UNSPECIFIED. (1998) Equilibrium structures in vertical oligopoly. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 37 (4). pp. 463-480. ISSN 0167-2681

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Abstract

The central purpose of this paper is to examine vertical integration as an equilibrium phenomenon. We model it as integration between Cournot oligopolists in bath the upstream and the downstream stages. We consider the issue of private profitability versus collective profitability and show that under several situations the equilibrium outcomes may result in a Prisoner's dilemma, The analysis is extended to consider equilibrium outcomes in a dynamic setting, where we find no integration to be a relatively common outcome. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
Journal or Publication Title:	JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION
Publisher:	ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
ISSN:	0167-2681
Date:	30 December 1998
Volume:	37
Number:	4
Number of Pages:	18
Page Range:	pp. 463-480
Publication Status:	Published
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/15020

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