Viable tax constitutions
Perroni, Carlo and Scharf, Kimberley A. (Kimberly Ann), 1961- (2003) Viable tax constitutions. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. Warwick economic research papers (No.683).
WRAP_Perroni_twerp683.pdf - Requires a PDF viewer such as GSview, Xpdf or Adobe Acrobat Reader
Official URL: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/twerp6...
Taxation is only sustainable if the general public complies with it. This observation is uncontroversial with tax practitioners but has been ignored by the public finance tradition, which has interpreted tax constitutions as binding contracts by which the power to tax is irretrievably conferred by individuals to government, which can then levy any tax it chooses. However, in the absence of an outside party enforcing contracts between members of a group, no arrangement within groups can be considered to be a binding contract, and therefore the power of tax must be sanctioned by individuals on an ongoing basis. In this paper we offer, for the first time, a theoretical analysis of this fundamental compliance problem associated with taxation, obtaining predictions that in some cases point to a re-interptretation of the theoretical constructions of the public finance tradition while in others call them into question.
|Item Type:||Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HJ Public Finance|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Taxation, Finance, Public, Economic policy, Taxpayer compliance, Public goods, Welfare economics|
|Series Name:||Warwick economic research papers|
|Publisher:||University of Warwick, Department of Economics|
|Place of Publication:||Coventry|
|Official Date:||September 2003|
|Number of Pages:||63|
|Status:||Not Peer Reviewed|
|Access rights to Published version:||Open Access|
Preliminary and Incomplete: First draft January 2003; this draft September 2003
Abreu, D. (1988). “On the theory of infinitely repeated games with discounting,” Econometrica 56, 383-396.
Actions (login required)