Decentralized job matching
Haeringer, Guillaume and Wooders, Myrna Holtz (2003) Decentralized job matching. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. Warwick economic research papers (No.688).
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This paper studies a decentralized job market model where firms (academic departments) propose sequentially a (unique) position to some workers (Ph.D. candidates). Successful candidates then decide whether to accept the offers, and departments whose positions remain unfilled propose to other candidates. We distinguish between several cases, depending on whether agents’ actions are simultaneous and/or irreversible (if a worker accepts an offer he is immediately matched, and both the worker and the firm to which she is matched go out of the market). For all these cases, we provide a complete characterization of the Nash equilibrium outcomes and the Subgame Perfect equilibria. While the set of Nash equilibria outcomes contain all individually rational matchings, it turns out that in most cases considered all subgame perfect equilibria yield a unique outcome, the worker-optimal matching.
|Item Type:||Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Statistical matching, Employees -- Recruiting, Equilibrium (Economics), Sampling (Statistics), Employability, Game theory|
|Series Name:||Warwick economic research papers|
|Publisher:||University of Warwick, Department of Economics|
|Place of Publication:||Coventry|
|Official Date:||6 October 2003|
|Number of Pages:||34|
|Status:||Not Peer Reviewed|
|Access rights to Published version:||Open Access|
|Funder:||Spain. Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología (MCT)|
|Grant number:||BEC2002- 02130 (MCT)|
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