Conformity and bounded rationality in games with many players
Cartwright, Edward and Wooders, Myrna Holtz (2003) Conformity and bounded rationality in games with many players. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. Warwick economic research papers (No.687).
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Intepret a set of players all playing the same pure strategy and all with similar attributes as a society. Is it consistent with self interested behaviour for a population to organise itself into a relatively small number of societies? In a companion paper we characterized how large e must be, in terms of parameters describing individual games, for an equilibrium to exhibit conformity in pure strategies. In this paper we provide a wide class of games where such conformity is boundedly rational, that is, where e can be chosen to be small.
|Item Type:||Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Statistical decision, Games of strategy (Mathematics), Game theory, Strategy (Philosophy), Group theory|
|Series Name:||Warwick economic research papers|
|Publisher:||University of Warwick, Department of Economics|
|Place of Publication:||Coventry|
|Official Date:||20 October 2003|
|Number of Pages:||26|
|Status:||Not Peer Reviewed|
|Access rights to Published version:||Open Access|
 Cartwright, E.J. and M.H. Wooders (2003a) “Bounded rationality in arbitrary games with many players,” University of Warwick Department of Economics Working Paper no 672. On-line at http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/papers/twerp672-revised.pdf
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