Equilibrium structures in vertical oligopoly
UNSPECIFIED. (1998) Equilibrium structures in vertical oligopoly. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 37 (4). pp. 463-480. ISSN 0167-2681Full text not available from this repository.
The central purpose of this paper is to examine vertical integration as an equilibrium phenomenon. We model it as integration between Cournot oligopolists in bath the upstream and the downstream stages. We consider the issue of private profitability versus collective profitability and show that under several situations the equilibrium outcomes may result in a Prisoner's dilemma, The analysis is extended to consider equilibrium outcomes in a dynamic setting, where we find no integration to be a relatively common outcome. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions|
|Journal or Publication Title:||JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION|
|Publisher:||ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV|
|Date:||30 December 1998|
|Number of Pages:||18|
|Page Range:||pp. 463-480|
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