Nietzsche on the Social Whole and Unity

By

Jihun Jeong

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy

University of Warwick, Department of Philosophy

September 2019
Table of Contents

Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................................................. ii
Declaration .......................................................................................................................................................... iii
Abstract ............................................................................................................................................................ iv
Abbreviations .................................................................................................................................................. v
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................................... 1
Chapter 1: From the Individual to the Whole ................................................................................................. 6
Chapter 2: The Organic Whole and Rank Order ............................................................................................ 29
Chapter 3: Naturalisation and the Whole ....................................................................................................... 55
Chapter 4: Decadence ..................................................................................................................................... 77
Chapter 5: Culture and Society ..................................................................................................................... 109
Chapter 6: European Culture ......................................................................................................................... 134
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................................... 161
Bibliography ..................................................................................................................................................... 167
Acknowledgements

First of all, I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor Prof. Keith Ansell-Pearson for his support throughout my PhD years and for providing insightful feedback on my drafts, which helped me develop this thesis. I would also like to thank Prof. Stephen Houlgate, Prof. David James, and Prof. Miguel Beistegui, who served on my Graduate Progress Committee and provided useful comments. It was also helpful for me to discuss my draft with postgraduate colleagues working on Nietzsche at the Nietzsche seminar. I am thankful for the financial support that I received from the Korean Institute for International Education, without which I could not have started my study at Warwick, and from the University of Warwick, without which I could not have continued my research and completed this thesis. For the University’s award of a scholarship, Prof. Ken Gemes as well as Prof. Keith Ansell-Pearson provided me with the references, for which I am grateful. Finally, a great debt of gratitude is owed to my family, my parents and brother, for all their love and support. In particular I am deeply grateful to my wife, Eunyoung, for her love and encouragement, which kept me on course, and to my daughter, Youjin, for filling our days with a sated joy.
Declaration

This thesis is submitted to the University of Warwick for my application for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. This thesis is my own work and it has not been submitted for a degree at another university.
Abstract

This thesis aims to elucidate Nietzsche’s idea of the social whole and how it is formed and structured. It is argued that Nietzsche’s perception of a naturalised humanity and his idea of translating man back into nature are oriented towards society as a well-integrated whole, in which different types live actively in accordance with their nature or respective physiological constitution. Such accordance is the repeated theme in his philosophy, and Nietzsche’s envisioned whole is where such accordance is realised. This theme is also central to his concept of decadence. Decadence refers to the deviation from one’s natural instincts or what one is, and the loss of the self. At a social level, it refers to the absence of the whole. The basis of the formation of the whole is the affective interpretation of the world. The whole can be formed when the interpretation is stable, shared, and not fragmented, and this stability can give rise to cultural unity. This cultural unity requires the social foundation to support it. As Nietzsche is concerned about European culture, he concerns himself deeply with European political unity. A unified Europe is the setting in which Nietzsche expects his envisioned social whole to be established to allow European culture to blossom. However, in examining his idea of culture and unity, we come to recognise its Eurocentric nature, which leads a society to form problematic relations with the rest of the world.
Abbreviations

A = The Antichrist
BGE = Beyond Good and Evil
BT = The Birth of Tragedy
CW = The Case of Wagner
D = Daybreak / Dawn
EH = Ecce Homo
GM = On the Genealogy of Morality
GS = The Gay Science
GSt = ‘The Greek State’
HH = Human, All Too Human
HH II i = Mixed Opinions and Maxims
HH II ii = The Wanderer and His Shadow
KSA = Sämtliche Werke : Kritische Studienausgabe
KSB = Sämtliche Briefe : Kritische Studienausgabe
NW = Nietzsche contra Wagner
TI = Twilight of the Idols
TL = ‘On Truth and Lies in an Extra-Moral Sense’
UM = Untimely Meditations / Unfashionable Observations
UM I = ‘David Strauss, the Confessor and the Writer’
UM II = ‘On the Use and Disadvantage of History for Life’
UM III = ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’
UM IV = ‘Richard Wagner in Bayreuth’
Z = Thus Spoke Zarathustra

References to Nietzsche’s writings are to section and aphorism numbers. When KSA is cited, references provide the volume number followed by the fragment number (e.g. KSA 7: 8[9] refers to volume 7, fragment 8[9]); when KSB is cited, references provide the volume and letter number.

I cite Nietzsche’s works and Nachlass using and often revising the existing translations according to Nietzsche’s German text (KSA and KSB). Other translations of Nietzsche’s notes and letters are my own.
Introduction

This thesis aims to elucidate Nietzsche’s idea of the social whole and how it is formed and structured. I argue that Nietzsche’s perception of a naturalised humanity and his idea of ‘translating man back into nature’ (BGE 230) are oriented towards the social whole in which each type can be active in accordance with its respective physiological constitution. Furthermore, Nietzsche’s interest in the whole is connected with his aspiration to construct a new European culture. Thus, this thesis will also explore his preoccupation with a European unity, and its political implications.

In the fourth book of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, published in 1884, Zarathustra says ‘we do not want to enter the kingdom of heaven: […] we want the kingdom of earth’ (Z IV ‘Festival’ 2), and asks ‘Who shall be master of the earth?’ (Z IV ‘Sleepwalker’ 5). Nietzsche writes in a note that this question is ‘the refrain of my practical philosophy’ (KSA 11: 25[247]). Concerning this, he often remarks that we should breed new masters or rulers of the earth, struggling against Christianity which he considers sickens, damps, and ruins ‘the whole love of the earthly and of dominion over the earth’ (BGE 62).

These expressions easily bring to mind a form of dominion that only serves the power of the few; however, at the same time Nietzsche maintains that his idea of mastery over the earth is to breed humanity as a whole. In this regard, adducing Nietzsche’s expressions such as ‘Species’, ‘die Pflanze Mensch’, ‘der Typus Mensch’ etc., Siemens argues that Nietzsche’s programme is ‘maximally inclusive’, so not for an exclusive elite of a few select individuals but for ‘the species as a whole’.1 However, the claimed inclusivity of Nietzsche’s programme is by no means clear, and many scholars may even think that Nietzsche has no right to say ‘humanity as a whole’, given his aristocratism and emphasis on the higher type. It is undeniable that the higher type is important in his philosophy, but if we take Nietzsche’s words seriously, we also have to investigate how he can both eagerly anticipate the master of the earth and the order of rank, and expect to cultivate humanity as a whole at the same time.

One possible, and easy, solution to this problem is that the enhancement of humanity depends solely on the select few who represent the highest that humans can achieve. This

---

makes sense to some degree, since Nietzsche’s main focus seems to be on the excellent few. However, this cannot be the conclusive answer, not only because for Nietzsche one who is entitled to rule is not simply, as Appel argues, of ‘a self-absorbed master caste whose only concern is for the cultivation of its own excellence’ but one who ‘has the conscience for the overall development of humanity’ (BGE 61); but also because the achievements of the few cannot mean the same as ‘humanity as a whole’. There should therefore be a further explanation as to how Nietzsche can still make such remarks on the cultivation of humanity as a whole, given his call for masters of the earth and his sometimes disparaging comments on humanity.

The first two chapters deal with such problems that can be raised by the individualist reading of Nietzsche. Here, the individualist reading refers to the Nietzsche that is not interested in society or politics. There are two aspects of this reading. First, the prevalent view of what Nietzsche’s philosophy is oriented towards is the individual who seeks self-cultivation or self-mastery and escapes to solitude away from the miasma of society. In this context, Nietzsche’s criticism of society is understood to be the grounds for distancing himself from society. Second, it is understood that even when Nietzsche speaks of society and culture, the lives of the majority of people are of no concern to him and his only interest is in a few excellent and exceptional individuals. Therefore, if Nietzsche has any interest in society, as Rawls understands, this is to the end of arranging institutions ‘to maximize the achievement of human excellence in art, science, and culture’ and to make most people work ‘for the good of the highest specimens’.

My aim is not to deny that such aspects are present in Nietzsche’s thinking. It is evident that Nietzsche is concerned with self-cultivation, self-mastery, and the exceptional few who achieve human excellence. Rather, I argue that the idea of self-cultivation or mastery itself demands engagement with society, rather than simply breaking off relations with it; I further argue that Nietzsche envisions a social whole in which different types can be active and healthy together, even though his main interest is in the few.

Nietzsche’s emphasis on society and culture has been interpreted in some aspects. Young

---


has attempted to interpret Nietzsche’s philosophy in terms of ‘religious communitarianism’; scholars have focused on myth in regard to its role in giving unity to culture, particularly expressed in the early Nietzsche; and Nietzsche’s ideal of wholeness is claimed to be found in his pursuit of cultural integration. Scholars tend to focus on Nietzsche’s work in the early period, i.e. The Birth of Tragedy and Untimely Meditations, to demonstrate that culture and its unity are Nietzsche’s central concern. However, in Chapter 1 I begin by discussing how the idea of self-cultivation or mastery itself is required to engage in mastery over others and the whole. The reason for taking this as the starting point is to respond to doubts raised by the reading that focuses on the individualist tendency expressed in Nietzsche’s philosophy, especially from his middle period writings onwards. In this way, I look into the logic behind the connection between Nietzsche’s individualist tendency and his engagement with the whole. This connection is mainly concerned with the few; therefore, the tension between Nietzsche’s focus on the few and the lives of the many still remains. To solve this tension I introduce the physiological view of natural order.

In Chapter 2, I look further into the development of Nietzsche’s concept of physiological rank order, in which different types can be active and healthy together by living in accordance with their nature or physiological constitutions. I argue that from this physiological perspective, Nietzsche’s seemingly contradictory remarks about the few and humanity can be understood in a more coherent way. I show that Nietzsche’s ultimate concern is the demand to become what one is or live in accordance with the (true) self, and this demand is what drives the development of his concept of the whole. In other words, the whole that Nietzsche envisions is where the ideal of such accordance is realised. We can repeatedly recognise this ideal as the leitmotif of Nietzsche’s naturalisation project throughout the thesis.

Chapter 3 explores the basis of the formation of the whole, or the basis that allows individuals to be incorporated into the social order, and demonstrates how the individual and

---


7 Here the self basically indicates what one is, according to one’s physiological make-up, meaning ‘the structure of his soul’ that is expressed in ‘what groups of sensations within a soul awaken most quickly, speak up and give the command’ (BGE 268).
the whole are intertwined. As nature is understood in terms of will to power, I examine the social character in the concept of will to power, paying particular attention to Nietzsche’s idea of affect. Here we understand that society is important for Nietzsche because the organisation of our drives is influenced by social circumstances, or by the individual’s interaction with the affective network. Human beings form an affective network that generates an affective interpretation of the world. The whole can be formed when this interpretation is stable, shared, and not fragmented, and this stability can give rise to cultural unity.

Nietzsche envisions a society that promotes a healthy life, and ‘decadence’ is representative of the opposite of a healthy life. Thus, in Chapter 4, I analyse Nietzsche’s concept of decadence, which has often been mentioned in Nietzsche studies and thus feels familiar, but in fact has not been thoroughly analysed. Decadence refers to the deviation from one’s natural instincts or what one is, and the loss of the self. Here we can again recognise the ideal of becoming what one is, or living in accordance with the self or one’s nature, working in the development of the concept of decadence. Nietzsche further diagnoses contemporary society and culture in terms of decadence, which he considers to indicate that ‘The whole does not live at all any more’ (CW 7). He presents ‘decadence’ as a framework for social analysis. In this context, decadence refers to the absence of the whole, and a society that overcomes such decadence is understood as a body or a whole.

In the last two chapters, I look into the development of Nietzsche’s idea of culture. The healthy society that Nietzsche envisioned as a body, or as an integrated whole, is the basis of a culture. The early Nietzsche defines culture as a ‘unity of artistic style in all the expressions of the life of a people’ (UM I: 1; II: 4). As Nietzsche broadens his horizons and becomes concerned about European culture, he wants to shape the social foundation to support it, and thus concerns himself deeply with European political unity. This unity is the foundation of a new European culture. However, in examining his idea of culture, we come to recognise its Eurocentric nature, which leads a society to form problematic relations with the rest of the world.

For Nietzsche, society is a field of struggle over what kinds of human being are to be raised. In this respect, ‘society itself [is] a means of war’ and ‘life is a consequence of war’ (KSA 13: 14[40]). Nietzsche engages in this war and tries to form the society he envisions. His picture of it is not in agreement with the democratic mindset that many people share today. Nietzsche once shows a positive appreciation of democracy in his middle writings,
especially in *The Wanderer and His Shadow*. ‘Democracy wants to create and guarantee *independence* for as many people as possible, independence of opinions, of lifestyle and of livelihood’ (HH II ii 293); ‘Democratic arrangements are the quarantine wards against the old plague of tyrannical desires: as such, they are very useful and very boring’ (HH II ii 289; cf. 230). Here Nietzsche recognises the emancipatory aspect of democracy. However, as Siemens demonstrates, this recognition does not mean ‘a complete, unambiguous affirmation’ of democracy. ⁸ In the same period, Nietzsche considers that such an emancipatory aspect is limited because while democracy prevents a despotic ruler against individuals, it makes ‘the people’ ‘the sole sovereign’ (HH I 472), and individuals become afraid to be different from people. Accordingly, in democracy ‘human beings become uniformed’ and it drives humanity to be like sand: ‘all very alike, very small, very round, very accommodating, very boring’ (KSA 9: 3[98]). This critical view of democracy continues in his late writings.

Taking an anti-democratic stance, Nietzsche has controversial views about the arrangement of society. While his anti-democratic sentiments are evident, some scholars have tried to use Nietzsche’s thoughts as constructive resources to rethink democracy or develop an agonistic concept of democracy. ⁹ This thesis does not seek to reconcile Nietzsche’s thinking with democratic theories. Rather, I try to show how his rejection of the modern assumption that everyone is equal, or should be treated equally, challenges and pushes us to face the societal problems that can easily be overlooked with such an assumption.

---

⁸ For how Nietzsche changes and develops his views on democracy, see Herman W. Siemens, Nietzsche’s Critique of Democracy (1870-1886), *Journal of Nietzsche Studies* 38, 2009, pp. 20-37.

Chapter 1:
From the Individual to the Whole

The Individual

Before we deal with the problem of the whole, or social totality, in Nietzsche’s philosophy, we need to address the question of why and in what way the whole comes to matter in Nietzsche’s writings. This is also the question in order to answer doubts that may be raised by individualist readings with regard to the topic of this thesis: Nietzsche’s concern about the whole.

Passages about the need to distance oneself from public affairs are easy to find in Nietzsche’s writings. Kaufmann recognises Nietzsche’s ‘breach with society’ and regards the ‘leitmotif of Nietzsche’s life and thought’ as ‘the antipolitical individual who seeks self-perfection far from the modern world’. Alasdair MacIntyre holds, as many do, that the Nietzschean notion of greatness is devoid of any social relations or social activity, while its individualism is destructive to a community or society because ‘Nietzschean man […] finds his good nowhere in the social world’ which amounts to ‘the isolation and self-absorption of “the great man” which thrust upon him the burden of being his own self-sufficient moral authority’.

Certainly one of Nietzsche’s main concerns is individuals’ self-cultivation; his advice to those who would engage in great work was ‘Flee, my friend, into your solitude’ (Z I ‘Flies’). Considering Nietzsche’s emphasis on this kind of solitude, in which an individual can face his existential problems away from the crowd and public, it seems that his philosophy cannot be understood as one that reflects on the whole and its value. In addition, it is generally held that after his break with Wagner (or after his Untimely Meditations), Nietzsche’s main focus shifts onto the individual, especially a few exceptional individuals.

In his middle period, Nietzsche calls for liberation from the communal morality that individuals are encouraged to follow uniformly for the sake of society. He observes that, in

11 Ibid., p. 418.
the contemporary trend of morality, only ‘the common security’ and ‘society’s sense of security’ are regarded as good (D 174), while he sees ‘the fear of everything individual’ in ‘the praise of impersonal actions that serve the public good’ (D 173). Within this atmosphere, individuals suppress their own virtues and desires and comply with social norms, so that ‘the individual conceals himself in the communal generality of the concept “human being”, or in society, or he adapts himself to princes, classes, political parties, opinions of the time or place’ (D 26). What appalled Nietzsche was that, in such a situation, ‘so often the inventive and fructifying person’ is sacrificed (D 164) without having had the opportunity to realise his own creativity or individuality under the pressure to adapt. Nietzsche therefore encourages individuals to seek new ways of life free from social conventions, and not to waste their spirit by pursuing politics or public affairs but to focus on their self-cultivation.

Nietzsche shows a high regard for the Stoic Epictetus, one of the ‘greatest marvels of antique morality’ who ‘fought with all their might for their ego’ without the ‘concept of the now common glorification of thinking about others or of living for others’ (D 131). Nietzsche’s positive appraisal of Epictetus ‘as the quiet, self-sufficient one […] who defends himself against the outside world’ with ‘inwardly turned gaze’ (D 546) seems to show that Nietzsche’s focus in this period is more on the individual than on the social whole. It does not matter to Epictetus that he was a slave because, as an individual, he could always seek inner virtues irrespective of the personal or social condition he was situated in.13

This description of Epictetus as one who is ‘self-sufficient’ and ‘defends himself against the outside world’ may remind us of Epicurus, whom Nietzsche also holds in high regard. Although the path that led Epictetus to self-sufficiency was different from the way of Epicurus – the former being insensitive to the world outside him, the latter being sensitive enough to make his own garden (GS 306) – the idea of cultivating self-sufficiency away from the public greatly appealed to Nietzsche. This was the Nietzsche who said that ‘we want to take walks in ourselves’ (GS 280), who was inspired by the Epicurean garden and its idea of self-sufficiency and whom, in this respect, Ansell-Pearson argues that ‘Nietzsche in his middle period writings prizes Epicurus for his teaching on a refined egoism and advocating social withdrawal’.14

---


Nietzsche seems to lay greater stress on individuals’ self-cultivation and to see society as an impediment to this cultivation. Certainly his concern is for the individual when he expresses that people want ‘nothing short of a thoroughgoing transformation, indeed a debilitation and cancellation of the individual’ (D 132). However, we should not conclude from this emphasis on self-cultivation that Nietzsche excludes any idea of the whole or society; rather, that his criticism of the contemporary commercial society may indicate that a new form of society is called for, as he says ‘numerous new attempts at living life and creating community shall be undertaken’ (D 164). Regarding such a situation, he observed:

It seems to do every single person good these days to hear that society is on the road to adapting the individual to fit the general requirements and that the individual's happiness as well as his sacrifice consist in feeling himself to be a useful member and instrument of the whole: only, at the present time it is still very much up in the air as to where this whole is to be sought, whether in an existing state or in one that must be founded, in a nation state or in a brotherhood of peoples or in small new economic communities. On this matter there is currently a great deal of reflection, doubt, argument, a great deal of agitation and passion, but marvellous and pleasing to the ear is the harmony that reigns in the demand that the ego must deny itself (D 132).

Here Nietzsche is worried about those situations in which the individual is suppressed, and specifically the diminishing and concealment of our own uniquely individual virtues and abilities through the dissolution of ourselves into the throng. However, such a concept of individualism is not about unconditionally abolishing any kind of community or rejecting all idea of the whole. Nietzsche understood that his contemporary period had witnessed a fierce discussion as regards ‘where the whole is to be sought’ (ibid.). What concerns him is the possible dissolution of individuality. Is it not possible, therefore, for a society to be the place in which individuals can be healthy? Did Nietzsche dismiss this question of the whole because he considered it a contemporary and worthless debate? This thesis argues that this question of the whole remains in Nietzsche’s sight and that he attends to this question in a different way.

Nietzsche’s apparent demand that we distance ourselves from society and from its
conformist pressures originates from what I understand as his ultimate ethical concern: ‘You should become who you are’ (GS 270). I would argue that the ethical pursuit of forming the self that one is, also leads him to his interest in the whole, and this ethical concern is connected with the whole in two regards. First, individuals, particularly the great individuals who are often seen as Nietzsche’s main focus, cannot shape themselves on the level of a self-contained individual; they have to expand their horizons to the whole in the sense that they have to engage in shaping the whole. Second, since the human being is also socially constituted, the individual is unavoidably bound up with the whole. As these two aspects are connected, this thesis deals with the first aspect in the following two chapters, then shows how this discussion is connected with the second aspect in chapter 3.

**Nietzsche’s Transition**

Nietzsche seems to emphasise individual self-mastery and self-fashioning. But how are individuals required to expand their horizons to the whole? A clue can be found in Nietzsche’s change of attitude toward Epicurus and why he later came to call Epicurus a decadent.15

It is well known that at the heart of Epicurean ethics is the idea of self-sufficiency. According to Epicurus, ‘self-sufficiency is the greatest of all riches’16 and ‘the greatest fruit of self-sufficiency is freedom’.17 This Epicurean idea of freedom as self-sufficiency was not entirely new. Rather, it reflects a certain tendency in Greek philosophy. Aristotle originally presented the idea of freedom: that is, a free man is ‘who exists for himself and not for another’.18 In other words, being the master of one’s own self is freedom. Freedom as being the master means, primarily as opposed to servitude, not to fall into passivity, i.e. not to be under the control of or subjugated by the other. This idea of freedom as being for oneself without being dependent on others has self-sufficiency as its essence. When I am in relationships with others whom I cannot control in the way I want, I always run the risk of

---

15 This issue is also dealt with in chapter 4.
17 Ibid., p. 119.
being put in a passive position. Hence, in order for me to exist wholly for myself I should not be dependent on the other, and in order not to be dependent on the other, I should be self-sufficient. Therefore, according to Aristotle, ‘self-sufficiency is the end and the best’.19

This notion of self-sufficiency indicates a state of self-reliance independent from others, a concept that belongs together with the idea of self-governance – namely, that I rule myself. In other words, I can be free only when I do not follow any externally imposed order but the law that I establish. In social and political context, this freedom means being the master of making a law and running a society. It was in this sense that Aristotle said that ‘a citizen pure and simple’, as a free man, ‘is defined by nothing else so much as by the right to participate in judicial functions and in office’.20 When the law in a society operates irrespective of my will, then the law becomes an external force oppressing my freedom. But if each person in a society, as the free human beings and masters of that society, actively participates in the law and agrees with its binding force, then the law is no longer the alienated power that compels people to follow. Instead, each person’s will is extended into the whole society by the law so that, in fact, I follow my will as I follow the law. Thereafter Hegel repeated this idea of the law, stating that ‘only that will which obeys the law is free: for it obeys itself and is self-sufficient and therefore free’.21

This idea of freedom as self-sufficiency means to maintain the status of the active subject at all times without being subjugated to or under the influence of others. In philosophy, this is embodied above all in the subject of contemplation, or *theoria*. The state of pure contemplation that sees the world without suffering is considered the most ideal state. This is the most ideal state not simply because rational activity is given superiority over sensibility but because, in a deeper sense, contemplation is of the highest freedom. Aristotle expressed his concept of this state as follows:

---

19 Aristotle, *Politics*, 1253a 1. Also see Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*: ‘the self-sufficient we now define as that which when isolated makes life desirable and lacking in nothing; and such we think happiness to be; and further we think it most desirable of all things’ (1097b 14). Of course, to be purely and absolutely self-sufficient would be possible only for God; a human being cannot be self-sufficient alone. Therefore, human beings have to form a society and, in this respect, the *polis* was, for both Plato and Aristotle, an organisation for realising self-sufficiency.


the activity of contemplation will be found to possess in the highest degree the quality that is termed self-sufficiency; [...] whereas the just man needs other persons towards whom or with whose aid he may act justly, [...] the wise man on the contrary can also contemplate by himself, and the more so the wiser he is; [...] he is the most self-sufficient of men.22

In this sense, I am not yet self-sufficient if I need the other or something external. However, inasmuch as the contemplative activity is sufficient in itself and without need for the other, it is the most self-sufficient activity. In the end, this idea of freedom indicates complete self-reliance. The relationship with others would be needed in one’s life, but it is not seen as good in itself.23 In this respect, a free man acquires his self in the self-relation rather than the other-relation. The idea of freedom that confirms itself thoroughly in the self-relation can also be understood, to follow Arendt, in terms of ‘sovereignty’ as ‘the ideal of uncompromising self-sufficiency and mastership’.24

On the face of it, Epicurus expresses almost this very same idea of freedom when he states that ‘the greatest fruit of self-sufficiency is freedom’. But in fact, this line indicates the impoverishment of the ideal of ancient Greek life in which individuals’ lives were to be realised by participation in their political community, the polis, to ensure a harmonious balance between citizens and the community.25 One of the central elements of the Greek ideal of freedom was shaping one’s own life for oneself in the sense that one takes part in

22 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1177a 28 f. Also see this: ‘the performance of virtuous actions requires much outward equipment, and the more so the greater and more noble the actions are. But the man, so far as the pursuit of his activity [of contemplation] is concerned, needs no external apparatus: on the contrary, worldly goods may almost be said to be a hindrance to contemplation’ (1178b 2 f.).

23 In this respect, it is natural that happiness was thought to be *summum bonum* in ethics. Compared with humaneness, which is considered the most fundamental virtue in traditional northeast Asian culture, happiness is the good and the end suitable for a free man who exists for himself and accordingly places top priority on self-perfection or self-realisation, not others. That Aristotle views contemplation as the most complete happiness shows that the substance of the happiness is again rooted in the idea of freedom. The good is that which is good for a free man.

24 Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition*, Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 1998, p. 234. Arendt understands that, with a similar view of freedom to that which I’ve explained here, the western idea of freedom is obsessed with sovereignty, and criticises that this sovereignty has been understood as freedom without question. According to her, identifying freedom with sovereignty is an error because no human can enjoy this kind of sovereignty inasmuch as a human does not live alone but with others.

political activity that forms one’s condition of life. In Athens, as Pericles proudly said, anyone who refrained from politics or public affairs was not seen as the ‘easy-going’ or ‘quiet’ type of life but was called the ‘useless’. By contrast, Epicurean self-sufficiency reflects the contemporary Hellenistic period in which Greece had lost its political power to the foreign empire; the Epicurean philosophy is one that an individual who is alienated from a political community and disappointed with the outside world will seek. This ideal means that I give up on a society that is not within my power and try to enjoy joy or happiness in the private garden that I am able to shape with my hands. In this way, the sphere of self-sufficiency has shrunk to pleasure in the private realm.

One of the reasons that Nietzsche could not fully accept Epicurus later on was that he understood the weakness of this Epicurean freedom. Although one is the master of his own garden, he can still be a slave to the rest of the world. He cannot carry out self-fashioning or self-mastery, so he cannot be the master of his life if he is subjugated to the order of the external world when he sets foot outside his private realm. On this point, Nietzsche writes in a note in 1883 that ‘Epicureans […] enjoy the freedom as […] prisoners’ (KSA 10: 20[5]). Only when one can also rule the world to which he belongs can his self-mastery be possible.

For the mature Nietzsche, the very idea of self-fashioning or self-mastery carries a need to be the master of the whole and to develop dominion [Herrschaft] over others. Many scholars have focused on this Herrschaft as self-mastery on an individual level, but Nietzsche was well aware that it cannot be achieved only on an individual level. In a sense, Nietzsche would have understood what Arendt means when she argues that ‘in the realm of human affairs sovereignty and tyranny are the same’.

Therefore, Nietzsche urges individuals to step out of their solitude and to be strong enough to take on responsibility for the external world. So while exhorting and encouraging the solitude that a noble human being would enjoy away from the rabble of the market, Nietzsche also suggests that the solitude in which one shies away from the relationship with

---

26 Sang-Bong Kim, 서로주체성의 이념, Jil, 2007, p. 62.


28 With this shrinkage, pleasure should be passive, not active, as Epicurus says pleasure means ‘freedom from pain in the body and from trouble in the mind’ (Epicurus, op. cit., p. 89). Of all relationships with others, friendship is the most desirable relationship befitting a person seeking this passive pleasure. Friendship is not as intense as love is, but unlike love, it does not break tranquillity of mind.

the external world is the expression of lassitude or ‘the wise tiredness [Müdigkeit]’ (KSA 13: 14[99]), hence he is ‘against Spinozistic or Epicurean happiness and against all rest in contemplative states’ (KSA 12: 1[123]). Thus, Nietzsche finds ‘reduced men [reduzierte Menschen]’ (KSA 11: 25[222]) in the Epicurean self-contained life that is afraid to come out of its private garden. In this way, he rejects its ‘enjoying solitude’ (KSA 10: 16[86]), seeing the possibility for decadence and fatigue in such Epicurean self-sufficiency, and invokes noble human beings who lead a reclusive life to emerge and rule.30

This is the transition in Nietzsche’s thinking. Many scholars give added attention to the aspect of self-fashioning and self-mastery, and discuss Nietzsche’s proposal ‘To “give style” to one’s character’ (GS 290) mostly in the individual’s existential dimension.31 For Nietzsche, however, ‘great men […] want to embed and shape themselves in great communities [Gemeinden]; they want to give a single form to the multifarious, disordered’ (KSA 11: 25[335]). If, as an isolated individual, one remains a mere object of the world and becomes an object as soon as he gets out of his private room and sets foot in the world, then far from being able to govern himself, he can barely keep hold of his own room. To exist as the master of oneself, one has to be the master of the whole and be one who shapes the world that is entangled in relationships with others. This involves mastery over others, which Nietzsche expresses as follows:

Zarathustra 3: the transition from the free spirit and hermit to one that must rule. […] The tyranny of the artist first as self-discipline and self-hardening!

Psychology of rulers. (The desire for the friends turns out to be the desire for instruments of the artist!) (KSA 10: 16[51])

In this way, the free spirit that keeps a certain distance from the world is brought to the domain of domination concerning the world. It is an illusion to believe he can conduct self-fashioning only by his inner self and enjoy his freedom regardless of the external world; a human being cannot be a self-reliant and self-determining individual by himself alone. For

30 ‘To call for those to compete for power, those who would like to hide and live for themselves – also who are wise, pious, and still in the country! Scorn for their enjoying solitude! / All creative natures wrestle for influence, even if they live alone’ (KSA 10: 16[86]). Compare this with Epicurean teaching that says ‘Live unknown’ (Epicurus, op. cit., p. 139).
instance, if someone in a country where military service is compulsory decides to reject the compulsory military service because of his conscience, so to speak, then he will go to jail instead. In this sense, as long as one is not a lawgiver of the world, he would still be subjugated to the world outside himself, and accordingly still remain merely a passive object of the world.

The problem Nietzsche identifies with Epicurean self-sufficiency is that, within this model, individuals are compelled to shrink from the outside world so that they remain as fragments, and they are unable to become the masters of the whole. Working from this realisation, Nietzsche appeals to the solitary not to remain self-sufficient, affirming ‘the lust to rule’ as ‘bestowing virtue’ (Z III ‘Three Evils’ 2), and coming to conclude that ‘All virtue and self-overcoming has meaning only as preparation for the rulers!’ (KSA 10: 16[86]).

To sum up, this is the transition from individual self-mastery to mastery over others and the whole. On the one hand, Nietzsche encourages the self-cultivation, criticising the subordination of individuals to society and the social pressure on individuals to conform, though it seems that his concern about this social pressure and subordination is primarily focused on the excellent few.32 On the other hand, there are many passages including some referred to here where Nietzsche casts doubt on the solitary life and emphasises the necessity of mastery over others. I therefore looked into the logic between these two aspects, and argued that self-mastery according to Nietzsche was not something to be completed on an individual level but that it entails mastery over others and the whole. This is what I called the transition. Ottmann argues that in this respect the ideal of free spirit changes rapidly into the theory of domination;33 however, transition here does not refer to a certain point of discontinuity or disconnection in Nietzsche’s thinking. Nietzsche continues to appreciate the value of solitude and self-cultivation. The transition means that Nietzsche now realises that mastery over others and the whole is necessary, and that to be the master of one’s life, one has to be the master of the whole. Therefore, Nietzsche considers ‘solitude’ as the “meanwhile” [Einstweilen] of the philosophers’ (KSA 11: 35[47]). That is to say, it is true that one needs time to develop and focus only on oneself; however, as Zarathustra descends

32 Nietzsche’s fear is that ‘a host of the most eminent talents will continually be sacrificed’ in serving the state (HH I 481) and ‘it is always relatively more of the most highly cultivated individuals who will be sacrificed, the very ones who would guarantee an extensive and excellent posterity’ (HH I 442). Thus he argues that ‘the inventive and fructifying person shall no longer be sacrificed’ (D 164).

33 Henning Ottmann, Philosophie und Politik bei Nietzsche, Berlin ; Boston : De Gruyter, 1999, p. 239 f.
the mountain, one should not be a permanent recluse and needs to go into the world.

**Nietzsche’s Question**

Self-mastery involves itself with mastery over the whole, as regarding the sovereign individual Nietzsche writes ‘this mastery over himself also necessarily brings with it mastery over circumstances, over nature and all lesser-willed and more unreliable creatures’ (GM II 2). However, it seems that this picture of self-mastery applies only to those great individuals who ‘want to embed and shape themselves in great communities’ (KSA 11: 25[335]), and who shape themselves as they shape the whole. Nietzsche’s idea of the whole then comes to be irrelevant to the many. In other words, only the few are able to enjoy freedom as being the master, and most people are to be rendered subordinate to the order that is shaped by the few. On the other hand, although Nietzsche emphasises the rank order and while not all of his ideas are always directed at people universally, he still believes that his project is to cultivate humankind as a whole. We need then to ask how this tension can be solved.

Let us start with the question Nietzsche himself raises in 1885: ‘how ought the earth as a whole to be administered? And to what end should “man” as a whole – and no longer a people, a race – to be raised and bred?’ (KSA 11: 37[8]). Siemens adduces this as a sign of Nietzsche’s project’s inclusive generic orientation ‘beyond the interests of any specific type’, and connects it with Nietzsche’s critique of modern democracy that promotes only one type, the herd type. Nietzsche is opposed to democratic uniformity from the perspective of ‘pluralism’, based on the will to power and ‘diversity’ of human life.  

Siemens argues that Nietzsche’s focus is ‘the future of humankind’, and modern democracy where ‘diversity of human types’ are excluded will only lead to the contraction of humanity. However, the use of the term ‘inclusive’ could be misleading. It is not that Nietzsche pays attention merely to the diversity of types, but that he greatly emphasises the rank amongst types. In this respect, the tension still remains regarding how the order of rank with the ruling few can also be claimed as being for man as a whole, since in the same text referenced above Nietzsche calls for ‘a ruling caste’ or ‘masters of the earth’, for the ‘elevation of the type man’.

In the same year, Nietzsche considers this theme of dominion over the earth using the term ‘great politics’ (KSA 11: 35[47]). Here he says ‘the new values must first be created’. Brobjer argues that great politics has hardly any actual political sense but is related to

---

Nietzsche’s revaluation in a cultural sense. It is clear that great politics is connected to ‘revaluation of all values’; however, we don’t have to see this as entirely lacking in political sense because, as Nietzsche put it, the revaluation or ‘a reversal of values’ is also related to breeding ‘a new master type and caste – […] a certain strong kind of man of the highest spirituality and strength of will’ (KSA 11: 37[8]).

New values are required on which the new dominion can be based, and in Nietzsche’s ‘order of rank’ one ‘who determines values and directs the will of millennia […] is the highest man’ (KSA 11: 25[355]). This task of creating new values is what ‘the new philosopher’ would commit to, and on this point he says, ‘the philosopher must be like a lawgiver’ (KSA 11: 35[47]). He then writes, ‘The new philosopher can only arise in connection with a ruling caste, as its highest spiritualisation. Great politics, earth-governance near at hand; complete lack of principles for that’.

In this note, Nietzsche seems to advance an idea of rule over the earth being conducted by the philosopher-legislator, but he also claims that principles for this are lacking. Siemens understands from this that the great politics is ‘not grounded in any known principles of politics’, and shows Nietzsche’s equivocation or indecision about Herrschaft, not asking further about the principle. In my view, this seemingly indecisive attitude that Siemens identifies comes from the fact that the spiritual rule that creates values so as to direct humanity can be considered different from the political rule that enforces the spiritual rule. However, as far as spiritual activity is not completely irrelevant to ‘rule’ and can even be thought of as rule, we should not remain at a point of equivocation. Rather, we have to enquire further as to what the principle could be. This thesis argues that we can find the principle in the following note from Nietzsche’s last productive year: ‘great politics makes physiology into the ruler [Herrin] over all other questions – it wants to breed humanity as a whole’ (KSA 13: 25[1]). In short, physiology is what provides principles for constructing a whole.

We then need to ask what physiology is for Nietzsche, and how his physiological view of things can solve the tension mentioned above and how it is involved in his ideas of self, rank

36 Cf. ‘the genuine philosophers are commanders and lawgivers: they say “thus it shall be!”’, they first determine the where to? and what for? of humanity’ (BGE 211).
37 Siemens, op. cit., 2008, 239 f.
order, and the whole. Let us start by first looking at the position and usage of physiology in Nietzsche’s philosophy.

**The Position of Physiology in Nietzsche’s Philosophy**

There is a wide range of things that Nietzsche understands in terms of physiology. He reads books on natural science primarily in his middle period, but as Brobjer shows, his interest in physiology ‘intensified until his mental collapse’. As Nietzsche relates in *Ecce Homo*, writing the material for *Human, All Too Human*, he ‘pursued nothing but physiology, medicine, and natural science’, realising and regretting that ‘realities were entirely lacking’ in his knowledge at the time (EH ‘HH’ 3). The first occasion upon which he imparts positive meaning to physiology in a published book is in section 453 of *Daybreak*. There he suggests that physiology can be of ‘foundation stones for new ideals’ to ‘construct anew the laws of life and action’ (D 453).

With this awareness, he first of all started to see moral phenomena as the expressions of a physiological process (D 119, 542). This perspective continues in later years, and he often explains the origin of the herd instinct, slave (or Christian) morality, and *resentment* on physiological grounds (BGE 202; GM I: 10, III: 1, 13, 14, 15; A 25; etc.). This physiological view also provides deeper understanding of moral and cultural phenomena. We can see, for example, that the ascetic ideal, psychologically, seems to be a self-contradiction representing ‘life against life’, but ‘when considered physiologically and no longer psychologically’ it turns out to be ‘an artifice for the preservation of life’ (GM III 13). This attention to physiology is based on a view that rejects regarding any phenomenon as separate from the body. Nietzsche therefore accounts for things that are seemingly of the mind, such as strength of will, rancour, a vengeful spirit and so on, as bodily states (BGE 208, GM III: 15). This physiological view is honest about ‘the human being under the skin’ (GS 59). Thus, in the preface to the second edition of *The Gay Science* in 1887, Nietzsche asks whether ‘philosophy has been no more than an interpretation of the body and a misunderstanding of the body’ and discovers the ‘unconscious disguise of physiological needs under the cloaks of the objective, ideal, purely spiritual’. In this respect, physiology also functions as a stepping stone to revaluation.

---

Furthermore, Nietzsche uses ‘physiology’ as a theory of life especially regarding instincts and functions of the organism. In Nietzsche’s view, ‘all occurrences in the organic world are an overpowersing, a becoming-master [Herrwerden]’. He is concerned that the democratic mindset against rule or government has permeated ‘the whole of physiology and theory of life’ and ‘robbed it of its fundamental concept, that of genuine activity’, so ‘the essence of life’ is now not to be found in the ‘will to power’ but in ‘adaptation’ (GM II 12). He therefore advises that ‘physiologists should think again before positing the instinct of self-preservation as the cardinal instinct of an organic being. A living thing wants above all to discharge its strength – life itself is will to power’ (BGE 13). What is essential then in the organism is will to power, which the organism expresses actively from within. It is well known that this is one of the points on which Nietzsche criticises Darwin.39

It should be noted that not only is the body significant, but Nietzsche extends and applies the physiological consideration to human society and its development. He considers the progress and development of humanity by analogy with that of the organism (BGE 13; EH ‘D’ 2). He also finds that ‘behind all the moral and political foregrounds’ of Europe and its democratic movement, a ‘physiological process is taking place’ (BGE 242). For Nietzsche, life itself is will to power, and this should be true on a collective level as well as an individual level. So a collective body, as in ‘every healthy aristocracy’, ‘if it is a living and not a dying body, […] will have to be the will to power incarnate, it will want to grow, expand, draw to itself, gain ascendancy – not out of any morality or immorality, but because it lives, and because life simply is will to power’. But, he claims, people in the democratic movement deny this and enthrone about the ‘conditions of society from which “the exploitative character” will be removed’. Nietzsche remarks, ‘to my ears this sounds as if one were promising to invent a life that would refrain from all organic functions. “Exploitation” does not belong to a spoiled or imperfect and primitive society: it belongs to the essence of the living thing, as organic fundamental function’ (BGE 259). This exploitation indicates the exercising of life’s appropriating and shaping force that makes the other subservient. Richardson regards this exploitation as one aspect of will to power as ‘mastery of others’ where ‘the second is not just a means to the first’;40 however, as we shall see, it mainly points to making others into means or functions – the instrumentalisation of

39 Cf. ‘the influence of “external circumstances” is absurdly overestimated in Darwin; the essential thing in the life process is precisely the tremendous shaping, form-creating force from within, which utilizes, exploits “external circumstances”’ (KSA 12: 7[25]).

others, when we consider it at a social level.

In this way, Nietzsche views a desirable society as an organism with the will to power from a physiological perspective. He extends this perspective to society and humanity without limiting it to the individual being, as he asserts ‘the predominance of physiology over theologians, moralists, economists and politicians’ (KSA 12: 9[165]). In this respect, he says, ‘It is decisive for the lot of a people and of humanity that one begin culture at the right place – […] the right place is the body, gesture, diet, physiology, and the rest follows from this’ (TI ‘Expeditions’ 47). From this physiological perspective, he tries to see all things in a new light in which the body and bodily constitution are crucial.

Ultimately, this physiological view is connected with Nietzsche’s naturalisation programme; that is, his ‘task’ as ‘the naturalisation of man’ (KSA 9: 11[211]) and ‘to translate man back into nature’ (BGE 230). The naturalisation of which Nietzsche speaks concerns, among other things, the difference of human types that cannot be brought to a single level. Again, the question then is in what ways the physiological understanding and naturalisation have to do with the formation of a whole and specifically, what kind of a whole Nietzsche envisions, and what will be the basis of the different types forming a whole.

**Natural Order**

A whole implies the existence of a certain relationship among the parts in order to form the whole. Nietzsche believes the whole should be structured hierarchically; otherwise the whole cannot be made.\(^{41}\) Hierarchy here does not simply mean the few oppressing the many. As we shall see, Nietzsche portrays the parts as the functions of our body that are associated physiologically. It is known that he advocates a kind of aristocracy; however, this should not be taken as a mere preference for a dictatorial political system. To make a healthy whole, he believes, its parts and the lower parts of the rank should also be healthy.\(^{42}\) But how can one in the lower rank be healthy in a hierarchical society?

\(^{41}\) Nietzsche does not present any justification for this view. This is problematic because we can think of other organic conceptions of the whole that do not rely on hierarchy. Nietzsche seems to think that only in the hierarchical structure, is there the centre of gravity that binds its parts together.

\(^{42}\) In this respect, Nietzsche criticises that Indian morality and the ‘Law of Manu’ made the lower part of rank sick, saying ‘it had no other means of making its antithesis [the chandala] harmless and weak than to make it sick – it was the struggle with the “great mass”. There may be nothing more contrary to our sensibility than these safety measures of Indian morality’ (TI ‘Improve’ 3).
Nietzsche’s aristocratism, and the idea of rank order it promotes, is an aspect of his thinking that makes readers uncomfortable, so many can doubt that Nietzsche is concerned about the health of the majority of people who are not exceptional. Scholars have variously dealt with this issue, directly or indirectly, from different angles. Young, for example, argues for his communitarian reading that the highest value for Nietzsche is the flourishing of community and even ‘the exceptional type is valuable only as a means to the flourishing of the social organism in its totality’. Although this thesis agrees with Young’s recognition of Nietzsche’s interest in the flourishing of culture as a whole, Young’s claim unnecessarily downplays the significance of great individuals, against which Clark and Wonderly demonstrate that those individuals are not just instrumentally but intrinsically valuable for Nietzsche.

In a similar vein to Young, Huddleston argues that culture remains a central value throughout Nietzsche’s writings, and that ‘the highest calling of most people is to be in the service of culture’. According to this reading, ‘it lends greatest worth to a human life to be “sacrificed” to promote the flourishing of great individuals’, and someone’s sacrifice is ‘also in a roundabout way for his own sake’ because ‘this sacrifice is what endows his life with direction and meaning’. This is also in line with Young’s argument that ‘most people best flourish in positions of subordination’ and are ‘valued for their contribution to the social organism’. It is true that Nietzsche considers the majority of people to be functions to support the few and the social body, and this thesis agrees with this line of argument. However, in this reading, it is still not clear how the lives of most people can be healthy within Nietzsche’s aristocratic structure, since what matters seems to be only whether or not they serve the individuals who can enrich and elevate culture. Thus, the wellbeing of most people depends on their service to the few, and the question of the health of the lives of common people seems to be dissolved in the ultimate emphasis on community and culture. In this respect, even though the importance of culture and society is acknowledged, scholars may still interpret Nietzsche as claiming that the lives of the masses do not matter and are only to be

43 Young, op. cit., p. 135.
46 Young, op. cit., p. 93, 163.
exploited by the few.\textsuperscript{47} Therefore, the wellbeing of most people, which eventually benefits the few as well, needs to be understood on its own terms. Chapter 2 will demonstrate that Nietzsche arrived at a picture of the social whole in which most people are healthy as they follow their nature.

With regard to this issue, Jonas argues that Nietzsche has interest in the ‘welfare of all’ because his ultimate goals, ‘the flourishing of the higher humans and the flourishing of culture’, do ‘require the flourishing of the masses’. In Jonas’ argument, Nietzsche’s educational thoughts are emphasised to support the idea of bringing people to thrive, referring to Nietzsche’s early lectures in 1872, ‘On the Future of Our Educational Institutions’. Here, Jonas maintains that ‘certain educational, social and occupational freedoms’ should be given to the masses, and the aristocratic few have to ensure that people ‘are provided with a robust education that allows them to flourish culturally and economically’.\textsuperscript{48}

It cannot be denied that education is important in cultivating people and encouraging them to realise their abilities. However, in Jonas’ reading, the role of education is somewhat overstated given that Nietzsche does not believe that education can lead to a change in what one is (cf. BGE 264; KSA 13: 14[113]), and his concern about the lack of genuine education is primarily aimed at the exceptional individuals. If we can draw a consistent view of education from Nietzsche’s scattered remarks from his early period to the end, then it is that education should be conducted in a way that is not against one’s own nature but nurtures it, and he firmly opposes the idea of general education and believes ‘higher education always belongs to the exception’ (TI ‘Germans’ 5). However, Nietzsche does not give much attention to education for the majority of people. He is not interested in approaching the problem of people’s wellbeing in terms of education.

The reason why Nietzsche often expresses scepticism about education, especially in the late period, is that he lays stress on the role of the body from a physiological and biological view, claiming that ‘with the help of the best education [Erziehung und Bildung] one will at

\textsuperscript{47} For example, Fredrick Appel, \textit{Nietzsche contra democracy}, and Don Dombowsky, \textit{Nietzsche’s Machiavellian politics}, Basingstoke : Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. This understanding was already presented by Russell who argued Nietzsche ‘holds that the happiness of common people is no part of the good \textit{per se}. All that is good or bad in itself exists only in the superior few; what happens to the rest is of no account’ (Bertrand Russell, \textit{A History of Western Philosophy}, Simon & Schuster/Touchstone, 1967, p. 769).

best deceive with regard to such heredity’ (BGE 264). He draws attention to ‘marriage as an institution’ (TI ‘Expeditions’ 39), and writes that ‘merely training one’s feelings and thoughts is worth practically nil (here lies the great misunderstanding in German education, which is completely illusory): first one must convince the body’ (TI ‘Expeditions’ 47).

According to Nietzsche’s understanding, the way for people to thrive and to live healthily is to live in accordance with their nature, or who they are. This health can also be understood in terms of being in accordance with the self. Nietzsche views the self as a kind of inner structure of one’s drives, and understands what one is or ‘who he is’ as ‘meaning in what order of rank the innermost drives of his nature stand in relation to each other’ (BGE 6). This thought is Nietzsche’s consistent preoccupation and we can find a hint of it in his early writing where he says, ‘Be yourself!’ (UM III: 1). Such a thought leads to his concept that there is an order of rank according to innate talents and abilities, against the contemporary demand for equality. In the early lecture ‘On the Future of Our Educational Institutions’, Nietzsche states that the order in which the majority serve the excellent few is ‘the natural rank-order’ (KSA 1: 698-9). This outlook, I would argue, develops as he pursues his interest in physiology and biology, to the point where he later finds a shape in the physiological order of rank, which is dealt with in the next chapter.

This ideal of being in accordance with one’s nature and self is not something Nietzsche suddenly invented. It relates to the idea of freedom in a certain line of thought in which freedom is considered as being in harmony with nature. Before we move on to the next chapter, let us look at this idea of freedom to understand and so give context to Nietzsche’s philosophy of how individuals of different ranks can be healthy together as a whole.

The Idea of Freedom: Brief Historical Context

On the face of it, Nietzsche has interest only in those individuals strong enough to exercise self-mastery, while he rejects a democratic way of securing each person’s freedom together, which refers to the idea that when individuals’ freedoms conflict, each individual can retain freedom by participating together in the power that dominates the whole. This idea is well expressed in the ideal of law. When one as a citizen of a community follows its

49 For the discussion of Nietzsche’s view of marriage in relation to his politics, see Hugo Drochon, op. cit., p. 169 ff.
laws that he has made or approved, then he follows himself as he obeys the laws.  

This is also the paradigm of the way to reconcile freedom with necessity as the external force, which Hegel expresses as follows: ‘when the subjective will of men subordinates itself to laws, the opposition between freedom and necessity disappears. […] the objective and the subjective will are then reconciled, forming a single, undivided whole’.  

However, when Nietzsche states ‘to breed humanity as a whole’ (KSA 13: 25[1]), he has a different picture of how people can be healthy (and free, in a sense) together. To understand this picture, we need to look at his idea of freedom.

At base it seems that Nietzsche thinks of freedom as being self-mastery or autonomy, without distinction from the traditional concept of freedom. However, it is known that he breaks with that tradition and rejects the notion of free will, presenting rather a determinist view.  

In this way, Nietzsche’s brief and dispersed remarks on freedom seem to be non-definitive and allow various interpretations, as his statements appear inconsistent. It seems that he places a high value on those individuals strong enough to be autonomous, but he also denies the concept of free will and stresses necessity rather than freedom.

In this respect, many scholars try to interpret Nietzsche’s view as a kind of compatibilism.  

From the perspective of the history of philosophy, Nietzsche has been compared to the Stoics and Spinoza in relation to the agreement or compatibility between

---

50 In this respect, Socrates explains in *Criton* that the reason he chose to accept his death is that he, as a free citizen, has agreed with the law and *politeia* of Athens throughout his life. This shows the idea that each person can secure freedom by being the subject of the law and, accordingly, being the joint master of their community.


52 Nietzsche does not use the word ‘freedom’ in relation to people’s lives, but only a few exceptional and sovereign individuals. The reason for this will be dealt with in Chapter 3.

53 It is not the aim of this thesis to analyse every aspect of Nietzsche’s idea of freedom itself, which is beyond the scope of the thesis, but to clarify the important aspect that his elusive statements on freedom can be brought together to support his other ideas as presented in this thesis.


freedom and necessity, which is well discussed by Rutherford. I would also argue that to understand Nietzsche’s idea of freedom we have to consider a certain line of thought in the ancient philosophical context, which takes freedom in congruity or harmony with nature, before the Christian notion of will dominates the discussion of freedom. This is because the central reason for his denial of free will is that it is connected to the Christian idea of moral responsibility.

Freedom in antiquity was understood in terms of self-mastery, and is above all connected with the political sense that free men should control for themselves the direction of their community. Christianity then internalised the concept of freedom and gave it a metaphysical aspect by understanding it as ‘free will’, meaning an inherent ability within the human will to choose good and evil. Thus, Christianity connected ‘imaginary causes’ such as the ‘I’ and ‘free will’ to ‘imaginary effects’ such as ‘sin’ and ‘punishment’ (A 15). In this way, freedom was seen not only as being free from external constraint but as being free from sin. Thus, freedom came to be more firmly tied to individuals’ moral responsibility.

In Nietzsche’s view, this Christian conception of free will is only for condemnation of and punishment for our life on earth. Nietzsche, as it is well known, resolutely rejects this concept and seeks an idea of freedom that is not infiltrated by the Christian notion. The reason we might identify in Nietzsche’s idea some similarity to ancient thinking is not only that he once went deep into the ancient world as a philologist, but above all that he rejected the path directed by Christianity.

A prominent argument of Nietzsche’s thinking is that we cannot choose or decide who we are or what we want to be; hence, his view of freedom should not be reduced to individualistic autonomy in terms of one’s ability to consciously choose and decide what to do. In this respect, Nietzsche’s idea of freedom is also rooted in the idea of becoming what one is; that is, as mentioned, his ultimate ethical concern: ‘You should become who you are’ (GS 270). One should follow and develop one’s own nature and thus form the self that is to be formed according to one’s nature. This ‘becoming what one is’ has nothing to do with the freedom of choice and is not concerned with the expression of a particular part of a human being, the rational ability that has been usually considered the core of a human being. Rather, it is accepting one’s existence as a whole. In this regard, I argue that Nietzschean freedom

consists in one’s being in accord with one’s own nature.\(^{57}\)

As mentioned, Nietzsche has often been compared to the Stoics and Spinoza. Rutherford argues that ‘the most basic value distinction recognized by Nietzsche’, the ‘contrast between the noble and the base, the master and the slave, the independent and the dependent’, is ‘one that places him in the same orbit of ethical thought as that occupied by the Stoics and Spinoza’.\(^{58}\) This distinction or contrast is the important aspect of Nietzsche’s philosophy; however, that is not something unique to Nietzsche because, as I discussed earlier in this chapter, being the master is originally a foundational notion of freedom. Rather, I argue, it is the idea of being in accordance with one’s nature that puts Nietzsche in line with the old ethical thought. It is the modern democratic idea, close to free will, that you can do anything or choose to do anything among the options available. In contrast, the ancient understanding in a certain line of thought, which I will demonstrate in the following, is that one cannot do absolutely anything, but should do something that conforms to what one is. In this respect, being the master implies being true to oneself or one’s nature.

Aristotle regards the *polis* as the free community since ‘a *polis* is self-sufficient, but a slave is not self-sufficient’.\(^{59}\) However, this characterisation of the *polis* is not because people lead *laissez-faire* lives and have licence to try and do anything they want, but because they do what they naturally tend to do according to their aptitude and abilities, which complement each other to make the community self-sufficient. In this respect, Plato defines ‘justice’ as ‘doing one’s own work’ [*to ta hautou prattein*].\(^{60}\) In a sense, this definition means that ‘it is right for someone who is by nature a cobbler to practice cobblerly and nothing else’; however, in a deeper sense, it is concerned ‘with what is inside him, with what is truly himself and his own’, and thus with putting ‘himself in order’ based on ‘what is

\(^{57}\) The ethics of becoming what one is has its roots in the old tradition of Western philosophy in that the main focus of Greek ethics is self-realisation or self-perfection, as expressed in the term *arête*, or virtue, meaning excellence which is pursued in Greek ethics. Kaufmann refers to Nietzsche’s philosophy in relation to self-perfection (Kaufmann 1974, p. 418), but the ethical tradition has always been about self-perfection or self-realisation in a sense, especially before Christianity came to dominate. In this respect, the care for oneself constitutes the root of Western ethics. This becomes clearer when we look at the Confucian tradition where the care for others is considered the starting point of ethics. There is no word in Confucian ideas that corresponds to freedom in Western vocabulary. The main focus of Confucian ethics is being harmonious with others and the whole. Cf. Confucius, *論語集註*, Book 12: 1, 22.

\(^{58}\) Rutherford, op. cit., p. 520.


really his own’ to become ‘entirely one, moderate and harmonious’. Therefore, one should form the self that one is expected to form according to his nature, ‘what is truly himself and his own’.

This idea of doing one’s own work is later applied by the Stoics to the concept of freedom, appropriated as the equivalent to *autopragia*, which can be translated as self-action, or ‘autonomous’ or ‘independent action’. However, *auto-* in *autopragia* here refers ‘not simply to the autonomous capacity for action, but also to the special and limited domain over which humans are masters and in which only they are indeed free’.

The idea of freedom in this ancient sense is connected to being true to oneself and doing what is good for oneself. Having many options or alternatives to choose from, which some may argue even includes doing harm to oneself, does not mean being free but means being deficient and not knowing what is good for oneself, which is a characteristic of the slave type. In this tradition, freedom is not a concept standing against necessity because it is not about having alternatives or options. Rather, one is viewed as free when they act by necessity of their nature for the sake of their own good. Thus, Plotinus understands ‘that is enslaved which is not free and which does not have the power to move towards the Good’. Freedom is understood in terms of the ability to pursue the good that is true to oneself, and is not therefore the positive ‘power to move towards the bad’. Therefore, choosing what is bad for oneself indicates, in itself, the absence of freedom.

In line with this understanding, Spinoza urges his readers to ‘not confuse freedom with contingency’, which is the opposite view to Schopenhauer who understands freedom as absolute contingency as opposed to necessity. Spinoza writes, ‘A man can’t be called free on the grounds that he can not exist, or that he can not use reason; only insofar as he has the

---

61 Ibid., 443 c-d.


65 ‘the free, as absence of necessity is its distinguishing mark, would have to be that which simply depended on no cause whatsoever, and would have to be defined as the absolutely contingent’. Arthur Schopenhauer, Prize essay on the freedom of the will, in Christopher Janaway trans., *The two fundamental problems of ethics*, Cambridge, United Kingdom : Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 36.
power [potestas] to exist and have effects, according to the laws of human nature, can he be
called free’. So the fact that one ‘can fail to use reason and choose evils in preference to
goods’ is not indicative of one’s being free. In this respect, freedom again is not something
we have simply because we have other options. Spinoza understands that ‘freedom is a
virtue, or perfection’ which can be achieved when one is in accordance with his nature. In
this sense, he further argues that ‘as God exists in accordance with the necessity of his nature,
so also he acts in accordance with the necessity of his nature. I.e., he acts absolutely
freely’.66

This discussion provides a context for understanding Nietzsche’s idea of freedom and
health. It is not that Nietzsche’s idea is wholly consistent with the concept discussed above,
but there are certain affinities between them insofar as Nietzsche speaks of the healthy life
that is true to one’s nature in which one instinctively does what is good for oneself. In this
sense, Nietzsche and the line of thought I have just outlined share a similar view of freedom.
Furthermore, in my view, the reason why Pippin considers that ‘the problem of freedom […]
does not seem to be one of Nietzsche’s central concerns’67 is that Nietzsche’s idea of
freedom is not focused on the debate around free will itself, but is rather focused on his
ethical concern for becoming what one is, which connects him to the old notion of being true
to oneself and the line of thought described above.

What distinguishes Nietzsche from this line is that he has a different understanding of the
self and its nature. If one possesses freedom expressed as self-sufficiency and self-reliance,
then one should not follow anything other than one’s nature. However, the genuine self has
been understood generally in terms of the mind and intellect; hence, freedom is considered
as being concerned with mind and reason. This implies that the body is considered as a
hindrance to freedom. Nietzsche’s novel view of the self rejects this dichotomous approach
and declares the body to be the self: ‘Behind your thoughts and feelings, my brother, stands
a mighty commander, an unknown wise man – his name is Self. In your body he dwells, he
is your body’ (Z I ‘Despisers’). As we will see, Nietzsche also argues that behind one’s
thoughts and feelings are drives or affects, and thus the self as the body is considered in
terms of drive and affect. In this way, he rejects the view that the locus of self is
consciousness. Zarathustra says ‘Your Self laughs at your I’ (ibid.) in the sense that behind

67 Robert Pippin, How to Overcome Oneself: Nietzsche on Freedom, in Gemes / May eds., op. cit., p. 69.
the conscious I is the bodily self.\textsuperscript{68} This approach leads Nietzsche to a different way of thinking about freedom and health. That is to say, Nietzsche emphasises the arrangement of drives and affects under the dominant drive in the healthy self, whereas, for example, Epictetus emphasises the peace of mind, regarding ‘\textit{apatheia}’ (or serenity without passion) as the same as ‘freedom’,\textsuperscript{69} and speaks of ‘a mind in accord with nature’.\textsuperscript{70}

In this chapter, we have looked at the logic in which the whole becomes important, showing that even Nietzsche’s interest in self-mastery needs to be expanded to the idea of mastery over the whole. For Nietzsche, the great individual is one who shapes the whole as he forms himself. As the formation of the whole comes to matter, what kind of whole is to be formed becomes the question. Here physiological perspective emerges as a lens through which to look at the question, and in this context, physiology refers simply to taking the body as a guiding principle [\textit{Leitfaden}] to understand the world, which is also connected with Nietzsche’s naturalisation project.

In what way then should the whole be structured? Nietzsche envisions a hierarchical social whole wherein each type can be healthy and active in the sense that they live in accordance with their nature, or what they are. To give context to this idea, we have looked at a certain line thought that tries to reconcile freedom with nature or necessity of nature. In the following chapters, we’ll see how Nietzsche’s physiological view develops the natural rank order that structures the whole he envisions. We will also explore how this view is related to his understanding of the self and freedom in Chapter 3.


\textsuperscript{70} Epictetus, \textit{Discourses}, 3.9 [17].
Chapter 2:  
The Organic Whole and Rank Order

The previous chapter discusses that physiology is what provides principles for constructing a whole, concerning which Nietzsche uses the term ‘great politics’\textsuperscript{71} and ‘earth-governance’. In this physiological perspective the body and bodily constitution are crucial in relation to how the whole is structured. This chapter shows how the body is significant in terms of rank order and how physiology is involved in ‘the order of rank’ that is ‘carried through in a system of the earth-governance’ (KSA 11: 35[73]).

\textbf{Aristocracy of the Body}

One might think the rank order is about psychical power, not corporeal, considering that Nietzsche’s highest type has the spiritual task of creating new values to direct humanity. As we have seen, Nietzsche mentions the new philosopher and the strong master type as being of ‘the highest spirituality’. While psychical power is important in this sense, however, the body is the most fundamental; as Nietzsche put it, ‘I am body entirely, and nothing beside; soul is just a word for something on the body’ (Z I ‘Despisers’) – so there is no psychical power separate from the body. In this respect, as I shall argue, the order of rank Nietzsche expected to be established is based on difference of bodily constitution or make-up.

In fact, while Nietzsche accepts the term ‘aristocratic radicalism’ which Brandes used about him (KSB 8: 960), he finds the aristocracy that focuses only on the mind or spirit distasteful, and detaches himself from it, saying “‘aristocrats of the spirit \textit{[Aristokraten des Geistes]}’ is a favourite word for Jews’ (KSA 11: 35[76]). This focus on the spirit means that those who are born as slaves in reality or who are not from ‘good’ families claim they are the ‘chosen people’ and put ‘we’ against ‘the world’ (KSA 12: 10[72]; BGE 195). In other words, describing ‘humans of ressentiment’ as ‘physiological failures’ (GM III 14), Nietzsche distances himself from the idea of society in which people believe the noble character lies in their spirits and those who were not born with an excellent body think

\textsuperscript{71} In this chapter I focus on Nietzsche’s idea of the order of rank in relation to great politics. For a comprehensive discussion of the concept of great politics, see Drochon, op. cit., especially chapter 5 and 6. Drochon demonstrates that Nietzsche wants to create ‘a party of life’ that is ‘strong enough to pursue a great politics of breeding a new type of being’ (p. 167).
nevertheless that they are noble in a spiritual sense. Nietzsche does talk about spiritual nobility, but to him this should be already embodied in the body: ‘the mere cultivation [Zucht] of feelings and thoughts is almost nothing […]: one must persuade the body first’ (TI ‘Expeditions’ 47). One cannot think the excellence of the mind as being apart from the body as the natural ground. In this respect, he writes the following:

There is only nobility of birth, only nobility of blood. (I am not talking here about the little word “von” or of the *Almanach de Gotha*: addition for asses.) Where “aristocrats of the spirit” are spoken of, reasons are usually not lacking for concealing something; as is well known, it is a favourite word among ambitious Jews. For spirit [Geist] alone does not make one noble; rather, what is required is something *that ennobles the spirit*. – What then is required for this? Blood. (KSA 11: 41[3])

As we can see in the additional parenthesis, the nobility of which Nietzsche speaks is not the royal family on the list of the *Almanach de Gotha*, or those with ‘von’ in their name as the mark of the noble class. We also see his argument that one cannot become suddenly noble just by changing consciousness or one’s mind. Thus when Nietzsche speaks of blood he does so in the sense of biological traits.

This emphasis on blood is connected to his interest in biological and evolutionary theory. Nietzsche believes in the inheritance of acquired characteristics, but as Richardson points out, he ‘tends to blur or ignore the difference between genetic and cultural inheritance’. One can ask whether, in Nietzsche’s view, characteristics are to be passed on

---

72 Although Heidegger was against reading Nietzsche through physiological and biological lens (cf. Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, vol. 3, trans. Joan Stambaugh, David Farrell Krell, Frank A. Capuzzi, San Francisco ; London : Harper & Row, 1987, p. 39 ff.), recently many studies have given attention to the relation of Nietzsche’s philosophy to evolutionary theory or Darwinism. There are somewhat conflicting views on this; for example, while Gregory Moore (*Nietzsche, biology, and metaphor*, Cambridge, U.K. : Cambridge University Press, 2002) shows that Nietzsche was influenced by contemporary Non-Darwinian theorists of evolution, such as Wilhelm Roux, William Rolph, and Carl Nägeli, John Richardson (*Nietzsche's new Darwinism*, Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2004) argues that though he repudiates a certain popular Darwinism, Nietzsche can be understood as a Darwinian naturalistic thinker who believes in the predominance of life over intellectual values and has interest in genealogical explanation.

73 John Richardson, *Nietzsche's new Darwinism*, p. 18.
in a biological way or a cultural way of memes, but it is naturally difficult to draw the line between them once the idea of inheritance of acquired traits is accepted. He uses the biological term *Züchtung* as well as the cultural term *Erziehung*, and the critical point here is that he thinks that the characteristics have to be cultivated and incorporated into the body through the generations. In this sense, the human physiological state is not ahistorical. Philosophers with a ‘lack of historical sensibility’ think the human has been the same throughout history, but we should ‘learn that man has become, that even the faculty of cognition has become’ (HH I 2). In this respect, he says ‘we believe in becoming also in the spirit, we are *historical* through and through’, situating ‘Lamarck’ in this kind of historical thought (KSA 11: 34[73]).

From physiological and evolutionary developments in the nineteenth century, Nietzsche draws three ideas regarding inheritance and birth of the great human or higher type. Firstly, their birth can be the product of a stroke of luck, in which their abilities cannot be transmitted. Secondly, the greatness is an atavism, the recurrence of the great cultural power of the past; and connectedly and thirdly, they can be the result of hereditary accumulation that is not always a linear or gradual process. While in relation to the first idea we can understand the irregularity of the existence of the great human being that can easily perish, when it comes to breeding our attention naturally turns to the second and third ideas since the first idea is not related to inheritability of characteristics. In this respect, Nietzsche emphasises the human types, rather than a particular individual. This is because while the ‘genius’, as the first idea implies, may not be directly inheritable and may emerge with luck: ‘the *type* is hereditary; a type is nothing extreme, not a “stroke of luck”’ (KSA 13: 14[133]). Thus, Nietzsche urges the breeding and strengthening of types. Regretting that the higher type has appeared ‘only as a stroke of luck, as an exception, never as *willed*’ (A 3), and mentioning the new philosopher or new species – although Nietzsche does not think the breeding is absolutely controllable – he requires ‘to *will*’ them ‘*consciously*’, not just leaving things to chance (KSA 11: 35[47]).

Whether it is atavism or hereditary accumulation, or progressive atavism based on

---


76 ‘I prefer to understand the rare human beings of an age as suddenly appearing, late ghosts of past cultures and their powers: as atavisms of a people and its mores’ (GS 10).
accumulation, there should be durability and continuity in social structure in order for these to occur. Even such atavism can happen ‘principally in the generations and castes that conserve a people’, and ‘is highly improbable where races, habits, and valuations change too rapidly’ (GS 10). In such durability the noble, beauty, and genius are ‘the final result of the accumulated work of generations’ (TI ‘Expeditions’ 47), and great human beings can arise as the fruit of this accumulative force collected and stored for a long time, though this may not be a linear or conspicuous process. Therefore, they are ‘explosives in which an immense force has been piled up; their prerequisite is always, historically and physiologically, that things have long been gathered up, piled up, saved, and preserved for them’, and this force is what makes them ‘masters’ (TI ‘Expeditions’ 44). In this respect, the ‘higher natures’ or the ‘great individuals are the oldest’. Nietzsche, connecting his ‘blood’ with the pedigree of ‘a Polish nobleman’, also traces his origin further back: ‘I do not understand it, but Julius Caesar could be my father – or Alexander, that Dionysus incarnate’ (EH ‘Wise’ 3).

To build the enduring structure in which these kinds of great natures can be born more ‘consciously’ and not perish so easily is what the earth-governance or great politics is oriented toward. In one sense, Nietzsche has a conservative outlook based on this biological view. This may be because biology itself takes a relatively conservative view in that it bears some doubt about drastic, sudden change in human characteristics; humans cannot change their bodily constitution in the way they can change their minds. Nietzsche acknowledges the difficulty of such change, stating that education cannot erase ‘the inherited plebeian’ (BGE 264). Thus he mentions the necessary ‘decay’ of ‘the nobility without the foundation of descent and purity [Reinhaltung]’ (KSA 11: 25[246]). Nietzsche thinks there has to be duration in a caste of the noble in order to breed the new kind of masters of the earth, though this should not mean the permanently exclusive order. That is to say, ‘because the lifetime of a single man means virtually nothing in relation to the implementation of such prolonged tasks and aims, first of all a new kind has to be reared […] through many generations’ (KSA

77 It is also durability that Nietzsche finds valuable in the middle age. ‘There were times when men believed with rigid confidence, even with piety, in their predestination for precisely this occupation, precisely this way of making a living, and utterly refused to acknowledge the element of accident, role, and caprice. With the help of this faith, classes, guilds, and inherited trade privileges were able to establish those monsters, the broad-based social pyramids that distinguish the middle ages and to which one can credit at least one thing: durability (and duration is a first-rank value on earth)” (GS 356).  

78 In 1882, Nietzsche says ‘I have learned the origin of my blood and name to be traced back to the Polish nobility which were called Niëtzky and gave up their home and their nobility about a hundred years ago, yielding to unbearable religious oppressions: for they were Protestants’ (KSA 9: 21[2]). In 1885, he puts ‘the Polish, the most noble of the Slavic world’ (KSA 12: 2[3]).
From this ‘master of the earth’ or ‘a new ruling caste’ can ‘the Übermensch’ arise (KSA 11: 35[73]). This master is ‘an aristocracy of the body’ [Leibes-Aristokratie] as well as ‘of the spirit’, who ‘breeds himself and always take new elements into himself’ (KSA 11: 25[134]). The higher type should select the good elements and convince the body to internalise and continue them; through this process, the higher type becomes the richest. Nietzsche considers this new type as ‘the most comprehensive soul’, in which ‘all ever-existing individual-capabilities’ are centralised to be ‘ready for the various tasks of earth-governance’ (KSA 11: 25[221]).

Nietzsche finds the reasons for ‘the democratic order of things’, as opposed to his aristocratism, in ‘the mixing of blood of masters and slaves’ (BGE 261), and the cause of the sick and degenerate will in the mixture of ‘races or classes long separated’ ‘whose blood inherits different standards and values’ (BGE 208). Speaking of a new master caste and order of rank, Nietzsche therefore means the order of some duration based on blood and physiological difference. When he talks about ‘an aristocracy of the body’ in addition to the spirit, this indicates nobility without a lack of the blood or physiological constitution or make-up for it. For Nietzsche, the ‘starting point’ is ‘the body and physiology’, and from this we can take ‘the correct idea’ of the dependence of the ruler upon the ruled and of ‘an order of rank and division of labour as the condition that makes possible both the individual and the whole’ (KSA 11: 40[21]).

**The Antichrist**

The idea of the order of rank based on the physiological perspective clearly appears in *The Antichrist*. The strong connection between this book and Nietzsche’s great politics is indicated by two pieces of evidence: one, that in an 1888 letter to Georg Brandes, Nietzsche writes ‘We have entered into the great politics’, and expects a ‘manuscript edition’ of *Antichrist* to be published and to be translated into ‘all of the main European languages’ (KSB 8: 1170); and two, that the first principle of ‘Law against Christianity’ in *The Antichrist* is presented as a principle in a late note under the title ‘the great politics’.

Even without considering this connection with his idea of great politics, the book has

---

79 After all, Nietzsche put ‘The concept “stronger and weaker man” is reduced to the fact that in the first case a great deal of force is inherited – he is the sum; in the other, still little – inadequate inheritance, splintering of that which is inherited’ (KSA 13: 15[78]).

80 This theme of mixture is discussed in chapter 4 on decadence.
historically drawn attention for its political content. In it, Nietzsche expresses great appreciation for the Roman Empire that built an aristocratic, durable, substantial form of organisation. He also admires the law book of Manu as opposed to the Christian ideal, and says ‘Not to forget the main point, the fundamental difference from every kind of Bible: with it [the law book of Manu] the noble classes, the philosophers and the warriors, stand above the crowd’ (A 56). In section 57, he argues that ‘every healthy society’ consists of three physiological types. The first are the most spiritual, the strongest and the fewest, as the law-giver; the second are the type with muscular and temperamental strength who are the executive of the first, as the guardians of the law; and the third are the majority of people with mediocre abilities who work in various fields, including science.

However, there is an objection to the view that understands The Antichrist as an expression of the ideal society Nietzsche expects. Brobjer argues that Nietzsche’s remarks on Manu are not to advance any political ideal but to make a strong contrast with Christianity and show that even Manu has a healthier ideal than that of Christianity.81 This is also the position endorsed by Leiter, who deems the passage in question ‘rhetorical’.82 It is true that in some passages in Twilight of Idols and other notes, Nietzsche is critical of Manu regarding the position of priests and Chandala.83 However, Brobjer’s and Leiter’s arguments are not strong ones because the idea presented in The Antichrist is not that of Manu itself but Nietzsche’s modified version for ‘every healthy society’, in which, unlike Manu, the first class is not the priest but the philosopher as the spiritual type, and there is no fourth class and Chandala.

Even if we leave Manu out of the political content of Nietzsche’s thought, we cannot throw aside the physiological perspective on society. As discussed above, Nietzsche was concerned with the physiological idea even before 1888, and as he discovered Manu, he sent a letter in 1888 to Peter Gast (Köselitz) saying that he was deeply impressed by the book of Manu presenting a form of religion that was not pessimistic, and that it complemented his ideas about religion (KSB 8: 1041). As we know, Nietzsche was critical of Manu in some aspects; accordingly, instead of the book of Manu itself it is his modified or idealised version that appears in The Antichrist.

83 Cf. the footnote 42 in page 19.
More importantly, Nietzsche repeatedly says that ‘Nature, not Manu’ separates the three physiological types of the caste order, which is ‘merely the sanction of a natural order, natural lawfulness of the first rank’. ‘In all this, to repeat, there is nothing arbitrary, nothing “contrived”; what is different is contrived […] to put nature to shame. The order of castes, the order of rank, just formulates the supreme law of life itself’ (A 57). As Nietzsche strongly stresses that this physiological order is based on ‘Nature, not Manu’, we can recognise that it is the physiological rank order that Nietzsche here advances. His emphasis on the body and blood is expressed again in this idea of rank order as natural order.

**Physiological Order of Rank**

Nietzsche includes ‘physiology of rank order’ in his project of ‘Will to power’ (KSA 12: 2[74]), and his thoughts on this is later revealed to some extent in The Antichrist. Nietzsche views human society from the perspective of ‘physiology’ of ‘the organic functions’ (KSA 13: 13[3]), and he advances ‘the theory of the ruling structure’ based on the thought of ‘development of organisms’ (KSA 12: 6[26]). With this consideration, he firmly believes that ‘the separation of the three types is necessary for the preservation of society, for making possible the higher and the highest types’ (A 57). The differences of the physiological types are related to one’s physiological constitution or condition, or ‘what groups of sensations within a soul awaken most quickly, speak up and give the command’. This decides the rank order of one’s values, which reveals ‘the structure of his soul, and where it sees its conditions of life, its real need’ (BGE 268). There is a tendency in the democratic ages to ignore and break down differences, but Nietzsche asserts that the different physiological types should be cultivated.

This physiological thought is to distinguish the ‘lower and higher functions’ and accordingly the ruler and the ruled based on ‘the value differences as physiological rank-order of “higher” and “lower”’ (KSA 11: 25[411]). More precisely, those of highest rank are not reduced to merely fulfilling a function (BGE 258); rather, they are the ones who give order and meaning to functions. If we call this role a function, it is one without which other functions lose their meaning. In this respect they are the law-giver under whom a whole can form. ‘Their work is an instinctive creating of form, impressing of form, […] something new stands where they appear, a ruling structure [Herrschafts-Gebilde] that lives, in which parts and functions are delimited and related to one another, in which nothing at all finds a place unless a “meaning” in relation to the whole has first been implanted in it’ (GM II 17).
discussed, one who is entitled to rule is one who shapes the whole as he shapes himself. This shaping force is creating a well-constructed organism out of disparate people by directing them to develop toward the organic whole. Here we can find a parallel between the structure of the whole or society, and that of the individual.\textsuperscript{84} Nietzsche understands that ‘our body is only a society \([\textit{Gesellschaftsbau}]\) constructed of many souls’ (BGE 19). So, in the way that different ‘drives learned to comprehend their coexistence and to feel that they were all functions of one organising force in one human being’ (GS 113) to form the hierarchical structure of drives constituting an individual, the rank order develops out of different types of people as they are given place and meaning as functions in the whole by the shaping force of the ruler.

Here though a problem remains, since only the select few are to rule in this order of rank. This ruling structure is pyramidal; section 57 of \textit{The Antichrist} states ‘A high culture is a pyramid: it can stand only on a broad base, its first presupposition is a strongly and healthily consolidated mediocrity’. For the majority of people as functions who form this base, ‘to be mediocre is a happiness’ on which a high culture depends. Nietzsche holds that socialists or apostles of equality make the people refuse to be functions and to be ruled, rid them of their natural happiness, and ‘undermine workers’ instincts and pleasures, their sense of satisfaction in their little existences’. This is to destroy the natural order, and accordingly to pull down this structured condition of culture.

Although Nietzsche’s aristocracy based around the image of a pyramid gives us the impression that its structure is only for the few, he also emphasises the majority as the condition of a high culture. To his mind this is not contradictory, for the few and majority depend on one another, and the rank-order is ‘the sanctioning of a natural distance between several physiological types’ which are ‘determined and best developed for different activity’, like ‘division of labour’ (KSA 13: 14[221]). Therefore, Nietzsche describes the physiological types divided in a healthy society as ‘differently gravitating’ and ‘mutually conditioning’ types (A 57); so, ‘the rank order is established […] through the indispensability of the weaker for the stronger and the stronger for the weaker’ and through their ‘separate functions’ (KSA 11: 25[430]). In order for a society to be healthy as a whole, individuals should be neither uniform nor scattered, but should be in an organised structure.

\textsuperscript{84} In this regard, see Richardson, op. cit., 1996, p. 50. Clark and Dudrick argue that this passage refers mainly to the individual soul, not just to the state. See Maudemarie Clark / David Dudrick, \textit{The Soul of Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil}, New York : Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 206 f.
together. This structure is ‘opposed to an atomistic anarchy’. A ‘human community [Gemeinwesen] is a unity [Einheit]’ and ‘all unity is unity only as organisation and co-operation [Zusammenspiel]’. In this way ‘a ruling structure’, which does not exist as one, ‘means one [Eins]’ (KSA 12: 2[87]).

In consideration of this aspect of his thought around the whole and the different roles of people in forming societal structure, we can understand that Nietzsche speaks of ‘breeding humanity as a whole’ because in his view it is healthy for people to seek their own perfection in accordance with the physiological order. This is, as Nietzsche put it, the natural order, and when people live on the grounds of this order the health of human beings and society becomes possible. Here each type has ‘its own hygiene, its own realm of work, its own feelings of perfection and mastery’. In this respect, Nietzsche presents a proposition that ‘A right is a privilege’ (A 57). In a note, he also expresses that he understands ‘a kind of being’ and ‘a kind of activity’ of a person in terms of ‘privilege’ (KSA 13: 14[221]). This proposition means that each person’s right [Recht] is something already within the person according to the kind of being the person is, so a right is based on a prior right, a privilege [Vor-recht]. Different types therefore have their own tasks and health physiologically fit for them respectively.

Nietzsche holds that we should not mix these types. This is what leads the types to ‘degeneration’, so ‘nothing should be banished more than […] the approximation and reconciliation’ of these types (KSA 12: 10[59]). Christianity, democracy, and socialism, in Nietzsche’s view, inculcate people with a fantasy against this natural order; in democratic ages ‘the individual is convinced he can do just about everything and can manage almost any role’ (GS 356). Thus, he argues, since the Christian ideal was introduced humanity has been losing its health, suffering from ‘physiological absurdity’ and ‘the instinct-contradiction’ (KSA 13: 25[1]). Nietzsche’s remedy to confront this situation and make humanity healthier as a whole is his naturalisation project and the earth-governance or great politics. In this regard, Nietzsche wrote a note under the name of ‘great politics’ in his last productive year (December 1888 – January 1889) as follows:

I bring the war. […] Not between classes. […]: one who is at the top in the society today is physiologically condemned and moreover – what the evidence for this is – has become in his instincts so impoverished, so uncertain that it confesses the opposite principle of a higher kind of man without scruples.
I bring the war across all absurd coincidences of a people, class, race, profession, education, culture \([\text{Bildung}]\): […] All ‘higher classes’ are not free to take the party for the lie – they \textit{have to} be this way: it is not in one’s hand to keep bad instincts from the body. – Nowhere is how little the concept of “free will” is shown more evident than in this case: one affirms what one \textit{is}, one denies what one is \textit{not}. […] the \textit{great} politics makes physiology into the ruler \([\text{Herrin}]\) over all other questions, – it wants to \textit{breed} humanity as a whole, it measures the rank \([\text{Rang}]\) of races, peoples, individuals […] according to their guarantee for life that they carry within themselves. (KSA 13: 25[1])

The remark ‘\textit{Not} between classes’ indicates, in my understanding, how Nietzsche distances himself from socialists or egalitarians. The democratic movement has already broken down the order of ‘blood’, making European people similar and society levelled down, and those of the upper classes, such as royalty in the \textit{Almanach de Gotha} or other nobility with ‘von’ in their name, were convicted of physiological degeneration. Now Nietzsche looks forward to establishing the new nobility of blood – aristocracy of the body, in a certain sense. Their nobility, spiritual excellence, richness and superfluous power belong to their nature. That they rule is not due to an ambition of dominating others; in other words, it is not a move of arbitrary volition. ‘They rule not because they want to but because they \textit{are}; they are not free to be second’ (A 57). Therefore, in great politics, ‘one affirms what one \textit{is}’ and ‘one denies what one is \textit{not}’. The ordinary understanding of the concept ‘free will’ cannot be applied here.

This perspective can be more readily appreciated if we consider artists. They ‘know only too well that precisely when they no longer do anything “arbitrarily” but do everything of necessity, their feeling of freedom, subtlety, full power, of creative positing, disposing, and shaping reaches its height, – in short, that necessity and “freedom of will” then are one in them’ (BGE 213). From this standpoint, not a note could be added to or removed from the fourth movement of Mozart’s 41st symphony at one’s will; the completed piece is not allowed even the change of a single note. Mozart had to compose it just in this form. That was an act of necessity; nevertheless, it was also a true act of freedom as an expression of the fullest power.

In this sense, the physiological rank order is to place ‘the height and power of spirituality \([\text{Geistigkeit}]\)’ in accord with the natural order. ‘In the end there is an order of rank of states
of soul that corresponds to the order of rank of problems’. To deal with the highest problems, one has to have the highest spiritual power first as his privilege [Vor-recht]. Otherwise, the problems repel one who approaches them ‘without being predestined’ for them: ‘For every high world one has to be born; or to speak more clearly, one has to be bred for it’. Nietzsche continues, ‘one has a right to philosophy […] only by virtue of one’s descent, and ancestors and “blood” are decisive here. Many generations must have done the preparatory work for the emergence of a philosopher; each of his virtues must have been individually acquired, tended, inherited, incorporated’ (BGE 213).

In the great politics, the rank of man is measured ‘according to their guarantee for life that they carry within themselves’. That is to say, the rank is based on the natural order of the body, on the physiological order to which one belongs according to the kind of blood one is born into. There should be no degeneration. Only when each person in their position in this rank order pursues perfection in accord with their position can humanity be healthy as a whole. So when Nietzsche speaks of breeding humanity as a whole, it is not that he encourages everyone to be equally noble, but to seek ‘feelings of perfection and mastery’ in their own ‘realm of work’ in order to be healthy. This recalls Plato’s idea of ‘doing one’s own work’ [to ta hautou prattein] discussed in the previous chapter.

While contemporary political ideas, in Nietzsche’s view, focused on how to maintain a balance among people assumed as free and equal, Nietzsche, finding this assumption unacceptable, considered the overall health of society where different types coexisted. Nietzsche seems to focus more on the few, who have power to determine values and cultural creativity, as fruits of this health, but it is clear that he considers that both individuals of different types and society as a whole can be healthier when different types make an organic structure together.

From this physiological perspective, Nietzsche’s seemingly contradictory remarks about the few and humanity can be understood in a more coherent way. This also allows us to understand his controversial mentions of slavery. Nietzsche’s view of slavery indicates, as I shall argue, that there should be people who fulfil the role of functions in society or instruments for the maintenance of a culture. This means first of all that society accepts the physiological view that for the majority of people ‘it is destined by nature to be a public utility, a wheel, a function’ (A 57). It is also connected to the idea that a broad base is required for a high culture to be established. Slavery is the term indicating this broad base of functions, and in the following I will deal with the problem of slavery in more detail.
Slavery: Instrumentalisation

Before we start, it should be noted that the concept of slavery I discuss here does not refer to the slave in terms of ‘an inner “master” and an inner “slave,” that is, a command-obedience structure’ ‘in each individual’. It rather refers to the third, mediocre type that constitutes the physiological rank order on a social level. Since slavery here is not an inner slave on an ethical level, it is not simply about slave morality or people of slave morality. What slavery indicates here is also different from the slave type that Richardson describes in his book *Nietzsche’s System*. Richardson uses the notion of will to power as ‘the conceptual tool’ to explain Nietzsche’s ‘typology of persons’ of three basic types, ‘master’, ‘slave’, and ‘overman’. In his reading, the two basic forms of occurrence of will to power are ‘active’ and ‘reactive’, an idea influenced by Deleuze; the slave type, which is also the type of ‘sickness’, ‘decline’, and ‘poverty’, is reactive. ‘Reacting is indeed a matter of “obeying”’ in which, on the one hand, one obeys the other ‘by adopting, “internalizing”, the latter’s views and values’, and on the other hand, ‘by reacting against’ foreign forces, ‘by taking over their values, whether positively or negatively.’ He argues that ‘two main species of reactivity’ are ‘the herd animal and the person of resentment, the former obeying by following, the latter obeying by reacting against.’ In this way, ‘the reactive has somehow turned aside from its essential end’ and ‘sets its sights by reference to [the] other and is still diverted from its own development.’

From this understanding Richardson points out that in ‘slavery’, which involves ‘subjection’, ‘one is barred from one’s natural and preferred behaviours’. Nevertheless those of the slave type, which he regards also as the mediocre type in *The Antichrist*, obey the elite and conform to the social order, he argues adducing A 57, because they are led to ‘not find the life of these elite more pleasant than their own’. However, the understanding that society is organised to accommodate only the masters’ drives and to restrain the drives

---

86 Richardson, op. cit., 1996, p. 52.
89 Ibid., p. 59.
90 Ibid., p. 175.
of others, is predicated on the assumption that people have the same drives when in fact, according to Nietzsche, different types have different organisation of drives. As discussed above, the mediocre type is not one who has gone astray from its nature in Nietzsche’s thinking of the physiological order. Rather, being ‘a public utility, a wheel, a function’ is in accordance with its nature, and what destroys this concord is the democratic fantasy that everyone is equal and can be anything.

The problem is that when we understand slavery in terms of the slave type as in Richardson’s reading, the majority of people (as the mediocre type) can never be healthy since the slave type is considered to be sick in itself. The idea of breeding humanity as a whole thus becomes absurd, with the majority being always sick and away from their nature. Only when different types make up a society structured physiologically together and each type seeks ‘its own feelings of perfection and mastery’ in ‘its own realm of work’ following their respective positions in the physiological rank order (A 57), can they be healthy as a whole. In this respect, when it comes to the necessity of new slavery which Nietzsche often speaks of, we should understand slavery as referring to the third, mediocre type constituting a broad base of functions in a society. With this in mind, let us look at the notion of slavery.

From the time of his earlier works onwards, Nietzsche seems to advocate slavery forthrightly. He seriously asserts, not as a passing metaphor, that ‘slavery belongs to the essence of culture’ (GST, KSA 1: 767). This early idea is not a manifestation of tyrannical proclivity, nor one originated from a penchant for economic exploitation, but is rooted in a tragic worldview based on a somewhat romantic perspective on genius and art. This

---

91 In his early work The Greek State Nietzsche was, to some extent, taking a similar stand on slavery to the ancient Greek thinking we can read in Plato and Aristotle that leisure [σχολή] is needed for high cultural activities like philosophy, and a working class is required for that. According to Nietzsche, slavery is ‘ignominy’ and a ‘necessity’ at the same time. He writes that the majority should be in service of the few ‘in order that there would be a broad, deep, and fruitful ground for the development of art’, and ‘at their cost, through their surplus labour, that privileged class is to be taken away from the struggle for existence in order now to create and to satisfy a new world of want’. Nietzsche asserts that ‘the misery of toilsome living men must still be increased in order to allow a small number of Olympian men the production of the world of art’.

92 Eugen Fink, Nietzsche’s Philosophie, Stuttgart; Berlin: Kohlhammer, 1960, p. 34. See chapter 1 of this book. Nietzsche was seeking the aesthetic justification of life and the world; a genius is important for this aesthetic justification. Therefore, there was no higher goal of culture than the production of genius (KSA 7: 11[1]), and insomuch as slavery served this goal, Nietzsche advocated it without reluctance. In this sense Nietzsche also considered that ‘the goal of the community’ or ‘a state’ is ‘that the highest exemplars can live in it and can create’ (KSA 7: 30[8]).
perspective would undergo change later on, but Nietzsche held consistently that slavery is ‘in some sense’ the necessary condition of all higher culture (GS 377; BGE 239; KSA 11: 37[14]; KSA 12: 2[13] etc.). He maintains that ‘an aristocratic society’ that makes ‘the enhancement of the type “man”’ and ‘the constant “self-overcoming of man”’ possible ‘believes in a long ladder of rank order and value distinctions between man and man, and needs slavery in some sense’ (BGE 257). He also suggests that ‘good Europeans’, who will have responsibility for the future of Europe, ‘think about the necessity for new orders, also for a new slavery’ (GS 377).

A detailed discussion of slavery would require a new paper altogether. However, the one thing above all that we can pinpoint here is that this slavery means nothing other than instrumentalisation [Verwerkzeugung]. This is not necessarily slavery in the ancient sense. Nietzsche refers to a subordinate, subjugated person or a slave as an ‘instrument’ (Werkzeug) (BGE 257, 258). Not only in an historical sense, but also when applied to ‘new’ slavery, the core meaning consists in the ‘slave’ being an instrument. He holds that ‘the higher type is possible only through bringing the lower type down to a function’, and in order to produce the most powerful individuals, the multitude comes to be instruments – and ‘the most intelligent and pliable instruments’ at that (KSA 12: 2[76]). To the rank of these most

---

93 Cf. ‘What does it matter to the genius, if he does not impart to his observer and admirer such freedom and height of feeling that the latter no longer needs the genius!’ (HH II i 407)

94 Nietzsche, saying aristocratic society needs slavery, continues: ‘Without the pathos of distance as it arises from the ingrained differences between classes, from the ruling caste’s constant looking out and looking down on subservient types and instruments and from its equally constant exercise in obeying and commanding, in holding down and at a distance, that other, more mysterious pathos could not have arisen either at all, that longing for ever-new widening of distance within the soul itself, the formation of ever higher, rarer, more distant, longer-span, more comprehensive states’ (BGE 257). Pride [superbia] is consciousness of ‘being above’; it tries to keep itself away from the low, thereby to lift itself up higher. Here, in this respect, Nietzsche says as if the pathos of distance ingrained in the body from external social order of rank is to make a transition into the internal pathos within the soul. Regarding this one may understand that order of social class is needed to maintain the passion for the permanent self-overcoming of humankind. (Daniel Conway, Nietzsche and the political, London: Routledge, 1997, p. 38 f. ch. 2; Keith Ansell-Pearson, An introduction to Nietzsche as political thinker: the perfect nihilist, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 50 f.) Or this may be read, emphasizing Nietzsche’s perspectivism, that a human’s feeling of power is related to internal change of perspective rather than actual social power (David Owen, Nietzsche’s Genealogy of morality, Montreal; Ithaca: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007, p. 34). Or, this may be reinterpreted as that the widening of distance within the soul ‘arises not from the activity of the elite within a stratified social order, but from the dissolution of this order.’ (Thomas Fossen, Nietzsche’s Aristocratism Revisited, in Nietzsche, Power and Politics, 2008, p. 302 f.) Fossen especially understands Nietzsche’s remarks on the need for new slavery, not in the sense of a social class but in the sense of an attitude, so he considers it as expressing the need for cultivation of an attitude of an unconditional devotion to oneself to the extent that one does not hesitate to treat others as mere means.
intelligent and pliable instruments belong scholars as well; for a scholar, who objectively examines given things and is not a philosopher who advances values and directions, is ‘an instrument, a piece of slave, though certainly the most sublime kind of slave, but nothing in himself’ (BGE 207). Moreover, in a note, Nietzsche says that slavery, whether we want it or not, already has a place in society, giving examples such as the officers of Prussia, clergy, and scholars (KSA 11: 25[225]). We can thereby deduce that what Nietzsche has in mind by slavery is not simply the underclass, but instruments or means accompanying dominion, or to make someone a function. He sums up: ‘The necessity of slavery (the man as an instrument –)’ (KSA 11: 25[238]) and ‘Concept of slavery i.e. instrumentalisation’ (KSA 12: 2[204]).

This concept of slavery is also connected to his biological or physiological perspective and the view of the ‘indispensability’ of ‘separate functions’ (KSA 11: 25[430]), which is shown as: ‘Physiology: the organic functions’ (KSA 13: 13[3]) and ‘Theory of ruling-structure [Herrschaftsgebilde]: development of organisms’ (KSA 12: 6[26]). According to Nietzsche, ‘slavery is necessary for the formation of a higher organism’ and the one who rules is the one ‘who has power the most to lower others to function’ (KSA 9: 11[134]). The need for slavery means the need for tools and functions, which means to make others instruments or functions. In this sense, ‘if fellow humans are only a kind of *our sensations*, then *to rule* is a kind of *self-control* [Selbst-Beherrschung]: and the will to be ruler is the highest conquest of our own fear and pity and transformation of others into *our* function – that is, the production of an organism’ (KSA 10: 16[87]).

Instruments are needed in society. In agreeing this, we do not necessarily mean or agree to oppression and tyranny. Were it not for people who build houses, I could not warm myself up in my room right now. Without shoemakers, I could not tread on the ground as comfortably as I do. Most relationships and meetings inevitably take place between those people functioning as instruments and means to each other. Instrumental relationships are essential and necessary to human life. The problem therefore is whether instruments can be healthy, at the level of person, and what meaning instruments can have at the level of the social whole. On a social level, if all relationships remain purely in a blind instrumental sense, the whole of those relationships are bound to fall into decline and futility. However, if the relationships can serve a higher purpose, then the people in them can get avoid a sense of futility.

This perspective is shown prominently in Nietzsche’s critique of blind economic
optimism. He argues that ‘a stronger species, a higher type’, who rules over and gives meaning to the ‘machinery’ of humankind woven into the economic relationships and who becomes the purpose of humankind, must come to light. He calls this type the ‘Übermensch’, and continues:

Once we have that inevitable impending economic-total-management over the earth, then mankind as machinery can find its best meaning in serving it. […] In opposition to this reduction and adaptation of men to a specialised usefulness, the opposite movement is required – the production of the synthetic, the totalising, the justifying man, for whom such mechanisation of mankind is an existence-precondition, as an under-structure, on which he can invent his higher form of being. […] Morally speaking, that total-machinery, the solidarity of all cogwheels, represents a maximum in the exploitation of men: but it presupposes those on account of whom this exploitation has meaning. Otherwise, it would be in fact merely the total-reduction, value-reduction of type man – a decline-phenomenon in largest styles. (KSA 12: 10[17])

Although Nietzsche was critical of contemporary commercialism that made humans shallow,⁹⁵ and also thought that the circumstances of workers should be changed (M 206), he believed that an order of rank was needed for the enhancement of humans, so he never conceded to any sort of political empowerment of the lower classes. He understands that the instrumental relationships among humans are necessary and irremovable; thus, his concern is the meaning that instruments can have. For Nietzsche, exploitation is based above all upon the ‘will to power’ and this is a fundamental nature of human society which cannot be expunged (BGE 259). Therefore, if exploitation is such that it cannot be removed – in other words, if instrumental relationships cannot be removed – it is required that such exploitation is meaningful and the one who exploits it is sufficiently worthy (KSA 10: 14[2]).⁹⁶

⁹⁵ For the discussion of Nietzsche’s ambiguous view of commercialism and economy, see Peter R. Sedgwick, Nietzsche’s economy: modernity, normativity, and futurity, Basingstoke : Palgrave Macmillan 2007.

⁹⁶ ‘What incenses us when the individual person exploits the other for himself? – The premise is that he is not worthwhile enough. But suppose that he is considered worthwhile enough (e.g. as prince), he will be bearable and gives a kind of happiness ("resignation to God") / One resists exploitation by lower beings than he himself is. / So I resist the current government, Bildung, etc.’
Some might say that in any society these instrumental relationships are based on those functions and division of labour, even in a society that is democratic or socialist. The difference is that, while in a democratic society it is believed that everyone has equal rights, in Nietzsche’s idea of rank order it is accepted that ‘a right is a privilege’ and people should do things fit for their respective physiological types. In this respect, the mediocre type can seek perfection and mastery in their work, keeping their position as functions, but should not engage in directing a society, which is not their realm of work. For Nietzsche ‘democracy is the form of [...] ascendancy of the failed’ or wrong people (KSA 11: 34[146]), in which ordinary people become ‘jealous’ and learn ‘revenge’ (A 57), so they always remain reactive. Only when they keep themselves within their own realm of work, striving hard to perfect it, can they be active in a sense, and society can be healthy as a whole. In this respect, Nietzsche holds that there should be clear divisions among different physiological types, and that this distinction must be maintained. He writes that one should not ‘educate slaves to be masters’, implying that people should not be allowed to have rights to which they are now in our contemporary society normally entitled such as ‘the right to organise’ and ‘the political right to vote’ (TI ‘Expeditions’ 40). Nietzsche, who actually was against ‘educational groups for workers’,97 opposes the idea of general education for all; in his ideal, different types are to get different education,98 and higher education should be only for the select few, which is a way of maintaining the divisions of types.

Conclusion: Feasibility

Nietzsche’s concept of rank order can be considered from various perspectives. This chapter has so far attempted to thoroughly explain the rank order that forms the social whole from the physiological perspective. Nietzsche asserts that his idea of rank order is based on nature, hence natural order, in which people live in accordance with their nature. But how is this view to be justified and have normative force? Does he feel his view doesn’t need to be justified? For he writes, ‘Respectable things, like respectable people, do not carry their reasons around [...]’. Whatever has to get itself proved first is worth little. […] ‘[W]herever one does not “give reasons” [begründen] but commands, the dialectician is a sort of clown’


98 Although Nietzsche advocates different education for different types, he seems to think that people need to get common discipline at a certain young age. Cf. KSA 13: 14[161].
It seems that while Nietzsche doesn’t concern himself much with justification itself, he certainly believes we should accept this natural order because we can be healthy, active and powerful only when we live according to our nature. Otherwise, Nietzsche argues, we come to have contradictory values and feel conflict within ourselves, which leads to decadence and denial of life. In this regard, the binding force of Nietzsche’s claim can only be stated in terms of health and illness. Healthy is the instinctual life in accordance with what one is; in contrast, the sick life goes against the physiological condition and order. In this respect, he seems to view this natural order as a kind of fact to accept, like the simple fact that we are born with different talents and abilities. According to him, the rank order is ‘based on the observation’ that there are ‘several physiological types’ ‘determined and best developed for different activity’, so it is ‘only the sanctioning of a natural distance’ between these types and ‘only the sanction of experience’ (KSA 13: 14[221]). For Nietzsche it is natural that we know those several types exist, in history and in the present, and the distance or difference among them makes the rank order.99

However, the feasibility of this hierarchical structure being created in reality is another matter. It may be said that this is an idealised picture, and an ideal, apart from the feasibility of it, can affect the real world through inducing effort towards it. Alternatively one may view the concept of great politics and Nietzsche’s political vision as a mere ‘atopian’ project regarded purely philosophically away from a historical place [topos],100 or as a concept of distant ‘utopia’101 that is not to be settled based on concrete reality, even though it does not seem to lack these characters entirely. Still, Nietzsche seems to express a desire for influence on reality and expect the realisation of his ideal of naturalisation of society. He presents his

99 In this regard, one can argue that normativity in Nietzsche’s naturalism comes from facts in the sense that ‘Facts are already normative in the sense that they make certain claims on us, that is, they shape the way we act, think, imagine, and so on’ (Christian J. Emden, Nietzsche’s naturalism : philosophy and the life sciences in the nineteenth century, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. 69.). However, it seems that normativity is not Nietzsche’s central concern. See P. J. E. Kail, Emden’s Nietzsche, The Journal of Nietzsche Studies, Vol. 48: 1, 2017.

100 Alex McIntyre, The sovereignty of joy: Nietzsche's vision of grand politics, London; Toronto; Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1997, p. 11. According to McIntyre , the ‘genuine philosopher in Nietzsche’s grand politics’ is not ‘fully political but atopian because, instead of addressing itself to “politics,” the sovereignty of joy rebuilds “polity,” not on solid ground, but right into placelessness (a-topia), into the monstrous playfulness of the necessary wave-play of becoming.’ With this understanding, McIntyre came to disregard Nietzsche’s texts concerning the contemporary political situation.

idea of the social whole, not as a strategist, but as a philosophical commander, and urges the resolution in building an enduring construction. Does he then have any idea concerning how the hierarchical structure can be maintained?

As we have seen, durability or continuity in social structure is important to Nietzsche in terms of breeding human beings, and accumulation of cultural force. However, this continuity comes into question because of our bodily limitations in the human condition itself. That is to say, in politics ‘the natural cycle of birth and death necessitates a constant transfer of power and generates thus the peculiar instability of all our arrangements’. One can question then if Nietzsche has any ideas concerning such a transfer. Young argues that rank in Nietzsche’s thinking is not ‘something established by birth’ but ‘the product of an authentic meritocracy’. However, while Nietzsche’s system could be called a meritocracy in the sense that one’s position in the rank order corresponds to one’s natural ability, the question of what system could allow the meritocracy to continue and how it could be maintained remains because, broadly speaking, the old system of monarchy at least had the stability of a royal family, compared with a system wherein anyone with merit can be a ruler.

Sluga points out that ‘hereditary monarchy and electoral systems of government have developed elaborate mechanisms’ for such a transfer of power. While Nietzsche speaks of long stretches of time for breeding, and has a great appreciation for society in the middle ages for its ‘durability’ (GS 356), he does not explicitly present any detailed ideas of maintenance of social structure. However, he certainly opposes the monarchy or democratic election because he thinks they are systems oriented towards the interests of royal families or the private interests of the democratic herd. In this interest-oriented politics, he understands, Europe suffers from ‘its dynastic as well as democratic fragmentation of the will [Vielwollerei]’ (BGE 208).

Nietzsche believes politics should not be swayed by the self-interest of a monarch and its family. The ‘first principle of all great architecture’ is stability not being affected by ‘the

---


103 Young, op. cit., p. 188. Young seems to write ‘by birth’ to mean a fixed class system where one’s ability does not count for determining one’s position in society. However, as we have discussed, when Nietzsche writes ‘There is only nobility of birth, only nobility of blood’ (KSA 11: 41[3]), ‘birth’ does not mean ignoring one’s natural ability.

104 Sluga, op. cit., p. 41.

105 This aspect will be dealt with in more detail in chapter 5.
accident of persons’ who rule (A 58). Moreover, it is Nietzsche’s consistent idea that modern democracy is a chaotic system in which people are fragmented. In his understanding, ‘the result of the democratic concept of the state’ is ‘the unleashing of the private person’, which leads to the ‘death of the state’, and he anticipates that ‘Private companies will step by step absorb the business of the state’ as we observe today. Here people are fragmented, fighting for influence on the government to get it to serve their private interests, and in this competition ‘people and parties change too quickly’. Thus, Nietzsche continues, ‘No government is able to guarantee the duration of any of the measures that it puts into place; people shy away from undertakings that would require quiet growth over decades or centuries in order to bring their fruit to maturity’ (HH I 472).

Nietzsche, on the contrary, takes the long view. Emphasising the need of the movement that runs counter to the herd ideal, Nietzsche writes that ‘the life of a human being is too short to carry out such a prolonged will, human beings must be bred, in which duration of such a will is guaranteed through many generations’ (KSA 11: 34[176]). However, Nietzsche does not seem to concern himself with the detailed path to his long view. Rather, he considers the problem of how the hierarchical structure can be created and maintained, not in relation to a transfer of power, but in terms of how to breed human beings and make them keep their place in society.

On this issue, Nietzsche thinks of education and religion as the institutions of breeding.106 The purpose of ‘education’ is ‘to create durable structures in which something long can grow’ (KSA 12: 5[50]). In this respect, he considers ‘education as breeding’ (KSA 12: 9[1]). As we have seen, education’s purpose is not to bring about a change in what one is. Rather, education is to train human beings to ‘learn to act’ and ‘to achieve the certainty of an instinct’; Nietzsche adds, ‘this unconsciousness belongs to every kind of perfection: even the mathematician employs his combinations unconsciously’ (KSA 13: 14[111]). This means to train a person to seek ‘perfection and mastery’ in his own ‘realm of work’ (A 57) and to embody his innate talent, so that ‘he really becomes a talent, that is, becomes what he is, which is to say: discharges it in works and actions’ (HH I 263). Therefore, in this education as breeding, people become natural, living and actualising their nature.107

---

106 Cf. ‘I look at religions and education systems for how far they accumulate and inherit strength; and nothing seems to me more important to study than the laws of breeding, in order not to lose the greatest amount of strength again by inappropriate connections and ways of life’ (KSA 11: 34[176]).

107 Nietzsche refers to the noble human being’s ‘perfect functional certainty of the regulating unconscious instincts’ (GM I 10) and considers ‘whoever is “master” by nature’ as ‘the most
In his early period, Nietzsche believes people should be taught to appreciate the cultural meaning and greatness of exceptional individuals and to accept the natural order of rank. Jonas argues that education in Nietzsche’s thinking is required to help the masses recognise that their differences of natural abilities are ‘not to be resented but embraced’, and this is a way to prevent the many from refusing to be rendered subordinate and ‘to convince the masses to desire the hierarchy that must make up higher culture’. However, in later periods Nietzsche does not attach such a weight to education and schooling as Jonas does. Rather, Nietzsche gives attention to religion as a breeding institution in relation to the problem of making people keep their place. Religion, for him, is a ‘principal means by which one can shape man’ (KSA 11: 34[176]).

In section 61 of Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche writes that the philosopher ‘will use religion for his breeding and educating work’, referring to ‘the selecting, breeding influence which can be wielded with the help of religions’. For ‘a ruling race’ ‘prepared and predestined to command’, religion is a means to rule; it is ‘a bond that binds ruler and subjects together’ and makes this bond and subordination into ‘the consciences’ of the ruled. For the majority, it provides ‘an invaluable contentment with their situation and type’, ‘an ennoblement of obedience’, and ‘something of a justification’ for their mediocrity.

In the next section, Nietzsche emphasises again that religion has to remain as a means: ‘it costs dearly and terribly when religions hold sway, not as a means of breeding and education in the hands of the philosopher, but in their own right and sovereignly, when they themselves want to be final ends and not means beside other means’, like Christianity becomes sovereign and serves itself (BGE 62). Nietzsche’s positive picture of religion, including his idea of eternal recurrence, is another matter for discussion that extends beyond the scope of this thesis. However, it is clear that Nietzsche understands religion as a means to support the social structure, which is consistent with the view presented in HH 472 that religion helps to preserve ‘internal civil peace and the continuity of development’ and ‘the unity of the involuntary [unfreiwilligsten], unconscious artists’ who instinctively create forms (GM II 17).

108 We have discussed Nietzsche’s vision of life in which freedom and necessity of nature are reconciled. Cf. ‘Everything good is instinct – and consequently is easy, necessary, free’ (TI ‘Errors’ 2).

people’s feeling’, so that government and religion go hand in hand.\textsuperscript{110}

Although Nietzsche acknowledges that democratic religions like Christianity at the time help to produce people who will eventually form a broad base of society (KSA 11: 35[9]) and the ‘Christian ideal’ is useful as an opponent against which nobler ideals can become stronger (KSA 12: 10[117]), it is a new religion, not Christianity or one of the existing religions operating as the final ends, that should be used in the society he envisions, since he writes that ‘One must destroy the existing religions’ (KSA 11: 25[491]). Nietzsche asks ‘why did life, physiological well-constitutedness everywhere succumb? Why was there no \textit{affirmative} philosophy [\textit{Philosophie des Ja}], no \textit{affirmative} religion?’, and he finds ‘the historical signs of such movements’ towards affirmative religion in ‘the pagan religion’, ‘Dionysus’, and ‘the Renaissance’ (KSA 13: 14[137]). What then is the religion that says yes to life and ‘physiological well-constitutedness’? Above all, it is not a religion of morality, since ‘culture’ and ‘religions are destroyed by belief in morality’ (KSA 12: 2[107], 2[197]). What the religion should affirm, in Nietzsche’s view, is the rank order:

Religion is thought of as the continuation and deepening of the fundamental political teaching, which is always the doctrine of unequal rights, the necessity of a social construction with the high and the low, with the commanding and the obedient: Religion means to us the doctrine of the rank-difference of the souls (KSA 12: 3[13]); Religion, essentially a teaching of the \textit{rank order}, even an attempt at a \textit{cosmic} order of rank and power (KSA 12: 2[78]).

It is not clear how this religion of rank order, which Nietzsche expects, should prevail. It should give people a sense of belonging to the whole in their respective position in the rank order. It should overcome Christianity that ‘represents the \textit{countermovement} to every morality of breeding’ (TI ‘Improve’ 4) and that bears ‘mortal enmity towards the masters of the earth’ (A 21). Thus, religion should affirm and enable the masters to govern. In this way, ‘These masters of the earth are now to \textbf{replace} God, and to create the deep unconditional trust of the ruled’ (KSA 11: 39[3]).

At this point, Nietzsche’s envisioned society seems to be almost a religious construction.

\textsuperscript{110} In HH, Nietzsche deals with the relationship between the state government and religion, but in the late period, his political vision is beyond a state.
This may be because he wants, with the help of religion, to establish a long-standing structure that makes possible the breeding of humanity. In this sense, even with his scathing criticism of Christianity, he appreciates the ‘durability’ of ‘the broad-based social pyramids that distinguish the Middle Ages’ (GS 356). In his concept of a new politics he goes beyond the state government, unsurprising when he is known to have been severely critical of the modern democratic and nationalist states. By contrast, Nietzsche is inspired by the religious construction of the Middle Ages in two aspects: for its being comprehensive, and hierarchical:

The Middle Ages exhibit in the church an institution with a completely universal goal encompassing all of humanity, moreover, one that was concerned – supposedly – with their highest interests: by contrast, the goals of states and nations exhibited by modern history make a stifling impression; they appear petty, low, materialistic, and spatially limited. (HH I 476)

Let us not forget in the end what a church is, specifically as opposed to any “state”. A church is above all a ruling-structure [Herrschafts-Gebilde] that secures the highest rank to the more spiritual human beings […], – for this reason alone the church is under all circumstances a nobler institution than the state. (GS 358)

Here, Nietzsche appreciates the Middle Ages and the church as an institution within that period in terms of its comprehensive perspective, spatial broadness, and its hierarchical structure in which the spiritual type takes the highest position. The problem Nietzsche has with this institution is that he considers it to be based on pernicious fictions that frustrate healthy and natural life. That is to say, the supposed needs and interests presented by the church are not the ones that are true to human nature, but imaginary ones such as the need for salvation, which do not make life on this earth healthy but only make people deny this earthly life and depend on priests. Therefore, Nietzsche expects a new, nobler institution or a ruling-structure to be established that serves the flourishing of culture and life on the earth beyond a limited interest and space of a state, saying ‘the time is coming when institutions will arise to serve the shared, true needs of all human beings and to put the fantastic archetype, the Catholic Church, into shadow and oblivion’ (HH I 476).

In the rule of a social structure beyond the state, religion can still be a means to provide a
perspective from which people understand the world and their situation. Through religion, thoughts and ideas do not remain just words to people but become their life. ‘The philosopher as a lawgiver […] uses religion’ as a means to lead his attempt at ‘new possibilities’ (KSA 11: 35[45]) to permeate society and to be absorbed into people’s lives, hence religion as a means of breeding. In this respect, Nietzsche’s idea of religion as a means also indicates his recognition of the importance of faith or belief [Glaube]. He often speaks of the creation of new values; however, these values cannot be the guiding principles of one’s life if they do not become one’s faith. In section Vom Lande der Bildung of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, he shows contempt for ‘men of today’ who think they are cultured and enlightened because they do not believe things beyond what they can see and touch, and who say ‘we are complete realists and without belief or superstition’. Nietzsche continues, ‘Unworthy of belief: that is what I call you, you realists! […] Unfruitful you are: therefore you lack belief. But he who had to create always […] believed in belief!’ (Z II ‘Culture’)111

These men of today believe in knowledge, while not knowing how knowledge is produced and not committing to anything. In Nietzsche’s view, knowledge or ‘science [Wissenschaft] itself is never value-creating’; rather, science operates always based on presuppositions, and it first needs ‘a value-creating power in whose service it may believe in itself’ (GM III 25).112 Thus Nietzsche argues that ‘a philosophy, a “belief” must always be there first so that science can gain from it a direction, a meaning, a boundary’ (GM III 24).

In this sense, philosophy is what provides the foundation upon which the world is understood. Religion, in the broad sense of belief or faith, indicates that this foundational interpretation of the world becomes ingrained in people’s lives and view of the world. That is to say, the views and values we embrace have grown from this fundamental belief that philosophy establishes. In this respect, it may also be said that ‘philosophers will also become religions’ (KSA 11: 42[3]). However, those men of today to which Nietzsche refers do not want to commit to anything but their narrow knowledge, while not knowing that the knowledge they have is actually grounded in beliefs. Therefore, Nietzsche says ‘all customs and all beliefs speak motley out of your gestures’, looking down on these ‘motley-spotted men’ who ‘are paintings of all that has ever been believed’ (Z II ‘Culture’).

---

111 This is related to BGE 287 that reads ‘it is the belief which is decisive here, which determines the rank order here, to take up again an old religious formula in a new and deeper sense […]. The noble soul has reverence for itself.’

In conclusion, religion can be the philosopher’s ‘means of breeding and education’ (BGE 62) in two aspects. First, it binds the ruler and the ruled together by teaching people about their difference of rank and convincing them to be content with their type and positions in the hierarchy. Second, it can shape the belief that is to be ingrained. This ‘belief’ is not a personal opinion, but indicates the values become internalised, instinctualised, and accordingly naturalised. The belief therefore operates as the lens through which to see the world, and religion refers to the belief that is shared. In this respect, ‘The power, which lies in the unity of people’s feeling [Volksempfindung], […] is protected by religion’ (HH I 472). Therefore, when Nietzsche speaks of affirmative religion, he is mainly referring to shared belief and the social bonds that come from this belief, not merely to the established forms of religion we know today.

Nietzsche avoids the question of the feasibility of his envisioned social whole and the maintenance of its structure by turning the questions toward the problem of breeding. He wants human beings to be raised in a certain way, arguing that humanity should be bred to be natural and that we should restore the denied human nature and cultivate different types. We have also seen how he views religion as a means of breeding. At this point we can ask again in what sense Nietzsche’s ideas are based on nature. The term ‘natural’, which in the ordinary use of the word often implies not man-made or artificial, may give the initial impression that we should not do anything, i.e. not interfere, but leave things as they would naturally progress. However, Nietzsche emphasises the active force of cultivating and shaping things: the force of breeding the forms of life. Human nature is not something given, in this sense, but something to be cultivated and realised; as Nietzsche writes, there is ‘Not “return to nature”\(^{113}\): for there has never been a natural humanity. […] man reaches nature after a long struggle’ (KSA 12: 10[53]). In this regard, his apparent naturalistic politics presented in the physiological rank order needs an intervention, such as a religious support, to bring unity to people. We need then to investigate how such an intervention can be understood in terms of nature. In the next chapter I will examine what nature means for Nietzsche when it comes to his ideas of the social whole and naturalisation, and how the basis of the social order, the mechanism of how different types can form a whole, is

\(^{113}\) Nietzsche opposes Rousseau’s concept of ‘return to nature’. In Nietzsche’s view, Rousseau believes in the goodness of human nature and regards nature as the peaceful and equal space, and thus he blames the institutions of culture for ruining the goodness of nature (Cf. HH I 463, TI ‘Streifzüge’ 48, KSA 12: 9[125], 9[185]). However, Nietzsche here understands Rousseau’s ‘return to nature’ thoroughly in terms of anti-culture or anti-civilisation. In this regard, Nietzsche oversimplifies Rousseau’s position. See Henning Ottmann, op. cit., ch. II.3.
explained in terms of nature.
Chapter 3:
Naturalisation and the Whole

We have discussed Nietzsche’s project concerning humanity as a whole based on the physiological perspective. The project is part of Nietzsche’s naturalisation programme, which aims to naturalise humanity as a whole. His ‘task’ is ‘the naturalisation of man’ (KSA 9: 11[211]) and ‘to translate man back into nature’ (BGE 230), and this naturalisation programme is centred on the affirmation of nature; as he says in ‘great politics’, ‘one affirms what one is, one denies what one is not’ (KSA 13: 25[1]). Here a question arises regarding what this naturalisation means in relation to the formation of the whole.

The first point to note is that Nietzsche sees nature through the lens of the concept of will to power: ‘homo natura’. The “will to power” (KSA 12: 2[131]). In other words, ‘to translate man back into nature’ the ‘basic text homo natura must be recognised again’ (BGE 230) based on the will to power. This means that we do not simply accept the chaotic characteristic of nature and dissolve in nature as ‘chaos’ or its indifference (GS 109), since will to power also means the power of exerting oneself onto things. It should be noted that the ‘nature’ of which Nietzsche speaks involves human nature strong enough to play with chaos and even defy to nature’s indifference and brutality. Nietzsche understands that life is will to power, but he often describes nature as something chaotic that is elusive, uncertain, indifferent to human affairs, and without purpose and mercy. Thus he writes, ‘how could you live according to this indifference? Living – is that not precisely wanting to be other than this nature? Is living not assessing, preferring, being unjust, being limited, wanting to be different?’ (BGE 9) What Nietzsche calls for as a ‘return to nature’ is not a return to chaos. As Conway points out, ‘the “return to nature” that he envisions thus involves a return to human nature as the sole authority or justification for the nomothetic preferences required by the restricted economy of Life’,\(^\text{114}\) the economy regulated by the philosophers within the general economy of nature and will to power. It is human nature to claim life in nature; that is, to give form of life into amorphous nature and to create a hierarchy of values in nature’s indifference – this is perfectly natural as the expression of will to power and is the task of the philosophers. Therefore, rather than settling in ‘the infinite domain of Chaos’ as Seung

argues,\textsuperscript{115} Nietzsche reminds us of human nature: ‘We speak of nature and, in doing so, forget ourselves: we ourselves are nature’ (HH II ii 327).

If we understand will to power in terms of ‘active’ and ‘reactive’, the whole structured based on the physiological rank order is the place where one’s life is in accordance with one’s physiological constitution or condition, which is the way of being active discussed in the previous chapter. The problem is how physiologically different types can form a whole: how this naturalisation programme that centres on human nature is related to the formation of the whole. We have discussed a means of maintaining a social structure, but we need to ask how the formation of the whole is considered from the perspective of nature and will to power. Individuals of different types with different power will not automatically gather to be a whole if they remain merely as individuals. In other words, if there is no social character in nature itself, a society could be seen to be formed ‘by accident’, as Hobbes understands.\textsuperscript{116} What then is the basis that allows individuals to be incorporated into the social order? As nature is understood in terms of will to power, there should be a certain social character in the concept of will to power. In this respect the will to power is not only about the individual’s power enhancement or feeling of power; this chapter explores the social aspect of this concept, particularly with attention to the idea of affects. This examination will demonstrate the relationship between the will to power and the formation of the whole and culture.

The First Nature

The starting point of the programme is ‘the dehumanisation of nature’ (KSA 9: 11[211]), which is to strip the overlaid moral understandings off nature. The moralisation of nature has led humanity to split from human nature or natural instincts, and this split is the source of the sickness of humanity. For this reason, morality becomes the main target for Nietzsche’s scathing attack.\textsuperscript{117} However, as Nietzsche seeks different grounds for morality rather than simply its elimination (cf. D 103), he does not abandon the term morality but rather advances his ‘moral naturalism’ (KSA 12: 9[86]).


\textsuperscript{117} In a nutshell, it is Nietzsche’s understanding that ‘culture is destroyed by belief in morality’ (KSA 12: 2[107]).
I put a principle into a formula. Every naturalism in morality, that is, every *healthy* morality, is governed by an instinct of life – some decree of life is fulfilled by a particular canon of “should” and “should not”, some inhibition and hostility on the path of life is thereby shoved aside. *Anti-natural* morality, that is, almost every morality that has been taught, revered, and preached up to now, turns precisely *against* the instincts of life (TI ‘Morality’ 4).

Naturalism in morality for Nietzsche is to affirm the instinct of life; what is significant is on what instinct this morality is based. Compassion can be regarded as the instinct to which morality is reduced, as Nietzsche fears, and ‘the philosophers as *moralists*’ in this sense ‘undermine the naturalism of morality’ (KSA 13: 15[5]). It is not that Nietzsche here thinks, for example, that any action to help others which would usually be considered compassionate should be prevented. He does not deny that ‘many actions called immoral ought to be avoided and resisted, or that many called moral ought to be done and encouraged’; however, he maintains that ‘the former should be avoided and the latter encouraged *for other reasons than heretofore*’ (D 103). These ‘other reasons’ refer to self-affirmation as opposed to self-denial; that is to say, the affirmation of our nature or natural instinct without confining ourselves to self-denying values.

This idea of the affirmation of nature is at the heart of Nietzsche’s naturalisation programme. While Nietzsche considers nature generally in terms of will to power since the concept is introduced in *Zarathustra*, he thinks that individuals have different structures of drives, and from the early period onwards he seems to keep ruminating on the nature that should be sought for each person to be healthy. The problem is that there is no unaffected nature, and human nature is conditioned and affected by circumstances. Nietzsche was well aware of this, and he pointed out that most value judgements, our behaviour, and our feelings are affected by and adopted from others and then ‘become our nature’ (D 104; D 34, 35, 38, 247, etc.). In other words, ‘*nature arises from the long-lasting practice*’ (D 248). We can understand that his genealogical work is therefore designed to trace the practices that have formed our nature. This also connects with Nietzsche’s belief in the inheritance of

---

118 This does not mean that there is no nature inherent in a person and anyone can develop any natural abilities. Nietzsche clearly states that ‘Every type has its limits; beyond these there is no development’ (KSA 13: 14[133]). Therefore, nature can be cultivated within the type’s limits.
acquired traits, and with his idea of breeding. The line between nature and culture is blurred, and cultural practice that will train people to incorporate certain values into the body becomes significant. If human nature is always affected by circumstances, what nature are we required to affirm?

In his early and middle periods, Nietzsche distinguishes between the first nature and second nature. The first nature is the ‘inherited nature’ given to us as ‘the outcome of earlier generations’, and the second nature is what is cultivated as ‘a new instinct’ in us. On the face of it, his view of the second nature appears negative because the second nature is implanted ‘so that our first nature withers away’. This implantation is a dangerous attempt at ‘negating of the past’ that has formed us (UM II: 3). As we learn what is socially desirable and approved behaviour, we develop a second nature whereby a certain socially acceptable drive predominates over the first (D 38). Human beings have their own nature, but its development can be hindered, in Nietzsche’s view, by contemporary education and upbringing that is applied to all in a blanket fashion, not distinguishing between or adapting for different types. This contemporary method of upbringing compels a man to accept values against his nature, which in Nietzsche’s logic will lead him to ‘fall sick’ and ‘ruin his nervous energy [Nervenkraft]’ (D 500). In this situation, ‘With most people, the embryo of the first nature dries up’ and only a few can be strong ‘enough to shed this skin’ of the second nature ‘when under its cover their first nature has matured’ (D 455).^119

When Nietzsche speaks of one living according to one’s nature, it is arguably this first nature that he has in mind. However, it should be noted that the distinction between first and second nature does not mean that his intention is to entirely deny the second nature and bring out the first, since there is no such thing as absolutely ahistorical human nature; ‘this first nature was once a second nature, and every victorious second nature will become a first nature’ (UM II 3). As stated above, nature comes from long-lasting practice (D 248, GS 290). Nietzsche at first seems to consider ‘nature’ in terms of ‘talent [Begabung]’ in contrast with ‘learning’, but then again, he writes ‘he who learns bestows [begaben] talent upon himself’. Goethe and Raphael, without ‘envy’, ‘were both great learners and not just the exploiters of those lodes’ of what was given from ‘their ancestors’ (D 540). They were able to use their

---

^119 What Nietzsche is critical of is that contemporary education or upbringing is conducted in a way that the socially and commonly developed second nature causes people’s first nature to wither away. Therefore, as he alerts us to the danger of implantation of the second nature causing neglect of the inherited first, what has to grow to maturity is the first nature, and the second nature should then be cultivated to nurture and enrich the first.
formative power, actively and without envy, to appropriate other nature. In this respect, the interplay between first and second nature is significant. Given that human beings live always in relationship to society and culture, we understand that there is a limit to what can be achieved by individuals’ personal cultivation if society as a whole is not healthy. It is therefore understandable for Nietzsche to envision a new society or a new whole where healthy individuals can be raised.

In his letters dated December 1882, Nietzsche writes ‘I have a “second nature”, but not to destroy the first [nature] but to bear it’; ‘I will now prove that only with this second nature I have entered into the actual [eigentlich] possession of my first nature’ (KSB 6: 344-5). These statements emphasise the second nature formed by the social context or interrelation that affects our first nature; unfortunately for the scholastic pursuit of continuity, he no longer explicitly uses the term ‘first nature’ in his later period.120

With the interplay described above in mind, it is difficult to create a reference point for measuring the health of nature and judging the kind of nature it is suggested that we should strive for. Nietzsche seems to emphasise the first nature and the ‘drives that constitute his being [Wesen]’ (D 119), but drives are ‘transformed’, and what transforms the drives by being attached to them Nietzsche calls the ‘second nature’ (D 38). It is hard then to reach the first nature, or to ‘return to myself’, the ‘nethermost self’ (EH ‘HH’ 4), since our nature is already engaged in a web of social relationships. If we take Nietzsche’s view of the interplay of our two natures into account and we understand that drives are transformable, it is hard to create a single position from which the different drives that constitute human nature are judged and prioritised. Thus, Nietzsche no longer uses the term ‘the first nature’ since 1883;121 instead, he uses the concept ‘will to power’ as a tool for understanding nature.

From this discussion we learn that Nietzsche gives weight to the social and cultural aspects of nature; that is to say, the fact that human nature is coordinated and transformed in social relationships. This aspect is also included in the concept of will to power, as we shall see. By looking into the social character within the concept, we can see what the basis of the

120 However, we can see that Nietzsche’s interest in this interplay between the first and second nature, or between nature and culture, continues in his genealogical work and discussion on the idea of breeding.

121 He uses ‘second nature’ once in the late period when he criticises Christian morality for replacing ‘health’ with ‘salvation of the soul’: ‘The concept of “sin” invented along with the torture instrument that belongs with it, the concept of “free will”, in order to confuse the instincts, to make mistrust of the instincts into second nature’ (EH ‘Destiny’ 8).
Affect

The will to power can of course be considered and examined in various ways. Nietzsche thinks ‘life itself is will to power’ (BGE 13) and explores ‘a world whose essence is will to power’ (BGE 186). He explores and considers will to power using several terms: drive, affect, desire, and instinct. Our conscious thoughts and movements are symptoms and below them lie ‘drives’ (KSA 11: 39[6]) and ‘affect’ (KSA 12: 1[61]) but also ‘desires’, and ‘the basic desire’ [Grundbegierde] is ‘the will to power’ (KSA 12: 1[59]). The idea of will to power also indicates that life is ‘instinct’ for growth and power (A 6), and ‘the basic drive of life’ [Lebens-Grundtrieb] is ‘the expansion of power’ (GS 349). These varied descriptions come from the complex and multifaceted nature of life itself, with the ‘multiplicity of “will to power”: each with a multiplicity of expressions and forms’ (KSA 12: 1[58]). These descriptions show the multi-layered aspects of the concept. Life unfolds itself in various ways, through thoughts, desires, emotions, etc. In other words, life is a field wherein these express themselves. Nietzsche understands these expressions in terms of will to power, which is ‘the innermost essence of being’ (KSA 13: 14[80]). He refers to this essence and its expressions with the same name; in essence, will to power is the affect and drive and desire that are expressed as affects and drives and desires.

At the basic level of these life expressions, Nietzsche believes, are drive and affect above all. This chapter focuses more on affect, because looking at will to power in relation to affect shows its social character in an evident way and reveals its political implications more clearly, especially the implications associated with the formation of the whole. What then is the affective understanding of will to power? Nietzsche speaks of ‘will to power psychologically’, holding ‘that the will to power is the primitive form of affect [primitive Auffekt-Form], that all other affects are only its developments’ (KSA 13: 14[121]; cf. BGE 23). He thinks about the ‘derivation of all affects from the one will to power’, and considers them as of the same essence [wesensgleich] (KSA 12: 10[57]). Will to power is the affect that is to consist in and be expressed as all affects. Since life is ‘the foundation of the


123 Cf. ‘Morphology of the affects: Reduction of these to the will to power’ (KSA 12: 6[26]); ‘form of
affects’ (BGE 258) and life is will to power, will to power is also considered the foundation of the affects.

It has often been discussed that drives are essential for understanding our nature. We need to see now in what sense affect is constitutive of nature. The affect here is not simply a mental state, as Nietzsche says ‘what is really going on in the activity of our human affects’ is the ‘physiological movements’ (KSA 9: 11[128]) and ‘all affects’ are ‘a state of body’ (KSA 10: 9[44]). However, Nietzsche does not provide a clear definition of affect. Broadly, scholars understand affects to be ‘feelings’, 124 or ‘any mental episode which constitutively involves a pro- or con- attitude’.125 In a rather different stance Emden, highlighting the precedence given to biology, asserts that affects are not ‘discrete mental states’ but the same as what Spinoza meant by affect [affectus].126 Spinoza used ‘affect’ [affectus] differently from emotions in an ordinary sense127 and argued that all affects arose from three primary affects: desire, joy and sadness.128 Nietzsche similarly regards affects as a state of body and considers them as derived from will to power, and saw ‘pleasure’ [Lust] and ‘displeasure’ [Unlust] as ‘cardinal facts’ in the action of will to power (KSA 13: 14[80]). However, due to the lack of explanation in Nietzsche’s text as well as in Emden’s it is not clear that what Nietzsche means by the term was necessarily influenced by Spinoza.

Whether affects are understood as mental states or whether their physiological basis is emphasised, Nietzsche’s comments on affect doing the work of interpreting and its relation to the will to power have often been somewhat downplayed. For example, Gemes argues that it is better to focus on drives rather than affects because ‘it is drives that Nietzsche most consistently and plausibly emphasizes as the basis of our nature’, and an affect or ‘a feeling,

---


127 ‘By affect I understand affections of the body by which the body’s power of acting is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same time, the ideas of these affections’ (Spinoza, Ethica, III, D3, in Edwin Curley trans. The collected works of Spinoza, vol. 1).

128 Spinoza, Ethica, III, P11, Schol.
“what it feels like” does not seem to have the right temporal spread or active character to do interpreting’. This kind of view proceeds mainly from the understanding that affects are occurrent feelings. Are affects merely incidental then to the activity of drives?

We find that in many places Nietzsche uses the terms ‘affect’ and ‘drive’ together, such as ‘soul as social construction of drives and affects’ [Gesellschaftsbau der Triebe und Affekte] (BGE 12). Although he does not seem to differentiate between them clearly, scholars have tried to clarify the difference, although not particularly in relation to will to power. Janaway understands that ‘a drive is a relatively stable tendency to active behaviour of some kind, while an affect, put very roughly, is what it feels like when a drive is active inside oneself’. Similarly, Constâncio and Branco draw a distinction in the editors’ introduction: ‘by “drives” Nietzsche means the “forces”, “under-wills”, or “wills to power” that direct our behavior towards the satisfaction of organic needs. An “affect” is simply what it feels like to be driven by a drive’. Katsafanas clarifies the connection between drives and affects by defining drives as ‘non-conscious dispositions that generate affective orientations’. Surely affects accompany drives, and we can agree with the analysis in this respect. However, Nietzsche often puts them together without clarification or differentiation as if they are interchangeable. For example, Nietzsche writes that ‘the animals follow their drives and affects: we are animals. […] and morality is only a sign language of our drives?’ (KSA 10: 7[76]). Later in another passage he posits that ‘moralties are only a sign language of the affects’ (BGE 187); it is understandable then that some scholars do not distinguish sharply between the two terms.

Still, if ‘drives and affects’ is not merely a pleonastic expression, they at some point should play different roles in constituting our nature, and affects should not be considered merely incidental to drives. The first thing to point out in demonstrating this is that although affects are related to feelings, affects operate at a deeper level than feelings. Nietzsche says, ‘under every thought there is an affect’ and the ‘series and succession of feelings, thoughts,

131 João Constâncio / Maria João Mayer Branco eds., Nietzsche on instinct and language, Berlin; Boston: De Gruyter, 2011, xvi.
etc. are symptoms of the actual occurrence!’ (KSA 12: 1[61]) Here it is suggested that the actual occurrence is the affect, and feelings are only the aspect we are conscious of. Further, affects are not merely transient feelings but can have continuous influence or the temporal spread, which concerns Gemes as seen above. Affects are related to the mechanism of our physiological response to what we encounter in the world, and this mechanism can be ingrained in the body. Nietzsche understands that ‘affects’ are connected to ‘the formation of the memory-material – continuous living on and interacting [Zusammenwirken]’ (KSA 11: 25[514]), and memory leads to ‘a habituation to a particular causal interpretation’ (TI ‘Errors’ 4). This view of interpretation in relation to affects not only applies to causality but can also be understood in a broader context. Nietzsche writes that ‘all affects’ are ‘first a state of the body: which is interpreted. Later the interpretation freely produces the state’ (KSA 10: 9[44]). This shows that once the mechanism of how we respond to the world, how we interpret, is ingrained in the body, this mechanism or interpretation can produce our bodily state – so in the end, the interpretation does not come after events but comes first. With this in mind, we need to look at the concept of will to power in relation to drives and affects more closely.

The Will to Power as The Drive and Affect

Behind our conscious thoughts and activities is the ‘play of affects’ (KSA 13: 11[113]) or the ‘play and struggle of affects’ (KSA 12: 1[75]), and the nature of this play is agonal (cf. BGE 117). It should be noted that Nietzsche does not think that the way the affects or drives work is entirely individual. He makes critical comments in a note on Spinoza’s idea of self-preservation: ‘Pre-egoism, herd-drive [Heerdentrieb] are older than the “willing self-preserving”. The human being is first developed as a function: from this the individual releases itself again later, while the individual as a function has come to know innumerable conditions of the whole, of the organism, and has gradually been incorporated’ (KSA 9: 11[193]; cf. 11[182]).

In this respect, the human being and its drives are raised first in the context of society. Therefore, Nietzsche does not consider the play of affects and drives to be simply an occurrence isolated to the individual, since our existence is in the context of society and relationships with others. I argue that we can understand that in Nietzsche’s paired expression ‘drives and affects’, the drives refer more to intra-relation and the affects to inter-relation. In other words, the drives are the basic element that constitutes an individual
formed by the arrangement of drives, and the affects indicate how this individual is situated in the relational network of the whole.

It is discussed that our judgments, especially moral judgments, result from affects about, or affective responses to, situations.\textsuperscript{134} Even in his middle period, Nietzsche clearly emphasises the moral feelings that prescribe moral actions. But this feeling, this affective response, is not an individual’s personal one;\textsuperscript{135} ‘evidently moral feelings are transmitted’ in the way that children ‘imitate’ the older generation’s ‘inclinations for and aversions to certain actions’ (D 34). These feelings become so natural for them that they grow to believe they are rationally justified. However, ‘behind feelings there stand judgments and evaluations which we inherit in the form of feelings (inclinations, aversions)’. He continues, ‘to trust one’s feeling – that means obeying one’s grandfather and grandmother and their grandparents more than […] our reason and our experience’ (D 35). It is notable that Nietzsche thinks ‘the same drive evolves into the painful feeling […] or the pleasant feeling’ under the different customs and social evaluations attached to it, which he calls the ‘second nature’ as seen above, and in this way, drives are ‘transformed’ (D 38). Drives can be transformed in the sense that some drives grow and others wither, in line with their interaction with external circumstances.

It is important to note that Nietzsche places great emphasis on the social character of drives, or the second nature, as the factor coordinating drives. In his later period he still believes in the transformation of drives, arguing ‘drives are the after-effects of long-standing evaluations, which now act instinctively’ (KSA 11: 25[460]). Nietzsche’s concept of drives transformed by socially attached feelings evolves into the paired expression ‘drives and affects’ in his late period. The transformation is now understood in terms of ‘interpretation’: ‘the will to power interprets’ (KSA 12: 2[148]),\textsuperscript{136} and ‘the interpretation itself, as a form of the will to power, exists […] as an affect’ (KSA 12: 2[151]). ‘Who interprets? – our affects’ (KSA 12: 2[190]). This affective interpretation shows ‘a symptom of certain physiological conditions’ (ibid.) that reveals what one’s life needs. In this respect, affects are not just what it feels like to be driven by drives, but rather show how we interpret and how we instinctively see and utilise the world for our growth. All our activities are based on

\textsuperscript{134} See Poellner, op. cit., 2007, and Leiter, op. cit., 2015.

\textsuperscript{135} Cf. ‘through unspeakably long habituation, human beings first perceive the affects of society […], and not as individuals!’ (KSA 9: 11[182])

\textsuperscript{136} Cf. ‘This “will to power” expresses itself in the interpretation’ (KSA 12: 10[138]).
affectivity, the unconscious process of the affective interpretation of the world.

Furthermore, what we understand as drives always work or are expressed in the form of affects. This is because on the one hand, as Katsafanas argues, drives induce affective orientations, and on the other hand and more importantly for our discussion, the movements of the drives of individuals are always within the broader context of the whole since we live in the world as will to power, ‘essentially the world of relationships [Relations-Welt]’ (KSA 13: 14[93]) where ‘only relations constitute being [Wesen]’ (KSA 13: 14[122]). That Nietzsche already speaks of the ‘social drive’ [socialer Trieb], like ‘fearfulness’ (D 174) directing the moral principle, hints that drives are in the social context and already in the form of affects.

Affectivity indicates the relations or our being in the relations. As seen above, Nietzsche points out the imitation of feelings which shows how our judgments, inclinations and aversions are already settled in us. Our life is situated in this kind of affective web of relationships, which generates a certain affective interpretation of the world. This interpretation becomes ingrained in us as we grow up. Human beings are always born and live in a certain affective network, and this network generates the interpretation to be built in them. This does not mean that there is only this network and there are no drives or affects that belong to the individual, but what we regard as belonging to the individual does not exist by itself but operates within the network and so cannot be thought of apart from the network.

For example, appetite may be regarded as intrinsic to an individual, but the way the appetite is activated is largely prescribed in the network, so that something tasty to people in one country can be repulsive to people in another country merely by imagining it. This is the same with sex drive. We know the ancient Greeks treated sex differently to the way modern society does, and in particular differently to the largely repressive approach of Christian morality. That we acknowledge that general standards of beauty have changed over time means these changes have taken place in the affective network that generates certain interpretations based on which we encounter the world. We may easily think that human drives are intrinsic and the same irrespective of circumstances, but we can imagine how differently the structure of the totality of our drives will be shaped and work should we grow up in a community where people believe men’s libido is aggressive and women’s passive, or

---

wherein *Eros* is understood as longing for harmony and beauty as Plato understood it.\(^{138}\)

In this way, the structure of drives constituting the individual is formed by the individual’s interaction with the affective network. The drives refer more to the intra-relation and the affects to the inter-relation, though they are not separated, and Nietzsche’s paired expression ‘drives and affects’ places emphasis on the social character of the expression of drives, meaning that drives are coordinated by affects and expressed in the form of affects.

The world as will to power is the world of relationships. In this light it makes sense that affect, which implies relationships, is used as the term to describe the concept of will to power. The will to power consists in wills to power, the multiplicity of the will to power, and this multiplicity signifies the relationships which are in the play of affects. In this respect, the will to power is the most basic ‘drive and affect’ from which other ‘drives and affects’ stem. Nietzsche remarks that ‘will’ is ‘above all an *affect*: and specifically, the affect of command’ (BGE 19). The command is toward power, and this ‘toward’ indicates the drive, specifically ‘the basic drive of life’ [*Lebens-Grundtrieb*] as ‘the expansion of power’ (GS 349). Thus, will to power refers to affect that drives towards power. In this way, the will to power is related to the paired expression ‘drives and affects’ and becomes the basic premise upon which one may view the world.

**The Formation of The Whole and Culture**

From the discussion above we understand that the economy of drives and affects points to the dimension beyond the individual. Nietzsche writes:

The world seen, felt, interpreted as thus and thus so that organic life may preserve itself in this perspective of interpretation. Man is *not* only a single individual but the living total-organic [*Gesammt-Organische*] in a particular line. That *he* endures proves that a species of interpretation (albeit continuously being constructed) has also endured, that the system of interpretation has not changed. (KSA 12: 7[2])

The way people live represents a certain interpretation of the world produced by the

\(^{138}\) Cf. Plato, *Symposium*. 
economy of drives and affects. The character of this economy is basically agonal, and there is a struggle between interpretations. The formation of the whole points to the relatively stable status of the affective interpretation, and this stability can give rise to cultural unity. Nietzsche therefore sets a high value on durability: ‘duration is a first-rank value on earth’ (GS 356). Nevertheless, struggle is necessary. This struggle is between the ‘incorporated piece of interpretation’, that is, ‘older evaluations which are so firmly incorporated that they belong to our basic constitution’, and the new interpretation based on ‘newer needs’. The status in which there is not a struggle and the dynamic of interpretation ends means the ruin of life and of the whole (KSA 12: 7[2]).

Here the struggle of interpretation is not a horizontal movement; a ‘reinterpretation of the strengthened elements into the “good”’ (KSA 12: 9[185]) is needed. The ‘reinterpretability of the world’ is related to the ‘managing of affects’ (KSA 11: 35[84]), and this reinterpretation is the enterprise of Nietzsche’s great human beings with the long view who create values to direct humanity. They are the ones who can initiate the reshaping of the existing affective interpretation. This change in the affective interpretation as the way we instinctively see the world is also a change in our ‘taste’ concerning the world. Thus, Nietzsche asks, ‘[h]ow does the general taste change?’. The great individuals who initiate the change enforce ‘the judgment of their taste’ to make it ‘a need of everyone’ (GS 39). Since ‘our needs’, which represent our physiological condition, are the basis of the interpretation (KSA 12: 7[60]), the change they initiate will eventually form a certain affective interpretation based on which people conduct their relationships and see the world. In a sense, they conquer the world: ‘to conquer – is the natural consequence of an overflowing power’. The ‘philosophers’, like ‘artists’, ‘want to make their taste ruling in the world’ (KSA 10: 7[107]). The change of the interpretation, then, involves this vertical movement.

The struggle for the dominant interpretation might seem to be at odds with Nietzsche’s idea of the physiological rank order and his emphasis on the durable structure. Nietzsche advocates the strengthening of characters of the types through generations; however, it is not that he promotes a static society. He is well aware of ‘the gradual increase in inherited stupidity, which follows all stability like its shadow’ (HH I 224). However, the dynamics between old and new interpretations do not mean an unstable and rapidly changing society, which only indicates chaos of valuations. He believes the dynamics are possible only when based on a stable structure.
We can find a clue to how Nietzsche explains the dynamics in social change or progress in section 224 of *Human, All Too Human*, where he employs the term ‘inoculation’. Here he argues that ‘Every progress of the whole must be preceded by a partial weakening’. There are individuals who attempt new things but unfortunately perish without gaining influence. However, ‘in general, especially when they have descendants’, they effect a partial weakening and come to inflict ‘a wound upon the stable element of a community’. ‘Precisely in this wounded and weakened spot, the whole collective being is inoculated, as it were, with something new’. However, Nietzsche adds, the whole has to be ‘strong enough to absorb this new thing into its blood and to assimilate it’; otherwise, it only dismantles the whole. In this sense, durability is a necessary condition for constant social development.139 The ‘continuous development and ennobling inoculation’ is possible ‘only when there is securely founded and guaranteed greatest duration’, though established authority will resist this inoculation. Nietzsche sums up, ‘two things must come together: firstly an increase in the stable force through binding minds in belief and communal feeling; then the possibility of attaining higher goals through […] the occurrence of weakenings and woundings of the stable force’. In other words, there should be a durable society but at the same time the attempts at a new interpretation or reinterpretation are always needed.

In the vertical movement, great individuals seek to embed themselves and their values in society and shape it. If this is successful, people come to share a certain affective interpretation to form a whole. In this respect, society is ‘a means of war’ to raise people in a certain way, and ‘Life is a consequence of war’ (KSA 13: 14[40]). Also in this way, when there is a stable interpretation of the world, people can have a style, which will lead to a culture.140 As already affirmed, Nietzsche’s return to nature is not a return to chaotic nature. We as nature try to shape ourselves and the whole, and in this context chaos refers to space where we can experiment or play with our power to shape the world; Nietzsche says, ‘one must still have chaos in one to be able to give birth to a dancing star’ (Z ‘Prologue’ 5). Also along these lines Goethe, whom Nietzsche regards as the exemplary ascent to nature, is considered ‘a stylised man’ (KSA 7: 29[119]) and ‘the most comprehensive, but still not

---

139 Here, referring to Machiavelli, Nietzsche emphasises again that the most important in politics is ‘duration’, not ‘the form of governments’.

140 For example, the affective interpretation of the Greek world is expressed as Greek style and culture; and what Nietzsche often describes as the Greek instinct or the fundamental instincts of the Greeks, which Greek people would also develop in them as they grew up in that culture, indicates the foundation for that interpretation and culture. The relationship between style and culture is dealt with in chapter 5.
chaotic man’ (KSA 12: 9[179]). Thus Nietzsche considers ‘naturalising’ in terms of the ‘instinct for style’ (KSA 8: 23[7]).

For Nietzsche, nature and culture are not opposing sides of life. Rather, the full naturalisation of humanity goes hand in hand with a healthy culture. When he writes ‘my task: the dehumanisation of nature and then the naturalisation of man’ (KSA 9: 11[211]), this means his intent is to strip away all supernatural and moral interpretations painted over nature from nature, and then to place humans in this naked nature again to allow them to fully express human nature and play with will to power. This affective engagement with the full economy of life involves the ‘return to nature’ as ‘transformation of nature’ (UM VI: 5) and as ascent to ‘high, free, even terrible nature and naturalness […] that plays, that is allowed to play, with great tasks’ (TI ‘Streifzüge’ 48). Facing nature stripped of moral humanisation means opening up the space for the human activity to be wholly exercised and realised, which will lead to ‘culture as a new and improved physis’ (UM II: 10). In a note in 1887, Nietzsche understands ‘the naked nature’ is ‘where the power quantities are admitted as decisive (as rank-determining)’ and ‘where the great style appears again’ (KSA 12: 9[75]). Healthy life expressing the active will to power strives for culture as stylised nature, for ‘the great style is the expression of the “will to power” itself’ (KSA 13: 11[138]). Healthy people endeavour to achieve ‘the great style no longer merely art but turned into reality, truth, life’ (A 59). This is the end that Nietzsche’s naturalisation project is expected to reach.

The Most Comprehensive Soul

The great individual who shapes the whole with a new interpretation Nietzsche also calls ‘the most comprehensive soul’ [die umfänglichste Seele]. This expression has not been dealt with in Nietzsche scholarship, but is useful for our discussion because it contains both aspects of ruling over the whole and new attempts that social progress requires. The most comprehensive soul is one who expands their horizons to the whole, which I mentioned in the first chapter. In general, ‘for the ordinary, everyday man the value of life rests solely on the fact that he takes himself to be more important than the world’ (HH I 33). Therefore, their horizons are flat and not expanded. We have discussed that Nietzsche calls the majority, ordinary people, slaves, but he also calls slaves ‘useful […] humans-fragments’ (KSA 11: 25[242]) since they are not those who command with a view of the whole, but exist as a part, wherein they exist already as instruments.
By contrast, a comprehensive person manages ‘to conceive and to feel the total consciousness of humanity within himself’ (HH I 33), with strength not to despair at the unbearable lightness of the value of life. Nietzsche’s expected ‘philosopher’ is ‘the man of the most comprehensive responsibility, who has the conscience for the overall development of humanity’ (BGE 61). For Nietzsche ‘the task’ is ‘to form a ruling class with the most comprehensive souls, who are ready for the various tasks of earth-governance’ (KSA 11: 25[221]). In short, Nietzsche explains this human type as follows: ‘The man, who most strongly commands, leads, sets new values, judges most comprehensively on the whole humanity and knows means to shape it – in some cases sacrifices it for a higher structure. Only when there is the governance of the earth [Regierung der Erde], such beings will emerge’ (KSA 11: 26[243]).

The comprehensive souls are in ‘heights of the soul’ (BGE 30) where they can both govern the whole and attempt a new cultural development. Here comes Nietzsche’s split language, or what Siemens analyses as Nietzsche’s equivocation about Herrschaft.141 On the one hand, Nietzsche considers ‘the most powerful and comprehensive souls’ as opposed to ‘clever-Epicurean’ ‘weaker natures’ (KSA 11: 25[222]). Making an objection to ‘the risk of reduction’ shown in the Epicurean life (KSA 12: 1[123]),142 Nietzsche looks toward another path, i.e. the way of Caesar, for whom to shape himself is also to shape the world. For ‘the genuine philosophers’ who ‘are commanders and legislators’ (BGE 211), to rule means above all to carry through their ideas and values, and as an exemplar of this Nietzsche sets forth Caesar and Napoleon. ‘Great men like Caesar and Napoleon are living types! All other governance is imitation’ (KSA 10: 7[119]). They are not seen as merely political rulers who obsess only about their political power. For them, like sculptors working on marble, to shape the whole is also to realise themselves, and they do ‘“disinterested” work on their marble’, bearing ‘the greatest responsibility’ (KSA 12: 1[56]).143 They have a long view of the whole.

141 Siemens, in regard to Nietzsche’s equivocal attitude toward ruling, suggests three positions that philosopher-legislators can adopt, analysing Nietzsche’s mid-1880s posthumous fragments. According to his analysis, (1) they have a spiritual task, so that they do not rule, but are backed by political rulers; or (2) they engage in rule, but at the same time, they also, in their own sphere, are exploring new values and possibilities of humans; or (3) they are by no means involved in rule since they are beyond the political realm. Therefore, Siemens claims that ‘any attempt to ascribe a coherent, settled political vision to Nietzsche’ would fail, and asks for thinking about Nietzsche’s philosophy in various ways. See Siemens, op. cit., 2008, p. 240 ff.

142 ‘the risk of reduction, of rest, is right there: against Spinozistic or Epicurean’ (KSA 12: 1[123]).

143 ‘To stay objective, hard, firm, severe in carrying through a thought – [...] One can somewhat intuit with natures like Caesar and Napoleon about “disinterested” work on their marble, whatever the cost possibly in men. On this road lies the future of the highest men: to bear the greatest responsibility and
In this respect, Nietzsche says, ‘like Caesar […] I will shape and transform me and you’ (KSA 10: 10[3]).

Nietzsche views the comprehensive soul as the most independent, and sometimes implies it needs to be beyond the realm of dominion; ‘The most comprehensive soul’ is ‘standing alone’ and ‘going alone’ (KSA 11: 35[25]). ‘It is the business of the very few to be independent: – it is a privilege of the strong’ (BGE 29). This few may look down on their times from the heights where they enjoy self-fashioning and development. They are ‘a race with its own sphere of life, with an excess of strength for beauty, bravery, culture, manners to the highest peak of the spirit’ (KSA 12: 9[153]). While Nietzsche regards the Übermensch as the masters of the earth, he also in one passage describes the Übermensch as the same being as the Epicurean god (KSA 11: 35[73]; cf. 10: 7[21]), which, as it is known, resides in intermundus without external interference. However, the ‘Epicurean spectator-god’ (KSA 12: 2[13]) is a being, as an onlooker, who puts distance between himself and the world rather than intervening in it, which may be read as contrary to ‘some divine hammer’ that shapes the world (BGE 62). Because of the Epicurean limits, as we have seen, Nietzsche wishes ‘the lonely height may not eternally be solitary and sufficient to itself’, while affirming ‘lust to rule’ as ‘bestowing virtue’ (Z III ‘Three Evils’ 2).

The origin of this split language between the models of Caesar and Epicurean god can be found in the expression ‘the most comprehensive soul’ itself. Nietzsche does not speak of a medium by which people can equally participate in the whole, such as universal laws applying to all, or an other-worldly god presiding over the fate of humanity. What becomes comprehensive is not an abstract self, which is of the first person in its description but of the third person in content, as in the ‘I’ in modern philosophy that is not the individual self of Descartes or Kant but the universal and abstract self. Rather, the most comprehensive soul expands its horizon to the whole while being a single characteristic individual. The most comprehensive soul is the individual, but it identifies itself with the whole.

In this respect, Nietzsche wants the individual, without any medium, to be the master of the whole. A very symptomatic remark is his ‘last consideration’: ‘after the old god is removed, I am ready to govern the world’ (KSA 13: 25[19]). Nietzsche’s description of the master of the earth and the most comprehensive soul as both the individual one and the

\[\text{not break by it}\] (KSA 12: 1[56]). Cf. ‘The earth now lying there as a marble-workshop: a ruling race with absolute force is necessary’ (KSA 11: 35[74]).

144 ‘He who with opposite needs, no longer Epicurean but with some divine hammer in his hand’.
whole in a sense, comes to be similar to the notion of God as one and all, an all-encompassing unity. Of course, this God is not possible. Rather, Nietzsche calls for the overman \(\text{Übermensch}\): ‘Could you create a god? – So be silent about all gods! But you could well create the overman’ (Z II ‘Islands’).

Zarathustra finally declares: ‘Dead are all gods: now we want the overman to live’ (Z I ‘Bestowing Virtue’ 3). After the death of God that vouches for meaning, man should recreate meaning for themselves; ‘Since the belief has ceased that a God directs the destinies of the world overall, […] men has to set themselves ecumenical goals embracing the whole earth’ (HH I 25). Therefore, now ‘man himself has to take in hand the overall earth-governance \[\text{Erdregierung}\]’ (HH I 245). As Nietzsche demands that ‘These masters of the earth should now replace God’ (KSA 11: 39[3]), he also says: ‘I write for a species of man that does not yet exist: for the “masters of the earth”. […] In Plato’s Theages it is written: “Each one of us wants to be master over all men, if possible, best of all, to be God.” This attitude must exist again’ (KSA 11: 25[137]).

These remarks may confuse us. It is a consequence of Nietzsche’s project that rejects any external and universal medium, like law, in which people can participate equally. The desire for the master that rules the whole without losing its individuality is the root that produces such remarks that are close to the description of God. Of course, it is evident that Nietzsche’s projected few who are to rule are not mere tyrants obsessed only with their political ascendancy. Like Faust calling out, ‘in my inner self I will enjoy what is portioned out to the whole mankind, seize the highest and the deepest with my spirit, heap mankind’s weal and woe on my breast, and thus expand my own self to mankind’s self”, those few

\[\ldots\]

\[145\] It seems that the notion of God as an all-encompassing unity that follows his nature necessarily yet thereby is the most free is moved to the overman, which is ‘the highest soul that can go deepest, the most comprehensive, […] the most necessary that plunges into accidents, […] [that is] entirely self-love and therefore entirely in the all’ (KSA 10: 20[10]).

\[146\] At times Nietzsche thinks that the philosopher as the legislator and commander has some aspect similar to the founders of religions who have the ‘value-setting’ or ‘value-creating’ power, though the religious founders are ‘a much coarser form’ of commander (KSA 11: 26[243], 26[258], 35[74], 38[13]). Also, religious founders are those who reinterpret the existing life style. Cf. ‘The true invention of the founders of religions is first to establish a certain way of life and everyday customs that work as a discipline of the will while at the same time removing boredom; and then to give just this life an interpretation that makes it appear illuminated by the highest worth, so that henceforth it becomes a good for which one fights and under certain circumstances even gives one’s life’ (GS 353).

are the self expanded to the whole while being a single characteristic individual who has a responsibility to the healthy whole. In this sense, in Nietzsche’s vision ‘the ruling class identifies itself with the successes of the community [Gemeinwesen]’, which ‘is what happens in every well-constructed and happy community’ (BGE 19). However, although Nietzsche’s main concern seems to be spiritual or cultural rule with new values that lead humanity, this is accompanied by political rule, as Nietzsche connects Faust with Napoleon. This makes it hard to distinguish between cultural and political rule, which can be a recipe for the political appropriation or exploitation of Nietzsche. At any rate, Nietzsche takes himself to be beyond good and evil and have a wide view on humanity and history. Thus he says: ‘I have, of all Europeans who live and have lived, the most comprehensive soul’ (KSA 10: 4[2]).

The Affective Networks within the Whole

The fact that the ruling class identifies with the successes of the community does not indicate that society is organised only for the benefit of the few, but that its act of ruling is deeply concerned with the health of society as a whole. However, it is true that Nietzsche attributes ‘freedom’ only to a few, comprehensive and sovereign individuals. In chapter one, we discussed a certain line of thought that views freedom as being in accordance with the necessity of nature, and that Nietzsche is in line with this thought. In this sense, everyone in an ideal picture can be free, in that no matter what one’s type and position are in society, one lives according to one’s nature in Nietzsche’s envisioned physiological order. However, we also discussed that freedom as self-mastery is only possible when one can shape the whole, i.e. not as a self-contained individual but as the master of the whole. In this respect, while everyone can be healthy and active in terms of being in accordance with their nature, only the few can be called free in the sense that they are the masters shaping the whole; the rest exists as parts of it. This is because, as seen above, the drives of the public operate within the affective interpretation of which the great individuals initiate the formation.

Nietzsche states that different types should have different morality and education. The

148 Cf. ‘What is certain is that it was not “the Wars of Liberation” that made him [Goethe] look up more cheerfully, any more than the French Revolution – the event on account of which he rethought his Faust, indeed the whole problem of “man”, was the appearance of Napoleon’ (BGE 244).

149 Richardson, Nietzsche’s Freedoms, p. 144. ‘the masters’ society has been organized to make their own lives possible, with other members constrained to supporting roles (into which their drives are severely forced)’.
‘shared’ affective interpretation may seem contradictory in relation to this statement; still, there should be the shared fundamental affect through which to see the world in order that different types form the whole and are not fragmented or scattered. Thus, we should think that there are various affective networks which share the basic interpretation. What people feel about the world is based on the basic interpretation. Therefore, while the fundamental affect, interpretation or valuation about the world is the basis of the formation of the whole, ‘the feeling’ is ‘a consequence of the valuation’, which is ‘the common seat or organ of sensation’ [Sensorium commune] (KSA 11: 25[461]). The basic affect that interprets the world operates like the common organ of senses, or the common sense as the sense common to other senses. In this respect, the shared affective interpretation works as the basic fabric of affects and feelings.

In this basic fabric of society, different affective networks are formed by different types, according to their physiological constitution, or ‘the structure’ of the soul in terms of ‘what groups of sensations within a soul awaken most quickly, speak up and give the command’ (BGE 268). While people share the basic affect that forms the basis of the whole, each type has the different arrangements of affects as Nietzsche mentions: ‘A division of labour of the affects within society’ (KSA 12: 10[8]). In this respect, ‘religions and systems’ are given ‘according to the rank order’ (KSA 11: 39[3]). As different types have different organisation of drives and affects, they accordingly create different affective networks.

In this affective network a person is educated and trained in a certain way. The highest type in particular is trained ‘to represent the pride of the whole’ and represent ‘the community in [its own] person’ (KSA 13: 11[286]), as the ‘noble natures’ of ancient Rome ‘found in the cause of Rome their own cause, their own seriousness, their own pride’ (A 58). This ‘responsibility for the whole trains [anerziehen] and permits the individual to acquire a broad view’. This also allows them to have the ‘collective self-awareness’ or self-esteem [Collektiv-Selbstgefühl] that will cultivate their personality and ‘sovereignty’. This is the training to make a comprehensive person, and ‘the noble class is that which inherits this training’ (KSA 13: 11[286]).

We have so far discussed how the social whole is formed and structured. This chapter in particular has dealt with Nietzsche’s thinking around nature. While this is not an analysis of the whole picture of his views on nature, I have tried to shed a new light on his thinking of nature as the will to power in relation to the formation of the whole. However, as briefly
mentioned at the end of chapter 2, there might be confusion because Nietzsche’s emphasis on the active force of cultivation seems not naturalistic from the perspective of the ordinary dichotomy between nature and culture. Kaufmann in his seminal book expressed a similar concern: ‘Nietzsche is consistently naturalistic, insofar as he insists that man need not break completely with his own animal nature […]. When he adds, however, that man should transfigure his *physis*, perfect himself, and aid nature, one must ask whether that, too, is naturalism – and Nietzsche fails to answer that question’.\(^{150}\)

As discussed, just like any living things need nutrients to grow, human nature needs cultivation to fully develop and express itself. For Nietzsche, this cultivation itself is the expression of will to power, and what he focuses on is the way of cultivation, the way to cultivate healthy life for each type, in opposition to the Christian way that compel people to repress or break with their nature, which will lead to the ‘physiological absurdity’ and ‘contradictoriness of instinct’ (KSA 13: 25[1]). In this respect, culture becomes Nietzsche’s main concern in that a culture refers to a certain way to cultivate human beings in that culture. The problem that Kaufmann saw as puzzling comes from the fact that Nietzsche does not take the concept of culture and nature to be separated. Humans and their nature develop in a cultural way in the sense that ‘circumstances increase and diminish our power’ (D 326).\(^{151}\) The will to power refers to the way human nature operates, and Nietzsche wants to organise a social structure in which the will to power can work in an active and healthy way. It is human nature that forms an affective network, but the network should be organised to allow the healthy form of will to power. Thus, the philosopher exerts an influence on the mechanism in human nature that forms the networks.

The discussion so far leads us logically to discussion of decadence in the next chapter, since the term ‘decadence’ for Nietzsche is representative of the opposite of healthy life. As we shall see, Nietzsche considers decadence as the lack of instinctual certainty, the deviation from one’s natural instincts or what one is, and the loss of the self in the sense of the failure of the arrangement of drives to form the self.\(^{152}\) Furthermore, on a social level, decadence

---

\(^{150}\) Kaufmann, op. cit., p. 176 f.

\(^{151}\) That humans evolve in a cultural way is consistent with the today’s research. See an interview with biologist and neuroscientist Jeff W. Lichtman regarding a study conducted by his team at Harvard on the mammals’ ‘strategy to generate a nervous system that is tuned to the world it finds itself in’. (https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2012/06/the-growing-brain/)

\(^{152}\) As mentioned, Nietzsche understands ‘what one is’ in terms of ‘in what order of rank the innermost drives of his nature stand in relation to each other’ (BGE 6).
refers to the absence of the formative power to form the whole, contrary to the great style. In this regard, it is the phenomenon that Nietzsche’s naturalisation has to remedy or overcome.
Chapter 4:
Decadence

The Problem of the Term ‘decadence’

Nihilism has often been understood as the central concept of what Nietzsche confronts as the problem to be overcome. However, in the preface to *The Case of Wagner*, Nietzsche states that ‘what I have been most deeply occupied with is the problem of decadence’. If we accept Nietzsche’s statement, we should also regard the concept of decadence as central to his work, but this is potentially problematic in that the concept only appears in his published works in 1888, although he uses it before in the *Nachlass* and letters. So, even though Nietzsche asserts his preoccupation with decadence, it can be questioned whether the concept in fact fully represents the problem Nietzsche’s philosophy as a whole is facing. This doubt is reflected in the fact that very few studies, at least in Anglophone Nietzsche scholarship, place the concept of decadence itself at the centre.153 Further, due to the vagueness of the concept of decadence, the term nihilism, which Nietzsche presents in a clearer way, has been the subject of far greater focus.154

If we take Nietzsche’s statement seriously, decadence should be regarded as the main problem with which he is preoccupied; it should also be seen as a sustained problem for Nietzsche, not just a temporary or casual interest during 1888 alone. Furthermore, we need to understand the concept of nihilism in relation to decadence, as Nietzsche considers ‘nihilism’ as ‘the logic of decadence’ (KSA 13: 14[86]). This chapter aims to clarify the concept of decadence, its position in Nietzsche’s philosophy, and its relation to his idea of the whole.

---


154 The terms decadence and nihilism are interconnected, so it is not that decadence is the more important term of the two. While scholars often use decadence not as a technical term but as having the general meaning of decline, nihilism has been treated as Nietzsche’s central concern, even though the meaningful use of ‘nihilism’ also appears in the very late period and ‘decadence’ is more frequently used than ‘nihilism’.

77
To demonstrate Nietzsche’s sustained interest in the problem of decadence, it is necessary to trace his earliest discussion and understanding of it. It is broadly accepted that Nietzsche’s use of the term was influenced by Paul Bourget’s book *Essais de psychologie contemporaine* which Nietzsche read in 1883.155 However, we should not conclude from this that decadence matters only in Nietzsche’s late works, as Kaufmann argues that ‘Bourget’s chapter, *Théorie de la décadence*, does not introduce an entirely new turn into Nietzsche’s thought; it merely strengthens a previously present motif’.156 Agreeing with Kaufmann, Moore understands that the motif which allows Nietzsche to accept eventually the word decadence is ‘the idea of cultural decline’157 presented throughout Nietzsche’s work. It is true that decadence is concerned with cultural decline, but Moore adduces terms such as ‘degeneration’ in *The Birth of Tragedy* to show Nietzsche’s early recognition of the problem. However, it is not an obvious assumption from these early instances that this term is being used as a technical and ‘biologistic’158 term, and not as a general term for decline.

To narrow our focus on the term decadence, Kaufmann and Moore have both pointed to Nietzsche’s use of the word before 1883. However, those isolated and rare uses do not prove Nietzsche is employing the word in the same way as in later works; in particular, the earlier use of the word is without the accent aigu found in the French word décadence, which he only used from 1883. In a note written between the end of 1876 and summer 1877, which is his first recorded use of the word, Nietzsche views Cervantes’ *Don Quixote* as belonging to ‘the decadence of Spanish culture’ (KSA 8: 23[140]). In an 1881 letter, Nietzsche describes the ‘bad conditions’ he experienced under the terrible weather as ‘general decadence’ (KSB 6: 146). In both cases, the word decadence is used with a general meaning of decline, not in a more specific way. However, there is one example from before 1883 that is worth noting: the letter to Köselitz in 1882 in which Nietzsche mentions decadence and Cagliostroism, which will be applied later in *The Case of Wagner* regarding Wagner’s Parsifal, though without any further explanation (KSB 6: 272). Although the word decadence here does not seem to be used in the same developed manner as in the later works, this letter shows that Nietzsche recognised the concept before he adopted the French styling of the word.

---


156 Kaufmann, op. cit., p. 73, n. 1.


158 Ibid.
At any rate, what is important is not necessarily the use of the word before 1883, but the awareness of the problem of decadence. He explains in *Ecce Homo* that he recognised decadence in Christian morality and Socrates’ obsession with ‘reason’ as early as *The Birth of Tragedy* (EH ‘BT’ 1, 2), and discovered the ‘decadence instinct’ in the contemporarily praised values in *Daybreak* (EH ‘D’ 2). In addition, the description of Socrates from *The Birth of Tragedy* is very similar to Socrates as a decadent in *Twilight of Idols*. Although Nietzsche did not explicitly use the term in his earlier period, he realised later that the problem he faced was something that should be called decadence. Therefore, decadence is the sustained matter for Nietzsche.

What then is the problem of decadence that occupies Nietzsche so profoundly? Here the vagueness of the term as used by Nietzsche becomes a challenge; arguably, one of the reasons that not many works are centred on decadence is that the concept is not very clear. Nietzsche does not present the concept of decadence with a clear definition. He describes many phenomena in terms of decadence and the extension of the term may be seen as too broad, so ‘one could almost think that he simply uses terms like “degeneration” and “decadence” to describe whatever he does not like’.\(^\text{159}\) Because of this, some would consider decadence not to be a technical term that requires analysis but that it has a general meaning of decline or decay. However, if we accept decadence as the central term Nietzsche specifically uses to reveal the problem of modernity, we need to explore how he uses it and clarify its meaning in that context.

**Essence of decadence**

Even without a clear definition as mentioned – Conway points out Nietzsche’s ‘failure to develop an adequately articulated account of decadence’\(^\text{160}\) – many phenomena are described as decadence. Bauer suggests that what Nietzsche calls decadence is something that can be recognised only by its symptoms.\(^\text{161}\) Following Bauer, Horn maintains that Nietzsche does not show the evident relations between decadence as the cause, and its symptoms.\(^\text{162}\)

---


\(^\text{160}\) Conway, *Nietzsche’s dangerous game*, p. 23.


\(^\text{162}\) Anette Horn, *Nietzsches Begriff der décadence : Kritik und Analyse der Moderne*, Frankfurt am
traces the symptoms of decadence in several aspects, suggesting that we simply perceive the symptoms or epiphenomena of decadence as if we sense the symptoms of a disease but do not know what the disease may be or what may have caused it. In a similar vein, Bernheimer thinks we cannot construct one picture of decadence out of Nietzsche’s various descriptions of its symptoms.  

It may be because of this elusiveness that when scholars briefly deal with decadence, they usually discuss its symptoms, such as wanting what is bad for oneself or a failure of integration. These are two characteristic marks of decadence; however, unless we grasp the essence or the fundamental principle of decadence in which the symptoms originate, we cannot fully understand how the various symptoms are connected and or even whether those symptoms refer to the same ‘décadence’.

Looking closely at his published works first, we understand that for Nietzsche decadence is in essence the impoverishment of vital power, which consists in the self-loss or deviation from the self. Here, as previously discussed, the self is understood in terms of drive or instinct, as Nietzsche argues that drives constitute our being. For Nietzsche, the self consists in an arrangement of drives. This arrangement can be different for each type according to what kind of drives is predominant in one’s nature, which refers to what one is. In order for the self to form, the drives should be organised hierarchically, centred on the master drive. The deviation from the self here refers to the loss of the centre based on which the self can form. What kind of drive should be the centre or master depends on one’s physiological constitution. When the totality of drives is organised under the master drive according to one’s physiological make-up, one can form the self that expresses the active form of will to power. In relation to this loss of the centre, Nietzsche speaks of the deviation

---


166 Conway claims that ‘Up until 1888, Nietzsche treats the terms *Trieb* and *Instinkt* as roughly synonymous’ but in 1888 he makes a distinction between the terms, so the instinct refers to ‘any specific organization of the drives’ (*Conway, Nietzsche’s dangerous game*, 30 ff.). However, this claim needs to provide decisive textual evidence. Cf. Katsafanas, op. cit., 2016, p. 77, and Gemes / Le Patourel, op. cit., p. 598.
from or lack of instinct. In this sense, the deviation from the self does not mean the disruption of any drives; rather, what is significant is the master drive or fundamental instinct that functions as the centre. Therefore, Nietzsche considers ‘Greek philosophy as the decadence’ because it has ‘strayed so much from all the fundamental instincts [Grundinstinkten] of the Hellenes’ (TI ‘Ancients’ 2). In other words, decadence refers to the lack of the ‘dominant instinct’, and a decadent is one who squanders themselves in other activity that disrupts their dominant instinct (KSA 13: 23[2]); the deviation from the self should then be understood as the breaking away from the fundamental instinct. The fundamental instinct can be understood (we shall return to this below) in terms of the active form of will to power, and this active form, as discussed, is bound up with one’s physiological constitution. If fundamental instinct is will to power, each type develops different fundamental instincts as different expressions of will to power. Those expressions can be healthy when they do not deviate from physiological order. In this sense, decadence consists in the deviation from instinct, i.e. the way people are physiologically.

To analyse the term in more detail, decadence generally is ‘declining life’ (TI ‘Reason’ 6) with ‘the general loss of vitality’ (TI ‘Expeditions’ 37), and more precisely, ‘decadence’ is identified with ‘physiological decline [Rückgang]’, which exists when ‘the will to power falls off in any form’ (A 17). Considering the will to power is the expression for Nietzsche to describe human beings and the world, we see that the reason why the extension of ‘decadence’ seems so broad to the extent that it is taken to include anything he disapproves of, is that he understands it from the perspective of decline of will to power. Although the distinction between the weakness and strength in power is fundamental to Nietzsche’s critique of decadence, it seems this broad sense of decline of power leaves much to be explained regarding decadence and its symptoms.

What I am focusing on here is the ‘physiological decline’. Just as Nietzsche warns of ‘the error of confusing the cause and effect’ in Cornaro’s skimpy diet (TI ‘Errors’ 1), he

167 Nietzsche does not clearly differentiate between the terms instinct and drive in a significant way, but he seems to use ‘instinct’ more when it comes to this deviation from the self as the loss of the centre.

168 I understand that for Nietzsche the core of the self is the organising power of the master drive as the centre. The self should be formed under the dominant or master drive, and this dominant drive should be different according to different types. Thus, what should come first is the development of the master drive based on one’s physiological constitution, which will allow the integrated self.

emphasises the physiological basis from which other symptoms and phenomena arise. Thus, he points out that ‘one confuses cause and effect: one fails to understand decadence as physiological and mistakes its consequences for the real cause of being in bad condition’ (KSA 13: 17[6]). In a different way to ‘psychologists, whose glance involuntarily lingers only on symptoms of decadence’ (KSA 11: 35[27]), we need to look into the physiological basis of the concept. If we should understand decadence as a physiological term, then what does this physiological decline mean? If this is a kind of decline of will to power, it is above all the loss of the active form of will to power. This activeness, as discussed, largely depends on one’s leading life in accordance with one’s physiological constitution. Therefore, at the core of the decadence lies the deviation from what one is physiologically; in other words, it is the loss of self, or self-lessness. In this sense, Nietzsche calls ‘selflessness [Selbstlosigkeit]’ ‘the principle of decadence’ (NW ‘Antipodes’).

From this self-loss, or ‘the de-selfing [Entselbstung] and de-personalising [Entpersönlichung]’ (BGE 207; CW ‘Epilogue’; A 54; EH ‘D’ 2, ‘Destiny’ 7), come various other symptoms of decadence. First, people come to suffer the physiological discord within them, and this discord is expressed as the disorganisation and disruption of instincts. The will to power refers to the activity that interprets, transforms, organises, and assimilates what one encounters into oneself for one’s growth. But the self-loss means there is no focal point for this activity for growth, the point around which different experiences come together. So, decadence in this sense of ‘selflessness’ indicates the ‘weakening of an individual’s self-interest’ (A 20), ‘instinctual contradictoriness’ and ‘the loss of a centre of gravity [Schwerewicht]’ (EH ‘D’ 2; ‘Destiny’ 7).

This loss, Nietzsche asserts, also means that people are not in line with their instincts and become alienated from them. Individuals are internally split into dispersed interests, without being able to organise their instincts to form a whole. Thus, decadents suffer the ‘chaos [Wüstheit] and anarchy of the instincts’ (TI ‘Socrates’ 4). They come to feel strange about their instincts, and they ‘have to fight the instincts – that is the formula for decadence’ (TI ‘Socrates’ 11). With ‘the lack of self and self-assurance’ (TI ‘Expeditions’ 37), they distrust the instinct and lead ‘life […] without instinct, in resistance to the instincts’, which is ‘a sickness’ (TI ‘Socrates’ 11).

This alienation or ‘separation from instincts’ (KSA 13: 16[51]) is also connected with ‘the disintegration of the will’. The will is so fragmented that people do not know what they should do with any certainty. Nietzsche explains the connection between the will and the
instinct: ‘The multiplicity and disintegration of the impulses [Antriebe], the lack of any system among them, results in a “weak will”; the coordination of them under a single predominant impulse results in a “strong will”; – in the first case it is the oscillation and the lack of the centre of gravity; in the latter, the precision and clarity of the direction’ (KSA 13: 14[219]; 17[6]). In this respect, the disintegration of the will is understood as the disintegration of the instincts and ‘degeneration of the instincts’ (TI ‘Errors’ 2).

This instinctual failing, which signifies ‘a decline in organising power, in “will”, to speak physiologically’ (KSA 13: 14[117]), leads to another characteristic symptom: wanting what is bad for oneself. ‘The instinct is weakened. People are attracted to the things they should avoid’ (CW 5). Concerning this, Nietzsche again emphasises the physiological basis of decadence: ‘What is best is missing when self-seeking starts to be missing. To choose instinctively what is harmful to oneself, to be tempted by “disinterested” motives, is virtually the formula for decadence. “Not to seek one’s own advantage” – that is just the moral fig leaf for a totally different, namely physiological factuality: “I don’t know how to find my own advantage anymore” – Disintegration of the instincts!’ (TI ‘Expeditions’ 35) People are so physiologically dislocated that their instincts are not to be organised but dispersed, so that they lose ‘the internal necessity’ (A 11) to lead an instinctual life and are not able to choose with an ‘instinctual certainty’ (EH ‘Wise’ 2) what is good for them.

Nietzsche summarises these phenomena with the word ‘corruption’: ‘I understand corruption […] in the sense of decadence: […] I call an animal, a species, an individual corrupt when it loses its instincts, when it chooses, when it prefers, what is detrimental to it. […] I regard life itself as the instinct for growth, for duration, for accumulation of force, for power: where the will to power is lacking, there is decline’ (A 6).

Simply, decadence is the decline of vital power that consists in the fact that people deviate from their physiological constitutions and accordingly from the self, so that they suffer instinctual disorder and contradictoriness. They are internally dispersed and fragmented, and lose the instinct to seek what is good and avoid what is bad for them. Decadents, in Nietzsche’s view, are so weak that they shrink from accepting their natural instincts and deny the joy they would feel when following them. ‘When the instinct of life compels us to act, pleasure proves that the act is right’, but a morality of selflessness sees ‘pleasure as an objection’ (A 11). The renunciation of the self is praised, and happiness as feeling the increase of power (A 2) is taken to be filthy. Thus they fight the instincts, while in fact, ‘as long as life is ascending, happiness is the same as instinct’ (TI ‘Socrates’ 11). In
this sense, decadence is ‘the lack of nature’ or ‘anti-nature’ (EH ‘Destiny’ 7).

The decadent ‘wants to escape from himself’ (CW Epilogue). Thus, Nietzsche further avers that compassion, which makes one look away from the self, is the virtue of decadence (CW 7; EH ‘Wise’ 4), the virtue that ‘has a depressive effect’ and brings about the loss of vitality. Moreover, religions that have selfless compassion as their main teaching are ‘decadence-religions’, since ‘by multiplying misery just as much as by conserving everything miserable, compassion is a prime instrument for the increase of decadence’ (A 7).

Redemption

‘To understand how all forms of corruption belong together’ (KSA 13: 14[6]), we have analysed ‘decadence’ in terms of the loss of self as the deviation from one’s physiological constitution. Different types have different dominant drives under which the self develops, and they have different roles in society. In this sense, ‘corruption is something fundamentally different depending on the life-form in which it manifests itself’ (BGE 258). Decadence indicates that ‘the individual becomes untrue to his own instincts’ (KSA 13: 22[21]). This also implies that the physiological rank order is required, in which the self of each type develops according to its nature, and without which the instincts of each type are physiologically dislocated.

Without being aware of the nature of the problem, people seek a number of ways to overcome decadence and their weakness. However, though they may not realise it, ‘what they choose as a means, as salvation, is itself just another expression of decadence – they change its expression, they do not get rid of it itself’ (TI ‘Socrates’ 11). Indeed, their ways to overcome decadence are just an expression of it because they all stand against the instincts in some ways (ibid.).

Let us look in detail at why attempts to overcome decadence fail. There are broadly two ways sought to escape decadence; one is to smooth away the self, and the other is to redefine the self. Although Nietzsche suggests that these ways are not divided but rather connected with one another, I argue that the Christian is representative of the former, and Socrates the latter.

Consider first those who try to diminish or remove the self. Decadents want to escape from themselves and this life because, Nietzsche asserts, they suffer from life and reality, and so they long for a form of redemption. In this ‘need for redemption’, which is ‘the most
honest expression of decadence’ (CW ‘Epilogue’), people believe that the locus of true self and genuine life is not here but somewhere else or some status they wish to reach. They cannot feel pleasure as what it feels to accord with instinct. Rather, they suffer from this life and feel its reality not as something true but as something wrong and which they have failed in. So, they have ‘a deep discontent with the reality’ and ‘hatred of the natural (–of reality!–)’. In this sense, ‘The preponderance of feelings of displeasure over feelings of pleasure […] provides the formula for decadence’ (A 15).

In Nietzsche’s understanding, the physiological condition that gives rise to the doctrine of redemption is ‘an extreme over-sensitivity and capacity for suffering’ (A 30). This sensitivity concerning suffering is not an ultimate cause, but already a sign of decadence. They are so weak and fragmented that they respond to every stimulus in a kind of piecemeal, haphazard way, with a lack of the unified self or centre of gravity, based on which what they encounter is filtered and digested for their growth. They show an ‘inability to resist reacting to any stimulus and to “control” oneself’ (KSA 13: 14[113], 14[209]). They are overwhelmed by the stimuli and become sensitive to any contact with the world; thus, they escape or shrink from the world. The typical type of this case is the Buddhist who shrinks himself to minimise contact with suffering. Although Nietzsche takes the Buddhist to be healthier than the Christian in that ‘it no longer says “the struggle against sin”, but rather, giving reality its dues, says “the struggle against suffering”’ (A 20), he considers both as decadence (A 20, 42) for the diminished vital force, which cannot fully embrace the world.

The sensitivity that makes one shrink is also what allows Nietzsche to see Epicurus as a decadent. The Epicurean’s sensitivity leads him to have ‘his “garden”’ (GS 306) and he stops expanding the realm of life. He fears the world and confines himself in his private garden, so Nietzsche writes ‘Epicureans […] enjoy the freedom as […] prisoners’ (KSA 10: 20[5]). In ‘decadents’ Nietzsche finds ‘a certain warm, fear-repelling narrowness and confinement’, and says ‘Thus I gradually came to understand Epicurus, the antithesis of a Dionysian Greek’ (NW ‘Antipodes’). As discussed in the first chapter, this kind of isolated individual, far from being able to govern himself, could barely keep only his own private realm. The Buddhist and Epicurean are decadents in that they are so shrunken and unable to step into the world where suffering is inevitable. Nevertheless, they do not go further to negate life as Nietzsche understands as the Christian does, making life a sin.

Of course, Nietzsche does not deny that there are respectable aspects of the Buddhist and Epicurus, who especially opposes the Christian concept of sin. Still, Nietzsche views
Epicurus, along with Pyrrho, as one of ‘forms of Greek decadence’, ‘representing a state in which one is neither sick nor healthy, neither alive nor dead’ (KSA 13: 14[99]). In this respect, one’s opposing decadence does not make one not decadent. Epicurus is a decadent even though he has a noble aspect, just as Pyrrho has ‘the instinct against […] the Socratic, Plato’ (KSA 13: 14[100]) but is still a decadent.

The Buddhist and Epicurean try to maintain life, albeit a contracted one, with minimal suffering, whether enjoying a small garden or keeping mental peace. Still, this sensitivity to pain has within it the seeds of the denial of life. For if suffering is inevitable in life, denying life could be the final solution. Schopenhauer is one case that illustrates this; influenced by Buddhism, Schopenhauer is considered a decadent for valuing the ascetic life that disowns desires and avoids the suffering that the desires will bring, which, Nietzsche understands, leads to ‘negation of the will to live’ (TI ‘Morality’ 5). Suffering indicates connection with the world, and the denial of this connection can be the ultimate ending. Nietzsche states that ‘Epicurus is a typical decadent. […] The fear of pain, even of the infinitesimal in pain – this cannot end any other way than in a religion of love’ (A 30). Although Epicurus opposed the Christian concepts such as ‘guilt, punishment, and immortality’ (A 58), Nietzsche believes the over-sensitivity ends in a Christian movement that is to ‘divide the world into a “true” and an “illusory” world, which is ‘only a suggestion of decadence – a symptom of declining life’ (TI ‘Reason’ 6), and to condemn life and the world (TI ‘Morality’ 5; ‘Expeditions’ 34). People who are so weakened to the point they cannot bear this world will find refuge away from the world. In this respect, Nietzsche points out ‘Epicureanism in Christianity’ (KSA 13: 14[87]).

In this way, Christianity, which is the ‘denial of the will to life made into a religion’ (EH ‘CW’ 2), comes to be representative of what Nietzsche ultimately fights against. Christianity has moved the locus of the true self and life to the ‘beyond’. While ‘noble morality […] is rooted in a triumphant Yes said to oneself, […] self-affirmation, self-glorification of life’, ‘The Christian wants to escape from himself’. For him ‘the I is always hateful [Le moi est toujours haissable]’. The Christian morality, with the ‘need for redemption, the embodiment of all Christian needs’, ‘negates the world’ and ‘impoverishes, makes pale and ugly the value of things’ (CW ‘Epilogue’). Hence, the Christian denies life and the world, and accordingly promotes ‘anti-nature’ morality, and with Christianity, humanity itself has been in decadence (EH ‘Destiny’ 7). The decadent judgment that ‘nothing is worth anything – life isn’t worth anything’ has infected the earth, ‘now as religion (Christianity), now as
Socrates: Redefining the Self

The second way to overcome decadence, which is still perceived as being of decadence, is to redefine the self. Socrates is representative of this route, which Nietzsche deals with in the chapter ‘The Problem of Socrates’ in Twilight of Idols. Socrates is a decadent in two aspects: resistance to instinct, and tyranny of reason. Above all, Socrates fights against instinct. He believes ‘every acquiescence to the instincts, to the unconscious, leads downward’ (TI ‘Socrates’ 10), and he takes instinct to be a threat to the normal life. In this sense, he is a typical decadent. But why did he combat the instinct? First, Nietzsche found in Socrates the physiological decline that led him to devalue life, even referring to Socrates’ lowly origin and ugly appearance (TI ‘Socrates’ 2, 3). Socrates was of the declining type and as such, he strayed from his instincts. He was not able to master himself since he deviated and did not know how to organise instincts or drives in a hierarchical form centred on a ruling drive. Without this centre of gravity, he suffered the affliction that he was not ‘master of himself’ and ‘the instincts had turned against each other’ (TI ‘Socrates’ 9). In this chaos, he feared he would not be able to manage the instincts and would instead be overwhelmed by them. He felt that the instincts were tyrannical.

Socrates’ solution to this problem is to make reason dominate. He believes ‘The drives want to play the tyrant; one has to invent a stronger counter-tyrant’ (ibid.), and he makes reason the tyrant. However, as Nietzsche writes, ‘Socrates’ decadence is indicated not only by the admitted chaos and anarchy of the instincts, but also by the hypertrophy of the logical’ (TI ‘Socrates’ 4); this solution is merely a way to bring about the deterioration of decadence. Socrates finds it ‘necessary to make a tyrant out of reason [Vernunft]’ (TI ‘Socrates’ 10) because he does not know how to deal with the instincts and have self-control. He feels the instincts are a ferocious dark force that has to be neutered by the daylight of rationality. In Socrates’ decadence, ‘the wildness and anarchy of instincts’ and ‘the hypertrophy of logic and of brightness of reason’ ‘belong together’ (KSA 13: 14[92]). Why is the emphasis on reason not then the way to overcome decadence, but in fact achieves the opposite? On the face of it, this may seem to be an effective means of fighting decadence, as reason can play a

---

170 In this respect, the difference between Christianity and Socrates is that while Christianity, exalting the faith in the other world, is not only ‘against nature’ and this world but also ‘against reason’ (KSA 13: 14[13]), Socrates, exalting reason, tries to make reason the master to repress nature and instinct.
central role in integrating instincts. Confronting ‘the Greeks’ strongest instinct, the will to power’ and ‘the tremendous force of this drive’ (TI ‘Ancients’ 3), Socrates tries to understand himself in a different way. He redefines the self, believing he can achieve a new integration as a stronger form of self by the reign of reason. Can reason then not be a force that causes drives to be organised or brought to unity?

Nietzsche thinks the rational capacity of man cannot bring about a unified self. This is primarily because our conscious thoughts are the products of interaction among drives, and reason is not a commander but an instrument of the body and self (Z ‘Despisers’). In fact, conscious thought itself indicates one’s detachment and distance from instinct. This is why Nietzsche views the dialectic, the Socratic reasoning or argumentative methodology, as producing ‘mistrust’ (TI ‘Socrates’ 6). It refers to the rift within oneself and lack of self-confidence, which is caused by being at odds with instinct. In this respect, Nietzsche sees the opposition between instinct and reason: ‘Socrates […] as a typical decadent. “Rationality [Vernünftigkeit]” against instinct. “Rationality” at any price as a dangerous, life-undermining force!’ (EH ‘BT’ 1) As he states that he recognised Socrates being a decadent early in The Birth of Tragedy (EH ‘BT’ 1, 2), he has already made this point: ‘While in all productive people instinct is precisely the creative-affirmative force and consciousness acts critically and dissuasively, in Socrates instinct becomes the critic and consciousness the creator’ (BT 13).

Many scholars argue that the Nietzschean self consists in the unity in which diverse drives are organised under a dominant drive; the problem is the kind of unity that should be pursued. If only formal unity is what it takes to be the self that Nietzsche advances then integration under rationality might be a possibility, for although this integration is possible only in a tyrannical way by repressing the instincts,¹⁷¹ this could arguably reach a kind of unity. On this issue, Katsafanas argues that Nietzschean unity refers to a harmonious relation ‘between drives and conscious thought’.¹⁷² This, I believe, is not a tenable claim, given the downgraded position of reason and consciousness in Nietzsche’s view,¹⁷³ even though it is not Nietzsche’s aim simply to extirpate consciousness and rational faculties. At any rate,

¹⁷¹ Bernard Reginster (What is a Free Spirit? Nietzsche on Fanaticism, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 85, 2003, 76 f.) distinguishes tyranny and mastery. According to his reading, tyranny is only achieved when a dominant drive suppresses other drives, while mastery allows other drives to be expressed within a dominant drive’s end.

¹⁷² Katsafanas, op. cit., 2011, p. 87 ff.

¹⁷³ See Gemes / Le Patourel, op. cit. for a detailed criticism of Katsafanas’ argument in this respect.
from the example Katsafanas gives for arguing against what he calls the ‘unity as predominance’ model, we can infer where the misunderstanding lies. He questions the predominance model, presenting an example of a high functioning alcoholic with the alcoholic urges ‘mastering the other drives’. Here, we can see that this problem arises when only formal unity is focused on. It is misleading to believe that the unity as the hierarchical integration by a master drive is that which one can have with any domineering drive, such as an alcoholic one. Gemes argues that not just any drive is suitable for being a predominant drive, but only a drive that achieves mastery not by repressing but by sublimating other drives. Still, it is not clear whether any drive is capable of sublimating other drives to serve its end.

I argue that, the failure to form the self should be understood as the deviation from the fundamental instinct or drive. Not just any drive is suited to be the master in organising drives to make a whole. If a formal unity is focused on, it is hard to explain why unity under rationality is the product or a symptom of decadence. The self should be formed not based on any drive but on the fundamental instinct. Thus, ‘decadence’ refers to the ‘total aberration of humanity from its fundamental instincts [Grundinstinkte]’ (KSA 13: 11[227]), and Christianity, against the ‘higher type’, ‘has banished all the fundamental instincts of this type’ (A 5). This fundamental instinct or drive is seen from the perspective of life that wants to grow and to increase its power, i.e. will to power (KSA 12: 2[179]); GS 349). This, of course, is the active form of will to power as opposed to the reactive form encouraged by Christian morality, which leads to ‘weakening and abatement of […] the powerful fundamental drive’ (KSA 12: 2[13]).

What Nietzsche mainly has in mind when he speaks of the loss or lack of instinct is the fundamental instinct as the expression of ‘the strongest, most life-affirming drive, […] the will to power’ (GM III 18). Each type, as mentioned, develops different fundamental instincts as the centre that functions as a cornerstone around which its self is organised. However, as discussed in chapter three, drives can be transformed. Decadence then refers to the situation in which a new set of drives toward the declining life takes the place of what Nietzsche understands as the life-affirming drive. Thus, he sees that currently the basic instinct of ‘civilized society’ is ‘against the great human beings’ (KSA 12: 9[137]).

---

174 Katsafanas, op. cit., 2011, p. 98 f.
fundamental instinct also indicates the soil from which instincts grow. Thus, ‘affects and fundamental drives’ in every race and class express something of the conditions of their existence (at least of the conditions under which they have prevailed for the longest time)’ (KSA 12: 9[173]), and Christian morality has cultivated the soil or the condition to encourage humanity ‘to despise the very first instincts of life’ (EH ‘Destiny’ 7). In this respect, to deal with the problem of decadence means also to tackle ‘the morbid soil of society’ (TI ‘Expeditions’ 35). This is concerned with specifically social decadence which is one of Nietzsche’s predominant topics, primarily in the Nachlass.

Decadence on a Social Level

In this way, Nietzsche asserts that modern people, who grow up on the morbid soil, suffer ‘physiological absurdity’ and ‘contradictoriness of instinct’ (KSA 13: 25[1]). On an individual level, this absurdity actually mirrors that of a society as a whole. ‘A well-constituted human being [… ] carries the order that he represents physiologically into his relations with people and things’ (TI ‘Errors’ 2). As the physiological order fails, society suffers decadence and comes to have no pivot from which it can marshal forces. Accordingly, society witnesses people of ‘declining natures’ mirroring the social disaggregation and representing ‘the physiological contradictoriness’, whose ‘instincts lack a centre of gravity, the Wohin?’ (KSA 13: 14[94]). Society is cluttered with people who believe they are free and can be whatever they want to be, but really are frustrated by dispersed interests and conflicting instincts. Therefore, the characteristic symptom of the decadence of society is a failure of integration and of making the whole. In a famous passage on Wagner, Nietzsche connects and expands the idea of literary decadence to a social one:

What is the hallmark of all literary decadence? That life no longer dwells in the whole. The word becomes sovereign and jumps out of the sentence; the sentence reaches out and obscures the meaning of the page; the page gains life at the expense of the whole – the whole is not a whole any more. But this is the simile of every style of decadence: every time, the anarchy of atoms, disintegration of the will, “freedom of the individual”, morally speaking, – expanded into a political theory, “equal rights for all”. Life, equal vitality, the vibration and exuberance of life pushed back into the smallest structures; the rest, poor in life. Everywhere
paralysis, arduousness, torpidity or hostility and chaos: both more and more obvious the higher one ascends in the forms of organisation. The whole no longer lives at all: it is composite, calculated, artificial, an artefact. (CW 7)

The fragmented parts claim equal rights and scatter without any focal point. Nietzsche takes it that one can find the chaos more obviously in a higher form of organisation. That is to say, while a person seems to remain the same in appearance even with his disorganised drives, we can more obviously observe, on a social level, that separate groups are fanatically formed with conflicting opinions, or that people may be self-indulgent but consume disparate cultures. Society suffers paralysis with this lack of directional stability, but how did the disaggregation begin?

Ultimately, the physiological inconsistency is what brings about the chaotic situation. As discussed, when recognising Socrates and Plato ‘as the instrument of Greek dissolution, as a typical decadent’ (EH ‘BT’ 1; TI ‘Socrates’ 2), Nietzsche considered decadence as the separation from and disagreement with the Greek instinct. In a societal sense, this means a society cannot sustain the foundation based on which the instincts grow. That is to say, the decadent philosophers ‘severed the instincts from the polis’ and ‘from belief in tradition and ancestors’ (KSA 13: 14[94]) so that ‘the anti-Hellenic instincts come to the top’ (KSA 13: 11[375]). In this respect, Nietzsche finds decadence in the ‘emigration from the polis, detachment from origin [Herkunft]’ (KSA 12: 7[20]). With the physiological inconsistency caused by this detachment, people are led to doubt their instincts and question the society into which they were brought. Therefore, ‘the philosophers are the decadents of the Greek world, the countermovement against the old, noble taste (against the agonal instinct, against the value of the race, against the authority of tradition)’ (TI ‘Ancients’ 3).

With regard to the modern world in particular, Nietzsche attributes this loss of the foundation that causes instinctual inconsistency to the Christian idea of equality that will break down a hierarchical order of classes and races. In his understanding, the social phenomena of decadence are a result of the mixing of physiologically different types separated from their origins. In ‘an age of disintegration’, ‘races are mixed indiscriminately’ (BGE 200). And when races or classes separated for a long time are suddenly mixed, ‘a certain complex physiological condition that in ordinary language is called nervous debility and sickness’ develops, which causes ‘the will’ of the people in this mixed generation to become ‘sick and degenerate’ so that they suffer ‘will-paralysis’ (BGE 208). This paralysis
is the expression of the chaotic unorganised system wherein smaller parts want power at the
cost of the whole, as presented in the passage above. This chaotic situation in which the
individual and society are lacking directional certainty leads to lethargy.

Here, Nietzsche’s remarks on race \([\text{Rasse}]\) of this kind may cause confusion. Some
scholars have tried to rid the word ‘race’ in readings of Nietzsche of its biological sense, as
Kofman maintains that in Nietzsche’s use of the word, ‘race’ does not carry ‘a biological
meaning for him’.\(^{176}\) This dismissal of the biological sense of race is an attempt to
demonstrate that Nietzsche is not the racist from whose writings the Nazi can make political
capital. In this respect, Schank argues that although the ‘modern biological meaning of the
word “\([\text{Rasse}]\) was also known to Nietzsche’, the word is not mostly used in a biological
sense, and ‘for Nietzsche “races” mean “people” \([\text{Volk}]\), developing their “character” in the
environments where they stay and live over extended periods of time’.\(^{177}\) Following Schank,
Tongeren emphasises that the word is not used in the ‘modern’ sense, and that ‘Race for
Nietzsche means “people” or “human being”’ in general, rather than “race” in the racist sense;
the characteristics of ‘races’ are social and cultural, rather than biological’.\(^{178}\)

These arguments are predicated on the assumption that only the cultural meaning of race
is safe,\(^{179}\) based on the dichotomy between culture and nature. This dichotomy is not only
something that Nietzsche would not accept, but it is also without adequate consideration of
the discussions of race in the nineteenth century.\(^{180}\) The use of race as referring to peoples
like the English or the French was not unusual at the time,\(^{181}\) thus when Nietzsche uses the


\(^{178}\) Paul van Tongeren, Nietzsche’s Naturalism, in \textit{Nietzsche and the German Tradition}, 2003, p.205.

\(^{179}\) This view that separates the social and cultural from biological meaning of race is odd because
racism operates in the distinction between us and them, and is sustained by a sense of pride and
superiority, which does not rely simply on biological differences. In this respect, Bourdieu connects
racism with social class and argues that ‘all racism is essentialism’, referring to ‘racism of the
intelligence’ which is ‘specific to a dominant class’ who through this racism justifies ‘the social order
that they dominate’. Pierre Bourdieu, \textit{Political interventions : social science and political action},

\(^{180}\) For the discussion of race in nineteenth century, see Robert Bernasconi, The Philosophy of Race in
scholarship, see Robert Bernasconi, Nietzsche as a Philosopher of Racialized Breeding, in: Naomi

\(^{181}\) Bernasconi, op. cit., 2010, p. 499.
term ‘race’ to refer to peoples, this usage is not peculiar to Nietzsche, and not out of line with the contemporary meaning. Therefore, it is based on this kind of misunderstanding that Schotten asserts that ‘Nietzsche also breaks significantly with his contemporaries’ views of race and degeneration in another way by avoiding a biologically essentialist account of race’.182 As Bernasconi demonstrates, racial essentialism was not a prevalent view in the nineteenth century, and the widespread belief in the inheritance of acquired characteristics ‘excluded any straightforward application of the nature-culture distinction to the topic of race’.183

It is of course true that race in Nietzsche’s terminology has a cultural meaning in that, as Schank shows, a race consists in the ‘character’ [Charakter] developed for a certain climate, environment, or living conditions under which people live (KSA 11: 25[462]). However, this does not mean that race has nothing to do with the biological sense, because the character is to be incorporated and ingrained in the body and passed on to the next generation. Thus, Nietzsche writes, ‘It is not in the least possible that a human being might not have the qualities and preferences of his parents and ancestors in his body: […] This is the problem of race’ (BGE 264).

This view that race is about biological and cultural inheritance further allows Nietzsche to use the term ‘race’ often in connection with class or social rank when dealing with social organisation and decadence. He also writes that ‘classes always also express differences of descent and race: European “Weltschmerz”;184 the “pessimism” of the nineteenth century is essentially the result of a nonsensically sudden mixing of classes’ (GM III 17). As the difference of races consist in the differently inherited and developed character, classes too consist in types of a different character. Hence, when Nietzsche mentions the problem of the races mixing, this does not merely mean, say, the mixing of French and Italian people, but the mixing of people from different classes that have developed disparate characters and values. What Nietzsche believes is that when they intermingle, they come to be sceptical about the values they have carried and lose confidence in their origin; they come to feel

183 Bernasconi, op. cit., 2010, p. 510.
184 The word Weltschmerz ‘signifies a mood of weariness or sadness about life’, and this pessimistic mood became ‘a public state of mind, the spirit of the age’ at the time. Frederick C. Beiser, Weltschmerz: Pessimism in German Philosophy, 1860–1900, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 1. In an early letter, Nietzsche writes such Weltschmerz is produced only by the ‘Christian viewpoint’ (KSB 1: 301).
unsure about themselves. Thus, in an age of mixture, society produces a generation that ‘has inherited different standards and values’, in which ‘everything is unrest, disturbance, doubt, experiment’, and ‘balance, a centre of gravity, and upright certainty are lacking’. Therefore, he observes, ‘Our Europe of today, the arena of an absurdly sudden experiment of radical class mixing and consequently race mixing, is therefore sceptical in all its heights and depths’ (BGE 208).

What I have argued above as the essence or fundamental theme of decadence, i.e. the self-loss and deviation from the physiological order, is revealed here again. The order is missing which is otherwise physiologically structured and gives people adequate places in the whole. Accordingly, society cannot be the foundation in which people can root themselves and grow with stability. In this sceptical milieu, pessimism also arises, and ‘those uncertain of themselves and weary’ express ‘a pessimistic suspicion of the whole situation of humanity’ (BGE 260).

With this ‘weary pessimistic gaze, the mistrust of the riddle of life’, the human being ‘learns to be ashamed of all its instincts’ (GM II 7). In this way, the class or race mixing as the mingling of disparate values leads to ‘pessimism, the No-saying’ (KSA 11: 34[67]). As decadence indicates the disjointed system of society and of person, it is natural that the result is pessimism that is devoid of assurance about life and the world. Therefore, Nietzsche sees ‘the pessimism’ as one of the ‘consequences of decadence’ (KSA 13: 14[73]); that is, pessimism is ‘not a problem but a symptom’ and ‘only the expression of physiological decadence’ (KSA 13: 17[8]; 15[32], 15[34]). In this pessimism, ‘the weakness, fatigue, racial decadence [Rassen-décadence] are formulated in concepts and valuations’ as in the pessimistic philosophy and ‘nihilistic religions’ (KSA 13: 14[25]), so that these deepen the decadence.

This pessimism is also connected with nihilism, since ‘pessimism’ is ‘an early form of nihilism’ (KSA 12: 10[58]). Pessimism develops the idea that ‘the world does not have the value we believed it had’ (KSA 12: 6[25]), and this idea of ‘valuelessness’ and ‘meaninglessness’ is what drives the ‘development of pessimism into nihilism’ (KSA 12: 9[107], 10[192]). This movement is ultimately the logical result of, or is based in, decadence, which implies the disjointed system in which one is unsure about oneself and its instincts. Therefore, Nietzsche writes ‘nihilism is not a cause, but only the logic of decadence’ (KSA 13: 14[86]) and considers ‘the nihilistic movement as an expression of decadence’ (KSA 13: 17[1]; cf. 13: 14[94], 23[3] 3).
In an 1888 letter to Köselitz, Nietzsche mentions ‘the soil of racial decadence’ in which ‘pessimistic values […] have their origin’, and he presents the law book of Manu as opposed to the pessimism (KSB 8: 1041). We have seen that Nietzsche takes the rank order in accordance with the physiologically different types to be the significant point that we can get from Manu. The decadence of race certainly indicates a race losing assurance about itself, detached from the ground from which its instincts grow. For Nietzsche the difference of classes or races is fundamentally physiological, in that types are physiologically different to be ‘determined and best developed for different activity’ (KSA 13: 14[221]). What nullifies this physiological difference is the democratic movement of ‘the blood-mixing of masters and slaves’ (BGE 261), or the ‘semi-barbarism into which Europe has been plunged by the democratic mixing of classes and races’ (BGE 224). Within this democratic movement, Nietzsche observes, ‘a tremendous physiological process is taking place’, which is ‘the process whereby Europeans are becoming similar, their growing detachment from the conditions under which climate- and class-bound races originate, their increasing independence from every determinate milieu, which would like to inscribe itself for centuries with the same demands into soul and body’ (BGE 242). In this respect, social decadence propelled by democratic enthusiasm indicates that ‘the ingrained difference between classes’, out of which ‘the pathos of distance’ can arise (BGE 257), is resolved, so that human beings are levelled and mediocratised.

However, as we will see in the following chapters, Nietzsche on other occasions seems to have a more positive appreciation of mixing of cultures and races, particularly in Human, All Too Human, and appears open to the development towards new European culture that the mixing of cultures will bring. This positive appreciation concerns ‘the production of the strongest possible European mixed race’ (HH I 475). The idea that a new race is formed by race mixing is a widespread notion in the nineteenth century, which is already argued early on by Lamarck.185 As Nietzsche recognises the necessity of the unified European culture, he encourages the formation of the stronger European race. Some would argue that Nietzsche’s both negative and positive approaches are influenced by Gobineau, who considers the race mixing as causing racial decline but also as necessary for civilization.186 However, as Schank

185 Bernasconi, op. cit., 2017, p. 58.
186 Arthur de Gobineau, The inequality of human races, trans. Adrian Collins, London : Britons Pub. Co., 1966. Gobineau writes that ‘most human races are for ever incapable of civilization, so long as they remain unmixed’ (p. 63), and ‘The result [of a mixture of civilizations] was a very complex and learned society, with a culture far more refined than before’ (p. 94). He is notorious for his racist view, but he also argues that ‘Artistic genius […] arose only after the intermarriage of white and black’ (p.
demonstrates, there is hardly any evidence that Gobineau’s work was studied and reflected by Nietzsche, not to mention Nietzsche’s possible repulsion against Gobineau’s anti-Semitism.\(^{187}\) Rather, therefore, Bernasconi argues Francis Galton is Nietzsche’s inspiration for this matter.\(^{188}\) Still, while Galton’s influence is evident, this cannot explain Nietzsche’s early positive appreciation in *Human, All Too Human*.

This debate on the influence of racial theory on Nietzsche seems to fail to grasp Nietzsche’s specific point. Nietzsche is not against the unifying of peoples, or races in the sense of peoples, in Europe itself. What Nietzsche opposes and cautions against is the mixing of types or the breakdown of rank order. As discussed, a ‘*race*’ consists in a ‘*character*’ it develops under a certain ‘*milieu* – a firmly imprinted role’, by virtue of which certain facts are emphasised and strengthened again and again’ (KSA 11: 25[462]). This character is related to the ‘physiological constitution of people’ and ‘comprises certain physiologically based values appropriate to ensure life’ under the milieu.\(^{189}\) A people can share a certain character, just as they share an affective interpretation, but Nietzsche further understands that different classes develop different characters and valuations, thereby connecting the idea of race and character with social class. In this sense, when races or classes with different characters are mixed, ‘the many inherited valuations are in conflict with each other, interfering with each other in the growth’ (KSA 11: 34[67]). What primarily concerns Nietzsche, particularly in relation to decadence, is this conflict that the collapse of rank order will bring about. Therefore, he mentions ‘class-bound races’ (BGE 242), ‘class mixing and consequently race mixing’ (BGE 208), and ‘the blood-mixing of masters and slaves’ (BGE 261), while viewing this mixing as a ‘democratic’ movement, not as a globalising one, so to speak.

When it comes to the European situation of intermingling, Nietzsche presents two lines of thought. On the one hand, he hopes that the mixture can develop a stronger race (in the sense of a people) as a whole, with the few as a ruling race (in the sense of class) in which the good elements of peoples in Europe are centralised,\(^{190}\) alongside the majority that form


\(^{188}\) Bernasconi, op. cit. 2017, p. 59.

\(^{189}\) Schank, op. cit., 2003, p. 237, 239.

\(^{190}\) Cf. ‘To centralise all existing individual-abilities in one nature’ (KSA 11: 25[221]).
the broad base of society. On the other hand, he warns against the denial of rank order and mixing of types. Types should develop further and ‘nothing should be banished more than […] the approximation and reconciliation’ of the types, which leads to ‘degeneration’ (KSA 12: 10[59]).

The Necessity of Decadence

In a status of decadence, society loses its directional stability and certainty. The question then is how we should deal with social decadence. Nietzsche seems severe in his criticism of the phenomenon of decadence and people infected with it, decadents. However, in a letter to Carl Fuchs in 1886, when Nietzsche finds in Wagner’s music ‘the sign of disintegration’ or dissolution that ‘the part becomes master over the whole’, he writes that the word ‘decadence’ is used ‘not to repudiate but only to describe’ (KSB 7: 688). Furthermore, especially in the Nachlass, Nietzsche often considers decadence as necessary and says we need to embrace it. In what sense then can he describe decadence as the necessary aspect of life? As I shall show, the necessity of decadence can be considered in two ways: (1) from a diachronic perspective in long history, and (2) from a synchronic perspective in a society. The former is concerned with the development of decadence through time in the big picture of history, the latter with the fact that there is always a decadent part in society.

(1) First, the necessity of decadence refers to the periodicity of decadence in an individual life or history of a culture. There are the stages of the rise and fall in life, as Nietzsche mentions: ‘A long, all-too-long succession of years means recuperation for me, – it also unfortunately means at the same time relapse, decline, the periodicity of a kind of decadence’ (EH ‘Wise’ 1; cf. KSB 8: 1036). Nietzsche often reminds the readers of the long perspective of history and the fact that everything is hedged or bounded in time, and sometimes makes analogies between one’s life and seasons (HH II ii 269) and between the culture of a people and seasons (GS 23). That there are peaks and valleys in the history of a human society and culture is in fact a plain and general statement that anyone with some historical knowledge will recognise and accept. The question is what kind of picture of social decadence in history Nietzsche has in mind more specifically.

Conway argues that Nietzsche ‘interprets Western history in terms of a renewable cycle of inexorable growth and decay’, but whether the sufficient textual evidence is provided to

191 Conway, Nietzsche’s dangerous game, p. 72.
support this claim could be questioned. He maintains that Nietzsche is convinced of the idea of the ‘cycle of growth and decay’ and that the cycle of ‘all macro-capacitors’ is between two types: ‘healthy peoples and ages, which express themselves through the expenditure of a continually replenished store of vital forces; and declining peoples and ages, which express themselves through the expenditure of a continually diminished store of vital forces’.

Although Nietzsche works with a broad idea of health and decline, this description is not the accurate picture of historical stages that Nietzsche has in mind concerning decadence. In a note that Conway does not consult, Nietzsche divides this evolution into three stages: ‘The accumulative ages and individuals’, ‘the prodigal [verschwenderisch] [ones]: the ingenious, the victorious, the conquering, the discovering, the adventurous’, and ‘after the latter the decadent necessarily follows’ (KSA 13: 14[88]). Therefore, the temporal development is the accumulation, expenditure, and decadence.

This view actually reflects to some extent the physiological and biological discussion of inheritance at the time. There was a debate throughout the nineteenth century about whether inheritance is a force, whose strength or effects could be ‘accumulated and could be reinforced over generations – or weakened by neglect’ and which ‘granted the persistence of type’, or matter, a material structure ‘that was transmitted over the generations’, though ‘the dominant belief was unequivocally of heredity as a force’. Nietzsche would probably be familiar to some extent with both sides from his reading of contemporary scientific literature. For example, on the former, the concept of heredity as a force was ‘particularly widespread among nineteenth-century breeders, and it influenced Francis Galton’ whose work Nietzsche read and consulted for several years. As for the latter, Nietzsche read Carl

---

192 Ibid., p. 75.
197 See Marie-Luise Haase, Friedrich Nietzsche liest Francis Galton, Nietzsche-Studien, 18: 1, 1989. Nietzsche obtained a copy of Galton’s Inquiries into Human Faculty and Its Development in 1883,
von Nägeli who presented a hypothetical hereditary substance ‘idioplasma’.\(^{198}\) While it seems that Nietzsche did not seriously participate in the debate and did not distinguish the positions and take one particular side on this specific issue, but was influenced eclectically, we can certainly find in his work the trace of the idea of hereditary accumulation. For Nietzsche, life is ‘the will to the accumulation of force \([\text{Kraft}]\)’, which ‘all the processes of life depend on’ and which is ‘specific to the phenomena of life, to nourishment, procreation, inheritance, to society, state, custom, authority’ (KSA 13: 14[81], 14[82]; A 6). Based on this view, he sees the history of human society through the lens of the accumulation of force.

In this understanding, greatness does not arise suddenly in virtue of ‘a miracle as a gift of heaven and “chance”’, but because the ‘ancestors have paid the cost’ for it, in which ‘one discovers the history of a tremendous storing up and capital accumulation of force through all kinds of renunciation, struggle, work, and prevailing’ (KSA 12: 9[45]). In this way, ‘the beauty of a race or family […] is the final result of the accumulated work of generations’ (TI ‘Expeditions’ 47). Therefore, an age of exuberant richness is preceded by the times of preparatory work, that is, “The accumulating ages, where force and means of power are discovered that the future will one day make use of” (KSA 12: 5[59]).

Similar to the contemporary breeders emphasising the continuance in a breed with the idea that hereditary force of character becomes more powerful through a long-continued transmission of it, about which Darwin was doubtful,\(^{199}\) Nietzsche, on a social level, emphasises the durability of the social structure. He believes that, for the accumulative times, there should be a society that is rigorously structured and durable because only when there is one, is ‘the increase of force’ as a whole ‘despite the temporary falling of the individual’ (KSA 12: 9[174]) possible.

On this subject, Nietzsche highly appreciates Rome as a model structure for the social durability required for the accumulation. The Romans understood that it took time to create a culture, and they built a structure that had ‘the will to tradition, to authority, to responsibility for centuries to come, to the solidarity of chains of generations forwards and backwards in

\(^{198}\) Emden, op. cit., 2014, p. 34.

\(^{199}\) Charles Darwin, *The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication* Vol. 2, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2010 [1868], p. 62. ‘It is a general belief amongst breeders that the longer any character has been transmitted by a breed, the more firmly it will continue to be transmitted. I do not wish to dispute the truth of the proposition, that inheritance gains strength simply through long continuance, but I doubt whether it can be proved’.

---

and also mentioned his *Hereditary Genius* in a letter in 1888 (KSB 8: 1176).
infinitum’ (TI ‘Expeditions’ 39). Rome, he asserts, is something with ‘great style’, something ‘that has duration, that promises life a future’ with ‘the genius of organisation and administration’, and accordingly, that makes it possible ‘to gain the ground for a great culture’ (A 58, 59). Nietzsche implies that an accumulation stage involves some domination and violence that prevents force from being scattered, but he certainly believes that a durable structure of this kind is what allows the accumulation of force that cultivates the soil for a great culture in the future. This is the point which he laments about ancient Greece. Though Nietzsche is amazed by the Greeks who are ‘the first cultural event of history’ (TI ‘Expeditions’ 47), he feels they lacked the Roman genius of organisation and failed to construct an enduring structure, so that their accumulated power couldn’t last long (HH I 261).

When ‘the acquired and accumulated forces of many generations have not been squandered and dispersed but bound together’ for a long time, in the end come the prodigal or lavish ages, in which there appear human beings ‘who are the heirs and masters of this slowly acquired manifold richness’ (KSA 11: 26[409]). The accumulated force ‘waits for an heir who spends it lavishly’ (GS 354), and these heirs are social fruits of long preparatory work. These social fruits Nietzsche also calls explosives: ‘Great men, like great ages, are explosives in which an immense force has been accumulated; their prerequisite is always, historically and physiologically, that things have long been gathered up, piled up, saved, and preserved for them – that for a long time, no explosion has taken place’ (TI ‘Expeditions’ 44). Therefore, the age of richness is when people capitalise on the inherited power lavishly and explosively. Hence, Nietzsche views this age also as conquering and adventurous, with ‘the high spirits and an overflowing, prodigal will’ (KSA 13: 11[44]) where ‘a lot can be dared, a lot can be challenged, a lot can also be squandered’. As Nietzsche asserts that ‘ages are to be measured according to their positive forces’ (TI ‘Expeditions’ 37), he includes in this prodigal age the age of classical Greece, where ‘never has life been lived so prodigally, so exorbitantly’ (HH I 261), and the age of the Renaissance, which is ‘so prodigal and fateful’ as ‘the last great age’ (TI ‘Expeditions’ 37).

However, ‘The danger that lies in great human beings and ages is extraordinary; exhaustion of every kind, sterility follows in their wake’. Thus, Nietzsche adds ‘the great age, the Renaissance for instance, is an end’ (TI ‘Expeditions’ 44). The problem is that even if exhaustion and decadence necessarily follow, the great age failed to have a society constructed to maintain its cultural force and accordingly, was too short as ‘Greek history
races so fast’ (HH I 261). On this point, Nietzsche writes: ‘What does the Renaissance prove? That the reign of the “individual” can only be brief. The squandering is too great; the very possibility of collecting and capitalizing is lacking; and exhaustion follows on its heels. These are times when everything is squandered, when the very force is squandered, with which one collects, capitalizes, and accumulates riches upon riches’ (KSA 13: 15[23]).

Therefore, when various, extraordinary cultural energies explode and flood, there already has to be a steady social structure capable of storing these energies and allowing them to continue to flow for future generations. In this sense, ‘A culture of exception, of attempt, of danger, of nuance – a hothouse culture for the extraordinary plants has a right to exist only if there is enough force now to make squandering itself economical’ (KSA 13: 16[6]). This profligacy can be economical when there is a substantial society in which the energies are not to be just wasted but also to sustain, to be marshalled and concerted. In this respect, Nietzsche especially in the late period praises Rome for its durable structure.

When the various energies are not marshalled together to form a closely knit culture, they are only to be spent and exhausted, leading to the decadent age. On the one hand, this age witnesses the ‘racial exhaustion [Rassen-Erschöpfung]’ (KSA 13: 14[171]) that wants ‘rest’, ‘peace’ and ‘tranquillity’ as expressed in ‘the happiness of nihilistic religions’ (KSA 13: 14[174]). On the other hand, this age may seem to be vibrant with all its diverse cultural practices. However, this vibrancy really means the dispersed interests and a decadent need for strong stimulants and excitement. Thus, the exhausted has often been confused with richness when the former ‘appears with the gesture of the highest activity and energy’ (KSA 13: 14[68]) as in Wagner. In this way, ‘the race is corrupted because it did not recognise exhaustion as exhaustion’. These ‘physiological confusions are the source of all ills’ (KSA 13: 15[13]), but common. In this regard, Nietzsche also confesses a mistake in that he understood ‘the philosophical pessimism of the nineteenth century’ as a ‘victorious fullness of life’, and ‘Wagner’s music’ as ‘the expression of a Dionysian might’ (NW ‘Antipodes’, GS 370). He realised later that these concerned not the richness of culture but the exhaustion and decadence in which dissolved forces consume each other without directional stability as a whole.

We have distinguished the three ages above – the accumulative, the prodigal or lavish, and the decadent – but they are not completely separate stages. In other words, the accumulative ages also spend force, so to speak, and the Roman imperium was a structure in which power could be used economically while still accumulating. Furthermore, in a
prodigal age the social system would be more complex with all the vitality, and this complexity is shared with the decadent within a fragmented and less organised system. Therefore, although in the big picture the accumulative ages are followed by the squandering and the decadent, the ages should be understood in terms of interacting movements. Related to this, Nietzsche distinguishes two forms of movements that respectively partly respond to the previous times: one is ‘newly awakened […] accumulated force, joyous, exuberant, violent: health’, and the other is ‘fatigue from a preceding movement’ that is related to ‘sickness’ (KSA 10: 8[27]). In this respect, the prodigal ages are when the former movement is stronger, and the decadent ages are the latter movement is dominant.

These movements can happen concurrently in a society. In the prodigal age ‘the tremendous tension’ of ‘the bond and the constraint of the old discipline’ ‘eases up’ in a sense and the cultural forces flood, and ‘the means of life, even for the enjoyment of life are abundantly present’ (BGE 262). However, when the movement of squandering is not economical at all without a social structure to support it, this will give the initiative to the other movement of decline rapidly. In this decadent age, ‘we no longer collect, we squander the capital of the ancestors’ (KSA 13: 14[226]).

The accumulated force does not automatically make a prodigal age. When the accumulated force is wasted in a dispersed manner as in a democratic society, it is the decadent age of the chaotic consumption of force, which could have been a prodigal age. In this respect, while Nietzsche sees the decadence prevailing in contemporary Germany, characterising ‘modern democracy and all democratic halfway measures, such as the “German Reich”, as a *decaying form of the state*’ and ‘the declining form of organizational force’ (TI ‘Expeditions’ 39), he still recognises the inherited force in it, saying ‘The new Germany represents a great quantity of ability, inherited and acquired by training, so that for a while it may spend its accumulated store of force lavishly’ (TI ‘Germans’ 1). Therefore, although in the big picture temporal progress is manifested in accumulation, expenditure and decadence, these stages should not be considered separate but should be understood in terms of what kind of movement is dominant. Therefore, while these movements of accumulation, expenditure and decadence are there at the same time in society, the dominant movement determines the age in a big picture, and thus Nietzsche thinks decadence is also present as a concurrent movement in a society.

(2) Second, the necessity of decadence can be considered from a synchronic perspective in society. Regarding this point, Nietzsche writes assertively in a note from 1888 under the
Waste, decay, the defective are not in themselves to be condemned: they are necessary consequences of life, of the growth of life. The phenomenon of decadence is as necessary as any ascent and advance of life: one is in no position to abolish it. […]

It is a disgrace for all socialist systematisers that they think there could be circumstances, social combinations, in which vice, sickness, crime, prostitution, distress would no longer grow. But that means condemning life. A society is not free to remain young. And even in its best force it has to form refuse and waste materials. The more energetically and boldly it advances, the richer it will be in failures and deformities, and the closer to decline. (KSA 13: 14[75])

Here Nietzsche views decadence as a concurrent movement in the process of life. This understanding is particularly based on the physiological perspective that an organism or life develops the ‘healthy’ and ‘degenerate’ parts. Furthermore, society as a whole is seen in a way analogous to an organism that necessarily produces waste matter. This point also refers to Nietzsche’s demand for the affirmation of life as a whole; that is to say, not only the joy in life but also all of what are considered the dark corners of life must be affirmed. This attitude is opposed to all the idealist movements that aim to have society as a pure space in which no distress or affliction exists.

This idealist tendency is represented in history by Plato, as well as by socialists and Christians in contemporary times. For them, this earthly life is not true life, whose locus is considered other-worldly or in the great future. Nietzsche sees this kind of idealism is the expression of exhaustion and disgust for earthly life. As is well known, for Plato (or Socrates) idea or form is the true being which is the foundation of what we see in the world. In a dialogue, Socrates affirms that there is a form [eidos] of ‘just, and beautiful, and good, and everything of that sort’. However, when he is asked if there is a form of ‘absurd’ things like mud and filth or ‘anything else totally undignified and worthless’, he answers ‘Not at all’, saying ‘it is too outlandish to think there is a form for them’. In this way, ugly things like

200 Plato, Parmenides, 130 b-d.
filth are banished from the world of true beings, while at the same time we see that they are still there in the world. Thus, they remain incomprehensible as things which exist without raison d'être.

Nietzsche seems to demand the recognition of such things, the decadent part of life, as he presents ‘Dionysus’ as ‘the religious affirmation of life, life whole and not denied or in part’ (KSA 13: 14[89]). As decadence is necessary in society, while a sick person or decadent is considered as parasitic (TI ‘Expeditions’ 33), he even tries ‘to measure the health of a society and of the individual according to how many parasites they can endure’ (D 202). However, here a certain tension occurs. Although it is recognised that the development of life naturally involves decadence, this does not seem to mean it has his complete approval. It seems decadence is not, so to speak, waste matter simply to be accepted but waste matter to eliminate, hence ‘decadents as excrement of society’ (KSA 13: 16[52]). Thus, the tension is between his assertion that decadence should be accepted as a necessary part of life and the fact that he also often demands getting rid of a decadent part in society, as in the following passage:

When within an organism the least organ neglects, however slightly, to pursue its self-preservation, its energy renewal, [...] with complete assuredness, then the whole degenerates. The physiologist demands that the degenerating part be cut out, he denies any solidarity with what is degenerating, he is at the furthest remove from sympathy with it. But the priest precisely wants the degeneration of the whole, of humanity: that is why he preserves the degenerate – at this price he dominates it. (EH ‘D’ 2)

Nietzsche here seems to regard decadence not as a necessarily entailed part in life, but as a diseased part to be done away with. He seems then, contrary to the passage quoted earlier, to want to make society free of decadence. He writes in a note in a more direct and emphatic manner: ‘One should amputate sick members: first morality of society. [...] Society is a body in which no member may be ill, if it does not want to run into danger at all: a sick member that is corrupted must be amputated: [...] My writing opposes all natural types of decadence’ (KSA 13: 15[13]).

Further, like Plato who advises abandoning ‘the children of inferior parents, or any child
of the others that is born defective’,\textsuperscript{201} Nietzsche demands to question ‘the right to procreate, the right to be born, the right to live’ for the decadents or the physiologically degenerate (TI ‘Expeditions’ 36). In this respect, Nietzsche does not show any mercy or tolerance for decadence even though he understands that life can be naturally ill and defective. Is decadence in the end merely something to extirpate, in Nietzsche’s view? How should we then understand the earlier suggestion that the denial of decadence is connected to the condemnation of life?

The clue to resolving this apparent contradiction is found in a note where Nietzsche presents ‘basic insight regarding the essence of decadence’: ‘Decadence itself is not something to combat: it is absolutely necessary and peculiar to every age and every people. \textit{What} to combat with all strength is the introduction of the contagion into the healthy parts of the organism’. In this respect, decadence concerns the ‘basic \textit{biological} question’ (KSA 13: 15[31]), and he still draws an analogy between human society and an organism. It may reasonably be said that the best or most ideal scenario is one in which there is no decadent or diseased part in life, but this is not possible. Instead, the partial illness should be prevented from spreading across the whole to spoil and deteriorate it. What should be fought is not decadence itself but its metastasis that risks the health of the whole.

Now, two connected questions are still to be answered here. Firstly, what is the social mechanism by which Nietzsche understands decadence to spread to the whole society? Secondly, what does Nietzsche mean when he says that the more energetically society advances, the more decadents it produces? In what follows, I further clarify his idea of decadence while addressing these questions.

\textbf{Decadence and the Morality of Equality}

The basic mechanism of the spread of the illness to the social whole is to make the mediocrities or the herd ill. As discussed, decadence indicates the rift in the self and the failure of being in accordance with the physiological order. What disconnects people from who they physiologically are and from their positions in the physiological order, Nietzsche understands above all, is the Christian morality of equality which makes them find dissatisfaction and injustice with themselves and their positions. This morality plays the key role in transforming the herd into decadents.

\textsuperscript{201} Plato, \textit{Republic}, 460 c.
Humans are not born as individuals. For humanity, the herd is a mode of living, because individuals are always in the context of their interaction with others and society. The results of this interaction and social relations are affects and consciousness. As seen in chapter three, people are born into a society that has a certain affective network, which produces an affective interpretation with which people encounter the world. Nietzsche also argues that the human being is first developed as a function of the whole. Furthermore consciousness, which has developed, along with language, for the need of ‘connections’ and ‘communication’ between human beings, belongs much more to the ‘social and herd nature’ than to the individual existence (GS 354). Thus, consciousness functions as the pressure that detaches one from one’s instincts and coordinates them according to social appropriateness. In this way, Nietzsche recognises that the herd is a mode of living that is based on basic human nature.

Although Nietzsche gives considerable thought to the birth of the individual that breaks away from the herd and herd instinct, he does not see that the herd is bad as such. ‘In itself, there is nothing sick about the herd animal; it is even invaluable’. However, the herd is ‘incapable of leading itself, it needs a “shepherd”’. ‘The priest understands this’, and here he comes into the picture. He leads the herd by ‘directing the conscience’ and makes people ashamed of their lives. In this way, ‘the herd animal has been made sick by the priest’ (KSA 13: 23[4]). Nietzsche understands that decadence consists in ‘selflessness’ and ‘depersonalisation’, and these ‘decadence values’ are what have only been taught as the highest values by the priest. The priest sees ‘his means to power in Christian morality’, and with this ‘morality of un-selfing’ [Entselbstungs-Moral], which ‘denies life at the most fundamental level’, he ‘has lied his way up to being the determiner of humanity’s values’ (EH ‘Destiny’ 7).

Nietzsche distinguishes the herd/mediocre and the decadent. ‘It would be completely unworthy of a deeper spirit to find an objection in mediocrity as such’ (A 57). Rather, for the mediocre ‘every step away from mediocrity’ leads to sickness (KSA 13: 15[118]). However, the priest is the one who benefits from people being sick, i.e. from the herd or mediocre becoming decadent. Thus, ‘For the type of person longing for power in Judaism and Christianity, the priestly type, decadence is only a means: this type of person has a life-interest in making humanity ill’ (A 24). In this morality, ‘the decadent forms are worth more than the mediocre’. As this morality becomes prevalent, ressentiment, which is the
expression of powerlessness and dissatisfaction with oneself,\(^{202}\) comes to be the social affect that promotes the ‘organised herd instincts’ to oppose the stronger types (KSA 13: 14[123]). ‘Being ill is itself a kind of ressentiment’ (EH ‘Wise’ 6). People attribute guilt upwards for the unfavourable conditions of their existence. Thus, ‘the decadents of all kinds are in revolt over themselves and need victims so as not to quench their thirst for destruction by destroying themselves’, and they ‘shift the responsibility’ for their being born this way to others (KSA 13: 15[30]). Nietzsche calls this attitude ‘the pessimism of indignation’, which refers to the ‘preponderance of ressentiment’ (KSA 13: 15[32]).

In modern times the decadent situation deteriorates, since the ressentiment as the basic social affect is combined with the mixing of classes. In this way, ressentiment is no longer the matter of a certain social rank, but of the majority of people that cannot bear to see anyone towering above them. Nietzsche has it that in the democratic age, the whole becomes ‘the social mishmash’ wherein the ‘bearers of the instincts of decline (of ressentiment, discontent, the drive to destroy, anarchism, and nihilism), including the slave instincts, […] and canaille instincts of the long-kept-down strata, mingle with the blood of all classes: two, three generations later the race is no longer recognisable – everything has become of the rabble’ (KSA 13: 14[182]). In this way, he understands, in the modern society the decadent instincts overwhelm the whole. The belief in moral world order and the ressentiment against the existing order have become the basis of every social movement.

However, what does Nietzsche mean when he implies that the more energetically society advances, the more decadents it produces? What is the point of endeavour to prevent decadence from spreading if even a healthy society produces decadents naturally? A society wherein its members are strictly disciplined for definite life can be stable, but it can also suppress the creative expressions of the members to some degree. However, when an age of richness comes, ‘the tremendous tension’ of ‘the bond and the constraint of the old discipline’

in the previous society ‘eases up’. In this age, ‘variation, whether as deviation (into the higher, finer, rarer) or as degeneration and monstrosity, is suddenly on the scene in the greatest abundance and splendour; the individual dares to be individual and stand out’ (BGE 262). This relaxation, so to speak, of the old constraint allows the various expressions of creative forces, but it also allows degeneration. In other words, in this relaxation when people would encounter new and different cultural streams, some would be enriched by incorporating the new forces, but some would become disjointed due to their incapacity to digest the new and foreign influence or ‘environment’, which constitutes decadence (KSA 13: 14[65], 15[80]).

Therefore, as the cultural forces form creatively, the decadents are also developed. Each social class and group, whether higher or lower in rank, can produce decadents who show the incapacity leading to a disjointed and exhausted being. Thus, a society comes closer to decline as the cultural energies are not generated continually enough to deal with the decadence it produces. In this respect, decadents are not merely ‘the oppressed races’, but the dregs or ‘discharge [Auswurf] of previous society of all classes’ (KSA 13: 16[53]).

In the modern age the situation becomes worse with the mixing discussed above. ‘Realising that all our classes are permeated by these elements, we understand that modern society is no “society”, no “body”, but a sick conglomerate of chandalas – a society that no longer has the strength to excrete’ (KSA 13: 16[53]). As a society advances, it also develops decadence; the lack of strength even to excrete means that society does not grow at all. Nietzsche sees that it is the ideology of equality that fundamentally hinders growth.
Chapter 5:
Culture and Society

Society as the Condition of Culture

We can draw two points from the discussion of decadence. First, we recognise in the discussion again the theme of becoming what one is in Nietzsche’s philosophy; that is to say, we identify the importance of one’s being in accordance with one’s physiological constitution. Therefore, to overcome a decadent state where one loses the centre of gravity of one’s instincts, a social structure is required which enables such accordance, i.e. a structure with physiological rank order, which is dealt with in chapter two. Second, we also recognise the importance of the social structure that enables accumulation of cultural forces. In a society (in a synchronic picture) there is the decadent part as well as accumulating and expending forces. In order for a society to maintain its health, even though from an historical viewpoint it can and will eventually decline, it should be durable enough to accumulate cultural forces, and should be a society in which this accumulation is able to sustain the expenditure and in which decadence does not spread into the whole.

Above all, to deal with decadence whether individual or social, the hierarchical and durable social structure should be constructed first. The social system is significant, since a person’s instinctual structure mirrors the social condition. Nietzsche denounces ‘modern society’ as ‘no “society”, no “body”’ (KSA 13: 16[53]). In the decadent age of mixture, the interpretation of the world is fragmented and ‘the rank order of valuations according to which a people, a society, a human being has lived’ is disarranged. Thus ‘every form and way of life’ is merely mixed without the focal power to organise the diversity into the whole, and ‘thanks to that mixture, our instincts now run back everywhere and we ourselves are a kind of chaos’ (BGE 224).

The biggest obstruction that Nietzsche sees to his vision is Christian morality and democracy. Since he views Christianity as the core culprit in allowing and spreading decadence, it is natural for him to combat prevailing Christianity, which ‘has absorbed diseases of all kinds from morbid soil’ (KSA 13: 10[96]; A 51). One may ask then why Nietzsche demonstrates appreciation for the Middle Ages, a period in which Christianity was dominant. However, this appreciation is not for Christianity itself but for the fact that society in the Middle Ages cultivated people to have belief in hierarchy and their positions in it. It is
the modern age then in which the Christian morality of equality prevails in every aspect of life.

Christianity leads the herd to be sick, and thus it is ‘a denaturalization of herd-animal morality’. Coming into the age of democracy, the situation deteriorates because democracy causes this denaturalisation to be accepted as natural. Now ‘the mediocre nature’ does not stay in its mediocre position, but becomes the assertive herd instinct that ‘gets its highest sanction through Christianity’. In this way, this ‘mediocre nature at last grows so conscious of itself (–acquires courage for itself–) that it arrogates even political power to itself’. This is what Nietzsche understands as democracy. In this very sense, he writes, ‘democracy is the naturalised Christianity’ (KSA 12: 10[77]).

Now the idea of hierarchy is discredited, and the belief in equality permeates all levels of society. Here a peculiar phenomenon appears: the herd becomes powerful, and the individual is overemphasised at the same time in modern society. In the democratic context, the herd and the individual are not mutually exclusive aspects of life. The herd here does not indicate what Tönnies describes as the organic community based on which its members’ identities develop and are bound together.203 The herd is only a gathering of atomistic individuals ‘removed from all soil’ (KSA 13: 14[111]), who do not have community spirit but have a sense of relief when they gather to express ressentiment to check anyone going higher.

Nietzsche views ‘the individual as the bearer of the life-process’ (KSA 13: 22[22]). Thus, an individual cannot be simply an atomistic island that does not take root in life as a whole, since ‘one belongs to the whole, one is in the whole’ (TI ‘Errors’ 8). In the democratic age, the organic social foundation as a whole falls apart, and here liberal individualism and the herd instinct belong together, and the overemphasised individual and non-personal objectivity204 go hand in hand. It was the morality of equality that ‘first prompted the individual to play the judge of everything and everyone’. Now the individual is considered beyond the ‘social, familial, historical relationships’, and ‘is made transcendent’. In this way,


204 This objectivity refers to the detachment from one’s instincts. This detachment as being ‘able to stand so distant’, which allows the ground for depersonalisation as the symptom of decadence, is expressed in the social tendency towards ‘generality’ or ‘objectivity as disintegration of the will’. This general objectivity disguises the loss of direction, the loss as ‘a sign of separation from organisational forms’ (KSA 13: 14[83]; A 20), and it appeals to people as the fair view of the world.
‘a nonsensical importance is attached to the individual’ (KSA 13: 15[30]). However, this is to make individuals the same and depersonalised and, accordingly, nothing. The emphasis on the individual stems from the demand for equality, but this demand in turn requires their depersonalisation.

In the democratic herd instinct supported by such individualism, ‘what the sum has to mean depends on the value of the units’; but as mentioned individuals, without the social foundation, become depersonalised and nothing. Therefore, Nietzsche thinks ‘the herd’ is ‘the sum of zeros [summirten Nullen]’, ‘where every zero has “equal rights”, where it is virtuous to be zero’ (KSA 13: 14[40]). In this respect, the democratic herd cannot form the whole, but rather it indicates the absence of the social whole. Thus, the herd instinct is close to the individualist tendency, which is opposed to the formation of the whole.

For Nietzsche, the idea of the individual as ‘a plant removed from all soil’ is, in itself, a manifestation of anti-nature. When Nietzsche criticises that Greek decadent morality as ‘the dissolution of the Greek instincts’, he explains this morality is ‘denaturalised’ in that ‘moral judgments are torn from their conditionality [Bedingtheit], from which they have grown and in which alone they possess any meaning, from their Greek and Greek-political ground and soil’. In the same manner, the individual is severed from its ground in that the society is no longer the foundation into which people’s lives put down roots to be trained for certain forms of life. Thus, Nietzsche writes, ‘the completely absurd “individual” in itself; the unnaturalness [Unnatur] of the highest rank’. This ‘denaturalisation’, he continues, leads to ‘the creation of a degenerate type of man’ (KSA 13: 14[111]). Therefore, we should run counter to this anti-natural tendency, and bring to mind that society is a place of rearing.

In this way, Nietzsche again recognises the significance of social structure. A society should not be disjointed to permit people to lead a life haphazardly given to them; it should be the space that trains people for a certain way of life. In this regard, decadence refers also to a society failing to rear the human being, and this failure will allow the degeneration of types. Against such an absurd individualism, Nietzsche considers ‘antisocial inclination’ as one of ‘typical forms of decadence’ (KSA 13: 11[362]). Society is a field of struggle over what kinds of human being are to be raised. ‘Life is a consequence of war, society itself a means of war’ (KSA 13: 14[40]). Nietzsche enters this war and tries to form the society he envisions.

In the end, the significance lies in what kind of society should be built. A democratic system, which is based on the Christian conception of equality, cannot manage decadence;
rather it makes society decadent in its totality. Furthermore, it cannot accumulate the forces because it is based on the sum of zeros. In order for a social construction to spend cultural forces economically – in other words, for it to accommodate lively cultural activities without rapid exhaustion of their energy – it should be hierarchically structured to stand firmly, and durable enough to accumulate the forces at the same time. This structure also indicates a society as a body, which means that it is an integrated whole. When it is well integrated to achieve unity it is healthy as a whole, so that it can endure partial weakening or decadence. Such a unity, as we shall see, is what Nietzsche understands as the basis of a culture, and this cultural unity requires the correct social foundation to support it. As Nietzsche is concerned about European culture, he wants to shape the social foundation to support it, and thus he deeply concerns himself with European political unity. In other words, unified Europe is the setting in which Nietzsche expects his envisioned social whole to be established to allow European culture to blossom. In the following, I will clarify in detail Nietzsche’s thinking around European unity. I will then look at the development of his idea of culture as unity from the early to late period.

**Imperium Romanum: The Great Style**

As one can expect, Nietzsche’s emphasis on social structure does not progress to reference contemporary political theory or sociology, because in his view it was infiltrated and polluted by decadent ideas. It was enthused by the idea of equality, and found its morality in a set of compassionate virtues. Thus confronted with this and mentioning ‘New aristocracy’, Nietzsche writes: ‘Theory of ruling-structure [Herrschaftsgebilde] instead of sociology’ (KSA 12: 5[61]). This kind of remark is repeated several times, and in a note in the autumn of 1887 Nietzsche again writes, ‘In place of “sociology”, a theory of the ruling-structures’ as one of ‘the plans’ (KSA 12: 9[8]).

---

205 Nietzsche views himself as décadent in a corner but healthy as a whole (EH ‘Wise’ 2).

206 According to Nietzsche, ‘All our political theories and state-constitutions […] are implications, necessary consequences of decline; the unconscious effect of decadence has become dominant […] Declining life, the diminution of all organising, that is, separating, gulf-opening, subordinating and superordinating force, is formulated in today’s sociology as an ideal’ (TI ‘Expeditions’ 37). Therefore, he adds ‘sociology’ to the list of ‘the modern ideas as false’ that he criticises (KSA 13: 16[82]; cf. 14[6], 14[40]).

207 The plans include: ‘In place of moral values, purely naturalistic values’ and ‘In place of “epistemology”, a perspective theory of affects’. 
We have looked already at how the idea of self-mastery involves mastery over others. Further, it is discussed that the intervention of vertical force is needed for an affective network to form the whole. This intervention is an activity similar to that of one who first forms a state, as Nietzsche describes in *On the Genealogy of Morality*. One ‘who can command, who is by nature “master”, […]’ Their work is an instinctive creating of form, impressing of form; […] something new stands where they appear, a ruling-structure that lives, in which parts and functions are delimited and related to one another, in which nothing at all finds a place unless a “meaning” in relation to the whole has first been implanted in it’ (GM II 17). In this respect, what Nietzsche calls the theory of ruling-structure refers to the formation of the whole that should be the body as a whole.

As the ruling-structure Nietzsche envisions means the formation of the whole, it also means overcoming decadence as chaotic disintegration. What is notable is that Nietzsche deems this structure to have great style [*grosse Stil*]. He applies the term ‘great style’ in various ways, using it in relation to nature, persons, art, music, architecture, society, and even morality, as he puts ‘the great style in morality’ (BGE 250). Just as Nietzsche extends the idea of literary decadence to a social one when discussing Wagner, so he uses the term ‘great style’ not only regarding art and music, but also analogously regarding social construction.

Above all, Nietzsche presents the great style as the opposite of decadence. In a letter in 1886, he writes that ‘the *great style*’ is what is farthest from ‘decadence-taste’, and decadence here is described as the loss of the whole as in *The Case of Wagner* (KSB 7: 688; cf. KSA 13: 16[77]). It is also concerned with ‘totality’ (KSA 12: 10[5]), and he writes that ‘the great style wants one strong basic will and abhors the disjointedness the most’ (KSA 11: 25[332]). Thus, he considers ‘the *great style*’ as the ‘expression of the “will to power” itself’ (KSA 13: 11[138]), which wants ‘to become master of the chaos’ and ‘compel the chaos to become form’ (KSA 13: 14[61], 16[49]).

What this great style expressed as social construction is *imperium Romanum* or the Roman Empire. Nietzsche does not seem always to have a consistent attitude towards the Romans, and he often seems to appreciate ancient Greece more than Rome in terms of culture. However, he rarely comments negatively on the Roman Empire itself, for he certainly knows the significance of the formation of society, of which the Roman Empire is a model.

As discussed in chapter four, continuity is important to the strengthening of the human
types. What guarantees this continuity is the ruling-structure with great style. Thus ‘a great organisation of society’ is ‘the supreme condition for the thriving life’, and the imperium Romanum is the exemplar as ‘the most magnificent form of organisation ever to be achieved’. The imperium was ‘the world’ ‘that stands grandly, that has duration, that promises life a future’ (A 58).

In this way, Nietzsche points out the imperium’s magnitude and durability. ‘The imperium Romanum which we know, […] this most admirable work of art in the great style was a beginning; its structure was calculated to prove itself through thousands of years – to this day there has been nothing built, nor even dreamed of being built, on the same scale sub specie aeterni’ (A 58). With this idea of social construction as a work of art, Nietzsche wants to build a ruling structure with great style.

Nietzsche’s remarks on the imperium imply the scale on which the structure he envisions should be built. In this regard, he presents the idea of One Europe. As Nietzsche criticises democracy as ‘the declining form of organising force’, where institutions are lost, he continues that to establish institutions, there has to be a kind of ‘anti-liberal’: ‘the will to tradition, to authority, to responsibility for centuries to come, to the solidarity of chains of generations forwards and backwards in infinitum. If this will is there, something like the imperium Romanum is founded – or like Russia, the only power that has physical endurance today’. This kind of grand social construction is ‘the antithesis of the pathetic European petty-state-sectionalism [Kleinstaaterei] and nervousness’ (TI ‘Expeditions’ 39). Therefore, the ruling structure with great style is to overcome the rise of small states in the Europe of the time, to form a unified Europe. In what sense, then, is One Europe important to Nietzsche?

**One Europe**

Nietzsche’s idea of Europe is not a new topic, but the concept of ‘One Europe’ seems to receive less attention than it deserves. This might be due to some nuance of the term that might not be attractive to researchers, but above all it is likely because few give

---

208 This idea seems to be influenced by Burckhardt’s consideration of ‘the state as the outcome of reflection and calculation, the state as a work of art’. Jacob Burckhardt, *The civilisation of the period of the Renaissance in Italy*, Vol. 1, trans. S. G. C. Middlemore, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 5. For the similarity between Nietzsche and Burckhardt, see Nikola Regent, *A ‘Wondrous Echo’: Burckhardt, Renaissance and Nietzsche’s Political Thought*, in *Nietzsche, Power and Politics*, 2008.
consideration to Nietzsche’s political remarks with enough seriousness. For example, Tongerena, who understands Nietzsche as ‘über-politischer (or supra-political) thinker’, maintains that ‘Nietzsche’s critique of the “European system of a lot of petty states” does not aim at a unified Europe’.209

However, as other scholars suggest,210 Nietzsche clearly calls for One Europe, especially in the name of great politics. In section 208 of Beyond Good and Evil, where he points out ‘the European sickness’ of ‘will-paralysis’ resulting from class and race mixing, he resolutely urges Europe, confronting the Russian threat, to will a single will, and expects a new caste ruling over Europe to acquire the will to set a goal spanning over millennia and to rule the earth. This means that ‘the long-drawn-out comedy of its petty-states-sectionalism [Kleinstaaterei] and its dynastic as well as democratic fragmentation of the will could finally come to an end’. He continues, ‘The time for petty politics is past: the very next century will bring the struggle for the dominion over the earth [Erd-Herrschaft] – the compulsion to great politics’.211

What should be noted is that when Nietzsche says that Europe can overcome the sectionalism with the resolution to have a single will through a new caste ruling Europe, he considers those things to be overcome to be ‘petty politics’ [kleine Politik]. In this way, he keeps his distance from the so-called ‘great politics’,212 which at the time is understood as nationalistic activity to expand external power, by demoting it to and dubbing it ‘petty

_____________


211 This passage is a potential cause for bewilderment amongst researchers, and when trying to interpret great politics in a positive line, they tend not to mention this passage at all; for example, Alex McIntyre in his book The sovereignty of joy : Nietzsche's vision of grand politics, which focuses on the concept of great politics and hardly ever gives an eye to this passage or the other related to Europe, and Nandita Biswas Mellamphy in her book The Three Stigmata of Friedrich Nietzsche: Political Physiology in the Age of Nihilism (Basingstoke : Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), which takes ‘great politics’ as one of key concepts, does not deal with this section properly. This situation may be repercussions of Lukács’ interpretation that somewhat immoderately reads Nietzsche of this aspect as prefiguring European imperialism. See Georg Lukács, Die Zerstörung der Vernunft 2, Darmstadt : Luchterhand, 1983.

212 ‘Great politics’ was a term which indicated foreign or international politics believed to be superior to domestic politics, and was rooted in the ‘fashionable conviction of the primacy of foreign policy, of a higher form of politics specifically addressing European and world power conflicts in contradistinction to a presumably lesser form of politics dealing with internal matters’ (Peter Bergmann, Nietzsche, “the last antipolitical German”, Bloomington : Indiana University Press, 1987, p. 162). Nietzsche also found domestic politics overwhelmed by foreign politics (HH II ii 292).
politics’. This creates a space for him to pursue what he means by the same term, *grosse Politik*.\(^{213}\) He writes ‘My goals and tasks are more comprehensive than those of any others – and what I call great politics gives at least a *good* standpoint and bird’s-eye view for things of the present’ (KSB 6: 507). Later, in 1888, he states clearly that ‘I know nothing that would oppose the *sublime* sense of my task more deeply than this execrable incitement to national and racial selfishness that currently claims the name “great politics”’ (KSA 13: 25[6]).

Nietzsche has shown contempt for this sense of petty politics. Section 377 in *Gay Science* deals with ‘good Europeans, the heirs of Europe, the rich, oversupplied, but also overly obligated heirs of thousands of years of European spirit’. Being with good Europeans, Nietzsche expresses ire at the ‘petty politics’ that has been sustained by putting asunder the European nations and peoples and by stirring up hatred between them, and asks: ‘*Must* it not desire the perpetuation of petty-states-sectionalism of Europe?’

Nietzsche was critical not only of the states’ clamouring for independence or desire for establishment of nation-states, but also of the complex, multi-layered alliances and hostile relations between powers; that is, all of the national movements taking place in Europe at the time, since those movements were internally inciting the populace to follow them by appealing to its welfare and, externally, pursuing alliances and containment using military build-up for their interests. However, as those were only self-consuming activities lacking in understanding of the genuine tasks worth considering, he says: ‘The small states [*Kleinstaaten*] of Europe, I mean all of our current states and “empires”’. ‘I see beyond all of these national wars, new “empires” and what else is in the foreground: what has to do with me […] is the One Europe’ (KSA 11: 37[9]). In this way, he observes ‘petty politics’ thriving based on and making use of divided European states, and considers ‘earth-governance’ as being opposed to it:

Finally, when a superior force [*force majeure*] of genius and will strong enough to

\(^{213}\) Bergmann argues that Nietzsche at first stands ‘outside the concept’, but in about 1884, he eventually ‘internalizes’ the concept of great politics (Bergmann, ibid., p. 6, 162 f.). However, in my view, Nietzsche, so far from internalising, strongly disapproves of the contemporary idea of great politics. We should understand that in Nietzsche’s works there are two different lines of usage of *grosse Politik*, which must be distinguished. One is the so-called great politics that was going on at the time of Europe, toward which Nietzsche assumes a critical position; the other is great politics that he calls for actively and positively, which he also refers to as ‘the dominion over the earth’ or ‘earth-governance’.
make Europe into a unity, a political and economic unity for the purpose of earth-governance [Erdregierung] became visible on the bridge between two centuries of decadence, the Germans with their “Wars of Liberation” [Freiheits-Kriege] robbed Europe of the meaning, the miracle of meaning, in the existence of Napoleon, – thereby they have responsibility for everything that came about and exists today: the most anti-cultural sickness and unreason there is, nationalism, this national neurosis that Europe is sick with, this perpetuation of Europe’s petty-states-sectionalism, of petty politics. They have even robbed Europe of its meaning, its reason – they have brought it into a dead end. – Does anyone except me know a way out of this dead end? A task great enough to bind peoples again? (EH ‘Wagner’ 2)

Nietzsche repeatedly identifies petty politics with the sectionalism of European states and brings up ‘One Europe’ in opposition, calling for a dominion over earth that one Europe will oversee. Therefore, we can see that ‘One Europe’ that overcomes the sectionalism to acquire a single will is the setting for the ruling-structure to be established. In other words, the great politics he envisions refers to ‘earth-dominion’ or ‘earth-governance’ carried out in the setting as one Europe. He implies that this also means to overcome decadence as the divided will and disintegration.

Forming a European unity is important to Nietzsche because the contemporary sectionalism of states is a decadent, self-consuming and self-destructive movement. It is the different types, not nationalities or peoples, that Nietzsche believes should not become approximated and homogeneous. However, the European petty-states-sectionalism does not differentiate what is to be distinguished by dismantling the rank order, but pushes only the consuming strife or warfare between peoples by drawing meaningless border lines. This situation serves only the interests of politicians and royal families, who benefit from decadent chaos, and it is ‘the most prominent talents’ that would be sacrificed from this situation by being mobilised (HH I 481). This thoroughly belongs to the politics of ressentiment. It is a system that is maintained by destroying rank order with the decadent idea of equality, and turning people’s ressentiment, which has become the basic social affect, towards the other nations.

In this way, the state has become ‘the new idol’ and ‘the coldest of all cold monsters’ that ‘lies in all the tongues of good and evil’ (Z I ‘Idol’). The state is merely a monster that gets stronger, encouraging and feeding on people’s ressentiment. For this reason he criticises the so-called ‘great politics’ of the time as a nationalistic movement for the reason that it ‘devours the seriousness about all really great things’ (KSA 13: 19[1]; TI ‘Germans’ 4). Nietzsche brooded over and wanted to stop this movement. Sensing that warfare was looming at the time, he believed that ‘we ourselves could dispense with the wars; a correct opinion might be already enough’ (KSA 13: 25[14]).

Thus, Nietzsche presents his idea of great politics and One Europe, which is called for not only from the perspective of recognising a power conflict and an increase in the risk of war which should cause Europe to address the matter of unity, but because there are already ‘the most unequivocal signs […] that Europe wants to become one’ shown in Napoleon and Goethe; accordingly, ‘disintegration politics’ among European countries is only ‘interlude politics’ (BGE 256).

With the politics of the time representing a democratic movement, Nietzsche believes it becomes inevitable to establish new dominion in one Europe. He argues that ‘the completion of the European democracy’ is the ‘new and sublime development of slavery’, a phrase which refers to the levelled and broad base of society, and asks, ‘would it not be a kind of goal, redemption, and justification for the democratic movement itself if someone arrived who could make use of it[?]’ (KSA 12: 2[13]) That only a herd exists would mean the total lack of direction and loss of values. In this respect, ‘the appearance of an unconditional commander’ for ‘the herd-animal European’ is of ‘redemption’ and ‘blessing’. Therefore Napoleon, for Nietzsche, is representative of ‘the latest great evidence’ (BGE 199) and ‘all of the higher hopes of this century’ (KSA 12: 9[44]).

When Nietzsche says the ‘time is coming when one will relearn about politics’, he speaks of those of higher types who ‘employ democratic Europe as their most pliant and supple instrument for getting hold of the destinies of the earth, so as to work as artists upon “human beings” themselves’. Observing the democratic progress in Europe, which will form a broad base of society (slavery to use Nietzsche’s term), he writes that ‘there will be more favourable preconditions for a more comprehensive ruling-structure, whose like has never yet existed’ (KSA 12: 2[57]). On this base, he believes, ‘Caesarean spirits’ (KSA 12: 2[13]) will emerge, giving it form.
Europe as the Culture Centre

We understand that Nietzsche’s idea of great politics and one Europe is against nationalistic politics and war. However, even if we are to understand the earth-governance positively as being ‘cosmopolitan’ or ‘transnational’, his expressions are still daunting. As seen in the passage quoted above, he deplores the ‘Wars of Liberation’ against Napoleon that led to Napoleon’s 1815 exit from European stage. Considering that Nietzsche expresses a sense of frustration at the removal of Napoleon, who had conquered a vast land of Europe, should we understand Nietzsche’s aim is the establishment of a vast empire uniting the landmass of Europe to reign over the world? For Napoleon ‘wanted One Europe, as is known, and wanted it as mistress of the earth’ (GS 362).

On this issue, one Europe is not simply a matter of spatiality. In other words, ‘the smallness and wretchedness’ of the soul is ‘not a consequence of petty-states-sectionalism’ itself. As we can see ancient Greece, which was formed of small city-states, blooming amazingly in culture, ‘the big state [Großstaaterei] in itself does not make the soul freer and manlier’ (KSA 11: 34[114]). It is certain that ‘One Europe’ entails an actual political unity; however, what Nietzsche aims for is not Europe simply being at the head of the international war of power politics, but cultural greatness for a unified Europe to blossom. As Nietzsche notes above that there are ‘good Europeans, the heirs of Europe’, for him one Europe means above all a setting for bringing culturally creative forces together.

We have to grasp that cultural interest always lies behind the political remarks Nietzsche makes that seem sometimes to be expressed in an incoherent way. For instance, viewing democracy as ‘the form of decay of the state, of degeneration of races, of predominance of the failed [Mißbrathenden]’ (KSA 11: 34[146]), Nietzsche once said that ‘Russia’, which is not a democratic state, ‘must be the master of Europe and Asia’; at the same time he wrote of ‘Europe as the Greece under the rule of Rome’. That is to say, as early Rome dominated politically yet was still under the leverage of Greek culture, as if political dominion does not

---

215 Shapiro, op. cit., ch. 2-3.
217 Nietzsche passes some remarks, regarding Russia governed by Tsar Aleksandr III who was trying to intensify autocracy, that ‘we need an unconditional alliance with Russia’ and must keep away from ‘English principle’ of representing a people (KSA 11: 26[336]), and that ‘Russia have to colonise and get China and India’ (KSA 11: 25[112]). Also, he suggests that ‘in order to enter the struggle for the governance of the earth with good prospects’ Europe needs ‘the colonies of England’, so it is ‘necessary’ for Europe to ‘come to an understanding with England’ (KSA 11: 37[9]).
matter much, he remarks on ‘to grasp Europe as the culture-centre’ (KSA 11: 25[112]). This attitude, as seen above, has been modified to emphasise ‘one Europe’ as a political unity as well. In his late period, Nietzsche shows growing attention to Europe’s political unity because of his interest in the social structure to maintain a culture. At any rate, the important point is that Nietzsche’s main focus is on culture.218

As we can see with many thinkers, there had been interest in European culture with its Greek origins, and in Europe’s identity. The idea of ‘One Europe’ was not entirely new at the time. Victor Hugo introduced the term ‘the United States of Europe’ [les États-Unis d’Europe] at the International Peace Congress in Paris in 1849 where he delivered the keynote speech, expecting European countries to ‘be merged together in a superior unity and […] form the European brotherhood’ with ‘universal suffrage of the people’.219 Regarding Hugo, however, Nietzsche remarks that Hugo is ‘a people-flatterer, with the evangelist-voice for all the low, failed, oppressed’ (KSA 11: 26[454]) and that he ‘has always put beautiful words and flashy cloaks on herd-instincts in the name of freedom’ (KSA 11: 34[85]).

Nietzsche, as a matter of course, would oppose the European unification promoted in terms of democratic freedom and equality, and wanted to construct the new ruling-structure in the setting of One Europe as he had envisioned. The important point here is that ‘One Europe’ means to sublate existing states, and accordingly the ground upon which those states are standing. That ground Nietzsche calls ‘dynastic as well as democratic fragmentation of the will’, and this, he understands, is expressed in reality as petty-states-sectionalism.220 Thus, he emphasises: ‘I have no words to express my contempt for the


219 Victor Hugo, Œuvres Complètes : Politique, Paris : Robert Laffont, 1985, p. 301. ‘A day will come when you France, you Russia, you Italy, you England, you Germany, all of you, nations of the continent […] will be merged together in a superior unity and you will form the European brotherhood. […] A day will come when bullets and bombs are replaced by votes, by universal suffrage of the people. […] A day will come when we shall see these two immense groups, the United States of America, the United States of Europe, in face of each other, stretching out their hands over the sea.’

220 On one hand, European countries stirred up the popular passion internally and fought with each other externally under the pretext of welfare of their nationals. Behind these, on the other hand, there was a power struggle of European royal families, which was merely the unproductive struggle of interests of the families such as the House of Hohenzollern of Prussia, the House of Bourbon of France, and the House of Habsburg of Austria. For example, the Franco-Prussian War in 1870 in which Nietzsche once took part involved Bismarck taking advantage of France’s opposition to giving the Spanish throne to the Hohenzollern family (Mary Fulbrook, A concise history of Germany, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 128 f.). In this situation, each country was consuming themselves with pointless and inconsequential works.
execrable interests-politics of European dynasties, which, through the incitement to selfishness, makes conceitedness of peoples against each other a principle and almost a duty’ (KSA 13: 25[1]). Therefore, it is Nietzsche’s task to present the new thoughts on which the European culture can be based and the direction towards which people have to combine efforts, since ‘for one who concerns himself with the conditions under which the plant “man” most powerfully grows upwards, […] the appearance of a new political power is, if it does not stand itself on new thoughts, yet no event’ (KSA 11: 34[146]).

One of the new thoughts should be the idea of physiological rank order, and what Nietzsche wants is the construction of new dominion or the ruling structure founded on this new thought, which will be conducted in one unified Europe. This is to create a higher culture, and Nietzsche finds the signs that ‘Europe wants to become one’ and the anticipation of ‘the Europeans of the future’ in ‘Napoleon, Goethe’ and other cultural figures (BGE 256). That is to say, the will united should aim for not merely a huge empire but ‘producing a higher type’ (KSA 11: 25[211]) leading to a new creation of great culture. Therefore, we have to overcome the old thought that absolutises the state saying ‘the state […] is the absolute end of reason’, and thereby dominion that is to unite great forces should be conducted on the setting as one Europe where nationalistic division is sublated. In this sense, Nietzsche refers to ‘Napoleon’ as one who ‘conceived Europe as a political unity’ and ‘Goethe’ as one who ‘imagined a European culture that comes into the full inheritance of humanity that had been attained’ (KSA 13: 15[68]).

The Early Tension between the Few and Many

We understand that the whole should be constructed on the foundation of one Europe, and that culture, not nationalistic politics, is Nietzsche’s main focus regarding the ruling-structure with great style. Such a unity itself is the precondition for culture; for Nietzsche, the formation of the whole also means the construction of culture, particularly European culture. We need then to clarify his thinking on how a culture is formed. We have mentioned that when there is a stable affective interpretation of the world, people can have a style which will lead to a culture. However, Nietzsche develops his thinking of culture in probably the most explicit way in the early period in Untimely Meditations, before he

---

introduces the concept of will to power and affect.

Undoubtedly culture is one of Nietzsche’s main concerns. In an early note, he says ‘My task: to comprehend the inner coherence and the necessity of every true culture’ (KSA 7: 19[33]). This concern for culture is not confined to the early period. In the so-called positivist middle period, he calls for ‘a knowledge of the conditions of culture exceeding all previous degrees of such knowledge’ as ‘the enormous task for the great spirits of the next century’ (HH I 25). Nietzsche never abandoned this question of culture: in a note in 1887, he simply writes ‘the culture-complex as my foremost interest’ (KSA 12: 10[28]).

However, there is disagreement as to what Nietzsche’s specific focus is concerning the broader topic of culture. Although most will agree that his interest in culture is that of a diagnostician, some argue that his main concern is not culture in itself but great individuals who can create cultural work, hence, as Leiter remarks, ‘what matters are great human beings’. In this understanding, most people have nothing to do with culture and the vast majority are to sacrifice themselves for a few individuals. In brief, many understand that ‘Nietzsche was an elitist, and throughout his work culture is regarded as the domain of the few’.

There is a grain of truth in this kind of understanding. It is undeniable that Nietzsche takes an elitist stance as he presents the proposition: ‘Humanity should work ceaselessly toward producing great individuals’ (UM III: 6). However, when we look into the text, we can see Nietzsche’s emphasis on unity regarding culture, which is at odds with such an individualist reading in that this unity does not simply mean individual works of art.

This emphasis on unity is found throughout Nietzsche’s work, but most prominently in relation to culture in his early period. Nietzsche gives his famous definition of culture in Untimely Meditations: ‘Culture is, above all, unity of artistic style in all the expressions of the life of a people’ (UM I: 1; II: 4). In this definition, culture is not understood simply as ‘the domain of the few’; it is not made up of pieces of art produced by an exceptional few. It


Bruce Detwiler, Nietzsche and the politics of aristocratic radicalism, Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1990, ch. 5. Also Appel op. cit. shares a similar view. In the similar vein, Hurka reads Nietzsche as a perfectionist from a perspective of a maximax principle that requires people to devote their energy to a select few to produce the greatest perfection. See Thomas Hurka, Nietzsche: the perfectionist, in Leiter / Sinhababu eds., Nietzsche and Morality, 2007.


This view is already implied in Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks. (KSA 1: 812)
is unity of style, established and manifested throughout the life of a people as a whole. This aspect seems to be at odds with the other, which creates a tension between Nietzsche’s emphasis on great individuals and his apparent understanding of culture as unity.

In relation to this tension evident in Nietzsche’s early period, Church contrasts the two concepts of culture that he claims Nietzsche adheres to. One is ‘national culture’, in which ‘the few and the many collaborate and compete for their common end’ (which Church maintains is freedom or ‘human self-determination’), and the other is ‘cosmopolitan culture’ in which the few ‘transcend the many and establish a cosmopolitan community’ beyond ‘social conventions and needs’. Although there is tension between these two understandings of culture, ‘what unifies them is the notion of merit’. In this respect, he argues that ‘the two concepts of culture share a fundamental aim, namely, the establishment of a standard of excellence’. Here, Church maintains that Nietzsche’s notion of culture has both the aristocratic aspect and a kind of democratic one, and claims ‘Nietzsche is neither aristocrat nor democrat, but a classical liberal thinker who seeks to lodge high culture prominently in public esteem’. This culture, in Church’s view, is not about ‘any particular identity, any arbitrary set of beliefs, practices, or values’ but cultural exemplars. Thus, it is the culture where ‘a unified people’ is forged with ‘exemplary individuals’ or ‘the common memory of a culture’s exemplars’.

However, even if we accept the attachment of the problematic term ‘democratic’ to Nietzsche’s concept of culture, or the phrase ‘a classical liberal thinker’ to describe Nietzsche, Church’s idea that Nietzsche’s view is democratic because excellence is in principle open to all, not a select few, is the very idea that Nietzsche rejected many times as discussed in chapter two and it is therefore hard to support this with textual evidence. The two concepts of culture that Church separates, even though ‘Nietzsche does not himself explicitly disentangle these two concepts’, eventually meet together in the promotion of exemplary individuals, to which anyone can basically aspire; hence the democratic view,

---

227 Ibid., p. 8.
228 Ibid., p. 169.
229 Ibid., p. 5.
230 Ibid., p. 249.
231 Ibid., p. 84.
because they are the exemplars not by heredity or blood but by the merit they achieve.\textsuperscript{232}

This can be claimed only when we ignore Nietzsche’s remarks on natural order, which are presented even in the early period, and his biological considerations.

Furthermore, although we agree that great individuals are important, Church’s claim that the ‘unity of culture consists in the common memory of a culture’s exemplars’ and ‘a people can have diverse beliefs, practices, and values and still be unified by their best exemplars’\textsuperscript{233} is questionable when considering Nietzsche’s emphasis on myth in bringing unity of culture and giving meaning to life in \textit{Birth of Tragedy},\textsuperscript{234} and his definition of culture in \textit{Untimely Meditations} that draws attention to the shared style of life, or lifestyle, of a people. German people revering Goethe, so to speak, does not make a unity of German culture if their lives are fragmented with different cultural practices.

There has to be a shared basis for a cultural unity, other than reverence for the exemplars. The higher type is significant in forming a shared basis, as I have argued in the previous chapters that the great individual is the most comprehensive soul who forms the whole, and one who shapes people’s affective network generating a certain interpretation of the world. This shared basis is certainly what gives rise to a cultural unity. We can also find the early development of Nietzsche’s idea of a shared basis for a cultural unity in his early notion of culture. In fact, he develops his idea of culture in a most prominent way in the period of \textit{Untimely Meditations}. In the following, I will analyse the early concept of culture, and then trace how it is developed in later periods.

\textbf{Early Concept of Culture: Language}

Let us look again at Nietzsche’s definition of culture. ‘Culture is, above all, unity of artistic style in all the expressions of the life of a people’ (UM I: 1; II: 4).\textsuperscript{235} In opposition to


\textsuperscript{233} Church, op. cit., p. 249.

\textsuperscript{234} See Gemes / Skyes, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{235} In this definition we may find some influence Nietzsche might receive from Burckhardt who uses ‘unity of style’ as an evaluative principle regarding culture. Cf. Richard Sigurdson, \textit{Jacob Burckhardt’s Social and Political Thought}, University of Toronto Press, 2004, p. 114 f.
‘true culture’ that ‘presupposes unity of style’ (UM I: 2), he considers contemporary German culture a mishmash of styles and disunity between inner and outer. However, he does not fully expound the definition itself, and it does not seem his discussion in UM always centres on this definition. I believe we can gain an insight into what he means by this definition when looking into his discussion of culture in the Nachlass from the same period.

What is crucial in the definition of culture is ‘unity’ [Einheit]. In early texts Nietzsche praises the Greek culture for its ability to build cultural unity based on myths; he understood that ‘without myth every culture forfeits its healthy, creative, natural force: only a horizon surrounded with myths completes a whole cultural movement to the unity’ (BT 23). Therefore, unity is at the heart of culture; in a word, ‘Culture [is] a unity’ (KSA 7: 19[221]).

The unity in this definition of culture has two facets. First, where the unity resides is in all the life-expressions of a people. Second, it is not just unity but specifically ‘artistic unity’. Thus, a culture means that first there is a people established and it manifests a unified style, which is related to an artistic world. To understand this better we should consider Greek culture because what Nietzsche refers to for this idea of culture is, especially in the early period, ancient Greece. Regarding this, he writes in a note: ‘The solid point around which the Greek people crystallises is its language. / The solid point on which its culture crystallises is Homer’ (KSA 7: 19[278]).

Regarding the first point, language is essential for a people to be established. A people should not be a mere collection of individuals, but as a matter of course they should form a certain unity. Politics cannot make a genuine unity out of people, but only ‘a visible mechanical unity’ with ‘government apparatus’ and ‘military pomp’ (KSA 7: 7[122]), which have nothing to do with culture. So Nietzsche asks, ‘Where does the unity of a people rest?’ He answers ‘inwardly, language and customs’ (KSA 7: 19[308]). But above all, language is core. As to the origin and function of language, Nietzsche understands it developed for communication [Mittheilung]. Through language each person comes to share and take part in ‘the common’ with others. He later also understands that ‘consciousness’, whose development goes hand in hand with ‘the development of language’ as ‘signs of communication’, ‘actually belongs not to the individual existence of man but rather to the community-nature and herd-nature in him’ (GS 354). Humans cannot just share their inner individual experience in itself without any medium through which to share it. Language is the base for shared experience because it translates individual experience in a common
horizon. Therefore, ‘[a]s a sharing, language works to make people have “equal” experiences (wants and feelings), to bring them into a “common” stance or view’.

Although Nietzsche has a mixed view on ‘the common’, the important aspect is that language allows the common basis on which humans can communicate with and understand each other, accordingly to form a people. In this vein, ‘to understand one another […] we must also use the same words for the same species of inner experiences, we must ultimately have our experience in common’. With this shared basis, ‘when human beings have lived for a long time under similar conditions […], then something emerges that “understands itself”, a people’ (BGE 268). This shared experience is the foundation of the unity of a people.

Furthermore, language as ‘metaphor’ (TL, KSA 1: 879) is not designed to reveal things in themselves: it only shows the way in which we see and understand the world. In this respect, to share language means to share the way to see things; to construct a world in which we take part together even though this may be an illusion. From this comes the basis of unity: ‘The significance of language for the development of culture lies in the fact that in language human beings set up a world of their own beside the other one’ (HH I 11). Nietzsche also writes, ‘[the] first stage of culture: the belief in language, as continuous metaphorical designation’ (KSA 7: 19[329]).

In brief, to be a people as ‘something that understands itself’, a group of people who understand one another, humans have to enter a stage of agreement. What makes them enter this stage is language, which allows the shared experience and the shared world. In this respect, to share language is to share life. As Wittgenstein suggests, ‘it is in their language that human beings agree. This is agreement [Übereinstimmung] not in opinions, but rather in form of life’. However, this is not enough in itself to form culture. To have a culture, a people has to have ‘artistic unity’ in its life as a whole. Regarding this, as mentioned above, Nietzsche sees ‘Homer’ as the ‘point on which [Greek] culture crystallises’ (KSA 7:

---

236 In a sense, similar to Wittgenstein’s view, ‘it makes no sense to refer to “the world of experience” as other to the “world of language”’ Joshua Rayman, Nietzsche, Truth and Reference, *Nietzsche Studien* 36, 2007, p. 164.


238 See Richardson, ibid.

19[278]); in other words, the ‘Second stage of culture: unity and coherence of the world of metaphor, based on Homer [durch Anlehnung an Homer]’ (KSA 7: 19[329]). In the light of this, we can ask: in what sense was Greek culture born in Homer’s bosom?

**Early Concept of Culture: Artistic Style**

What is prominent about the Greek culture is that a poet was first called for, prior to a prophet or philosopher. Unlike other places with advanced culture, such as ancient China, India, and Israel, poetry emerged in Greece before philosophical wisdom or religious faith was expressed in language. This is evidence of the aesthetic spirit of the Greek people. In Greece, poetry was not a mere tool for conveying philosophical thought or religious conviction; rather, it was their own way to understand the world and the way to express their life. Of course, Greek art was also related to religion or philosophy, but it never sacrificed its artistic or aesthetic aspects for religious content. Hölderlin had an insight into this when he wrote, ‘Poetry […] is the beginning and the end of philosophical knowledge. Like Minerva from the head of Jupiter, philosophy springs from the poetry of an eternal, divine state of being’.

With regard to Greek culture and philosophy before Socrates, Nietzsche also appreciates its ‘aesthetic value’, saying ‘the inadequately proven philosophy of Heraclitus has far more artistic value than all the propositions of Aristotle’ (KSA 7: 19[76]). Such aesthetic value refers to the expression of philosophy rooted in the Greek artistic ground; ‘the great ancient philosophers belong to general Hellenic life’ (KSA 7: 19[28]). Although philosophy represents ‘the isolated elements of art’, ‘[t]he content of art and of ancient philosophy is identical’ (KSA 7: 19[41]). When Hegel said ‘The stage of Greek consciousness is the stage of beauty’, he saw the Greek as inchoate, but Nietzsche endowed this stage of beauty with much more value since, in this stage, he recognises great culture in the artistic or aesthetic horizon.

---

240 Snell points out that the essence of Greek religion and Homeric gods is wonder at and admiration for beauty, not fear of the unknown or reverence for morality. See Bruno Snell, *The discovery of the mind : the Greek origins of European thought*, trans. T. G. Rosenmeyer, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1953, ch. 2.


The horizon in which the Greek culture developed was Homer. It is not difficult to see Homer’s great status in terms of Greek culture. In *Symposium* by the Greek historian Xenophon, Niceratus said that ‘My father was anxious to see me develop into a good man […] and as a means to this end he compelled me to memorise all of Homer; and so even now I can repeat the whole *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* by heart’. Homer with *Iliad* and *Odyssey* was the only teacher of Greeks until the sophists appeared in 5 B.C. At the time people became Greek and ‘good men’ by reading Homer. Through Homer, Greece was able to maintain its cultural unity in spite of all its political divisions. Even Plato, who did not always treat Homer favourably, admitted that ‘he is the poet who educated Greece’.

Nietzsche sees that one who educates a people is required, as exemplified in Greece with ‘the tragic poet as a teacher of a people’ (KSA 7: 9[61]). This requirement is because unity of style in life does not occur suddenly but is gradually formed and built. Style indicates a whole way of life organised and shaped in a certain manner, not simply as an individual but also as a collective entity. However, people as a group living in the same place do not automatically exhibit unity of style, since ‘unity does not exist in space’ (KSA 7: 37[6]). It should be formed, which was what Nietzsche hoped for at the time. Therefore he says, ‘The German as a characteristically artistic style has yet to be found, just as in the Greeks the Greek style was found only late: there was no earlier unity’ (KSA 7: 29[47]).

Then how is unity of style built? Nietzsche’s early answer is art. Religion, of course, can function to bind people together, and Nietzsche was well aware of the religious characteristics of Greek myths and tragedy. However, he places more emphasis on art, as he believes that ‘The religious ideas [Vorstellungen] [are] the womb of the political ones’ but ‘The religious [ideas] spring from the artistic [ideas]’. In this respect, he places ‘The growth of the artistic ideas as the source of all religious and state changes’, as ‘my theme’ (KSA 7: 9[61]). After all, the artistic is the most foundational. The religious and political operate on the horizon opened and the foundation laid by the artistic. Therefore, he argues

---


245 Plato, *Republic*, 606 e.

246 Cf. ‘The tragedy is a religious act of the whole people, that is, a whole community of citizens’ (KSA 7: 25[1]); ‘the Greeks were religiously tuned when they watched [tragedy]; it was high mass, with the glorification of the god at the end, which they had to wait for’ (KSA 7: 3[1]).
‘Culture can always only issue from the centralising meaning of an art or a work of art’ (KSA 7: 23[14]).

This shows how deeply Nietzsche has ingested the aesthetic spirit of the Greek, but this also means that his view of art is not wholly of the modern thought that art is the self-expression of an individual artist. The early Nietzsche considers ‘the subjective artist only as a bad artist’, and what is demanded ‘in every kind and height of art’ is ‘first of all the conquest of the subjective, and redemption from the “I”’ (BT 5). ‘The base of modern art is no longer the people’ (KSA 7: 9[107]), but in Greek art in particular, ‘tragedy is […] the act of uniting the whole people’. Thus, ‘The Greek artist addresses his work not to the individual but to the state; and the education of the state, in turn, was nothing but the education of all to enjoy the work of art. All great creations […] have their sights on […] feelings of the people’ (KSA 7: 7[121]).

This feeling – to be more exact, ‘the unity of feeling of a people [Einheit der Volksempfindung]’ (UM II: 4) – Nietzsche understands, is what is significant for culture and what can be formed by art. With this ‘unity of feeling’, the unity of a people truly crystallises and the shared world of it as a collective entity can have a style and become richer. Here, we can find some connection with his later idea of the social affect or the affective network. The early Nietzsche understands that ‘The culture of a people manifests itself in the unifying control of the drives of this people’ (KSA 7: 19[41]).

Nietzsche’s emphasis on art is not merely based around acclaim for individual excellence. Even if it is an individual who creates a work of art, ‘[t]he consequence of every great artistic world is a culture’ (KSA 7: 19[33]). Now that culture is understood to be that which is expressed in the life of a people, great art leads to the expression of a people, which means art should infuse all aspects of the people’s life. In other words, a people as a collective entity is to embody the meaning of the art. In a note, Nietzsche implies that to instil something into us to be acquired [anerziehen] is ‘artistic power’ or the ‘power of art’ [Kunstkraft] (KSA 7: 19[49]). With this power, art can shape a style out of a people. So ‘if we are ever to attain a culture’, this power of art is required ‘so as to produce a unity’ (KSA 7: 19[27]). Because of this, art should not stop at being an isolated expression of an individual artist, but has to be the power that shapes the whole, and the whole way of life of a people.

What then is the art that is the power that gives unity of style permeating every level of community; the art that can construct a culture? It cannot be just any work of art. Early
Nietzsche understands that a work of art has a shaping force on life because it originated from life or the nature of life. In other words, only the art rooted in the life or nature of a people can exert great influence over its life. A transplanted art, which is not rooted in the people’s life, can be mere decoration without any formative power. This is what Nietzsche regarded as the contemporary problem. Although there were many works of art consumed by the public at the time, in his view, nothing was like Homer or Aeschylus who were the expression of the Greek life and also pivotal power shaping its life. In a lecture on Greek tragedy, Nietzsche discusses art that is not artificial but ‘unconscious’, ‘rooted in the Hellenic ground’ and ‘growing out of the life of a people [Volksleben]’, as opposed to the modern opera that is ‘without the unconscious force of a natural drive, but formed in accordance with an abstract theory’ (KSA 1: 515-6). In this way, moderns have no artistic world rooted in their lives.

**Modern Disunity**

For Nietzsche, art means also the broader sense of the formation [Bilden]. Thus he recognises ‘the artistic forces in our becoming’, saying ‘the artistic also begins with the organic’ (KSA 7: 19[50]). With the lack of this formative power in the modern world, Nietzsche found disunity in every aspect of life, leading to ‘the opposite of culture, barbarism, which is lack of style or a chaotic jumble of all styles’ (UM I: 1). As discussed above, language and art are essential for culture. Language is the common basis for a shared world of a people. Art is what shapes the shared world, giving it form or style, and making it richer. So, the lack of culture indicates the decline of language and art. What this means is cracks in the shared world and a chaotic mixture of different styles.

This disunity stems from the situation whereby people have lost their natural ground. That is to say, ‘we moderns have nothing that comes from ourselves’ (UM II: 4). When nothing is our own, our lives become a mixture of things foreign to our nature. This is Nietzsche’s diagnosis of contemporary culture, especially German culture. This can also be understood as the early development of the later notion of decadence as self-loss prevalent in the modern.

The lack of unity is first found in language: A ‘new characteristic of German language: to accept and imitate everything, [a] European mosaic’ (KSA 7: 26[16]). From within this mosaic, the chaotic aspect of language and accordingly cracks in the basis of the shared
world, people cannot truly communicate with each other. As Nietzsche understands, ‘All intercourse among human beings is based on the fact that one person can read the soul of another; and the common language is the voiced expression of a common soul. The more intimate and sensitive that intercourse becomes, the richer the language; which either grows — or wastes away — along with that shared soul’ (KSA 7: 37[6]). But now that this intercourse becomes shallow because of the insufficiency of language, the shared world also pales. In this respect, ‘the impoverishment and fading of language is a symptom of the stunted shared soul in Germany; […] our greatest and richest minds are no longer able to make themselves comprehensible to their fellow Germans’ (KSA 7: 37[7]). This rupture in communication causes disunity and discontinuity among people, making them shallower, without any unity.

People still use the same language, and therefore it looks like the shared world is still there. However, they cannot truly communicate with one another because they are only tied by customs or convention, a sort of inertial sediment left after the original common experience is drained. As mentioned, unity of feeling is necessary for cultural unity, but the natural ground for this is now missing. Thus, people are ‘suffering from convention, that is, agreement in words and actions without agreement in feelings’ (UM VI: 5). So, any ostensible style they adopt in their lives is superficial and alien to them. In this way, the modern people ‘fall wretchedly apart into inner and outer, content and form’ (UM II: 4). Due to this discrepancy, they wander without touching what is indigenous to their nature, what is of their own, so they can think only ‘through mediating abstractions’ (BT 23) and ‘feel in abstractions’ (UM II: 4).

Nietzsche believed Wagner had seriously grasped this situation,247 and once believed that Wagner could heal this crippled modernity by constructing an artistic world based on which a culture would be established. Nietzsche believed that what resounds in ‘the music of our German masters’ is ‘the right feeling’; that is, ‘the enemy of all convention, all artificial alienation and incomprehensibility between man and man’. This music is not a decoration but an expression truly rooted in life with the artistic power to shape it. In this sense, he says ‘this music is a return to nature, while being at the same time the purification and transformation of nature’ (UM VI: 5). With this shaping power, art can give unity of style to

---

247 ‘Wagner was the first to recognize a state of distress that […] everywhere language is sick, and the oppression of this tremendous sickness weighs on the whole of human development. […] man can no longer really communicate at all: […] As soon as men seek to communicate with one another, and to unite for a common work, they are seized by the madness of universal concepts’ (UM VI: 5).
the life of a people. Nietzsche found this power in Wagner, so he said Wagner ‘has a sense for unity in diversity – that is why I consider him a bearer of culture’ (KSA 7: 32[12]).

Regarding this view of culture as unity presented in the UM, Huddleston argues that to be a genuine culture ‘in Nietzsche’s valorised sense’, the culture should manifest ‘noble ideals in its whole form of life’ in addition to unity, since even a ‘pseudo-culture can have this unity’.\footnote{Andrew Huddleston, \textit{Nietzsche on the decadence and flourishing of culture}, Ph.D. Thesis, Princeton University, 2012, p. 15 f.} This could be true, as Nietzsche suggests, ‘if true culture in any event presupposes unity of style, and even an inferior and degenerate culture cannot be conceived other than as diversity brought together in the harmony of a single style’ (UM I: 2). The problem is that in this reading, the determinative touchstone for a culture is not unity; rather, what distinguishes a genuine culture from its opposite is noble ideals. However, in the same paragraph Nietzsche continues to say that it is a delusion that there is a culture, in a genuine sense, to which the cultivated philistine \textit{[Bildungspilister]} belongs. The cultivated philistine is deluded because he discovers ‘everywhere the uniform character of himself’ and from this uniformity ‘infers a stylistic unity \textit{[Stileinheit]} of the German Bildung; in short, a culture’. It looks like a unity, owing to the consistent ‘negation of all the artistically productive forms and demands of a true style’, but it is ‘not culture, even inferior culture, merely because it has system’ (ibid.). In ‘this pseudo-culture’ of the cultivated philistine, ‘he who exhibits his strength only in warding off a real, artistically vigorous cultural style’ finds and ‘arrives at a uniformity of expression, which, in turn, almost seems to resemble a unity of style’ (UM I: 11). Therefore, it is not that Nietzsche points out the lack of noble ideals when he argues Germany lacks culture. It is unity of style that Nietzsche regards as the hallmark of culture. As a matter of course, he would espouse a culture based on noble values, and he also implies that culture should be the expression of ‘the noble core’ of the ‘people’s character’ (BT 23). But without unity, any values, even noble values, can be just an isolated exhibition, since unity points to values infusing all aspects of life and becoming the expression of a people as a whole.

As discussed, the absence of culture as a lack of unity indicates the discrepancy between inner and outer, content and form, a situation where people have nothing grown out of themselves, and where an artistic world is not rooted in life but only consumed as a decoration or distraction. In this way, art loses its binding force and people come to believe that culture is merely about a consumable, individual work of art, not related to the life-
expression, and that it has nothing to do with their lives. This split should be overcome. Nietzsche once argued that the unity or ‘oneness [Einssein] of people and culture’ is ‘what was for a long time France’s great merit and the cause of its vast superiority’ (BT 23). By overcoming the split, a people can restore its ‘health’ and discover its natural ground, i.e. ‘its instincts and therewith its honesty’ again (UM II: 4).

In the age of decadence, Nietzsche calls for a return to nature and wants to recover the natural ground on which a cultural unity can be established. It is along this train of thought that he refers to the Greeks who once faced the danger of ‘perishing in a flood of things foreign and past’, in ‘a chaos of foreign’ forms. Despite the alien forces, ‘Hellenic culture, thanks to that Apollonian oracle, did not become an aggregate. The Greeks gradually learned to organise the chaos by reflecting, following the Delphic teaching, on themselves, that is, on their genuine needs, and letting those pseudo-needs die out. Thus, they again took possession of themselves’. From this we learn ‘the concept of culture as a new and improved physis, without inner and outer, without dissimulation and convention; culture as a unanimity of life, thought, appearance and will’ (UM II: 10).

In tracing Nietzsche’s text to explain the meaning of his definition of culture, we started from language and art and ended in nature, since only an artistic world rooted in the nature of a people can bring people together to form a unity of style in its life. Although Nietzsche speaks of the natural ground, i.e. ‘what issues unconsciously from the deepest fount of the spirit of a people [Volksgeist]’ (KSA 7: 29[66]), he does not think a cultural unity would automatically spring from it. A unity has to be formed and shaped. Even ‘the character of the Greeks’ was not just given, but acquired with great efforts (HH II i 219). Therefore, we need ‘the artistic power to construct a whole’ (UM I: 9). We need an educator like Homer, who guided the Greeks to organising the chaos to be a unity, not a mere aggregate. In this respect, great human beings, who can capture the noble core of nature of a people’s life and shape it into a unity as stylised nature, are really significant. They are creators. ‘It was creators who created peoples and hung a faith and a love over them: thus they served life’ (Z I ‘New Idols’). Without them, a culture cannot be established.

This aspect, the significance of great human beings, is the continuous theme from early to late Nietzsche. This has also been the focus of elitist individualist readings, often without relating it to the other aspect: unity of life of a people. Certainly in his early period, culture is concerned with a human community. In the next chapter, I will trace and explore how this notion of culture continues and changes through Nietzsche’s late period.
Chapter 6: European Culture

As we have seen, the concept of culture refers to a shared world. If culture is not merely about individuals’ personal preference, then the concept of culture is concerned with the question of how the shared world is formed. As I have argued, in his early ideas of culture in relation to this question, Nietzsche believes language and art are significant as the basis for a shared world, and this is reflected in his definition of culture. What becomes then of his early idea of culture in the later periods; does his interest in a shared world continue throughout his work?

The answer is clearly yes, as this thesis has demonstrated in the previous chapters. However, the fact that Nietzsche does not seem to refer to the early definition of culture in later periods is viewed as indicating that Nietzsche’s concern is no longer the cultural whole that he once hoped to renew with Wagner’s projected festival. Some would therefore maintain that Nietzsche’s interest in a shared world wanes after the departure from his early enthusiasm for Wagner and rather romantic view of art, even though Nietzsche’s emphasis on unity in a culture as well as self is still noticeable.

That Nietzsche does not provide a clear definition of culture in his later works as he does in the early period, puzzles scholars to some extent. Blondel suggests ‘Culture, then, might well be no more than a word, a pseudo-concept referring only to the illusory perception that man, an unconscious natural being, would have of the gap that in him and around him separates nature from itself’.249 Cohen, in his interpretation of Human All Too Human, considers Nietzsche’s concept of culture to be ‘a loose combination of diverse elements’ which is ‘relying on the reader’s common-sense understanding’,250 although it is still vague what the common-sense definition of culture is. It seems that Nietzsche critically observes society as a cultural diagnostician in his later periods, but does not seem to further develop his earlier concept of culture.

However, Nietzsche does not simply abandon the early concept, and thus we should not

discount his early definition of culture as ‘unity of artistic style in all the expressions of the life of a people’. In the following I will look first at how, in the later periods, Nietzsche deals with that which he earlier thought was crucial to forming culture, i.e. language and art. Then I will show how his idea of a new European culture develops, and critically examine its limits and implications.

**Language**

We know that Nietzsche once hoped for a renewal of German culture, but later he envisages One Europe or a European unity in a cultural sense. The problem here is this: once Nietzsche’s concern has shifted and is no longer simply regarding German culture but European culture, how is the shared world created when it goes beyond national boundaries? Since he goes beyond national culture and speaks of European culture, it is naturally expected that he would rethink what were regarded as the foundations of the shared world. Nietzsche not only hoped for One Europe, but also believed that it was inevitable. He understood that this necessity had political reasons which sat against the backdrop of world power conflicts. The question is whether One Europe can be a culture, rather than a mere aggregate of countries which happens to be developed in the respective pursuit of economic and political interests.

Let us look first then at language, which he believed to be one of the crucial factors that make a people. There is continuity in Nietzsche’s view of language in relation to culture. In line with his early idea of culture in the previous chapter, he still recognises in later periods the ‘significance of language for the development of culture’ (HH I 11). He recognises in particular that language has a vital role in forming a people, as it provides the common basis on which humans can communicate with and understand each other, which leads to something that “understands itself”, a people’ (BGE 268; GS 354). On this point, there would appear to a problem in the lack of a single common language that allows people to connect with each other and will provide the foundation of a culture. The question is whether Europe can establish a common ground, and therefore a common culture, with different languages.

It seems that European society or the European race cannot be produced by a certain language or by making one language a dominant one. If there was such a language, Nietzsche’s early discussion of culture in relation to language would have continued.
Language itself is the product of collective life and is also in turn what allows and sustains the collective life. If there were such a single language, it might have been easier to expect the natural emergence of a European community. Thus, when Nietzsche speaks of One Europe, he does not consider language as playing a decisive role (as arguably he has before) in binding people together. In other words, language is not considered the thing that sustains a European society. Nevertheless, he believes that as European countries come to have commercial intercourse and be bound economically together, this can bring about the emergence of something new for culture, i.e. new language. Observing that ‘human intercourse is inevitably becoming ever more cosmopolitan’, he writes,

in some far-off future there will be a new language for everyone, at first as a commercial language, then as the language of intellectual intercourse [geistiger Verkehr] generally, just as certainly as there will one day be air travel. For what other purpose has the science of languages studied the laws of language for a century and appraised what is necessary, valuable, and successful in every individual language! (HH I 267)

In this passage Nietzsche expresses that he does not expect some existing language to dominate, i.e. in the way that English today functions in a similar manner to the new language described here. He believes that cosmopolitan circumstances compel people first to learn other languages, and then to cause a new language to emerge. However, this is a prediction about a distant future following a long period of exchange between people. Hence, the new language itself is to be considered as a product of European integration, rather than a means of binding peoples together.

It is not clear upon what Nietzsche’s confidence that the times will come when a new language for everyone emerges is based. For contemporary man, he suggests that writing well could be the first step to take:

we want to make ourselves understood beyond the peoples. Therefore anyone who is good European-minded must now learn to write well and ever better: […] To write better means […] to be translatable into the languages of our neighbours, to make ourselves accessible for the understanding of those foreigners who learn our
language, to work toward making all good things common property and everything freely available for those who are free, and finally, to prepare for that still far-distant state of things where the good Europeans have in their hands their great task: the direction and supervision of the total culture of the earth [Erducultur] (HH II ii 87).

Language is a means of communicating, spreading and sharing thoughts and ideas. Language therefore plays a significant role in providing a foundation for raising future generations, although it may take many generations for ideas to be embodied in society. Thus, Nietzsche himself also hopes his writing will be translated into other European languages so that his philosophy can shape European culture.

One of Nietzsche’s ideas of language which was associated with forming a people, is not advanced in his later discussions. Nietzsche does not look at language’s role in European culture in the same way that he understands language to have functioned in relation to Greek culture. As he goes beyond national boundaries, his idea of culture naturally outgrows the early notion that had developed centred on the ancient Greek city. This does not mean that he abandoned his early idea; it is rather that language is not taken to be central to the formation of European culture. Nevertheless, Nietzsche anticipates the new language and European race in the distant future, when both could sustain each other.

Art

Let us now move on to Nietzsche’s idea of art or the artistic world, which is central to his early concept of culture. Again, the question to be asked is how the shared world is formed. What we will focus on here is not Nietzsche’s theory of art per se, but the social function of art in establishing a culture.

The social function of art is a topic that is often dealt with. Aside from the fact that Greek culture has developed centred upon the artistic world, it has been a common understanding that art or tragedy in the culture of ancient Greece serves to overcome horror and suffering in life, and to unite Greek people and society. In so doing, art serves life, or the affirmation of life. In this respect, as Came puts it, ‘Nietzsche was not interested in art as such’, 251 but

rather saw it in relationship to life. Art matters only when it serves to affirm life.

This view of art in relation to life continues throughout Nietzsche’s work; the view that is rooted in his understanding of the Greeks who ‘knew that even misery could become enjoyment only through art’ (HH I 154) and proved the significance of art for overcoming existential problems. Regarding the continued idea of art serving or affirming life, Gemes and Sykes write that ‘It is no longer controversial to argue, as Nietzsche himself did in his “Attempt at Self-Criticism”, that the early Nietzsche […] is thematically continuous with the later, and now more canonical, Nietzsche’, referring to Came who understands the thematic continuity is a kind of ‘theodicy, a mode of justification’ of existence in this world.

However, although there is surely a continuity to the idea of art serving life, it certainly seems that from the middle period of his work onwards Nietzsche’s interest in art is not as intensive as it was and he does not expect what he expected from art before, as he simply says that ‘art […] does not exist for physicists and philosophers’ (HH I 160), implying art belongs to a less evolved form of culture (HH I 222, 223). In this way and from this period, Nietzsche does not necessarily attach serious importance to art, and he notably reduces or limits the role of art in social integration.

The likely reason here is firstly that Nietzsche looks at art more critically as he reflects on himself as having been beguiled by Wagner. He therefore comes to find degeneration in today’s art; art is now of decadence. This means that art emerges from the desire to escape from the self and encourages such a passion. People today are tired of and annoyed by themselves, or even disgust themselves. With this displeasure with themselves, they want ‘to throw away for a while what one now has’ (D 531) and to escape from the self, for which art becomes a mere tool. In this way, to them ‘art counts as a leisure, a recreational activity: […] artists of grand art too now promise recreation and distraction’ (HH II ii 170). Art becomes so degenerate that ‘one uses works of art to lure poor, exhausted, and sick human beings to the side of humanity’s great road of suffering for a brief lustful moment’ (GS 89).


continues to see ‘unnaturalness’ in art as the ‘evasion of oneself’ (KSA 12: 111).

Having previously analysed the essence of decadence as the deviation from the self, here we again recognise the decadent form of art as an escape from the self. Nietzsche distinguishes the genuine and degenerate forms of art; one is from ‘the overflowing’, and the other from ‘the dissatisfied’ (HH II i 169). In other words, ‘One person wants to enjoy his own nature by means of art, another wants with its aid to get above and away from his nature for a time. In accordance with both needs there exists a twofold species of art and artist’ (HH II i 371). The former kind of art, that emerging from the overflowing, is what the Greeks enjoyed and the latter kind of art, coming from the dissatisfied, is what appeals to people today. Therefore, Nietzsche writes that ‘self-enjoyment was what led them [the Greeks] to art, whereas what leads our contemporaries to it is – self-annoyance’ (HH II i 169). This indicates and is connected to his later distinction between art from ‘a superabundance of life’ and art from ‘an impoverishment of life’, the latter of which he also considers as ‘romanticism’ (NW ‘Antipodes’, GS 370).

Another reason that art seems to be less appreciated in relation to forming a society is that Nietzsche’s model of art was that of Greek culture and based in small Greek city-states. Considering that Nietzsche now envisions a larger community, it is natural that the old picture of art cannot be applied to it. In Greek life, he understands, the theatre was the place to ‘stimulate, purify, and discharge the whole life of the people’ with ‘the tremendous power of tragedy’ (BT 21), entailing that art there had the power to shape the people’s life. The prerequisite for this is the interaction between art and people, i.e. ‘the tragic poets and also the whole city communities that especially delight in them’ (HH I 212). However, this kind of interaction of art with society would only be possible in small communities like Greek city states. As a community gets larger, it becomes harder for the community to be centred on art that has influence on social integration.

Nietzsche believes art has the power to change souls (HH I 152), and that an artist is supposed to ‘raise his public’ to the height that his works create (HH I 168), like the Greek artists who ‘want really to be more excellent’ to ‘demand outside assent to their own evaluative terms’ (HH I 170). However, with art having now become a brief excursion playing to the gallery, it has lost its power to raise the public and has thus lost its life-elevating power. Additionally, the theatre today as a place for relaxation is not the same as

---

255 In this respect, ‘a romantic is an artist who makes the great dissatisfaction with himself creative – who looks away from himself and from his world’ (KSA 12:2[112]).
the Greek theatre wherein the ‘ancient Greeks demanded of the poet that he should be the
teacher of adults’. Thus, the earlier artists were ‘sculptors, reshapers and further shapers of
life’, but today ‘poets [are] no longer teachers’ (HH II i 172).

That he is critical of art that he thinks is decadent does not mean that Nietzsche
depreciates or abandons art in general. He does not confine his view of art to the narrow
sense of the word, claiming to be ‘Against the art of works of art’ (HH II i 174). Today ‘an
art of works of art continues to endure’ for ‘those who have leisure time’ and do not know
how to spend time without listening to music, going to theatres, and reading novels (HH II i 175). However, Nietzsche understands that art is genuinely the activity to ‘beautify’ or
‘reinterpret’ life so that we can love living it. Art should ‘allow the meaning behind
whatever is unavoidably or insurmountably ugly to shine through. Compared to this great,
indeed immense task of art, the so-called real art, that of the work of art, is merely an
appendage’. Here Nietzsche lays stress on the artistic power, that is, the ‘beautifying,
concealing and reinterpretating powers’ which can ‘seek to discharge […] in works of art; so,
too, under the right circumstances, a whole people’ (HH II i 174). He understands that what
leads life is not merely an artwork, but this artistic power of interpreting and organising the
world, i.e. the power that is expressed in various forms, from a work of art to a community
or state.

Nietzsche understands art in a broad sense in terms of formative power, which, as
discussed in chapter five, also holds true for the early period, as Heidegger also argues that
Nietzsche considers art in the broader sense of ‘forming [Bilden]’ or ‘formation
[Bildung]’.256 With consideration of the formative power, or ‘nature in its organic formation
and growth’ (HH II i 146), we can say that ‘the world itself is nothing but art’ (KSA 12:
2[119]; 2[114]). In this broader sense of the word, what he regards as art ranges from
shaping one’s own life257 to organising a society. In this respect, Nietzsche understands that
those who create a community or ‘a ruling structure’, the whole, by ‘creating and imprinting
forms’ are ‘the most involuntary, unconscious artists there are’ (GM II 17).

Within this context, we can claim that shaping the whole is itself a form of an activity of

---

256 Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe II. Abt. Vorlesungen 1919-1944: Bd. 46. Zur Auslegung von
Nietzsches II. Unzeitgemäßer betrachtung »Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben«,
Frankfurt am Main : Vittorio Klostermann, 2003, p. 55, 57, 279.

257 In this sense, ‘to “give style” to one’s character’ is ‘a great and rare art’. Those with the strong
formative power to give style are to make ‘stylised nature’ ‘under their own law’ when they have to
build or design something (GS 290).
art. This activity, as I have argued, is connected to setting up and organising affects or the affective interpretation that takes root in the body as the way we see and respond to the world. This is where art or works of art come to play a role; that is, although inspiring and organising affects is not a business only for art, art certainly can have a significant role to play in it. Art can produce even ‘religious feelings and moods’, but ‘without conceptual content’ (HH I 131, 150). Through art one can learn ‘the elevation of mind’ (HH I 222) without having to commit to a particular religious doctrine. In this way, art can educate people and cause ideas to penetrate and be accepted into people (cf. GS 106). If a work of art has a role in establishing the whole, this has to do with affect; that is, it can help to create a certain affective network.

In this respect, art ‘creates forms of social interaction’, and ‘binds ill-bred people’ to those forms (HH II i 174). Nietzsche regards art as ‘forming souls through forms’ (KSA 11: 26[40]); ‘Religion and art’, he writes, ‘endeavour to bring about a change of feeling, partly through changing our judgement of the experiences’ (HH I 108). In this way, art can encourage different modes of experiencing the world, and change the affective network accordingly. A work of art serves art in the broader sense as long as it serves the organising of people and society. Nietzsche later mentions ‘the artist-philosopher […]: the higher concept of art’, which can stand away ‘from other people to shape them’ (KSA 12: 2[66]). Therefore, artists in the higher concept are also ‘creators of human beings and, above all, sculptors, reshapers and further shapers of life’ (HH II i 172). In this sense, artists are even considered as successors of ‘the Napoleonic movement’ (KSA 11: 35[45]).

**The Architecture of Culture**

Art that contains the organising power in the higher sense can be understood as construction of the whole, since it is the ‘organic’ power that ‘creates a whole from individual motivations and stimuli’ (KSA 11: 25[333]), which is continuous with the early Nietzsche calling for ‘the artistic power to construct a whole’ (UM I: 9). It seems that Nietzsche’s consistent emphasis is not on art in itself but artistic power, while his concern with the whole and unity is evident throughout his works. In this sense, art in the broad sense of the artistic power that creates unity can be understood as the activity of creating culture as a unity.

At this point culture, again, is not about individual works of art or individual
performances, but about the totality of life. ‘Nothing is more harmful to good insight into culture than allowing genius and nothing else to count. That is a subversive way of thinking, in which all working for culture must cease’ (KSA 8: 30[163]). Culture is concerned with totality because all work for and toward culture requires not only the excellent few but also collective effort, as Nietzsche writes that ‘the system of all that humanity needs in order to endure is so comprehensive and lays claim to such varied and numerous forces that humanity as a whole has to pay a great penalty for any one-sided preference’. On this point, Nietzsche understands that ‘the harmony and continued resonance of all that is human’, which ‘must not be lost again’, has been achieved not merely by a few individuals but ‘attained through astonishing labours and lucky accidents and as much the work of ants and cyclopses as of genius’. Therefore he continues, ‘how, then, could we dispense with the common, deep, often uncanny ground bass, without which melody cannot be melody?’ (HH II i 186) This ‘ground bass’ is later connected to the broad base of mediocrity as the condition of culture.

Culture should make a certain melody out of different parts coming together; that is to say, it should form a harmonious whole. In a note in 1887 Nietzsche writes, ‘the culture-complex as my foremost interest’, and he regards this culture-complex as the ‘whole in relation to its parts’ (KSA 12: 10[28]). Therefore, as in the early idea of it, culture still consists in being the whole and unity. In order for culture to be a whole, it follows logically that it must not be fragmented or fractured. In this regard, Nietzsche saw the nationalist divisions of the time as the major threat to the formation of European culture. As we have seen, ‘One Europe’ is the expression that aspires to overcome the divisions and achieve integration.

Nietzsche now seems to focus more on the condition or the foundation upon which culture should be built, which is why his interest in culture sometimes appears more political in the late period. Regarding such a foundation, early Nietzsche refers to the unity of a people as the condition of cultural unity. As he later thinks beyond nationality, a European unity is required as the basis for European culture. In this respect, he argues that the nationalist fragmentation of nations is ‘anti-cultural’ (EH ‘Wagner’ 2). Thus, Napoleon’s attempt ‘to bring Europe into a state-association’ should be ‘the great course of European culture’. If such an attempt had been successful, it could have prevented ‘the misfortune of the madness of nationality’ (KSA 11: 25[115]). In an 1888 letter, Nietzsche admits to understanding that the most ‘important moment in history’ of asking ‘the great value
question’ in relation to humanity and culture was the appearance of Napoleon, who was ‘strong enough to form a political and economic unity from Europe’ to overcome ‘the petty-states-sectionalism and cultural atomism’ (KSB 8: 1132).

This unity is the foundation of European culture, but it is unity of style that makes the political integration become a whole. In the later period, Nietzsche seems not to develop his earlier definition of culture, but he does not simply abandon his earlier concept. In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche rather proudly mentions Bruno Bauer as one of his ‘most attentive readers’ and who had referred von Treitschke to Nietzsche as one ‘who he could turn to if he wanted to learn about the concept of “culture”, a concept he (von Treitschke) was lacking’ (EH ‘UM’ 2). Moreover, Nietzsche still relates the ‘concept of culture’ to ‘style’ (KSA 11: 35[84]), although again without further developing this idea.

In the late period, Nietzsche points out ‘the complete lack […] of “style” in every sense’ (KSA 11: 43[3]) in the German Empire which he deprecates for being a merely political entity and not being a culture. This lack of style indicates the age of mixture that has yet no directional stability, which permeates people and leads them to have conflicting instincts. Today, ‘all the styles’ and ‘all the stages and kinds of morality, customs, cultures’ are ‘reproduced one beside the other’ (HH I 23), which entails that ‘our age’ has not yet been able to create its style; since style is a kind of law according to which life is organised, there are no laws determining how people are to be raised. When pointing out the lack of style he continues ‘I mean [the lack] of new value-positing, value-creations’ (KSA 11: 43[3]); that is, the values that will lead people’s life.

This is the age of mixture or, to put in a perhaps more positive way, ‘the age of comparison’: ‘Such an age acquires its meaning from the fact that in it the various worldviews, customs, cultures can be compared and experienced side by side; this was not possible earlier, when the dominance of every culture was always localised and all artistic styles were correspondingly restricted to a particular place and time’ (HH I 23). Thus Nietzsche believes that, after these stages of mixture and comparison, a new culture should exist that is ‘as far beyond the isolated, original cultures of individual peoples as beyond the culture of comparison’ (ibid.). In this way, Nietzsche has a more positive appreciation of the mixture and is open to the development it will generate, and thus he expects a new

258 One may think that this positive appreciation is not consistent with Nietzsche’s later criticism of race mixing. However, as I explained in chapter 4, the criticism of intermingling of races is mainly about the mixing of classes, i.e. the mixing of types and their disparate values, which resulted from
European culture to be constructed. He calls for the ‘great style’ to develop a new European culture, one that goes beyond the peoples and mixing collage of disjointed cultures.

As briefly discussed in chapter five, this great style is concerned with the formation of the whole. Nietzsche understands the great style to be farthest from the decadent style that refers to the absence of the whole. Hence, ‘Wagner stands farthest from the great style’ (KSA 11: 41[2] 6), who ‘could not create out of the whole’ (CW 10). This great style is one of the standards for seeing and evaluating things; as Nietzsche writes, ‘One must have a standard: I distinguish the great style’ (KSA 12: 10[111]), which means that ‘the greatness of an artist is not measured by the “beautiful feelings”’ but ‘according to the degree to which he approaches the great style, to which he is capable of the great style’ (KSA 13: 14[61]), in which ‘chaos obeys its artistic command and becomes a form’ (KSA 13: 16[49]). The great style basically refers to the artistic power to construct a whole, which shows ‘the peak of the development’ (KSA 13: 14[117]) where the ‘highest feeling of power and sureness finds expression’ (TI ‘Expeditions’ 11).

As mentioned, culture takes a long time to establish itself, a fact which Nietzsche believes the Romans understood. They did ‘the tremendous deed of laying the ground for a great culture’, building the imperium Romanum, the ‘most admirable work of art in the great style’, whose ‘structure was calculated to prove itself over the millennia’ (A 58). In this respect, ‘the great style […] is a sense of […] the long [view]’ (KSA 11: 25[321]). With this perspective on the long stretches of time, Nietzsche, who is concerned with ‘what makes the great style’, says ‘I am the predestined man who determines the value for millennia. […] I have to be a lawgiver’ (KSA 11: 35[74]). From these statements we can take that the great style in the context of culture indicates a durable structure based on new values. In Napoleon Nietzsche finds ‘great style in action’ and ‘the “totality” as health and highest activity’ (KSA 12: 10[5]). Since Napoleon has much significance to Nietzsche as the power that conceives European unity, here we recognise again Nietzsche’s aspirations for imperium Europae. Therefore, for Nietzsche the problem of culture is also the problem of the construction of Europe as a whole.

This construction also constitutes a counter-action to European democratisation. Nietzsche believes that ‘the democratisation of Europe is irresistible’ (HH II ii 275). On the one hand, he sees in this irresistible progress a positive outcome, that democratic herd-like the collapse of the hierarchical order.
people can be useful instruments for building a culture (KSA 11: 35[9]). The age of
democratisation, he understands, can constitute a new time to construct a structure for
culture and harden the broad base of culture. However, Nietzsche is not entirely optimistic
about this. He questions the possibility of building a durable structure in the democratic age,
which is in contrast with the Middle Ages. He writes,

There were times when men believed with rigid confidence, even with piety, in
their predestination for just this business, just this way of making a living, and
simply refused to acknowledge the element of accident, role, and caprice. With the
help of this faith, classes, guilds, and hereditary trade privileges managed to
establish those monsters, the broad-based social pyramids that distinguish the
Middle Ages and to which one can credit at least one thing: durability (and
duration is a first-rank value on earth) (GS 356).

This faith becomes unlearned in the age of democracy, in which individuals believe they
can do anything and play any role with the freedom to choose what to do. In this way, they
all become actors, giving rise to the age in which ‘the “actors”, all kinds of actors, are the
real masters’. In this respect, things in Europe becomes ‘artistic’ in the sense that people do
not develop their character true to their nature but have the ‘bold faith’ that they ‘can
manage almost any role”; thus ‘all nature ceases and becomes art’ (ibid.).

Nietzsche has a nuanced view of ‘actor’, as he understands artists are actors to some
extent (cf. GS 99).259 We have dealt with the imitation of affects; in general, human beings
learn how to act by the imitation of others, copying the effective behaviour as they grow up,
and this social aspect allows human beings to develop a kind of actor’s or performer’s
character (KSA 11: 25[374]). However, just as Nietzsche distinguishes the second nature
cultivated ignoring the first nature, from the second nature cultivated to enrich the first, he
also implies that we can distinguish between different kinds of actors (KSA 12: 10[145]);
between those actors that try to live up to ‘the higher self of theirs’ and train themselves by
‘imitat[ing] over and over the self of their best moments’ (HH I 624), and the democratic

---
259 For a discussion that focuses on this aspect, see Babette Babich, Nietzsche and Eros between the
devil and God’s deep blue sea: The problem of the artist as actor-Jew-woman, Continental Philosophy
Review 33: 2, 2000. However, Babich does not much engage with Nietzsche’s text containing his
critical view of actor, e.g. GS 356 quoted here.
actors that are ‘self-deceivers’ (BGE 9) and push aside and extinguish their character (GS 361) by ‘representing anything that [they] are not’ (GS 366). Therefore, Nietzsche finds ‘decadence’ in such self-deception and self-loss of the democratic actors as ‘counterfeiter’ (Z IV ‘Sorcerer’ 2; KSA 13: 11[54], 16[29], 23[2]; KSA 12: 8[1]).

In the democratic age, Nietzsche believes, it has become near impossible to construct society or a durable structure. For him, ‘wherever the great architecture of culture has developed, its task has been to compel the contending powers into harmony’ (IH I 276) with a social cultural structure grand enough for them to be integrated. Yet within this context, atomistic actors, who believe in becoming the masters by playing any roles, can be thought to be refractory in developing such an organised whole with a stable order. Therefore, Nietzsche argues that when actors dominate,

another human type becomes ever more disadvantaged and is finally made impossible; above all, the great “architects”: the strength to build is now paralysed; the courage to make far-reaching plans is discouraged; the organisational geniuses become scarce – who still dares to undertake works that would require millennia to complete? For what is dying out is that fundamental faith on the basis of which one could calculate, promise, anticipate the future in plans of such scope, […] – namely, the basic faith that man has value and meaning only in so far as he is a stone in a great edifice; to this end he must be firm first of all, a “stone” – above all not an actor! (GS 356)

From this perspective, although the democratic age can provide some opportunity for culture, today ‘everything is lacking, above all the material’ to build a society: ‘We all are no longer material for a society’ (ibid.). That the material is needed to build a society, as we have seen in chapter two, is the idea behind Nietzsche’s insistence on slaves as instruments. He writes, in the same passage cited above, that what he fears is that modern men become actors. He even seems to be worried more at this point about individualistic actors than about the herd.

At any rate, the material is needed and the material should be made. As mentioned above, democratisation can be used to support the idea of people being the material for the construction of society; however, this can happen when the rank order is established in
which people accept themselves as the material, that is, as a part to be used for the whole society. In this respect, Nietzsche’s philosophy ‘aims at rank order: not at an individualistic morality’ (KSA 12: 7[6]).

What Nietzsche sees is an age of uncertainty that now needs to be moulded. He describes ‘the earth’ as ‘a marble workshop’, calling for ‘a ruling race’ to shape it (KSA 11: 35[74]). The movement for the construction of culture should begin in these unsettled, democratic times when the broad ground of the masses is made. Thus he says in a hopeful manner, ‘Now is the age of cyclopean building! Finally, there is secureness of the foundations, so that the entire future can build upon them without danger! Impossible henceforth for the fruitful fields of culture again to be destroyed overnight by wild and senseless torrents!’ (HH II ii 275). Nietzsche laments that ‘the ground for a great culture’ of Imperium Romanum was ‘undone overnight by Christianity’ (A 58, 59), but now he wants to build the foundation from which the brick and mortar for society and life are formed, a base that will not collapse suddenly into rubble.

As Nietzsche implies, the democratic herd or masses should develop into a solid working class firmly established in the broad base of society (KSA 13: 11[60]; TI ‘Expeditions’ 40), which is preparation for the coming age of the architecture of culture. Thus, ‘the cyclopean architects and road builders of humanity’ (HH I 246) are required to enable the preparation; and the democratisation of Europe should be ‘the clever composite preparation of the highest artist of horticulture’ (HH II ii 275), which will lead the masses to be the material.

The Problem of Europe

While the idea of a new European culture that overcomes nationalistic politics may have some elements that resonate with today’s situation, Nietzsche’s vision falls short of achieving a global perspective. Nietzsche’s expectation is that ‘An age of architecture is coming, where one builds again for eternity like the Romans. The backward peoples of Asia, Africa, etc. will be utilised as workers, and the populations of the earth will begin to mix’ (KSA 9: 4[136]). In this statement of Nietzsche’s we encounter his deep Euro-centrism squarely.260 As we have seen in the discussion of One Europe, Nietzsche’s cultural project

260 Large argues that Nietzsche still develops a positive view of the Orient, even though he sometimes borrows some prejudiced orientalist perceptions from the contemporaries, such as Friedrich August Wolf, William Gifford Palgrave, Julius Wellhausen, Ernest Renan, and Karl Ernst Ritter von Baer. See Duncan Large, Nietzsche’s orientalism, Nietzsche-Studien 42: 1, 2015.
consists in re-establishing Europe. For him, culture is above all European culture.

This Eurocentric perspective is also shown in his hope for a European race, or ‘the European as such an Über-Rasse’ (KSA 11: 25[462]). As previously discussed, race to Nietzsche is about character, and the racial character is, he thinks, biologically hereditary but also culturally reared and cultivated, aligning with a widespread contemporary belief in the inheritance of acquired characteristics. The European race indicates that its life manifests the character that is inherent in or characteristic of being European. What raises this character to be embodied in its life, is culture. Therefore, Nietzsche’s interest in the European race is concerned with the European culture and those who shape it. As he wants to breed the European race, he also views the ‘European problem’ as ‘the breeding of a new caste that will rule over Europe’ (BGE 251).

However, the European race is yet a goal to be achieved, just as One Europe has not yet been established. ‘What is called a “nation” in Europe today […] is in any case something becoming, young, and easily displaced, not yet a race’ (ibid.). Nietzsche anticipates that ‘a mixed race, that of the European man, must come into being’, as a result of crossing or crossbreeding, with ‘trade and industry, the circulation of books and letters, the commonality of all higher culture, rapid changes of place and region, the present nomadic life of all those who do not own land’. Therefore, what matters is not ‘conserving nations’ but ‘the production of the strongest possible European mixed race’ (HH I 475).

What Nietzsche aspires to is that this mixed race should become pure in the sense of eventually becoming one unified race formed from diverse sources, like the mixed inhabitants of Greece have become the Greek race.\(^{261}\) Thus he writes, ‘Crossed races always mean at the same time crossed cultures, crossed moralities: […] In the end, however, if the process of purification is successful, all the strength that was formerly expended in the struggle of the disharmonious qualities stands now at the command of the entire organism: which is why races that have become pure have always also become stronger and more beautiful. – The Greeks offer us the model of a race and culture that has become pure: and hopefully we shall one day also achieve a pure European race and culture’ (D 272). Being that Nietzsche understands Europe in its Greek origin from a cultural perspective (cf. KSA 8:

\(^{261}\) Nietzsche was influenced by the contemporary literature and sources for this idea of the Greek race. Cf. Hubert Cancik, “Mongols, Semites, and the Pure-Bred Greeks”: Nietzsche’s handling of the racial doctrines of his time, in Jacob Golomb ed., *Nietzsche and Jewish culture*, London : Routledge, 1997, ch. 3.
the European race he conceives would be the race that makes ‘Europe’s mission and history into a continuation of the Greek’ (HH I 475).

What then does it mean to be Europe, having ancient Greece as the model and seeking a continuation of the Greek model of culture? Although the One Europe that Nietzsche advocates may be a problematic unity in relation to the rest of the world, scholars have paid more attention to its positive aspects, notably in expressing cosmopolitanism. Prange argues that Nietzsche was influenced by the cosmopolitanism of the Greeks, who had the quality of ‘openness’ toward others and were ‘students of other cultures’. The power of Greek culture thus lies in what she calls ‘dynamic interculturalism’, which searches for foreign cultures from which to learn. In this respect, the praxis of the good European as the cosmopolitan person ‘consists in the continual effort of creating the self into a true “citizen of the world”’, and the ‘good European citizenship […] consists indeed in participating in the dynamic process of interculturalism, i.e., to bring together two different worlds actively, to connect their different customs, views, and styles’. In this sense, she characterises the good European in terms of a ‘mix of cultures’.

However, is this interculturalism what Nietzsche has in mind when he references or draws from the Greeks as the model? Aside from the fact that they saw the non-Greek people as barbaroi, the Greeks were not simply the humble learners of other cultures, which Prange should also understand when she writes ‘one must control the foreign input […] the Greeks were successful in doing so, i.e., conquering (soaking up and organizing) the oriental influences (in a unity of style)’. Nietzsche’s repeated emphasis is on how the Greeks were able to form unity out of the chaos of mixed foreign influences. The power of Greek culture lies in its ability to secure its identity by making the foreign elements absorbed, assimilated, and incorporated into it, by ‘reshaping them into the most beautiful appearances’ (HH II i 221); that is, by appropriating them as its own things. Thus, the Greeks were not only ‘discoverers and travellers’ but, above all, they were ‘colonisers’ (KSA 7: 19[42]).

---


263 Martine Prange, Cosmopolitan roads to culture and the festival road of humanity: The cosmopolitan praxis of Nietzsche’s good European against Kantian cosmopolitanism, *Ethical Perspectives* 14: 3, 2007, p. 270.


265 Ibid., p. 170, 188, 196.

266 Ibid., p. 174.
In this respect, a culture expanding its contact with other cultures does not mean the full acceptance of cultural diversity into it. When we read Herodotus as ‘a major source of knowledge [Erkenntnis]’ (KSA 7: 5[123]) and one who first reflected on the clash of civilisations or cultures, we notice his implied admiration of Greek culture in preference to the Orient or Persian Empire.\textsuperscript{267} To some extent, almost every culture has interacted with foreign influences, and Greece was no exception. What is important is that the Greeks, in being divided into several independent city states, still formed a cultural community through the religious medium such as the pan-Hellenic Olympic Games, and did not lose their identity or ‘self’ but cultivated and allowed it to grow even under the influence of the Orient.

This cultural power is what made the Greeks the origin of the groundwork laid for future cultural development; not in reference to isolationist opposition to cultural diversity, but to the strength that can digest and synthesise diverse foreign forces while returning from otherness. European civilisation is one that reserves this strength the most and exhibits cultural continuity. Unlike other civilisations, Europe is the world in which ancient ideas or ideals are still alive and referred to, as Hegel testifies that ‘among the Greeks we feel ourselves immediately at home’,\textsuperscript{268} and as Nietzsche writes ‘so much depends on the development of Greek culture, since our whole western world has received its impetus from there’ (KSA 8: 6[11]). Nietzsche thus believes that nationalistic ‘disintegration politics’ among European countries only constitute ‘interlude politics’, and he finds longing for ‘One Europe’ in cultural figures like ‘Napoleon, Goethe, Beethoven, Stendhal, Heinrich Heine, Schopenhauer’ and pre-senescent ‘Richard Wagner’ (BGE 256).

A question can now be raised as to whether ‘cosmopolitanism’ is the right word to describe Nietzsche’s philosophy of culture. Certainly, there are cosmopolitan aspects in Nietzsche in the sense that he rejects nationalism and the parochial mindset. However, if one has a general understanding of cosmopolitanism as ‘an orientation to the world in which all human beings are thought to belong to one community built on a foundation of mutual respect’,\textsuperscript{269} which ‘denies that membership in a particular cultural community is necessary

\textsuperscript{267} One of the examples of this is where Herodotus makes a distinction between the rule of law in Greece and the rule of a person in the Orient.


\textsuperscript{269} Luis A. Vivanco, \textit{A Dictionary of Cultural Anthropology}, Oxford University Press, 2018. In the entry ‘Cosmopolitanism’, by Pauline Kleingeld and Eric Brown, in \textit{Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, it is explained that there are various versions of cosmopolitanism, but ‘The nebulous core shared by all cosmopolitan views is the idea that all human beings, regardless of their political
for an individual to flourish in the world’, then one might hesitate to use ‘cosmopolitanism’, which might be acceptable within Europe but not in a global sense.

Moreover, while Prange argues that Nietzsche eventually reaches the idea of ‘a “supra-European” or “global” view of things’, ‘Europe’ is still very significant in Nietzsche’s idea of culture, and when it comes to unity out of plurality, his emphasis is on self-identity rather than cultural mix. Thus, when Nietzsche refers to ancient Greece and Rome when musing upon culture, his interest is, once again, largely in how to become what one is. To understand the synthesising power that Nietzsche sees in the Greek culture, we should thus consider a certain implication of his reference to Greece as the cultural model.

**The Greek and Western Tradition**

The central implication of taking the Greek as the model is building ‘the great architecture of culture’ large enough to accommodate, unify, and shape diverse forces into a whole (HH I 276). This is forging a unity out of plurality, which is Nietzsche’s continuous concern in relation to the individual self or a cultural whole. In this respect, forging a unity is also concerned with the theme of one becoming what one is. This theme, as discussed earlier, is bound up with the idea of freedom as one’s living according to oneself as the master. The meaning of this has been differently understood, whether according to one’s own nature or to one’s rational judgement. At any rate, that one should be the master or helmsman of one’s life to lead a good life, not like a slave whose life is directed by others, is the fundamental idea of a certain model of freedom, which is originally expressed by Aristotle: that a free man is one ‘who exists for himself and not for another’. This idea defines how one maintains a relationship with others and, by extension, how a culture treats other cultures.

The problem is that this idea of freedom itself is basically at odds with the existence of others. As discussed in chapter one, from the very beginning this freedom is deeply connected with self-sufficiency, because one cannot fully control one’s life if one is not self-sufficient and has to depend on others in any way. However, freedom in this sense is only

---


possible for a God that is absolutely self-sufficient, unlike human beings who need each other in order to survive. Still, self-sufficiency has been accepted as an ideal state.

At any rate, we can recognise the fear of passivity in this idea of freedom. I am not free if I am in a state of passivity and my action is affected by other than myself, which is why Kant understands freedom as ‘the absolute spontaneity of an action’. The western history of philosophy presents variations on the idea of freedom, while self-sufficiency and the exclusion of passivity continue to be seen as the core elements of freedom. What fundamentally changed coming into the modern age is that freedom, which was understood primarily in a social and political sense in antiquity, has become internalised and generalised, which is the influence of the long Christian domination of the Middle Ages in which everyone, regardless of social status, is believed to be free in a spiritual and moral way as a citizen of the kingdom of God and as children of God. Another change is that people are gradually getting out from under God’s absolute hold over them to the point that Nietzsche confirms that God is dead. Thus, the quest for a mind that does not rely on the concept of God is pursued intensely.

These thoughts are repeated in modern philosophy. Hegel writes, ‘if I am dependent, I am beholden to something other than myself, and cannot exist without this external point of reference. If, however, I am self-sufficient, I am also free’. The exclusion of passivity leads logically to the exclusion of others that can be equally active as I am and can thus make me passive. Therefore, Schelling grasps that freedom ‘can be determined negatively as complete independence, even as complete incompatibility with all that is not-I’. In the logic of freedom, the incompatibility between I and not-I is apparent. Thus, to borrow Sartre’s expression, ‘Hell is – other people!’

What is important for our discussion of culture is the attitude towards other cultures. In the modern era, even though freedom is frequently discussed philosophically in the domain of mind and self-consciousness, the ideal expressed in the concept of freedom is not


disconnected from the social sphere. In fact, it reflects on and affects the way of treating others, and especially the other culture that is not considered as ‘analogue [Analogon]’\(^{277}\) of my own self, as we can see some tragic events in history. Since Nietzsche does not have a moral lesson in view, he calmly considers ‘the character of the Europeans according to their relation to foreign countries, in colonising’ (KSA 11: 25[177]), and says ‘How the European founded colonies proves its predator nature’ (KSA 11: 25[163]).

In Nietzsche, the idea of freedom is reshaped in a de-spiritualised manner in two ways. First, as the self consists not in spirit but in body, Nietzsche understands freedom on an instinctive level. Second, freedom is recovered from the modern discussion detached from the social and political context, as in antiquity when the concept of freedom was also connected to social class. As we have seen, Nietzsche clearly reveals the political implications of this concept of freedom in his idea of slavery, which I will return to below. However, these changes do not divorce him completely from the traditional idea of freedom; he still learns from the Greek view and holds it as a reference.

Even when Nietzsche seems to speak of a global perspective, he still returns or refers to the Greek, as he writes ‘step by step to become more comprehensive, more supranational, more European, more supra-European [übereuropäischer], more Eastern, finally more Greek’ (KSA 11: 41[7]). How does becoming more comprehensive align and conclude with becoming more Greek? He continues in the same note, ‘for the Greek was the first great union and synthesis of all the Eastern – and thus the inception [Anfang] of the European soul, the discovery of our “new world”’. If we see this simply as cosmopolitanism, however, we do not fully understand the synthesising cultural power of the Greek. What then is the power of the Greek; what does it mean to have the Greek as the cultural model; And what is it that Europe should learn from the Greek?

The Greek culture was deeply self-centred, and not only because the Greeks had ‘their festivals and arts […] to glorify themselves’. It is, above all, that the Greeks, with ‘their strongest instinct, the will to power’ (TI ‘Ancients’ 3), interpreted the world according to themselves. The ruling power finds its own image in everything. The world has already to be understood as the same as one that rules, in order for one to appropriate the power to rule the

\(^{277}\) This is how Husserl basically solves the problem of the other, which is to make the other an analogue of my own self. See Edmund Husserl, *Cartesianische Meditationen : eine Einleitung in die Phänomenologie*, Hamburg : Meiner, 1995. “Der „Andere“ verweist seinem konstituierten Sinne nach auf mich selbst, der Andere ist Spiegelung meiner selbst, und doch wieder nicht eigentlich Spiegelung; Analogon meiner selbst.“ (p. 96) „„Fremdes“ […] ist also nur denkbar als Analogon von Eigenheitlichem.“ (p. 118)
world, because one cannot rule the world if it is regarded as incomprehensible in any way. In this respect, ‘belief in oneself’ belongs to the noble that ‘knows itself to be that which imparts honour to things in the first place’. ‘Everything it recognises in itself it honours: such a morality is self-glorification’ (BGE 260).

Greek mythology clearly shows this drive to find oneself in everything. Many ancient civilisations understand the world through gods, but no other has a mythology that represents the gods in such a human-like form as the Greek. The Greeks did not just yield to the overwhelming power of nature and worship or submit to some incomprehensible gods. Greek gods are humans, but idealised and not dying, as Aristotle regards them as ‘eternal men’.278 In this way, the Greeks recognise themselves in the world, and they recognise their greatness in nature (GS 155). This is, in Nietzsche’s view, the expression of the will to power: ‘Will to the thinkability of all beings: thus I call your will! […] But they shall accommodate and bend themselves to you! Thus your will wills it. They shall become smooth and subject to the spirit, as its mirror and reflected image. That is your entire will, you who are wisest, as a will to power; and even when you speak of good and evil and of valuations’ (Z II ‘Self-overcoming’).279

In this way, even in the mythological understanding of the world, the Greeks avoided becoming passive under the unknown world by actively assimilating the world into their horizon. This tendency can, of course, come into conflict with other cultures, just as the idea of freedom can lead in the end to the incompatibility between I and not-I.

What is distinct about the Greeks is that they truly understood the power of culture. They were divided into many city-states that often had political conflicts; nevertheless, they formed a cultural community that bound them together. Thus, when they encountered the alien powers, they recognised these powers not simply as constituting political and military entities but also as cultural units. These units were grasped within the order of the horizon the Greeks constructed, which made the Greek ‘the first great union and synthesis of all the Eastern’.

This aspect becomes clearer when we look at the Achaemenid Empire, or what is generally called the Persian Empire. The Persian Empire was very generous and its


279 Cf. ‘It [philosophy] always creates the world in its own image […]: philosophy is this tyrannical drive itself, the most spiritual will to power, to the “creation of the world”, to the *causa prima*’ (BGE 9).
conquered peoples were allowed their culture and religion. Its generosity was also expressed in the fact, as Herodotus reported, that Mardonius, the Persian military commander, ‘deposed all the Ionian tyrants and instituted democracy in the cities of Ionia’; and people there could continue to have their culture as long as they did not politically oppose or rise up against the Empire. This demonstrates that while the Persians dealt with politically and militarily opposing forces, they did not recognise the other cultures as an opposing threat, whereas the Greeks took the other cultures as a menace to their freedom. Therefore, in the Persian Empire the different cultural units could coexist in an uninterested or uninvolved way, while the Greeks endeavoured to defend their cultural unity against the other.

What makes the Greeks great is this endeavour, from which they were able to incorporate the alien cultural forces and establish themselves not as one of cultures but as the culture. Accordingly, the Greek culture could become the judge of cultures and give itself not relative, but absolute superiority over other cultures.

Broadening one’s horizon by assimilating the world entails one becoming the centre of digesting others. This means that what cannot be assimilated into oneself is viewed as the hostile threat to one’s freedom. Without this synthesising power, any search for other cultures is a decadent taste. Thus, in a note, Nietzsche considers ‘exoticism’ and ‘cosmopolitanism’ to be symptoms that show ‘cultural pessimism’ (KSA 12: 9[126]). He even considers ‘colonisation’ as the growth of a living people in that ‘it is part of the concept of the living that it must grow – that it must extend its power and consequently incorporate foreign forces’ (KSA 13: 14[192]). In this sense, the Greeks constituted a living culture.

When it comes to the said cosmopolitanism or interculturalism, in order for these terms to ever be meaningful today, cultures have to help develop one another by interacting, inspiring, and elevating each other; if not, these terms can be used as a smokescreen for cultural imperialism. This mutuality, however, is not Nietzsche’s point concerning European culture, although he does not exclude the possibility of mutually interacting great world cultures. Thus, when Young understands Nietzsche to seek ‘a revived European culture to become the world culture’ and calls this aspect ‘cosmopolitanism’, it is a naïve use of the word.

---

Slavery and Colony

The emphasis on synthesising power is connected with a desire for activity. Nietzsche’s vision of naturalisation is oriented towards the social whole in which each type can be active with ‘its own feelings of perfection and mastery’. Here Nietzsche shares the fear of passivity, which is expressed in his view of society’s internal and external relations.

The first aspect is slavery. As discussed in chapter two, it primarily refers to instrumentalisation, and the necessity of slavery means that beings as tools and functions are necessary to form the foundation or ‘substructure’ (KSA 12: 9[1]) of the whole. Since Nietzsche thinks that notions such as ‘the human dignity’ and ‘the dignity of labour’ are man’s self-comforting fictions, he views the claim of ‘the abolition of slavery’ as just the ‘lovely vanity which feels being unequal, being publicly rated lower, as the hardest lot’ (HH I 457).

Nietzsche’s advocacy of slavery can appal today’s civil conscience. With regard to this, Warren argues that Nietzsche’s claim, that the division of work is required for culture, is based on the ‘uncritical assumption’ of taking Greek culture as a model, which, he believes, has little to contribute to political philosophy. He therefore suggests one should draw from Nietzsche’s philosophy some political implications and meaning, such as positive freedom and individuality, not based on such an assumption.282 However, the existence of slavery is not the assumption that Nietzsche uncritically accepted from Greek culture, even though he is influenced by the Greek. Rather, the idea that the instrumental aspect, i.e. slavery, is necessary for a society to work is the natural development of his physiological view of society as a body.

Here a seemingly paradoxical picture appears. Each part of a body works actively for the body to be maintained, but as a whole, it seems, only the brain is active and other parts merely serve its cause and maintenance, and thus are passive in the sense of instrumentality. Similarly, each type works actively in accordance with their nature, but as discussed, from the perspective of the whole, only a few can be considered free in the sense that they direct the whole, and the majority of people can be considered passive in the sense that they work within the order that the few shape.

This aspect of passivity is often obscured in modern society in which everybody is

believed to be equal. However in antiquity, where such a belief in equality was not prevalent, the problem of passivity was seriously recognised. The problem stems from the very condition of human existence, the human body. The needs which must be fulfilled in order for human beings to live or survive originate from the fact that people have bodies which produce the internal necessity requiring fulfilment, and if this fails, people cannot perform other activities. It is imperative to fulfil this internal necessity, and the work for this fulfilment may be considered as opposed to freedom, i.e. it is of passivity that one cannot avoid dealing with. Therefore, activity and passivity in this sense belong together whether in an individual or in a society; how these are mediated and reconciled is one of the most fundamental problems.

As shown conspicuously in the ancient world, the ancients were aware of the problem of the conflict between activity (largely represented by cultural activities such as philosophy and politics) and passivity (largely represented by bodily labour), and they burdened slaves with all the work that is necessary to maintain the body. To exist purely in the state of freedom, free men were not to be involved in the work related to enabling passivity. In this respect, when Aristotle excludes workers and mechanics from citizenship as he argues that a state needs them but ‘it must be admitted that we cannot consider all those to be citizens who are necessary to the existence of the state’, this is to allow free men not to be involved in passivity but to stay utmost in the realm of activity.

As part of the human condition, each individual has their own share of passivity to deal with. If one lives a life now without easily feeling any bonds of passivity, this is not because those bonds disappear but because another is coping with their share of it instead. In this way humans are inter-related with each other. In this regard, a free man is one who rides himself of the work of fulfilling such bodily necessity whilst tying others to it as much as possible – that is, one who exploits others the most. This ‘exploitation’ as ‘a consequence of the intrinsic will to power’ cannot be removed from any society (BGE 259). In this respect, Nietzsche’s idea of slavery has echoes to some extent of ancient slavery, which indicates that instruments for bearing the aspect of such passivity are necessary in society.

In this way, ‘passivity’ provides a frame in which to look at Nietzsche’s view as situated in such a tendency of history and in connection with his appreciation of Greek culture. Slavery basically refers to the system to deal with such passivity, and particularly a system

---

that shifts passivity on to others. How such passivity can be managed to be of the other, by shifting it to others, has been the core problem of politics. At this point this politics is connected with another aspect, society’s external relation. In ancient Greece most slaves were outlanders and war captives, rather than fellow Greeks. Therefore, slaves were literally ‘others’. Free men engaged purely in spiritual and cultural activities, and their sole or main physical activity was war. We could even think that the tendency that shifts passivity on to ‘others’ is, roughly speaking, expressed notably in modern colonial expansion.

The fact that Nietzsche considers colonisation as the growth of a living people shows his indifference to the moral aspects of the issue. He even remarks on ‘a mass introduction of barbaric peoples from Asia and Africa’, which can replace the European worker that ‘demands liberation from work’ and ‘wants to impose it on any other’, ‘so that the civilised world would continually make the uncivilised world serviceable, and thus non-culture would be regarded plainly as an obligation to compulsory labour’ (KSA 8: 25[1]). Nietzsche lived in a time in which colonial expansion was being vigorously pursued, and the issues of colonisation and enslavement in Africa were discussed among European powers at the Berlin Conference of 1884-85, in which a region of the Congo was allocated to Leopold II of Belgium. However, just as Nietzsche understands the substructure is required for a society to stand, he seems to view colonies as useful for cultural growth, while being aware of ‘the cost of every great growth: who bears it’ (KSA 12: 10[30]). In a note in 1887, therefore, Nietzsche even mentions ‘the necessity of having to remain master over barbarians, in the Congo or elsewhere’ (KSA 12: 10[29]; cf. 13: 25[13]).

The way to approach such external relations, which is shown repeatedly in history, can be thought of as the extension of the fear of passivity or an attempt to get rid of passivity. Although Nietzsche’s main concern is culture and he does not dig much into the problem of colonisation itself, his idea of the necessity of slavery shows how a desire for activity is bound up with the inevitable dealing with passivity. Nietzsche arrives at the position that all types can be active in a sense, but the mediocre type should be active within their roles in the


285 Cf. ‘“Nobility and honour are attached solely to otium [leisure] and bellum [war]” – that was the voice of the ancient preconception!’ (GS 329)
substructure. Nietzsche therefore questions the philosophy which starts from the premise that all humans are born equal and free. For him, a society where people are equal and free is a fantasy or delusion; when this fantasy dominates, the society as well as the new ruling structure that Nietzsche expects cannot be established, because it destroys ‘the basic faith that man has value and meaning only in so far as he is a stone in a great edifice’ and thus accordingly lacks ‘material for a society’. Nietzsche therefore replies to socialists who spread that fantasy: ‘Free society? Yes! Yes! But […] out of what [do] you build that?’ (GS 356) He poses another connected problem in a similar way:

I cannot see what one wants to do with the European workers. They are situated far too well now not to demand more, little by little, but to demand presumptuously: after all, they have great numbers on their side. The hope is completely gone that a modest and self-sufficient type of man, slavery in the most moderated sense of the word, in short a class that has immutability, could be developed. We have made the workers soldierly; we have given them the right to vote and the right to organise; we have done everything to destroy the instincts on which a Chinese type of workers could be founded, so that the workers today feel and are allowed to feel their existence as already a crisis (expressed morally, as an injustice). But what does one will? I ask once again. If one wills an end, one must also will the means: if one wants slaves, – and one needs them! – one must not educate them to be a master. (KSA 13: 11[60]; TI ‘Expeditions’ 40)

As we have seen, Nietzsche consistently expresses the view that there has to be a broad base of the many for a higher culture to be built, and that ‘ordinary men, […] the great majority, who exist for service and general utility and who are only so far entitled to exist’ (BGE 61) have to remain in the position of being instruments and functions. On this issue, when we do not bracket what Warren called the uncritical assumption in relation to slavery, which is sometimes disparaged and at other times intentionally overlooked, then the problem that Nietzsche pushes us to face becomes clearer. In other words, rather than ignored or

---

286 This also corresponds to Nietzsche’s attitude toward the social situation at the time. ‘He was against shortening the length of the workday from twelve hours a day to eleven in Basel. He was a proponent of child labor, noting with approval that Basel permitted children over the age of twelve to work up to eleven hours a day. He opposed educational groups for workers. Still, he felt that cruelties should not exceed a certain limit’ (Rüdiger Safranski, op. cit., p. 148 f.).
viewed as a false assumption, Nietzsche’s idea of slavery as necessary for culture should be understood as allowing us to face ‘the radical question’ at the root of political philosophy: ‘The radical question is: must there be slavery? Or rather, it is not a question at all, but the fact: […] In truth, there is always slavery – whether you want it or not!’ (KSA 11: 25[225])

This question does not come to the fore when it is assumed or posited that everyone is equal and free. As Nietzsche rejects such an assumption, he argues that in order for human society to work as a whole, there should be people that bear the work dealing with passivity, or do the work that humanity is compelled to deal with due to human existence itself. The picture of slavery that Nietzsche expects to be eventually reached is that people of the mediocre type work hard and actively without ressentiment in their positions as parts of a society, although there should be a long progress to reach such an ideal picture. However, as long as Nietzsche’s concern here is connected with the problem of passivity and its focus is on Europe, such a concern could find a shape in a system whereby the burden of passivity is transferred to ‘others’, which has been shown in history, just like Nietzsche is against “‘liberating” the black servants, out of love for the slaves’ as well as against instigating ‘nationalism among peoples’ (KSA 13: 25[13]). This is one aspect that Nietzsche’s thinking of a European unity and culture can fall into, which takes the Greek culture as its model.
Conclusion

Nietzsche’s envisioned society is a well-integrated whole, in which different types live actively in accordance with their nature. A unified Europe is the setting for the whole to be established. This whole is structured hierarchically with the rank order of different physiological types. Such a ‘separation of the three types’ is the necessary condition that makes possible both ‘the whole’ and ‘the higher and the highest types’, and thus ‘a high culture’ (A 57, KSA 11: 40[21]).

The fact that the highest type, as the spiritual type or philosopher, rules in the sense of creating values can lend itself to the understanding that Nietzsche’s view of politics is concerned with ideology, rather than political systems. This is what Maudemarie Clark presents in her recent influential book,287 and I would like to review my reading presented in this thesis by discussing her argument. In the paper ‘Nietzsche’s Antidemocratic Rhetoric’ in the book, Clark argues that particularly in Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche is ‘not committed to an aristocratic political system’ or ‘an antidemocratic politics’.288 Differentiating aristocratic society from the aristocratic political institutions or system, she contends that what makes a society aristocratic for Nietzsche is not the political institutions but ‘its underlying value orientation’ towards the rank and differences in value between human beings.289 In Clark’s reading, the problem Nietzsche has with democracy is not concerned with democratic institutions, but with the ideology or values that promote equality and undermine the belief in the value differences among humans. Therefore, he does not oppose the democratic institutions that support ‘the individual’s right to self-determination’ to lead one’s life, as long as the institutions acknowledge ‘the aristocratic values’ and ‘the higher states of soul’, and allow the few to pursue an excellence that most people cannot relate to and which is beyond the majority’s pursuit of contentment.290

It can be debated whether a political system or structure can be considered as separate from an ethical outlook, or whether the democratic institutions can uphold the aristocratic...

288 Ibid., p. 164.
289 Ibid., p. 171.
290 Ibid., p. 174 f.
values that support the differences in value or worth among individuals.\footnote{291} Although Nietzsche does not pay detailed attention to political institutions, it is not that the problem of democracy is only about its values, since those values are expressed or embodied in the political system. Thus, Nietzsche considers democracy in terms of not only democratic ideology but also its political system. Therefore, democracy is a system in which ‘the sole sovereign’ is ‘the people’ (HH I 472). It is a politics in which ‘all’ parties are obliged to flatter the “people” and the people ‘finally become omnipotent’ (HH II ii 292); that is to say, ‘democracy is a form of […] predominance of the failed [Mißrathenden]’ that are not entitled to rule (KSA 11: 34[146]).

Clark says that the idea of ‘philosophers dominating people by imposing their values on them’ sounds ‘too silly’.\footnote{292} It seems that she imagines philosophers’ ‘rule’ to be, rather, political enforcement, and thus ‘as involving force and violence, as a matter of imposing their will on a resisting populace’.\footnote{293} However, in my reading, the philosopher’s rule, by creating values, engages in change in society by organising the affective network. Here we need not imagine only enforcement.

The problem is that in Clark’s interpretation society is not an integrated whole. According to her, philosophers do not impose their values on society but share the values within their circle. They share a value orientation that ‘posits their own form of existence as the telos or highest good achieved by society’, regardless of social or public recognition. While it is true that different types share different value orientations, in Clark’s nuanced individualist reading philosophers are isolated from the public, and social or cultural unity does not matter anymore. Thus, she writes that ‘A group of philosophers should therefore be able to form an aristocratic society in Nietzsche’s sense by sharing such a value orientation, […] even if the larger society in which they live is governed by democratic political

\footnote{291} John Rawls in \textit{A Theory of Justice} contends that ‘On the contract doctrine […] the equal liberty of citizens does not presuppose that the ends of different persons have the same intrinsic value, nor that their freedom and well-being is of the same worth’ (p. 329). However, he later argues in \textit{Political Liberalism} (New York : Columbia University Press, 1996) that in ‘a well-ordered democratic society’, citizens do not accept ‘antecedent social ends that justify them in viewing some people as having more or less worth to society than others and assigning them different basic rights and privileges accordingly’ (p. 41); and that justice as fairness does not ‘try to estimate the extent to which individuals succeed in advancing their way of life or to judge the intrinsic worth (or the perfectionist value) of their ends’ (p. 188).

\footnote{292} Clark, \textit{Nietzsche on ethics and politics}, p. 168.

\footnote{293} Ibid., p. 170.
Philosophers, of course, can form a community; however, Nietzsche does not think it should be an Epicurean self-contained group that is not interested in influencing the wider society.

The main reason that Nietzsche seems occasionally to be positive about democracy, which Clark takes to be Nietzsche’s acceptance of it, is that it can produce, so to speak, the herd waiting for a shepherd; that is to say material for society, or the broad base of society. Thus Nietzsche writes, ‘I have as yet found no reason to be discouraged’, in that ‘Whoever can command finds those who must obey’ and ‘the trainability of men has become very great in this democratic Europe’ (KSA 11: 26[449]). Furthermore, Nietzsche does not use the term ‘slavery’ merely in a metaphorical sense, as Clark argues. It refers to the fact that society needs various instruments and functions in order to be established. As Nietzsche refers in a note to a stable working class by ‘slavery in the most moderated sense of the word’ (KSA 13: 11[60]), he believes a durable social structure of rank order is required, in addition to a value orientation. I think it is more useful, rather than sidelining such a term as metaphorical only, to consider it as a fundamental question about the existence of human passivity and the instrumental part of society.

Nietzsche takes society to be the space for rearing, cultivating and training the human types, for which engagement with the affective network is required. In contrast, mostly in today’s society the basic form of social relationships is considered as a ‘contract’; the relationships, for example, between workers and employers, or citizens and the government, are all defined in terms of a contract or legal agreement. A contract is what defines each party’s rights, and such rights are the basic elements of the whole social relationship. In this way, the individuals become the subject of rights, whereas Nietzsche does not consider the atomistic individual as such a subject, nor does he believe that rights are merely based on such contracts. With this understanding of today’s common institutionalised practice, based on the idea of the individual as the subject of rights, Nietzsche’s idea of the social whole with the rank order of different types can be challenged. Why should we accept Nietzsche’s vision of the revaluation of democratic values? Why should we organise society along Nietzsche’s lines? The argument would be, Nietzsche thinks, that his vision is based

---

294 Ibid., p. 171.
295 Ibid.
296 For the discussion of Nietzsche on rights, see Paul Patton, Nietzsche on Rights, Power and the Feeling of Power, in Siemens / Roodt eds., Nietzsche, Power and Politics, 2008.
on nature in the sense of the active form of will to power. However, we understand that the
claim that life or nature are such and such does not necessarily mean a particular politics.
One can argue that democracy is to be valued precisely because it is anti-natural. Bergson,
for example, highly appreciates democracy, since ‘Of all political systems, it is indeed the
furthest removed from nature’. 297 Democracy can make amends for the inadequacies in
nature with ‘a mighty effort in a direction contrary to that of nature’, 298 and this can be the
reason why one values it. Nietzsche views such a democratic effort as decadent and
unhealthy. In this respect, Nietzsche may present ‘health’ as an answer to the question about
the binding force of his claim. That is to say, Nietzsche’s envisioned whole is an ideal that is
good for humanity to pursue because it makes them healthy.

Nietzsche wages the struggle to breed such healthy humanity as a whole. This is ‘a war of
spirits’ [Geisterkrieg] (EH ‘Destiny’ 1) against the Christian ideals and morality of
equality, 299 which is also against a national, physical war that is led by the ressentiment
instigated by such morality. 300 This is war of ideas concerning the kind of the human type to
be raised, against what Nietzsche calls ‘modern ideas’ 301 that have stemmed from the slave
morality and belief in equality. This is ‘war without powder or fumes, without belligerent
posturing, without pathos and contorted limbs’ (EH ‘HH’ 1). This war is concerned with
establishing a new affective interpretation of the world; that is, it intends to change the way
we see the world by cultivating and incorporating a new set of drives into our body.

Developing his thinking on drive in his middle period, Nietzsche already expects such a war
of ideas to come. ‘The time is coming, when the struggle for the earth dominion
[Erdherrschaft] will be conducted – it will be conducted in the name of fundamental
philosophical teachings. […] Then come social wars – and again concepts will be
incorporated! […] the most powerful concept must prevail’ (KSA 9: 11[273]). 302

297 Henri Bergson, The two sources of morality and religion, trans. R. Ashley Audra and Cloudesley
Brereton, with the assistance of W. Horsfall Carter, Notre Dame, Ind : University of Notre Dame
298 Ibid., p. 283.
299 On the war of spirits, see Drochon, op. cit., ch. 6, or pp. 170 ff.
300 Cf. ‘The old God invents war, he separates the peoples, he makes people destroy each other (– the
priests have always needed war . . .)’ (A 48).
301 Cf. BGE 10, 44, 58, 202, 203, 222, 239, 242, 253, 260; GS 362; GM III 26; A 57, 62; TI
‘Expeditions’ 48; EH ‘UM’ 2.
302 In this respect, Strong argues that ‘Nietzsche understood far better than anyone else that the
twentieth century would be the century of great ideological wars’. Tracy B. Strong, Friedrich
The image of war gives an impression of Nietzsche promoting revolutionary sudden change in society. However, he does not believe in such a change. Rather, he has the long view: ‘The transformation of man takes millennia for the formation of the type’ (KSA 9:11[276]). In this respect, although Nietzsche’s thinking seems radical, his realistic expectation is gradual social change. Therefore, in *Daybreak*, he writes ‘If a change is to be as profound as it can be, the means to it must be given in the smallest doses but unremittingly over long periods of time’, so that ‘we, very late, presumably, become fully aware that the new evaluation has become the predominant force and that the small doses of it, to which we must grow accustomed from now on, have laid down a new nature in us’ (D 534). While Nietzsche continues to expect the change to take a long time, he seems to use a more urgent language in his late writings, sensing that nationalistic warfare in Europe was looming at the time.

Nietzsche’s warning against nationalism that incites people to resent one another becomes the important part of his thinking about politics. However, in his vision, the society that should be reached after overcoming the politics of ressentiment and considering ‘the necessity of new orders, also of a new slavery’ (GS 377) is only possible by rejecting the morality of equality. Since democracy is based on such morality, his anti-democratic stance is natural. As Nietzsche understands, the core principle of democracy is citizens’ equal rights. The development of democracy has been a process of recognising such equal rights and citizenship of groups excluded from that principle, such as workers, women, and various minorities.

Aristotle, as discussed in chapter 6, defines ‘citizens pure and simple’ in a narrow sense, excluding workers and mechanics from citizenship, so that citizens as free men are understood not to be involved in passivity but to stay in the realm of activity. Democracy has been developed towards inclusion, overcoming such exclusion. What Nietzsche recognises as one of the problems of democratic movement is that it encourages a free society where everyone is equal as if there is not a part of instruments and functions that deal with passivity in human society, the part that Nietzsche asserts is necessary. Therefore he writes, ‘what they sing – “equal rights”, “free society”, “no more masters and no servants” – has no

---

*Nietzsche and the politics of transfiguration*, Berkeley; Los Angeles; London: University of California Press, 1988, p. 189. However, it is not evident that Nietzsche’s concept of war of spirits can be considered in terms of the ideological war in the twentieth century.

303 In this respect, Nietzsche is against fanaticism, especially in the middle writings. See Ansell-Pearson, op. cit., 2018, pp. 54-60.
allure for us’ (GS 377). He believes that such a fantasy of equality plays the role of producing ressentiment.

Nietzsche would not support democratic inclusion based on equality, but the incorporation of people into society based on different positions in the hierarchically structured whole. To keep people from having ressentiment about the hierarchy, there should be a gradual change in the affective interpretation of the world, or the rank order should be made almost religiously acceptable as discussed in chapter 2. Still, it is not clear how Nietzsche’s idea can achieve a place as the normative force in an age where what is embodied in people’s lives are democratic ideals and qualities, and not those put forward by Nietzsche. It may be also for this reason that he comes to use a more urgent language and considers his writing as ‘a great declaration of war’ (TI ‘Foreword’).
Bibliography

Primary Sources


I cite Nietzsche’s works using and often revising the existing translations according to Nietzsche’s German text (KSA and KSB). The existing translations include the well-known ones translated by W. Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale, and Cambridge Edition (Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy: Nietzsche), Stanford Edition (The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche), and The Will to Power translated by Kaufmann and Hollingdale. Other translations of Nietzsche’s notes and letters are my own.

Secondary Sources


Constâncio, João / Branco, Maria João Mayer eds., *Nietzsche on instinct and language*, Berlin; Boston: De Gruyter, 2011.


Leiter, Brian, Moralities Are a Sign-Language of the Affects, in Nietzsche and the Problem of Subjectivity, Joao Constâncio, Maria Joao Mayer Branco eds., Bartholomew Ryan Berlin, Germany ; Boston, Massachusetts : De Gruyter, 2015.

Lichtman, Jeff W., Interview (https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2012/06/the-growing-brain/)


McIntyre, Alex, The sovereignty of joy: Nietzsche's vision of grand politics, London; Toronto; Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1997.


Plato, Plato: Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper ; associate editor, D. S. Hutchinson,


Prange, Martine, *Cosmopolitan roads to culture and the festival road of humanity: The cosmopolitan praxis of Nietzsche's good European against Kantian cosmopolitanism*, *Ethical Perspectives* 14: 3, 2007.


Smith, John H., Nietzsche’s ‘Will to Power’: Politics Beyond (Hegelian) Recognition, *New German Critique* 73, Special Issue on Heiner Muller, 1998.


