Leech, Dennis (2003) The utility of the voting power approach. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. (Warwick economic research papers).

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Abstract

This paper argues that the voting power approach is much more general than is portrayed by Albert (“The Voting Power Approach: Measurement without Theory”, European Union Politics, 4:3, 2003) and is therefore capable of generating important insights about voting systems, such as qualified majority voting in the EU Council. The voting power approach focuses on understanding the properties of voting systems by analysing outcomes and thereby is able to generate empirical facts that are not otherwise obvious. That the approach is so general has not previously been pointed out in the relevant literature; it has usually been taken as coinciding with power indices. Albert’s criticism is directed at one aspect of the theory of voting power indices: the assumption of probabilistic voting that underlies conventional power indices. It is argued that he fails to take account of the different uses of power indices and that the probabilistic voting assumptions he derides may or may not be useful depending on this. It is necessary to emphasise the key distinction between a priori power indices and measure of empirical voting power. Albert misrepresents the voting power approach and is not willing to allow that it encompasses a diversity of methods as well as a research agenda.

Item Type:	Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Voting research, Utility theory, Probabilities, Power (Social sciences), European Union countries -- Politics and government
Series Name:	Warwick economic research papers
Publisher:	University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Place of Publication:	Coventry
Date:	June 2003
Number:	No.678
Number of Pages:	15
Status:	Not Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access
References:	Albert, Max (2003), “The Voting Power Approach: Measurement Without Theory”, European Union Politics, 4:3, Banzhaf, John F (1965), “Weighted Voting Doesn’t Work: A Mathematical Analysis”, Rutgers Law Review, 19, 317-343 Banzhaf, John F., III (1968), ”One Man, 3.312 votes: a Mathematical Analysis of the Electoral College”, Villanova Law Review, 13, 303-332. Brams, Steven J. and Paul Affuso, (1985), “New Paradoxes of Voting Power on the EC Council of Ministers”, Electoral Studies, 4:2, 135-139. Coleman, James S. (1971)., "Control of Collectivities and the Power of a Collectivity to Act," in B.Lieberman (ed), Social Choice, New York, Gordon and Breach, reprinted in J.S. Coleman, 1986, Individual Interests and Collective Action, Cambridge University Press. Coleman, James S. (1973), “Loss of Power”, American Sociological Review, 38:1, 1-17. Felsenthal and Machover, (1998), The Measurement of Voting Power, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar. Garrett, Geoffrey and George Tsebelis (2001), “Even More Reasons to Resist the Temptation of Power Indices in the EU”, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 13(1): 99-105. Hayes-Renshaw, Fiona and Helen Wallace (1997), The Council of Ministers, Macmillan. IMF (2003), Annual Report for 2003. Leech, Dennis and Moshé Machover (2003), “Qualified Majority Voting: the Effect of the Quota” in Manfred Holler, Hartmut Kliemt, Dieter Schmitdchen and Manfred E. Streit (eds.) Yearbook of New Political Economy, Vol. 22, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. Leech, Dennis (2002), “Voting Power in the Governance of the International Monetary Fund”, Annals of Operations Research, 109, 375-397. Shapley, Lloyd S. and Martin Shubik (1954), “A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System,” American Political Science Review, 48, 787-92, reprinted in Alvin E. Roth (ed.), (1988),The Shapley Value, Cambridge University Press.
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/1511

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