Kovalenkov, Alexander and Wooders, Myrna Holtz (2003) Laws of scarcity for a finite game: exact bounds on estimations. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. (Warwick economic research papers.

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Abstract

A "Law of Scarcity" is that scarceness is rewarded. We demonstrate laws of scarcity for cores and aproximate cores of games. Furthermore, we show that equal treatment core payoff vectors satisfy a condition of cyclic monotonicity. Our results are developed for parameterized collections of games and exact bounds on the maximum possible deviation of approximate core payoff vectors from satisfying a law of scarcity are stated in terms of the parameters describing the games. We note that the parameters can, in principle, be estimated.

Item Type:	Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Subjects:	Q Science > QA Mathematics
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Functions of real variables, Game theory, Scarcity, Estimation theory, Demand functions (Economic theory)
Series Name:	Warwick economic research papers
Publisher:	University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Place of Publication:	Coventry
Date:	2003
Number:	No.691
Number of Pages:	17
Status:	Not Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access
Funder:	Economic and Social Research Council (Great Britain) (ESRC), IBM fund, Latané fund, University of North Carolina Research Council, Warwick Centre for Public Economics, Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC), Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona (UAdB)
Version or Related Resource:	Revised version of: Kovalenkov, A. and Wooders, M.H. (1999). A law of scarcity for games. [Coventry] : University of Warwick, Economics Department. (Warwick economic research papers, no.546).
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URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/1496

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