Cartwright, Edward and Wooders, Myrna Holtz (2003) Social conformity and bounded rationality in arbitrary games with incomplete information: some first results. Working Paper. University of Warwick, Department of Economics, Coventry.

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Abstract

Intepret a set of players all playing the same pure strategy and all with similar attributes as a society. Is it consistent with self interested behaviour for a population to organise itself into a relatively small number of societies? By introducing the concept of approximate substitute players in non-cooperative games we are able to put a bound on the rationality of such social conformity for an arbitrary game and arbitrary number of societies.

Item Type:	Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HM Sociology
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Conformity, Compliance, Equilibrium (Economics), Group theory, Information asymmetry
Series Name:	Warwick economic research papers
Publisher:	University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Place of Publication:	Coventry
Date:	August 2003
Number:	No.672
Number of Pages:	31
Status:	Not Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access
Description:	First version, January 2002; this version August 2003
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/1517

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