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Essays on information economics
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Pant, Ayush (2019) Essays on information economics. PhD thesis, University of Warwick.
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Official URL: http://webcat.warwick.ac.uk/record=b3492692~S15
Abstract
This thesis consists of three essays on information economics. It broadly deals with understanding how and why can players be motivated to research. Researching helps us to achieve better outcomes and make better decisions by seeking better ideas and information. While this is a relevant question for organizations seeking to innovate, it is also applicable for societies in general in the current times. Chapter One deals with supervisor-agent relationships in organizations where supervisors give feedback to their employees on the ideas that they generate. Best implementation requires the supervisor to shoot down more mediocre ideas honestly. However, this potentially discourages the agent. The paper shows that supervisors are only honest with agents who have a high belief in their ability to succeed. Overconfidence is, therefore, potentially welfare improving. Chapter Two studies the effect of increased competition in the modern digital environment on the quality of reporting by media outlets. Two opposing forces determine how media outlets resolve the competing demands for speed vs. accuracy – preemption and reputation. The paper shows that more competitive environments may be more conducive to reputation building. Therefore, it is possible to have better reporting in a more competitive world. Finally, in Chapter Three, I return to the question of innovation in organizations. This paper solves for the optimal delegation mechanism that grants an agent the authority to take time off from his current task to pursue creative endeavors. Driven by a high intrinsic motivation, the agent would like to take time off for any idea. The principal, on the other hand, would like the agent only to pursue ideas that have a high potential to succeed. In the optimal mechanism, the principal is inefficiently harsh on the agent who gets time off. Creativity, therefore, only receives a limited opportunity.
Item Type: | Thesis (PhD) | ||||
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Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory | ||||
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): | Information theory in economics, Knowledge economy, Feedback (Psychology), Reporters and reporting, Reputation, Organizational change | ||||
Official Date: | September 2019 | ||||
Dates: |
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Institution: | University of Warwick | ||||
Theses Department: | Department of Economics | ||||
Thesis Type: | PhD | ||||
Publication Status: | Unpublished | ||||
Supervisor(s)/Advisor: | Perry, Motty ; Akerlof, Robert J. | ||||
Format of File: | |||||
Extent: | vii, 131, 4 leaves : charts | ||||
Language: | eng |
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