Cartwright, Edward (2003) Imitation and the emergence of Nash equilibrium play in games with many players. Working Paper. University of Warwick, Department of Economics, Coventry.

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Abstract

We model a learning dynamic in which players imitate and innovate. Of interest is to question whether Nash equilibrium play emerges, and if so, the role that imitation plays in this emergence. Our main result provides a general class of coordination games for which approximate Nash equilibrium play does emerge. Important conditions include that players imitate "similar" individuals. The role of imitation in learning is discussed in the context of two examples where it is shown that imitation can lead to pareto superio outcomes.

Item Type:	Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory Q Science > QA Mathematics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Equilibrium (Economics), Imitation, Convergence (Economics), Group theory, Game theory
Series Name:	Warwick economic research papers
Publisher:	University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Place of Publication:	Coventry
Date:	October 2003
Number:	No.684
Number of Pages:	29
Status:	Not Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access
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URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/1506

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