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Candidate stability and voting correspondences

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Rodríguez-Alvarez, Carmelo (2003) Candidate stability and voting correspondences. Working Paper. University of Warwick, Department of Economics, Coventry.

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Abstract

For each set of candidates at state and each profile of voters' preferences over running candidates a voting corresponsence selects a set of candidates. following Dutta, Jackson and Le Breton (Econometrica 2001) a voting correspondence is candidate stable if a candidate never benefits from withdrawing unilateraly her candidacy. If candidates cannot vote and compare sets of candidates according to their expected utility conditional on some prior probability assessment only dictatorial voting correspondences are candidate stable and unanimous. If the assessments are restricted to be uniform, rules that select the set of best candidates of tww fixed voters are also allowed. We also analyze other domains of preferences fitting extreme attitudes towards risk in which positive results are obtained.

Item Type: Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Q Science > QA Mathematics
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Voting research, Probabilities, Social choice -- Mathematical models, Decision making, Chioce (Psychology)
Series Name: Warwick economic research papers
Publisher: University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Place of Publication: Coventry
Date: January 2003
Number: No.666
Number of Pages: 49
Status: Not Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version: Open Access
Funder: Comissionat per Universitats i Recerca de la Generalitat de Catalunya (CURGC), Spain. Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología (MCT), Fundación "Pedro Barrié de la Maza, Conde de Fenosa" (FPBMCF)
Grant number: 1998FI00022 (CURGC), PB98-870 (MCT)
URI: http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/1523

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