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Social conformity and bounded rationality in arbitrary games with incomplete information: some first results
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Cartwright, Edward and Wooders, Myrna Holtz (2003) Social conformity and bounded rationality in arbitrary games with incomplete information: some first results. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. Warwick economic research papers (No.672).
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Official URL: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/resear...
Abstract
Intepret a set of players all playing the same pure strategy and all with similar attributes as a society. Is it consistent with self interested behaviour for a population to organise itself into a relatively small number of societies? By introducing the concept of approximate substitute players in non-cooperative games we are able to put a bound on the rationality of such social conformity for an arbitrary game and arbitrary number of societies.
Item Type: | Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper) | ||||
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Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HM Sociology | ||||
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics | ||||
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): | Conformity, Compliance, Equilibrium (Economics), Group theory, Information asymmetry | ||||
Series Name: | Warwick economic research papers | ||||
Publisher: | University of Warwick, Department of Economics | ||||
Place of Publication: | Coventry | ||||
Official Date: | August 2003 | ||||
Dates: |
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Number: | No.672 | ||||
Number of Pages: | 31 | ||||
Status: | Not Peer Reviewed | ||||
Access rights to Published version: | Open Access (Creative Commons) | ||||
Description: | First version, January 2002; this version August 2003 |
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