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Learning to play approximate Nash equilibria in games with many players
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Cartwright, Edward (2003) Learning to play approximate Nash equilibria in games with many players. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. (Warwick economic research papers).

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Abstract
We illustrate one way in which a population of boundedly rational individuals can learn to play an approximate Nash equilibrium. Players are assumed to make strategy choices using a combination of imitation and innovation. We begin by looking at an imitation dynamic and provide conditions under which play evolves to an imitation equilibrium; convergence is conditional on the network of social interaction. We then illustrate, through example, how imitation and innovation can complement each other; in particular, we demonstrate how imitation can ‚help a population to learn to play a Nash equilibrium where more rational methods do not. This leads to our main result in which we provide a general class of large game for which the imitation with innovation dynamic almost surely converges to an approximate Nash, imitation equilibrium.
Item Type:  Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper) 

Subjects:  H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory Q Science > QA Mathematics 
Divisions:  Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics 
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):  Equilibrium (Economics), Imitation, Convergence (Economics), Game theory, Group theory 
Series Name:  Warwick economic research papers 
Publisher:  University of Warwick, Department of Economics 
Place of Publication:  Coventry 
Date:  March 2003 
Number:  No.671 
Number of Pages:  47 
Status:  Not Peer Reviewed 
Access rights to Published version:  Open Access 
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URI:  http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/1518 
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