of radicalisation at universities and that action is needed against campus hate-preachers” (Quilliam Admin, 2011c).

In response to an article by the-then UCL Provost, Michael Grant, which claimed that hate speech was not an issue on campus, the Quilliam Foundation issued a statement claiming that it had discussed radicalisation at UCL and other university campuses with Professor Grant several times. In an article in the Jewish Chronicle, Brandon stated that Grant’s attitude was “deeply irresponsible” and that he was “clearly not suitable to lead a modern university”. “It is clear”, he wrote, “that he’s made up his mind that extremism is not a real issue that affects many students” (Lipman, 2011). This again echoes the Prevent strategy which focuses on universities having a “clear and unambiguous role to play in helping to safeguard young people” (Home Office, 2011, p. 75). Section 10.59 of Prevent states that: “Higher education institutions must be challenged on whether they give due consideration to the public benefit and associated risks, notably when they or one of their affiliated societies invite controversial or extremist speakers to address students” (Home Office, 2011, p. 75).

The Quilliam Foundation’s focus on universities can be further seen through its active presence on university campuses, both through talks given by its members and through the establishment of Quilliam Foundation university societies. Its website includes a constitution for the societies, which states that: “The Quilliam university society is built on one simple principle: to promote the values of universal human rights to counter extremism across all political spectra” (Quilliam

27 FOSIS: The Federation of Student Islamic Societies which represents ISOC’s across the UK and Ireland.
Admin, N.D). Societies are also given support by the Quilliam Foundation, including access to ‘myth busters’. To this extent, the presence of the Quilliam Foundation on university campuses can be seen as a reflection of the Prevent policy which seeks to “establish links between universities and colleges and local programmes to support people vulnerable to radicalisation” (Home Office, 2011, p. 76). In analysing the public output of the Quilliam Foundation concerning universities, we can see an intersection between the government's policy and the organisation's discursive strategy.

### 7.3.2.2 Online Extremism

Another significant area of focus for the Quilliam Foundation was the use of media in the role of spreading and promoting Islamist/extremist ideology. Section 8 of the Prevent strategy focuses on challenging the doctrine that underpins terrorism and the promotion of terrorist narratives. Section 8.11 of Prevent, for instance, focuses on the ideology which is associated with Al Qaeda and states that it is based on a “specific interpretation of Islamic Law” (Home Office, 2011, p. 45). This is echoed in the Quilliam Foundation’s public output relating to the use of the media to spread Islamist ideology. In this, we see the Quilliam Foundation reproduce the securitisation policies of the government, as it associates both the MCB and Hizb-ut-Tahrir as being related to Islamist ideology, framing them as the ‘radical other’.

The press release on Islam UK, a satellite TV channel, argues that: "Many of its speakers are Islamist extremists from organisations like Hizb ut-Tahrir who use the channel to promote intolerant and bigoted interpretations of Islam. Others are Wahhabi graduates of Saudi universities who have denied the Holocaust and promoted hatred of Shia Muslims” (Quilliam Admin, 2009f). The MCB’s Inayat Bunglawala is also used as an example of speakers on the
channel. The statement continues: “Earlier this year, Bunglawala complained to the BBC after they referred to the pro-jihadist cleric Abu Qatada as “an extremist” (Quilliam Admin, 2009f).

The Quilliam Foundation argued that, in its aim to provide a platform for all Muslims, the Islam channel had over-amplified Islamist voices, resulting in an underrepresentation of groups such as the Shia community. Here we see the Quilliam foundation challenging the double securitisation that occurs within the Muslim community, with the dominance of Sunni voices. Paradoxically, it does this by echoing the securitising policies of the government.

The Quilliam Foundation would release a further report on the Islam Channel in 2010: ‘Reprogramming- British Muslims’. Based on three months of monitoring the report accused the channel of “sowing suspicion between different religious communities and promoting intolerance and prejudice” (Quilliam Admin, 2010e). The report stated that: “Although the channel does not directly call for terrorist violence, it clearly helps to create an atmosphere in which religiously-sanctioned intolerance and even hatred might be seen as acceptable”. It further accused the channel of promoting extremism by showing lectures by Anwar Al Awlaki, described as a ‘pro-al-Qaeda preacher’ (Quilliam Admin, 2010e). Awlaki’s lectures were seen to be the inspiration for the Fort Hood shootings in the USA, resulting in YouTube removing them from its platform in 2010. Quilliam wrote: “The British government has done the right thing by contacting YouTube and making its concerns clear. Freedom of speech does not include allowing active supporters of al-Qaeda to incite violence and hatred against others and to recruit a new generation of followers online” (Quilliam Admin, 2010f). In November 2010 Quilliam reported that Ofcom had found the channel to be in breach of the broadcasting code “after presenters on the channel advocated marital rape, justified violence against women and described women who wore perfume as ‘prostitutes’” (Quilliam Admin, 2010g).
7.3.3 International War on Terror.

From the outset, the Quilliam Foundation has placed itself in a global context with its aims to "address the unique challenges of citizenship, identity, and belonging in a globalised world. Quilliam stands for religious freedom, equality, human rights and democracy" (Quilliam Admin, N.D). The organisation's aim is built around the construct of counter-extremism policies which promote a secular, liberal worldview. Within the UK the organisation has been critiqued for its close relationship with the government and its part in the social engineering of moderate Islam. Arenes states that: “some officials, academics and think tanks [have] questioned their vision of the radicalisation process” (Arenes, 2014, p. 64). This section seeks to analyse whether this position is reflected in the Quilliam Foundation’s public output relating to the conflicts in Pakistan, Iraq and Afghanistan. Out of the 334 press releases put out from 2005-2013, only 31 related to the international war on terror.

7.3.3.1 Quilliam in Pakistan

Arenes write of Maajid Nawaz and Ed Husain that: “the main credentials of the organisation, could be found in the very identity of its leaders, who embodied what a successful process of de-radicalisation could be” (Arenes, 2014, p. 65). A crucial part of this identity can be traced back to their period as HBT members. While the Quilliam Foundation has never called for HBT Britain to be proscribed, its contentious relationship with the organisation can be analysed within the prism of the Quilliam Foundation’s work in Pakistan. Through a series of press releases, a duality is presented which, firstly, links HBT Britain to HBT in Pakistan, and secondly presents Nawaz as a reformed former member of Hizb-ut-Tahrir who is seeking to promote Quilliam Foundation’s pluralism. The above point is highlighted in a press release in May 2009 which referred to a physical attack on Nawaz during a tour of university campuses in Pakistan. It states that Nawaz was “attacked by a man subsequently identified as Tayyab Muqeem, a British Muslim who was
sent to Pakistan by the British branch of HT in order to recruit Pakistanis into HT” (Quilliam Admin, 2009h).

Nawaz has stated that he wanted to use his experience to combat extremism in Pakistan. He is described in a press release as: “A man courted by the world’s top political leaders and a TED speaker, Nawaz was once a top international recruiter for Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT), a group that seeks to create a Muslim superstate, a global Caliphate” (Quilliam Admin, 2012b). In “Confronting the ideology of radical extremism”, Levitt et al. describe HBT as a conveyor group. They state that: “Through these groups, as the State department describes, individuals can turn by stages into sympathisers, supporters, and ultimately, members of terrorist networks” (Carpenter, Levitt, & Jacobson, 2009). They position the Quilliam Foundation as an example of former extremists having “stepped into the debate over the future of Islam and have begun to reject the fringe ideas advanced by extremist theoretician” (Carpenter, Levitt, & Jacobson, 2009).

The Quilliam Foundation continued its focus on Hizb-ut-Tahrir with a press release relating to the infiltration of the Pakistani army by members of HBT. By 2012, HBT was banned from Pakistan, and the infiltration of the Pakistani military was seen as an attempt to plan an uprising.28 A Quilliam press release stated that: “The Pakistani Army has recently arrested a group of senior officers, among them a one-star General, for suspected links to Hizb ut Tahrir (HT), [...] HT is not a terrorist outfit, although its claims that it is nonviolent are inaccurate. To attempt to overthrow democracies via military coups is a violent and illegal act. This incident is the most recent in a long line of suspected HT involvement in coup plots in Muslim-majority nations, not just in Pakistan” (Quilliam Admin, 2011d). The focus on Hizb-ut-Tahrir in Pakistan, and Nawaz and Husain’s former involvement in it, positions them as an example of positive de-radicalisation and

28 Kugelman writes in the NY Times of the concern arising from “after an army brigadier named Ali Khan was arrested in May 2011; his six-month trial, on charges of having ties to Hizb-ut-Tahrir, and of conspiring to overthrow the government” (Kugleman, 2012)
can arguably be viewed as the foundation for the launch of their work in Pakistan and the launch of its sister organisation Khudi.

7.3.3.2 The Blueprint for Pakistan

In 2009 Quilliam Foundation launched 'Pakistan, Ideology and Beyond'. Ed Husain spoke of the need "to undertake a ‘paradigm shift’ in tackling Islamist extremism in Pakistan, with greater focus on an intellectual rebuttal of Islamist ideology". Alongside this, he also highlighted "the issues that have arisen due to Pakistan’s inability to forge a coherent national identity for its diverse populace, which has allowed Islamism a chance to gain ground within the country" (Quilliam Admin, 2009g). The report aimed to “recast the struggle against Islamism as an ideological rather than a religious debate, and through viewing Pakistan’s current dilemmas as symptoms of its troubled identity” (Mullick & Yusuf, 2009, p. 19). The report aimed not only to challenge Islamism in Pakistan through promoting an alternate ideology, but also the concept of Pakistani identity. The report stated that it was a failure in Pakistani identity, which had led to “pan-Islamism and separatism competing to fill the vacuum” (Mullick & Yusuf, 2009, p. 9).

Key for Quilliam in understanding and combatting extremism in Pakistan was its national identity and its relationship with religion in its constitution. The report stated: "The vision of Islam as a movement in the constant struggle for political actualisation of the ideal shari’ah became a state-sponsored idea that found root within the political discourse" (Mullick & Yusuf, 2009, p. 11). The report further discussed the relationship between the military and the mullahs focusing on the role that Pakistan played in the war on terror. It goes on to argue: "The sudden emergence of Pakistan as a frontline state in the ‘War on Terror’ in the post 9/11 period provided an international endorsement for the regime of Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's fourth military dictator, who had sailed to power after dismissing a democratically elected government in 1999" (Mullick & Yusuf, 2009, p. 15). From this, it can be seen that Quilliam views Pakistan as a failing
nation-state, with democratic periods often propped up by Islamist ideals\textsuperscript{29}. They conclude that “Pakistan's ideological affiliation and its identity crisis, for the ultimate determinant of the country's stability as a nation-state, will be its ability to confidently rebut challenges to its secular foundational principles and to forge new ways of thinking about its identity” (Mullick & Yusuf, 2009, p. 19).

For the Quilliam Foundation, Pakistan's current instability was influenced not only by events set in motion by the US-UK led military operations in Afghanistan, but also the influence of religious groups in Pakistan. Quilliam thus put forward several proposals which included the launch of Khudi. As with Quilliam in the UK, the Khudi aimed to challenge Islamist ideology in Pakistan. The Quilliam Foundation saw Khudi as a way to encourage a more democratic culture. It states of Khudi that: “Quilliam seeks instead to direct its efforts primarily towards citizen-led social change aimed at popularising critiques of the Islamist ideology, de-coupling this from Islam as a faith and promoting a secular democratic framework for resolving political disputes. The aim is to thereby bolster Pakistani civil society and empower the educated classes to reclaim the meaning of both Islam and Pakistan” (Mullick & Yusuf, 2009, p. 22). It attempted to achieve this through different forums, by targeting HBT at universities as well as by engaging with students and vice-chancellors. It also worked to influence civil society by working with lawyers and through the media.

An example of this can be seen in December 2010 where “Quilliam's sister organisation Khudi and events firm Miradore Productions, in collaboration with the Pakistani Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, are proud to announce democratic Pakistan's first-ever International Youth Conference and Festival (IYCF) to be held in Islamabad” (Quilliam Admin, 2010h). The event sought to address questions of social mobility and unemployment and also tried to promote

\textsuperscript{29} The report gives the example of Pakistan’s, Zulfqar Ali Bhutto, set up the Council of Islamic Ideology, declared a minority sect of Ahmadis as non-Muslims. Bhutto also brought in the Hudood Laws. Further examples of this can be found in Sharif’s tenure as prime minister who proposed a legal system based on the Sharia.
political pluralism in Pakistan. In echoes of the British governmental policy, the organisation supported 'moderate' schools of Islam, interviewing the Sufi band 'Junoon'. Within Pakistan, we can see the Quilliam Foundation adopting some of the securitising processes identified in Croft’s Post Copenhagen model. In its role as an NGO in Pakistan, the Foundation places issues of social mobility into the context of security, linking Hizb-ut-Tahrir to university campuses and infiltration of civil society. This message was then reproduced through events such as ICYF, which worked with elite groups in Pakistan such as vice-chancellors, leading employers such as Google, YouTube in addition to the Pakistani military. Finally, by working with bands such as Junoon, they used music and popular culture to perform this new pluralistic identity in Pakistan. The next section seeks to analyse Quilliam’s work on the international war on terror by analysing the press releases relating to Iraq and Afghanistan.

7.3.3.3 Iraq and Afghanistan

For the Quilliam Foundation, the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts represented a further example of Islamist ideology and its interpretation by jihadist organisations such as Al Qaeda. This was through the threat this posed in Iraq and Afghanistan, and similarities with how the doctrine was disseminated within the UK. They focus particularly on the growing tensions between the Shia and Sunni sects in the two countries. Discussing bombings in Karbala in February 2010 they argued that the tension was a result of the influence of Wahhabism which they equated with Islamist ideology. The press release stated that: "The attack, like many others carried out in recent years, was executed by individuals who believe that the Shia, on account of their love and veneration for the family of the Prophet Mohammed, is not Muslim and should be killed. Such attacks are the direct result of Saudi-inspired takfiri ideology which continues to sow intolerance, hatred and ultimately violence" (Quilliam Admin, 2010i). The press release is not only indicative of the ideological aspect of Quilliam’s discourse on Islamism but also begins to highlight the influence that Islamist ideology has on sectarian tensions, which would again be seen in later events in Syria.
Whereas the focus on Iraq was the growing sectarian violence in the country, in Afghanistan, the challenge was the increasing instability of the country and the withdrawal of US troops. A press release focused on a leaked NATO report which examined the implications of the proposed ISAF withdrawal which included the possible collapse of the Karzai government and the return to power of the Taliban. The Foundation pointed to critical factors which they believed could lead to these scenarios, the lack of proper partners in Afghanistan and the growing deterioration of relations between Pakistan and the US. They further identified a critical number of challenges, highlighting that the Afghan conflict has reached beyond its borders and the potential that this had to destabilise Central and South Asia. Their statement proposed that: “Security will come from stability, which will come by building a nation-wide governing consensus. Such a consensus can only be a product of civil society, rather than imposed by the military. Funds would be well spent on civil-society surges and consensus building” (Quilliam Admin, 2012c). For the Foundation, Afghanistan remained an important focus for both its role in reproducing Islamist ideology but also its role in potentially destabilising the region and its relationship with Pakistan.

7.4 Foreign Affairs

The global context in which the Quilliam Foundation placed itself saw an emphasis on Islamist groups which had risen outside the sphere of the War on Terror. The section on foreign affairs accounted for 36% of the total overall output for the Foundation. An increase in the frequency of press releases in this category in 2011-2013 coincided with the Arab Spring. As such, the output in this area focuses on the Middle East - North Africa region, in particular the countries of Egypt, Libya and Syria. Table 5 below represents the proportion of press releases in this area concerning the overall press releases.
The press releases pre-the Arab spring period continue the Quilliam Foundations focus on Islamist groups. These focused on events in Bangladesh and the Israel-Palestine conflict, and in the case of the former would continue to highlight the links between Islamist movements in South Asia and the UK. In Bangladesh, the Quilliam Foundation highlighted this link in a press release relating to a raid on an orphanage in Bhola. The Bangladeshi authorities linked the orphanage to banned Islamist group Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh. The press release claimed that the orphanage in Bhola had links to the British registered charity, Green Crescent. Highlighting the relationships that one of the charities’ trustees, Andreas Tzortzis, had to Islamist movements, it stated that: “Tzortzis has close links with Hizb ut-Tahrir and regularly speaks at Islamist events across the UK. This evening, for example, he will be speaking at Birmingham University on the subject ‘Sharia law: Barbaric or Misunderstood?’ Tzortzis is also a regular guest on the Islam Channel, a number of whose regular presenters are members of Hizb ut-Tahrir” (Quilliam Admin, 2009i). This category continues to highlight the possible impact of foreign affairs on Islamist movements.

This can further be seen in the press releases on Israel, which relates not to events within the country but to the government's decision to host Avigdor Lieberman. Lieberman, the-then Israeli foreign minister, was “also the founder and leader of the Yisrael Beiteinu, a hardliner nationalist
and extreme Zionist political party in Israel" (Quilliam Admin, 2009f). In May 2009, the organisation criticised the decision of the Foreign Office to host Lieberman, the then Israeli Foreign minister arguing, "this decision to host Lieberman is inconsistent with recent Home Office decisions to exclude other individuals on the specific grounds that they “promote hatred, terrorist activities and serious violence”, and “advocate hatred and violence in support of their religious beliefs” (Quilliam Admin, 2009f). The Financial Times wrote of Lieberman that “Mr Lieberman, the leader of the far-right Yisrael Beiteinu party, is a hawkish politician whose record of making provocative and inflammatory statements that have already cost Israel valuable diplomatic capital. (Buck, 2009)”. The Jewish Chronicle quotes his stance on Israeli – Arabs, describing them as “likely to serve as terrorist agents on behalf of the Palestinian Authority” (Hoare, 2001).” In this case, we see the Quilliam Foundation critique the decision of the Foreign Office, not only because of Lieberman’s views but also because of the impact that this could have on Islamist narratives. The Quilliam Foundation statement on this issue reads:

The FCO’s decision to host Avigdor Lieberman in London illustrates that the government’s policy of excluding extremists from the UK is inconsistent. Lieberman clearly holds views that are no less extreme than those of many other racists and bigots who have been banned from the UK. The government’s apparent double-standards on such key issues can bolster extremist and Islamist narratives that seek to portray Western governments as biased and unjust (Hoare, 2001).

Within this statement, we see a distinction emerge in the Quilliam Foundation’s discourse. Though the Foundation demonstrates a commitment to free speech, they do so while cautioning against those speakers who it believed advocated for hatred.

---

30 This view was also echoed by the MCB who argued that “Lieberman clearly holds views that are no less extreme than those of many other racists and bigots who have been banned from the UK. The government’s apparent double-standards on such key issues can bolster extremist and Islamist narratives that seek to portray Western governments as biased and unjust”.
While the press releases in this area focused on Libya, Egypt and Syria, this section will focus on Libya and Egypt to highlight the different narratives adopted by the Quilliam Foundation towards the region. In its approach to conflict within this area, the Quilliam Foundation would again emphasise the background of its staff, particularly that of Norman Benotmen, a former member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. The Libyan uprising in February 2011 saw a shift in the geographical focus of the Foundation as it moved towards commenting on the events in Libya and the Arab Spring. In a briefing paper calling for regime change in Libya, they stated: “The international community should stand up for Libya’s democrats and work with them to bring the era of Gaddafi to an end” (Quilliam Admin, 2011e). The press release linked the Gaddafi regime to Islamist terrorism in the Middle East.

The Foundation produced a further briefing paper on the ongoing uprisings in February 2011. The document included proposals for the international community to work together to build a coalition with anti-Gaddafi Libyan groups and to help them “evolve into a broad-based interim government that can ultimately prepare the way for a peaceful transition towards democracy in Libya” (Quilliam Admin, 2011f). This also marks a departure in the discursive strategy for the Quilliam Foundation whose narratives had centred on Islamist groups. The press release on Libya marked the first instance of the Quilliam Foundation calling for intervention in a foreign state based on its Islamist ideals. The Quilliam Foundation further sought to influence the international response by producing a second report, which recommended the implementation of a no-fly zone and called for both military and humanitarian support for Libya. The Quilliam Foundation’s focus on Libya continued with a further briefing paper released in June 2012, which looked at the rise of Jihadist groups in the country. It warned that the fragile situation in Libya was “generating a security vacuum ready to be exploited by various militant groups.” It again called for intervention from the international community (Quilliam Admin, 2012d).
The Quilliam Foundation’s emphasis on the relationship between Islamist ideology and regimes was further highlighted in their narratives surrounding events in Egypt. Commentating on the 2012 Egyptian election, Nawaz urged caution anticipating an “unhappy settlement where the military remains ever-present, in the shadows, influencing the civilian government without controlling it” (Wedeman & Greene, 2012). Whereas in Libya, the Quilliam Foundation had emphasised the link between Islamism and the regime, they offered a different view on Egypt. On the new Egyptian president Mohammed Mursi they urged caution against fears on the possibility of the Muslim Brotherhood returning to power. They stated that: “Through the dissolution of the lower house, the Muslim Brotherhood is no longer in charge of both Parliament and the executive. Civil society and establishment pressure against the group has curtailed any significant powers they may have held” (Quilliam Admin, 2012e). Egypt, they argued, was a complex situation and could not be limited to an Islamist vs Secularist dichotomy. As with Libya, they called for international pressure to be applied, arguing that Egypt was the standard-bearer for democracy in the region. In both these countries, the Quilliam Foundation’s discourse was influenced by the role of Islamist groups, and their output sought to promote a democratic environment which would prevent Islamist ideology from prevailing in the Middle East.

7.5 Islamophobia

The discursive strategy of the Quilliam Foundation in its public output relating to Islamophobia is constructed in two spheres. Firstly, the organisation contests the term Islamophobia, by examining this within their broader framework centred on challenging Islamism. Secondly, they focus on the narrative of far-right groups such as the BNP and EDL. In the concept leaflet: “Islamism and Language: How using the wrong words reinforce Islamist narratives”, they focus on the “the importance of language when discussing issues affecting Islam and Muslims” (Readings, Brandon, & Phelps, 2010, p. 2). The report uses the example of the term Islamophobia as one which “can inadvertently strengthen the narratives and arguments of Islamism” (Readings, Brandon, & Phelps, 2010). The report focuses on the 1997 Runnymede report “Islamophobia: A
Challenge for us all” and argues that much of the confusion surrounding the term stems from the report. It states that the term is used:

> Analogously to racism or anti-Semitism to refer to the very real and disturbing phenomenon of bigotry against Muslims. At others, it is used to refer to criticism of certain aspects of Islam or even to a criticism of Islamism. This profusion of meanings has made accurate usage of the term problematic and challenging (Readings, Brandon, & Phelps, 2010, p. 13).

The report provided examples of where the term Islamophobia has been used against those who critique Islamist thinking, for instance referring to criticism by Dominic Grieve of a decision to invite Yasir Qadhi to a Global Peace and Unity event. The report stated that Qadhi responded to the criticism by saying that: “Islamophobia is defined to be the illogical and irrational fear of Islam, and Dominic Grieve seemed to be a perfect example of it” (Readings, Brandon, & Phelps, 2010, p. 13).

The Runnymede definition of Islamophobia is often used as the starting point for discussions on the topic, with authors such as Modood, Anwar and Meer all using this definition. The Quilliam Foundation offered an alternative explanation of Islamophobia, arguing that the Runnymede definition “can undermine freedom of speech by conflating criticism or scrutiny of aspects of a religion or the behaviour of its followers with inciting hatred against individuals on the basis of their religion, in this case, Islam” (Readings, Brandon, & Phelps, 2010, p. 13). They propose the terms Anti-Muslim bigotry or Anti-Muslim prejudice. It is within this context we can view the Quilliam Foundation’s discourse around Islamophobia.

In 2009 the emphasis on free speech could be seen in a press release relating to a decision by the Home Office banning Geert Wilders from the UK. The Foundation announced its opposition to the ban, arguing: “Just as the ideas of nonviolent Islamist groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir should be tackled through debate and argument, so should those of Wilders and others. Freedom of speech should

---

31 Yasir Qadhi: A Pakistani American Scholar who teaches at the Religious Dept at Rhodes University. In 2010 the Telegraph claimed he was the influence on the Detroit Bomber.
be protected – so long as people do not use this freedom to call for violence against others” (Quilliam Admin, 2009j). The press release underscores their commitment to freedom of speech and reflects a discursive strategy which compares far-right ideology to Islamism. Usama Hasan discussed the organisation’s work on far-right groups and argued that: “there’s a symbiotic relationship between it and jihadism” (Neather, 2013).

This can further be seen in a press release relating to Tommy Robinson’s departure from his role as leader of the English Defence League, in October 2013. It stated: “Quilliam has been working with Tommy to achieve this transition, which represents a huge success for community relations in the United Kingdom. We have previously identified the symbiotic relationship between far-right extremism and Islamism and think that this event can dismantle the underpinnings of one phenomenon while removing the need for the other phenomenon” (Quilliam Admin, 2013b). Robinson himself would echo the sentiment in an interview with the Guardian, where he argued that: "Fascists and Islamists, they are both sides of the same coin" (Malik, 2013). The Foundation further explored far-right ideology in their paper ‘In defence of British Muslims’, which argued that the far-right rhetoric of the BNP was "a deliberate decision to see the acts of Islamist extremists as representative of all British Muslims” (Quilliam Admin, 2009k).

Those press releases which related to Islamophobic incidents in this period focused on the reaction by the police and government to anti-Muslim crimes. In the case of an arson attack on a Luton Mosque, it argued that: “the police can only win the trust of minority communities by showing that they are serious about tackling all forms of extremism. By getting it right in Luton, the Bedfordshire police will go some way towards tackling the breakdown in trust that has occurred over recent years” (Quilliam Admin, 2009l).

The relationship between the government and British Muslims in relation to anti-Muslim crime can be seen within its stance in a statement regarding Terry Jones, the American pastor who had threatened to publicly burn a Quran, in which we can also see the double securitisation emerge as Quilliam seek to distinguish between those they deem to be Islamists and ‘ordinary Muslims’.
This statement read: ‘The British government has taken two important steps to tackle prejudice against Muslims by banning the US anti-Muslim pastor Terry Jones from entering the UK and through today’s speech by Sayeeda Warsi, Britain’s first female Muslim cabinet minister, which calls for action to tackle ‘bigotry’ against Muslims”. It continued: “While Islamist terrorism and Islamist extremism pose a clear danger to our society that needs to be tackled, this cannot justify the demonisation of Muslims as a whole. British Muslims have a right to live their lives without fear of attack and without being discriminated against because of their religion” (Quilliam Foundation, 2011f). The distinguishing of Islamists and British Islamists would form part of the overarching narrative of the Quilliam Foundation. We can see this further in the next section on religious engagement, which would also establish a double securitisation within the British Muslim community.

7.6 Religious Engagement

The dichotomy between British Muslims and Islamist groups and a call to reform Islam forms the underlying discursive strategy of the Quilliam Foundation relating to Religious Engagement. In this category, the focus is on the promotion of a more pluralistic community and promoting moderate Muslim voices. To emphasise the issues facing the British Muslim community, they released a transcript of a speech from 1990 by an Asian businessman, Iqbal Wahhab. The focus of the speech was on the issues facing the British Asian community at the time. The press release by the Foundation states that the speech was “remarkable for showing the surprising longevity of many of the issues facing Britain’s Muslim communities – indeed issues surrounding free speech, education, politics and identity, to name just a few, remain just as hotly debated and contested today as they were in 1990. The speech is also a useful reminder for policy-makers to avoid seeking short-term fixes that may do little to alter longer-term trajectories” (Quilliam Admin, 2010j). The press release is significant in its portrayal of Muslims as being synonymous with the South Asian community. Within this and other press releases, no distinction is made to reflect the different ethnic minority groups that make up the British Muslim community. The use
of the term, 'Asian community' to denote the Muslim community and how this creates a hierarchal other within will be developed further in this thesis.

Where the Quilliam Foundation discussed theological issues, this was done within the framework of reforming Muslim practices, particularly where these reinforced links to practices associated with Arab (Wahhabi)/Muslim Brotherhood interpretations of Islam. In an article discussing the practice of waiting for a visual sighting of the moon before beginning Ramadan, Usama Hassan argues that many of these practices differ based on the ethnic makeup of British Muslims. Hassan calls the practice ‘confusing’, arguing that: "If they can’t see the moon in Britain, they’ll follow what’s ‘happening back home. There’s a lot of ignorance of the science” (Henegan, 2012). This can also be seen as reflective of the Quilliam Foundation’s overall discursive strategy, which aims to move away from conservative interpretations of Islam and promote a more pluralistic model.

The need for reform within Islam underpins many of the press releases in this section. In September 2012, the Quilliam Foundation announced a series of discussion groups, titled “Islamic Reform”. These were presented as a “series of study/discussion sessions on cutting-edge ideas around Islamic Reform” (Quilliam Admin, 2012e). Topics included ‘Interpreting the Quran for the modern world’ and ‘Approaches to Sharia Reform’. Further press releases also focused on a need to reform Islam, as the Quilliam Foundation sought to promote moderate Muslim voices. This can be seen in the case of the movie, ‘The Innocence of Muslims’. The movie which depicted the Prophet Mohammed [p.b.u.h] and the subsequent protest that surrounded it would bring to the fore conversations around blasphemy laws. Nawaz told Channel 4 News: “I think there have been moderate voices in the past on blasphemy but since the murder of the ex-governor of Punjab, Salmaan Taseer, for merely suggesting a change to Pakistan’s blasphemy laws people, have been much more cautious about speaking out" (Nawaz, 2012).

They further produced a concept paper on this topic, ‘No Compulsion in Religion: an Islamic Case against Blasphemy Law’. The paper used theological arguments to oppose the strengthening of blasphemy laws, again presented within the framework of reform. The paper stated on
blasphemy laws that: “Muslims are often the worst offenders when it comes to blaspheming against other religions, yet the most vociferous in taking offence when their sacred symbols are insulted” (Hasan, 2012). Key to their argument is the Quranic verse ‘Let there be no compulsion in religion” (2.256). Hasan further argued that the scriptures promote respect for all sacred symbols and that punishment is reserved for life after death. He stated: “This is true even for mocking God, the Prophet Mohammed and the Qur’an that entails blasphemy against Islam” (Hasan, 2012). The paper calls on laws in Muslim majority countries to be revisited in light of Islamic principles of tolerance.

It is within their concept paper: ‘Muslim Communities between Integration and Securitization’ that the Quilliam Foundation brings together the organisation’s different discursive strategies on both religious engagement and counter-extremism. The concept paper reflects much of the securitisation process set out in chapter five, examining Muslim communities and “their isolation from their countries of residence” and explores some of the “different levels on which integration has failed” (Quilliam Admin, 2012f). The concept paper starts from the premise that the July 7th London Bombings had “exacerbated the conflict between Western Muslims and the Muslim Diaspora” (Benotman, 2012). It presents several reasons for what it believes to be the failure of Muslim integration, presenting Muslims, as Blair had, as a separate community. They identify these as socioeconomic, civil cultural and religious reasons, the latter two inferring that the cultural practices of the Muslim community in the UK, prevent them from being part of the ‘in-group’, the mainstream British society. The paper further argues that Islamists have been using Palestine and Kashmir conflicts as a way of “nurturing the existing grievances over Western foreign policies in an attempt to create one Islamic community” (Benotman, 2012). Benotman echoes the Muslim consciousness identified by Meer but states that: “extremists hoped to create a religious Islamic identity that transcends ethnic and cultural differences” (Benotman, 2012). The paper reflects the multi-faceted approach of CONTEST, which links both community and counter-extremism, reinforcing the idea of the Muslim radical other.
7.7 Public Engagement

It is within this category that we see the Quilliam Foundation interacting with the broader political process and attempting to shape the securitisation process. It is in their interaction at briefings and party conferences that we can position them as an elite group. In this sense, they have a dual role, both as part of the dominant discourse in broader political practice and as an elite within the Muslim community. This section will focus on the former. One of the earliest examples of this was at the Liberal Democratic conference in September 2010, where they held an event: “Tolerating the intolerant: What should be the Liberal approach?” The talk called for the need to “publicly challenge viewpoints that were intolerant, and that impinged upon others civil liberties” (Quilliam Admin, 2010k). It focused on the issue of sharing platforms with nonviolent extremists and “politicians sharing public platforms with known Islamic extremists” (Quilliam Admin, 2010k). By also discussing the burqa and sharia law in this event, they positioned these ideas as incompatible with a liberal society. They would repeat the event at the Labour and Conservative Party conferences.

A second report, ‘Skin Deep Democracy: How race, religion and ethnicity continue to affect Westminster politics’, sought to examine whether more should be done within the Westminster political scene to engage with BME groups. The press release stated that in “addition to helping to promote integration, a healthy democratic culture within the UK will help to undermine extremist (Islamist, far-right and other) narratives” (Quilliam Admin, 2010l). The report argues that seeking out of bloc votes, by working with gatekeepers within the community and religious institutes, risks “damaging integration and representative democracy” (Quilliam Admin, 2010l). It further examines racism suffered by ethnic minority candidates in Westminster, in addition to the dangers of being stereotyped as the ‘diversity’ candidate.

The report presented several case studies which examined how different communities interact with the system. Presenting two case studies on Tower Hamlets and Birmingham, they focused on bloc voting and how this could enable the infiltration of Islamist candidates. Again we see the
Muslim community being portrayed as South Asian (Bangladeshi and Pakistani respectively). In the case of Tower Hamlets, it discusses the impact that Hizb-ut-Tahrir has attempted to have on local elections. The report stated: "Hizb-ut-Tahrir openly state that they believe democracy to be *kufr* (unbelief) and therefore tell Muslims not to become involved in democratic elections" (Harty Dyke & Readings, 2010, p. 59). Providing the example of Shiri Khatun, a Labour councillor, they show the effect that conservative Muslim attitudes were having on politics after she was critiqued for not wearing a headscarf. On Tower Hamlets, they quote Sarah Glyn, who argues that “in Tower Hamlets, populism now means appealing to Muslims [i.e. Bangladeshi residents]” (Glyn, 2010, p. 991). In both this case studies, we see Quilliam’s discourse centred both on the way that Islamist groups interact with political discourse and an inferred link between these Islamist groups and the racial politics of the different South Asian communities in the UK.

The intersection between the Quilliam Foundation and public engagement can further be seen in Nawaz’s decision to stand as a Liberal Democratic candidate in 2013. While the organisation confirmed that Nawaz was running in a personal capacity, they stated: “He will remain Chairman of Quilliam and is committed to its cross-party values and mission of countering extremism, promoting pluralism, inspiring change and seeding democratic culture. Quilliam supports its Chairman’s personal decision but is neither involved in his political campaign nor will it ever be officially affiliated with any political party” (Quilliam Admin, 2013a). Subsequent campaign releases highlighted his background and current work in counter-extremism. An article on Nawaz looks at his work in setting up the Quilliam Foundation and Khudi. It states that: “Both organisations seek to challenge extremist thought, and he sees initiating this debate as a first step to addressing the problem. Nawaz hopes to represent these same causes as Liberal Democrat MP for Hampstead and Kilburn come 2015, should his campaign be successful” (Degenhart & Wilkinson, 2013).

Nawaz’s political campaign and the work in this category can be seen to reflect both his and the organisation’s position as a member of the elite in engaging with the broader political process.
While it reproduces ideas of securitisation in its counter-extremism work, and by challenging Islamist behaviour, the Foundation argues that this must be done through the engagement of Muslim communities. Paradoxically, while the organisation disputes the notion of community gatekeepers, in its interactions within the political system, the Foundation positions itself as a gatekeeper to policy writers seeking to engage politically with the British Muslim community.

7.8 Securitisation

Of the three organisations, it is the Quilliam Foundation who comes closest to having co-opted the securitisation process. It was in the section on Prevent in particular that we have seen the synergies between the securitisation processes and the Foundation’s work. We can see this both in reports such as “Unlocking Al Qaeda: Islamist extremism in British prisons” and in their work on universities, which reflected the government’s Prevent policy of focusing on extremism in places of freedom. Acts of resistance for the Quilliam Foundation were centred on providing an alternative discourse to prevent acts which they perceived would provide material for Islamist groups to unite Muslims in ‘grievances’ against Westminster decisions. While the organisation sought to distinguish between Islamists and Muslims communities, it did this through attempts to define the way the term was used and thus influence who was the case as the ‘radical’ other. For the Quilliam Foundation, any critique of the overall dominant discourse is less about securitisation processes and focuses instead on those elements which contradict the groups’ message. These acts of resistance will be further examined in the next section.

7.8.1 Sharia Law

It is within their acts of challenging perceptions of Muslims in which we see acts of resistance from the Quilliam Foundation to the othering of Muslim communities. As with the MCB in the previous chapter, this was often centred on press coverage of British Muslim communities. One example of this concerns response to an article in the Express, which claimed that there was a desire in the British Muslim community for Sharia Law. The article itself focuses on Anjem
Choudary’s Islamist group Islam4UK and argues that Muslims want a “complete upheaval of the British legal system, its officials and legislation” (Brown M., 2009). Although the article does add the caveat that fellow Muslims had condemned the activities of Islam4UK, Quilliam argued that the title of the article: “Now Muslims Demand Full Sharia Law” gave the impression that this is representative of the British Muslim community. They state:

“More concerning is your paper’s failure to identify this group as being entirely unrepresentative of British Muslims, a failure which risks fanning the flames of right-wing extremism. For example, on October 15th you used the headline ‘Now Muslims Demand Full Sharia Law’ whilst your article on the day of the protest, October 31st, ‘Uproar as Fanatics Go On March For Sharia Law in UK’ opened referring to “A Muslim march to promote sharia law” and repeated Choudary’s claim to be “Britain’s chief sharia law judge”. This could easily give the impression to your readers that British Muslims respect and follow Anjem Choudary and share his desire to turn Britain into his medieval vision of an Islamic state (Quilliam Admin, 2009m).

In this statement, we see the Quilliam Foundation seeking to counter a narrative which was indicative of newspaper articles which conflated the behaviour of Islamist groups with that of the broader Muslim community. These claims made by the Express, also echoed in an article in the Daily Telegraph were indicative of debates about Sharia Law and its role in the UK (Jamieson, 2009). The arguments centred on the claim that the implementation of Sharia courts would see Muslims in the UK having access to a parallel legal system. This claim was repeated by other elite actors with the MP, Ann Widdecombe, stating: “You cannot have two legal systems side by side, and the one we have now works and the British people are perfectly happy with it” (Brown M., 2009). Here we see British Muslims being portrayed further as a separate community, who want to have a separate legal system whose values do not match that of the British people. This ‘speech’ act occurs both via MPs and the media. By seeking to emphasise the difference in Islamist such as Choudary and the British Muslim community we also further see the identity of the Quilliam Foundation as a pluralistic organisation seeking to promote a more moderate version of Islam, one, it portrays as being more compatible with British values. While the Quilliam Foundation’s
discursive policy often appears to reproduce the securitisation process, it does so to limit this to those as an organisation it sees as Islamists.

7.9 Conclusion

The Quilliam Foundation portrays itself as an independent think tank which seeks to counter extremism and promote pluralism. Its key aim to combat Islamism underlies much of its public output, in particular in the largest of our categories, the war on terror. By setting out the link between Wahhabism and Islamist groups, the Foundation focuses on the ideology that underpins jihadist movements. They link this ideology primarily to the Saudi region and to the influence that this has on imams both from Saudi and South Asia and the way this is used in British Muslim society. While the Quilliam Foundation emphasises that the majority of British Muslims are peaceful, and caution against any legislation that will target the community as a whole, their discursive strategy reproduces the securitising narratives of the government by examining the need for the Muslim community to integrate more. In this vein, we can see the Quilliam Foundation reflect the different strands of CONTEST, one which seeks to combat violent extremism and focus on the need for the British Muslim community to integrate.

Further similarities between the Quilliam Foundation discourse and government policy can be seen within their press releases relating to the war on terror. It further engages with the broader political process by focusing on the role that religion plays for the South Asian diaspora, often using the community as a synonym for the British Muslim community. Their focus on the South Asian community’s interaction with Westminster politics called for an end to the bloc voting which relied on community leaders and institutions to act as gatekeepers to the Muslim vote and therefore more susceptible to Islamist ‘infiltration’.

The focus on combatting Islamist ideology underlies all the areas of the Quilliam Foundation’s work. Within this, we can see not only the reproduction of the securitisation process but the
framework of a double securitisation emerges. Through their focus on south Asia, further recreates a hierarchal other. Through their framing of Islamist behaviour, they also portray some Muslim organisations as a radical other. The focus on Islamist ideology is evident in their work in Pakistan. Here, through the launch of their sister organisation, Khudi, they sought to combat Islamist ideology and HBT in Pakistan through initiatives which reflected British government policy. In Pakistan, the organisation sought to support different models of Islam. Its promotion of the Sufi band Junoon echoes the UK government’s promotion of the National Sufi Council after the July 7th London bombings. In the issue of blasphemy laws, they used Quranic verses and hadiths to argue against the strengthening of blasphemy laws in countries such as Pakistan. The focus on Islamist ideology abroad can further be seen in their press releases and reports concerning Libya and Egypt where they sought to prevent Islamist groups taking advantage of power vacuums and instability which emerged following the Arab Spring of 2011. In their work in the UK and abroad, the public discourse of the Quilliam Foundation focuses on the need to combat Islamism. It does so through working with governmental policy and in its engagement with the broader Muslim communities.
Chapter 8: Hizb-ut-Tahrir: The search for a global Caliphate.

The July 7th bombings would result in Hizb-ut-Tahrir Britain [HBT] emerging as a focal point in the securitisation of British Muslims, with the government attempting to proscribe the organisation as part of its proposed counter-terrorism legislation. This would also inform HBT’s decision to remove all press releases predating July 7th 2005, from its website. Abdul Wahid from HBT wrote: “The decision to remove some of our overseas literature from our British website was a considered response to the legitimate proposition that people who read it out of its context might see it as offensive” (Wahid, 2005).

As an organisation, the roots of Hizb-ut-Tahrir (the party of Liberation) can be traced back to a "transnational Islamist movement founded in Palestine in the early 1950s by its ideologue Taqiuddin al Nabhanni" (Hamid, 2007, p. 45). Hizb-ut-Tahrir was part of a growing movement of Islamist parties that included in their aims a social and political movement. This sought to restore "the political unity of the Muslim world by the re-establishment of a pan-Islamic state or caliphate" (Hamid, 2007, p. 46). The movement sees itself as providing an Islamic alternative to capitalism and communism and rejects any political ideology which does not originate from Islamic ideology. Karigiannis and McCauley write that Hizb-ut-Tahrir’s programme of action has been “modelled after the three stages that the Prophet Mohammed experienced en route to the establishment of the first Islamic state” (Karagiannis & McCauley, 2007, p. 318). These stages, summarised, were to find individuals who agreed with the aims of HBT, to interact with the ummah to establish Islam in their private spheres and finally, to establish the Islamic state.

8.1 Pre 2005

HBT Britain [hereafter referred to as HBT] first emerged in the 1980s under the leadership of Omar Bakri Mohammed. HBT targeted members of the disenfranchised youth population, who were frustrated at the political system targeting second-generation Muslims. Lewis sees the rise of organisations such as HBT on university campuses “as a result of the failure of mainstream
Sunni traditions to connect with young Muslims educated and socialised in Britain” (Lewis, 2007, p. 138). Meer writes that by the “beginning of the 1990s HT could count several thousand young British Muslim supporters amongst its ranks” (Meer, 2010, p. 87). Primarily targeting British Muslim students, HBT attracted alarm amongst the student community with the distribution of literature which was anti-Semitic and homophobic. In response to this, the group began to operate through alias organisations such as ‘Thought Society’, ‘1924 Society’ and ‘One Nation Society’. The group further used the rise if channels such as Islam Channel and Press TV to disseminate its message (Hamid, 2007). The departure of its leader, Sheikh Omar Bakri Mohammed, in the late 1990s, saw the group’s profile decline.

HBT would re-emerge in 2002 with the onset of the War on Terror. By 2003, the group could attract up to five to eight thousand people to a gathering (Hamid, 2007). The group positioned itself as opposing both the military campaign in Iraq and Pakistan’s role in the War on Terror. The international campaign would be reflected in the public output of HBT, which would also focus on events in Iraq and Pakistan. Hamid writes that the group’s message finds resonance with those "who reject both the wider Western culture of the majority and the mainstream Islam of their community" (Hamid, 2007, p. 151). While the organisation itself does not publish membership figures, there are disputing claims over the size of the organisation within the UK. A report by Ahmed and Stuart claimed that at its peak, the organisation’s annual gathering had attracted up to 10,000 members (Ahmed & Stuart, 2009). Two press releases within this period, however, claimed that conferences had attracted crowds numbered in the thousands. The exact membership figure remains unknown.

This chapter will firstly examine the conditions in which the organisation emerged within the UK and the circumstances which would lead to its attempted proscription. While the organisation deleted all its public output before the July 7th attacks, we can see the discursive strategy followed the organisation’s aim to promote the idea of a caliphate state in opposition to what it terms as a

---

32 Sheikh Omar Bakri Mohammed was a Syrian exile who was forced to resign by HBT. The group saw his tactics as being as odds with the message of the Caliphate. He went on to form Al-Muhajiroun, who would be banned as part of counter terrorism legislation introduced by the Blair government.
colonial system. Within the period, the War on Terror provides the largest area of focus for the organisation. The attempted proscription of the organisation by Blair’s government would see HBT adopt differing discursive strategies for the domestic and international arena. Reflecting its transnational roots, the organisation further focused on countries with a Muslim governing system, particularly those it believed to be colluding with ‘colonial powers’. Finally, this chapter will analyse how the organisation has used the securitisation processes which have ‘othered’ them to create ontological security based on its resistance to securitisation.

8.1.1 September 11th Terror Attacks

While the HBT website does not hold any information before 2005, we can analyse how HBT’s discourse changed by looking at the account of former members such as Shiraz Maher and Reza Pankhurst. By the mid-1990s, HBT had been banned by several student unions and were viewed through the prism of the Islamist label. While HBT belongs to a global organisation who seek to create a global ummah, Abbas writes that: “It is essential to regard HT more as a ‘local’ movement rather than global as it is impotent without its interconnections within a local context” (Abbas, 2011, p. 40). Lewis describes them as "a radical Islamist group with roots in Palestine, dubbed by Muslims and non-Muslims alike as the Islamic BNP, given its supremacist and exclusionary rhetoric" (Lewis, 2007, p. 29).

The changing discourse of HBT in this period can be seen firstly by this quote by Shiraz Maher who, in Philip Lewis’s Young British and Muslim, recounts his own recruitment shortly after September 11th: “So, brother what do you think of 9/11 [...] Of course, America will use this to wage war of Islam”. He goes on to say that: “after my initial contact with the party, we met quite intensively, and I was told I had a duty to ‘defend Islam’ from the impending ‘humiliation’ America was about to inflict” (Lewis, 2007, p. 119). Lewis adds that: “In recent years, much of their radical, anti-Western rhetoric has been toned down and they have sought to portray themselves as family-friendly” (Lewis, 2007, p. 121).
8.2 Overall Strategy

The deletion of previous press releases, reports and pamphlets was the organisation’s first response to Tony Blair’s attempted proscription set out in his speech in August 2005. Blair had stated that: “we will proscribe Hizb-ut-Tahrir and the successor Al Mujahiroun. We will also examine the grounds for proscription to widen them and put forward proposals in new legislation” (Blair, 2005). Consequently, while the discursive strategy of the organisation still reflected that of the broader international movement, that of a Caliphate State, Blair’s proposed prescription would see a change in focus as they sought to challenge the legitimacy of this action. This ‘new’ discursive strategy emphasised their right as a non-violent group to operate legally within the UK, and the group argued that the ban would be in effect going against British values. They stated that the proposed ban “proved that all the talk about freedom of speech, tolerance, people power and democracy, are only acceptable as long as one agrees with policies of 10 Downing Street” (HBT, 2005a). Here we see HBT using values which Croft argues “constitute the parameters of contemporary Britishness”, such as tolerance and meritocracy, to protect their right to exist (Croft, 2012b, p. 157). HBT further sought to align itself with other groups on this issue. This reflected a departure away from the global Hizb-ut-Tahrir discourse, which focused on the establishment of a caliphate state. Globally, the organisation critiqued Muslim leaders in different countries which they believed upheld colonial narratives. Within the timeline of this thesis, it is the categories of the War on Terror and Foreign Affairs, which formed the critical areas of focus. The breakdown by category can be seen in the table below.
Tables 15 and 16 breakdowns each of our five categories by year, analysing the frequency of which they are the subject of press releases. The highest concentration in this period of press releases occurs from 2005 to 2010. There are two factors which can be linked to the high number of press releases in this period. Firstly, the war on terror and the impact of the US and UK campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. Secondly, the securitisation process that occurred through legislative changes and media articles. The category of Foreign Affairs reflects the focus on the growing Islamist threat and the global nature of HBT as they were banned in countries such as Pakistan and Bangladesh. The increasing securitisation of Muslims in Europe, with bans on Islamic symbols such as minarets and burkas in some countries, also featured in press releases as the organisation sought to resist the impact of legislation in the UK and abroad.
While overall the largest category in this period was the War on Terror, the below table reveals that the category of Foreign Affairs features within the top percentile if we break this down by year. Though the call for a caliphate system underpins the organisation's discourse, the category of religious engagement consists of only 46 press releases, at only 7% of the overall press releases.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>War on Terror</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Discourse</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamophobia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Engagement</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 15 Breakdown by Year

Table 16 Percentile Breakdown by Category
While statistics from the Runnymede Trust show that Islamophobia was on the rise in this period, this remains consistently the smallest of the categories featured. Within the context of this analysis, the areas of political engagement and Islamophobia will be analysed together.

There are several issues which will be considered when analysing HBT’s press releases. We know from the previous section that the tone of HBT has been toned down and Maher’s recollection from his days at HBT indicates that its members receive internal communications. We will also see the next sections that HBT uses leaflet drops as part of its campaigns. As these are not available on the website, we cannot analyse these as part of the discourse. We can though infer that HBT has an internal and an external audience, and this informs their discourse. Their discourse has several different audiences. In the UK, they appeal to the in-group to persuade them to help resist the securitisation processes and abroad, their audience is aimed at Muslim communities which they wish to persuade to adopt the Caliphate model.

8.3 The War on Terror

For HBT, the war on terror would impact their discursive strategies within both the international and domestic spheres, resulting in the organisation deploying two differing approaches. On events in the international arena, HBT often reproduced press releases from the global Hizb-ut-Tahrir website. These presented the conflict within a colonial framework, claiming that the US-UK alliance was seeking new imperialism. While the war on terror fed into grievances that HBT members had with foreign policy, the section on the international war on terror demonstrated how the military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq were used to reinforce the claims of new imperialism. These were further used to enhance the idea of an alternate governing system, a caliphate state, based on the group’s literalist interpretation of Islam. Within the UK, the securitisation process would see the group adopt a new framework, working with different Muslim groups and organisations in acts of resistance, as they sought to combat the impact of the changes that had occurred in political discourse and legislation following the July 7th terror attacks. While HBT became one of the focal points of the governments proposed counter-
terrorism policy, an analysis of the press releases reveal that, except for the year 2005, the public output relating to the domestic war on terror forms a lower proportion of press releases in comparison to the overall pattern.

8.3.1 The Domestic War on Terror

Hamid writes that: “Following the July 7th bombings in London, the radical Islamist group Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT) remerged into the media spotlight after being placed on the list of proscribed groups as part of the British government’s proposed anti-terror legislation” (Hamid, 2007, p. 145). The organisation has two periods, where the domestic war on terror would form its primary focus. The first period is in 2005 with a series of press releases reacting to both the London bombings and then Tony Blair’s speech. Its second ‘peak’ in 2007 follows the pattern of 2005, with HBT responding to parliamentary reports and suggested legislative changes that were emerging as part of the CONTEST strategy. CONTEST was introduced in 2003 by Blair’s government in response to the September 11th terror attacks. It was “an attempt to coordinate the pan-Governmental response to the emerging terrorist threat in the aftermath of the attacks on New York and Washington, DC, in September 2001” (House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2009). Its primary aims were to prevent radicalisation and terrorism through three different objectives:

- To challenge the ideology behind terrorism
- To prevent individuals from taking part in acts of terrorism
- To work with different sectors and organisations where there were ‘risks of radicalisation’.

By including HBT within the framework of CONTEST, the government positioned HBT as a radical other, whose aims of establishing a caliphate state were seen as a threat to the values and security of the country.
The period following the London July 7th bombings would see HBT’s press releases focus on two significant areas. Firstly, the attempted proscription of the organisation and secondly a series of articles which linked HBT to several global radical organisation, reproducing the positioning of the organisation as a radical other. On the latter, HBT employed a similar responsive discursive strategy to that of the MCB, issuing press releases which sought to distance the organisation from radical Islamist groups. HBT moved away from the secular narrative adopted by the MCB framing the discourse surrounding the group as reflective of ‘western colonialism’. This can be seen within the first available press release from HBT following the July 7th London bombings, which states that: “Despite the intense scrutiny that our community will find itself under after these attacks, it is imperative that the Muslim community is not silenced about the colonialism of western governments” (HBT, 2005b). HBT would use the lens of western colonialism to provide the framework for many of its press releases relating to the War on Terror which the organisation framed as a war against Islam, and a method to impose secular values on Muslims. This will be further explored in the proceeding section, which focuses on those press releases which refer to the proposed proscription of HBT and media articles relating to the organisation.

8.3.1.1 The Emancipation of Hizb-ut-Tahrir

Tony Blair’s proposed ban on HBT was met by opposition from several organisations, including both the Muslim Council of Britain and the Quilliam Foundation. These outlined their arguments within a secular framework, focusing not only on the impact that this would have on British Muslims but on the democratic process. The human rights organisation Liberty further argued that the “idea of criminalising those who condone, glorify or justify terrorism anywhere in the world is now on his [Blair] shopping list- deeply dangerous, deeply counterproductive” (Chakrabati, 2005). HBT first responded to the proposed ban on July 14th, 2005, arguing that it was a political organisation who rejected the use of violence, with proceeding press releases referring to
themselves as a non-violent political organisation. In a press release titled “Hizb-ut-Tahrir Britain urges Muslim community to speak out against western colonisation”, HBT accused the UK government of trying to “utilise the aftermath of the London bombings to repress legitimate Islamic political expression by blurring the margins between Political Islam and violence” (HBT, 2005c). The press release set the tone with the ‘mainstream Islam’ it believed was being pushed by the government. This tone would further reinforce the double securitisation within the British Muslim communities, which will be explored in the next chapter.

The organisation inferred that the proposed ban was suggested by two of Tony Blair’s Muslims MP’s, writing that: “After meeting with Tony Blair yesterday, Shahid Malik MP and Khalid Mahmood MP have both suggested that action needs to be taken against Hizb-ut-Tahrir” (HBT, 2005c). This reflects a discursive strategy which ‘othered’ those Muslims which it saw as being aligned with the government. In a further statement, the organisation positioned itself as the voice of those Muslims “who have been incensed by the West’s colonialism in the Muslim world, into political work” (HBT, 2005c). As with many of HBT’s campaigns, this was supported by a leaflet drop outside mosques, a mode of public communication frequently used by the organisation.

Following the initial press release, HBT continued to reaffirm its identity as a non-violent political organisation, framing their opposition to the war on terror as part of its resistance to western colonialism. They accused the government of using the war on terror to condemn “Muslim and Islamic movements who are working for political change” (HBT, 2005d). Furthermore, they argued the war of terror’s true agenda was to ensure that:

> Corrupt rulers stay in power to facilitate the Western political-economic and military aggression in our lands as is happening in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. It is a war to prevent the Muslims realising their legitimate political demand of removing the corrupt rulers and establishing a sincere and competent leadership (HBT, 2005d).
Within this press release, we see HBT position the war on terror, not as a war against radical jihadism, but as feeding into the constructions of Islam as the other.

By early August 2005, HBT adopted a new discursive strategy concerning its proposed ban by emphasising its shared values with the broader Muslim communities. It took a similar framework to that of the Muslim Council of Britain, who had also issued press releases condemning the ban (MCB, 2005f). In a statement to the BBC its spokesman, Imran Waheed, claimed that the organisation had a lot of support within the Muslim community and that the ban was an attempt at “stifling legitimate political dissent” (Waheed, 2005). He framed their discourse as legitimate political expression stating that: “Our members are all for political expression, not for violence. We have been very clear about that, and we will fight any ban through the legal system. We will continue our work. Our work is totally non-violent” (Waheed, 2005). In a joint statement with other Muslim organisations published in the Guardian, HBT argued that:

any disagreement with a political organisation must be expressed through debate not censorship. Whatever objections one may have to someone else’s point of view, we must uphold their right to hold and articulate those views. If it is suggested that any laws have been broken by any individuals or groups, then this must be proven by due legal process. Criminalising the mere possession of certain opinions is the hallmark of dictatorships, not democracies (Joint Statement: Muslim Groups, 2005).33

Following concerns raised by the UN to the possible threat to individuals’ human rights, in its criticisms of “provisions covering the encouragement of terrorism as producing a chilling effect on freedom of expression and interfering with human rights”, the government’s proposed offence

---

of ‘glorifying terrorism’ was overturned in January 2006 (Liberty Central, 2009). The House of Commons defeat for the government would thus prevent the prohibition of HBT. Nevertheless, HBT continued its focus on the attempted proscription by framing it within the context of the war on terror and its organisational aim of establishing a caliphate state. They wrote that: “It seems Blair is eager to silence Hizb-ut-Tahrir as it at the forefront of leading the Muslim world towards a representative and accountable Islamic Caliphate that will end the era of unelected dictators and tyrants” (HBT, 2006a).

The organisation would face a further attempted ban following the 2013 Woolwich attacks on Lee Rigby. In a parliamentary debate concerning a proposed amendment to the terrorism act, Diane Johnson stated that: “The former Leader of the Opposition, who is now the Prime Minister, said to the House that he wanted Hizb-ut-Tahrir to be banned. I hope that the Minister will say what progress has been made in banning Hizb ut-Tahrir and that he will assure the House that he continues to keep the activities of that group under review” (Hansard, 2013). In response, the government argued that proscription could only be applied to those organisations who were defined as being involved in terrorist activities. To this, it added the caveat that HBT was “an organisation about which the government have significant concerns, and we will continue to monitor its activities very closely. Individual members of Hizb ut-Tahrir are, of course, subject to the general criminal law” (Hansard, 2013). In its response to this new proposed proscription, HBT revisited earlier attempts to ban them in 2006 and 2007 and argued that no legal reason had been found. They framed this as an attempt to silence the organisation’s criticism of colonialism. They stated that: “Preferring to ban ideas rather than debate them, the Government wants to silence the Muslim community’s criticism of Western foreign policy, labelling those who speak out against colonialism and occupation as ‘extremist’” (HBT, 2013a).

8.3.1.2 Trial by Media

The period following the July 7th London bombings would see a series of articles appear in the press linking HBT to organisations such as Al Qaeda and its activities in the UK. Several of these
articles centred on allegations that members of HBT were ‘infiltrating’ British companies and campuses to recruit members and train them for jihad. An article in the Independent: “How militant Islamists are infiltrating Britain’s top companies” focused on the membership of the organisation stating that: “A significant proportion are university-educated and work in areas such as finance, information technology, health and education” (Malik, 2005). The article gives examples of Hizb-ut-Tahrir members working as journalists for the Guardian, for IBM and as qualified doctors. Malik writes:

A former Hizb ut-Tahrir activist told the Independent on Sunday that behind closed doors he was encouraged to take up boxing and self-defence classes in order to "prepare for jihad". Although he never accepted full membership, he was associated with the group for nearly a decade and said two members had told him how they had joined the Territorial Army in order to get "real" military training. After TA rules were changed, and it was no longer possible to opt-out of military action if asked to take part, this stopped" (Malik, 2005).

The article does not state whether the former activist was working in a similar field to those described in the article. HBT rejected the allegation that it trained its members for jihad arguing the article was the latest in a series of attacks on Muslim groups in the media following the London bombings. It further cited articles on organisations such as the Muslim Council of Britain, the Islamic Forum of Europe and the Ramadhan Foundation. From within the framework of the post-Copenhagen model, this can be seen as an example of social agents, in this case, the media, "participating in securitising moves in their own right" (Croft, 2012b, p. 209).

A further article by the Sunday Times argued that HBT was using universities as a recruitment ground through the support of campaigns such as Stop Islamophobia. It drew upon a report by Anthony Glees, which claimed that the organisation was homophobic, anti-Semitic and also anti-Hindu (Winstone & Smith, 2007). The emphasis on perceived students’ support of HBT was indicative of a broader discussion which focused on the reason as to why young Muslims were joining organisations such as HBT. Hamid draws on Abbas work on structural issues facing British
Muslims and argues that there was a “dislocated reality facing many young British Muslims arising from the fusion of social and economic disadvantage, discrimination, low social class position, low social capital, racial/religious prejudice and hostile media” (Hamid, 2007, p. 151).

Hamid’s study of HBT built on Abbas’ work further states that these conditions, coupled with domestic and foreign policy, “exacerbates the possibility of young people being susceptible to HT’s messages, which promise a sense of belonging and a vehicle for resistance and protest” (Hamid, 2007, p. 151). The Sunday Times’ article would lead to the communities’ secretary, Ruth Kelly, declaring that universities needed to “identify and confront unacceptable behaviour on their premises” (Curtis & Taylor, 2005).

HBT would frame this further attempt to proscribe their activities on campus as a broader attack on Muslim groups. In a letter to the Sunday Times, it focused on the perception that the ban would have on Muslim groups at universities. The letter quoted the-then NUS National President, Kat Fletcher, who stated that: “the report amounts to a concoction of allegations and hearsay and has only contributed to Islamophobia and witch hunts against Muslim students on Campuses” (HBT, 2005f). Here we see HBT work with the NUS to resist the securitisation of Muslim student societies, as Kelly’s speech sought to enact a policy which would construct Muslim students as the other on campuses. The organisation had previously lent its support in 2006 to the reinstatement of Keith Shilson, an NUS president who had been suspended after refusing to stop a planned HBT speaker, calling the decision an example of the government’s McCarthyism agenda (HBT, 2005e).

These press releases about the new domestic war on terror reflect a discursive strategy which focuses on the impact of legislation and the media (re)securitisation of the organisation. Absent in their discourse is the effect that these measures would have on the wider British Muslim community. While HBT refers to Prevent, this is only concerning the impact that this would have upon HBT itself. The tone of the press releases also shows the organisation adopting a more secular framework, emphasising legislation and positioning these within the context of British values. The next sections explain how these contrast with reports produced and the discourse on the international war on terror, which emphasise the call for a Caliphate system.
8.3.1.3 Reports

HBT produced two reports whose focus was the domestic war on terror: “Radicalisation ‘Extremism’ & ‘Islamism’: realities and myths in the war on terror” and “The British Government’s Preventing violent extremism & community cohesion agenda”. These were published in July 2007 and July 2008 respectively. In the previous report, HBT aimed to “expose the many inconsistencies in the ‘War on Terror’ narrative and the manipulation of security fears to attack political ideas that carry support in the Muslim world” (HBT, 2007a). The report describes “how the language used in the security debate has become politicised to counter dissenting voices, particularly to falsely claim Islamic political ideas are at the part of the problem” (HBT, 2007a, p. 10).

The report is a further example of HBT’s discursive strategy of framing the war on terror as a new colonial project. This is evident in the report’s critique of Britain’s military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, which they describe as both an ‘invasion’ and ‘occupation’ respectively. They argue that that the campaigns “must be observed as part of a colonial tradition of occupation, intervention and regime change” (HBT, 2007a, p. 7). Drawing on parallels between speeches from Lord Curzon in 1924 and Charles Clarke in 2013, HBT argued that this new system of colonisation sought to prevent the return of the caliphate system and the imposition of sharia law. They cite a Charles Clarke speech to the Heritage Foundation in 2005 where the Home Secretary said that: “there can be no negotiation about the recreation of Caliphate; there can be no negotiation about the imposition of Sharia (Islamic) law” (Clarke, 2005).

HBT viewed the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan as an attempt to introduce ‘western secularisation’ which equated any call to a return to a Caliphate system with terrorism. This, they argued, “lacks intellectual credibility when measured against the public opinion that poll after poll are indicating” (HBT, 2007a, p. 8). For HBT, the term ‘western colonisation’ was used to describe events which the organisation believed sought to prevent the ‘Muslim world’ from being governed under a caliphate system. The ‘battle for hearts and minds’ by the US and UK governments, they argued, echoed the sentiments of Lieutenant General Stanley Maude, who as
part of the Mesopotamian campaign in the early 20th century had invaded Baghdad. They quote Maude as saying that: “Our armies do not come into your cities and land as conquerors or enemies but as liberators” (HBT, 2007a, p. 7).

The report addressed two significant themes: challenging the narrative around radicalisation and extremism and addressing perceptions of violence in Islam. Using findings from think tanks such as Policy Exchange and the International Crisis Group, HBT argued that the language that surrounds the war on terror feeds into a perception that there is an inevitable relationship between political Islam and violence. Here we see HBT directly addressing the securitising nature of the speech acts highlighted in the post-Copenhagen model, which takes the issue of Political Islam into security. They highlight the differences in Esposito’s definition of a political radical as someone who believes the 9/11 attacks were completely justified, with the language used by Policy Exchange. They argue the latter “equates ‘radical’ Islam with a desire for an Islam based society, an idea that carries mainstream support amongst Muslims” (HBT, 2007a). The report for Policy Exchange in 2006 by Martin Bright claimed that the British government was seeking to engage with radical Muslim organisations. Bright argued that a letter from a foreign office official, Angus McKee, reveals “that senior officials were not so much asking whether Britain should be engaging with Islamic radicals - but rather how” (Bright, 2006, p. 15).

Building on this theme, HBT argued that western commentators fail to understand the relationship between Islam and politics. They further stated that within Islam, there is no distinction between the public and private sphere for the implementation of Islamic law, which they argue is considered by Muslims to be a complete way of life. This distinction, they claim, is ‘born out of an imposition of a secular framework on Islam” (HBT, 2007a, p. 7). Crucially, they argue that an assessment of orthodox Islamic literature is required to show that this distinction is false. The use of the term orthodox within Islam is usually associated with the Sunni schools of thought, Wahhabism and Salafism, which are associated with literal interpretations of Islamic

---

34 The Mesopotamian Campaigns refers to a battle in World War One between the British Empire (including troops from Australia, Britain and British India and the Ottoman Empire
Law. Therefore, while calling for a global caliphate state, the model proposed by HBT creates a double securitisation, based on a hierarchal other which excluded Shia schools of thought. Paradoxically, the return of the Caliphate state, also underpins the beliefs of the Ahmadiyya sect, who as with the Muslim Council of Britain, HBT do not regard as a legitimate Islamic sect.

Another critical aspect of HBT’s discursive strategy highlighted in this report centred on the argument that the UK had seen an ‘awakening’ of political consciousness. This has led to increased political activity amongst Muslims through joining civic organisations which promote Muslim interests in addition to conventional Westminster political parties. While HBT acknowledges the rise in Muslim consciousness, they portray this, in contradistinction to the work on Muslim consciousness by Meer and Mandaville,\(^{35}\) as a result of the failure of the mainstream political model to connect with Muslims. They argue that: “Flirtations with various political experiments, movements to respond adequately to the perceived problems as having a particular Muslim or Islamic bearing has developed. This increasing 'Islamicisation' of Muslim or Islamic political practice can be perceived through levels of religious practice, affiliation with members of local Islamic organisations” (HBT, 2007a). For HBT, a rising Muslim consciousness was a rejection of political experiments which could only be achieved through religious organisations. This again builds on HBT’s model of a caliphate system where there is no distinction between the private and public sphere. Here we can see HBT begin to position Islam as a vector which used religion to reassert self-identity. Religion here not only provides a sense of security but is used for the basis of ontological security which informs Muslims everyday routines and practices. It also to refer back to Giddens, offers a trusted figure to which people can be anchored, and provides an “institutional safeguard in organised religion (Giddens, 1990, p. 103).”

\(^{35}\) This theme is explored by Nasar Meer who argues that in contrast to the universal cultural values promoted as part of Blair’s Multiculturalism, Muslims in the UK are looking to build a distinct social group with Muslim values which he bases on Mandeville’s concept of Universal Islam\(^{35}\) as opposed to one that is centred on their identity as British Muslims. Mandaville uses the term Universal Islam to describe the search for a global ummah which transcend the localised versions of Islam practiced by first generation Muslims. He writes “This ‘village Islam’ as many saw it, was mired in a past that had little relevance to the challenges of daily life in twentieth century, globalising Britain.” (Mandaville, 2009)
The second report by HBT: 'The British Government’s Preventing Violent Extremism & Community Cohesion agenda" published in 2008 focused on the Government’s Prevent strategy. This report, as with the former, analyses Prevent through the organisation’s lens of western colonisation. The report states that:

For centuries the British government has tried to control and secularise Islam under the name of promoting reform and modernisation. Their attempts in occupied colonial India were most famous when establishing the Qadiani religion. In the Arab Muslim world and Turkey, they had many attempts at promoting reformist movements, ultimately leading to the collapse of the ‘Uthmani Khilafah’ (Ottoman Caliphate). Their attempts continue within the UK and overseas and, as with other western governments, they have hastened their efforts since the onset of the ‘war on terror’ (HBT, 2008a, p. 3).

The report builds upon the themes highlighted in its previous report, arguing that the terminology used to describe political Islam resulted in the term becoming associated with radical/extremist organisations. Here we again see the performative nature of speech, with political Islam being moved to the realm of security through its association with radical organisations. They emphasise that policies such as Prevent have imposed a definition of ‘moderate’ and ‘extreme’ on the Muslim community. As they put it: "Initially ‘moderates’ included some Muslims who even agreed with some of the Islamic ideas that were deemed unacceptable [...] However, past 7/7... a true moderate could only be someone who rejected these Islamic ideas and gave a wholehearted endorsement of secular liberal democracy" (HBT, 2008a, p. 4). This argument of a differing definition of moderate Islam echoes the work of Ahmad and Modood. They argue that: "Moderate Muslim’ is obviously a relational term: it only makes sense in terms of a contrast with non-moderates, as is always the case in a moderate–radical couplet (cf. moderate feminist and radical feminist). While the discourse of ‘moderation’ is most clearly a reaction to, and defined in opposition to, terrorism of the kind that took place on 9/11” (Ahmad & Modood, 2007, p. 191).
HBT saw the attempt to define moderate Islam by the UK government as a contributing factor to the efforts to proscribe them as a radical organisation. They argue that Prevent was an extension of the government’s attempt to create a British version of Islam. HBT further claimed that Prevent funding was being used as a “colonial plan to gain control of local community organisations through a culture of financial dependency” (HBT, 2008a, p. 7). The report referred to the proposed national board of Imams, arguing that the state was attempting to establish a government-based model to approve any fatwas. This, they argued, was an attempt to create a British Islam which would oppose the caliphate model that the organisation sought to promote.

The report further claimed that any attempt at reforming Islam in the UK was a further attempt by the government to secularise Islam. They argued that “In the West, Hizb ut-Tahrir works to cultivate a Muslim community that lives by Islam in thought and deed, whereby adhering to the rules of Islam and preserving a strong Islamic identity. The party does not work in the West to change the system of government, but works to project a positive image of Islam to Western society and engages in dialogue with Western thinkers, policymakers and academics.” (HBT, 2008a, p. 14).

The events of the July 7th bombings saw HBT change its discursive strategy to react to the securitisation that proceeded it along with the media securitisation which repeated the narrative that HBT was an example of the radical group. While HBT continued to build internal ontological security based on ‘othering’ other Muslim groups they perceived to be promoting British secular models of Islam, they also sought to work with different civic groups in acts of resistance to combat the securitising process of the attempted proscription. The group’s response can also be seen as an example of securitising subjectivity in an attempt to create a stable identity in response to the ontological insecurity caused by the attempted ban. The stranger other, who Kinnvall argued was necessary as part of this process was in this case, other Muslim groups. Here it is the groups who present a secular model of Islam who are presented as a threat (Kinnvall, 2004).

The next section in its discursive strategy concerning the international war on terror, it continued this focus on a caliphate system.
8.3.2 International War on Terror

The onset of the war on terror in 2002 would see HBT re-emerge in the UK with a focus centred on these developments. The group’s discursive strategy opposing the war centred both on the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan and on Pakistan’s role in the war on terror. This section will analyse HBT’s discursive strategy regarding the international campaign and demonstrate that this also focused on a Caliphate state and which framed the war on terror as a project of new colonialism.

Despite being part of a more extensive international organisation, press releases about the international war on terror made up just 20% of HBT overall focus,\(^{36}\) with 140 out of 634 press releases centred on this area. The tone for its discursive strategy is set within its interactive timeline, which sees the organisation highlight key events it sees as being significant for the Muslim ummah over the last 90 years. The September 11th attacks are described as “a seminal moment in the history of the Muslim world as the US would use this incident as an excuse to begin its ‘War on Islam’” (HBT, 2014). The subsequent campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq are referred to as invasions, described as an “effort to malign the Islamic ideology as an alternate to Western liberal capitalism in the Muslim world” (HBT, 2007, p. 2). This can be seen as reflective of their overall discursive strategy of framing events through the lens of Western Colonialism. For HBT, it was Pakistan which would form the significant area of focus in this category. This can be examined both through the organisation’s history in the country, its view of Pakistan’s political regime under Pervez Musharraf, who HBT viewed as a “western supported dictator”, and the role that Pakistan played in the war on terror due to a shared geographical border with Afghanistan (HBT, 2005). The frequency in which these countries are mentioned is broken down in the below chart, with the most commonly referred country being Pakistan.

---

\(^{36}\) *This figure excluded reports*
This section will further analyse HBT’s opposition to the war on terror, through their public output to the military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. These they claimed were “nothing more than a smokescreen to conceal the true colonial nature of western foreign policy in the Muslim world” (HBT, 2006b). This next section will first analyse the relationship between Pakistan and HBT before focusing on the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns.

### 6.3.2.1 Pakistan

As part of Pakistan’s counter-terrorism policy in 2003, Hizb-ut-Tahrir [Pakistan] was proscribed under an ongoing campaign which targeted groups including Tehrik-e Taliban (TTP) and Al Qaeda. As with its British counterparts, Hizb ut-Tahrir [Pakistan] runs a localised website which it states: “advocates for a caring global caliphate and demonises democracy as a Western project to enslave Muslims” (Khan, 2014, p. 179). Despite the ban, the group retained its presence in Pakistan through the composition of its members. Kugelman wrote: “Its recruiting targets are high ranking military officers, affluent, educated urbanites and students at prestigious private universities” (Kugleman, 2012). Thus, the war on terror and HBT’s presence in Pakistan was a contributing factor to Pakistan remaining a consistent focal point for HBT [Britain]. Its first press
release on Pakistan is indicative of both the relationship the organisation has with Pakistan and its self-representation of itself as a counter-movement in the Muslim world. They write: “In their treatment of Hizb ut-Tahrir, the rulers of the Muslim world have made it abundantly clear that they will not tolerate any political dissent whatsoever. Despite this intense repression, including torture, rape, imprisonment without trial and extra-judicial killings, Hizb ut-Tahrir has not wavered from the path of non-violent political work in the slightest” (HBT, 2005g).

In its relationship with Pakistan, HBT Britain echoes its overall discursive strategy of presenting itself as a non-violent movement and as opposing western colonialism. The organisation refers to Musharraf as a “western supported dictator”. It continues to advocate for a Caliphate state arguing that “only the caliphate can ensure food, clothing and shelter for the people of Pakistan” (HBT, 2006c). For the duration of his regime, Musharraf would continue to be a focus of HBT’s press releases concerning Pakistan, centring on HBT’s perceived perception of his relationship with the US and UK governments. Referring to Pakistan’s role as an ally to the US-UK military campaign in Afghanistan, Musharraf is named as ‘The butcher of Islamabad’ and a ‘tyrannical dictator’. In November 2006, they critiqued an aid package worth £480 million to Pakistan from the UK as an attempt to de-Islamicise Pakistan and support the tyranny of Musharraf’s regime (HBT, 2006d). Musharraf is presented as part of a subversive colonial takeover in Pakistan (referred to by HBT as a wilayah) which despite the countries’ status as an Islamic country, sought to implement secular ideals.

HBT’s promotion of a Caliphate state can be seen in their criticism of the suspension of Pakistan’s democratic constitution in May 2007. HBT responded to the sacking of Iftikhar Chaudhury, Pakistan’s Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, by organising a protest outside of the Pakistani consulate calling for the re-establishment of the Caliphate. In line with the organisation’s aims of presenting the Caliphate as an alternate to western colonialism, HBT called on “people of power and influence in Pakistan to liberate themselves and Pakistan from American hegemony by re-establishing the Caliphate” (HBT, 2007b).
The year 2007 would prove to be a pivotal year in the relationship between Hizb-ut-Tahrir and Pakistan. Three key events dominated this year, the Siege of Lal Masjid [the Red Mosque], President Musharraf declared a state of emergency in November and the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, the then leader of the opposition party, Pakistani’s People Party. These will be analysed in the next sections.

8.3.2.1 The Lal Masjid

November 3rd would see a state of emergency declared in Pakistan with President Musharraf suspending the constitution as a response to clashes with Islamist groups in the Northern Frontier and Swat regions. The siege of Lal Masjid in July 2007 was a critical factor in the suspension of the constitution. Two brothers, Maulana Abdul Aziz, led the siege and Abdul Rashid Gazi who had links to militant Islamist groups and lasted eight days (July 3rd to July 11th, 2007) in protest at the demolition of mosques in Islamabad built illegally on state land. The siege ended with the Pakistani army storming the mosque, an act which resulted in several casualties. HBT referred to the Pakistani government’s actions as a ‘massacre’ and organised a political leaflet which critiqued Musharraf’s proposal of ‘enlightened moderation’. The flyer called on “Muslims to expose Musharraf’s plan and his use of this murderous crime to further his Kemalist agenda for Pakistan” (HBT, 2007b). Here we can also see an example of leaflets being used to speak to a Muslim audience and the language of murder which is quoted is markedly different to the tone of those press releases intended for the in-group.

In both these press releases, HBT frames their opposition to the actions of Pakistan’s government by calling for the return of a Caliphate system as an alternative to a secular government. By referencing secular models from different ‘Muslim’ countries, HBT frames themselves as a global movement who see the caliphate state as an alternative to globalisation. HBT would use the events at Lal Masjid to highlight the perceived influence that the UK and US government had on Pakistan economically and politically, which they argued allowed Musharraf’s actions.
8.3.2.2 The Suspension of the Constitution

September 2007 was a crucial month for Pakistan, beginning with several terrorist attacks in Rawalpindi and the federally administered tribal areas. These would be a catalyst for Pakistan's increased attempts to fight its internal war on terror. These attacks coincided with the return of Benazir Bhutto from political exile, which HBT portrayed as another example of the influence of the US-UK governments. The press release by HBT states that a key UK/US goal "under the cover of restoring a semblance of a democratic process, is to aid Musharraf in his campaign to stem the tide of Islam and its growing influence in Pakistan" (HBT, 2007c). They again frame their opposition to Bhutto's return by calling for a revival of a caliphate system. In a press release: "The Musharraf-Bhutto pact: 'Britain and America's desperate attempt to save Pakistan's dictator'", they write: "It outlines Britain and America’s role in trying to save Musharraf, the treachery of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, and the need for a root and branch change of the system in Pakistan to the Islamic Khalifa system in order to arrest the current state of political chaos" (The Kilafah, 2007).

HBT proposed that a system of governance based on a caliphate model would bring change to the underlying political system in Pakistan. Setting out a blueprint for an alternative governance system in Pakistan, HBT claimed that:

"Pakistan needs real change that will never be delivered by politicians and generals who outsource their politics to Washington and London. It is not sufficient to change from military leaders to political leaders without changing the underlying political system that has brought Pakistan to its knees. It is only the Caliphate that can take power away from the feudal landowners and the rich industrialists, implement a real rule of law, produce economic prosperity for the many and not the few and ensure political decisions on the future of Pakistan are made in Islamabad, not London or Washington" (HBT, 2007c).

The constitutional crisis further deteriorated with the suspension of Pakistan's constitution in November 2007 as President Musharraf responded to terror attacks by declaring a state of emergency and by assuming the roles of President and Chief of Army. HBT responded to this with
another leaflet distribution in the UK, accompanying this with a press release entitled "Musharraf declares emergency with UK and US blessing". The press release argued that this was a further example of the influence that the US and UK had on Pakistan, through the granting of aid packages. They quote a Guardian article which stated: "There was pressure from the US and Britain in the beginning. But later on, when the government gave them the detail that elections will be held on time, and the president will take off his uniform, they did not have any objections" (Walsh & Borger, 2007). The press release goes on to reference the state of emergency arguing of Musharraf that:

"It is he, and his American masters through their war on terror, that have brought the country to its knees – destroying security and precipitating fragmentation. By supporting NATO’s illegal occupation of Afghanistan, he has helped to deliver chronic instability on both sides of the border. By massacring his own citizens in Waziristan, the Lal Masjid and Swat he has brought violence to the streets of the country while his divisive policies in NWFP, Balochistan and Karachi are threatening the very unity of Pakistan he purports to be so concerned about" (HBT, 2007g).

Despite the condemnation of the state of emergency by the UK and US governments, HBT framed their opposition against “incompetence, broken promises, and American hegemony” (HBT, 2007g).

8.3.2.3 The Assassination of Benazir Bhutto

The state of emergency declared by President Musharraf would lead to the newly returned Benazir Bhutto declaring an open demonstration, protesting the suspension of the constitution in December 2007. It was at this demonstration that Bhutto was assassinated by a 15-year-old suicide bomber. A BBC article states that the assailant had been asked to carry out the attack by the Pakistani Taliban (Bennet Jones, 2017). HBT released two press releases relating to this. The first launched its public seminar with a 'New Leadership, New System Dossier' which again argued that a governance model based on the Caliphate model would solve Pakistan’s constitutional crisis. The second: "Benazir Bhutto’s assassination is a sign of Pakistan's deepening
Political crisis” referred to events mentioned above such as the bombings on FATA and the Lal Masjid siege, citing these as examples of Musharraf’s political violence in Pakistan. They argued that:

“Pakistan's entrenchment in the US war on terror, sectarian conflicts and the lack of any real political alternative have all contributed to this turmoil which cannot be resolved under the current status quo. Musharraf bears a lot of responsibility for bringing the situation this far, but secular governments in the past have inflamed different types of lawlessness under their watch. [...] Furthermore, as long as Pakistan’s politics is more influenced by Washington and London than it is by its own people there is no hope that violence and instability within the country will diminish” (HBT, 2007d).

The influence of a neoliberal hegemony reproduced through US and UK aid packages, and foreign policy is a theme which HBT would return to in their press releases relating to Afghanistan and Iraq and the impact that the war on terror had on these countries.

8.3.2.4 Iraq and Afghanistan

HBT’s focus on the conflict in Iraq, which it termed a colonial war, centred on the treatment of Iraqi civilians by the US/UK alliance and the death of HBT leaders in that country. By focusing on the killing of and suspected use of illegal torture on civilians in Iraq, they portrayed the occupying troops as new colonials. As with Pakistan, they again suggest complicity in these acts by the different Iraqi regimes. HBT condemned the killing of 24 Iraqi civilians (including HBT members amongst them) in Haditha as a massacre. They referred to HBT leaders in Iraq, arguing that the men were at the forefront of a political struggle against occupying forces. They stated that: “There can be little doubt that the Iraqi regime had a hand in their murders. Over the last few decades, dozens of Hizb ut-Tahrir members were kidnapped, tortured and murdered by Saddam Hussein. Now, they are murdered by Iraq’s new client regime” (HBT, 2006e).

The organisation’s focus on Afghanistan continued its portrayal of the war on terror as an extension of colonial activities. These, however, form the smallest proportion of press releases in
this category, with only ten press releases focused on the country. On the 2009 Afghanistan elections, seen as an essential keystone for democracy in the country, HBT stated: “Holding presidential elections in Afghanistan, a country occupied by nearly 90,000 foreign soldiers is as absurd as it would have been to hold elections after World War 2 in Soviet-occupied Poland. The proposed candidates, including Hamid Karzai, are no more than glorified caretakers to protect western interests at the expense of the Afghan people” (HBT, 2009a).

Other critical statements on Afghanistan focused on NATO airstrikes. One press release condemned the airstrike where 27 civilians were killed and argued that the campaign in Afghanistan is a war against the Muslim Ummah. Here HBT used the framing of the war on terror as a war against radical Islam and subverts the securitising process, which then reproduces these narratives against a radical/oriental other, by emphasising the global ummah. The press release ends with a quote from Abu Dawad: "If the people witness an oppressor and they do not take him by his hand (to prevent him), then they are close to Allah covering them all with punishment” (HBT, 2010a). Here the ummah is presented as a movement, using religion to formulate a new form of politics.

The two sections on the war on terror highlighted the differing approaches to HBTs discursive strategy on the domestic and international war on terror. While both approaches portray the campaigns and subsequent legislation as part of a new colonial project, it is within the international war on terror that we see HBT emphasise its position as a religious organisation advocating for a return to a Caliphate state. It further continues to ‘other’ those Muslim governments which it perceives to be working with the US-UK governments, echoing its strategy towards British Muslim organisations who work with the UK government.

8.4 Foreign Affairs

The prominence of foreign affairs as a category reflects HBT’s position as an international organisation. Of the 690 press releases in this period, 280 were focused on foreign affairs. These areas of focus reflect not only a continuation of HBT’s discursive strategy reacting to current events but also indicate those areas where HBT have an active presence. This section will focus
on three key countries: Bangladesh, Israel and Egypt, based on the frequency in which they appear in HBT’s public output.

8.4.1 Israel

HBT produced 13 statements in this period relating to Israel. As an organisation, they deny the right of the state of Israel to exist. This can be seen in early statements referring to the conflict in Israel. A June 2006 press release applies to the capture of Corporate Gilad Shalit. It draws an equivalence between the life of the Israeli soldier and the Palestinian people, who HBT argue are living in “the large Israeli prison called Gaza [and] are bearing the brunt of Israeli aggression” (HBT, 2006f). This is also indicative of HBT’s position on Israel, which it frames as an anti-Muslim occupying force. A May 2010 press release further demonstrate this position, stating that: “Israel's murders on aid ships only proves the need for armies from Muslim lands to liberate Palestine” (HBT, 2010b).

HBT’s stance on Israel echoes the discursive strategy it deployed in the preceding war on terror section, both with its call for a return to a Caliphate state and the ‘othering’ of Muslim regimes it believes to be in collusion with the US-UK regime. As with their press releases relating to the international war on terror, they infer that the US-UK alliance are influencing events in the region through financial agreements. Its first press releases in this area refer to the recent aid agreement negotiated by the Middle East quartet, Dr Waheed of HBT stated: “In making aid conditional on the recognition of an illegal and oppressive occupation, the Mid-East Quartet has illustrated that aid from Western governments is used to further their foreign policy interests” (HBT, 2006g).

---

37 Shalit was an IDF soldiers who was captured by HAMAS on 25th June 2006 as part of a cross border raid on underground tunnels. He would be released on 18th October 2011
38 This can be seen referenced in the following press statements referring to President Mubarak Many Demonstrate Against Israeli Terrorism and Mubarak’s Betrayal (Jun 2006) Egyptian Regime Colludes in Israel’s Brutal Oppression of the Palestinians Jan 2007
39 The Quartet of the Middle East compromises of the United Nations, the United States, the European Union and Russia. It was formed in 2002 to create a forum for the Israel-Palestine Process. Additionally it focuses on Palestinian economic and institutional empowerment.
This statement reflects not only HBT’s overall discursive strategy with its focus on the idea of an occupying power but also demonstrates its focus on the relationship between aid and influence. This is further exemplified in subsequent press releases regarding Israel, such as the following statement from February 2009 which focuses on an aid package agreed by Secretary Clinton. The press release focuses on Clinton’s comments, which stated: “the United States has an unwavering commitment to Israel’s security and its right to protect itself” (HBT, 2009b). HBT argues that: “This unwavering support for the Israeli entity’s brutal massacres should dispel any hope some may have had about Obama’s ‘new way forward’ with regards to Palestine” (HBT, 2009b). They portray the UK as a pro-Israeli government with several statements which argue that the then UK foreign policy was “following in the tradition of former British foreign secretaries who have supported Israel, turned a blind eye to its brutality and surrounded themselves with Arab tyrants who now do not even speak against Israel, let alone dream of reversing its illegal occupation” (HBT, 2008b). This can be further seen in press releases which refer to a speech given by Cameron as pledging his commitment to Israel, and press releases which stated that the “UK government [was] guilty of aiding the preparation and commission of Israeli terrorism” (HBT, 2009c).

8.4.2 Bangladesh

Bangladesh is one of the leading areas of focus for HBT in this category with a total of 45 press releases. While these press releases follow a similar reactive discursive strategy to that identified within the previous sections, they also emphasize HBT’s assertion that Muslim countries should be run under a Caliphate system. Reflecting HBT’s transnational movement, they focus on the position of HBT in the country and its relationship with the Bangladeshi government. An example of this can be seen in September 2007 in a press release which protested the depiction of the Prophet Mohammed [PBUH] in the Bangladeshi newspaper Prothom Alo. They referred to the depiction as “cheap insults in the name of ‘freedom of speech” declaring “the government of Bangladesh has now failed to defend Muslims against these grave insults to their
beliefs. Instead, it has used the police to brutally crackdown on demonstrations against these insults” (HBT, 2007e).

The 2008 Bangladeshi elections provide further evidence of HBT’s discursive policy portraying events in the country as being “dictated by the foreign believing imperialists which will make the country a client state” (HBT, 2008c). Comparing Bangladesh to her neighbour, Pakistan, they argue that the US/UK and India are “dictating the political dialogue and compromise process in Bangladesh in the same way that they imposed it in Pakistan” (HBT, 2008c). They further critique the work of the Awami party who they accuse of “turning Bangladesh into a tyrannical dictatorship”, claiming that “Crusader America and the imperialists are working to prevent this region encompassing Indonesia, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Central Asia from becoming a starting point for the re-emergence of the Khilafah” (HBT, 2010c) (HBT, 2010d). The comparison between Bangladesh and Pakistan allow us to analyse further how HBT ‘other’ Muslim countries, by implying that it is not Muslim governments but non-Muslim governments who are responsible for adverse events. This allows them to criticise countries under a Muslim governing system while calling for a return to a Caliphate system.

Further comparisons can be seen in the relationship between HBT in Bangladesh and HBT in Pakistan with the proscription of HBT in Bangladesh. As with Pakistan, HBT reacted to the ban through protests at the Bangladesh Embassy and a letter to the ambassador which argued: “that activists of Hizb ut-Tahrir Bangladesh were arrested in Rajshahi on 18/09/08 and subsequently various media have published false and misleading news about the party” (HBT, 2008e). They further emphasise their role as a non-violent party arguing that this would be in direct contradiction with the Quran. They say that the Prothom Alo group were “spreading lies that we threatened to carry out violent acts against the people if our demand to release the members and activists of the party is not accepted” (HBT, 2008e). A further press release again echoed the ‘othering’ of the government by arguing that “growing demand for Khilafah has spread far and wide, and the arrests are proof that those who wish to prevent this work are attempting to hamper its return” (HBT, 2008f).
8.4.3 Egypt

Despite the history of Hizb-ut-Tahrir as an organisation in Egypt, its press releases on Egypt form one of the smallest proportions in the foreign affairs category, with only nine press releases relating to this country. The first area of interest pertaining to Egypt is the reference to the ‘Egypt 3’ which account for over 50% of the press releases. The Egypt 3 consisted of Ian Nisbet, Reza Pankhurst and Maajid Nawaz. As HBT members, Nawaz et al. were arrested in Egypt. On the arrest, Waheed argued:

These men were prisoners of conscience who were never accused even by the Egyptian authorities of violence, terrorism or militancy – they were incarcerated solely for their political views and were tortured by a government which Tony Blair counts as one of his allies in the region. Ironically, while they were jailed for five years for their peaceful political views under Mubarak’s dictatorship in Egypt, they could end up being jailed for ten years for their peaceful political views in the UK, if Tony Blair succeeds in proscribing Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain (HBT, 2006h).

The press releases prior to the 2011 revolution follow a similar pattern to that which emerged for both Pakistan and Bangladesh. HBT’s press releases sought to other the Egyptian regime, in contrast to HBT’s global aim of the establishment of a Caliphate state. We further see echoes of the language and discursive strategies used in press releases relating to the war on terror, through holding of a protest which “demanded the destruction of the colonial border which the Egyptian government uses to uphold Israel’s brutal strangulation of Gaza and the suffering of its people” (HBT, 2008d). A press release in 2010 focused on a law which sought to ban the niqab for students taking exams in state-run universities. HBT argued that the “decision by the Egyptian Administrative Court is simply the latest chapter of Mubarak’s fight against the rising tide of Egyptian Muslims embracing Islam as a spiritual, social, and political ideology” (HBT, 2010e). Consequently, we can see the pattern which emerged in previous sections in Egypt.
HBT’s discursive strategy relating to foreign affairs further contribute to its attempts a creating new ontological security, based on its call for a Caliphate system, and its resistance to a new colonial project. As with the construct of Britishness examined in Chapter five, this new ontological security is based on the othering of those Muslim governments who they believe to be in cooperation with the US-UK regime. Its use of the term colonial places the actions of the US-UK government in the context of earlier campaigns which historically had resulted in the downfall of Muslim governments.

8.5 Religious Engagement

The category of religious engagement sees HBT focus on two significant areas, the role of Islam in the UK and challenging the discourse that had emerged around the wearing of the veil. In HBT’s focus on the role of Islam in the UK, they framed their discussions through the lens of the Caliphate system. In June 2008, the organisation launched a nationwide campaign to “counter-propaganda against Islam and Khalifa” (HBT, 2006i). The press release, which was accompanied by a leaflet distribution argued that: “despite the intimidation lies and threats against Hizb-ut-Tahrir, the party continues to work in Britain, like everywhere else in the world, through peaceful intellectual and political means to further the call for the Islamic Khalifa state” (HBT, 2006i). The press release further claimed that the organisation had exposed “the relationship between western governments, kings, dictators and despots of the Muslim world” (HBT, 2006i).

In addition to press releases and leaflet campaigns, HBT organised a conference exploring the Caliphate state model, which it claimed was attended by 2500 people. At the conference, Taji Mustafa, the then media spokesman discussed “the problems that exist within the Muslim world, all worsened by the War in Terror, and their solution was a comprehensive solution in the form of the restoration of the Khalifa” (HBT, 2007f). This would be the first of two conferences within the UK which called for a return to a Caliphate system. HBT used the Caliphate system as an act of resistance, arguing it would dispel what they termed a “vicious media and political onslaught against Islam and Muslims” (HBT, 2008g). Discussing events such as the depiction of the Prophet
[pbuh] in cartoons, and calls to burn the Quran, they argued that there was a “supremacist war that aims to force one system - capitalism and secular liberal values on the whole world”. Echoing HBT overall public discourse, the caliphate system is presented both as an act of resistance and an alternative system. While HBT uses this category to address securitising processes, they also subvert these as a means of promoting the Caliphate system.

8.5.1 Women

In contrast to the Muslim Council of Britain and the Quilliam Foundation, HBT is the only one of the three organisations examined in this thesis to have several press releases which focus on Muslim women. Of the 690 press releases analysed within this period, 32 (4%) specifically concerned women. As with the MCB, the hijab was a key area of focus for the organisation, with several press releases focusing on the proposed ban of hijabs, burkas and the jilbab. Quoting Jack Straw’s remark that the “veil is a sign of difference”, HBT argued that rather than “creating sincere debate about community cohesion, the comments have sparked a racist backlash against Muslim women and stirred further xenophobia and hatred between communities” (HBT, 2006j). They place Straw’s remarks in a broader context of “the government […] blaming the Muslim community for the fall-out of its own foreign policy and anti-terrorist laws” (HBT, 2006j). For HBT, the debate surrounding the hijab was indicative of a broader political discourse towards Muslims which had occurred as a result of the war on terror. For HBT, this process of ‘othering’ had courted a right-wing vote with Islamophobic and racist rhetoric. Commenting on the proposed ban on the veil in France, they draw a parallel between the ban and racist behaviour. Within France, the ban was seen as a “political football to court the Islamophobic and anti-immigrant vote amongst their electorate” (HBT, 2010f). This, they argued, was “the failure of secular liberalism to accommodate the rights of its religious minorities. Laws have been formed which target the minority based upon the prejudice of the majority” (HBT, 2010f).

The discursive strategy of HBT regarding the proposed ban was indicative of the organisation using their status as ‘other’ to reaffirm their identity and to create new ontological security based
on this. This is demonstrated in a call from HBT’s representative, Dr Nasreen Nawas, in July 2010 to debate the Conservative MP, Phillip Hollobone, on the issue of the veil. Hollobone had previously argued that the burka went against the British way of life. He stated that: "We are not going to get along having a fully integrated society if a substantial minority insist on concealing their identity from everyone else" (McSmith, 2010). Here, Hollobone securitises women who wear burqa by arguing that “not only is it against the British way of life, it prevents them from being part of British society” (McSmith, 2010). Nawas argued by saying that:

“For too long, attacks on the Muslim woman’s dress have been used as a smokescreen to woo right wing voters and hide deeply held racial prejudices. The hijab and niqab have often been used by secular governments as a convenient scapegoat to which various social ills including community division have been attributed. Feminist rhetoric has long been employed by Western politicians for cheap political ends. This current attack on the burqa is no different" (HBT, 2010g).

HBT used the focus on Islamic head coverings to argue that it formed part of the more extensive securitisation process and sought in its press releases to resist this.

8.6 Securitisation

Out of the three organisations, it is HBT who best fits within the parameters of an ‘out’ group. It is within the output of HBT that we see acts of resistance to the overall securitisation process and an attempt to create what it perceives to be a government-imposed version of British Islam. Its arguments can be exemplified by the following statement:

The foundations of British life are liberal, secular and capitalist and so the British state protects and fosters and promotes these values at home and abroad with only the utilitarian value of self-interest as a matter of concern. Islamic values will only be tolerated where they happen to coincide with British values, and even then, only if they fit British interests at the time, not because they are Islamic (Hizb-ut-Tahrir, 2014).
For HBT its resistance lies in emphasising that British values and Islam are not always compatible and that the idea of a British Islam veers away from the caliphate model. This resistance to HBT's perception of British values can be seen in the following statements, which see them again reaffirming their identity in active resistance to this. In response to a Gordon Brown speech which argued that British laws should be based on British values, and which reaffirmed David Miliband's proposals that there was a ‘moral’ imperative to intervene and spread democracy across the world, Waheed stated:

Gordon Brown said that British laws must be based on British values. Today, Miliband is saying that the rest of the world's laws must also be based on British values – imposed by force if necessary. To insist on imposing secular liberal democracy despite recent polls that show that the vast majority of people in the Muslim world want an Islamic form of government, is arrogant supremacist and doomed to failure (HBT, 2008h).

HBT further reacted to comments by Phil Woolas, the-then environment minister, linking Asian cousin marriages to higher rates of genetic diseases. HBT claimed that the subsequent discourse, particularly by Ann Cryer MP, who had referred to the practice as ‘medieval’, had led to a dehumanising of Muslims, stating that “the media prefer to use the term ‘in-breeding’, usually reserved for animals. Woolas would be better off looking at the health issues emanating from the ‘freedom-gone-mad culture in secular societies” (HBT, 2008h). Here we see HBT resist the use of cousin marriages within some South Asian communities to reinforce the idea of an ‘other’ by ministers, one whose values are not compatible with British values.

In contrast to the MCB and the Quilliam Foundation, whose discourses emphasise the shared values between Muslims and the broader British society, HBT seeks instead to question the morality of the western secular culture. Their acts of resistance are the promotion of an Islamic system as an alternative to, and not as part of, British values. They argue that: “Belief in Islam and doing good deeds is the only protection from the values that dominate western society” (HBT, 2008). For HBT, the resistance towards securitisation and the construct of Britishness itself forms the basis of their group’s ontological security with Islam used as a vector to reassert their self-identity. In the next chapter, we will further examine this mutually constitutive relationship.
between securitisation and group identity and explore how HBT used securitisation to create an internal hierarchal other.

8.9 Conclusion

While Hizb-ut-Tahrir has had a presence in the UK since the 1980s, this chapter focused on those press releases that were available post-July 7th. This chapter was able to analyse the changing nature of this discourse via secondary accounts of former members, such as Shiraz Maher. The organisation's principal aim in this period remained the restoration of the Caliphate system, which underpins their discursive strategy. By setting out this as an alternative to what they term a secular liberal state, the organisation calls for a political system based on literalist interpretations of Islam. For HBT, the construct of Britishness and the imposition of secular ideals were extensions of a colonial project. These claims of colonialism informed much of their discourse on the war on terror.

The proposed ban on the organisation would influence its discursive strategy relating to the legislation and securitisation that occurred following the July 7th London bombings. This would see HBT adapting their discursive approach. They firstly co-opted other Muslim organisations and framed their discourse around the British values of free speech and tolerance to oppose their proposed proscription. Secondly, this was used to create new ontological security for the organisation framing their opposition to the war on terror and securitisation as attacks on Islam, providing the basis of their resistance. In their promotion of a caliphate state based on the literalist Sunni model that the organisation follows, HBT creates a double securitisation, forming a hierarchical other based both on those Muslims that it believes are working with the British government and those who do not follow the Caliphate model.

The 'othering' of Muslim whose aim differ from that of HBT, or who the organisation believed to be colluding with the UK–US alliance underpins the discursive strategy in the international war on terror category, which is framed as a new colonial war. Here Muslim leaders such as Musharraf and Karzai are referred to as puppets for the alliance. It is within this category that HBT
emphasises their status as part of a transnational movement, with the press releases and reports produced focusing not only on the impacts of the military campaigns but also of the role of HBT within those countries. This is particularly relevant in the case of Pakistan, where the organisation was banned. In its discourse on Pakistan, its press releases and report focus not only on the war on terror but on internal events in Pakistan such as the Lal Masjid siege and the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. Its report on Pakistan outlined its plans for a Caliphate state within that country to prevent the influence that it perceived the UK and US governments had on Pakistan through the granting of aid packages. HBT portrayed the war on terror as a war on Islam, and the organisation argued that the war on terror conflated all Muslims with radical Islamists.

The organisation uses the term colonial to purport that while the war on terror was aimed at terrorism, it instead upheld supremacist notions of Islam as the other and thus impacted all Muslims.

The category of foreign affairs also highlighted the role that the organisation plays in different countries, particularly within the context of an international discourse centred on the growing Islamist threat. HBT was also banned in Bangladesh, and three of its members arrested in Egypt. Again, their discourse ‘othered’ the regimes as being supported by the West. Although HBT is an overtly religious organisation, the category of religious engagement formed one of the smallest categories. Here they focused on two key areas, the promotion of the Caliphate state and the right of women to wear Islamic head coverings and the securitisation of Muslim women. Throughout this period, it was HBT who were impacted by the securitisation that occurred. Through their resistance to securitisation, HBT was able to create a new ontological identity which othered those whose aims they believed conflated with political and media elites who had created these securitising moves.
9. Colonial Hangover

The previous chapters in this thesis have set out the securitisation process, which led up to and occurred after the July 7th London Bombings. Chapter 5 used the Post Copenhagen model to allow an extension of the securitising processes. This extended the focus on speech acts to include a variety of text to add visual images. Additionally, the definition of who was a securitising actor was also relaxed to include the social elite, including think tanks and religious organisations. This allowed us to begin to reposition the organisations as elites within the microcosm of British Muslim communities. By examining the public discourse of three key Muslim organisations – the Muslim Council of Britain, the Quilliam Foundation and Hizb-ut-Tahrir, this thesis has analysed how their discursive strategies have responded to securitising processes. Additionally, it has discussed how, as elite groups within the Muslim community, they have set out a framework for an internal securitisation based on the hierarchal other.

The purpose of this chapter is to show how the idea of a model mainstream moderate form of Islam, works only by the development of internal hierarchies created within Muslim communities and that for some Muslims this has resulted in a double insecuritisation. The foundations of this can be seen in the relationships the three organisations have had with dominant sources of power, explored in the previous three chapters and their relations with each other. These relationships can be viewed as a microcosm for the wider Muslim community. The chapter argues that a transformation of identity has occurred within British Muslim communities with the arrival of new migrant groups. This transformation, coupled with contestations in religious identity, has seen these new migrant communities face a 'double insecuritization'. On the one hand, these new communities are 'othered' by the current public discourse of British Muslims groups and, on the other hand, the idea of Britishness which, as with colonisation, has been constructed in contradistinction to a new securitised identity, the hierarchal other. If British Muslims are the 'other', it is new migrant communities amongst Muslims who are this 'hierarchal' other.
Through this construction of an imagined 'British Muslim community,' we can see how these three groups seek to define 'moderate Islam' and define the idea of a mainstream Muslim community. By viewing Muslim identity as having a mutually constitutive relationship with the insecuritisation process, we can see the impact that these groups have on one another. The idea of a mutually constitutive relationship further allows us to interrogate the idea that the insecuritisation of British Muslims occurs not only through securitising moves by the dominant power but also how this impacts British Muslim identities. By following the Post Copenhagen framework, we can explore how British Muslims have attempted post-July 7th to establish themselves as part of an imagined British community and how this has resulted in the groups reproducing the securitisation processes.

This chapter will continue to use the Post Copenhagen model to explore how British Muslims have been subjected to the securitisation process and how this has impacted their group identity. It will demonstrate this, firstly by continuing its analysis of how the three organisations responded to the securitisation process, and secondly, how this resulted in constructions of separate Muslim identities for each of our organisations. Through this, we will continue to explore the mutually constitutive relationship between securitisation and Muslim identity identified in the previous chapters and examine how the discourse explored in the earlier chapters has contributed to this post-July 7th. Finally, the chapter will discuss how these identities have contributed to a double securitisation within the Muslim community. It will do this by adopting in following Croft’s methodology to examine how key values in the Muslim community, much like the construct of Britishness are used to other some Muslim communities. These values are identified based on the discourse analysis of the previous chapters and are created in contradistinction to a hierarchal other.
9.1 Group Identity

While the exogenous relationship between the government and the individual organisations has been discussed in the previous chapters, this section will further develop this analysis to show how these group identities developed in contradistinction to notions of Britishness and processes of securitisation. By focusing on the group attempts to define a 'British Islam' through the microcosm of British Muslim communities, this section will position these groups as an elite within British Muslim communities. It further seeks to identify how the organisations have attempted to reconstitute their identity in relation to each other to create in and out-group dynamics. This will allow us to analyse how these groups are now able to implement securitising moves and create a hierarchal other within Muslim communities through the creation of boundaries. Using this as our framework, we can understand further how the groups have attempted to define a new British Muslim idea, and thus a sense of ontological security based on this new construct of identity.

The emphasis on community cohesion and key groups which occurred as a result of the securitisation process post-July 7th, 2005, would set boundaries both in the organisation's relationship with each other and with the government. This section will use these relationships to demonstrate the mutually constitutive relationship between the insecuritization of British Muslims and Muslim identity.
Figure 1: Group Identity

The above diagram represents the intersection between the three groups and the government which emerged after the July 7th bombings. The government reinforced the securitisation process which had been set out in Blair’s August 2005 speech, through legislative changes, the funding of community groups and an emphasis on groups which promoted moderate Islamic schools of thought. This can also be viewed as an attempt from the government to create a hierarchal structure within British Muslim communities which encouraged key Muslim groups and ‘othered’ groups such as HBT. Within this, we see how the internal securitisation process mirrors the overall securitisation process. While the construct of Britishness relied on constructions of a radicalised ‘other’ and an orientalised ‘other’, this was reflected through the group’s creations of a hierarchal other.

9.1.1 The Muslim Council of Britain

While the MCB’s opposition to the Iraq war was seen as the stance which resulted in them losing access to the government, their refusal to attend a Holocaust Memorial Day remembrance
ceremony in 2005 and their position on homosexuality were also contributory factors. The organisation's discourse on these issues can be seen as being in direct opposition to the values of British tolerance. On the boycott of Holocaust Memorial Day, Sacranie backed plans which called for the day to be renamed the Genocide Remembrance Day, arguing in The Telegraph that: "The message of the Holocaust was 'never again' and for that message to have a practical effect on the world it has to be inclusive" (Helm, 2005). If we view this within the prism of the historical construct of British identity, which relies heavily on myths surrounding its role in the Second World War the Holocaust memorials play an essential role in the construct of British values. The memorial becomes important only for remembering the victims of the Holocaust but because it reminds us of the values of a "Britain that was "heroic and stoic whether in the face of evil, war or austerity; and able to stand alone against tyranny" (Croft, 2012b, p. 132).

The boycott was further condemned by Muslim commentators such as Mehdi Hassan who argued that British Muslim attitudes towards the Holocaust were defined by "not just denial but by indifference" (Hasan, 2012). Hasan further quoted a Channel 4 poll which claimed only one in three Muslims believed the Holocaust had occurred. He stated: "How can we claim to be proud, integrated, European Muslims if we ignore a seminal moment in the history of this continent" (Hasan, 2012). The boycott of Holocaust Memorial Day can be seen to reinforce the perception of Muslim communities as a separate entity.

This thesis outlines the MCB’s stance on the definition of marriage in Chapter six. In addition to their support of campaigns to have the definition of marriage unchanged, a 2012 press release stated that while the organisation opposed all discrimination, including homophobia, it nevertheless had "a duty to defend the meaning of marriage, guard its sanctity and protect the welfare of children" (MCB, 2012f). It continued: "The purpose of this campaign is to stand firm for the true definition of marriage. As with other faiths, Islam recognises marriage as a union between a man and a woman" (MCB, 2012f). This reflects a previous remark made by Sacranie on a Radio 4 programme in January 2006, where he stated that: "Each of our faiths tells us that it is harmful and I think, if you look into the scientific evidence that has been available in terms of the
forms of various other illnesses and diseases that are there, surely it points out that where homosexuality is practised there is a greater concern in that area” (BBC News, 2006). The statement was met by condemnation by gay-rights campaigners, including Peter Tatchell, with several complaints being lodged. Archer writes that "the politicisation of these types of social issues, where Muslims are seen as holding illiberal views that may threaten the rights of fellow citizens or the established social order, can be understood as a major factor in pushing the state to govern through the politics of unease” (Archer, 2009, p. 339). In both issues, Sacranie's views were positioned as illustrative of the MCB holding illiberal values. These were used as part of the securitising process, repositioning the MCB as an 'out-group' whose views were in contradiction to liberal British values.

To understand how the MCB securitise different groups and attempt to construct the idea of being a British Muslim, we must examine the scope of its influence within British Muslim communities. The MCB's influence occurs not only through its public discourse but also through its affiliate organisations. Examples of these include mosques, community groups based on national identities and FOSIS (the Federation of Student Islamic Societies). The MCB's public discourse seeks to emphasise its position as an umbrella organisation. The intention, highlighted by the MCB's attendance at the Global Peace and Unity conference of 2005, is to "showcase the MCB as an inclusive umbrella body that seeks Muslim solidarity, national unity and prosperity ... in a multi-cultural Britain in the 21st century” (MCB, 2005f). The Islam Channel, who have been critiqued by the Quilliam Foundation for its Islamist views, organised the event.

In establishing their group identity, the MCB’s public outputs shy away from overt references to different Muslim groups. As set out in chapter six, they refer to HBT only within the context of its proposed proscription and its press releases in this period make no reference to the Quilliam Foundation. While the MCB promotes its affiliate list as being non-sectarian, its affiliate list reflects that of the Sunni majority. The way in which the MCB further constructed its values and identity through its discursive strategy can also be seen in the way that it focused on reacting to the consequences of the various crises that occurred within this period both in the U.K. and in
international settings that affected the British Muslim community. Campaigns were centred on macro issues such as Islamophobia and civil marriages, while also focusing on information for British Muslims on such issues as Hajj, each of the campaigns defining the organisation's identity. While the MCB campaigned against the discrimination of minorities and condemned homophobia, its discourse also campaigned against the Marriage Act, and it is not affiliated to any Muslim organisation such as IMAAN, a Muslim LGBTQI charity.40

Whereas chapter 6 established the secular tone of the MCB’s public discourse, the group further attempted to set the tone of being a Muslim by promoting key imams and schools. Here we can see an example of the mutually constitutive relationship emerge. Whereas its secular tone precluded the MCB from overtly focusing on theological issues, the organisation supported initiatives such as the establishment of MINAB (Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board) which was seen to be independent of state-led organisations such the government-backed Mosque Advisory Board. The MCB saw MINAB as a "milestone for the Muslim community as British Mosques, of all traditions, will come together and establish good practice" (MCB, 2006g). The MCB's involvement in MINAB established its role in attempting to create a new identity for the organisation, one which was being developed in contradistinction to the government, emphasising its independence to the government and attempting to establish itself as representing all the traditions of Islam. They asserted that another view expressed strongly by some younger imams was that the MCB Mosque and Community Affairs Committee should take the lead in this area. The MCB stated: “Others expressed the view in favour of MCB and its affiliates continuing their engagement with MINAB as long as its independence was made clear and ensured” (MCB, 2006g).

Despite its inclusive views, the MCB's list of affiliates reveals that many of its members represent South Asian or Sunni organisation which further contributes to internal securitisation based on the hierarchal other. We see this in the following press releases which relate to the Sufi Muslim

---

40 Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Queer, Intersex
Council (SMC) and the Ahmadi Muslim community. Reacting to the Channel 4 documentary "Who Speaks for British Muslims?" which examined British Muslim attitudes towards Israel, the MCB responded to claims made in the documentary by critiquing the Sufi Muslim Council’s stance in the programme and questioning their representation within the Muslim community. They stated:

One figure, from the so-called Sufi Muslim Council, was quoted on Radio 4’s The World This Weekend last Sunday [1] as claiming that his new body was backed by several non-Muslim organisations, including the Board of Deputies of British Jews when surely he should have been questioned about what level of support if any - he actually had within the Muslim communities across the U.K. which he is now claiming to represent" (MCB, 2006h).

The documentary also critiqued the MCB’s view on the Ahmadi Muslim community. The documentary director, Martin Bright, argued that the British government should not deal with the MCB until they had changed their position on regarding Ahmadi Muslims as non-Muslims. The MCB explained that:

Unfortunately for Bright, our position on Ahmadis is not restricted to the MCB or indeed to British Muslims. It is actually a global consensus among Muslim scholars from all the main schools of thought that the belief in the finality of the prophethood of Muhammad (God's peace and blessings be upon him) is a central tenet of faith in Islam. Those who do not accept this and believe in other prophets after Muhammad (p.b.u.h.) are entitled to their views, but they are not regarded as Muslims” (MCB, 2006h).

Here though, the MCB set up the Ahmadi Muslim community not as a hierarchical other with British Muslim communities, but as a separate entity, as an ‘other’, questioning their right even to call themselves Muslims. Here we see the MCB contributing to the ontological insecurity of Ahmadi Muslims, by denying their identities as Muslims. Thus while the MCB claims not to speak for all Muslims in the U.K., the period saw the MCB as redefining its identity as an independent body which represented British Muslim interests against securitisation processes introduced by
the government within this period and laying the foundation for the mutually constitutive relationship.

9.1.2 The Quilliam Foundation

The preceding chapter on the Quilliam Foundation established its role as a counter extremist think tank aiming to promote a pluralistic model of Islam and also explored how it co-opted the securitisation process. The organisation has previously called for a reformation in Islam, with Nawaz calling for a change in the way Islamic scriptures are interpreted. The Quilliam Foundation, as such, constructs its identity to assimilate its organisational values with British values. In addition to their counter extremist model, they also seek to advance "the values of pluralism, secularism, and equality, freedom of expression, religious liberty, democracy, and human rights among Muslims worldwide" (El Younassi, 2018, p. 317).

Arenes argued that the identity of the Quilliam Foundation is tied to its founders, Majid Nawaz and Ed Husain, and their former membership of HBT and, in Nawaz's case, time spent in an Egyptian prison. Nawaz and Husain enter this narrative as former 'radicals' who have been through the deradicalisation process, as a framework for other radicals (Arenes, 2014, p. 64). In doing this, they use their position as former members of HBT to legitimise their work. For the Quilliam Foundation, the construction of the British Muslim identity mirrors the construct of Britishness. Here, however the reliance is not on a radical/oriental other, but a radical/hierarchal other.

As a think tank, the Quilliam Foundation use their position as an elite group, both within the broader political framework and within Muslim communities, to influence discussions on Islam. We can see this with their attendance at party conferences, including an event at the Liberal Democrat party conference which examined issues such as Sharia Law. In this, we see the Quilliam Foundation attempt to frame how Muslims are viewed by proposing a lens which reflects their organisational values. The Quilliam Foundation would not only co-opt but would also further shape a new securitisation process, with Nawaz contributing to key political speeches, such as
Cameron's Munich 2011 counter-terrorism address (Shariatmadari, 2015). This speech called for an end to state-led multiculturalism and reiterated British values. Cameron stated that: "Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and the mainstream. We have failed to provide a vision of society to which they feel they want to belong" (Wintour, 2011). Cameron's comments echo those made by Blair that there are communities in Britain that are a separate entity within. Here we can see the spatial element of Croft's post-Copenhagen model, with another reordering of what constitutes the Muslim other. The speech goes on to reference different Muslim groups, and Cameron argued that: "Move along the spectrum, and you find people who may reject violence, but who accept various parts of the extremist world-view including real hostility towards Western democracy and liberal values" (Wintour, 2011). Cameron would focus his securitisation process on groups such as HBT and would, like Blair, attempt to proscribe them.

The declaration that the government would no longer "fund or share platforms with organisations that, while non-violent, are certainly in some cases part of the problem", sent a clear message that only those groups whose values matched those set out by the government would receive support (Wintour, 2011). Cameron went on to reiterate those values, again reaffirming a construct of Britishness. "Freedom of speech. Freedom of worship. Democracy. The rule of law. Equal rights, regardless of race, sex or sexuality. It says to its citizens: This is what defines us as a society. To belong here is to believe these things" (BBC News, 2011). The speech influenced by Nawaz would therefore not only reemphasise the construct of Britishness but would see Nawaz now behave as a securitising actor reconstructing a new radical other via Cameron's speech.

The Quilliam Foundation further sought to influence Islam not only in the U.K. but also in Pakistan through their sister organisation, Khudi. Nawaz spoke of the need to undertake a 'paradigm shift' in tackling Islamist extremists in Pakistan with a greater focus on an intellectual rebuttal of Islamist ideology. They welcomed a youth conference organised by Minhaj ul Quran, framing them as a moderate organisation. Minaj Ul Quran is a cross-sectarian organisation who cater to the middle classes in Pakistan (Bradley & Saigol, 2012). They claimed that this was the "first
major Muslim grassroots event in the U.K. specifically against Islamist extremism and terrorism. The group's founder Dr Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri made headlines earlier this year after he issued a 600-page fatwa against terrorism in which he condemned extremism with 'no ifs or buts' (Quilliam Admin, 2009).

They also focused on HBT in a report on the Islam channel. In the report 'Reprogramming British Muslims: A study of the Islam channel' the Quilliam Foundation stated that: "The Islam Channel is the largest satellite channel aimed specifically at British and European Muslims. Many of its speakers are Islamist extremists from organisations like Hizb ut-Tahrir who use the channel to promote intolerant and bigoted interpretations of Islam" (Quilliam Admin, 2009). Here we see two different strands of internal securitisation emerging. The first reflects the overall securitisation process set out in Chapter 5, which positions the views of HBT as being in opposition to British values. The second focuses on promoting a model of Islam it sees as compatible with being British. When discussing the Islam channel, the Quilliam Foundation argues that the "Islam Channel claims to be committed to giving a platform to a range of views from across Britain's Muslims" (Quilliam Admin, 2009). They argue that the result of "this laudable and broad-minded policy has been to give undue prominence to Islamist voices that represent only a small minority of British Muslims (Quilliam Admin, 2009). This over-representation has also led to other voices – for instance, from the U.K.'s Shia community or non-Islamist Muslim groups – being under-represented on the channel" (Quilliam Admin, 2009).

Its role as a securitising actor was further emphasised in a list of Muslim individuals and organisation which they deemed to be non-violent Islamists, which included the MCB and many of its affiliates. The Guardian reported the Quilliam Foundation as stating that: "The ideology of non-violent Islamists is broadly the same as that of violent Islamists; they disagree only on tactics" (Dodd, 2010). The report further argues that if local or central government engages with such groups then "it risks empowering proponents of the ideology, if not the methodology, that is behind terrorism" (Dodd, 2010).
For the Quilliam Foundation, their identity as a counter extremist organisation influences the role they play within the internal securitisation of the British Muslim community with the above examples showing them play the role of a securitising actor. In the Quilliam Foundation, we see the emergence of a vision of a pluralistic British Islam whose values assimilate with those identified as British values.

9.1.3 Hizb-ut-Tahrir

While the attempted proscription of HBT was met with condemnation by both the MCB and the Quilliam Foundation, it can be seen as the most overt example of securitisation concerning our three groups. Within the timeline of this thesis, HBT continued to be subject to a dual securitisation process. This occurred not only through the government and the media but through a range of other organisations, specifically the Quilliam Foundation. We can see this in the Quilliam Foundation’s 2010 report on Islamism. In addition to using HBT as an example of an Islamist organisation, this report argued that HBT's political ideology, "when combined with puritanical Saudi Wahhabism, helped to create modern Jihadism" (Quilliam Admin, 2010a). The reports' association of HBT with not only Islamism but also jihadism, further strengthened the idea that HBT was a radical other who promoted ideas which were not only incompatible with the British way of life but were a clear threat to it. The report further linked the organisation's values to the Saudi regime whose values are often held as being in opposition to the British way of life.

HBT used their status as a securitised ‘other’ to firstly establish the boundaries that they had built through their conservatism. Paradoxically, HBT further used their resistance to the securitisation process to continue to portray the British government as a colonial power. This use of the term colonial marks them apart from the MCB, who refer to the British empire only within the context of world war one and their efforts to establish a shared historical narrative. For HBT, new colonialism is still part of their everyday discourse. For HBT, the securitisation process is a
colonial hangover. Its narrative is based on showing that historically and currently, the British government have portrayed Muslims as the other. They depict the government as a colonial power seeking to rule the Muslim world through the war on terror. The press releases looked at in the preceding chapter on HBT showed how they called the-then Pakistani Prime minister a puppet dictator, through the acceptance of aid packages from the US-UK governments.

Through the language of religion and anti-imperialism, they contribute to an internal securitisation of Muslim sects who do not follow the Caliphate system that the organisation promotes. For HBT, "the resources of the ummah will be utilised by the Khilafah to advance this ummah to the leading state in all fields of life, as we were once our lands were governed by the divine system of Allah (SWT)" (HBT, 2010h). Whereas HBT sees the Caliphate system as crucial to ending sectarianism, the countries mentioned within the article on the global ummah are centred mainly on the Middle East and South Asia. This is also notable in the countries reflected in the HBT article: "Khilafah: A wealth of possibilities which examines the world oil reserves" (HBT, 2010h). The map of the reserves is reproduced below, showing that 66% of the world oil reserves are in the Middle East. The article infers that there is a symbiotic relationship between oil reserves and the neo-colonial project. It further suggests that these oil reserves would allow for its Caliphate system to be an economically successful model, thereby associating the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia, with the Caliphate system.

---

41 Colonial Hangover is defined in this thesis as the everyday hidden legacies of the Empire
Within the press releases by HBT examined within this thesis, there is little focus on minority groups within the British Muslim community. Despite focusing on a global ummah, the press releases reflect the dominance of the Sunni ideology to HBT's discourse focusing on countries such as Pakistan and Bangladesh. No mention is made of Muslim sects such as the Ahmadi or Ismaili community, or any Shia schools of thought. For HBT the ummah reflected its Pakistani/Arab Salafi interests, and this created an internal hierarchal securitisation for anyone who fell outside this prism of south Asian/Arab Sunni conservatism.

9.2 Constructing British Islam

This section will explore how the process of double securitisation occurs by firstly identifying the values that are used by the groups to define British Muslim identity. As Croft highlights the definitions of Britishness offered by Gordon Brown and Norman Tebbit show the different values
attached to the term. Similarly, the construct of British Muslim identity is also subject to varying interpretations within the British Muslim community. In his use of the post-Copenhagen model, Croft sets out the foundations for British values, arguing that these are subject to conditions of spatiality and temporality. Briefly recapped from chapter five, Croft’s relaxation of the four pillars of the Copenhagen school involves a move away from speech acts alone, allowing non-language to be incorporated, the broadening of who is considered to be an elite, and therefore capable of securitising moves, the role of the audience (the wider in-group) in resisting or accepting the securitisation process, and finally the re-enactment of this through every day performative actions (i.e. humour and sports). The values of modern-day Britain were reconstituted in crucial periods, such as the Second World War, the 1960s and 1980s, to reflect a new meritocracy and included commitments to social justice regardless of class, gender and race (Croft, 2012b).

In response to the developing crises of the September 11th terror attacks and July 7th London bombings, Norman Tebbit and Gordon Brown offered two differing accounts of Britishness. For Tebbit, Britishness was defined by his ‘cricket test’. Tebbit argued that British citizens would support England regardless of their country of birth. They would also accept Britain’s past as their past. For Gordon Brown, his vision of Britishness was built on a model of inclusivity. He stated that: "My vision of Britain comes not from uniformity but from celebrating diversity, in other words, a multi-ethnic and multinational Britain" (Brown, 1998). Thus, in the same way, that there are competing definitions of Britishness, the three groups explored in this thesis all offer differing competing models of being a British Muslim.

The components which make up the 'British Muslim values' are further subject to the spatial and temporal conditions that Croft identifies as part of the Post Copenhagen model. These values are dependent on the dual role these groups play, both being subject to the securitisation process, and within the microcosm of British Muslim communities as a securitising actor. As with 'Britishness' these relationships are dependent on the construct of an 'other'. Therefore, each groups construction of ‘British Muslim values’ is dependent both on the concept of the ‘other’ within and its relationship with different constructs of Britishness.
This then leads us to the mutually constitutive relationship between the insecuritisation of British Muslims and Muslim identity. These values which are explored below, highlight the intersection between the organisation's interactions with the state and the construct of Britishness.

1) The interpretation of Islam: While Croft's model demonstrates how radical Islam is constructed as the 'other', we have explored in the previous chapters how the securitisation process through media [re]securitisation, often associates this with schools of thought associated with more conservative/literal interpretations of Islam. Commentators link schools such as Wahhabism and the Deoband schools to Islamist movements. While none of our organisations has an overt relationship with one school, the discourse analysis of the previous chapters reveals the influence on the Sunni schools, through their interactions. HBT base their Caliphate model on the conservative Sunnism, and the Quilliam's discourse portrays a symbiotic relationship between Wahhabism and Islamist movements. The schools of Islam associated with our organisations influenced not only their relationship with the government but also the interactions with other schools of thought within Islam. This is key to our understanding of how these groups create their identity with the hierarchal other.

2) The organisation's historical relationships with Britishness: This value references the historical construct of Britishness set out in Chapter five, and how the organisations have positioned themselves concerning legacies of empire. Examined in connection with 'value one', we can analyse the differing relationships between the Islamic schools of thought and the historical construct of Britishness. This can be seen in the example of the Deobandi School with its origins as an anti-colonial movement. This value then focuses on how the organisation's identity has been constructed in contradistinction to Britishness. In the way that historical acts such as the Second World War play a role in the
construction of British values, crisis points such as The Satanic Verses protests have contributed to how some British Muslim communities construct their identity.

3) The organisation's role in broader public discourse, from civic campaigns partnering with elite groups and participation in political life: This sees the organisations attempt to move away from the temporal conditions created by Blair’s speech and from being seen as a separate community within. An example of this can be seen with the MCB’s campaigns with the TUC to combat Islamophobia and the reasons to vote campaign. While HBT builds an identity on their resistance to these temporal conditions, Chapter eight revealed how it worked with other civic organisations to position away from the ‘radical’ other.

4) Resistance to Securitisation: The previous chapters have explored how the groups have either resisted or co-opted securitisation processes. This chapter will show that these acts of resistance have, at times, been through the act of ‘othering’ groups such as the Sufi Council and othering the groups within this thesis. Thus, while the Quilliam Foundation does not call for the proscription of HBT, it nevertheless others it through its depiction of HBT as an Islamist group, feeding into an overall construction of the ‘other’.

In addition to this, various areas of commonality are highlighted. These include the organisation's presence in universities and the relationship that each of these groups has with Pakistan. Universities are a point of commonality between the three organisations, with all three having a presence on university campuses. The relationship between Pakistan and the organisation is pertinent in our understanding of the influence of the South Asian schools of Islam and how they are viewed within the context of the ethnic breakdown of British Muslims, with 65% of British Muslims identifying as having Pakistani heritage. Considered in conjunction with reports issued
by the government in this period concerning the role of Imams, we can then analyse how these play into the double securitisation.

9.2.1 Creating a New Other

The below table provides a summary of the different components which contribute to the construction of the three organisation’s identity. By using these components in a similar method to that used by Croft, who applied British values to create a construct of Britishness, we can see how these groups are constructing a new identity, often in exclusionary terms, reliant on an 'other'. The values have been summarised in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Muslim Council of Britain</th>
<th>Quilliam Foundation</th>
<th>Hizb -ut-Tahrir</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Umbrella organisation with 500 affiliates. The majority of its members are Sunni Muslim organisations/mosques. References to Islam within this period reflect this. No specific reference made to any school of Islam in associations with terrorism, whose roots they argue is not in Islamic thinking.</td>
<td>Describes itself as advocating a pluralistic model. Through its work and its founder, it calls for a reformation of Islam. Refers to schools of thoughts such as Salafi, Wahhabism and Deobandi as being associated with Islamism. Calls for reformation seek to combat this.</td>
<td>Seeks a Caliphate Model of Islam based on Sunni Islam. HBT follow a conservative form of Islam which follows a literal interpretation of Islam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration based on a shared historical narrative.</td>
<td>Integration based on secular liberal values</td>
<td>Islamic values as an alternative to western values.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral participation within the mainstream political voting process, encouraging Muslims to vote via the Khutbah. The organisation maintains a largely secular tone to their discourse.</td>
<td>Association with both Conservative party via funding and latterly with the Liberal Party</td>
<td>Non-participation in the mainstream political voting process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Events in Pakistan feature low on the MCB Foreign Policy discourse, with this</td>
<td>Focus on Pakistan through sister organisation, Khudi – an organisation which sought</td>
<td>Pakistan viewed as the subject of a new imperial project. HBT has a presence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>being one of the lowest countries proportionally mentioned within this section.</td>
<td>to combat extremism in Pakistan, and encourage youth participation</td>
<td>in Pakistan as part of the overall organisation. PM (Musharraf/Bhutto) being seen as 'puppets of the west'.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOSIS – Affiliate Organisation. No specific organised society</td>
<td>Presence in universities via Quilliam Foundation University societies (Quilliam Admin, N.D). The website lists examples of these as being at Warwick University, Aberystwyth and Oxford Brookes.</td>
<td>Historical (1980’s) presence in universities. Often has a presence in universities through alternate societies such, as the 1924 society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenged counter-terrorism laws particularly length of detention without charge, surveillance on British Muslim communities, and the creation of a suspect community.</td>
<td>Challenging aspects of counter-terrorism laws which the organisation felt would fuel Islamist thinking.</td>
<td>Challenged counter-terrorism laws, particularly the proposed proscription of the party.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table uses the discursive strategies identified in the previous chapters to demonstrate how the organisations construct new identities based on the above factors. The next section will, therefore, show that while crises such as the July 7th bombing have contributed to the constructs of the British Muslim other, a mutually constitutive relationship has emerged between the insecuritisation of British Muslims and Muslim identity. It is this relationship, used by the organisations repositioned as the securitising actors which have been used to construct a hierarchal other. This construction of the hierarchal other will be examined in the next section.

### 9.2.2 Creating a Hierarchal Other

This chapter has positioned our three organisations as part of the 'elite' within British Muslim communities, and therefore the securitising actor. This section will explore how the groups were able to reconstitute the crisis and subsequent securitisations as a basis for ontological security. Key to this defining was their relationships, firstly, as part of a securitised community and secondly, as part of the Muslim elite. It was these relationships which thus, impacted their ability
to create an internal securitisation. This section will firstly examine the group's relationship with the government (either through co-opting or resisting securitisation) and then further explore how this impacted the organisation's relationship with each other.

This relationship will be viewed within the prism of a speech made by the-then community secretary, Ruth Kelly, unveiled at a press conference held in August 2006 to launch the Commission on Integration and Cohesion. Kelly's speech reinforced the dual narrative of Blair's August 2005 speech whose dual narrative sought to both address extremism and work on community relations with the Muslim community, emphasising integration. Kelly began by stating that "patterns of immigration are becoming more complex. Our new residents are not the Windrush generation" (Kelly, 2006). In referencing the Windrush generation,\textsuperscript{42} Kelly created a distinction with new migrant communities inferring a different relationship. Chapter six demonstrated how the Muslim Council of Britain had used the empire and the World Wars to create a shared historical narrative.

The speech can be read as signalling an end to the multiculturalism which had preceded the crisis of July 7th. Kelly further argues of white Britons that: "they begin to believe the stories about ethnic minorities getting special treatment and to develop a sense of grievance" (Kelly, 2006). She went on to reinforce Blair's suggestion of separate communities, stating: "I believe that this is why we have moved from a period of uniform consensus on the value of multiculturalism to one where we can encourage that debate by questioning whether it is encouraging separateness" (Kelly, 2006).

Ruth Kelly's speech here also speaks to what can be perceived by rising ontological anxiety among white Britons. Kelly's speech speaks to growing ontological anxiety among some white Briton's For Gidden; anxiety had to be understood in relation to the individual's overall security system (Giddens, 1991). We can argue that these white Briton's saw the 'special treatment' that they perceived minorities received. Here we can link the individual's security system to their

\textsuperscript{42} Commonwealth citizens who had arrived between 1948 and 1971 from former colonies such as Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados.
perceptions of home. Browning states that “when home is “lost” or when one no longer feels welcome in their own home or is told to leave feelings of betrayal and dread can quickly set in (Browning, 2018, p. 340). Kelly’s speech hint at the idea that white Briton’s perceptions of home are lost, because of a perceived lack of status which as comes at the expense of special treatment for ethnic minority communities. This further feeds into the idea that these special treatments are a threat to the identity and values of the ‘home’ community, feeding also into feelings of ontological anxiety. This speech also increased the feelings of destabilisation for some new migrant communities, as they were unable to create an identity based on the shared history of the empire. For these communities the idea of homesteading, making a political space for themselves became more difficult, as they were ‘ignored’ by the mainstream Muslim community, whilst also displaced by the conflicts of home.

While the speech’s emphasis was seemingly on diversity within the U.K, the following excerpts reflect the dominance of the British Pakistani community within the overall discourse as well as the attention that would be placed on the Muslim community. On the former, Kelly argued that:

Young people may be seen as Pakistani on the streets of Burnley, but many feel out of place and 'British' when they visit Pakistan. And for some communities in particular, we need to acknowledge that life in Britain has started to feel markedly different since the attacks on 9/11 in New York and on 7/7 in London - even more so since the events of two weeks ago (Kelly, 2006).

Kelly further announced that there would be more specialised projects such "as the work in Bradford aimed at developing a citizenship curriculum for Madrassas" (Kelly, 2006). This would lead to the creation of the proposed Mosque Advisory Board (MAB) which would set further boundaries within the British Muslim community, both internally and externally, as shown in the previous section on the MCB.
CONTEST 2, released in 2009, would lead to further securitisations of British Muslim communities and an additional emphasis on the Good Muslim-Bad Muslim dichotomy. Brown writes that CONTEST 2 aimed to "overcome experiences of isolation and develop a vision of British identity" (Brown, 2010, p. 176). This identity, based on British values, sought to favour alternate constructions of British Muslim identity. Brown further states that "these alternative models present Muslim identity within cultural discourses that normalise citizenship based on participation in politics and economics as well as popular music" (Brown, 2010, p. 177). An example of this was the creation of the Sufi Council.

Writing on these organisations, Abbas contends that: "There was also a broad distinction to those who believed in an ideal of an Islamic state, and those who adjusted themselves to secular government. These organisations jostled with each other for the internal control of the Muslim community" (Abbas, 2005, p. 238). We can, therefore, use the government-backed creation of the Sufi Muslim council as an example of government securitisation and its promotion of alternative secular friendly based Muslim identity. We can explore the influence this had on the construction of both the identity of British Muslims and the creation of a hierarchal other. The positioning of Sufism within the Muslim community in the U.K. has changed not only with reinforcing crisis points in the U.K, but also globally.

Though Sufism is one of the oldest schools of thought within the Islamic tradition and has historically enjoyed prominence in the UK, Abbas highlights the theological differences between Sufism and other schools, writing: "There was a central division among the Sunnis between Deobandi’ s, who were concerned to purge Islam of all Hindu and Pagan elements, and the Barelvis who added their practices of Sufism" (Abbas, 2005, p. 238). After September 11th the securitisation process began to focus on what was constructed as a radical other. While a distinction was made between radical Islam and conservative Muslims schools, the securitisation
process would see schools such as the Deobandi and in particular Wahhabism, associated with radical Islam. We can thus see a hierarchy emerge via government securitisations through the promotion of the Sufi Muslim Council as a model of the integrated Muslim group.

The Sufi Muslim council was launched in 2006 by Haras Rafiq and was a recipient of funding made available to community groups from the government. Its launch can be seen to fill the requirements of the alternate model of Islams outlined by Brown. Its representatives from the voluntary sector included, "a Muslim advisor to the government on faith communities and prevention of violent extremism, and most importantly: shaykhs and representatives from various Sufi orders" (Stjernholm, 2010, p. 223). Here the Sufi Muslim Council appears to fulfil all the values favoured by the policy, with substantial participation in civic life. Rafiq claimed that the organisation stood for the silent majority of Muslims in the U.K. who opposed Islamist groups. Archer argues that "little proof was ever provided for this methodologically difficult claim" (Archer, 2009, p. 340).

Mandaville refers to the Sufi Council as an example of a Liberal-pluralist group which "emphasise the compatibility between Islam and other value systems and the possibility of assimilation into non-Muslim majority societies" (Mandaville, 2009, p. 499). A BBC article referred to the Sufi council as "one of two major groups to have emerged since the London bombings offering different views to the dominant Muslim Council of Britain" (Casciani, 2006). While the Sufi Muslim Council had started in 2006 as a marginal group, it "succeeded in bringing several significant Sufi communities under its umbrella in the public events in the beginning of 2009" (Casciani, 2006). The championing of the Sufi Muslim council is also reflective of the changing relationship of the MCB with the government following the Iraq war. The article further quotes Kelly as saying that: "We need to always ask ourselves whether we are working with the right groups in the right way", and that: "Organisations such as the Sufi Muslim Council are an important part of that work " (Casciani, 2006).

Within the Muslim community, there were questions raised about the group and a 'neo-con' charge was levelled against them. Archer states: "the neo-con charge was based on the content of
the SMC's website, which included material written by such conservative American–based researchers such as Lorenzo Visinio and Zeyno Baran, both of whom argue that political Islam, and particularly the Muslim Brotherhood represents a threat to the west” (Archer, 2009, p. 340). The Sufi Muslim council would term any group whose views were to the right, as Wahhabis, again connecting the school to a radical other. Archer goes on to argue that "the support that the SMC gained from the highest level of government is indicative of how citizenship meant that the state needed to find ways in which it could engage with British Muslims in a positive way – hoping that it could marginalise and suppress only the extremists, rather than simply securitising the whole community, deeming them all a threat” (Archer, 2009, p. 341).

While the Sufi council received initial attention and enjoyed success through public events, its influence was not sustained and its founder Haras Rafiq would go onto join the Quilliam Foundation. The importance of the Sufi Council can be arguably described as being part of the promotion of crucial schools of thought which are seen as more compatible with British values as part of the securitisation process.

By promoting an image of British Muslims who had assimilated with British values, either through funding or through the promotion of different schools of thought, the government impacted on the way that the three groups' identities formed in relation to each other, an inverse hierarchal structure would develop in the British Muslim community with groups such as the Sufi council being othered by British Muslim organisations such as the Muslim Council of Britain and HBT.

9.3 Double Securitisation

Through this construction of the 'British Muslim communities, we can see the roots of both the ontological security and the insecuritization of the three groups. By further developing Croft's model of insecuritisation, we can examine how the double securitisation occurs in two stages, firstly, how the construct of Britishness securitises these groups, and secondly through the creation of British Muslim identities formed in contradistinction to Britishness through the values identified in the previous section. Additionally, it is also through the silences of their outputs that
these groups reinforce an identity based on an idea of Islam that is centred on the Sunni schools originating with South Asian and Saudi Arabia. It is through this that those schools of thought and those communities who do not fit this construct are 'othered' as a hierarchal other.

The below table combined all the press releases issued in this period and focuses solely on that output which covers four minority categories: women's rights, the Shia sect, refugees within the U.K. and the African Caribbean Muslim community.

While the two main categories in this thesis are the war on terror and Islamophobia, which make up for 624 of all 1355 press releases studied, those press releases which focus on the four minority categories make up just 49 press releases of the total overall output. Even when there are areas of intersections (i.e. with Islamophobia), the press releases are limited, with only a few of these crossing over. Though we have seen the organisations, with HBT in particular, focus on women, this has remained limited, with output centred on religious clothing.

Here it is useful to explore the role of the audience in this internal securitisation. While the audience’s engagement is required for any securitising act, in the Post Copenhagen model, the role changes of the audience as they perform the functions that are crucial to the securitisation.
One of the key differences between the overall securitisation process and the double securitisation is that the securitising acts are not reliant on the 'in-group' being persuaded that an issue is a threat and therefore can be moved into the realms of security. In this process, the audience is asked to reconstitute messages, which instead position some models of Islam as a threat to the values and religious practices of the in-group of British Muslim communities. The audience becomes particularly important as the groups attempt to mobilise support which favours their groups model of Islam. The relationship between the groups and the in-group of British Muslim communities further differs in this double securitisation as the audience is asked to accept the silences in the discourse around some Muslim communities. It is here where the audience can resist /accept these silences, which reinforce Sunni schools of thought. The relationship between silences in the discourses and how these contribute to double securitisation will be explored within the next sections.

9.3.1 Shia Muslims in the U.K.

Within this area of minority issues, it is press releases on the Shia Muslim community which form the highest area of focus. Out of the 13 press releases for this topic, these are primarily focused on international themes, namely the growing sectarian violence in the Middle East and other parts of the Muslim world. While the MCB has Shia organisations amongst its affiliate lists, only three of its press releases focused on the Shia community. The outputs are all related to the growing sectarian violence with the MCB stating: "The Muslim Council of Britain today condemned the ongoing sectarian violence afflicting some countries in the Muslim world. It was exemplified brutally last Thursday through bombings in the Pakistani city of Quetta, killing some 120 Muslims, largely belonging to the Shia tradition " (MCB, 2013). Their work with the Shia community is often cited within acts of resistance, as we have seen in the previous chapter on the MCB, with the organisation refuting the Dispatches documentary claims about sectarianism. While the Quilliam Foundation also focuses on the growing sectarian violence in the Middle East, they further focus on the Shia community within the U.K. In a statement on the Quilliam
Foundation facilitating the departure of Tommy Robinson, the group states that: "Quilliam should also be encouraging him to meet with a range of Muslims, including gay, female, Shia, liberal and others, who are the primary victims of Islamism’s war on heterodoxy; he needs to see that it is not only white people but also Muslims who are the victims of Islamists like Islam4UK, whose agitation in Luton helped lead to the creation of the EDL" (Quilliam Admin, 2013a). Here the Quilliam Foundation infers that the Shia interpretation is a heterodoxy, that while it is a victim of Islamism, its position is at variance with the official position of Islam, the inference here being the Sunni interpretation. They further focus on the Shia community within the prism of their overall work, here reproducing as we have seen in the previous chapter, the need to focus on the extremism on university campuses. They claim that:

"Tensions between Shia and Wahhabi-influenced Muslims are also increasingly being seen on many British university campuses. For example, several university Islamic societies have regularly hosted events specifically denouncing Shia Muslims and have refused to stock Shia-authored books in supposedly 'multi-faith' campus prayer-rooms. They have also turned a blind eye to verbal abuse of Shia Muslim individuals. In some cases, this intolerance has led to Shia Muslim students being forced to leave these Islamic Societies and set up their own Shia-friendly ones" (Quilliam Admin, 2010m).

The press release lists no specific incident. Both the MCB and the Quilliam Foundation, use the focus on the Shia community to reinforce their positions. HBT produced no specific press releases on the Shia community in this period. In this way the Shia community are subject to a double securitisation, firstly, the inference that they do not fit the orthodox position and secondly the silences on their communities cast them not as a separate community within, but as a hierarchal other.

9.3.2 Black Muslims in the U.K.

While the issue of Islamophobia has been a significant area of focus for the MCB and the Quilliam Foundation, its racialised element is often ignored. Work surrounding Islamophobia reflects this,
and conversations on Islamophobia also reflect the dominance of the Arab-South Asian discourse in the British Muslim community. The absence of race from the organisations’ discourse, particularly concerning marginalised communities such as the African Muslim community, reflect the broader discourse in this area. Meer states that it is "striking to observe the virtual absence of an established literature and race and racism in the discussion of Islamophobia" (Meer, 2013, p. 385).

The marginalisation of the African Caribbean Muslim communities can be linked to both the overall securitisation process and from silences from ‘dominant’ South Asian Muslim communities. Kundnani links to the emergence of a politics of indifference which he argues occurred through an emphasis on ethnic differences with the development of multiculturalism. Kundnani contends that the cultural pluralism that emerged based on the meritocracy of British values could lead to an "inward reductive and conservative notion of identity" taking hold (Kundani, 2007, p. 49). Additionally, by the 1990s sociologists such as Modood had begun to argue that Asians could not identify with a black political identity because they did not share the legacies and history of the African transatlantic slave movement. Therefore the 1990s saw the black political identities which had been forged in the 1960s give way to a growing "fragmentation in and between Asian and African and African Caribbean communities" (Kundani, 2007, p. 50).

Even though the 2011 census revealed that Black Muslims made for 14.3% of the overall British Muslim community, there is only one specific press release in this area which relates to a British Black Muslim. We can, therefore, argue that the silences in the area of African/African Caribbean communities reflect the way that British Muslim identity is often synonymous with the Asian community. The marginalisation of Black Muslims in the U.K. results in issues from within and outside the Muslim community often ignored. On issues where there is an intersection, such as stop and search, the output is not specifically aimed at the African/African Caribbean community, despite this community being proportionally more targeted than any other ethnic group. The MCB’s press release on stop and search, entitled "MET’s Police Stop and Search Used Unfairly against Muslims" states that: "Metropolitan Police Service Stop and Search Practice' reveals a
huge 41% rise in the number of Asians who were stopped by the police in the year 2000/2001 to 2001/2002” (MCB, 2004). Sacranie argued that: “Just as an entire generation of young black people were alienated through Stop and Search practice, we are deeply worried that the same thing could occur again, this time to young Muslim men” (MCB, 2004). This press release again reinforces the synonym of South Asian with Muslim, with young black people being positioned as belonging to a separate community.

The Quilliam Foundation released only one press release on the African Caribbean Muslim community. This focused on Mohammed Ahmed, who the Quilliam Foundation referred to a British man of Somali origin, who placed under a terror order had “became the latest terror suspect to disappear, making a mockery of the U.K. security services, police and judiciary” (Wallis Simpson, 2013). The press release reproduces an article from the Telegraph. ‘The Muslim terrorist, his burka disguise and a compensation bid’, which feature commentary from Quilliam’s Usama Hasan. Referencing the burkha disguise used by Ahmed, the article states, that the use of the burkha, “which lies at the epicentre of the civil liberty debate in this country — is emblematic of his apparent contempt for British tolerance” (Wallis Simpson, 2013). The article further discusses the mosque Ahmed attended An Noor, which it describes as preaches Salafism, and sits “in the shadow of the green dome of the local Acton Masjid Sufi mosque, a well-established place of worship on the adjacent road, which is run by moderate Pakistanis” (Wallis Simpson, 2013). The article ends by saying: “There are between 40 and 60 British citizens engaged in terror activities in Somalia ... which is a disproportionately high number compared to other European countries. In some cases, U.K. Somalis are motivated by the desire to fight only in Somalia and protect their homeland against foreign invaders” (Wallis Simpson, 2013). This article sets the Ahmed and the British Somali community up as not only the radical other but within the prism of the British Muslim community also sets them up as an ‘other’ in contradistinction to a moderate Pakistani community.
9.3.3 New Migrant Communities

The latter period of this thesis saw the arrival of new migrant communities in the U.K. as a result of crises in countries such as Syria and Libya. These new migrant communities faced a double securitisation. Firstly, these new communities were often ghettoised, and also lacked the protection of the law. A distinction is made by the law, with those with citizenship and those with a right to stay. In addition to the construct of Britishness, these new Muslim communities were not classed as British, either legally or through constructs of Muslim identity put forward by the organisations. Secondly, these newly arrived refugee communities were unable to build on a shared sense of identity with which they could relate to a historical construct of Britishness in the way in which the MCB and HBT have done so. For these new refugee communities, the spatial element of a fixed sense of ontological security is missing, as their ‘home’ communities now lack security, as with the case of Syrian Muslims escaping ISIS and they face further marginalisation as refugees.

If we further view this within the context of the multiple British identities created by our three organisations, these new communities were ignored in the public discourse of the three organisations, with no press release in this period explicitly referring to the issues that these refugee communities faced. While the MCB have amongst their affiliate list organisations which refer to the needs of separate ethnic communities in addition to aid organisations, their national discourse in this period does not refer to an increase in refugees from the Middle East. It discourse fails to address any socio-economic needs that the newly arrived community might have had. A paper by Qasimyeh and Qasimyeh, which looks at Muslim Asylum seekers in the U.K., analyses the home office data on asylum seekers up to 2009, revealing that refugees from MENA countries, including Libya and Syria had made for 35% of the applications (Qasimyeh & Qasimyeh, 2010). The paper references racism towards Muslim refugees and states that the refugees who had participated in their study discussed “an extra dimension of religious tension and marginalisation ... in relation to the interaction between Muslim British citizens and Muslim refugees/asylum seekers” (Qasimyeh & Qasimyeh, 2010, p. 304).
Within the context of the mosques, the Friday khutbah, which we have seen has been used as a tool of communication by both the MCB and HBT, is often in Urdu, Punjabi or Turkish in MENA orientated mosques. Therefore, the communities are further marginalised through language. Qasmiyeh and Qasmiyeh quote an Arab refugee who discusses the “rupture that exists between the Asian Muslim community and the more recently arrived Middle Eastern community, a distance he claimed is epitomised in the different masjids frequented by these groups” (Qasimyeh & Qasimyeh, 2010, p. 304). These prevent them from having access to shared spaces and a sense of community. These groups, therefore, face a double securitisation, firstly through the state, and secondly through the values and identities constructed by our three organisations, which marginalise these new communities through the silences in their output preventing them from being able to create a new ontological security.

9.4 Conclusion

This chapter has built on the relationship between the securitisation process and public discourse of the three organisations identified in the previous chapters to examine how the double securitisation of British Muslims has occurred. This chapter then explored how these processes impacted the groups’ identities through their relationship to government as an ‘in’ or ‘out’-group and constructions of the ‘other’. Within this section, we further saw how the groups constructed their identities in relation to British Values. By developing the post-Copenhagen model used by Croft as a framework, a set of values were identified, which showed how the groups reconstituted their Muslim identity in relation to the securitisation process as part of the double securitisation. These values were based on the individual organisation’s relationship with schools of Islamic thought. As all the Islamic schools of thoughts, the organisations identified reflected the Sunni majority, it was in their relationships with the conservative schools of thought, that organisations built their identity either in support or opposition to the ideology. Further values identified were acts of resistance against securitisation, the organisation’s historical relationship with Britishness
and its broader political discourse. These values, as with British values, were constructed on the creation of an ‘other’. Each group ‘othered’ a group such as the MCB and the Sufi Council in relation to the values identified. While each of these groups put forward a different notion of Muslim identity, these were all still reflective of a Sunni orthodox position. Consideration was further given to the role the audience now played in the double-securitisation model and the way these were mobilised to support each organisation’s positioning. Thus, this chapter attempted to show how these groups created a double securitisation for some Muslim groups. These minority communities were firstly securitised by the government and secondly, through the creation of a hierarchal other, through the assertion of a South Asian Sunni model of Islam and, through the silences of the organisation’s outputs.
Chapter 10. Conclusion

This thesis started with the research question: Is there a mutually constitutive relationship between the insecuritization of British Muslims and Muslim identity? To this end, this conclusion will begin with the research questions that were identified in the introduction. These were:

1. How have the changes in the UK government policy affected the public discourse of these groups?
2. To what extent is the public discourse of these groups affected by their status as a minority group?
3. How does the emergence of a discourse of British values in this period impact group identity?
4. Does the rise of a Muslim consciousness reinforce a Sunni orthodoxy?

The thesis began with an analysis of the public discourse of the three organisations that were the focus of this thesis: The Muslim Council of Britain, the Quilliam Foundation and Hizb-ut-Tahrir. Applying the conceptual framework, the Post Copenhagen model set out by Stuart Croft, outlined in Chapter five, allowed an analysis of the organisation’s public discourse using the lens of securitisation. This conclusion will first review the overall findings of this thesis. Second, it will review the empirical chapters, and finally, it will identify areas that this study could be extended to in the future.

10.1 Key Findings

The discursive strategy of the three organisations was analysed in five broad areas. These were: The War on Terror, Foreign Affairs, Islamophobia, Religious Engagement and Public Engagement. The main area of focus for all three organisations was the War on Terror with an emphasis on two areas; new legislation introduced post-July 7th, the impact of this on the Muslim community in the UK. These reflected the tensions which had emerged following the July 7th bombings, how to protect citizens from security concerns while also encouraging an increase in community
cohesion. The tone for policy changes and subsequent insecuritisation of British Muslim communities were set out by Tony Blair in a series of speeches after the July 7th bombings. These speeches set up British Muslim communities as separate radical/oriental other and placed emphasis on universal values. Debates surrounding Britishness and values predate the period of this thesis. This was evidenced in the different definitions offered by Norman Tebbit and Gordon Brown, which were reviewed as part of chapter 5. The spatial and temporal nature of these values allowed an analysis of the securitisation process, both through constructs of Britishness and how these were reproduced within the microcosm of British Muslim communities.

The discursive strategies of the three organisations focused on two areas, the legislative impacts of the war on terror, and how securitisation processes were reproduced in the media. Of the three organisation's it was Hizb-ut-Tahrir who was furthermore impacted by this process as Tony Blair’s government sought to proscribe them. They were further subjected to negative media coverage. While the Quilliam Foundation stopped short of calling for a ban, they were cast as an Islamist group who followed a conservative model of Islam. This is also indicative of how the good Muslim/bad Muslim paradigm that had emerged which sought to favour those schools of thoughts/organisations whose values were seen to align with British values. For the Muslim Council of Britain, the discourse was also concerned with the 'every day', and its public output saw the organisation attempt to advocate for Islamic beliefs on issues such as civil marriage. Though the MCB access to the government had waned following its opposition of the Iraq war, as the largest Muslim umbrella organisation, it was still perceived by academics and the media to be the voice of British Muslims.

The ability to successfully engage in political discourse in this period was impacted by the relationship each organisation had with the state. This relationship affected both the group's discourse and its ability to set the tone for conversations around British Muslim communities. For the Quilliam Foundation, the recipients of government funding, and who were praised by the ministers in the Houses of Parliament, the relationship gave them the ability to shape the national
discourse. In this period, they called not only for a reform in Islam which would be more compatible with British values but also contributed to speeches such as David Cameron's 'End of multiculturalism speech' in Munich in 2011. Of the three organisations, it is arguably the Quilliam Foundation who can be seen as an elite within both the broader political discourse and the prism of British Muslim communities. This dual role allowed them to influence exogenous and endogenous conversations in defining British Muslim identity. While they condemned blanket legislation, which would impact all Muslims, their framing of organisations as Islamist, contributed to these organisations being cast as the radical other. This relationship between Islamist ideology and radical Islam was explored in the literature review. How the organisation's constructed their identity in contradistinction to their differing relationship with the securitisation process was indicative of the mutually constitutive relationship between the insecuritisation of British Muslims and Muslim identity as the groups sought to either co-opt or resist the securitisation processes.

This thesis then turned its attention to how organisations created a double securitisation within the prism of British Muslim communities. Using Croft's conceptual framework, we can see the way these organisations have reproduced the securitisation process, which was reliant not on a radical, but hierarchal other. By positioning the organisations as elites within British Muslim communities, we can see how they construct 'British Muslim' values. These are based on Sunni orthodoxy but also an identity which is dependent on each organisation's relationship with the state. Though this approach allows us to view the different discourses that make up British communities, it also reveals that these discourses uphold the Sunni orthodoxy. It is within the silences of the organisation's output we were able to see how a double securitisation occurred. Those public outputs from the three groups which centred on religion focused on Sunni schools of thought, from the Deobandi's to Sufism.

Furthermore, where race was a factor, such as the proposed increase in Stop and Search after the July 7th bombings, focus remained on the dominant South Asian community. In this way, the
organisations recreated a discourse which used South Asian Muslims as a synonym for British Muslims. Absent in the discourse was a focus on new migrant communities, Shia Muslims, women and Muslims of African descent. This thesis, therefore, argued that these communities are subject to a double securitisation, firstly through the more extensive securitisation process, and then from within the communities themselves. The proceeding sections will outline the individual chapters.

10.2 Creating a Suspect Community

The first empirical chapter sought to understand the historical context of the political environment, which provided the timeline for this thesis. This began through examining the conceptual framework of this thesis, Croft’s Post Copenhagen model. The Post Copenhagen framework moved away from a focus on speech acts alone and allowed for the use of a variety of texts and images. The extension of the securitising actor, to include a broader elite which included the media and NGO's would also lay down the foundations for the double securitisation this thesis explores. Croft’s definition further allows for the use of the media to help re-enact the securitisation process through everyday performances. It then examined the insecuritisation of the British Muslim community and discussed how two biographical markers had been set against one another, 'British' and Muslim. The focus here was how narratives of the other were reproduced through both factual media and drama series such as 24 with Muslim protagonists.

The construct of Britishness in relation to Islam as the other is one of the critical themes of this thesis. Tracing the securitisation process back to colonial Britain and its relationship with its Muslim subjects provided a historical context to the conditions leading up the present model of securitisation. This period also provided the foundations for many of the issues examined within the timeline of this thesis. This becomes particularly important when exploring the intersection between securitisation and Islamophobia, whose roots Kundnani argues lie in the construct of Islam of the other. The relationship between the Empire and the UK would continue with the
creation of the Commonwealth. The UK's reliance on these countries to fill labour demand following the Second World War and how it affected patterns of migration, in particular from Pakistan, provided us with an understanding of how the current dominant model of Sunni Islam in the UK emerged. Thus, while this thesis followed Nasar Meer's assertion that a new Muslim consciousness had developed which reflected a global ummah, this chapter argued that the foundations for this being seen as global Sunni ummah had been set within this period.

The next sections examined the changing discourses around Muslims, which focused firstly to race, secondly to multiculturalism and then finally to the War on Terror. The evolving discourse traced the mutually constitutive relationship between Muslim identity and securitisation. Though multiculturalism was seen as an attempt to create a new imagined community, one which accommodated different beliefs and culture, this also led to a new racism emerge. The discourse again changed with the September 11th terror attacks, the aftermath in which saw the advent of a new securitisation process. Finally, this chapter brings us to the period in which Croft argues that the insecuritization of British Muslims occurred, post-July 7th, focusing on Tony Blair's speech which the Muslim community were separated from the 'In group' and the Muslim community was cast as the radical/oriental other.

10.3 MCB

Chapter 4, 'We never claimed to speak for everyone', examined the discourse of the largest of our three organisations, the MCB. The MCB was born out of the first political Muslim movements, which had emerged in reaction to the publication of The Satanic Verses, as the government sought one Muslim voice to talk to.' The period ran parallel to the shift in the discourse surrounding the Muslim community in the UK from race to religion. Its changing relationship with the government can be viewed as indicative of the relationship between the state and its Muslim communities, following the September 11th terror attacks and subsequent military campaigns. This period also saw a new securitisation process begin to impact the British Muslim community with the
introduction of legislation such as the Terrorism Act 2000. The MCB’s opposition to parts of the new legislation such as the pre-detention charge would set the tone for its discursive strategy following the July 7th London bombings. The MCB then began 2005 as the largest Muslim organisation in the UK with over 500 affiliate organisations and positioned itself as advocating for a British Muslim community which were subject to an increased securitisation process. They thus presented their output in this period within a secular framework which was designed to draw on shared British values. Within this framework, they challenged some of the securitising legislation and behaviours that had emerged. Three major themes can be identified within this period: The legitimacy of UK’s actions in Guantanamo Bay, the proposed extension to the pre-detention charge period and the introduction of Prevent. They challenged these using the language of the law, and values of human rights and democracy in addition to the impact that this would have on the British Muslim community. On Prevent we see the MCB perform acts of resistance as it sought to combat the securitisation process. They viewed Prevent as an attempt to turn Muslims in the UK into a 'suspicious community' and accused the government of trying to engineer a moderate form of Islam.

They further challenged the reproduction of these securitising narratives via both popular culture and factual media which portrayed the British Muslim community as a radical other. Here the MCB’s resisted this narrative through press releases which rebutted the portrayal of Muslims in the media as terrorists, challenging episodes of 24 and Dispatches programmes. They argued these narratives would feed into anti-Muslim discourse. The MCB’s discourse on Islamophobia focused on both the domestic and the international. Part of this focused on acts of Islamophobia which occurred during the War on Terror, such as the use of replica mosques by the army during target practice. While the MCB does not set out to prove a causal relationship between the war on terror and Islamophobia, there is an underlying inference in their discourse that a pattern of correlation can be established. Within the UK, the MCB further sought to work with organisations such as the TUC to combat discrimination against the British Muslim community. Here again, the MCB built their discourse on the idea of shared values and sought to work with an ‘elite’ group to
resist what they saw as manifestations of how Islam was being constructed as the other, in contradistinction to British values. The MCB’s discourse emphasised that British Muslims, were, active contributing members of the British community, with campaigns focused on increasing voter turnout amongst British Muslims and highlighting the contribution Islamic financial systems such as Sukuk, could have on the British economy. While the MCB sought to resist the securitisation process in this period through acts of resistance, it also tried to use the biographical markers and shared values to create a new basis for ontological security.

10.4 The Quilliam Foundation

The Quilliam Foundation specifically sets itself out as a counter-extremism think tank which aims to promote pluralism. The Foundation argues that combatting Islamism, the ideology behind radical groups was key to challenging counter extremism. This then underpins much of its public discourse, particularly in output pertaining to the war on terror. The Quilliam Foundations emphasis on Islamism can be seen through its pamphlet series, which sets out the link between Islamic schools of thoughts such as Wahhabism and jihadi movements. As with Kepel, they emphasise the influence of thinker such as Sayyad Qutb. They further link the ideology primarily to the Saudi region and the influence that this has on imams both from Saudi and South Asia and the way this is used in British Muslim society. Within this, we see an example of a focus on the Sunni orthodox community in the UK, and there is little focus on Shia Islamist movements.

The War on Terror is the principal area of focus in this period. As with the MCB, the Quilliam Foundation emphasises two main areas, the legislation introduced in this period and Prevent. The Quilliam Foundation output stresses that the majority of British Muslims are peaceful. Within this period, they challenge any media narrative, which they believe conflates the British Muslim community with Islamists movements. However, when we apply our conceptual framework to the organisation’s discursive strategy, it shows how the Quilliam Foundation reproduces the
securitising narratives of the government by emphasising the need for the Muslim community to integrate into the broader society.

Here we see the Quilliam Foundation reflect the dual narrative of CONTEST, seeking to both combat violent extremism and promote community cohesion. The chapter outlined synergies with the Foundations output and the Prevent strategy with the focus on radicalisation in the prison system and on universities. The output in this area reproduces the overarching securitisation process outlined in Chapter 5. The Quilliam Foundation engages with the broader political process not only as a member of the Muslim community but also as part of the broader political elite. Here, through a focus on the Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslim community, they further perpetuate the South Asian/ British Muslim synonym. An example of this was seen in the Quilliam Foundation chapter, 'Hiding in Plain Sight', where they focused on the South Asian community's interaction with Westminster politics. The Foundation called for an end to the bloc voting which relied on community leaders and institutions to act as gatekeepers to the Muslim vote and therefore more susceptible to Islamist’ infiltration'.

Within the Quilliam Foundations discursive strategy, we see not only the co-opting of the securitisation process, but the framework of the double securitisation emerges. For the Quilliam Foundation, the double securitisation has two strands. The focus on the South Asian community further recreates a hierarchal other. Secondly, through their framing of Islamist behaviour, they portray some Muslim organisations as a radical other. This co-opting of the securitisation process can be seen in their work in Pakistan. Through the launch of their sister organisation, Khudi, they sought to combat Islamist ideology and jihadist networks in Pakistan through initiatives which reflected British government policy. As with the UK government, in Pakistan, the organisation sought to support different models of Islam which were seen as moderate. Its promotion of the Sufi band Junoon echoes the UK government’s creation of the National Sufi Council after the July 7th London bombings. In both their work in the UK and abroad, the public discourse of the
Quilliam Foundation focused on the need to combat Islamism through governmental policy and their engagement with broader Muslim communities.

10.5 Hizb-ut-Tahrir

Hizb-ut-Tahrir is part of a transnational organisation which has been present in the UK since the 1980s. The proposed ban would see the organisation delete all press releases pre-July 7th. Through the work of authors such as Philp Lewis who analysed the organisation before the July 7th London bombings, this chapter was able to analyse the changing nature of this discourse via secondary accounts of former members, such as Shiraz Maher. Reflecting the overall transnational movement, the organisation's principal focus is on the restoration of a Caliphate system within a Muslim country. None of the available press releases in this period call for a Caliphate state in the UK. The emphasis on the Caliphate system underpins their discursive strategy in the period.

The return to a caliphate system also influences the group’s ontological security as they build their values on a system which they set out is an alternative to a secular liberal state. The organisation thus, calls for a political system based on conservative interpretations of Islam. For HBT, constructs of Britishness and the imposition of secular ideals were extensions of a colonial project which informs much of their discourse on the war on terror.

The proposed ban on the organisation would further influence HBT discursive strategy relating to the legislation and securitisation that occurred following the July 7th London bombings. In this, they firstly co-opted other Muslim organisations and secondly as the MCB had framed their discourse around the British values. They argued that their proposed proscription was in opposition to the values of free speech and tolerance. They further used this to also construct their group's identity by framing the government’s securitisation process as an attack on Islam and constructed their identity on this act of resistance.
In creating new ontological security based on a literalist Sunni model, HBT would also create a double securitisation. This was based on hierarchical other based on Muslims that it argued were working with colonial powers, i.e. British government and those who do not follow the HBT version of the Caliphate model. This double securitisation underpins the discursive strategy in the international war on terror category, which they framed as a new colonial war. It is within this category that we can view HBT as part of a transnational movement, which focuses on the role of HBT within those countries. In its discourse on Pakistan, the organisation focused not only on the war on terror but on internal events in Pakistan such as the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. HBT further argues that the war on terror is a war on Islam and that it conflated all Muslims with radical Islamists. Here again, we see the discourse emerge which 'others' regimes as being part of a new colonial project. The chapter on HBT highlighted press releases which referred to the then President Pervez Musharraf as a 'puppet' of Bush and Blair.

Though HBT is an overtly religious organisation, the category of religious engagement formed the smallest categories within this chapter. Here, in addition to the promotion of the Caliphate state, they focused on the right of women to wear Islamic head coverings and the securitisation of Muslim women. Their resistance to this securitisation is indicative of how the organisation was able to create a new ontological identity based on its resistance to securitisation.

10.6 Colonial Hangover

This final chapter sought to bring together both the conceptual framework used to examine the securitisation process and the discursive strategies of the three organisations, to explore how the groups had created a double securitisation for some minority communities. Though the previous chapters had set out how the securitisation process had influenced the discursive strategy of the organisations, this chapter analysed the impact that this had on the group's identity. The securitisation process was again analysed through speeches by Tony Blair and Ruth Kelly. These speeches further impacted the group identities as they were framed as either an in-group (Quilliam), out-group (MCB) or the radical other (HBT). The chapter highlighted how the groups
constructed their identities in relation to this. This was done firstly by analysing the mutually constitutive relationship between Muslim identity and the securitisation process. The chapter further examined how this had impacted on the group’s relationships with one another.

Secondly, this chapter used the post-Copenhagen model as a framework to identify a new set of values, which underpinned each organisations construct of British Muslim identity, identity in relation to the securitisation process. These values incorporated different interpretations of Islam and the organisation’s relationship with the different schools of thought. The common thread in these interpretations was Sunni orthodoxy as organisations built their identity either in support of, or opposition to, conservative Islam. The additional values on which the organisation built their identity were: acts of resistance against securitisation, the organisation’s historical relationship with Britishness and finally the organisation’s political discourse. As Croft highlighted with British values, these were constructed on the creation of an ‘other’. While each of these groups put forward a different notion of Muslim identity, these were all still reflective of a Sunni orthodox position. This section gave further consideration to the role that the audience now played in this double securitisation. Thus, this chapter attempted to show how these groups created a double securitisation for some Muslim groups. These groups were firstly securitised by the government and then secondly through the creation of a hierachal other. These firstly recreated the Sunni orthodoxy which marginalised the Shia community, and secondly through the silences in the organisation’s outputs which ignored minority Muslim groups and sects. The chapter focused on three groups in addition to the Shia community: Women, New Migrant communities and African Caribbean Muslims. The public discourse relating to these groups consisted of only 49 of 1355 press releases at less than 3% of the total.

10.7 Future Areas of Study

Due to the limited scope of this thesis, this study has focused on two sets of elite groups, the government and the organisations. It is within the silences that were identified in the final chapter, the minorities within the minority that this study would hope to extend to. Ontological
security is an evolving field; this study could build on its focus on insecuritisation through a more
detailed study that the role of silences (which are more usually seen as part of a desecuritising
strategy) play in securitisation processes among subaltern communities. These communities
have been largely ignored by both the broader political discourse and the growing literature
surrounding the British Muslim community. A further focus is also warranted on the role of the
public intellectual, with academics like Anthony Glees and Jordan Peterson all looking to influence
the discourse around British Muslims. The influence that public intellectuals have on policy and
recreating narratives has not received attention. Similarly, the role they play in the resistance of
securitisation also warrants attention. The link between the securitisation process and acts of
violent Islamophobia is a field that this thesis believes warrants attention. Croft’s use of post-
Copenhagen model broadens the definition of the elite, and further emphasis should be placed on
the impacts of who the elites are and their role constructing a Muslim ‘other’ in this vein
Bibliography


Dodd, V. (2010, August 4th). *List sent to terror chief aligns peaceful Muslim groups with terrorist ideology*. Retrieved November 25th, 2018, from The Guardian: List sent to terror chief aligns peaceful Muslim groups with terrorist ideology


Harris, Z. c. i. P. B., 2012. s.l.:s.n.


MCB. (2010g, April 9th). British Muslim religious leaders urge community to vote on 6th May. Retrieved August 15th, 2010, from Muslim Council of Britain: http://www.mcb.org.uk/british-muslim-religious-leaders-urge-community-to-vote-on-6-may/


https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/prison-is-turning-angry-young-men-into-fanatics-j2vnt6bcgtv

Nawaz, M. (2012, September 20th). *Prophet Film Protests: where are the moderate voices?* Retrieved February 14th, 2018, from Channel 4 news:

Neather, A. (2013, October 10th). *The odd couple: has an ex-Islamist turned former EDL leader Tommy Robinson.* Retrieved February 13th, 2018, from Evening Standard:

Neumann, P. R. (2010). *Prisons and Terrorism, Radicalisation and De-radicalisation in 15 countries.* ICSR.


Quilliam Admin. ND. *About us.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.quilliaminternational.com/about/
[Accessed 15 September 2014].

Quilliam Admin. (2008a, August 13th). *Quilliam Foundation reaction to de Mendez inquest.* Retrieved October 13th, 2014, from Quilliam Foundation:


