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Blockholder disclosure thresholds and hedge fund activism

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Ordonez-Calafi, Guillem and Bernhardt, Dan (2022) Blockholder disclosure thresholds and hedge fund activism. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 57 (7). pp. 2834-2859. doi:10.1017/S0022109022000059 ISSN 0022-1090.

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Official URL: http://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109022000059

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Abstract

Blockholder disclosure thresholds shape incentives for hedge fund activism, which are jointly determined with real investment and managerial behavior. Uninformed investors value lower thresholds (greater transparency) when the cost of trading against an informed activist outweighs the benefits of the activist’s disciplining of management. Conversely, activists may desire disclosure thresholds if the threat of their participation discourages managerial malfeasance, which is their source of profits. Hedge fund activism can be excessive: If market opacity sufficiently harms uninformed investors, the costs of reduced real investment outweigh the social benefits from managerial disciplining, and society benefits from lower thresholds.

Item Type: Journal Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor
H Social Sciences > HG Finance
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Hedge funds , Stockholders , Stockholders' derivative actions , Stocks , Corporations -- Investor relations , Corporate governance
Journal or Publication Title: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISSN: 0022-1090
Official Date: November 2022
Dates:
DateEvent
November 2022Published
31 January 2022Available
3 March 2021Accepted
Volume: 57
Number: 7
Page Range: pp. 2834-2859
DOI: 10.1017/S0022109022000059
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Reuse Statement (publisher, data, author rights): This article has been accepted for publication in a revised form for publication in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis Link to Journal’s site on https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-financial-and-quantitative-analysis
Access rights to Published version: Restricted or Subscription Access
Date of first compliant deposit: 4 March 2021
Date of first compliant Open Access: 5 March 2021
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