Candidate stability and probabilistic voting procedures
Rodríguez-Alvarez, Carmelo (2003) Candidate stability and probabilistic voting procedures. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. (Warwick economic research papers).
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Official URL: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/resear...
We extend the analysis of Dutta, Jackson and Le Breton (Econometrica 2001) on strategic candidacy to probabilistic environments. For each configuration of the agenda and each profile of voters' preferences over running candidates a probabilistic voting procudure selects a lottery on the set of candidates at stake. Assuming that candidates cannot vote, we show that random dictatorships are the only unanimous probabilistic voting procedures that never provide unilateral incentives for the candidates to leave the ballot independently of the composition of the agenda. However, more flexible rules can be divised if we focus on the stability of specific agendas.
|Item Type:||Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Q Science > QA Mathematics
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Voting research, Probabilities, Social choice -- Mathematical models, Decision making, Chioce (Psychology)|
|Series Name:||Warwick economic research papers|
|Publisher:||University of Warwick, Department of Economics|
|Place of Publication:||Coventry|
|Number of Pages:||35|
|Status:||Not Peer Reviewed|
|Access rights to Published version:||Open Access|
|Funder:||Comissionat per Universitats i Recerca de la Generalitat de Catalunya (CURGC), Spain. Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología (MCT), Fundación "Pedro Barrié de la Maza, Conde de Fenosa" (FPBMCF)|
|Grant number:||1998FI00022 (CURGC), PB98-870 (MCT)|
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