Redoano, Michela (2003) Fiscal interactions among European countries. Working Paper. University of Warwick, Department of Economics, Coventry.

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Abstract

In this paper we investigate whether there is empirical evidence that EU Countries set their public expenditure and their taxes interdependently. We use a panel of data across European countries, years and fiscal variables to estimated countries’ reactions functions. We find evidence of intedependences consistent with the literature on tax and yardistick competition.

Item Type:	Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions H Social Sciences > HJ Public Finance
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Space in economics, Taxation -- Econometric models, International economic relations, Panel analysis, Europe -- Economic conditions
Series Name:	Warwick economic research papers
Publisher:	University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Place of Publication:	Coventry
Date:	28 June 2003
Number:	No.680
Number of Pages:	31
Status:	Not Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access
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URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/1510

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