Social conformity and bounded rationality in arbitrary games with incomplete information: some first results
Cartwright, Edward and Wooders, Myrna Holtz (2003) Social conformity and bounded rationality in arbitrary games with incomplete information: some first results. Working Paper. University of Warwick, Department of Economics, Coventry.
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Intepret a set of players all playing the same pure strategy and all with similar attributes as a society. Is it consistent with self interested behaviour for a population to organise itself into a relatively small number of societies? By introducing the concept of approximate substitute players in non-cooperative games we are able to put a bound on the rationality of such social conformity for an arbitrary game and arbitrary number of societies.
|Item Type:||Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HM Sociology|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Conformity, Compliance, Equilibrium (Economics), Group theory, Information asymmetry|
|Series Name:||Warwick economic research papers|
|Publisher:||University of Warwick, Department of Economics|
|Place of Publication:||Coventry|
|Number of Pages:||31|
|Status:||Not Peer Reviewed|
|Access rights to Published version:||Open Access|
|Description:||First version, January 2002; this version August 2003|
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