Haeringer, Guillaume and Wooders, Myrna Holtz (2003) Decentralized job matching. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. (Warwick economic research papers.

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Abstract

This paper studies a decentralized job market model where firms (academic departments) propose sequentially a (unique) position to some workers (Ph.D. candidates). Successful candidates then decide whether to accept the offers, and departments whose positions remain unfilled propose to other candidates. We distinguish between several cases, depending on whether agents’ actions are simultaneous and/or irreversible (if a worker accepts an offer he is immediately matched, and both the worker and the firm to which she is matched go out of the market). For all these cases, we provide a complete characterization of the Nash equilibrium outcomes and the Subgame Perfect equilibria. While the set of Nash equilibria outcomes contain all individually rational matchings, it turns out that in most cases considered all subgame perfect equilibria yield a unique outcome, the worker-optimal matching.

Item Type:	Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Statistical matching, Employees -- Recruiting, Equilibrium (Economics), Sampling (Statistics), Employability, Game theory
Series Name:	Warwick economic research papers
Publisher:	University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Place of Publication:	Coventry
Date:	6 October 2003
Number:	No.688
Number of Pages:	34
Status:	Not Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access
Funder:	Spain. Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología (MCT)
Grant number:	BEC2002- 02130 (MCT)
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URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/1499

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