Buenrostro, Lucia and Dhillon, Amrita (2003) Scoring rule voting games and dominance solvability. Working Paper. University of Warwick, Department of Economics, Coventry.

Preview

PDF WRAP_Buenrostro_twerp698b.pdf - Requires a PDF viewer such as GSview, Xpdf or Adobe Acrobat Reader Download (300Kb)

Abstract

This paper studies the dominance-solvability (by iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies) of general scoring rule voting games. The scoring rules we study include Plurality rule, Approval voting, Negative Plurality Rule, Borda rule and Relative Utilitarianism. We provide a classification of scoring rule voting games according to whether the sufficient conditions for dominance solvability require sufficient agreement on the best alternative or on the worst alternative. We also characterise the solutions when the sufficient conditions for dominance solvability are satisfied.

Item Type:	Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory Q Science > QA Mathematics
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Voting research, Elections -- Mathematical models, Solvable groups, Iterative methods (Mathematics), Game theory
Series Name:	Warwick economic research papers
Publisher:	University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Place of Publication:	Coventry
Date:	December 2003
Number:	No.698
Number of Pages:	36
Status:	Not Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access
References:	[1] Dhillon, A. and Lockwood, B., When are Plurality Rule Voting Games Dominance-Solvable?, forthcoming, Games and Economic Behaviour. [2] Dhillon, A. and J.F.Mertens, Relative Utilitarianism, Econometrica, Vol. 67, No.3, 1999. [3] Brams, Steven J. and M.Remzvi Sanver, Voter Sovereignty and Election Outcomes, NYU Working Paper, 2003. [4] Farquharson, R., Theory of Voting, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969. [5] Gilli, M., Iterated Admissibility as Solution Concept in Game Theory, Working Paper, Department of Economics, University of Milan{Bicocca, 2002. [6] Ho, T. Camerer, C. and Weigelt, K., Iterated Dominance and Iterated Best Response in Experimental \p{Beauty Contests", The American Economic Review 88 (1998), 947{969. [7] Marx, L., Adaptive Learning and IteratedWeak Dominance, Games and Economic Behavior 26 (1999), 253{278. [8] Marx, L. and Swinkels, J., Order Independence for Iterated Weak Dominance, Games and Economic Behavior 18 (1997), 219{245. [9] Moulin, H., The Strategy of Social Choice, North Holland, 1983. [10] Myerson, R., Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games, Journal of Economic Theory 103 (2002), 219{251. [11] Myerson, R. and Weber,R., A Theory of Voting Equilibria, American Political Science Review 87 (1993), 102{114.
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/1490

Request changes to a record

Actions (login required)

View Item