Scoring rule voting games and dominance solvability
Buenrostro, Lucia and Dhillon, Amrita (2003) Scoring rule voting games and dominance solvability. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. Warwick economic research papers (No.698).
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This paper studies the dominance-solvability (by iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies) of general scoring rule voting games. The scoring rules we study include Plurality rule, Approval voting, Negative Plurality Rule, Borda rule and Relative Utilitarianism. We provide a classification of scoring rule voting games according to whether the sufficient conditions for dominance solvability require sufficient agreement on the best alternative or on the worst alternative. We also characterise the solutions when the sufficient conditions for dominance solvability are satisfied.
|Item Type:||Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Q Science > QA Mathematics
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Voting research, Elections -- Mathematical models, Solvable groups, Iterative methods (Mathematics), Game theory|
|Series Name:||Warwick economic research papers|
|Publisher:||University of Warwick, Department of Economics|
|Place of Publication:||Coventry|
|Official Date:||December 2003|
|Number of Pages:||36|
|Status:||Not Peer Reviewed|
|Access rights to Published version:||Open Access|
 Dhillon, A. and Lockwood, B., When are Plurality Rule Voting Games Dominance-Solvable?, forthcoming, Games and Economic Behaviour.
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