Eloranta, Jari (2004) Warfare and welfare? Understanding 19th and 20th century Central Government spending. Working Paper. University of Warwick, Department of Economics, Coventry.

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Abstract

This paper evaluates theories aiming to explain the size and growth of government spending, develops a framework inclusive of the so-called guns vs. butter tradeoff effect, and offers insights especially for the period 1870-1938. There were differences between the excessive and responsive government explanations, and between the long-run and short-run explanations, as well as cross-section and time series approaches. Here central government spending, conditioned by the regime characteristics, is proposed to be analyzed on the basis of the demand characteristics of military spending and social spending, their interaction, public debt constraints, as well as institutional constraints and other environmental variables.

Item Type:	Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Expenditures, Public -- History -- 19th century, Expenditures, Public -- History -- 20th century, Government spending policy, Welfare economics, Armed Forces -- Appropriations and expenditures
Series Name:	Warwick economic research papers
Publisher:	University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Place of Publication:	Coventry
Date:	2004
Number:	No.699
Number of Pages:	34
Status:	Not Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access
Funder:	Fifth Framework Programme (European Commission) (FP5)
Grant number:	HPMF-CT-2002-01979 (FFP)
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URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/1489

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