Noble identity during the French Wars of Religion: Antoine de Crussol, the duc d’Uzès

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_Tugaigí buíochas don Tiarna toisc gur maith é, agus go maireann a bhuangrá go brách_
Declaration

I declare that this thesis is entirely my own work and has not been submitted for examination for a degree at any other university.
Abstract

This thesis explores the identity of the French nobility who joined the Protestant movement leading up and during the early Wars of Religion. Focusing specifically on Antoine de Crussol, the duc d’Uzès, and his relationship with the monarchy, I analyse this interaction before, during, and after his adherence to the Protestant movement. I examine what this adherence meant in practice and highlight the consequences of this decision. Crussol’s relationship with the crown is explored in three distinct parts, using a chronological framework (1559-1573). After analysing his numerous royal commissions, I outline his role as Protestant leader in the first religious war, fighting against royal armies. An evaluation of Crussol’s return to royal favour concludes the thesis. This work demonstrates that Crussol had a trusted relationship with the monarchy, despite his time as Protestant leader. He consistently presented his actions as being carried out on the crown’s behalf. His interaction with the monarchy influenced critical aspects of his life, such as family and provincial responsibilities, and religious convictions. This was a reciprocal relationship, as the crown relied on him to further royal control, using his Protestant links and provincial authority. Although Crussol reluctantly joined the war, he fully engaged in his powerful Protestant role during the conflict. While he had notable Protestant sympathies, there was a growing tension with his loyalty to the monarchy following the war. Crussol was quickly rehabilitated at court, and there was no question of further rebellion against the monarchy. He presented a Catholic faith after the conflict, as part of his attempt to emphasise his obedience to the crown. Although Crussol became an influential figure in his own right, increasing his prestige through the purchase of alienated Catholic church land, his primary marker of identity was his relationship with the crown through the years 1559-1573.
Abbreviations

ACC: Archives communales de Chabeuil, Chabeuil
ACSN: Archives communales de Saint-Nazaire-en-Royans, Saint-Nazaire-en-Royans
ACT: Archives communales de Tarascon, Tarascon
ACTH: Archives communales de Tain-l’Hermitage, Tain-l’Hermitage
ADA: Archives départementales de l’Ardèche, Privas
ADD: Archives départementales de la Drôme, Valence
ADG: Archives départementales du Gard, Nîmes
ADH: Archives départementales de l’Hérault, Montpellier
ADHG: Archives départementales de la Haute Garonne, Toulouse
ADI: Archives départementales de l’Isère, Grenoble
ADT: Archives départementales du Tarn, Albi
ADV: Archives départementales de Vaucluse, Avignon
AML: Archives municipales de Lyon, Lyon
AMLD: Archives municipales de Livron-sur-Drôme, Livron-sur-Drôme
AMM: Archives municipales de Montpellier, Montpellier
AMO: Archives municipales d’Orange, Orange
AMR: Archives municipales de Romans, Romans
AMT: Archives municipales de Toulouse, Toulouse
AMV: Archives municipales de Valence, Valence
AN: Archives Nationales, Paris
BA: Bibliothèque municipale d’Avignon, Avignon
BC: Bibliothèque du Château de Chantilly, Chantilly
BG: Bibliothèque d’étude et du patrimoine de Grenoble, Grenoble
BM: Bibliothèque Mazarine, Paris

BNF: Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Paris

BPF: Bibliothèque du protestantisme français, Paris

BSHPF: Bulletin de la Société de l’Histoire du Protestantisme Français

Correspondance Bèze: Théodore de Bèze, Correspondance de Théodore de Bèze, ed. by Henri Meylan et al., 43 vols (Geneva, 1960-2017)

Calvini opera: John Calvin, Joannis Calvini opera quae supersunt omnia, ed. by G. Baum, E. Cunitz, and E. Reuss, 59 vols (Brunswick and Berlin, 1863-1900)

Histoire ecclésiastique: Histoire ecclésiastique des églises réformées au royaume de France, ed. by G. Baum and E. Cunitz, 3 vols (Paris, 1883-1889)

HL: Claude de Vic, and Joseph Vaissète, Histoire générale de Languedoc avec des notes et les pièces justicatives, 16 vols (Toulouse, 1872-1904)

LCM: Catherine de Médicis, Lettres de Catherine de Médicis, ed. by Hector de la Ferrière, Gustave Baguenault de Puchesse, and André Lesort, 11 vols (Paris, 1880-1943)


Ménard: Ménard, Léon, Histoire civile, ecclésiastique, et littéraire de la ville de Nismes, avec des notes et les preuves, 7 vols (Paris, 1744-1758)


TNA: The National Archives, Kew
Conventions

The year started on a number of different dates in early modern Europe, generally relating to the date of Easter. For this thesis, old style dating will be indicated with two dates given. For example, if a document is dated as 21 January 1561, which should be 21 January 1562 according to modern conventions, the date will be written as 21 January 1561/1562.

All translations are the author’s own. Quotes in languages other than English will be translated and placed in the text, with the original citations placed in the footnotes. The original spelling of the early modern texts and manuscripts has been retained, although I have added several accents or apostrophes for the sake of clarity. Contractions in the original sources have been expanded. The names of individuals are written in their French form.

To minimise the number of footnotes, I have grouped citations from the same source together.
**Introduction**

This thesis explores the identity of the French nobility who joined the Protestant movement, in the period leading up to and during the early Wars of Religion in France, through the life of Antoine de Crussol, the duc d’Uzès. It defines identity as social markers that comprise of elements such as religion, family, social status, and loyalty to the king. Studying identity through Crussol’s life, I analyse his relationship with the monarchy before, during, and after his adherence to the Protestant movement. In considering why he chose to join the Protestants, I examine what this adherence meant in practice and highlight the consequences of this decision. The introduction of Protestantism into France had an important effect on the identity of the nobles who embraced the faith. This decision could trouble noble consciences and raise questions concerning loyalty to the crown. Civil war left Protestant nobles in the uncomfortable position of potentially fighting against the monarchy to support their co-religionists.

Given noble reliance on the king for favours and advancement, Crussol’s relationship with the crown was of prime importance. A close relationship with the king was a concrete resource, transferring into money and influence for a noble’s followers. Hence, loyalty to the king was an integral part of noble rhetoric. The theme of Crussol’s relationship to the

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monarchy was the dominant element in the identity he presented, in writing and conduct. Through this theme, the thesis also considers the practice of royal power and workings of the state, in its interaction with the nobility.

While different aspects influenced his affinity to the monarchy, Crussol’s religious convictions play a major role in this study. While his thought processes and beliefs cannot be fully uncovered, analysing how he publicly presented his faith and overall identity is an important part of this thesis. Furthermore, the wars themselves act as a backdrop to this theme and demonstrate how nobles were influenced in their actions by aspects of ideology and belief. The First War of Religion (1562-1563) is, therefore, a vital stage for studying Crussol’s motivations.

I examine the theme of Crussol’s relationship with the crown through his life in three distinct parts. The first section, entitled ‘Rise in influence’, details his growing importance to the monarchy, as shown through his numerous royal commissions. The second section, ‘Revolt’, considers his taking up of arms against the royal armies in the first civil war and explores his role in the Protestant war machine. The third and final section, ‘Return to favour’, evaluates his rehabilitation and return to royal favour, exemplified most clearly through his receiving of a dukedom in 1565.\(^3\) Tracing the development of this relationship through the years 1559-1573, the thesis is chronological and event-based. 1559 marked the end of the French wars against Spain, while 1573 was the final year of Crussol’s life. The period 1562-1563 is of particular focus, as it was a crucial point in his career. After introducing Crussol and outlining the thesis research questions and hypothesis, the chapter then considers four aspects of this study, along with a discussion of the relevant

\(^3\) This structure is similar to that of Irian Goossens, using the first religious war as a natural division, albeit with a different chronology. Goossens has completed a Master’s dissertation on Crussol (Irian Goossens, ‘Entre service du roi et ambition personnelle, entre protestantisme et catholicisme: Antoine de Crussol, premier duc d’Uzès (vers 1552-1573): mémoire de master I sous la dir. de M. le professeur Serge Brunet’ (Université Montpellier III, 2008), 11).
historiography. These aspects are religious convictions, noble alliances and territories, orality, and honour. After highlighting the relevance of my research generally, a summary of the main thesis sources concludes this introduction.

Context

Antoine de Crussol was a noble of Languedoc. Born on 21 June 1528, he was the son of Charles de Crussol, the seigneur de Crussol, vicomte d’Uzès, seigneur and baron de Lévis, Florensac and Aimargues, sénéchal de Beaucaire and Nîmes, grand panetier de France and lieutenant-général of Languedoc. Antoine’s mother was Jeanne de Genouillac, the dame d’Assier. Jeanne had strong Reformed sympathies and showed her concern for the church in a letter to John Calvin and Theodore Beza in September 1563, having heard unfavourable reports about the pastor on her land of Assier.

While Jean Bonnet asserts that Charles was one of the first people to enact the strict ordonnances of François I against heresy in Languedoc, Alain Molinier notes that he was attached to the idea of reform without being a Protestant. Charles’s will of 1546 is very different from the firmly Catholic wills of his own parents, with no mention of masses or the saints (although Mary and the celestial court remained), and without ceremonial pomp. While Antoine’s will in 1556 describes him as a ‘good and true Catholic’, he too wished to

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5 ‘Letter of Madame de Crussol à Calvin et Bèze, 12 September 1563’, in Correspondance Bèze, iv, 199–200. This letter is also found in Calvini opera, xx, 154–55. Her commitment to Protestantism, along with that of her second husband, the comte de Rhingrave, was evident before the first war, in the region of Quercy particularly, as shown in Guillaume Lacoste, Histoire générale de la province de Quercy, 4 vols (Cahors, 1883-1886), iv, 140, 142. Arlette Jouanna also mentions Jeanne’s commitment to Protestantism (Arlette Jouanna, ‘Crussol, famille de’, in Histoire et dictionnaire des guerres de religion, ed. by Dominique Biloghi et al. (Paris, 1998), 834).
have an austere ‘funeral ceremony’ with ‘the least amount of pomp as possible’. This will mentions generically the saints of the celestial court, while an earlier will had outlined the saints at length, including Mary, the archangel Michael, and Saint Antoine. These attributes uncover the religious fluidity of the period (outlined in more detail further on), which makes definitive analysis on religious convictions difficult. The will also shows Crussol’s interest in Catholic reform and could hint at future Reformed sympathies.

Antoine had five younger brothers: Jean, Jacques, Charles, Louis, and Galiot. His brothers were heavily involved in the Protestant movement. Jean, the sieur de Lévis, died at the royal siege of Le Havre in summer 1563. Although there is debate over whether Jean or Jacques was the sieur de Beaudiné (one of the lands belonging to the Crussol family) during the first civil war, it is most likely Jacques. Charles too died fighting for the

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8 AN, 265 AP 57, Dossier 1, No. 118, ‘Testament of Antoine de Crussol, 20 December 1556’; Ibid, 251. Two of these citations are also found (although incomplete) in Molinier, ‘Aux origines de la Réformation cévenole’, 251. ‘bon et vray catolique [sic], ‘obseques et funerailles’, ‘le moing de pomp[e] que faire le pourra’.

9 This earlier will is AN, MC/ET/XIX/175, fol. 1r, ‘Testament of Antoine de Crussol, 24 April 1548’. This document also described Antoine as a good Catholic but did not have this same wish concerning the funeral ceremony.

10 ADG, 1 E 3599 (H Dépôt 4 584), fol. 1r, ‘Veu par le conseil soubzsigné les testaments de messire Loys de Crussol, de messire Jacques de Crussol son filz Et de messire Charles de Crussol filz dudit messire Jacques’; AN, 265 AP 540, ‘Genealogia vice comitatis Uticensis » – Copie des actes de naissance des Crussol, 1470-1581’.


12 Hugues Daussy asserts that Beaudiné in the first conflict is Jean de Crussol, as opposed to Jacques (Hugues Daussy, Le parti huguenot: Chronique d’une désillusion (1557 - 1572), 2nd edition (Geneva, 2015), 614, 860), while Albin Mazon also labels Jean as Beaudiné (Dr Francus [alias Albin Mazo], Voyage autour de Crussol (Privas, 1888), 180). However, Jean was mentioned as the sieur de Lévis in the 1550s and had been accorded this title in the testament of his father (AN, 265 AP 57, Dossier 1, No. 114/1, ‘Testament of Charles de Crussol, 1535’). He is also mentioned alongside Coligny in northern France in 1563, as shall be seen in a further chapter. Jacques de Crussol is shown to be the sieur de Beaudiné and the baron de Crussol in June 1563, in a payment to him in this month, before the royal siege of Le Havre properly began (ADH, 1 B22803,’Muster rolls of the baron de crussol and captain gremyan, 20 June 1563’). Jacques also rendered hommage (hommage) for the seigneurie of Lévis in December 1563, which fits with the death of Jean in the summer, as shown by ‘Foy et hommage de la seigneurie de Lévis par Jacques de Crussol, 6 December 1563’
Protestants in 1563, while Louis died at Metz on an unknown date. Galiot was assassinated during the Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacres. Antoine also had two sisters, Marguerite and Marie.

Antoine entered the king’s household in 1555, becoming gentilhomme de la chambre du roi. His prestige increased significantly in April 1556, when he married Louise de Clermont, a close confidant of Catherine de Médicis (the queen and then the queen-mother), becoming the comte de Tonnerre through Louise. Louise was a dame de la reine mère and governess of the royal children. This was a profitable marriage for Antoine, as Louise brought more than 30,000 livres of rentes. Given the age difference between Louise and Antoine (Louise being fifty years of age at their marriage), their marriage was viewed in terms of its prospects for influence at court, as opposed to the possibility of heirs. Married in the
presence of the most powerful figures in France, Antoine’s lands in Crussol were raised to a comté, making him the comte de Crussol.¹⁹ His rise in power was evidently linked to Louise’s friendship with the queen, although he too was a favourite of Catherine. He was appointed her chevalier d’honneur (one of the closest members of her entourage) in 1559, as well as becoming chief of her council in the same year.²⁰ In addition, Crussol became a member both of the king’s conseil privé, and the king’s noble order of Saint-Michel, in 1560. During the wars against Spain in the late 1550s, he was also active on the monarchy’s behalf in northern France.

The period in which Crussol established himself as a loyal servant to the crown was a difficult one for the French monarchy, but one which offered significant opportunity for nobles who wished to expand their influence, either through a Protestant adherence or through fidelity to the king. He was given successive missions for the crown, most notably in December 1561, to pacify the troubled provinces of Languedoc, Provence, and Dauphiné. During the first civil war in 1562, Crussol became leader of the Languedoc and Dauphiné Protestants, who set up an extensive structure to fight against the royal armies. Following a lengthy disarmament process, he returned to court and was given the title of duc d’Uzès in early 1565. In 1567, Jeanne de Genouillac died, making Antoine the head of the family.²¹ In 1572, he was made a pair or peer of France, becoming one of the most powerful nobles in the realm. Crussol never again took part in the wars, except for joining the royal siege of La Rochelle in 1573. It was on the return from La Rochelle that he died, in August of this year.

¹⁹ AN, 265 AP 176, Dossier 2, No. 9, p. 14, ‘Contract of Marriage between Antoine de Crussol and Louise de Clermont, 10 April 1556’. The document raising his lands to a comté is found in AN, 265 AP 176, Dossier 1, No. 1/1, ‘Erection de la baronnie de Crussol en comté [sic], 1556’; ADHG, B 1905, fols 102r-103r, ‘Edit portant érection de la baronnie de Crussol en comté, 1556’.

²⁰ Le Roux, La faveur du roi, 57–58.

The difficulties in France had started in 1559, when the kingdom was recovering from the end of the Italian Wars against the Spanish Habsburgs. Having commenced as a proxy war in Italy between Charles V and the French king Henri II, it quickly became an all-out conflict, with theatres opening in Alsace, Lorraine, and Picardy. France was engaged in this conflict for most of the 1550s, which finished with the treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis in 1559. While this peace was denounced as shameful for France, Henri could now focus on the growing Protestant threat. Despite harsh decrees against Protestantism in 1551, 1557, and 1559, the Reformed church continued to grow, aided by the arrival of Genevan missionaries from 1555. The nobility was particularly drawn to this confession, as shown by its presence at Reformed assemblies in 1557 and 1558 at Paris. However, the death of Henri in 1559 severely weakened royal authority in tackling this threat, given the young age of the new king, François II. The influence of Charles de Guise, the cardinal de Lorraine, and François de Lorraine, the duc de Guise, on the king had an important impact on the court politics and religious troubles of the early 1560s.

Crussol was actively involved in the Spanish wars. He fought under Guise in 1552 and 1558, being given the governorship of Montreuil and Abbeville, and a role in Metz, in 1558. He was on familiar terms with Guise, and was later sent by the crown towards him, to

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25 Louise may have been present at the Protestant assembly in 1557 in Paris which was broken up (Molinier, ‘Aux origines de la Réformation cévenole’, 251n; Marguerite Christol, ‘Louise de Clermont, comtesse de Tonnerre, femme d’Antoine de Crussol, duc d’Uzès’, BSHPF, 106 (1960), 18), although it is surprising that Nancy Roelker does not mention Louise’s presence when discussing both this event and Louise in her chapter ‘Les femmes de la noblesse huguenote au XVle siècle’, in Actes du colloque: L’Amiral de Coligny et son temps (Paris, 24-28 octobre 1972) (Paris, 1974), 227–50.
26 Amat, ‘Crussol, Antoine de’, ix, 1328; Émile Haag and Eugène Haag, La France protestante, 10 vols (Paris and Geneva, 1846-59), iv, 128; Louis-François Daire, Histoire de la ville d’Amiens depuis son origine jusqu’à présent, 2 vols (Paris, 1757), i, 169. In a list of the gendarmerie in 1559, Crussol is listed as being in the provinces of Brie, Lorraine and Champagne, presumably due to the war against Spain (BNF, fr. 20507, fol. 112r, "Departement des compagnyes de la gendarmerye Ensemble des comiss[air]es ordinaries dela guerre ordonnez po[u]r f[air]e la monstre de Juillet aoust Et septembre 1559").
investigate a plot against Henri de Valois. Crussol was also assigned by Henri II to negotiate the handover of prisoners between Spain and France in 1558. Praising ‘the great affection that you carry for the good of our service and our affairs’, Henri ordered that Crussol meet with the deputy of the Spanish king for this purpose.\(^\text{27}\) Henri gave him ‘full power, authority, commission and special command’ for this role, and it is evident that the monarchy already had considerable trust in him.\(^\text{28}\)

**Thesis questions and hypothesis**

This thesis asks several questions: how did Crussol’s relationship with the monarchy develop through this period? How did he view his own identity or role? What did Protestant adherence and engagement in the Protestant party mean in practice for him? How did joining the Protestant movement influence his traditional roles as a noble? How did Crussol’s loyalty to the king fit with his religious convictions? How did he return to royal favour following his taking up of arms against the royal armies? What effect did Crussol’s Protestant adherence have after he returned to Catholicism? The hypothesis is that Crussol’s identity was dominated by his fidelity to the monarchy, and he felt a strong sense of loyalty to the queen-mother in particular. While he had strong Protestant sympathies, in part due to the influence of the Reformed confession on his territories, he presented his actions in terms of loyalty to the crown.

**Religious convictions**

Crussol’s religious convictions form a critical aspect of this thesis. Although he did not make a public profession of faith before joining the Protestants in 1562, he had notable Protestant sympathies. After the first civil war he acted like a Catholic noble, and it is this demonstration of Catholicism which provides an interesting discussion about the effect of his religious

\(^{27}\) AN, 265 AP 54, Dossier 18, No. 1, ‘Letter of Henri II to Antoine de Crussol, 30 August 1558’.
\(^{28}\) Ibid, ‘plain povoir [sic] auctorité Commission et mandement especial’. 
convictions on his relationship with the crown. Like several other nobles, he was conflicted about serving the monarchy and being a Protestant, as shown by a letter to Calvin in July 1563. Crussol is a figure on whom historians have had considerable differences of opinion, seeing him both as a Protestant and a Catholic. He is also viewed universally as a loyal servant of the crown.

Despite Crussol’s important role in the religious wars in the Midi, the south of France, he has not been subject to a major historical study. The high point of scholarship on Crussol is his involvement during this first war, where he features heavily in sixteenth-century histories and mémoires, and in antiquarian studies. His actions after this conflict are far less known, and my work outlines in depth his activity during these years.

A central part of this thesis considers how religion and politics, or religion and loyalty to the crown, should be treated in the religious wars. It is difficult to avoid splitting Crussol’s decision-making as being between religious or political reasons, even while acknowledging the other aspects that formed his identity. Historiography has not always been able to incorporate both these aspects. The traditional interpretation, which viewed religion as a

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29 Hugues Daussy argues that he was in fact Protestant (Daussy, Le parti huguenot, 69–70), as do Arlette Jouanna and Pierre-Jean Souriac (Jouanna, ‘Crussol, famille de’, 834, Pierre-Jean Souriac, Une guerre civile: affrontements religieux et militaires dans le Midi Toulousain, 1562-1596 (Seyssel, 2008), 71). While Irian Goossens concludes that religion was not a priority for Antoine (Irian Goossens, ‘Entre service du roi et ambition personnelle, entre protestantisme et catholicisme, 116), La France protestante argues that he was a Catholic at heart (Haag and Haag, La France protestante, IV, 130). Serge Brunet also disputes that Antoine was a Protestant (Serge Brunet, ‘Penser le consistoire au début des troubles religieux (vers 1560–62)’, in Dire l’Interdit: The Vocabulary of Censure and Exclusion in the Early Modern Reformed Tradition, ed. by Raymond A. Mentzer, Françoise Moreil, and Philippe Chareyre (Leiden; Boston, 2010), 107).


31 However, there are two recent Master’s dissertations by Goossens, one of which has already been mentioned (‘Entre service du roi et ambition personnelle, entre protestantisme et catholicisme’; ‘Du cadet protestant au duc et pair catholique: Jacques de Crussol, deuxième duc d’Uzès (1562-1584): mémoire de master II sous la dir. de M. le professeur Serge Brunet’ (Université Montpellier III, 2009).

cloak for noble factionalism and emphasised the political causes of the wars, was replaced by the view that religion was central to the conflict. The present historiography attempts to incorporate both perspectives. Barbara Diefendorf advises placing ‘the sacred and the secular within a spectrum that extends from more spiritual to more worldly matters but encompasses both’. This method avoids artificial distinctions between religion and politics, and allows for a multi-causal analysis of these wars. Most historians now reject the religion/politics binary, and give increased importance to the place of religion. The location for the origin of the wars has also shifted, from the court and aristocratic strife to the provinces and local tensions.

It is thus important to situate religious convictions within a wider framework of noble motives, while giving religious faith its proper place in noble conduct. In Nancy Roelker’s study of Protestant noblewomen, the faith of the noblewomen is never considered. While Junko Shimizu, in her work on Gaspard de Coligny, rightly indicates that ‘politics and religion were so inseparably interwoven that it was almost impossible to tell genuine religious conviction from political convenience’, she argues that Coligny fought for political issues and ambitions. Given the shift in historiography, emphasising religion’s position at the centre


34 Barbara Diefendorf, ‘Were the Wars of Religion about Religion?’, *Political Theology*, 15/6 (2014), 556.  
36 Ibid, 556.  
of the wars, the current question is how exactly it influenced the behaviour and actions of individuals.\textsuperscript{39} However, assessing the effect of religious zeal on conduct is problematic.

Various historians have rightly highlighted the difficulty in judging the sincerity of the noble spiritual experience.\textsuperscript{40} While arguing that sincere religious adherence has been underestimated by historians, who see other motivations as more important, Hugues Daussy rightly points out that one does not necessarily exclude the other, interest can align itself with faith.\textsuperscript{41} Religious convictions were clearly meaningful to the nobility. In his study of the Protestant Lacger family, Raymond Mentzer persuasively argues that the family’s long-term survival was due to both their confessional identity and strong kinship bonds, and indicates the family’s deep religious convictions.\textsuperscript{42} Brian Sandberg asserts that one major aspect of noble honour was sanctity, shown through devotion to God.\textsuperscript{43} Both Sandberg and Denis Crouzet underscore the noble religiosity in warfare.\textsuperscript{44} Several historians have also illustrated how the conversion of a large number of nobles is explained by their troubled consciences when coming into contact with Protestantism.\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{41} Daussy, \textit{Le parti huguenot}, 775.
\textsuperscript{43} Brian Sandberg, \textit{Warrior Pursuits: Noble Culture and Civil Conflict in Early Modern France} (Baltimore, 2010), 151–52, 154.
\textsuperscript{45} Jean-Marie Constant, ‘La pénétration des idées de la réforme protestante dans la noblesse provinciale française à travers quelques exemples’, in \textit{Les réformes: enracinement socio-culturel}:
Placing religious convictions within a wider framework shows these interplaying with various other motives in explaining noble entry to the wars. Discussing the debate between the religious wars being about religion or simply a cloak for political motives, Gianmarco Braghi correctly writes that:

there is no real contradiction between the two explanations, as religion and politics were hardly separable concepts in the sixteenth century. Individuals belonging to either of the two sides of the confessional divide could participate (or choose not to participate) in the wars for shrewd political expediency, religious zeal, or for infinite shades and combinations, or lack, of any of the two.46

David Potter also remarks that loyalties to the Protestant cause were ‘inevitably a mixture of conviction, family and kindred influence, residual loyalty to the crown and calculations of the outcome’.47 These citations encapsulate many of the motives that affected noble participation in the wars, for which historians have provided many useful conclusions.48

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48 Having Protestant sympathies did not necessarily mean taking up an armed defence of Protestantism, as shown in Benedict, ‘The Lesser Nobility and the French Reformation (Preprint)’, 20; Constant, ‘The Protestant Nobility in France during the Wars of Religion’, 69–82; Carroll, “‘Nager entre deux eaux”: the Princes and the Ambiguities of French Protestantism’, Sixteenth Century Journal, 44/4 (2013), 1015.
To avoid falling into a religion-politics dichotomy, it is important to consider the religious fluidity of this period. Studying the figures situated in between the Reformed and Roman Catholic confessions, Thierry Wanegffelen rightly emphasises that the distinction between Catholics and Protestants was not always clear, even in 1560, as the ‘confessional frontier’ was being built. As remarked by Stuart Carroll, historiography has not consistently grasped the fluidity of religious belief, in placing nobles into Protestant or Catholic categories. Speaking of the Protestant princes who stayed loyal to the crown, he argues persuasively that these figures wanted to maintain a middle course between the two engagement cannot be disassociated from their social ambitions, even if they coincided, in Arlette Jouanna, *Le devoir de révolte: la noblesse française et la gestation de l’État moderne, 1559-1661* (Paris, 1989), 122. Keith Luria notes the intersection of religious bonds with elements such as kinship ties, family interests, and patron-client networks, in Keith P. Luria, ‘Rituals of Conversion: Catholics and Protestants in Seventeenth-Century Poitou’, in *Culture and Identity in Early Modern Europe (1500-1800): Essays in Honor of Natalie Zemon Davis*, ed. by Barbara B. Diefendorf and Carla Hesse (Ann Arbor, 1993), 68. Robert Harding importantly cautions against viewing clients who followed their captain when he changed sides in war as being a choice between religious conviction and personal loyalty or self-interest. According to Harding, ‘the choice between the livery and the mass simply did not present itself’, in Robert R. Harding, *Anatomy of a Power Elite: The Provincial Governors of Early Modern France* (New Haven: London, 1978), 73. Jean-Marie Constant convincingly argues that fidelity to great nobles was seen as more important than religious fidelity, also highlighted by Carroll (Jean-Marie Constant, *La vie quotidienne de la noblesse française aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles* (Paris, 1985), 215, 181; Carroll, ‘“Nager entre deux eaux”’, 993). The themes of power politics and religious convictions, as well as the role of community and social bonds in religion, can also be viewed in a different spheres, such as in Anders Winroth, *The Conversion of Scandinavia: Vikings, Merchants, and Missionaries in the Remaking of Northern Europe* (New Haven, 2012). Thierry Wanegffelen, *Ni Rome ni Genève: des fidèles entre deux chaires en France au XVIe siècle* (Paris: Geneva, 1997), xv. ‘frontière confessionnelle’. Related to this stream in historiography is the work of Mario Turchetti, who considers the attempts at concord and tolerance in early modern France, looking at the *moyenneurs* (Mario Turchetti, ‘Middle Parties in France during the Wars of Religion’, in *Reformation, Revolt and Civil War in France and the Netherlands 1555-1585*, 165–83; ‘Calvin face aux tenants de la concorde (moyenneurs) et aux partisans de la tolérance (castellionistes)’, in *Calvin et ses contemporains. Actes du colloque de Paris, 1995*, ed. by Olivier Millet (Geneva, 1998), 43–56; ‘Religious Concord and Political Tolerance in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century France’, *Sixteenth Century Journal*, 22/1 (1991), 15-25; ‘Concorde ou tolérance? Les Moyenneurs à la veille des guerres de religion en France’, *Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie*, 118/3 (1986), 255–67). Luria’s work also puts forward important conclusions on the coexistence of the two confessions during this period, in Keith P. Luria, *Sacred Boundaries: Religious Coexistence and Conflict in Early-Modern France*, 1st ed (Washington, D.C, 2005).
concessions. The historiography has certainly not comprehended the complexity of the nobles’ religious convictions at times.

This is further reinforced by the work of Nicolas Breton. Given that the Protestant - Catholic boundaries were not fully defined in France in the early 1560s, Breton considers that it was the Council of Trent which drew Catholic confessional lines. As Carroll makes clear, Catholicism was a spectrum of beliefs before Trent, with Catholics being united through reverence of the Mass. Breton highlights well the religious fluidity and ambiguity of the late 1550s and early 1560s, as shown by his example of Odet de Châtillon’s speech in August 1560, which was interpreted by some as fervent evangelism, wishing for Catholic reform, and by others as evidence of Protestantism. There are certain parallels with Crussol, as Breton argues that although perceived as a Protestant, Châtillon was a Catholic and a moderate, and a loyal promoter of royal policy.

My work on Crussol, therefore, fits directly into the current historical literature, in which the nobility has attracted significant interest. I follow similar themes to those explored by Ariane Boltanski and Stéphane Gal. In her monograph on Louis de Gonzague, the duc de Nevers, Boltanski affirms his strong religious convictions, and criticises historiography for

51 Stuart Carroll, Noble Power during the French Wars of Religion: The Guise Affinity and the Catholic Cause in Normandy (Cambridge, 1998), 252; Carroll, “Nager entre deux eaux”, 1008. Carroll also importantly makes clear elsewhere, in both his studies on the Guise family, that the Guise’s relationship with several Protestant nobles in the 1560s was not constrained by religious ideology, and that family solidarity often took precedence over religion (Carroll, Noble Power during the French Wars of Religion, 137, 143; Martyrs and Murderers: The Guise Family and the Making of Europe (Oxford, 2009), 45).
56 Ariane Boltanski, Les ducs de Nevers et l’État royal: genèse d’un compromis (ca 1550 - ca 1600) (Geneva, 2006); Gal, Lesdiguières. Other notable examples of this focus on the nobility include Carroll, Martyrs and Murderers; Dewald, Status, Power, and Identity in Early Modern France.
neglecting to really consider the role of religious convictions in the actions of the great nobles.\textsuperscript{57} She claims that the high nobility is viewed as acting according to political concerns, as opposed to religious convictions.\textsuperscript{58} For Nevers, Boltanski explores his faith primarily through his clear goal of re-establishing the union of the religious, political and social body under a Catholic king, outlining his crisis of conscience when faced with a Protestant monarch.\textsuperscript{59}

In a study of François de Bonne de Lesdiguières, Stéphane Gal bases his conclusions on Lesdiguières’s faith as opposed to political motives. Analysing Lesdiguières’s famous conversion to Catholicism, which has been seen as a political move, Gal argues convincingly that this was instead the culmination of a spiritual journey.\textsuperscript{60} However, Gal sees this abjuration primarily as a support for the young king Louis XIII, in the face of significant agitation in France.\textsuperscript{61} This example reinforces the difficulty in fully understanding the nobility’s motives. As well as fitting alongside the work of Boltanski and Gal, my work engages with Jouanna’s \textit{Le devoir de révolte} and Sandberg’s \textit{Warrior Pursuits}, in considering noble fidelity to the king and activity in war.\textsuperscript{62} My thesis further complements recent studies of the lesser nobility, as Crussol is a good example of a noble who played both a prominent national and regional role for the monarchy.\textsuperscript{63}

A variety of different historiographical approaches have been adopted to study noble faith. It is essential to balance religious convictions with other aspects and motives in

\textsuperscript{57} Boltanski, \textit{Les ducs de Nevers et l’État royal}, 332–33.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid, 332–34.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid, 469, 472, 125, 345, 347, 391, 415.
\textsuperscript{60} Gal, \textit{Lesdiguières}, 306.
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid, 340–41.
\textsuperscript{62} Jouanna, \textit{Le devoir de révolte}; Sandberg, \textit{Warrior Pursuits}.
\textsuperscript{63} More literature is needed on the lesser nobility, the \textit{noblesse seconde}, which was highlighted by Philip Benedict in a recent article (Benedict, ‘The Lesser Nobility and the French Reformation (Preprint)’, 1–29). Laurent Bourquin has analysed the lesser nobility in Champagne. He points out the importance of the lesser nobles to the great nobles during war, as the former had an in-depth knowledge of the province (Laurent Bourquin, \textit{Noblesse seconde et pouvoir en Champagne aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles} (Paris, 1994), 36, 68).
noble life, which is difficult to do. Following in a similar vein to Boltanski and Gal, the interplay between Crussol’s religious convictions and loyalty to the crown is a major theme in my thesis. Taking account of noble religious fervour, while engaging in a more fluid understanding of religious belief, is important. Considering the pressures on Crussol and taking account of how much leeway he had to join or not join the Protestants, additionally helps to prevent viewing his decisions as being for religious or political reasons. Assessing the margin for manoeuvre that he had in terms of his religious convictions or Protestant adherence will therefore be explored throughout this thesis.

Crussol’s alliances and territories

Religious choice was navigated through the regional context, political constellations, alliances, and family loyalties. Noble relationships, or networks, are an essential aspect in discussing noble identity overall, as they dictated important facets of noble life. The significance of these networks is highlighted by Carroll, who argues that ‘the contours of political and religious conflict cannot be followed without a clear understanding of the dynamics, morphology and atrophy of power networks’. It is the relationship between the great nobles (the patrons) and lesser nobles (the clients) which has generated the most debate. Studying these noble affinities in war is an important part of the historiography, be

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64 Stuart Carroll, Noble Power during the French Wars of Religion, 7.
it which side to choose, or the mobilisation of friends or clients during the conflict, or how these ties were absorbed into the Catholic and Protestant parties. All patronage possibilities and favours extended outwards from the monarchy, as the great nobles redistributed royal favour to their clients, as mentioned earlier. The noble relationship with the crown was evidently the primary noble affinity, and the king governed his territory through trusted figures. The queen-mother in particular used Crussol to pacify troublesome regions and inform her about the southern provinces. Other noble social relationships included friendship and kinship. Given the use of affective language in the variety of noble

**European History Quarterly, 16/3 (1986), 299; Kettering, ‘Patronage in Early Modern France’, 852; and Boltanski, *Les ducs de Nevers et l’État royal*, 492. There has also been a discussion about the terminology of these relationships. Greengrass argues for the use of the term ‘affinity’ instead of ‘clientage’, as it recognises the ‘many degrees of devotion and duty’ present in a noble’s following, and does not neglect the emotional element in this relationship (Greengrass, ‘Noble affinities in early modern France, 299). The term ‘affinity’ is also put forward by Stuart Carroll, for its fluidity (Carroll, ‘Review: Sharon Kettering, Patronage in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century France’, *H-France Review*, 3/17 (2003), 66). However, as Jonathan Dewald correctly highlights, the terminology used by historians for these relationships ‘fail to convey the complexity of these situations, or the range of emotions they generated’ (Dewald, *Status, Power, and Identity in Early Modern France*, 164).


Boltanski, *Les ducs de Nevers et l’État royal*, 173. Ariane Boltanski views the clientele network of Louis de Gonzague as a triangle between the monarchy, his own clients, and himself, and this work particularly illustrates the role of the monarchy in the patronage system. Finley-Croswhite, *Henry IV and the Towns*, 5, 86. This excellent study of the relationship between Henri IV and urban France uncovers the role played by Henri’s clients in pacifying towns, and highlights Henri’s governance through trusted clients.
interactions, it can be difficult to tell these apart, and the words *ami* and *amitié* were multi-purpose.69

Crussol had several noble networks around him. Through his wife, Louise, he became allied with the Clermonts. Louise was the daughter of the *vicomte* de Tallard. One of her brothers was the Catholic bishop of Gap in Dauphiné, while another was the *comte* de Clermont, and the *lieutenant-général* of Dauphiné until 1560.70 These family links gave Crussol influential connections in the region. The marriages of his siblings also uncover the family’s alliances. Marie de Crussol married François de Cardaillac, the *seigneur* de Peyre, in 1564.71 François’s father, Antoine-Hector de Cardaillac, the *baron* de Peyre, was Crussol’s lieutenant in the Gévaudan during the first civil war, and this family was noted for their commitment to Protestantism.72 Similar to Crussol, the *baron* de Peyre joined the Protestants after his lands were pillaged.73 Jacques married Françoise de Clermont, niece of Louise, further cementing the alliance with the Clermonts, while Galiot married Françoise d’Ouarty.74

Godparents were an important part of noble life. Antoine’s godfather was Antoine de Tende, the *comte* and bishop of Beauvais, near to Paris, while his godmother was

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73 *Histoire ecclésiastique*, iii, 233.
Jacqueline du Mas, the comtesse de Ventadour.\textsuperscript{75} She was married to Gilbert de Lévis, the comte de Ventadour and baron de la Voute, and her daughter had married André de Crussol, the seigneur de Beaudiné, and uncle to Antoine.\textsuperscript{76} Ventadour and Crussol were both barons of Vivarais, who cyclically led the états particuliers of Vivarais and acted as one of its representatives at the Languedoc provincial estates, as a baron de tour.\textsuperscript{77} The choice of Crussol’s godmother particularly emphasises his provincial links. Family relatives and important provincial administrative figures were also chosen as godparents for Antoine’s siblings.\textsuperscript{78}

As well as these close family links, there were additionally wider noble networks around Crussol, as revealed through his muster rolls. Crussol was in charge of a military company of 30 lances.\textsuperscript{79} Through studying these men under his command, we can learn much about his noble affinities.\textsuperscript{80} Gendarmerie companies had five specific leadership positions. In

\textsuperscript{75} AN, 265 AP 540, fol. 7r, ‘«Genealogia vice comitatis Uticensis » – Copie des actes de naissance des Crussol, 1470-1581’; Jean-Pierre Papon, Histoire générale de Provence, 4 vols (Paris, 1776-1786), i, 240–41.

\textsuperscript{76} Louis Moreri, Le grand dictionnaire historique, 5 vols (Paris, 1718), iii, 110 (Levis).

\textsuperscript{77} Albert Du Boys, Album du Vivarais, ou itinéraire historique et descriptif de cette ancienne province (Grenoble, 1842), 21. The Vivarais états were comprised of twelve barons and other provincial figures (Du Boys, Album du Vivarais, 17–18). For information on the barons of the Languedoc estates, see Arlette Jouanna, ‘Le pouvoir royal et les barons des États de Languedoc’, Parliaments, Estates and Representation, 4/1 (1984), 37–43.

\textsuperscript{78} AN, 265 AP 540, fols 7v-8r, 9r, ‘«Genealogia vice comitatis Uticensis » – Copie des actes de naissance des Crussol, 1470-1581’.

\textsuperscript{79} The term ‘lance’ was used as a unit of account in the gendarmerie companies, representing ‘an abstract unit of two and one half horsemen’, one of these being a homme d’armes (man at arms) (James B. Wood, The King’s Army: Warfare, Soldiers, and Society during the Wars of Religion in France, 1562-1576 (Cambridge, 1996), 134). Wood outlines that ‘a company of 30 lances would have a total strength of 75 men – 30 hommes d’armes and 45 of the more lightly armoured archers’, which Souriac also puts forward (Wood, The King’s Army, 134; Souriac, Une guerre civile, 200). In 1562, Antoine de Crussol is mentioned as having a company of 30 lances, 30 men at arms, and 45 archers (A. Communay, ‘Les Gascons dans les armées françaises’, Revue de l’Agenais et des anciennes provinces du Sud-Ouest, 21 (1894), 386). While Crussol was originally given a company of fifty lances in 1559, from this year on it was reduced to a company of thirty lances (BNF, Nouvelles acquisitions fr. 9718, No. 154, ‘Gift of a company of fifty lances to Antoine de Crussol, 15 October 1559’; AN, 265 AP 40, fol. 467v, ‘Inventaire générale et sommaire des titres du duché d’Uzès, 1720’; Albiousse, Histoire des ducs d’Uzès, 60–61).

\textsuperscript{80} I have located eight of Crussol’s muster rolls. The information provided by Fleury Vindry’s major study is not always accurate for Crussol (Fleury Vindry, Dictionnaire de l’état-major français au XVle siècle (Paris, 1901), 180–82). Robert Harding has also noted that in Crussol’s military company, eleven percent of the troops had the same surname as another member, indicating the family networks within this group (Harding, Anatomy of a Power Elite, 24).
charge was the captain, with the lieutenant as the second in command. There was an enseigne, who carried the étendard or standard of the company; a guidon, who acted as a guide; and a maréchal des logis (quartermaster). Between 1560 and 1564, this core leadership of Crussol’s troop remained the same, only changing in 1565.\textsuperscript{81}

François de Cazillac, the sieur de Cessac in Quercy, was Crussol’s lieutenant for several years, and his first cousin.\textsuperscript{82} Cazillac’s ancestors had similarly served Crussol’s family, as his father fought under Crussol’s grandfather Jacques de Genouillac, grand maître de l’artillerie and grand écuyer de France. Antoine’s brother Galiot is listed as guidon in a muster roll of 1565, while a Jean de Voisins was the enseigne.\textsuperscript{83} Voisins was the son of the baron d’Ambres in the diocese of Castres, and was another of Antoine’s first cousins.\textsuperscript{84} Members of the Voisins family fought for both the Protestant and Catholic sides during the wars.\textsuperscript{85} Crussol’s muster rolls therefore illustrate both the web of noble networks around him, and his provincial grounding. In addition to these networks, he was also related to the Catholic Ancézune family, as his aunt, Marie de Crussol, had married Jean d’Ancézune, the seigneur de Codolet, situated between Avignon and Uzès.\textsuperscript{86}


\textsuperscript{82} Sainte-Marie and Du Fourny, Histoire généalogique et chronologique, ix, 82. François was the son of Antoine de Béral and Anne de Crussol. Anne was the sister of Charles de Crussol.

\textsuperscript{83} BNF, fr. 25801, fol. 131r, ‘Muster roll of Antoine de Crussol, 8 October 1565’.

\textsuperscript{84} Vindry, Dictionnaire de l’état-major français au XVIe siècle, 181. He was the son of Maffre de Voisins, and Jeanne de Crussol, the sister of Charles de Crussol.


\textsuperscript{86} AN, 265 AP 540, fol. 7v, ‘Genealogia vice comitatis Uticensis » — Copie des actes de naissance des Crussol, 1470-1581’; ADV, 2 E 9 /50, ‘Donation of Guillaume d’Ancézune for the marriage of his son Jean, 1515’. Another member of this family, Louis d’Ancézune, the seigneur de Caderousse, was part
The Crussols had a considerable number of territories, which increased through Antoine’s purchase of alienated church land in 1570 and 1571. It was the marriage of Antoine’s grandparents Jacques de Crussol, the baron de Crussol, and Simone d’Uzès, the vicomtesse d’Uzès, in 1486 which had united the two territories of Uzès and Crussol.87 The baronies of Lévis and Florensac were another part of the Crussol territories, along with the lands of Assier and Beaudiné.88 The 1565 act which raised Uzès to a duché recorded one hundred and fifty seigneuries and territories belonging to Crussol, while the current yearly revenue in 1565 was calculated as being 10,000 livres tournois.89 Crussol had judicial privileges on his land too.90 Most of his territories were in the Midi, in Lower Languedoc and the Vivarais.

The Midi was particularly susceptible to the rise of the Reformed confession, and numerous Crussol family territories had Protestant congregations. Uzès itself was at the centre of local networks of churches.91 Crussol also had influence in the neighbouring
province of Guyenne, becoming sénéchal of Quercy in 1545, taking over from his grandfather Jacques de Genouillac. In addition, Antoine held the comté de Tonnerre in Champagne, with a celebrated château at Maulnes.

Concerning the administration of the French provinces, these were directed on the king's behalf by the gouverneurs and the lieutenants-généraux. Collection of taxes and the administration of regional finances were generally organised through the généralités, which split into diocèses civils. Each diocèse civil had assemblies called assiettes, which discussed the repartition of royal taxes and the administration of the province. As Mark Greengrass has indicated, some of these assiettes and other tax-collecting mechanisms morphed into the Protestant political assemblies. Concerning the judicial system in the Midi, it was


Comtat Venaissin et de la Principauté d’Orange, i. However, for Provence, Marc Venard’s more recent work on Comtat-Venaisin is nonetheless useful (Marc Venard, *Réforme protestante, réforme catholique dans la province d’Avignon au XVIe siècle* (Paris, 1993)). The most significant overall study is Janine Garrisson’s *Protestants du Midi*, which provides a good general background (Janine Garrisson, *Protestants du Midi*, 1559-1598 (Toulouse, 1980)). Souriac’s *Une guerre civile* is also useful, though it only focuses on the Midi-Toulousain and Protestantism does not overly feature. General studies of the Protestant movement are beneficial too, given that the south of France became increasingly important during the wars (Daussy, *Le parti huguenot*; Robert M. Kingdon, *Geneva and the Consolidation of the French Protestant Movement 1564-1572: A Contribution to the History of Congregationalism, Presbyterianism, and Calvinist Resistance Theory* (Geneva, 1967)).

92 AN, 265 AP 54, Dossier 15, No. 18, Appointment of Antoine de Crussol as sénéchal of Quercy by King François I, 23 November 1544; Dossier 15, No. 21, ‘Confirmation of Antoine de Crussol as sénéchal de Quercy by King Henri II, 5 October 1547’; Dossier 15, No. 20, ‘Certification of Antoine de Crussol’s role as sénéchal of Quercy by the trésoriers de France, 9 March 1544/1545’; Alphonse de Ruble, ed., *Commentaires et lettres de Blaise de Monluc, maréchal de France*, 5 vols (Paris, 1864-1872), II, 329n. He held this position until 1559. Jacques and Antoine originally shared this role.


dominated by the *parlement* at Toulouse, although there were other *parlements* at Bordeaux and Aix-en-Provence.\textsuperscript{96}

An analysis of Crussol’s noble alliances and territories is integral to understanding his interaction with the Midi. This section outlined his noble networks in different regions, such as in the Vivarais through his godmother and role as *baron de tour*, or in Champagne and Dauphiné through his marriage with Louise. Crussol’s military companies similarly highlight the family alliances. Unfortunately, it is not always straightforward to see him engaging with his noble networks and alliances in the time parameters of this thesis. His involvement with the crown is the most evident of these networks, which defined his other interactions. As well as his family alliances, Crussol also had close friendships with Bertrand-Raimbaud de Simiane, the *baron de Gordes*, and Jean Ébrard, the *seigneur* de Saint-Sulpice.

Orality

Orality is another important element in this study, discussing identity through noble discourse. Noble correspondence is an oral source. Nobles dictated letters to scribes and sent these with a *porteur* (the person tasked with carrying the letter), which were then read out to the recipient. The *porteur* was often given an accompanying verbal message.\textsuperscript{97} As these verbal messages do not generally survive, we are missing a key part of the letter writing process, which included the sender, the scribe, the *porteur*, and the recipient.\textsuperscript{98} Written

\textsuperscript{96} Toulouse was the second sovereign court after Paris and had a considerable jurisdiction, stretching from Guyenne to the river Rhône, as shown in Souriac, *Une guerre civile*, 22.

\textsuperscript{97} Mark Greengrass, Thierry Rentet and Stéphane Gal, ‘The Hinterland of the Newsletter: Handling Information in Space and Time’, in *News Networks in Early Modern Europe*, ed. by Joad Raymond and Noah Moxham (Leiden; Boston, 2016), 626. This message would provide extra information, as there were limits to what it would be wise to put down in writing.

\textsuperscript{98} Peter Burke, ‘Oral and Manuscript Cultures in Early Modern Italy’, in *Interactions between Orality and Writing in Early Modern Italian Culture*, ed. by Luca Degl’Innocenti, Brian Richardson, and Chiara Sbordoni (Abingdon and New York, 2016), 25.
messages therefore existed within a context of oral messages.\footnote{Neuschel, *Word of Honor*, 114. Neuschel highlights that some letters were supposed to be just introductions for the bearers, who would give the actual message. She also remarks that noble correspondence itself reads like one long oral utterance, with frequent repetition of phrases (Ibid, 106).} Letters often had a public nature, and ‘functioned rather like email, readily forwarded and semi-public’.\footnote{Lyndal Roper, “‘To His Most Learned and Dearest Friend’: Reading Luther’s Letters’, *German History*, 28/3 (2010), 284–85; James Daybell, *The Material Letter in Early Modern England: Manuscript Letters and the Culture and Practices of Letter-Writing*, 1512–1635 (Basingstoke, 2012), 196, 230. It is also important not to view letters at face value, and to instead analyse aspects such as what the author had left out of the letter, and why he or she was writing (Roper, “‘To His Most Learned and Dearest Friend’”, 287).}

Letters were also performances on behalf of the sender. James Daybell writes that ‘Renaissance letters were often written with the intention of being read aloud and performance was integral to their presentation’, and this was particularly true for letters addressed to the crown.\footnote{Daybell, *The Material Letter in Early Modern England*, 18.} These letters should be seen as ‘public performances of submission and deference, staged bids for royal favour’.\footnote{Ibid, 24. Although Daybell is speaking of early modern England, this is certainly relevant to France in the same period.} In Crussol’s letters to the monarchy, these two oral aspects, the role of the *porteur*, and the letter as a performance, are emphasised. The messenger could also play a role in the performance of the letter. Crussol’s letters to the crown during the first religious war were almost certainly read out, being more like speeches, attempting to convince the king of his loyalty.

Furthermore, the style of early modern correspondence was important, as ‘even the spatial layout of letters was meaningful’.\footnote{Giora Sternberg, ‘Epistolary Ceremonial: Corresponding Status at the Time of Louis XIV’, *Past & Present*, 204/1 (2009), 34.} Letters were ‘a formal social act, a statement by the addressee about his or her status relative to the addressee’.\footnote{Ibid, 35–36.} Markers of status relations could include the address, the physical spacing of the letter, the closing subscription, and the signature.\footnote{Stéphane Gal, Mark Greengrass and Thierry Rentet, *Bertrand de Gordes, lieutenant général du roi en Dauphiné: correspondance reçue, 1572* (Fontaine, 2017), 16.} Using the term *monseigneur* was a sign of ‘the addressee’s recognition of his or
her inferiority vis-à-vis the addressee’, while monsieur was used towards peers.\textsuperscript{106} The royal use of the word cousin was sought after, which Crussol was first addressed as in January 1562.\textsuperscript{107}

Space between text was proportionate to deference, ‘physical distance thus mirroring social distance’.\textsuperscript{108} The opening letter interval, the position between the form of address and the rest of the text, could be used in different ways. When writing to inferiors, the body of the text started on the same line as the salutation; when addressees were near equals, the text began on the following line; while deference to superiors required even more space.\textsuperscript{109} The space between the end of the letter and the signature could similarly indicate deference. The subscription, the ending to the letter, also reflected status relations. Serviteur was the most common term used.\textsuperscript{110} Subscriptions to the king had another noun, sujet being used as well as serviteur, along with three adjectives.\textsuperscript{111} Crussol used three adjectives on numerous occasions. Replacing the word serviteur with ami could signal a close relationship between nobles or mark an increased sense of superiority.\textsuperscript{112} In addition, writing the letter in your own hand signified respect.\textsuperscript{113}

\textsuperscript{106} Sternberg, ‘Epistolary Ceremonial’, 46. Although Sternberg focuses primarily on the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, his analysis is also relevant for the sixteenth century.
\textsuperscript{107} Ibid, 50, 50n.
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid, 67.
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid, 67–68. Sternberg also mentions that extra deference could be given in placing the passage leading into the subscription on a new page (Ibid, 71).
\textsuperscript{110} Ibid, 52.
\textsuperscript{111} Ibid, 55.
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid, 58.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid, 73. Other aspects of status could be seen in the phrasing of the letter. Instead of writing ‘I have received your letter’, a longer ‘I have received the letter that you have given me’ could indicate more deference being given to the addressee (Ibid, 60).
Honour

In any study of noble identity (particularly concerning the sword nobility), honour forms a major part, as it influenced actions and dictated codes of behaviour. The language of honour expressed the noble’s rank, and public recognition was an important part of maintaining a noble’s honour. To conserve this dignity, ‘it was necessary that it might be demonstrated in the eyes of all through symbolic gestures and signs’. The defence of honour was an integral motive for noble conduct. There was, however, a gulf between these noble ideals and the actual behaviour of the nobility in war. Tracing military activity is a useful way to approach noble behaviour, as noble culture ‘was powerfully shaped by the prospect of violence and the actual experience of combat’. Nobles experienced violence as an expression of religious activism, and this mindset showed itself in the noble promotion of piety in armed clienteles and military units. Investigating these noble values through the actions of Crussol provides an opportunity to gauge how these values manifested themselves in reality.

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114 These ideas are highlighted particularly in Ellery Schalk, From Valor to Pedigree: Ideas of Nobility in France in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (Princeton, 1986); Jouanna, Le devoir de révolte; Neuschel, Word of Honor.
116 Sandberg, Warrior Pursuits, 164.
117 Jouanna, Le devoir de révolte, 237. ‘il faillait qu’elle soit manifestée aux yeux de tous par des gestes symboliques et des signes’.
120 Neuschel, Word of Honor, 38; Sandberg, Warrior Pursuits, 14. The citation is from Sandberg.
121 Sandberg, Warrior Pursuits, 273–75.
Relevance of study

My thesis contributes to our knowledge of the French nobility and the Wars of Religion for several reasons. Through this thematic approach to Crussol’s life, I provide an increased understanding of the motivations that led nobles to become Protestant. I uncover the consequences of this decision for their relationship with the crown, both during and after their engagement with the Protestant cause, and show how this adherence played out in reality. This is one historiographical area that has been neglected, with more research needed on what joining the Protestant movement meant in practice for a noble. There is also little historiography on the return to royal favour of Protestant nobles who rebelled against the king and evaluating Crussol’s reception at court sheds additional light on this subject. Assessing his relationship with the monarchy furthers our knowledge of the interplay between loyalty to the king and religious convictions, an issue which confronted many Protestant nobles.

A study of noble participation within the mechanisms of the Protestant war machine, and the leadership of the party, has not been previously explored in detail. Mark Greengrass, Hugues Daussy, and Claude Tiévant have delved into the machinery of the Protestant movement to an extent, but my thesis provides a more in-depth analysis of this movement. Given that Crussol was elected through the Protestant provincial assemblies, investigating his charge outlines how the assembly decrees were put into practice, to form the Protestant war machine. Studying how he engaged with his role can further uncover the workings of this movement, such as the relationship between the Protestant towns and the provincial conseils.

An inspection of Crussol’s actions also broadens our understanding of the royal response to the religious troubles enveloping the kingdom in 1560-1562. His royal missions outline the crown’s response to these threats, particularly the king’s use of noble networks. In this way, this study will draw together disparate histories of the religious wars in the Midi, to provide a more detailed chronology. Analysing the identity of the Protestant nobles during the religious wars, and Crussol’s own actions and behaviour, can greatly enhance our knowledge of noble loyalty and religiosity in this uncertain time for both the nobility and the state.

Sources

Various types of primary sources were used for this research. Correspondence is the most important of these, including royal, clerical, and general noble correspondence, taken from archives such as the Bibliothèque Nationale de France, the Archives Nationales (AN), the Musée Condé de Chantilly, and numerous provincial and municipal archives in the Midi. Apart from Crussol’s letters, the correspondence of figures such as Charles IX, Catherine de Médicis, and Guillaume de Joyeuse is used too. The Crussol papers in the AN, comprising of acts and letters relating to the family, are essential to the thesis. The records of the Protestant political assemblies, found in the Archives départementales de l’Hérault (ADH), de la Drôme and de l’Ardèche, provide further useful information on Crussol and help to analyse the components of the Protestant movement. The délibérations consulaires, the meetings of the town leaders, from numerous archives in the Midi, have been employed to track Crussol’s movements.

Crussol’s commands and decrees are also found in several departmental and municipal archives, most notably the ADH and the municipal archives of the Drôme region. Sixteenth- and seventeenth-century histories supplement these sources, such as the Histoire ecclésiastique, one of the main Protestant sources for the period, among others. In addition,
there are various antiquarian works which include valuable printed sources. Using this wide variety of sources provides for important conclusions concerning Crussol’s identity generally, and specifically his relationship with the monarchy.

Conclusion

Studying Crussol’s relationship with the crown fits directly into the current historiography on the civil wars, which emphasises the importance of religious faith within a broader spectrum of noble motives. His religious convictions have been much disputed, and it is necessary to take account of both the religious fluidity of the late 1550s and early 1560s, and the numerous pressures on Crussol, to critically assess his Protestant adherence. He presented himself in correspondence as a loyal servant to the crown, and the subsequent chapters detail the growing relationship between him and Catherine in particular. This period of 1559 to 1573 charts the impressive rise in influence of Crussol, due mostly to his close relationship with the queen-mother. Having situated Crussol in his provincial and historiographical context, his actions during the years 1560-1562 are crucial in understanding the foundations of this reciprocal reliance, in the first section of this thesis.

123 Jean Loutchitzki, ‘Collection des procès-verbaux des assemblées politiques des réformés de France pendant le XVIe siècle: No. 1 Assemblée à Nîmes, 1562’, BSHPF, 22 (1873), 506–16, 546–58; Edmond Cabié, Guerres de religion dans le sud-ouest de la France et principalement dans le Quercy, d’après les papiers des seigneurs de Saint-Sulpice, de 1561 à 1590 [1906], Reprint (Geneva and Marseille, 1975); Arnaud, Documents protestants inédits du XVIe siècle.
Section 1: Rise in influence

Chapter 1: Royal missions and increasing unrest, 1560-1561

Crussol was appointed to several royal missions during the years 1560-1562, which shed considerable light on his relationship with the crown. These appointments, culminating in his mission to the Midi in December 1561, underscore a growing reliance of the monarchy on Crussol and emphasise his role as a loyal servant to Catherine. He is shown to be the queen-mother’s trusted confidant, important for keeping the crown updated with current affairs. On the other hand, his fortunes were firmly tied up with, and dependent on, royal favour.

Failure in these missions, which included Crussol bringing the royal order for Antoine de Bourbon, the king of Navarre, to travel to court, and investigating a kidnapping plot concerning Henri de Valois, could bring further instability to the kingdom and affect the crown’s control over its territories. His perceived Protestant sympathies also proved useful to Catherine and Charles IX. Crussol’s appointments illustrate well the increase in religious troubles in France due to the rise of the new Protestant confession.

Crussol’s position as a favourite of Catherine was shown through his appointment as her chevalier d’honneur in 1559, and he later became chief of her council. This prestigious title of chevalier d’honneur was awarded to one figure at a time, who was paid 1200 livres tournois. The queen-mother’s chevaliers were all politically moderate, and Nicolas Le Roux asserts that Catherine’s regency saw the development of Crussol’s political role, as he was capable of forming a link between the Protestant and Catholic parties. Crussol’s close position to the queen-mother is portrayed in an engraving depicting the court in January

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1 Le Roux, La faveur du roi, 57–58.
2 ‘Officiers domestiques de la maison de la reyne Catherine de Médicis, femme du roy Henri II (depuis le 1er juillet 1547 jusques en 1585)’, in LCM, x, 519; Le Roux, La faveur du roi, 57.
3 Le Roux, La faveur du roi, 57–58.
Crussol’s proximity to the monarchy and importance for the government was also indicated in February 1561, when he escorted the English diplomats into the presence of Charles and Catherine on two occasions. He similarly led the English ambassador to Navarre’s chamber in 1561. Crussol became a member of the king’s conseil privé in December 1560, and was also a chevalier de l’ordre du roi, meaning the king’s noble order of Saint-Michel. Crussol’s and Louise de Clermont’s favour in the eyes of Catherine was likewise shown in 1560, when she gave them property near Fontainebleau, where the court was often present. As exhibited by these influential positions and royal favours, an optimistic future for Crussol lay ahead.

The years 1560-1562 were a tense period for the monarchy, especially due to the transition between the reigns of François II and Charles IX. Religious tensions in the kingdom were on the rise, with these troubles eventually heralding the start of the First War of Religion. Responding to the challenging increase in religious difference, the edict of Écouen in 1559 had been replaced by more favourable legislation towards Protestantism, with the

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5 TNA, SP 70/23, fol. 132r, ‘Francis Russell, Earl of Bedford and Nicholas Throckmorton to the Privy Council, 26 February 1561’; fol. 139r, ‘Francis Russell, Earl of Bedford and Nicholas Throckmorton to the Privy Council, 26 February 1561’.

6 TNA, SP 70/32, fol. 53r, ‘Nicholas Throckmorton to Queen Elizabeth I, 26 November 1561’.

7 AN, 265 AP 53, Dossier 7, No. 2 ‘Verification by Balthezar de Giannis of Antoine de Crussol’s position as conseiller, 31 May 1561’. However, Crussol was not officially appointed to this role on the conseil privé until February 1561.

8 AN, 265 AP 40, fols 324v-325r, ‘Inventaire générale et sommaire des titres du duché d’Uzès, 1720’.
edicts of Amboise and Romorantin in 1560. Since the summer of 1560, and particularly since the arrival of Charles IX in December of this year, the monarchy had opted for implicit toleration of Protestantism. After failing to reach religious concord at the colloque of Poissy in September and October 1561, Catherine moved to explicit toleration. The failure at Poissy left only one solution to avoid armed conflict, which was to render legal coexistence between the two confessions, at least temporarily.

This section will outline the numerous royal missions that Crussol undertook throughout these years, to examine in depth the growing dependence of the crown on him, and this relationship as a whole. It is first necessary to mention the influence of Protestantism on Crussol's territories, both to provide a snapshot of the tension caused by this religious upheaval, and to emphasise the links Crussol had with the Protestants.

Crussol's lands were not exempt from religious troubles and were heavily affected by Protestantism. There had been a church in Assier, land belonging to Crussol's mother Jeanne, since before 1562, while the barony of Crussol itself was Protestant. In late 1560 and early 1561, there was also a church at Crussol's territory of Florensac, with armed Protestants holding assemblies. A procureur d'office of Crussol (a figure in the seigneurial justice system), was the main instigator. Uzès itself was similarly affected in this religious turmoil, as shown by a letter of La Fare, the vicaire of Uzès, to François de Lorraine, the duc de Guise, in September 1560. La Fare outlined that there had been a Reformed public

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11 Ibid, 390.
12 Ibid, 389.
14 Loirette, ‘Catholiques et protestants en Languedoc à la veille des guerres civiles’, 520.
assembly in Uzès, at which a Genevan minister had spoken.\textsuperscript{15} Officers of the bishop of Uzès and of Crussol, had been prevented from seizing the pastor due to the sizeable crowd.\textsuperscript{16}

This incident suggests a significant Reformed presence in Uzès. This minister was presumably Guy Moranges, who had arrived from Geneva to lead the Uzès church in May 1560.\textsuperscript{17} La Fare provided further information to Charles de Guise, the cardinal de Lorraine and brother of the duc. The minister had been chased from the town and there was again order in Uzès, although another preacher might arrive.\textsuperscript{18} La Fare additionally outlined that the Nîmes Protestants had burned three churches in the diocese.

A letter of the Uzès church to Geneva, in May 1561, recounts its progress.\textsuperscript{19} The church had requested another minister, named Jean Mutonis (or Mouton), who became the pastor in summer 1561.\textsuperscript{20} The Uzès Protestants, speaking of Mutonis, wrote of ‘the good will that our seigneur and dame de Crussol, our magistrates, have towards him’ and made clear that ‘we see him as their representative’.\textsuperscript{21} Geneva had been asked to adjudicate a dispute

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\textsuperscript{15} BNF, fr. 15873, fol. 26r, ‘J. de La Fare, vicayre d’Uzès to the duke of Guise, 18 September 1560’.
\textsuperscript{16} The bishop would later join the Protestants.
\textsuperscript{17} Robert M. Kingdon et al., eds., \textit{Registres de la compagnie des pasteurs de Genève}, 14 vols (Geneva, 1962-2012), ii, 90. Moranges was also known as \textit{monsieur} la Garde or la Porte.
\textsuperscript{18} BNF, fr. 15873, fol. 30r, ‘J. de La Fare, vicayre d’Uzès to the cardinal de Lorraine, 18 September 1560’.
\textsuperscript{21} ‘L’église d’Uzès aux ministres de Genève, 7 May 1561’, in \textit{Calvini opera}, xviii, 442. It is difficult to determine whether the \textit{dame / madame} de Crussol referred to Jeanne de Genouillac or Louise de Clermont, a dilemma also highlighted by the editors of the \textit{correspondence Bèze} (‘Letter of Madame de Crussol à Calvin et Bèze, 12 September 1563’, in \textit{Correspondance Bèze}, iv, 200n). Either Jeanne or Louise became a patron of Mutonis. While Philippe Chareyre underlines that Mutonis served as \textit{aumônier} to Jeanne de Genouillac, and that his preaching in the \textit{château} at Uzès was particularly appreciated, Braghi notes that during the period that Mutonis had acted as itinerant preacher to several churches, including Uzès, he became ‘a protégé’ of Louise after delivering sermons in her and Antoine’s presence (Philippe Chareyre, ‘Jean Mouton et Dominique Deyron, anciens Jacobins, acteurs de la Réforme nîmoise’, \textit{Mémoire dominicaine}, 12 (1998), 125; Braghi, ‘The Evolving Character of the French Reformed Movement’, 189). Although Jeanne was a zealous Protestant, it is more probable that Louise supported Mutonis, given that it was Antoine who was in charge at Uzès. ‘la bonne volonte que nosseigneur et dame de Crussol noz magistratz luy portent’, ‘nous le tenons comme de leur main’.  

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in Nîmes, relating to Mutonis becoming the second minister there. Gianmarco Braghi argues that as Crussol and Louise valued Mutonis highly, the Nîmois congregation could potentially have alienated these crucial noble allies by ousting him. The Uzès request to have Mutonis as their minister therefore provided a clear solution to the Geneva consistory. Through this example, Crussol is shown to have close links with the Protestants in his territories.

Crussol was also associated with more troublesome Languedoc Protestants, as shown by a letter from Honorat de Savoie, the comte de Villars (the lieutenant-général of Languedoc), to the connétable Anne de Montmorency, in October 1560. Villars warned Montmorency about two gentilhommes, among those responsible for the troubles in the province, named Toiras, the seigneur de Saint-Jean de Gardonnenque, and a sieur de Cardet, who had gone to court and were staying at madame de Crussol’s house. In the investigations of Villars and the Toulouse parlement into the troubles in Nîmes in late 1560 and early 1561, Cardet, and a son of Toiras, were found to have helped organise the illicit Protestant assemblies. Villars urged Montmorency to arrest these individuals.

This chapter too provides further information about Crussol’s religious convictions. His Protestant sympathies had been first hinted at in his will of 1556, as noted in the previous chapter, and in October 1560, he received spiritual advice from Mutonis. In November

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23 Ibid, 196.
24 BNF, fr. 3158, fol. 99v, ‘Lettre of Honorat de Savoie, the comte de Villars, to Anne de Montmorency, 22 October 1560’; Guiraud, Études sur la Réforme à Montpellier, i, 156. As mentioned in an earlier footnote, Madame de Crussol could refer to Louise de Clermont or Jeanne de Genouillac, though the former seems more likely.
26 BNF, fr. 3158, fol. 99v, ‘Lettre of Honorat de Savoie, the comte de Villars, to Anne de Montmorency, 22 October 1560’.
1561, Theodore Beza observed his presence among the four noble families that formed a Protestant church at court, which was a public act on Crussol’s part.28 As highlighted elsewhere, the early 1560s was a time of religious fluidity, with many nobles having some interest in the new confession, or in an evangelical reform of Catholicism, with the latter being sometimes mistaken for Protestantism.29 However, Crussol’s adherence to Catholic reform, as shown through the 1556 will, was evidently becoming an interest in the Reformed church.

Prior to the colloque of Poissy, Louise de Clermont was too suspected as having a Reformed faith.30 Although Crussol’s Protestant connections might have seemed less than auspicious in gaining the crown’s trust, the monarchy sought to use these sympathies to its advantage, and considered that he would faithfully carry out royal commands. Crussol’s lands illustrate the tension caused due to this new confession, and he was certainly linked to the Protestants.

Nérac mission

In March 1560, in the event known as the Conspiracy of Amboise, Jean du Barry, the seigneur de La Renaudie, failed in an attempt to seize the king François II, overthrow the duc de Guise and the cardinal de Lorraine who were in control of the crown, and place France under the authority of the Bourbons.31 The Protestants had viewed the Guise takeover of power as

28 ‘Letter of Théodore de Bèze à Jean Calvin, 4 November [1561]’, in Correspondance Bèze, III, 206. This letter is also found in Calvin opera, xix, 96–98. This letter refers to a ‘D. Cursolii’, which I am taking to mean ‘Dominus Cursolii’, as opposed to ‘Domina Cursolii’. Given that Crussol’s name was mentioned among the Protestant nobles who warned Nîmes about the potential outbreak of war in March 1562 (some of these nobles being the same as those who were noted in the Protestant church at court by Beza), it seems reasonable to suggest that ‘D. Cursolii’ refers to Antoine.
30 Michel de Castelnau, Les mémoires de Messire Michel de Castelnau, seigneur de Mauvisière, ed. by J. Le Laboreur, 3 vols (Brussels, 1731), I, 71. Nancy Roelker also notes her actions on behalf of the Protestant party in 1561-1562, in Roelker, ‘Les femmes de la noblesse huguenote au XVIe siècle’, 240.
illegitimate. 32 Louis de Bourbon, the prince de Condé, was suspected of having been involved in this conspiracy, although he took no active role in the plot. 33 After he retired with his brother Antoine de Navarre to the latter’s lands at Nérac in southern France, a new plan was formed. 34 Navarre and Condé, who both had Reformed sympathies, supported plans that wished to stir up the Midi and deliver François from the supervision of Guise and Lorraine. 35 Troops were levied to capture Lyon, while Condé sought support from several great nobles. 36 However, both brothers were implicated at court in this conspiracy, which again failed. 37 The king himself had received many warnings of people planning to take up arms and had heard that Condé led the enterprise, with Navarre involved too. 38 François asked Navarre, at the end of August, to bring Condé to court so that he could answer these charges. 39 Although Navarre was not asked to respond to the accusations of rebellion directed towards him, he did need to defend his conduct at court.

Crussol’s first mission during these years was to carry the king’s request for Navarre and Condé to rejoin the court, travelling to Nérac in September 1560. 40 The choice of Crussol for this task emphasised the trust he enjoyed from the crown and he was sent in secrecy. 41

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35 Dufour, Théodore de Bèze, 73–74.
37 Daussy, Le parti huguenot, 176; Kingdon, Geneva and the Coming of the Wars of Religion, 75; Dufour, Théodore de Bèze, 74. One of the reasons for its failure was that Navarre renounced the operation at the last moment.
38 ‘Letter of François II to the bishop of Limoges, 31 August 1560’, in Négociations, 494–95.
40 BNF, fr. 3157, fol. 122r-v, ‘Copie de lettre missive envoyée au roy de Navarre de la part de monseigneur le connestable, 26 September 1560’.
41 According to the English ambassador in France, Nicholas Throckmorton, the news at court was that Crussol was to be sent to England or Scotland (TNA, SP 70/18 fol. 4r, ‘Nicholas Throckmorton to William Cecil, 3 September 1560’; fol. 25v, ‘Nicholas Throckmorton to William Cecil, 8 September 1560’).
This was a delicate mission, given what was at stake. Navarre and Condé, being princes of the blood, posed a serious threat to the king, who needed to assert his authority in resolving this situation. Crussol was viewed as a loyal figure by the crown, who would not join Navarre and Condé in revolt, and was not among the anti-Guise faction at court. As the letter from Mutonis around this time indicates Crussol’s interest in the Reformed church, the crown could have considered him an effective means of convincing Navarre and Condé to come to court, given their own Reformed sympathies. The cardinal de Bourbon, brother of Navarre and Condé, was also sent to Nérac.42

François’s instructions for Crussol provide further information on his position for the monarchy. Crussol was to present his lettres de créance (royal letters vouching for Crussol’s role as the king’s representative) to Navarre, and mention that the king had wished Navarre to attend the earlier assembly of the conseil privé members and other figures, ‘to advise concerning the troubles that were in his [François’] kingdom, as much for the matter of religion, as for the discontent held by many of his subjects’.43 He was to tell Navarre of the measures adopted there to pacify France, these being the decisions to hold a national ecclesiastical council (that of Poissy) and a national estates. The king desired that Navarre confer with him at court and attend the estates.44 Crussol was given a significant amount of trust by the monarchy in convincing the brothers to come to court, and to refrain from any

42 TNA, SP 70/18, fols 20v-21r, ‘Nicholas Throckmorton to Queen Elizabeth I, 8 September 1560’. Nancy Roelker writes that the cardinal was sent prior to Crussol, the latter being sent as the cardinal had failed to convince them to come to court (Roelker, Queen of Navarre, 144). However, it seems that Crussol was sent first, which is implied in François’s later letter to Limoges (‘Letter of François II to the bishop of Limoges, 5 October 1560’, in Négociations, 610).
43 BNF, 500 Colbert 28, fol. 49v, ‘Instructions of François II for Antoine de Crussol, 30 August 1560’. This letter is also found in ‘Instruction de M. de Crussol, allant, par ordre du roi, vers le roi de Navarre, 30 août 1560’, in Négociations, 482–86.‘pour adviser aux troubles qui estoient en son Royaume tant pour le faict de la religion que po[u]r le malcontentement q[ue] avoit beaucoup de ses su[bi]e[cts]’.
44 BNF, 500 Colbert 28, fol. 50r, ‘Instructions of François II for Antoine de Crussol, 30 August 1560’.
rebellious acts against the crown. He had to stress the king’s ability to quell any revolt, while maintaining that the invitation to court was not a trap, which it turned out to be.

Crussol was to inform Navarre that his presence was also desired for another reason. Due to ‘an infinity of warnings’ detailing the levying of men in the kingdom, to which Condé had been linked, Navarre was to bring him to court, where Condé would be heard before the king. If Condé was not present in Nérac, and Navarre consequently tried to delay, Crussol was to affectionately advise Navarre to come to court as soon as possible, ‘as much for the pleasure and contentment that his majesty [François] will have, as for the satisfaction that he is assured that the seigneur king of Navarre will receive from this’.45

In addition, Crussol would tell Navarre of François’s preparation for Condé’s plans to assemble forces. If Navarre again tried to avoid the journey to court, he was ‘to set out the good that he will do himself [in going to court], and the ruin that he prepares [for] himself in not satisfying the king’.46 Crussol clearly had an important role in convincing Navarre to travel to court, underlining the potential results of this decision. François had thought of several different potential situations to certify that both brothers arrived at court and took a severe tone towards Navarre in this letter.

To frighten Navarre, Crussol would mention that François de Vendôme, the vidame de Chartres, had been arrested and found guilty. The arrest of the vidame had occurred as compromising letters written between the vidame and Condé had been found. Crussol was later told to tell Navarre that Anne de Montmorency had warned the king of ‘this enterprise’,

46 Ibid, fol. 51r. ‘remonstrer le bien qu’il se fera et la Ruyne qu’il se prepare ne satisfais[an]t le Roy’. Louis Paris has the word ‘tort’ instead of ‘bien’ in transcribing this passage (‘Instruction de M. de Crussol, allant, par ordre du roi, vers le roi de Navarre, 30 août 1560’, in Négociations, 484).
which had resulted in a noble in Navarre’s company being arrested. Navarre was not to come to court with a significant train of people, and if he thought to assemble a considerable force, Crussol was to underscore the vast number of troops at François’s disposal, clearly meant as a warning against challenging the king’s position. François was well aware of the danger of Navarre coming to court with a substantial following, which would have led to questions over his own authority.

In the royal letter that Crussol carried for Navarre, François reinforced the need for Navarre to bring Condé to court, due to the continued reports about Condé’s seditious activity. To put Navarre at ease, the king indicated that this was ‘not for any other intention than to justify himself in your presence of that which he is charged’. The king ended the letter by threatening that if ‘he will refuse to obey me, I will know well to make known that I am king’, which Crussol would reiterate according to François. The king stressed his belief in Navarre’s own loyalty. The tone of this letter is softer than François’s instructions to

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47 ‘Letter of Catherine de Médicis to monsieur de Crussol, beginning of September 1560’, in LCM, i, 147. ‘ceste entreprise’. According to this letter, Montmorency, following his conversation with a noble in Navarre’s company named La Sague, had discovered the intended plot of Navarre and Condé, along with the names of those who were accompanying them. Montmorency later wrote to Navarre to justify himself of this accusation, strongly denying that he had ordered La Sague’s arrest (BNF, fr. 3157, fol. 122r-v, ‘Coppie de lettre missive envoyée au roy de Navarre de la part de monseigneur le connestable, 26 September 1560’). This letter is found too in ‘Lettre du Connétable de Montmorency au Roy de Navarre, 26 September 1560’, in Mémoires de Condé, i, 583–84; ‘Letter of Anne de Montmorency, Constable of France, to the king of Navarre, 26 September 1560’, in Négociations, 577–78).

48 BNF, 500 Colbert 28, fols 50r-51v, ‘Instructions of François II for Antoine de Crussol, 30 August 1560’. Crussol also had some other minor royal instructions, such as arresting certain people if found in Navarre’s household.

49 ‘Lettres du Roy François II au Roy de Navarre, pour luy faire amener à Orléans, Monsieur le Prince de Condé son frère, 30 août 1560’, in Mémoires de Condé, i, 572–73. This letter is also in La Popelinière, L’histoire de France, Tome II 1558-1560, 436–37; Lancelot-Voisin de La Popelinière, L’histoire de France, 2 vols (La Rochelle, 1581), i, fol. 209r.

50 ‘Lettres du Roy François II au Roy de Navarre, pour luy faire amener à Orléans, Monsieur le Prince de Condé son frère, 30 août 1560’, in Mémoires de Condé, i, 573. ‘non pour autre intention que pour se justifier en vostre presence de ce dont il est chargé’.

51 Ibid, ‘il refusera de m’obéyr, je sauray fort bien faire congoistre que je suis Roy’.

52 Dufour, Théodore de Bèze, 74.
Crussol, although the letter nonetheless revealed the seriousness with which the monarchy took this threat.

There are also surviving letters from the queen-mother to Navarre and his wife, Jeanne d’Albret. In a letter to the latter, Catherine made clear that Crussol would outline why he had been sent, and asked Jeanne to believe what he said on her behalf. This letter highlighted Catherine’s trust in him, as she wrote, ‘I have confidence in him as you can imagine, holding the position that he has near me, which was the reason that I did not write a longer discourse, entrusting all to him’. Crussol’s favour in Catherine’s eyes was evident. The separate letter to Navarre reiterated the confidence that she had in Crussol.

Catherine’s letters highlight why Crussol was chosen for this mission, being granted considerable responsibility in outlining the royal will. Given the significance of the mission, the queen-mother showed remarkable faith in his ability to explain the royal position, instead of disclosing it herself in correspondence. This example also illustrates the importance of orality in viewing Crussol’s carrying out of the royal orders, as Catherine’s message for these two nobles was not limited to her letters, but encompassed the instructions given to Crussol too.

Crussol’s arrival at Nérac did influence Navarre. According to Beza who was there at the time, Navarre dismissed his previously sincere interest in Protestantism ‘by the sole arrival of Crussol’. After having to decide ‘between obedience and open defiance’, Navarre finally obeyed the royal order. Navarre and Condé left Nérac with a great number of nobles,

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53 ‘Letter of Catherine de Médicis to Jeanne d’Albret, Queen of Navarre, start of September 1560’, in LCM, i, 148. ‘je me fye en luy com[m]e [vous] po[u]vés [sic] panser [sic], tenent le lyeu [sic] qu’il tyen [sic] auprès de moy; qui seré [sic] cause que je ne vous fayré [sic] plu[s] long dyscour, me remetent de tout en luy’.
54 ‘Letter of Catherine de Médicis to Antoine de Bourbon, King of Navarre, start of September 1560’, in LCM, i, 148.
55 Histoire ecclésiastique, i, 370. ‘par la seule venue du sieur de Cursol’.
56 Roelker, Queen of Navarre, 144–45.
who were disbanded before reaching Orléans. François was worried by the threat that Navarre posed to the overall troubled state of the kingdom en route, and in letters to nobles such as Charles de Coucis, the seigneur de Burie and the lieutenant-général of Guyenne, the king urged them to be on their guard. This convocation to court turned out to be an ambush, as Navarre was received coldly there, while Condé was arrested. However, the death of François in December ended Condé’s time in prison.

Crussol had already departed Nérac when Navarre and Condé travelled to court, as he was expected to pass through Bordeaux in mid-September. In a letter to the king at this time, Burie remarked that Crussol could inform François of the situation in Guyenne. As Navarre and Condé arrived at court, Crussol’s mission was a success, and the crown was satisfied with his actions. His loyalty was clear to the monarchy, shown both in Catherine’s discourse and the choice of Crussol for this mission. Navarre did not obey all the royal instructions conveyed to him by Crussol, such as the prohibition on assembling a force of nobles, though it was not Crussol’s role to enforce these instructions. Catherine particularly showed a considerable level of trust in him, which was to be mirrored in his later missions.

Montpellier estates

Crussol’s important role for the monarchy was similarly portrayed through the meeting of the Languedoc provincial estates at Montpellier in March 1561. The estates’ main function

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57 Histoire ecclésiastique, i, 371–72.
59 Knecht, The French Civil Wars, 1562–1598, 71; Dufour, Théodore de Bèze, 74–75; Jouanna, La France du XVle siècle, 364.
60 Dufour, Théodore de Bèze, 74–75.
62 BNF, fr. 15873, fol. 98r, ‘Letter of monsieur de Burye to François II, 11 September 1560’. This letter is also found in Lépicier, Archives historiques du département de la Gironde, tome treizième, 127–29.
was to accord royal taxation, while a wide variety of provincial matters was also considered.63

There were various nobles who sat at these estates, including the barons de tour for the Vivarais and Gévaudan regions.64 Crussol attended this assembly in person, as the baron de tour of the Vivarais.65 As he normally sent a deputy in his place, his appearance may have been due to a royal command that he report back personally on the estates.66 This was a critical time for the monarchy, as Languedoc had significant religious troubles. Although Crussol evidently had provincial responsibilities, he acted as a conduit for the crown during this assembly.

In a letter to Catherine on 23 March, he outlined the estates’ deliberations. The main subject was the significant royal debt, and Charles IX had outlined solutions to rectify this deficit, which involved buying back the taxes of the domaine, aides, and gabelle, through seizing Catholic church assets.67 These taxes had been mortgaged to private financiers. Crussol reported that the estates granted the king’s request.68 The issue of clerical land was central to this assembly, and there was a radical proposal put forward by the third estate

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65 The Languedoc provincial estates consisted of twenty-two bishops, twenty-two nobles, and forty-four town representatives.
68 However, the estates’ procès-véreaux do not make clear exactly which financial measure was taken.
and the nobles that the king ‘should sell the temporel [the material assets] of the church’.  

Unsurprisingly rejected by an ecclesiastical delegate present, this proposal involved the left over money being managed by town representatives.

As evidenced by this assembly, anti-clericalism among the nobility was at a high point in 1560 and 1561. Following the subsequent meeting of the Estates General at Pontoise, the clergy agreed, in October 1561, to give the king 1.6 million livres per year for six years, and promised to repurchase a part of the debt. Crussol also mentioned the estates’ gratitude for Catherine’s role as regent of the kingdom, who was asked to continue ‘the charge that you have’. The estates too urged her to use Navarre and the princes of the blood in her government. The estates further thanked the crown for important figures associated with the province, including Crussol.

In addition, Crussol noted an appeal by the Protestants, those following ‘the doctrine of Jesus Christ and his apostles’, that their request might be added to the cahier de doléances (a list of requests to be presented to the king).

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71 Salmon, Society in Crisis, 123.

72 Jouanna, La France du XVIe siècle, 370; Jouanna, ‘Le temps des guerres de religion en France (1559-1598)’, 80.


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the siège présidial of Nîmes and the consistory there, had controversially addressed the assembly.\textsuperscript{76} He presented a series of requests, or remontrances, on behalf of the Languedoc inhabitants who wished ‘to serve God purely, following the doctrine of Jesus Christ’, along with thirteen procurations (mandates given to act in someone’s name).\textsuperscript{77} Crussol’s definition of the Protestants is almost identical to that of the estates’ deliberations, which is a complementary description. The remontrances were wide ranging in scope, considering judicial and financial issues, as well as religious.\textsuperscript{78} The remontrances’ solutions for the royal debt similarly involved the clergy shouldering the cost, with the Languedoc inhabitants being exempt from this charge.\textsuperscript{79}

Chabot reiterated this suggestion in the assembly, although using more contentious language.\textsuperscript{80} He also indicated the poor morals of the priests and requested that the Protestants be given temples. Due to the assembly dealing only with the royal debt, the Protestant request to have the remontrances included in the cahier de doléances was denied.\textsuperscript{81} The assembly concluded instead that the request and procurations would be given


\textsuperscript{77} ADHG, 1 C 2280, fol. 476v, ‘Estats Generaulx du pais de Languedoc Assemblies du Mandem[ent] du Roy en La ville de Montp[elli]er Au Mois de Mars mil cinq cens Soixante (1561)’. ‘Servir purement à dieu Suivant la doctrine de Jh[es]uschrist [sic]’. The number of the procurations is disputed, as while the estates mention that Chabot had thirteen procurations from Protestants, Gamon noted thirty, while the Nîmes deliberations spoke of thirty five (Gamon, ‘Mémoires d’Achille Gamon’, 611; ‘Déliberations du conseil de ville de Nismes, en faveur des religionnaires. 1561 et 1562’, in Ménard, \textit{IV}, 286).

\textsuperscript{78} Remontrances des habitans de Nismes au roi Charles IX sur la réformation de l’état, 1561’, in Ménard, \textit{iv}, 267–82. These remontrances are also in Philip Benedict and Nicolas Fornerod, eds., \textit{L’organisation et l’action des églises réformées de France (1557-1563); synodes provinciaux et autres documents} (Geneva, 2012), 25-32. Allan Tulchin considers these articles in depth (Tulchin, \textit{That Men Would Praise the Lord}, 103–15), and compares the text in different manuscripts (‘BNF MSS FR 20153 and 15881 – Drafts of French Protestant Cahier, 1561’, <https://ship.academia.edu/AllanTulchin> [accessed 5 August 2020]).


\textsuperscript{80} Gamon, ‘Mémoires d’Achille Gamon’, 611; Ménard, \textit{iv}, 289–90.

to Crussol to present to the king, outlined too in Crussol’s letter to Catherine.\textsuperscript{82} Allan Tulchin argues that rejecting these proposals ‘would have inflamed Protestant opinion both within and without the chamber’.\textsuperscript{83}

In a further letter to Catherine on 25 April, Crussol reiterated the request he had been given by those who wish ‘to live in the purity of the Gospel’, again describing the Protestants in a favourable manner.\textsuperscript{84} He remarked that he saw a great obedience towards the crown in these people, ignoring the potential civil disorder that Protestant figures such as Chabot could cause.\textsuperscript{85} He stressed Protestant loyalty to the monarchy, perhaps on the behalf of the Protestants, some of whom lived on his territories, or to support his own Protestant sympathies, or both. Having hoped to travel to court, as shown by his previous letter, Crussol informed Catherine that he would go to Bordeaux, presumably on his next royal mission.

Concerning the religious tensions in France, Crussol commented that the Toulouse \textit{parlement}, in publishing an edict and a pardon, along with a command to free prisoners held for their religion, had added ‘so many changes and explanations that instead of following the

\textsuperscript{82} ADHG, 1 C 2280, fol. 476v, ‘Estats Generaulx du pais de Languedoc Assemblés du Mandem[ent] du Roy en La ville de Montp[ellier] Au Mois de Mars mil cinq cens Soixante (1561)’; BNF, fr. 3186, fol. 68r, ‘Letter of Antoine de Crussol to Catherine de Médicis, 23 March 1560/1561’; Tulchin, \textit{That Men Would Praise the Lord}, 115. Although Gamon and others mention that Crussol charged himself with delivering these items to the monarchy, the estates \textit{procès-verbaux} noted only that these would be given to Crussol, and this is also supported by Crussol’s letters further on (Gamon, ‘Mémoires d’Achille Gamon’, 611; \textit{HL}, xi, 347n). Chabot was to accompany Crussol in presenting this Protestant request. It is unclear when exactly Chabot went to court, but he was certainly there in July 1561 (Benedict and Fornerod, ‘Les députés des églises réformées à la cour en 1561-1562’, 309).

\textsuperscript{83} Tulchin, \textit{That Men Would Praise the Lord}, 115.
\textsuperscript{84} BNF, fr. 3186, fol. 101r, ‘Letter of Antoine de Crussol to Catherine de Médicis, 25 April 1561’. This letter is also found in Paris, ‘Les huguenots avant la Saint-Barthélemy’, 46–47. ‘vivre en la pureté de l’évangille’.

\textsuperscript{85} Initially denied the chance to speak at the assembly, Chabot was only permitted to do so due to the commotion of the people, and after his speech, it was the fear of starting a riot which stopped Chabot from being arrested for his words (Gamon, ‘Mémoires d’Achille Gamon’, 611). Given that the official estates’ deliberations purposefully do not record the full discussions of the delegates, sources such as Gamon provide context to the discussion (James E. Brink, ‘Les États de Languedoc de 1515 à 1560: une autonomie en question’, \textit{Annales du Midi: revue archéologique, historique et philologique de la France méridionale}, 88/128 (1976), 299).
will of the king and containing the people in peace, it seems that they wish to correct this edict or form it anew’.\textsuperscript{86} This edict was presumably the arrêt of 1 March, which published a lettre de cachet and a royal declaration, of 28 January and 22 February respectively. In this act, all investigations against individuals due to religious matters were to cease, while prisoners held for these issues were to be released. These figures were told to live ‘Catholicely’ and undertake no scandalous or seditious act.\textsuperscript{87} However, if the individual did not wish to live ‘Catholicely’, they were to leave the kingdom, on pain of death.\textsuperscript{88} Despite its harsh language, the edict offered implicit toleration for Protestants.

The condition to live ‘Catholicely’ had been seen in the earlier edicts of Amboise and Romorantin, in March and May 1560 respectively, which this decree modified.\textsuperscript{89} The Amboise edict offered an amnesty and liberation to all religious prisoners except pastors and conspirators, on the condition of living as ‘good Catholics’.\textsuperscript{90} The order to live as good Catholics meant that in practice, private Reformed assemblies were tolerated, but public assemblies remained illegal.\textsuperscript{91} These royal decrees were part of the crown policy which implicitly tolerated Protestantism, as further illustrated through the later edicts of Fontainebleau and July.\textsuperscript{92}


\textsuperscript{87} Pierre Dupuy, Preves [sic] des libertez de l’église gallicane, tome second, 3rd edn, 2 vols (Unknown, 1731), ii, 1321; Knecht, The French Civil Wars, 1562-1598, 72. ‘Catholicely’. The citation is from Dupuy. This arrêt is also found in François-André Isambert et al., eds., Recueil général des anciennes lois françaises, depuis l’an 420 jusqu’à la Révolution de 1789, 29 vols (Paris, 1821-1833), xiv, 99–101.

\textsuperscript{88} Dupuy, Preves [sic] des libertez de l’église gallicane, tome second, ii, 1321.

\textsuperscript{89} Knecht, The French Civil Wars, 1562-1598, 72.

\textsuperscript{90} Ibid, 67; Jouanna, La France du XVIe siècle, 352. ‘bons catholicques’. The citation is from Jouanna.

\textsuperscript{91} Loirette, ‘Catholiques et protestants en Languedoc à la veille des guerres civiles’, 503; Knecht, The French Civil Wars, 1562-1598, 69.

\textsuperscript{92} The edict of Fontainebleau on 19 April 1561 prohibited harassment of individuals in their homes, which was believed to be an open invitation to Huguenot worship in private (culte privé), therefore
Crussol also outlined the numerous Catholic riots in the region. He referred to the Catholics as ‘those who hold to the Roman religion’ as opposed to the ‘French’ religion, seemingly separating himself from the Catholics. Although it is not unusual to refer to Catholics in this way, it may suggest ambivalence on Crussol’s part. The tense situation in the province was similarly highlighted by other correspondents to the monarchy, who mentioned the numerous Protestant assemblies and the subsequent Catholic response.

In addition, Crussol mentioned that riots had occurred in Provence, and urged the monarchy to resolve this situation. He wrote, ‘for my part I ask you very humbly for the desire that I have to the service of the king and your own and to the peace of your poor people, who desire only to put forward their lives and their assets for your service’, seemingly again discussing the Protestants. Catherine was already aware of agitation in Provence, as she had ordered Claude de Savoie, the comte de Tende and gouverneur of the province, to resolve this troublesome situation, at the start of April.

 implicit toleration. The edict too contained a general amnesty for religious prisoners (Penny Roberts, *Peace and Authority during the French Religious Wars c.1560-1600* (Basingstoke, 2013), 21; Jouanna, *La France du XVIe siècle*, 390; Robert J. Knecht, *Catherine de’ Medici* (London and New York, 1998), 289). The edict of July followed a few months later, in which Protestant assemblies, both public and private, were still prohibited, even if in practice the Protestants were able to continue private gatherings (Roberts, *Peace and Authority*, 24).


94 In a letter to Catherine, Guillaume Calvière, the président of the siège présidial of Nîmes, mentioned that in Toulouse, people opposing the Protestant assemblies had killed those attending and had taken up weapons, not proceeding in a judicial manner. These events had occurred since the publishing of the edict freeing people imprisoned due to religion. Guillaume de Joyeuse, the lieutenant du gouverneur (and future lieutenant-général of Languedoc), too indicated the presence of Protestant assemblies in Languedoc (BNF, fr. 3186, fols 82r-83v, ‘Letter of Guillaume Calvière to Catherine de Médicis, 13 April 1561’; fol. 84r, ‘Letter of Guillaume de Joyeuse to Charles IX, 14 April 1561’. For the description of Joyeuse’s role, see Tiévant, *Le gouverneur de Languedoc pendant les premières guerres de religion* (1559-1574), 25–26.


96 ‘Letter of Catherine de Médicis to the Comte de Tende, 3 April 1561’, in *LCM*, i, 183.
Crussol was clearly an important figure for the monarchy in reporting what had occurred at the Montpellier estates, and informing Catherine and Charles of the increasing regional tensions. Contacts such as Crussol were essential for the crown’s information about the southern provinces. He was fulfilling both a royal and a provincial role. His utility to the crown is clear and the decision to present the Protestant request at court may have helped ease tension at the estates. Crussol’s Protestant leanings were apparent through this period. These were shown by the name he gave the Catholics in a letter to Catherine, his praising of the Languedoc Protestants, and his request for the crown to intervene on their behalf in Provence.

Guyenne commission

Crussol’s usefulness to the monarchy was also affirmed in his mission to Guyenne in summer 1561, where he investigated a province enflamed with religious troubles. The situation there had been steadily worsening, and correspondence from January 1561 highlighted the increase in Protestants and the presence of armed assemblies of four to five thousand people, particularly in the Agenais.97 The Guyenne Protestants had been arming their assemblies since 1557, and using militias from 1560.98 Burie was ordered by the monarchy to resolve troubles in Agen in mid-May, and there was a notable escalation of religious violence in this region during the summer.99

Charles IX sent two commissions to Crussol in June, and although this documentation does not survive, we can surmise that the king wished for him to investigate the Reformed

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99 BNF, fr. 3189, fol. 89r-v, ‘Letter of Charles IX to Charles de Coucis, the seigneur de Burie, 21 May 1561’; Carroll, ‘Political Justice and the Outbreak of the Wars of Religion’, 189. This letter to Burie is also found in LCM, I, 196.
churches’ activity in Guyenne. In a letter from the king to Crussol on 29 June, Charles had been alerted that there were pikes being forged in the province, and four to five thousand were ready for use.\textsuperscript{100} The king had additionally heard that the Reformed churches in Guyenne had raised 80,000 écus and aimed to reach 400,000 écus.\textsuperscript{101} Charles stated that such things were not done ‘without great cause’, and that their preparations did not indicate an obedience to his rule, instead only having an evil intention.\textsuperscript{102} To resolve this matter, the king urged Crussol to wisely carry out these commissions and to inform him of the truth of these matters. The king wished that if this money had been raised, it should be given to him.

Catherine’s letter, accompanying that of the king, reinforced the tense situation in Guyenne.\textsuperscript{103} She was assured of Crussol’s devotion to the king’s service, and reiterated the need for him to proceed with wisdom, not causing any trouble, which could enflame what is ‘already too troubled in these parts to my great regret’.\textsuperscript{104} The monarchy was well aware of the religious troubles that were taking place in Guyenne, almost a full year before the official outbreak of the first civil war. The queen-mother wanted to remedy these tensions and asked for Crussol’s opinion on the matter. Catherine also wished that he would tell her of his investigations and receive further orders from her, before handing the Reformed churches’ money to the receveur-général, as per his original instructions.

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\textsuperscript{100} AN, MC/DC/LVI/8, No. 15, ‘Le roi Charles à M[onsieur]r de Crussol, 29 June 1561’. This letter is also found in BNF, Nouvelles acquisitions fr. 9718, fol. 56r-v, ‘Letter of Charles IX to Antoine de Crussol, 29 June 1561’; Aubais and Ménard, ‘Lettres des rois, reines, princes, & seigneurs à M. de Crussol’, 87–88.
\textsuperscript{101} There is an error in the Archives Nationales copy, as it notes 300,000 instead of 400,000 écus.
\textsuperscript{102} AN, MC/DC/LVI/8, No. 15, ‘Le roi Charles à M[onsieur]r de Crussol, 29 June 1561’. ‘sans grande occasion’.
\textsuperscript{103} AN, MC/DC/LVI/8, No. 16, ‘La reine Catherine à M[onsieur]r de Crussol, 29 June 1561’. This letter is also found in BNF, Nouvelles acquisitions fr. 9718, fols 56v-57r, ‘Letter of Catherine de Médicis to Antoine de Crussol, 29 June 1561’; Aubais and Ménard, ‘Lettres des rois, reines, princes, & seigneurs à M. de Crussol’, 88–89; LCM, v, 317; LCM, x, 41–42.
\textsuperscript{104} Ibid, ‘déjà trop alteré en ces quartiers à mon grand regret’.
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This tumult continued into July, and in a letter to Charles IX at the start of this month, Burie outlined the current state of Guyenne. He had been ordered to investigate reports in upper Guyenne that people considered no longer paying *tailles*, or money owed to the church and the nobles. He mentioned that Crussol had spoken of the royal letter he had received, referring to these two commissions, by which Crussol was ordered to go into Guyenne to enquire of the situation there. Burie advised Crussol to shorten his voyage to save himself trouble, and he indicated that since his last letters to the crown, nothing new had occurred. He commented that while the Protestants, referred to as the ‘new Christians’, had responded favourably to a letter of Blaise de Monluc, they had nonetheless attacked churches, and he affirmed the need for punishment. There is quite a considerable amount of correspondence between the monarchy and the Guyenne commanders during this time, and it is curious that Crussol is only mentioned on two occasions. This may have been because he was quickly moved elsewhere.

It is, however, notable that Crussol was sent directly to deal with the Protestants, the monarchy realising his usefulness in negotiation. His Protestant sympathies were beneficial to the crown. As in his later mission in December, this was one of the reasons for which he was chosen, seen both by the monarchy as a loyal figure, trustworthy enough to carry out their orders faithfully, and by the Protestants as sympathetic to their cause, if not one of them. Crussol was not the only figure working in Guyenne on the king’s behalf, as the king used locally based nobles to oversee the regional situation and pacify the province.

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105 BNF, fr. 15875, fol. 30r-v, ‘Letter of Catherine de Médicis to monsieur de Burie, 9 July 1561’; fols 9r-10v, ‘Letter of the sieur de Burie to Charles IX, 4 July 1561’. This first letter is also found in LCM, i, 211–12.
106 BNF, fr. 15875, fol. 9r, ‘Letter of the sieur de Burie to Charles IX, 4 July 1561’.
107 Ibid, ‘nouveaulx crestiens’.
108 Crussol is never mentioned in royal correspondence to figures being sent into the province, while Burie and Monluc appear in almost every letter.
was evidently seen as a faithful servant to the crown, as shown by his extensive activity on its behalf.

Royal kidnapping

Crussol’s value to the monarchy, and in particular to Catherine, was also shown in the controversy involving Henri de Valois (the duc d’Orléans and the future Henri III), and Jacques de Savoie, the duc de Nemours, in October 1561. According to the ten-year-old Henri, Nemours attempted to convince him secretly to leave France and go to Lorraine or Savoy.\(^\text{109}\) Nemours would accompany him with the duc de Guise, while the latter’s own son, Henri de Joinville, of a comparable age to Henri, similarly tried to convince the prince to go to these territories. After hearing of this conversation, Catherine asked Henri to explain the situation in the presence of Crussol and two others, which indicates Crussol’s favoured position as her confidant. The separation of the royal children would have acted as a security for the Catholics against a Protestant seizure of power, if the monarchy inclined towards Protestantism.\(^\text{110}\) The explicit toleration of Protestantism by the crown had resulted in the Catholic nobles, including Guise, Lorraine, Nemours, and Anne de Montmorency, leaving court in this month.\(^\text{111}\) Guise felt he could not stay at court and risk being seen to support this royal policy.\(^\text{112}\)

To find out Guise’s involvement in this alleged plot, Catherine sent Crussol to Guise and Lorraine.\(^\text{113}\) Like the Nérac mission, Crussol was again sent to explore an alleged threat against the crown. He was certainly not among the Catholic court faction, as exhibited by his continued presence there following their exodus. Given that Crussol was chosen for this

\(^{109}\) LCM, i, cxiii; Noël Valois, ‘Projet d’enlèvement d’un enfant de France (le futur Henri III) en 1561’, Bibliothèque de l’école des chartes, 75 (1914), 6–8.


\(^{111}\) Ibid; Jouanna, La France du XVIe siècle, 390.

\(^{112}\) Jouanna, La France du XVIe siècle, 390.

\(^{113}\) Valois, ‘Projet d’enlèvement d’un enfant de France (le futur Henri III) en 1561’, 15–16; LCM, i, cxiii.
matter, Guise and Lorraine perhaps viewed him more as a loyal servant of Catherine as opposed to a member of the Protestant party. Catherine also suspected Spanish involvement in this plot and sent a letter to her ambassador at the Spanish court to investigate. At this stage, few people knew about this scandal, which again illustrates Crussol’s notable position. Guise and Lorraine, accompanied by Nemours, were at Nanteuil near Paris. Crussol arrived there at the end of October, only staying briefly before returning to court with Guise and Lorraine’s response. As shown by Crussol’s report, he presented Catherine’s letter to these nobles, and outlined that ‘monsieur de Nemours had spoken with monsieur [Henri] to persuade him to bring him out of this kingdom’. He did not bring up the circumstances which implicated Guise.

Lorraine and Guise expressed surprise at this news and made clear that Nemours had not informed them of this affair. Crussol also mentioned that he accompanied the brothers to Mass. After the Mass, Guise and Lorraine read him the letter they had written to Catherine, underlining both their thanks for being told of this matter, and for asking their opinion. The two brothers noted the implausible nature of this affair and in the subsequent discussion, Guise and Lorraine considered where Nemours would have taken Henri, as Crussol had not spoken of Nemours’s chosen destinations. In response, Crussol only acknowledged Savoy, not wishing to increase their suspicions by referring to Lorraine, a
territory to which they were linked.\textsuperscript{121} Crussol was not just a mere royal messenger, and skilfully withheld the entirety of the monarchy's information, keeping Guise and Lorraine unaware of the crown’s suspicions concerning their involvement. Similar to his assignment at Nérac, Crussol’s oral message supplemented the letter written to Guise and Lorraine by Catherine.

If Nemours was indeed guilty, Lorraine and Guise made clear that he would not have ‘a greater enemy than us’, asking Crussol to assure Catherine of their devotion.\textsuperscript{122} Their disavowal put Catherine more at ease, and it was on Crussol’s return to court that the controversy was made known there.\textsuperscript{123} Noël Valois is doubtful of the extent of Guise and Lorraine’s involvement in the matter, and argued that it was not impossible that the brothers were sincere in denying knowledge of this affair.\textsuperscript{124} At the end of October, Henri appeared before the king and the conseil privé, including Crussol. Following the departure of the Catholic nobility, the conseil privé was comprised of Protestants or nobles hostile to the Guise, along with political moderates. Henri’s account was generally in the same vein as his first statement, although there was no mention of the Guise involvement.\textsuperscript{125} Nemours was in a difficult position, and the composition of the conseil privé was not in his favour.\textsuperscript{126}

\textsuperscript{121} Ibid, fols 11v-12r; Valois, ‘Projet d’enlèvement d’un enfant de France (le futur Henri III) en 1561’, 18.
\textsuperscript{122} BNF, fr. 6608, fol. 12r-v, ‘Rapport de M. de Cursol [sic], touchant cequ’il [sic] a rapporté de son voyage à nanteuil, 1561’. ‘ung plus grand Ennemy [sic] que nous’.
\textsuperscript{123} Valois, ‘Projet d’enlèvement d’un enfant de France (le futur Henri III) en 1561’, 20. This matter was also discussed by the foreign ambassadors at the French court, although there were factual errors in their reports, as Valois shows (Henry Layard, ed., ‘Letter of Michele Surano to the Doge of Venice, 4 November 1561’, in Despatches of Michele Suriano and Marc’ Antonio Barbaro, Venetian Ambassadors at the Court of France, 1560-1563 (Lymington, 1891), 49; ‘Letter of Perronet de Chantonnay to the conseiller Tisnaq, 9 November 1561’, in Mémoires de Condé, i, 18; TNA, SP 70/32, fol. 19r, ‘Nicholas Throckmorton to Queen Elizabeth I, 14 November 1561’).
\textsuperscript{124} Valois, ‘Projet d’enlèvement d’un enfant de France (le futur Henri III) en 1561’, 20.
\textsuperscript{125} Ibid, 21. The second declaration also added that Henri had informed Nemours that he did not wish to leave the king or his mother, which was an attempt to portray Henri in a better light (ibid, 46). This was also seen elsewhere, in ‘Discours sur la liberté ou captivité du Roy, 1562’, in Mémoires de Condé, iii, 375, and Histoire ecclésiastique, i, 744.
\textsuperscript{126} Valois, ‘Projet d’enlèvement d’un enfant de France (le futur Henri III) en 1561’, 23.
The arrival of Nemours’ representative at court, Philibert Le Voyer, the *sieur* de Lignerolles, set out his defence. Lignerolles asserted that Nemours had merely said to Henri, ‘I would like, *monsieur*, that you might be in Savoy or Lorraine’, for the reason of the troubles in France.\(^\text{127}\) However, Nemours was still distrusted after this intervention and Lignerolles was arrested.\(^\text{128}\) Appearing before Michel de L’Hôpital and four members of the *conseil privé*, Crussol again among them, Lignerolles argued that he was not aware of Nemours’s suggestion to Henri.\(^\text{129}\) Other associates of Nemours were arrested too.\(^\text{130}\) Lignerolles was finally released from prison in January 1562.\(^\text{131}\) Catherine did not find a Spanish link to this affair and she abandoned the enquiries, as Henri’s testimony was the only evidence against Nemours.\(^\text{132}\) By May, Nemours was cleared of suspicion.\(^\text{133}\) Valois argues that the Catholic party had certainly considered the advantage gained by separating the royal children, and that one should not entirely give credence to Nemours’s denials.\(^\text{134}\) Although Nemours had perhaps thought to talk to Henri to bring him out of France, it was improbable that there was an ambush ready to be executed with the complicity of Catholic leaders. Catherine herself also came to this conclusion.

This whole affair reinforces Crussol’s important role at Catherine’s side, being chosen for a delicate operation to meet with Guise and Lorraine, to find out their involvement in this plot. Crussol was one of her most private confidants, hearing the two accounts of Henri, and that of Lignerolles. He was evidently trusted by Catherine to investigate this matter quietly, without creating further divisions in the kingdom through inciting Guise and Lorraine’s suspicions. Although this situation was perhaps not as serious as the earlier threat posed by

\(^{127}\) Ibid, 28–29. 47. ‘Je vouldroy, Monsieur, que vous fuissiez en Savoye ou Lorrayne [sic].’

\(^{128}\) Ibid, 30; *LCM*, i, cxiii.


\(^{130}\) Ibid, 31.

\(^{131}\) Ibid, 34–35.

\(^{132}\) Ibid, 35–37.

\(^{133}\) ‘Letter of Catherine de Médicis to the Duchesse de Savoie, May 1562’, in *LCM*, i, 303.

Navarre, Crussol was again employed to carry out the royal will, in the wake of another potential conspiracy.

Order of Saint-Michel

Crussol’s favour in the eyes of the monarchy was similarly shown by the royal command to him to appoint Bertrand-Raimbaud de Simiane, the baron de Gordes, and François d'Agoult, the comte de Sault (the lieutenant-général of Lyonnais) into the order of Saint-Michel. Membership of this prestigious order was used to attract noble fidelity to the crown. Benefits of this membership included frequenting the conseil privé and officially having direct access to the king.

Gordes and Sault were appointed by Charles in December 1561. Crussol himself had been appointed in the previous year. As this mission required ‘some good and renowned figure’, Crussol was given ‘full power, ability, authority, commission and special command’ from the king to carry out this task. He had set instructions for this ceremony.

135 AN, 265 AP 54, Dossier 19, No. 1, ‘Letter from Charles IX to Antoine de Crussol, 7 December 1561’. Charles used various people to appoint nobles to the order, and other examples are found in BNF fr. 3223, fols 2r–3v, 60r–v; fr. 3244, fols 132r–133r; fr. 3230, fols 130r–131v; fr. 15777, fol. 218r.
136 The monarchy used membership as a way to recompense a great noble, by appointing their clients, and also to maintain direct relations with the middle provincial nobility, as a means of showing them favour (Boltanski, Les ducs de Nevers et l’État royal, 305; Jouanna, La France du XVIe siècle, 228).
137 Jean Boutier, Alain Dewerpe and Daniel Nordman, Un tour de France royal: le voyage de Charles IX, 1564–1566 (Paris, 1984), 257–58. Although there had been a considerable number of appointments to the order since 1560, it nonetheless represented a substantial prestige.
141 AN, 265 AP 54, Dossier 19, No. 3, ‘La forme Que Mons[ieu]r de Crussol... aura à tenir à la p[rése]nta[t]ion qu’il fera du collier de l’ordre..., 10 December 1561’.
On the appointed day, Gordes and Sault were to meet him at his lodging, and go together to a church, accompanied by other nobles.\textsuperscript{142} After hearing Mass, Gordes and Sault would kneel before Crussol, who represented the person of the king. After he had outlined the duties required of them, Gordes and Sault would take the oath, while touching the cross and the Bible.\textsuperscript{143}

He would then put the collier (necklace) that signified their membership around their necks. Crussol’s actions and words were described in detail in these instructions, and this occasion was full of religious themes. The nobles were urged to carry the collier to the praise and service of God, and the glorifying of His church. After finishing with the words ‘in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit’, Crussol would, in a sign of friendship, kiss them.\textsuperscript{144} He may have been chosen to appoint these nobles for reasons of proximity, as three days later, the monarchy gave him a commission for southern France. Shouldering this commission provided him with the opportunity to appoint these nobles, and he seemingly carried out this ceremony while in Lyon on this royal mission.\textsuperscript{145}

However, given that this ceremony was a very religious event, it is notable that Crussol did not have any issues with participating in the ceremonial Mass. The potential issue of the Mass was highlighted in a letter of Burie to the monarchy, in January 1562. After the crown had asked him to award membership of the order to Jean de Parthenay-L’Archevêque, the sieur de Soubise, Burie sought advice for the possibility that Soubise would raise some difficulties due to the Mass, given his Protestant sympathies.\textsuperscript{146} Burie noted that ‘for the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{142} Ibid, p. 1.
\item \textsuperscript{143} Ibid, pp. 1-2. A copy of the oath that Gordes and Sault would have taken is found in AN, 265 AP 54, Dossier 19, No. 2, ‘Forme de la réception et accepta[t]ion de l’ordre que le s[jeu]r de Gordes signera de sa main et fera sceller du scel [sceau] de ses armes, 1561’.
\item \textsuperscript{145} BNF, fr. 32866, p. 27, ‘François d’Agoult de Montauban, comte de Sault’.
\item \textsuperscript{146} BNF, fr. 3186, fols 8r-9v, ‘Letter of Charles de Coucius, the sieur de Burie, to Catherine de Médicis, 5 January 1561/1562’.
\end{itemize}
period we are in, the Mass is not held in great esteem to many’.  
Like Crussol, Burie himself was a religious moderate. Although he remained Catholic, he was suspected of having Protestant sympathies, due to his conciliatory leadership in Guyenne.

While this mission is only a minor example of Crussol’s favour in the eyes of the monarchy, it nonetheless reinforces his helpful role for the king and the queen-mother. As well as being used for critical national missions, his activity on their behalf additionally included minor commissions. The religious nature of this ceremony also raises interesting questions about Crussol’s own religious convictions.

**Conclusion**

As shown by these various royal missions completed faithfully by Crussol, his usefulness to the monarchy is clearly highlighted, as is his fidelity to the king and the queen-mother. He was Catherine’s most trusted servant during the kingships of François II and Charles IX, being extremely busy on the crown’s behalf. These missions affirmed both his loyalty to the monarchy and his tight links to Catherine in particular. He was sent on significant operations which affected the overall state of the kingdom, such as his journeys to Nérac and Nanteuil. This was a tense period for the crown, due to the religious troubles throughout France.

Crussol was more than simply the messenger of the royal will, playing an important personal role in overseeing the success of these missions, such as through providing oral messages to accompany royal correspondence. Catherine’s trust in his explanation to Jeanne d’Albret of the situation for which he was sent is a good example of Crussol’s individual contribution. Crussol is shown to be especially close to Catherine during these years, and she

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147 Ibid, fol. 8r. ‘pour le temps où nous sommes la messe n’est pas à beaucoup en grande Recommandation’.
valued him highly. He was also chosen to resolve religious troubles, such as in Guyenne in summer 1561. The southern provinces were much harder for the monarchy to control, given their substantial distance from Paris. This distance gave the provinces considerable autonomy, which could clash with royal authority.

Being chosen to present the Protestant request from the Montpellier estates shows Crussol engaging with his provincial responsibilities, while his correspondence emphasises his importance for keeping the monarchy updated with current affairs, alerting it to events in Toulouse and Provence. Using local nobles to report back on the provincial estates could be very beneficial to the crown. Having regular provincial updates was critical to the royal response to the religious troubles. The choice of Crussol to appoint Gordes and Sault to the order of Saint-Michel is another example of his usefulness to the crown. While Crussol could be specifically chosen for an exceptional mission, at other times he could be one of the several figures used to carry out the royal will, along with figures like the lieutenant-généraux, as revealed by the monarchy’s attempts to pacify Guyenne.

Crussol’s religious convictions appeared to a certain extent in his royal role, his Protestant sympathies being useful for the crown, while his own lands were undoubtedly affected by Protestantism. He was a political moderate at court, not being among the anti-Guise faction as shown by the Nérac mission, and similarly not in the hard-line Catholic party, remaining at court after the explicit toleration of Protestantism. It is notable that although Crussol attended Mass at Nanteuil in October, he was part of the Protestant church at court during the following month. While he particularly praised the Languedoc Protestants in his letters to Catherine in March and April 1561, he later took part in the commissioning ceremony for the order of Saint-Michel. Through these examples, Crussol’s actions reflect the religious fluidity of the early 1560s.
Crussol’s regional connections to the Languedoc Protestants helped calm tensions at the Montpellier estates, in presenting the Protestant request at court. As will be discussed elsewhere, it is important to consider the margin for manoeuvre that Crussol had in terms of his religious convictions. On the one hand, Crussol was from a Protestant milieu and had a noticeable Reformed presence on his territories. On the other hand, his royal favour was strictly tied to his obedience to Catherine and Charles IX, and relative separation from the hard-line Catholics or Protestants at the French court.

The missions through these years emphasise well the growing reliance of the monarchy on Crussol for carrying out the royal will. The crown viewed him as a figure who could make known its wishes to the Protestants, as similarly shown in his later mission to the Midi. Despite his Protestant sympathies, Catherine and Charles trusted him to carry out their commands faithfully, even when directly involving Protestants. His fortunes were closely linked to crown favour, as evidenced by his royal positions of influence, most notably as Catherine’s chevalier d’honneur. As a noble from the southern provinces, Crussol was particularly useful to the monarchy, in understanding the various regional contexts and advising the crown on the best response to take in the face of these significant threats and religious troubles, in a time of growing tension in France. The crown was evidently satisfied enough with his actions throughout these missions to provide him with a full-scale commission in winter 1561.
Chapter 2: Mission to the Midi, December 1561

The religious troubles directly preceding the Wars of Religion posed a considerable challenge to the authority of the French state. Particularly in southern France, the rise of Protestantism led to a steady increase in religious tension, which the provincial officials struggled to contain. As part of a wider royal response to this situation, Crussol was sent to the provinces of Languedoc, Dauphiné, and Provence in December 1561. His mission was to quell these troubles and to enforce the edict of January, an act of religious toleration for the Protestants. The religiously motivated conflict in this region preluded the official outbreak of war in March and April 1562.

This mission to the Midi provides an opportunity to examine the central theme of Crussol’s relationship to the crown, to see how faithfully he obeyed the royal commands. His appointment to this task was another example of his rise in favour in the eyes of the king and the queen-mother. The question of Crussol’s religious convictions is also apparent through this mission, being discussed by different commentators at the time. Although his Protestant sympathies influenced his carrying out of this mission to a certain extent, his conduct expressed his close relationship to the crown as he attempted to implement the royal will, against strong regional opposition. Crussol’s task allows too for a better understanding of the monarchy’s response to religious conflict, in its attempts to prevent civil war. This chapter argues that the crown, seeing religious tension chiefly in terms of civil disorder or sedition, employed both religious tolerance and political violence to bring peace through Crussol’s mission, giving him a considerable autonomous role. As well as using toleration in the form of the aforementioned edict, the use of political violence was available to him when dealing with groups that refused to obey the royal commands.

As outlined previously, Crussol had a notable reputation at court. His wife, Louise de Clermont was ‘in great favour with the Queen-Mother [Catherine de Médicis] and held in
high esteem with the King of Navarre [Antoine de Bourbon]', which can only have benefitted Crussol.\footnote{De Thou, Histoire universelle, iv, 17. ‘en grande faveur auprès de la Reine-mère, et en grand crédit auprès du roi de Navarre’.} The young age of Charles IX meant that Catherine wielded significant power, while Antoine de Navarre was the lieutenant-général of the kingdom. Crussol therefore embarked from court with strong credit, although he can hardly have been unaware of the difficulty of his mission, given the extent of civil disturbance. To analyse his charge, this commission will first be placed in the wider context of royal policy. After outlining the instructions given to Crussol, his progress is followed from December to April, when he left the Midi to return to court.

In December 1561, the threat of civil war loomed in France, which had been reflected in the new royal edict published in October. This edict ordered the Protestants to leave the churches they had taken, restore seized property, and refrain from iconoclasm, while both Catholics and Protestants were to refrain from insulting each other.\footnote{HL, xi, 365; Nicola M. Sutherland, The Huguenot Struggle for Recognition (New Haven, 1980), 352–53.} This discontent in southern France, shown through riots and the presence of armed groups, coupled with a threat of foreign invasion, meant that this was a worrying period for the monarchy.\footnote{BNF, fr. 15875, fol. 263r, ‘Letter of Charles IX to Guillaume de Joyeuse, (?) December 1561’.} Crussol’s mission formed part of a concerted royal effort to end the troubles in these outlying provinces. The similarity of his instructions with those given to nobles going towards Poitiers, Provence, Guyenne, and Bordeaux, in autumn and winter 1561, illustrate a clear royal policy.\footnote{These instructions are all from BNF, fr. 15875. Guy de Daillon, the comte du Lude, and Melchior de Lettes, the seigneur de Montpezat, were sent to Poitiers, Jean Ébrard, the seigneur de Saint-Sulpice, was sent to Provence, while François de Peyrusse, the comte d’Escars, was sent to Bordeaux. For Guyenne, Louis de Bourbon, the prince de Condé, was originally chosen, but Blaise de Monluc and Charles de Coucis, the seigneur de Burie, were sent instead (Lucien Romier, Catholique et huguenots à la cour de Charles IX: Les États généraux d’Orléans, Le Colloque de Poissy, Le ‘Concordat’ avec les protestants, Le Massacre de Vassy (1560-1562) (Paris, 1924), 273; Histoire ecclésiastique, i, 803–804).}
Explicit toleration of Protestant worship was an integral part of this plan. There were several further parallels between other royal instructions and those of Crussol, such as the use of force as a last resort, the Protestants having to return Catholic churches and assets as per the edict, and the enforcement of the ordonnance banning the carrying of weapons. Blaise de Monluc and Charles de Coucis, the seigneur de Burie, were sent into Guyenne in December. Monluc wrote ‘the same charge that they granted me, they also gave to Cursol [sic] for the province of Languedoc, and they commanded us both that he who finished first would go to help his companion, if this was needed’. As Guillaume de Joyeuse had received the lieutenant-generalship of Languedoc earlier in the year, a position Crussol presumably coveted since his father had been a previous lieutenant-général, the appointment of Crussol for this mission may have been an attempt to compensate him for not receiving this charge.

A letter from Charles IX in December to Sebastien de l’Aubespine, the bishop of Limoges, sheds further light on the crown’s decision. Due to the troubles in Guyenne, Charles had commanded Burie and Monluc, accompanied by a strong cohort of soldiers, to remedy these troubles and make an exemplary punishment of those who had committed crimes, while Crussol was sent to Languedoc for a similar purpose. The king’s aim was that ‘providing for these two sides where the mutins are located, and making a good and strict punishment, this will bring a great tranquillity in this kingdom and will terrify the evil-

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5 BNF, fr. 15875, fol. 411v, ‘Instruction a mons[ieu]r le prince de Conde allant en guyenne, le ... Jo[u]r de decembre 1561’; fol. 8r-v, ‘Instruction a monsieur descars allant a Bourdeaulx, 1561’. This is also highlighted in Ruble, Antoine de Bourbon et Jeanne d’Albret, iv, 51. Although Crussol’s original instructions do not outline this explicit toleration for Protestants, his new instructions in January do.

6 BNF, fr. 15875, fols 411r-v, 413r, ‘Instruction a mons[ieu]r le prince de Conde allant en guyenne, le ... Jo[u]r de decembre 1561’; fol. 8r-v, ‘Instruction a monsieur descars allant a Bourdeaulx, 1561’; fols 369r-371v, ‘Instruction a Mesieurs [sic] les Conte [sic] du lude et de Montpezat allans a Poictiers, 30 October 1561’.

7 Ruble, Commentaires et lettres de Blaise de Monluc, ii, 345–46. ‘la mesme charge qu’ils me baillarent ilz en baillarent autant a monsieur de Cursol pour la province du Languedoc, et nous commandarent a tous deux que celuy qui auroit faict le premier allast secourir son compagnon, s’il en avoit besoing.’

8 L’Aubespine was based at the Spanish court of Philip II.

9 BNF, fr. 15875, fol. 444v, ‘Charles IX to the bishop of Limoges, 26 December 1561’.
doers’.10 This objective was certainly not achieved, although the nobles’ efforts were critically affected by the rapidly changing political landscape over the next few months.

Although this was a considerable appointment for Crussol, there was more to the crown’s decision than simply favouring a loyal noble. Claude Tiévant emphasises that ‘The choice of Crussol for this mission of trust and prestige was both a new statement of royal favour and political cleverness.’11 It was Crussol who could ‘most easily make known the royal will to the Protestants’.12 He was a useful figure in calming tensions, due to both his Protestant sympathies, as shown at the Montpellier estates earlier that year, and his family connections in the region.

Choosing a noble with Protestant sympathies could also repair damage caused by the actions of Joyeuse. Joyeuse lost royal favour due to an event at Béziers in October, seemingly concerning the Protestants there. An incident in the town involving Joyeuse had led to the deaths of several inhabitants. While there are differing accounts of this event, the end result was the king’s disapproval of ‘a great scandal, where some of my subjects were killed by a company with the baron de Lodun your lieutenant’.13 In December, Charles informed Joyeuse of Crussol’s mission and ordered him to support Crussol.14 As there was a strong Reformed presence in Languedoc particularly, a noble with Protestant sympathies would be far better received by the Protestants than a Catholic noble such as Joyeuse.

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10 Ibid, ‘pourvoyant de ces deux costez là ou estoient les mutins et y faisant une bonne et Roidde pugnition ce seront mettre ung grand Repos parmy ce Royaume et donner une terrible terreur aux malings’.
11 Tiévant, Le gouverneur de Languedoc pendant les premières guerres de religion (1559-1574), 33. ‘Le choix de Crussol pour cette mission de confiance et de prestige était à la fois un nouveau témoignage de la faveur royale et une habileté politique’.
12 Ibid. ‘le plus aisément faire entendre aux réformés la volonté royale’.
13 BNF, fr. 15875, fol. 308r, ‘Letter from Charles IX to Guillaume de Joyeuse, 8 November 1561’. ‘ung grande scandalle, où furent tuéz aucuns de mes subiectz par la compagnie qui estoit avec le Baron de lodun v[ot]re lieuten[ant]’.
14 BNF, fr. 15875, fol. 263r, ‘Letter of Charles IX to Guillaume de Joyeuse, (?) December 1561’. This letter provides further information about the reasons for which Crussol was sent to the Midi, due to the continual news Charles heard about the sedition there.
However, certain Catholics viewed Crussol as a clear Protestant, as opposed to simply having Protestant sympathies. Penny Roberts underscores that ‘this extraordinary commission to the Protestant Crussol had aroused objections from the municipal consuls of Aix-en-Provence’, in January 1562. Loys de Perussis (or Perusiis/Perussis), who championed the cause of Durand de Pontevès, the sieur de Flassans, one of Crussol’s adversaries in Aix, argued that the Protestants had pushed for Crussol’s appointment. In Avignon, ‘the pessimism of the Catholics was reinforced by the fact that the policy of Catherine de Médicis was represented, in their eyes, by the action of the comte de Crussol’. Seemingly discussing court opinion in December 1561, the Spanish ambassador maintained that Protestants would be favoured in these missions to Guyenne, Languedoc, and Provence.

During this mission itself, according to the papal nuncio, Prosper de Sainte-Croix, the view of Crussol at court was that ‘he would like to force the people in his quarter to become Lutherans’. Catholic complaints from Provence against Crussol and Claude de Savoie, the comte de Tende, and gouverneur of Provence, were similarly aired at court. Crussol’s close

15 Roberts, Peace and Authority, 53.
16 Perussis, ‘Discours des guerres de la Comte de Venayscin, et de la Provence’, 409. Crussol’s aunt, Marie de Crussol, had joined the Pontevès family through her second marriage, marrying Jean de Pontevès, the seigneur of Cotignac, Carcès, and Flassans (ADV, 2 E 9/112, No. 1, ‘Copie non signée du testament de dame Marie de Crussol, 8 September 1569’).
17 Venard, Réforme protestante, réforme catholique dans la province d’Avignon au XVIe siècle, 471. ‘Le pessimisme des catholiques est renforcé par le fait que la politique de Catherine de Médicis est représentée, sous leurs yeux, par l’action du comte de Crussol’.
19 Louis Cimber and Félix Danjou, eds., ‘Lettres anecdotes écrites au Cardinal Borromée par Prosper de Sainte-Croix, évêque de Chisame, nonce du pape Pie IV auprès de Catherine de Médicis, depuis l’an 1561 jusqu’en 1565’, in Archives curieuses de l’histoire de France, vi, 48. These letters are also found in Jean Aymon, Tous les synodes nationaux des églises reformées de France, auxquels on a joint des mandemens roiaux, et plusieurs lettres politiques, 2 vols (The Hague, 1710), i, 1–283. The letters in Italian are found in BNF, Italien 2182, ‘Registres des lettres écrites par le cardinal Prospero di Santa-Croce pendant sa nonciature en France, adresseses pour la plupart au cardinal Borromeo [S. Charles Borromée] [16 Octobre 1561 - 9 Novembre 1565].’ ‘il voudroit forcer les peuples de son quartier à devenir luthériens’.
20 Arnaud, Histoire des protestants de Provence, du Comtat Venaissin et de la Principauté d’Orange, i, 144.
relations with the Protestants were certainly evident during this mission, to the consternation of the Provençal Catholics in particular.\textsuperscript{21}

Mission outline

Crussol’s mission on 10 December 1561 is outlined in two main documents, the first of which is instructions addressed to him by Charles IX, and the other being the relevant royal decree, a public proclamation.\textsuperscript{22} There are important differences between these documents. The instructions will be considered first, followed by a discussion of the royal decree. These documents again illustrate the prestigious charge given to Crussol, as part of the royal plan to pacify southern France, who ‘was sent with such great power that each person knew to look to his coming’.\textsuperscript{23}

According to the instructions, Crussol was sent due to ‘the emotions that are in an infinity of places in this Kingdom’.\textsuperscript{24} The king wished to ‘restore to the good [subjects] the repos public [public peace] and so punish the evil-doers’.\textsuperscript{25} Citing the trouble caused by religion, Charles wrote that ‘we have tried all the most gentle and gracious ways possible for us to remedy and put all things on a good path’, but to no avail. To sort out this disorder and punish the seditious people, Crussol was chosen, and was praised for his ‘sense, virtues, courage, loyalty, faithfulness, experience and great diligence’.\textsuperscript{26} Civil disorder was the

\textsuperscript{21} See for example BNF, fr. 3186, fol. 25r-v, ‘Letter of Antoine de Crussol to Catherine de Médicis, 15 January 1561/1562’.
\textsuperscript{22} AN, 265 AP 53, Dossier 11, No. 3 ‘Royal appointment of Antoine de Crussol by Charles IX, 10 December 1561’; Dossier 11, No. 4, ‘Letter from Charles IX to Antoine de Crussol, 10 December 1561’. This letter is also found, with slight changes, in BNF, fr. 15875, fols 434r-435v, ‘Instructions a monsieur de Crussol allant en Languedoc, Dauphiné, et Provence en decembre 1561’.
\textsuperscript{23} Perussiis, ‘Discovrs des gverres de la Comte de Venayscin, et de la Provence’, 409. ‘fut mandé avec telle et si grande puissance que chacun ha [sic] sceu veoir à son advénement’.
\textsuperscript{24} AN, 265 AP 53, Dossier 11, No. 4, p. 2, ‘Letter from Charles IX to Antoine de Crussol, 10 December 1561’ ‘des emotions que se commectent en une Infinité de lieux de ce Royaume’.
\textsuperscript{25} AN, 265 AP 53, Dossier 11, No. 3 ‘Royal appointment of Antoine de Crussol by Charles IX, 10 December 1561’. ‘Restituer aux bons le Repos publicq et tellement chastier les meschans’.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid, ‘Nous avons tenté toutes les plus douces et gracieuses voyes qu’il nous a esté possible pour y pourveoir et Remectre toutes choses au bon chemin’, ‘sens vertus vaillance loyaulté fidelit[é] experience et grande diligence’.


primary concern of the monarchy, which religious conflict had stirred up. In each province, Crussol was to discuss how to quell any religious conflict with the lieutenant-général, the second in command in the province (or the gouverneur in the case of Provence), before punishing those who had contravened royal edicts. He was to stop en route in Lyon, to enquire of the situation there.27

There were, however, differences in Crussol’s orders for each province. For Dauphiné, the focus was on the removal of weapons due to reports of a plot, as there was not ‘a better nor more sure way to impede people rebelling than to remove their weapons’. The lieutenant-général there was cautioned, however, ‘not to drive the men to despair through a too curious search of their life, opinion, and actions’, given the tense situation.28 The official public document does not differ considerably from these instructions, although it is notable that while the instructions urged caution, not inciting discontent among the population, this royal decree simply indicated the punishment for those who disobeyed the king’s commands.29 Crussol would inquiere of the ‘seditious people and perturbators of the repos public and others committing scandalous acts and murders’, and seize such people.30

The king sent further orders for Dauphiné to Crussol in a letter of 21 December.31 Certain Dauphiné inhabitants had complained of the poor behaviour of the royal officers there, and the king wished to investigate both these reports and the allegedly controversial statements of the inhabitants. In Languedoc, the king had heard of:

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27 AN, 265 AP 53, Dossier 11, No. 4, p. 2, ‘Letter from Charles IX to Antoine de Crussol, 10 December 1561’.
28 Ibid, ‘ung meilleur ny plus seur moien po[u]r empesch Le people de s’esleer que de luy oster ses armes’, ‘ne desesperer point les hommes par une trop curieuse recherche de leur vye oppinion et actions’. The king’s wariness over causing further disorder through the conduct of his officials is also seen elsewhere (BNF, fr. 15875, fol. 8r-v, ‘Instruction a monsieur descars allant à Bourdeaulx, 1561’).
29 AN, 265 AP 53, Dossier 11, No. 3 ‘Royal appointment of Antoine de Crussol by Charles IX, 10 December 1561’.
31 AN, 265 AP 53, Dossier 11, No. 6, ‘Letter from Charles IX to Antoine de Crussol, 21 December 1561’.
many excesses, emotions, and scandalous acts with the deaths of many people, of which no punishment has been made, either through the consent of the officers or perhaps because the authors of these evil acts are so strong that the sieur de Joyeuse, lieutenant of the aforementioned governorship, is not able to punish them.\textsuperscript{32}

Along with highlighting the partiality of the provincial magistrates, this was a critique of Joyeuse’s previous efforts to quell the troubles. Crussol had five gendarmerie cavalry companies and several hundred arquebusiers at his disposal if he required troops, although the king was ‘hoping more for his dexterity and prudence in the pacification of such emotions than for force’.\textsuperscript{33} Crussol was also to correspond with Monluc, to trap any rebels that travelled between Languedoc and Guyenne.

When compared to the royal decree, it is Crussol’s ability to punish those who disturbed the repos public that is most striking, with the seditious activity in Languedoc being emphasised. If people resisted his commission, he was to assemble troops and destroy them, ‘tearing and putting them into pieces as Rebels and enemies of us and of our Kingdom’; the king using extremely strong language.\textsuperscript{34} Similarly, if the people refused to allow entry to fortified places or towns, or:

resist the sieur de Crussol through force of arms, he will put and bring the cannon before these towns, places, and castles to breach them and pursue the Rebels with all the forces that he will have in the province to put and tear into pieces all those

\textsuperscript{32} AN, 265 AP 53, Dossier 11, No. 4, p. 3, ‘Letter from Charles IX to Antoine de Crussol, 10 December 1561’. ‘plusieurs excèz emotion et scandalles avec la mort de plus[ieu]rs personnes desquelz Il n’a esté faict aucune pugnition soit po[u]r la connivence des officiers ou p[ou]r estre (peult-estre) les auteurs de telz malefices sy fortz que le S[ieu]r de Joyeuse lieuten[ant] aud[icht] gouvernements n’a peu avoir moien de les chastier’.

\textsuperscript{33} ibid, ‘Esperant plus de sa dexterité et prudence po[u]r la pacification de toutes telles emotions que de forces’.

\textsuperscript{34} AN, 265 AP 53, Dossier 11, No. 3 ‘Royal appointment of Antoine de Crussol by Charles IX, 10 December 1561’. ‘les tailler et mettre en pieces comme Rebelles et ennemys de nous et de n[ot]re Royaume’.
who have such temerity to resist my authority, to tear down and ruin the castles, places, and strong houses, to pull down and demolish the walls and to fill in their moats.\textsuperscript{35}

Along with being able to punish towns through other means, such as by suspending town privileges, Crussol was to take a strict line with negligent officers and those who had supported the rebellions, suspending or depriving these of their estates and offices. He was accompanied by \textit{commissaires} to enforce the royal edicts, due in part to the actions of these regional officers.\textsuperscript{36} Their charge was ‘to judge the rebellions, sedition, crimes and other abuses... to gather evidence, conduct trials, arrange for the release of religious prisoners, and check out the actions of royal officials and judges’.\textsuperscript{37} While the instructions expressed the royal desire that Crussol would not require the use of force, the decree outlined the consequences of potential disobedience. The king hoped to avoid conflict through these severe threats.

The instructions for Provence were very similar to those for Dauphiné and Languedoc, the royal decree reiterating the option of soldiers for Crussol’s use.\textsuperscript{38} In each province, Crussol was to certify that ‘the churchmen, their tax farmers, and officers are maintained in their possessions and rights’ and if someone has ‘despoiled them or chased

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{35} Ibid, ‘Resister a\textsuperscript{uc}[ict] s\textsuperscript{ieu}[r] de crussol par forces d\textsuperscript{armes} il fera mectre et amener le canon devant les\textsuperscript{ictes} Villes places et chasteaux Po\textsuperscript{u}\textsuperscript{r} en f\textsuperscript{air}e ouverture et courra sus aux Rebelles avec toutes les forces qu\textsuperscript{il} y aura a\textsuperscript{ud}[ict] pays Po\textsuperscript{u}\textsuperscript{r} mectre et tailler en pi\textsuperscript{eces} tous ceux qui seront si temeraires que de Resister \textsuperscript{a n\textsuperscript{ot}\textsubscript{re authorité} fera Raser et Ruyner les\textsuperscript{icts} Chasteaux places et maisons fortes abbatre et demoli les murailles et combler les fosses diceulx’.
\item \textsuperscript{36} Monluc also took \textit{commissaires} along on his mission (Ruble, \textit{Commentaires et lettres de Blaise de Monluc}, II, 346). He feared that the \textit{conseillers} in Guyenne would not be impartial, and his suspicions on this front were indeed well founded (Roberts, \textit{Peace and Authority}, 58).
\item \textsuperscript{37} Roberts, \textit{Peace and Authority}, 53.
\item \textsuperscript{38} AN, 265 AP 53, Dossier 11, No. 3 ‘Royal appointment of Antoine de Crussol by Charles IX, 10 December 1561’.
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them from these’, he was to rectify this. The king also commanded all military and judicial officers, town officials, and subjects, to obey Crussol, as they would ‘to our own person’. Through an overall comparison of the two documents, the language is much stronger in the royal decree, with any resistance to Crussol being severely punished. The instructions, on the other hand, urge caution, trying to avoid the use of force. Given the extensive conflict already occurring, the monarchy did not wish to enflame the regions further through antagonising its inhabitants. However, given the tense state of the provinces, Crussol could not have pacified the Midi without soldiers.

Change in situation

Before Crussol arrived in the provinces, having not set out immediately from court, a change of plan was required. This was due to the threats posed by Fabricio Serbeloni, commander in Avignon, and the sieur de Flassans, the first consul of Aix-en-Provence. Serbeloni was a threat for two reasons; as well as raising troops in Avignon and having a considerable number of these at his disposal, there were additional reports of Spanish collusion, which would bring further troops. The Spanish frontier was a heightened issue during this time. There had also been a massacre of Protestants in nearby Villeneuve-lès-Avignon, with Avignon inhabitants being involved. By the end of December 1561, Charles IX had heard that Serbeloni had been amassing troops to ‘guard his estate from Huguenots’ and was expecting

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40 AN, 265 AP 53, Dossier 11, No. 3 ‘Royal appointment of Antoine de Crussol by Charles IX, 10 December 1561’. ‘à n[ot]re propre personne’.
42 HL, xi, 370. For more information on Serbeloni’s appointment and activities, see Venard, Réforme protestante, réforme catholique dans la province d’Avignon au XVIe siècle, 472–73.
43 The Spanish frontier was uncomfortably close to Languedoc (William Beik, Absolutism and Society in Seventeenth-Century France: State Power and Provincial Aristocracy in Languedoc (Cambridge, 1985), 156).
44 Histoire ecclésiastique, i, 977–78; Perussiis, ‘Discovrs des gverres de la Comte de Venayscin, et de la Provence’, 407–8; HL, xi, 370.
five thousand Spanish troops. To prevent this, Charles had ordered troops to Marseille and had bolstered the town’s security, as while he was confident of the friendship of the Spanish king (‘the friendship of whom I am assured’), he had to prepare for this threat. The king made four to five hundred men from nearby garrisons available, as well as readying eighteen to twenty companies of infantry from Provence, Languedoc, and Dauphiné. Due to this royal concern over Serbeloni, several individuals were sent to report back on his activity.

Jean Ébrard, the seigneur de Saint-Sulpice, and Ferdinand de San-Severino, the prince de Salerne, were both sent separately to Avignon to investigate. Saint-Sulpice informed the vice-legate there that Catherine thought it ‘strange that one takes up arms’ without warning her ‘of the occasion which moved them’. While the vice-legate stressed Avignon’s concern over the religious troubles, Serbeloni himself also underlined his innocence. Salerne considered the situation in Avignon to be quite serious. In a letter to Charles at the end of December, he indicated that the town was challenging royal authority. Serbeloni was attempting to draw Charles’s subjects to his own service, while the attack on the king’s Protestant subjects at Villeneuve had not been punished by the Avignon leadership. Serbeloni was also stocking provisions and improving the town’s defences.

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45 BNF, fr. 15875, fols 444v-445r, ‘Charles IX to the bishop of Limoges, 26 December 1561’. ‘garder son estat des huguenotz’.  
46 Ibid, fol. 445r. Security measures for Marseilles are mentioned in royal letters to Claude de Savoie, the comte de Tende, and to Saint-Sulpice, in December 1561 (BNF, fr. 15875, fols 430r-431v, ‘Instruction a monsieur de Saint Sulpice allant en Provence en decembre 1561’; fol. 452r-v, ‘Letter from Charles IX to Claude de Savoie, comte de Tende, 27 December 1561’). In analysing this statement, it is important to consider the element of rhetoric in Charles’s words, and the public nature of this letter, as the French monarchy was certainly suspicious of Spanish interference in France, as shown through the earlier potential kidnapping plot. ‘l’amitié duquel Je m’asseure’.  
48 Ibid, fol. 438r-v.  
49 BNF, fr. 15875, fol. 466r-v, ‘Letter of Ferdinand de San-Severino, the prince de Salerne, to Charles IX, 30 December 1561’. Although this is recorded in the BNF as being from Girolamo Seripando, the évêque de Salerne, it was instead the prince de Salerne, who was in Avignon or Villeneuve d’Avignon during this time. Salerne refers to the Protestants as ‘evangélistes’. This is an interesting name for the Protestants, and perhaps underlines Salerne’s own Reformed sympathies, which would be seen through his presence alongside Crussol in November 1562.
while conspiring with the président of the Aix-en-Provence parlement.50 Salerne advised the king to remove Serbeloni.51

A letter from Charles IX to Joyeuse in December sheds further light on the royal response to this threat.52 The king wanted Joyeuse to have the region in a state of readiness. To deal with reports of Spanish troops near Perpignan, and Serbeloni’s plan to levy soldiers, he ordered Joyeuse to watch the Spanish border and move military companies towards Avignon. However, Joyeuse found no evidence that the Spanish were planning to cross the frontier.53 In addition, Charles asked the cardinal de Ferrara to write to Serbeloni in order:

that he does not play with making soldiers in the middle of my kingdom, because I am, thank God, strong enough to preserve him in his estate without that a prince other than myself mixes himself in this, and where he would employ himself in this way, I will bring against him such strong troops that he will be in difficulty.54

This was quite a severe warning on the part of the crown and given the multiple reports of the threat that Serbeloni posed, Charles IX ordered Crussol to go to Avignon and speak with him. In a letter to Crussol, Charles noted Serbeloni’s suspicious behaviour, and mentioned the military companies he had made ready for this situation, while Joyeuse watched the Spanish frontier.55 Crussol would first speak with Salerne to inquire of the situation in Avignon. Mentioning Serbeloni’s collection of munitions and vivres, he was to order him to desist these actions, and make clear that the king could not endure this activity

50 Ibid, fol. 466r.
51 Ibid, fol. 466v.
54 BNF, fr. 15875, fol. 445r, ‘Charles IX to the bishop of Limoges, 26 December 1561’. ‘qu’il ne se joue pas de faire gens dans le milieu de mon royaume Car je suis assez fort Dieu mercy po[u]r luy conserver son estat sans qu’autre prince que moy s’en mesle et là où il en useroit autrement que je luy metteray de si bonnes forces en teste qu’il s’en trouvera mal’.

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in the middle of his kingdom. He would offer royal forces to Serbeloni if he needed protection.

Both the king and the queen-mother also wrote directly to Serbeloni. Charles IX remarked to Serbeloni that he found it ‘very strange’ that ‘in the middle of my kingdom’, Serbeloni would ‘fear violence’ occurring. He further indicated that given ‘the season we are in’, this behaviour could certainly be viewed as suspicious, if the king was not so assured as he was of the ‘good will’ of the pope. He asked Serbeloni to cease this action, and emphasised that if he had need of forces, to use royal troops. Otherwise, Charles IX stressed that it would be clear that Serbeloni did not have good intentions, and ‘would force me to remedy this [situation]’, which was another strong royal threat. Charles signalled the charge he had given Crussol to speak to him ‘on my behalf’ and urged Serbeloni to receive Crussol ‘as myself’. Catherine similarly urged Serbeloni to believe what Crussol told him on her part. These royal letters again illustrate the important role that Crussol had for the king and the queen-mother, being entrusted to speak on their behalf.

During the escalation of the threat in the Midi over these few months, the crown used several nobles to deal with the Avignon situation. The influence of noble networks is evident, and Crussol was not operating in a vacuum. While the month of December was spent mainly dealing with Serbeloni, Flassans also appeared as a threat, although not on the same scale as Serbeloni. In a letter from the comte de Tende to Charles on 23 December, he

56 Ibid, fol. 451r.
57 Ibid, fols 450v-451r.
58 BNF, fr. 15875, fol. 464r-v, ‘Letter from Charles IX to Fabricio de Serbeloni, 30 December 1561’;
60 ‘bien estrange’, ‘dans le millieu de mon Royaume’, ‘craindre aucune violence’.
61 ‘la saison où nous sommes’, ‘bonne vont[é]’, ‘me c[on]traindrez dy pourvoir’.
62 Charles also sent a similar letter to the consuls and inhabitants of Avignon, again reiterating that Crussol was speaking on the king’s behalf (BNF, fr. 15875, fol. 465r, ‘Letter from Charles IX to the consuls and inhabitants of Avignon, 30 December 1561’). ‘de ma p[ar]t’, ‘c[omme] moymesmes’.
63 ‘Letter of Catherine de Médicis to the seigneur Fabricio, 30 December 1561’, in LCM, x, 49–50.
recorded that Flassans interrupted the holding of the provincial estates in Provence with fifty men, armed with ‘jackets of chain mail and pistols’. He was responsible daily for ‘many disorders’.

This new situation was similarly reflected in a royal letter in January, as Crussol was commanded again to ‘give order to Avignon and speak to the principal leaders of the town that I have heard abuse their offices’, punishing people if needed. This was a tense period, as there were religious riots in Nîmes, Montauban, Castres, Pamiers, and Carcassonne. Going then to Nîmes, Crussol was to make an exemplary punishment of those who ‘chased the bishop [Bernard d’Elbène] from his episcopal house and have constrained him with force and with arms to flee the town with a thousand violences [sic] and excesses’. The Nîmes Protestants had additionally seized the cathedral. He was to remind the Protestants to preach outside the town, and to see this not as permission from the king, but as ‘consent’.

Mentioning that Louis de Bourbon, the prince de Condé, had been sent to Guyenne, the king urged Crussol to work in concert with him and help each other if necessary. Catherine also

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64 Ibid, fol. 423v. ‘Plus[ieu]rs desordres’.
65 BNF, fr. 3186, fol. 16r, ‘Lettre of Charles IX to Antoine de Crussol, 8 January 1561/1562’. ‘donné ordre aud[ict] lieu d’Avignon et bien parlé aux principaulx de la ville que j’ay entendu faire de maulvaisys offices’.
66 HL, xi, 371–73.
67 BNF, fr. 3186, fol. 16r, ‘Lettre of Charles IX to Antoine de Crussol, 8 January 1561/1562’. The bishop had fled following Protestant attacks on the churches in December 1561 (Tulchin, That Men Would Praise the Lord, 135–36). ‘ont chassé l’evesque de sa maison episcopalle et l’ont contraint de force et à main armée de vuyder [sic] hors la ville avecques mille violences et excèz’.
69 BNF, fr. 3186, fol. 16v, ‘Lettre of Charles IX to Antoine de Crussol, 8 January 1561/1562’. ‘connivence’.
70 This is echoed in a letter around this time from Catherine to Crussol, before Crussol’s letter on 15 January (BNF, fr. 3189, fol. 84r, ‘Letter of Catherine de Médicis to Antoine de Crussol, January 1561/1562’). However, it seems that Condé again did not take up this role (Ruble, Antoine de Bourbon et Jeanne d’Albret, iv, 54–55).
wrote that she awaited Crussol’s news about Avignon, as she had heard that Serbeloni ‘does not behave himself very discreetly’.  

Instead of general commands in the king’s instructions and decree, these royal letters set out specific new orders for Crussol, which meant that he did not spend significant time in Dauphiné. Increased attention was given to Avignon and Nîmes, which the monarchy evidently viewed as the two main causes of disorder in the region. Both Catherine’s and Charles’s letters refer to Crussol for the first time as ‘mon cousin’ instead of ‘monsieur de Crussol’, indicating his favour in their eyes. This next section first considers Crussol’s actions in Lyon and Dauphiné, before discussing his conduct in Languedoc and Provence.

Lyon and Dauphiné

Crussol first arrived in Lyon at the end of December 1561 or early January 1562. Lyon had a significant Protestant presence. Shortly before his coming, the Protestants there were urged by the town consuls not to hold any assemblies or preach in the town, for eight or ten days until he arrived. This was to avoid the king hearing of these activities and sending a military garrison in response. Crussol’s mission was described as being ‘to give order to pacify all, following the will of his majesty’. Once in Lyon, Crussol arranged that the Protestants would preach outside the town, in the faubourgs (suburbs), while the people were disarmed. Despite these measures, the situation in the town remained tense until the start of the war.

Crussol also stopped in Valence en route, as shown by a letter from Jean de la Place to John Calvin in March 1562. La Place informed Calvin of the activities over the last few

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71 BNF, fr. 3189, fol. 84r, ‘Letter of Catherine de Médicis to Antoine de Crussol, January 1561/1562’. ‘ne se comporte pas fort discrettement’.
72 For both these letters, ‘monsieur de Crussol’ was originally written, before being replaced by ‘mon cousin’.
73 AML, BB 82, fol. 115r, ‘Conseil de la ville de Lyon, 19 December 1561’.
75 Histoire ecclésiastique, iii, 251–52.
76 Ibid, 253.
months. For La Place, Crussol’s command meant the possibility of assistance for the Valence Protestants. Crussol had summoned La Place, and between many warnings, had exhorted him to contain the people in ‘all Christian modesty’, asking the governor to hold them under his protection. He similarly commanded them to go to the faubourgs. Crussol would evidently return to Valence, as La Place wrote, ‘we are awaiting soon the sieur de Crussol, of whom we are hoping for some relief’. Crussol was viewed as a figure that the Protestants could turn to for protection, shown too by a request of the Protestants of Romans for support against the lieutenant-général of Dauphiné.

Although this positive opinion may have been in part due to Crussol representing the royal policy of explicit toleration towards Protestantism, it is more likely due to his Protestant sympathies. His prestigious role was also reflected in the consideration shown by the Valence consuls to his arrival. Representatives would meet him at Tournon-sur-Rhône and accompany him to Valence, where he would be greeted by an artillery salvo, with gifts, wine, and lodging prepared for him.

The edict of January redefined royal policy towards Protestants following its publication on 17 January 1562. Although this edict shared similar elements with those of the previous July and October, it gave increased recognition to the Protestants, and

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79 Ibid. La Place emphasised that Crussol told them to go to the faubourgs, even though there was no news of the edict of January yet. Although Crussol’s action here is similar to this future edict, and while Lucien Romier interprets the similarity of Crussol’s commands with the edict as indicating that Crussol knew the royal plans, Crussol was nonetheless following a royal policy as expressed in the instructions of other nobles sent on missions in autumn and winter 1561 (Romier, *Catholique et huguenots à la cour de Charles IX*, 273).


81 *Histoire ecclésiastique*, iii, 299; Arnaud, *Histoire des protestants du Dauphiné aux XVIe, XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles*, i, 97–98.

82 AMV, BB 6, fol. 127r-v, ‘Conseil de la ville de Valence, 22 December 1561’.
reiterated the royal desire to prevent civil disorder. In this decree, Charles IX detailed the ‘troubles and seditions’ caused in part by the diversity of religious opinions.\textsuperscript{83} After indicating the failure of the edict of July, which had banned Protestant assemblies, the king had decided to devise a new edict.

This royal decree fitted well with Crussol’s existing instructions. Protestants were to return the Catholic churches, revenues and assets they had seized, and were not to carry out further iconoclasm.\textsuperscript{84} They could assemble outside towns to hear sermons.\textsuperscript{85} These assemblies were not to have seditious people among them, and visiting royal officers were to be respected.\textsuperscript{86} Reformed ministers had to take an oath not to preach heretical doctrine, and were not permitted to preach against the Mass and other Catholic ceremonies.\textsuperscript{87} No synods or consistories could take place without the permission or presence of the officers, and they were not allowed to set up their own magistrates and laws.\textsuperscript{88} Any rules for the exercise of the Reformed confession would be authorised by royal officers. The Protestants were not allowed to levy men or revenue.\textsuperscript{89} They were also to guard the political laws of the kingdom, which included obedience to Catholic feast days.\textsuperscript{90}

One of the key emphases of this edict was preventing sedition, in refraining from receiving rebellious people in households, passing on defamatory placards, and promoting civil disorder through sermons.\textsuperscript{91} Weapons were not to be carried, either in assemblies or in

\textsuperscript{84} ‘Édit de janvier, articles one and two’.
\textsuperscript{85} ‘Édit de janvier, article three’.
\textsuperscript{86} ‘Édit de janvier, articles six and seven’.
\textsuperscript{87} ‘Édit de janvier, articles twelve and thirteen’. Heretical doctrine was defined as that which contravened the council of Nicaea, and the Old and New Testaments.
\textsuperscript{88} ‘Édit de janvier, articles eight and nine’.
\textsuperscript{89} ‘Édit de janvier, article ten’.
\textsuperscript{90} ‘Édit de janvier, article eleven’.
\textsuperscript{91} ‘Édit de janvier, articles fourteen, fifteen, and sixteen’. This royal focus on sedition is also highlighted in Penny Roberts, ‘Violence by Royal Command: A Judicial “Moment” (1574–1575)’, \textit{French History}, 33/2 (2019), 200–201.
general. Officers were to be present in their jurisdictions (an abuse which had contributed to the spread of the troubles), and quickly sort out disturbances. This edict emphasised the importance of public order, a concern which Crussol shared.

Following the edict’s publication, the Protestant representatives present at the assembly of Saint-Germain, at which the decree was drawn up, wrote to the Protestant churches asking them to execute this ruling. They wrote ‘we pray you in the name of God, that you may act with such diligence that the edict may be so guarded, that the king, queen, and all his conseil may have occasion to be contented by the obedience of those who are under your charge’. This letter addressed some of the potential Protestant concerns, such as leaving churches they had seized. The Protestants were not content to meet in the faubourgs, as they had preached publicly in the towns and churches in many places. The Histoire ecclésiastique, a source which must be used cautiously, maintains that the Protestants obeyed this edict immediately.

Languedoc

Arriving into Languedoc, Crussol went to Villeneuve-lès-Avignon on 10 January, which acted as his base to carry out royal commands. In Villeneuve, according to Perussiis, he did not concern himself with the Protestant sermons, but attended Mass each day. On the other hand, Léon Ménard remarks that Crussol spent much time with the Reformed minister Pierre

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92 ‘Édit de janvier, article five’.
93 ‘Édit de janvier, articles seventeen and eighteen’.
94 Sutherland, The Huguenot Struggle for Recognition, 355.
95 Histoire ecclésiastique, i, 760. This letter is also found in Mémoires de Condé, iii, 96–98.
96 Histoire ecclésiastique, i, 761. ‘nous vous prions au nom de Dieu, que [vous] faciès telle diligence, que l’Édit soit tellement gardé, que le Roy, la Royne, et tout son conseil ayent occasion de se contenter de l’obeissance de ceux qui sont sous vostre charge’.
97 Ibid.
99 Ibid, 766.
Viret, and that nobles from among Crussol’s following heard Viret preach. These sources raise interesting questions over both the portrayal and reality of Crussol’s religious convictions.

Crussol wrote to Catherine of his progress on 15 January, highlighting his obedience to the royal instructions. He reminded her ‘of the order that I have given to Pont-Saint-Esprit, Bagnols [Bagnols-sur-Cèze] and other places that I passed coming here’, stopping in several places en route. He informed Catherine that he had summoned a group from Nîmes, Viret among them, and ‘gave them a long remonstrance of the excesses, rebellions, and disobediences committed by them in the seizure of temples’, reminding them that they would have to face the full force of the law if it were not for the king’s clemency. This group was eager to emphasise the order in the town, where there had been no sedition or murders. Wishing to maintain control of the Catholic churches they had seized, the Protestants requested Crussol to pass on their remonstrances to the king and the conseil privé, and to send a letter to Catherine in their favour.

However, whether or not Crussol passed on these remonstrances, he certainly ordered them to leave the temples and reintegrate Catholic clerics in their assets and revenues if necessary. Those who committed iconoclasm would be punished. This group confessed to having committed ‘a great fault’, and stressing their loyalty, promised to obey ‘everything that was commanded of them’. Crussol recorded that the ministers left the

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102 Ménard, iv, 332.
104 Ibid, ‘leur fis une longue remonstrance des excès rebellions et desobeissances par eux commises en la saisie des temples’.
105 BNF, fr. 8666, fol. 67v, ‘Nîmes consistory meeting, 10 January 1562’. The following details are also mentioned in Ménard, iv, 328. The representatives’ claim that there had been no sedition evidently omitted the Protestant actions towards the Catholic churches and clerics.
107 Ibid. ‘une grand [sic] faulque’, ‘entierement à ce que leur aivos commandé’.
Catholic churches on 14 January to preach in private houses. These orders were reiterated by the town conseil and consistory, along with the need to hand over weapons.\(^{108}\)

There was a close relationship between the Nîmes consuls and Crussol, as the town neighboured Uzès. The Nîmes consuls had sent representatives to him, while en route to Villeneuve, to illustrate their willingness to obey his commands and to put the town at his service.\(^{109}\) They planned to give Crussol gifts when he arrived, greeting him with a large number of inhabitants.\(^{110}\) In response, he stressed that he would tell them his royal commission in full, and assured them that ‘you do not have a neighbour or friend who desires more the good and tranquillity of you all’.\(^{111}\)

Crussol had also issued an ordonnance on 13 January which detailed the same decrees as above, as well as the need for weapons to be collected and the guilty punished.\(^{112}\) In this document, Crussol is described as lieutenant-général for the king ‘for the pacification of the troubles that are in the provinces of Provence and Languedoc’.\(^{113}\) Elsewhere, the Nîmes consistory referred to Crussol as the ‘lieutenant for the king sent to pacify the troubles in this province’.\(^{114}\) Both Crussol and the Protestants interpreted his position as being that of a lieutenant. Although he was not called a lieutenant-général or ‘lieutenant for the king’ in

\(^{108}\) ADG, E Dépôt 36/127, fol. 271v, ‘Conseil de la ville de Nîmes, 14 January 1562’; BNF, fr. 8666, fol. 68r, ‘Nîmes consistory meeting, 12 January 1562’. While Marc Venard writes that the Protestants, particularly those of Nîmes, ridiculed Crussol’s orders, this is not shown to be the case (Venard, \textit{Réforme protestante, réforme catholique dans la province d’Avignon au XVIe siècle}, 471).

\(^{109}\) ADG, E Dépôt 36/127, fol. 265v, ‘Conseil de la ville de Nîmes, 30 December 1561’.

\(^{110}\) Ibid, fol. 265v-266r.

\(^{111}\) ADG, E Dépôt 36/127, fol. 270v, ‘L[ett]re envoyee par monseigneur le comte de crussol aux consulz concernant la delega[t]jon desd[icts] s[ieu]rs de sainct veray et charles rozel, 8 January 1562’. ‘Vous n’avez voysin ne amy qui plus desire le bien et Repoz de vous tous’.

\(^{112}\) ‘Ordonnance du comte de Crussol, 1562’, in Ménard, iv, 301–2. A section of this ordonnance is also found in ADG, H 492, fols 140v-141v.

\(^{113}\) ‘Ordonnance du comte de Crussol, 1562’, in Ménard, iv, 301. ‘pour la pacification des troubles qui sont ez pais de Provence and Languedoc’.

\(^{114}\) BNF, fr. 8666, fol. 67v, ‘Nîmes consistory meeting, 10 January 1562’. ‘lieutenent [sic] po[u]r le Roy envoyé pour pacifier [sic] les troubles de ce pays’. The following details are also mentioned in Ménard, iv, 328. This role should not be confused with that of Joyeuse before he became lieutenant-général, when he was lieutenant du roi or lieutenant du gouverneur (Tiévant, \textit{Le gouverneur de Languedoc pendant les premières guerres de religion (1559-1574)}, 25–26). In this previous charge, Joyeuse acted as a representative of Montmorency.
the royal instructions, this language was used as he was shouldering a role which had historical royal precedent, an extraordinary *lieutenant-général*.115 In this ordonnance, Crussol noted that ‘many murders, seditions, seizures of temples, breaking of images, demolition of altars, chasing and despoiling of priests, monks, nuns, from their churches and convents, with infinite other insolences’, had been committed.116 He asserted that this was against the royal edicts, particularly that of October. Disobeying Crussol’s commands meant ‘being declared rebels and disobedient to his majesty’.117

He informed Catherine that he had sent a similar request to Montpellier, and envisaged that the town would quickly obey.118 The keys of the churches were duly handed over by the Montpellier Protestants on 22 January.119 From the representatives sent by the Languedoc Protestant churches, Crussol demanded measures like those required of Nîmes, which were accorded. Both the Languedoc churches’ and Nîmes’ representatives had given Crussol documents emphasising their obedience to royal commands, which he would send to Catherine.120 He noted that he found these people ‘easier to sort out than I had believed before my arrival’.121 This citation explains his own thoughts on the mission, having considered that the Protestants would cause trouble, especially as they had to give up the Catholic churches.

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115 Tiévant, *Le gouverneur de Languedoc pendant les premières guerres de religion (1559-1574)*, 103–5. Tiévant indicates that the monarchy had appointed several figures to “*lieutenances générales* extraordinaires”, endowing them with an exceptional and extensive royal authority.
117 Ibid. ‘d’estre declarés rebelles et desobeissans à sa majesté’.
118 This letter of Crussol is presumably that mentioned in AMM, BB 393, fol. 88r, ‘Conseil de la ville de Montpellier 13 January 1562’.
119 *Histoire ecclésiastique*, i, 976.
120 BNF, fr. 3186, fol. 25r, ‘Letter of Antoine de Crussol to Catherine de Médicis, 15 January 1561/1562’.
121 Ibid. ‘assez plus facile arenger [sic] que Je ne l’eusse creu [sic] avant mon arrivee’.
A circular letter from Viret addressed to the Languedoc churches also indicated the Protestant danger of being declared rebels in disobeying Crussol. Viret made clear that they could not contravene the edict ‘without firstly disobeying God and be held as seditious people and rebels, without greatly perturbing the king and his conseil, and inviting monsieur de Crussol, lieutenant of the king, to use force and rigour against us’. The Protestants again viewed Crussol as a lieutenant du roy. Being defined as ‘rebels’ meant that Crussol could employ force against them. Viret further outlined the need to leave the temples and surrender weapons. This letter reinforced the Protestant adherence to Crussol’s commands, and there was a considerable effort to follow his orders. In the eyes of Perussiis, however, the Montpellier and Nîmes Protestants continued to interfere with Catholic practices.

Crussol reiterated the order he gave to Nîmes in a further letter to Catherine, on 17 January. In the company of Saint-Sulpice, he urged Catherine to believe what Saint-Sulpice said on his behalf, such as his ‘order of those of the Reformed church’. Saint-Sulpice and Crussol had a close relationship, as discussed in a later chapter. A journal anonyme also recorded that Crussol arrested some seditious Catholics in Nîmes while in Villeneuve. A later letter of Crussol, written while in Provence, again dealt with events in Nîmes. The king had asked him to certify that the ecclésiastiques received their biens, although Crussol maintained that he had not heard that the Protestants had taken these ‘material assets and

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122 Histoire ecclésiastique, i, 975. ‘sans premierement desobeir à Dieu et estre tenus pour mutins, seditieux et rebelles, sans irriter grandement le Roy et son conseil, et inviter monsieur de Crussol, lieutenant du Roy, en ce faict, à user de force et de rigueur contre nous’.
123 Ibid.
127 BNF, fr. 15882, fols 268r-269v, ‘Letter of Antoine de Crussol to Charles IX, 31 January 1562 (incorrectly noted as 1566)’. This error is also repeated in Tulchin, That Men Would Praise the Lord, 159; HL, xi, 473; Ménard, v, 2.
revenues’. No ecclésiastiques had complained to him about this matter, and he considered that this news was ‘rather slander’.\footnote{BNF, fr. 15882, fol. 268r, ‘Letter of Antoine de Crussol to Charles IX, 31 January 1562’. ‘temporel et revenuz’, ‘plustost calomnie’.


130 Ibid, 409, 417.

131 ACT, EE 1, No. 2, fol. 1r, ‘Mémoire, 1564’.


133 Nothing evidently came of this suggestion, given the continued presence of Flassans in the town.}

Crussol did not wish to return to Nîmes, due to the situation in Provence. Two commissaires, Michel Quelain and Jean de la Guesle, had arrived in Languedoc, and Crussol asked them to enquire of these matters in both Nîmes and Montpellier. Commissaires similarly arrived for Provence, Antoine Fumée and André de Ponat. Fumée and Ponat had Protestant sympathies, and Perussiis wrote that ‘all the evil found its source’ in these ‘old foxes’.\footnote{BNF, fr. 15882, fol. 268r, ‘Letter of Antoine de Crussol to Charles IX, 31 January 1562’.


130 Ibid, 409, 417.

131 ACT, EE 1, No. 2, fol. 1r, ‘Mémoire, 1564’.


133 Nothing evidently came of this suggestion, given the continued presence of Flassans in the town.}

Crussol is portrayed as having been led astray by these figures, who had a role in his later decision to pursue Flassans, according to Perussiis.\footnote{BNF, fr. 15882, fol. 268r, ‘Letter of Antoine de Crussol to Charles IX, 31 January 1562’.


130 Ibid, 409, 417.

131 ACT, EE 1, No. 2, fol. 1r, ‘Mémoire, 1564’.


133 Nothing evidently came of this suggestion, given the continued presence of Flassans in the town.}

Crussol also promised the king that he would enforce the edict of January.

Provence

Crussol finally entered Provence at the end of January or the start of February, mainly to deal with Aix-en-Provence, co-ordinating with the comte de Tende.\footnote{ACT, EE 1, No. 2, fol. 1r, ‘Mémoire, 1564’.

131 ACT, EE 1, No. 2, fol. 1r, ‘Mémoire, 1564’.


133 Nothing evidently came of this suggestion, given the continued presence of Flassans in the town.} In Crussol’s letter in mid-January, he had highlighted an assembly of one thousand to twelve hundred men in the town, led by Flassans and the président of the parlement, the sieur de l’Auris, who Salerne noted had been conspiring with Serbeloni.\footnote{BNF, fr. 15882, fol. 268r, ‘Letter of Antoine de Crussol to Charles IX, 31 January 1562’. ‘temporel et revenuz’, ‘plustost calomnie’.


130 Ibid, 409, 417.

131 ACT, EE 1, No. 2, fol. 1r, ‘Mémoire, 1564’.


133 Nothing evidently came of this suggestion, given the continued presence of Flassans in the town.} He urged Catherine to send letters to these figures as well as to several others, to make them leave the province.\footnote{BNF, fr. 15882, fol. 268r, ‘Letter of Antoine de Crussol to Charles IX, 31 January 1562’. ‘temporel et revenuz’, ‘plustost calomnie’.


130 Ibid, 409, 417.

131 ACT, EE 1, No. 2, fol. 1r, ‘Mémoire, 1564’.


133 Nothing evidently came of this suggestion, given the continued presence of Flassans in the town.} Crussol also mentioned in this letter that he had no further news about Avignon, and Serbeloni disappears from both royal and provincial correspondence at this point, with Flassans instead
taking centre stage. While Crussol did meet with Serbeloni, it is unclear what happened at this encounter.134

Concerning Aix, it is clear that Crussol envisaged difficulties in dealing with the town, due to Flassans in particular.135 Crussol and Tende’s representative was first refused entry into Aix, through the actions of Flassans among others. Following the departure of Flassans, Crussol and Tende entered the town a few days later.136 They hoped that the troops they had levied would bring obedience in Aix and elsewhere, so that ‘the will of your majesty will be adhered to’.137 In another letter to Charles, Crussol’s early optimism had all but dissipated, due in part to the trouble caused by Aix, and he requested extra troops, indicating that ‘things are in an uncertain and very unstable state’.138 He assigned the Protestants a place of worship, installed his commissaires, removed the people’s weapons, and published the edict of January in the parlement.139 To prevent further sedition, all officers in Aix loyal to Flassans were deposed, while those guilty of civil disorder were punished.140

Flasans continued to cause trouble for Crussol, refusing any form of religious toleration for the Protestants.141 He declared himself a chevalier de la foi in a sign of Catholic religiosity, taking as his standard the arms of the pope.142 After leaving Aix, Flassans levied

135 Crussol had requested arquebusiers in preparation for restoring order in the town (BNF, fr. 15882, fol. 268r, ‘Letter of Antoine de Crussol to Charles IX, 31 January 1562’).
139 Arnaud, Histoire des protestants de Provence, du Comtat Venaissin et de la Principauté d’Orange, i, 134; De Thou, Histoire universelle, iv, 306; Histoire ecclésiastique, i, 985.
140 De Thou, Histoire universelle, iv, 306-307; Histoire ecclésiastique, i, 985; Roberts, Peace and Authority, 55.
141 Roberts, Peace and Authority, 54.
142 Gustave Lambert, Histoire des guerres de religion en Provence (1530-1598), 2 vols (Toulon, 1870), i, 132; Histoire ecclésiastique, i, 986; Harding, Anatomy of a Power Elite, 55–56. He also had a Catholic cleric with a crucifix march in front of his troops singing hymns.
troops, pillaged the surrounding area, and destroyed a royal company. In response, Crussol and Tende assembled at least twenty enseignes or military companies, including troops from Nîmes. Flassans’s troops were finally defeated at Barjols. Crussol and Tende’s capture of Barjols was controversial, as it was followed by a general massacre and pillage taking place, while Flassans managed to escape. This event emphasised the charged atmosphere in southern France, and the difficulty for Crussol in subduing religious tensions. Following this event, Crussol left Provence and handed over control of the region to Tende.

Crussol’s actions were also discussed at court, as mentioned earlier. Sainte-Croix, who had highlighted the view of Crussol forcing people to become ‘Lutherans’, raised this issue with the king. He outlined that ‘In the time that Crussol was sent into Provence, I did not neglect to say what I thought, and his majesty replied saying that he was one of his faithful subjects, of whom he hoped all types of good services.’ Sainte-Croix evidently questioned Crussol’s loyalty, presumably emphasising that he was pursuing an objective that ran contrary to the royal will. The king, in response, publicly defended his efforts.

Aftermath

Crussol went again to bring order to Languedoc in April, due to the worsening situation there. He unsuccessfully attempted to alleviate tensions between Catholics and

146 ACT, BB 18, fol. 245v, ‘Conseil de la ville de Tarascon, 25 March 1562’.
148 Ibid. ‘Dans le temps que M[onsieur] de Crussol fut envoyé en Provence, je ne manquai[s] pas de dire ce que j’en pensois, et Sa Majesté me répondit alors qu’il étoit un de ses fidèles sujets, dont elle espéroit toute sorte de bons services.’
149 *Histoire ecclésiastique*, i, 990.
Protestants in places such as Montpellier, Carcassonne, and Castelnaudary. His efforts in late March and April were hindered by the outbreak of civil war, which divided the Midi into hostile camps and curtailed royal authority. The crown’s attempts to enforce the edict of January similarly failed due to this conflict.

Crussol was also involved in alerting Nîmes to the potential scenario of war, as shown by secret instructions that the town leaders received. Le Blanc, *a juge ordinaire*, outlined that he had been charged by Coligny, Condé, François de Châtillon, the *sieur d’Andelot*, and Crussol to tell the churches to live peacefully, and ‘to make the troubles cease and to punish the seditious people’. They were to ‘take guard if the adversaries stockpile weapons’, alerting the churches, and to make provision of weapons themselves. In addition, they were asked to pray for these nobles. In response, it was said that the ministers would include prayers for them in their sermons, and the seditious would be punished. The *conseil* would take charge of the provision of arms. This event was only a few months after Crussol had originally told them to give up their weapons. When Crussol arrived in Nîmes, representatives would speak with him about the slanders against the town’s conduct and the current affairs, although there is no surviving record of this conversation.

Along with reinforcing Beza’s claim that Crussol was part of the Protestant church at court, this incident further uncovers his Protestant sympathies, and helps to explain his later appearance with Condé at Orléans. Crussol is shown to be one of the Protestant nobility and

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150 Ibid, iii, 157–58, 160–62; ‘Journal anonyme’, in Ménard, iv, 4. Crussol also permitted the Toulouse Protestants to carry weapons to protect themselves, and allowed a guard of up to one hundred men, although always under the authority of the town consuls (AMT, BB274, Chronique 238, p. 296, ‘Année 1562’).
151 Roberts, *Peace and Authority*, 63.
152 BNF, fr. 8666, fols 91v-93v, ‘Nîmes consistory and *conseil* meeting, [mid-March 1562?]’. According to Ménard, this meeting took place on 18 March (Ménard, iv, 339). This event is also mentioned in Tulchin, *That Men Would Praise the Lord*, 155.
153 BNF, fr. 8666, fol. 92r, ‘Nîmes consistory and *conseil* meeting, [mid-March 1562?]’. ‘[f]aire Cesser les tumultes et punir les seditieux’.
155 Ibid, fol. 92r-v.
was noticeably the local representative of these four nobles. This event also highlighted his concern for Nîmes and the Protestants, informing them of the potential for war.

After Languedoc, Crussol was recalled to court by Catherine. The situation in the Midi only became worse following his departure, as exhibited by letters from the commissaires. In Aix, the peaceful situation in March had given way to riots by May, with both Protestants and Catholics up in arms, and Protestants mistreated. These disturbances had led to the exile of Protestants and several town officials, along with the expulsion of soldiers. Tende’s correspondence to Catherine raises important questions about the effectiveness of Crussol’s mission, and he warned her that ‘the divided province and everyone being up in arms, can only bring troubles and disorders’. He claimed that the parlement had demonstrated little effort in making these disturbances cease, which was due to the fact that ‘most of them [were] comfortable that such disorders took place, to better take their revenge’. He cautioned Catherine that the situation in Aix would be repeated in other towns, and that it was ‘impossible to attend to this without having some troops, because today is found less obedience among the people than ever’. The abuses of Crussol’s troops garrisoned in Noves and Saint-Rémy, near to Tarascon, had also led to the

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156 Histoire ecclésiastique, i, 990; De Thou, Histoire universelle, iv, 309; ‘Journal anonyme’, in Ménard, iv, 4; Lambert, Histoire des guerres de religion en Provence (1530-1598), i, 140.
158 ‘Le comte de Tende à Catherine de Médicis, 1562, 2 mai, Cadarache’, in Documents pour servir à l’histoire des guerres civiles en France (1561-1563), 40–41.
159 Ibid, 41; ‘Instructions du comte de Tende au seigneur de Vercors (May 1562, Cadarache), in Documents pour servir à l’histoire des guerres civiles en France (1561-1563), 44. The citation is from p. 44. ‘le pais divisé et aiant chacun les armes à la main, ne peult advenir que troubles et desordres’.
160 ‘Le comte de Tende à Catherine de Médicis, 1562, 2 mai, Cadarache’, in Documents pour servir à l’histoire des guerres civiles en France (1561-1563), 41. ‘la plus part d’eux bien aises que telz desordres se facent pour mieux faire leurs vengeances’.
161 Ibid, ‘impossible d’y pourveoir sans avoir quelque force, car aujourd’huy se trouve moings d’obeissance au people que jamais’.
exile of priests and some of the population. In response, Crussol asked Gaspard de Pape, the seigneur de Saint-Auban and commander of the gendarmerie at Saint-Rémy, that the town be treated fairly.

The situation was similarly dire in Languedoc. The Languedoc commissioners found a large number of Catholic prisoners being held unlawfully at Nîmes, while those responsible for seizing churches had not been punished, despite the earlier eagerness of the consuls to obey Crussol. A bleak picture of the province is painted, as Catholic clerics were still out of their benefices, Protestants had been killed, and people were up in arms. In a letter to Catherine in May, Joyeuse highlighted ‘an infinity of seditious people of which the aforementioned [frontier] towns are full’. He finished this letter by stating, ‘I think, Madame, that Crussol will say to you in what state he is leaving affairs’. Tiévant interprets this phrase as being a sly criticism of Crussol. These examples emphasise how the early optimism for peace had been eroded, with the outbreak of the civil war having a major effect.

Conclusion

To conclude, Crussol’s royal mission took place against the backdrop of religious troubles enveloping France. This period was the climax of built-up tension, which had been brewing since 1560. These troubles were viewed chiefly in terms of sedition as opposed to religion,

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162 ACT, BB 18, fols 243r-244r, ‘Conseil de la ville de Tarascon, 21 March 1562’; fol. 237r, ‘Conseil de la ville de Tarascon, 6 March 1562’; Venard, Réforme protestante, réforme catholique dans la province d’Avignon au XVle siècle, 471.
163 ACT, BB 18, fol. 245v, ‘Conseil de la ville de Tarascon, 25 March 1562’; fol. 247r-v, ‘Conseil de la ville de Tarascon, 5 April 1562’.
164 BNF, fr. 3186, fol. 70r, ‘Letter of Michel Evelain (or Quelain) and Jean de la Guesle to Catherine de Médicis, 24 March 1561/1562’.
165 Édouard de Barthélemy, ‘Correspondance inédite du vicomte de Joyeuse, lieutenant général pour le roi en Languedoc’, Bulletin de la société académique du Var, 7 (1876), 73. Although in Barthélemy’s work this letter is dated as 5 March 1562, Claude Tiévant takes it as being 5 May 1562, which seems more accurate (Tiévant, Le gouverneur de Languedoc pendant les premières guerres de religion (1559-1574), 59). ‘une infinité de séditieux dont lesdites villes sont pleines’.
166 Barthélemy, ‘Correspondance inédite du vicomte de Joyeuse’, 73. ‘Je cuide, Madame, que M. de Crussol vous aura dit en quel estat il laisse les affaires’.
167 Tiévant, Le gouverneur de Languedoc pendant les premières guerres de religion (1559-1574), 34.
and phrases such as *repos public* and ‘rebel’ underlined the royal concern with public order. The response of the crown to the religious strife was to send Crussol and other nobles throughout the kingdom to restore peace. The monarchy was extremely practical in dealing with threats, changing Crussol’s instructions if needed, and using several nobles to maintain order in the Midi.

This mission also sheds further light on Crussol’s relationship with the monarchy. His appointment to this charge was a significant sign of trust, presumably due in part to his successful carrying out of previous royal missions, such as bringing Navarre and Condé to court. He was sent with considerable authority, and faithfully attempted to carry out the royal commands, albeit with limited long-term success. His mission was ultimately a failure and was as difficult as originally envisaged by him, despite his early positivity. His measures in January and February were less effective from the end of March onwards, and the situation gradually became worse. The failure of Crussol’s mission was perhaps more to do with the rapidly changing political situation in France, than any specific action of his, as the issues he resolved caused trouble again after he left.¹６８ While the monarchy was naïve in preferring that Crussol quell the religious troubles without force, he did admittedly have success in Languedoc through peaceful means, before later requiring troops. There was no military coordination between Guyenne and Languedoc in the end, as both provinces had strong religious tensions to deal with.

The royal use of both toleration and political violence, although effective at the time, was hindered by the outbreak of war. The monarchy attempted to end the religious troubles by allowing toleration for Protestantism, while at the same time clamping down on threats to the *repos public* and any opposition to the new crown policy, as reflected in the edict of

¹６８ Kevin Gould refers to Crussol’s mission as an ‘unmitigated disaster’, which is unfair. He also adds that Crussol ‘soon defected from royal office to assume the role of military protector for Protestants in Languedoc’, although this event was long after the end of his Midi mission (Kevin Gould, *Catholic Activism in South-West France, 1540-1570* (Aldershot, 2006), 117).
January. The overall royal aim was to avert civil war. It is difficult to see how Crussol could have quelled the religious troubles after the start of this conflict, given the existing tensions in southern France, and the increased hostility caused by the war. The enforcing of the edict was always going to be difficult, as it allowed for the exercise of Protestantism and acknowledged two religious confessions in France, which was unpalatable to many.  

Crussol’s religious position was much discussed during this time. He was publicly viewed as favourable to the Protestants, as shown by the reaction of the Provençal Catholics to his appointment, Sainte-Croix’s comments at court, and the hope for relief from the Valence Protestants. Whether or not he did attend Mass in Villeneuve, as Perussis maintains, Crussol’s warning to the town of Nîmes is perhaps the clearest evidence of his Protestant sympathies, being noted with several Protestant nobility. However, this action should too be seen in the regional context of favouring the principal town near his territory. On the mission itself, he did not adopt an anti-Catholic approach, and his own actions reflected his desire to carry out the royal commands he was given and bring peace to the provinces. Crussol dealt more severely with Flassans than with the Protestants, as the former represented a more significant threat. He favoured using Protestants in his entourage and as allies in tackling the religious conflict in Provence. The Protestants were quick to obey his decrees at first, although Crussol was too trusting of their assurances to adhere to the new edict in the long term.

There was a very different atmosphere at court on Crussol’s return compared to when he had departed in winter 1561, and it was this environment which pushed him to leave again in summer 1562. Crussol was not able to debrief the monarchy on this mission, only doing so in October 1563. Although it is difficult to gauge his reception at court, it was

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170 Roberts, Peace and Authority, 53.
171 Ibid.
hardly favourable, given that the situation in the Midi was worse than when he had arrived there, and, in addition, the start of the war had divided the court. While the royal commission to Crussol had attempted to end religious troubles, the incendiary atmosphere that ignited the war meant that his efforts were ultimately without success. Having concluded the first section of the thesis, considering Crussol’s engagement in this civil war is an essential part of understanding his relationship with the crown.
Section 2: Revolt

Chapter 3: Entry into war, 1562

Crussol’s entry into the First War of Religion was a watershed moment for him. Having been a loyal servant to the monarchy on numerous missions, he became leader of the Protestants and fought against royal armies during this conflict. In terms of his relationship with the crown, he moved from being viewed by the king and the queen-mother as someone whom they could trust to carry out their will amidst religious troubles, without taking a side, to being a figure who would fight against the king’s soldiers. Crussol owed his prominent place in the kingdom entirely to royal favour, and he certainly attempted to convince Catherine of his loyalty after becoming leader of the Languedoc Protestants.

These next four chapters will consider his role in this conflict. After examining the reasons that led Crussol to join the Protestants in revolt, the following chapter details the Reformed assemblies which designated his charge and established the Protestant movement in Languedoc and Dauphiné. The third chapter studies his military campaigns and relations with the Protestant municipal leadership, while the fourth analyses the disarmament process which ended the war. The role of orality is also apparent in these four chapters, viewed through Crussol’s correspondence to the monarchy.

Start of the conflict

The end of Crussol’s mission in the Midi had been caught up in the official start of the first civil war. In March 1562, the infamous massacre at Vassy occurred, during which soldiers of the duc de Guise had killed Protestants worshipping in the town. This event resulted in Protestant nobles retiring from court.¹ Both Guise and Louis de Bourbon, the prince de

Condé, were ordered to leave Paris to defuse the tense situation. However, only Condé obeyed the request, and ‘instead of going to Fontainebleau to protect the queen-mother and her son, he left the way clear for his enemies to go there’. As a result, the so-called triumvirate, consisting of Guise, Anne de Montmorency, and Jacques d’Albon de Saint-André, and accompanied by Antoine de Navarre, had ‘with the intention of legitimising their position... descended on Fontainebleau with a thousand horse and prevailed upon Catherine and Charles IX to return with them to Paris’.  

Following this, Condé seized the town of Orléans in April, and ‘issued a call to arms’. Robert Knecht asserts that ‘Condé’s seizure of Orléans could not be construed as anything other than an attack on the king’s authority’. This was followed by considerable Protestant successes during the next three months, capturing numerous towns, before the royal armies undertook counter advances. Condé set up a chain of command, which included appointing Jacques de Crussol and François de Beaumont, the baron des Adrets, as his lieutenants-généraux in Languedoc and Dauphiné respectively. Catherine had no option but to turn to the triumvirate to put down the Protestant revolt.

When Crussol entered the war, the conflict had been ongoing for eight months. Having returned to court following the end of his royal mission, he appeared at Orléans alongside Condé, between April and June 1562. In a list of nobles, ‘Crussol and his brothers’

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2 Ibid, 82.
3 Ibid.
5 Knecht, The French Civil Wars, 1562-1598, 86.
7 Knecht, The French Civil Wars, 1562-1598, 89.
are noted. His presence could have been an expression of his discontent with the triumvirate and their disregard for the edict of January, as well as a show of support for Condé. He then departed for his lands in the Vivarais. According to Crussol, he had not planned to participate in the war, instead wishing to retire to his estates.

His original abstention from the war was recognised by the monarchy, as shown by the activity of his military company. Catherine ordered the maréchal de Brissac to use Crussol’s company in August 1562 to combat enemy troops, while it was known in early November 1562 that the king wished to remove the companies of Ferdinand de San-Severino, the prince de Salerne (whom we later find in Uzès alongside Crussol), and Crussol himself. To analyse Crussol’s decision to join the Protestants, four lines of inquiry will be used: loyalty to the monarchy (including discontent with the triumvirate’s actions), allure of

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10 TNA, SP 70/41, fols 46v, 47v, ‘List of the Party of the Prince of Condé, September 1562’. ‘cursol et ses frères’. This document is closely related to one in the British Library, which has a shorter list of nobles following Condé, also with an uncertain date, reprinted in the correspondance of Theodore Beza (‘Liste des gentilshommes de l’armée protestante à Orléans en 1562’, in Correspondance Bèze, iv, 266–71). Although the Correspondance Bèze considers that it is instead Jacques who was present alongside Condé, Jacques would not have been called Crussol, and the fact that in the list Crussol is noted under chevaliers, referring to those in the order of Saint-Michel, makes certain that it is instead Antoine. Antoine’s brother Jean de Crussol, the sieur de Lévis, was also noted separately as ‘de Lévis, brother of Crussol’ (‘de Levis frère de cursol’). Crussol’s other brothers were Jacques, Charles, Louis, and Galiot, although it is unclear whether Louis and Galiot took part in this war. Although it was possible that Crussol’s name was added to this list to bolster support for Condé, the few nobles from Languedoc mentioned on the list would weigh against this having occurred - my thanks to Hugues Daussy for this observation.  
11 Crussol’s court departure has also been understood as discontent with the actions of the duc de Guise (Albiousses, Histoire des ducs d’Uzès, 67–68). Crussol allegedly went to Germany and Switzerland before going to his estates (Haag and Haag, La France protestante, iv, 129; Histoire ecclésiastique, iii, 201–2).  
12 ‘Lettre de comte de Crussol à la reine mère, 14 November 1562’, in HL, xii, 643. Although the famous history by Jacques Gaches has several errors, Gaches nonetheless mentions that Crussol was commanded by Condé to join him at Orléans. While he incorrectly notes that Crussol was appointed Condé’s lieutenant in Languedoc, it is curious that Gaches notes the Orléans link with Crussol, which is not widely mentioned in the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century histories (Jacques Gaches, Mémoires de Jacques Gaches sur les guerres de religion à Castres et dans le Languedoc, 1555-1610, ed. by Charles Pradel (Paris, 1879), 29).  
13 BNF, fr. 15876, fol. 319r, ‘Letter of Catherine to Médicis to the Maréchal de Brissac, 9 August 1562’; fr. 15877, fol. 335r, ‘Letter of Cristophe, le comte de Rockendorf to Catherine de Médicis, 2 November 1562’. Given that Crussol’s company was used by others during this period, this challenges Robert Harding’s claim that his muster rolls during the war provide conclusions over the religious convictions of his troops, in assessing whether they remained at his service once he joined the Protestants (Harding, Anatomy of a Power Elite, 73).
power, religious convictions, and regional factors. To examine this decision, correspondence between Crussol and the monarchy will be used, along with his agreement with the Protestants.

Protestant justification

To justify their actions against the crown, the Protestants presented a detailed argument, as shown through the Protestant justification of arms given in April 1562 by Condé. In this document, Condé put forward the reasons that moved him to ‘serve the King, the Queen, and all this Kingdom, in their great need’. He declared that he was fighting to secure the king’s liberation from the triumvirate. These figures, who also dominated the king’s conseil, are portrayed as having abused royal authority. To avoid their responsibility for the war, Condé claimed that the triumvirate had announced that ‘their intention is only to conserve the Roman Catholic Religion’.

In justifying his own conduct, Condé affirmed that for the duty he owed to God and to the monarchy, he took up arms ‘to put back in full liberty the person of the king, the queen, and her children, and to maintain the observation of the edicts and ordonnances of his majesty’, such as the edict of January. This is very similar to the resolution passed by a Protestant assembly at Saint-Jean d’Angély on 25 March: ‘that in good conscience one could and must take up arms for the deliverance of the king and queen-mother, and defence of

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15 Ibid, 222. ‘faire service au Roy, à la Royne, et à tout ce Royaume, en leur grand besoing’.
16 Ibid, 228. A Protestant argument against the Guise (the duc de Guise and his brother the cardinal de Lorraine) seizing the king had appeared as early as 1559 (Hugues Daussy, ‘L’invention du citoyen réformé. L’expression de l’identité politique huguenote dans la littérature polémique et les premiers ouvrages historiques réformés’, in L’identité huguenote: faire mémoire et écrire l’histoire (XVIe-XXle siècle), 40–43). This Guise dislike was also apparent through the Conspiracy of Amboise, as shown earlier.
18 Ibid, 231. ‘leur intention n’est que de conserver la Religion Catholique Romaine’.
the religion oppressed by those of the Guise and their adherents, against the edicts solemnly made and published. 20

Given that these figures were in control of the monarchy, Condé refused to obey any royal commands, letters and other documents, ‘until the king and queen, and his legitimate conseil, may be in such place and such liberty that belong to a king and to a queen’. 21 This argument enabled the Protestants to disobey direct royal orders, on the grounds that it was not the royal will. 22 The king did claim that he was not in captivity, which the Protestants rejected. 23 Although this was a convenient argument, the Protestants did believe that monarchical authority was being usurped.

In his declaration, Condé argued that the January edict had been set up within the proper structures of the French state, and to ask for this edict to be applied was to fulfil his duty as a prince of the blood, defending the king’s subjects. 24 Condé’s argument was of a political rather than a religious nature, which helped to attract a wider audience. 25 During the wars, Protestant writings highlighted their political position as loyal subjects rather than putting forward their religious identity, to demonstrate that their faith did not affect their fidelity to the king. 26

21 De Thou, ‘Déclaration faicte par Monsieur le Prince de Condé’, iii, 234. ‘Jusques à ce que lesdits Roy et Royne, et son légitime Conseil, soyent en tel lieu et telle liberté qu’il appartient à un Roy et à une Royne’.
23 BM, Ms. 2589, no. 39, ‘Royal Letter of Charles IX, 8 April 1562’; Histoire ecclésiastique, ii, 38.
24 Jouanna, Le devoir de révolte, 150. The monarchy did declare in April, following Condé’s capture of Orléans, that the edict of January was still applicable, in their attempts to bring about the laying down of arms. However, the Protestants treated this as being from a captive monarch (Sutherland, The Huguenot Struggle for Recognition, 356; Histoire ecclésiastique, ii, 39).
25 Jouanna, Le devoir de révolte, 151.
26 Daussy, ‘L’invention du citoyen réformé’, 47.
Loyalty

Crussol’s primary desire was to stay out of the conflict, and after his appearance at Orléans, he departed to his estates. Loyalty to the monarchy is a valid element in considering the reasons for his entry into war. It is easy to be cynical about noble protestations of loyalty, but as Stuart Carroll has revealed through his study of Protestant princes, fidelity to the crown was highly regarded by the nobility. Although conscience demanded that they join with their co-religionists in defending Protestantism, they had a sense of loyalty to the monarchy.27 This sense of loyalty helps to explain their indecision during the war, and there are certainly parallels with Crussol. His agreement with the Languedoc Protestants in November 1562 is vital in understanding his reasons for entering the conflict. Crussol had contact with the Languedoc Protestants prior to this month, who had tried unsuccessfully to convince him to be their leader several times. At a Nîmes consistory meeting on 25 August 1562, Saint-Remy, a conseiller from Montpellier, informed them that Crussol had requested him to come to Charms, his territory in the Vivarais, although Crussol’s reasons for this are unclear.28 Several Languedoc consistories similarly decided to send representatives, to ask Crussol to take up the defence of the Reformed churches and of the province.

The Protestants also sent another delegation to Crussol in September, highlighting similar themes to the later remonstrances to him, such as the terrible state of the province and injustices done to the people, the presence of foreigners, the Protestant loyalty to the king, and finally the duty that Crussol owed to the monarch in taking up this charge.29 This

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27 Carroll, “Nager entre deux eaux”, 1015.
28 BNF, fr. 8666, fol. 151v, ‘Nîmes consistory meeting, 25 August 1562’. This event is mentioned in Ménard, iv, 359–60.
29 ADG, E Dépôt 36/127, fols 290v–291r, ‘Conseil de la ville de Nîmes, 13 September 1562’. Although foreign could mean both alien to the province, and outside of France, in this context it refers to foreign soldiers in the province, most likely Spanish troops. There was a considerable number of foreign mercenaries in the royal army, and more foreign troops entered France due to the civil war, as shown in Knecht, The French Civil Wars, 1562-1598, 95. In a wider national context, the term of foreigner was used by the prince de Condé and others to criticise the Guise family.
was followed by a letter in October to again request his support. In addition, the consuls of Valence had sent a representative to Crussol and Des Adrets in September, ‘for the urgent affairs of the town and to conserve it and its inhabitants under the obedience of his majesty the king’, seeking their protection. Crussol’s interaction with the Languedoc Protestants is further shown through the Nîmes consistory deliberations. On 2 October, the consistory deferred holding communion to wait for Louise de Clermont and Crussol, ‘who should come and who want to take it [communion] as has been said’. Crussol was still active in the area even if he had not joined the war. Although this is not a conclusive indication of his religious convictions, the consistory evidently considered that they both wished to attend this important Reformed ceremony.

In the final and successful request to Crussol, the Protestants urged him to aid this oppressed people, reiterating that he would be attesting to his loyalty to the king in shouldering this cause and preserving Languedoc from foreign invasion. This letter adopted a harsh tone, stressing that if Crussol did not act, then God would hold him accountable for ‘their spilt blood’ and ‘the contempt of their lives’. The Languedoc Protestant estates at Nîmes in November 1562 sent representatives to present this plea to Crussol, who was with Odet de Châtillon (brother of Gaspard de Coligny), the prince de Salerne, and Jean de Saint-Gelais, the bishop of Uzès who had converted to Protestantism.

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33 BNF, fr. 15877, fol. 352r, ‘Double des articles accordez entre monsieur le conte [sic] de Crussol et les habitans du pays de Languedoc, November 1562’. ‘leur sang espandu’ and ‘le mepris de leur yves’.
34 For more information about the prince de Salerne, see Wilhelmus F. Leemans and Elisabeth Leemans, La noblesse de la principauté d’Orange: sous le règne des Nassau et ses descendants aux Pays-Bas (La Haye, 1974), 315. Châtillon was involved in the peace negotiations on the monarchy’s side in April and May 1562, trying to convince the Protestants to lay down arms, but retired to his
An assembly representative also signalled the danger of Crussol delaying or not accepting this charge, as if he did not accept, he would be seen:

not as a good servant of his sovereign and good master, but on the contrary [as a] disloyal subject, evil servant, without love nor loyalty to his prince, forgetful of the good, favours, and innumerable benefices that he has received, bringing offence against the honour, virtue and so commendable memory of his own ancestors, and finally burying, by this sole contempt of the king’s service and inhuman forsaking of his patrie, all the great honour that he has so carefully pursued and guarded all his life.

This was shocking language to use towards a noble, but spoke to the noble character, pointing to important aspects of noble identity such as honour, patrie, and of course loyalty to the monarchy. Charles IX, following Condé’s rhetoric, was described as a ‘roi mineur, captive and exposed to the immoral and ambitious passions and affections of the enemies, conspirators of his crown’.

Crussol’s response was written in a similar vein to his later letter to Catherine. Asserting his loyalty to the crown and love of his patrie, he accepted the role, concerned by the presence of foreigners in Languedoc and the oppression of the king’s loyal subjects. He

southern estates following the failure of these discussions. Breton considers that Crussol’s election as Protestant leader in Languedoc permitted Châtillon to engage in the war alongside a noble deemed loyal by the crown and escape the accusations of rebellion that his brothers Gaspard de Coligny and François d’Andelot faced. However, Catherine’s letter to Crussol in December 1562 emphasised a royal doubt over Crussol’s loyalty (Breton, ‘Pour Dieu, pour le roi, pour soi [sic]’, 284–86, 344).


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wrote that he took on this charge only for the ‘conservation and maintenance of his [the
king’s] good and loyal subjects in the devotion and obedience of his majesty, and to prevent
these people and this province from being exposed as prey for these foreigners’.36 Crussol
additionally highlighted numerous conditions to be accepted by the Protestants, to which
they agreed.

As Crussol sent these articles to Catherine, it was in his interest to affirm the
legitimacy of his decision. He underscored his fidelity as a ‘very devoted and loyal subject
and servant of the king’ and detailed his efforts to preserve the people in obedience to
Charles.37 He claimed to take up arms to maintain the loyalty of the king’s subjects. Under
Crussol, the Protestants had to swear to serve the king faithfully, each town publicly
proclaiming its obedience. Crussol also ordered that the Protestants were to observe the
judicial laws of the kingdom, obeying the royal officers and magistrates, although the
Protestants did take over the justice system themselves. These articles were similar to those
of the edict of January, as discussed later.

Crussol’s letter to Catherine in November portrayed him as a noble who only
intervened when royal power was being abused, at first refusing to become involved.38 When
he saw violent acts that abused the king’s authority (which he listed at length), and directed
against the king’s loyal subjects, he decided to take up arms. Crussol pointed to his desire to
abstain from the war, stressing that he had ignored several pleas or events in attempting to
keep the peace: the continued Protestant remonstrances of the cruelties they had suffered
under the king’s name and ‘the miserable state and quality of the province’, their requests
for him to lead them, and finally the actions of Catholic nobles such as Joyeuse and the sieur

36 Ibid, fol. 354r. ‘Conserva[t]ion et entretennement de ses bons et loyaulx subiectz en la devotion et
obeyssance de sa ma[jes]té et empescher que Iceulx et led[ict] pais ne Solent exposéz en proye
ausdictz estrangers’.
37 Ibid, ‘tres devot et fidelle subiect et serviteur du roy’.
38 ‘Lettre de comte de Crussol à la reine mère, 14 November 1562’, in HL, xii, 643–47.
de Saint-Vidal, who pillaged his subjects and sacked his territories of Brousson (near Nîmes), Vias, and Florensac (both near Agde) among others.\footnote{Ibid, 643–45. The citation is p. 644. ‘l’estat et qualité miserable du pais’. It was in October 1562 that Joyeuse had let his soldiers pillage Florensac to stave off a mutiny, as they were discontented due to lack of pay and not being able to pillage Montpellier (Cimber and Danjou, eds., ‘Brief discours de la bataille de Saint-Gilles, advenue le 27 septembre 1562’, in Archives curieuses de l’histoire de France, v, 33).}

After he realised that these actions were carried out against the royal will, and abused the king’s authority, ‘I could no longer dismiss the tears and requests of this poor desolate people, to see your towns burned and sacked’. Therefore, upon the repeated Protestant request, he decided to join the war. Crussol argued that he took up arms not for vengeance, but ‘for the service of the king and your own, conservation of this land under your obedience, reestablishment of justice, tranquillity and peace of your subjects’.\footnote{‘Lettre de comte de Crussol à la reine mère, 14 November 1562’, in HL, xii, 646. ‘je n’ay peu plus longtemps esconduire les larmes et requêtes de ce pauvre désolé peuple, veoir brusler et sacager vos villes’, ‘pour le service du roi et votre, conservation de ce pais sous votre obéissance, rétablissement de la justice, tranquillité et repos de vos sujets’.} Crussol affirmed the legitimacy of his position through highlighting the presence of nobles such as Châtillon, as well as attaching a copy of his agreement with the Protestants.

As the Protestants were ‘desperate’, Crussol argued that if they had taken a wrong path and had been disloyal to the king, he would have been accountable, having had a way to prevent this rebellion. He also indicated the hate that his enemies had for him, and urged the monarchy ‘not to find [it] wrong, if for the good of your service and the security of my life, I have, with the most just reasons, considerations, and entreaties that are possible, accepted the guard and defence of one of your provinces’.\footnote{Ibid. ‘desesperé’, ‘de ne trouver mauvais, si pour le bien de votre service et seureté de ma vie, j’ay avec les plus justes raisons, considérations et instances qu’il est possible, accepté la garde et defense d’une de vos provinces’.} Crussol’s legitimate role is contrasted with ‘illegitimate oppression’, against which he vowed to fight.\footnote{Ibid, 647. ‘illégitime oppression’.} He pledged to hand over control to the crown when the king deemed this necessary. This letter is clearly a
performance. It paints him as a reluctant noble entering into war, and, in detailing the various situations that he was willing to overlook to maintain peace, he is shown to be a loyal servant. Part of Crussol’s performance of loyalty was contrasting his service to the monarchy with the disloyalty of others, notably Joyeuse and Saint-Vidal.

The Protestant requests by themselves were not enough to persuade Crussol to join the war and defend Languedoc. The Protestant representatives, in both the unsuccessful and successful requests, had stressed the terrible state of the province, the injustices done to the inhabitants, the presence of foreigners, their loyalty to Charles IX, and finally the duty that Crussol owed to the king in taking up this responsibility. While Crussol’s public response to the Protestants listed most of these aspects among his reasons for entering the war, along with maintaining the obedience of Charles’s subjects, his letter to Catherine focused on the abuse of royal authority by the Catholic armies against the king’s loyal subjects. These documents make clear that Crussol was forced to commit to the war, citing reasons such as the danger to his life. The importance of the regional context for understanding his conduct is evident, as shown in more detail further on, as the abuse of royal authority and attacks on his territories had a crucial role in him joining the conflict.

In analysing Crussol’s letters justifying his actions, it is useful to compare his correspondence with that of another noble who joined the Protestants, Jean de Parthenay-L’Archevêque, the sieur de Soubise. Soubise took command of Lyon on Condé’s behalf. In a letter to Catherine during the war, he affirmed that it was his ‘sole intention’ to preserve Lyon for the crown. Using the Protestant argument of the ‘captive’ king, he claimed that when the king and the queen-mother were free, he would not fail to ‘immediately obey all

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43 BNF, fr. 20783, fol. 121v, ‘Discours des choses advenues en la ville de Lyon pendant que monsieur de Soubize y a commande, 1562-1563’. This source is also found in BPF, Ms. 417, fol. 4, ‘Discours des choses advenues en la ville de Lyon pendant que m. de Soubise y a commandé’. ‘seule intention’.
their commands’, as Catherine had requested that he hand over Lyon. In a later letter of September 1562, Soubise again refused to give the town to the monarchy. He claimed that Catherine and Charles IX ‘do not have and will never have a more loyal subject and servant than myself’. He disagreed with Catherine’s path taken in the war, stating ‘I ask you very humbly to forgive me if I have the audacity to say to you as your very humble servant, that it seems to me that you are not taking the right path to put out a fire burning as much as that which one sees’ in France at this time. Soubise hoped to go before her to give an account of his actions and persuade her of his loyalty. There are some clear similarities between Soubise and Crussol, who expressed their fidelity to the crown in slightly different ways.

Catherine was clearly not convinced by Crussol’s rationale for entering the war. In a letter in December 1562, she expressed her disappointment at his decision to join the Protestants and urged him to transfer his allegiances, given the recent Protestant defeat at the battle of Dreux and the capture of Condé. She had found his action ‘very displeasing’. Crussol’s decision must have been a shock, as although the monarchy had used his Protestant sympathies to its own ends in the past, he was viewed as a loyal figure. This letter was quite threatening, as Catherine warned him about his position and the uncertainty of fortune. She stressed the little hope that the Protestants had, and ‘the manifest ruin that is prepared for them’ (also reiterated to Soubise). She asked Crussol to persuade the Protestants to lay down

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44 BNF, fr. 20783, fol. 121v, ‘Discours des choses advenues en la ville de Lyon pendant que monsieur de Soubize y a commande, 1562-1563’. ‘Incontinent d’obeyr a tous leur commandemens’.
46 BNF, fr. 20783, fol. 125v, ‘Discours des choses advenues en la ville de Lyon pendant que monsieur de Soubize y a commande, 1562-1563’. ‘Je vous suplye treshumblement me p[ar]donner si Je prens la hardiesse de vous dire Comme v[ot]re treshumble serviteur, Qu’il me semble que vous ne prenez pas le vray chemyn po[ul]r esteindre ung feu tant allumé comme est celuy que lon voit’.
47 AN, MC/DC/LVI/8, no. 17, ‘La reine Catherine a m[onsieu]r de Crussol, 23 December 1562 (incorrectly dated as 10 December 1561)’. Also in Aubais and Ménard, ‘Lettres des rois, reines, princes, & seigneurs à M. de Crussol’, 89.
48 AN, MC/DC/LVI/8, no. 17, ‘La reine Catherine a m[onsieu]r de Crussol, 23 December 1562’. ‘bien fort mauvaise’.
their arms. The queen-mother attempted to use this royal victory as leverage to persuade figures such as Crussol and Soubise to rejoin the royal side. She informed Crussol that the Protestants could hope only ‘for the liberty of their consciences in their houses’. Liberty of conscience appealed to figures such as nobles, who had chapels on their land and did not need sites of public worship. Despite Catherine’s displeasure with Crussol’s decision, he is still addressed as ‘mon cousin’ and not as ‘monsieur de Crussol’.

The queen-mother assured him of the great service he could carry out for the monarchy in obeying her instructions and remarked that he would be praised for this decision at court, hinting at royal favour. She reminded him of the provenance of his important position and affirmed that this action of Crussol could show that ‘you love me and that you are not ungrateful for the good, honour, and advancement that you have received through me’. Her letter also urged him to negotiate with Joyeuse and bring the Protestants to peace. In a letter to Joyeuse and Burie, Charles IX mentioned that Joyeuse was given authority to grant freedom of conscience to the Protestants in their houses, similar to Catherine’s letter. The porteur giving Crussol this letter from Catherine was evidently passing by Joyeuse, and Charles advised Joyeuse to include a word for him, to start peace negotiations if possible. The crown was eager to bring an end to this conflict.

The porteur and the content of the letter worked in tandem. In the queen-mother’s letter to Crussol, she mentioned having previously sent a porteur named Coucault, to make

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49 Ibid; BNF, fr. 20783, fol. 141r-v, ‘Discours des choses advenues en la ville de Lyon pendant que monsieur de Soubize y a commande, 1562-1563’. La ruine manifeste qui leur est préparée’.
50 BNF, fr. 20783, fols 140r-v, 142r-v, ‘Discours des choses advenues en la ville de Lyon pendant que monsieur de Soubize y a commande, 1562-1563’; Histoire ecclésiastique, iii, 287.
51 AN, MC/DC/LVI/8, no. 17, ‘La reine Catherine a m[onsieu]r de Crussol, 23 December 1562’. ‘pour la liberté de leur conscience en leurs maisons’.
52 Carroll, ‘Nager entre deux eaux’, 1003.
53 AN, MC/DC/LVI/8, no. 17, ‘La reine Catherine a m[onsieu]r de Crussol, 23 December 1562’. ‘vous m’aimez, et que vous n’êtes ingrat du bien de l’honneur et de l’avancement que vous avez reçu par mon moyen’.
54 BNF, fr. 15877, fol. 440v, ‘Charles IX to Charles de Coucis, the sieur de Burie, and Guillaume de Joyeuse, ? December 1562’.
known to him ‘the news that I had’ of Crussol becoming Protestant leader.\textsuperscript{55} This letter therefore complemented both Catherine’s message given to Coucault and presumably instructions given to the current porteur, and shows orality to be a major part of this process, further indicated by the queen-mother dictating this letter to a secretary. Coucault played an important role for the monarchy and was later sent to Crussol and Joyeuse to discuss their disarmament. Although Crussol’s reply to Catherine does not survive, this was surely a negative answer, as shown by his continued involvement in the war.\textsuperscript{56}

The aftermath of Dreux was an uncertain time for the Protestant movement, and Crussol’s decision to keep fighting deflates his protestations of loyalty. He had promised to hand over the defence of Languedoc when the king decreed it, but conveniently ignored this agreement, similar to Soubise. Crussol was forced to take part in the war, having wished to avoid participating in the conflict. While his presented reasons to Catherine and the Protestants were certainly rational, which he framed overall as being for the monarchy’s service and for the protection of the province, his continued adherence to the Protestants, even after the peace edict’s arrival in March, indicates that this reasoning was not entirely convincing. He evidently saw the Protestants as those who maintained the king’s authority, and the Catholic nobles in the area as those who abused this power. Crussol did not consider joining the Catholic commanders to change this behaviour and prevent the pillaging of his territory and subjects.

\textsuperscript{55} AN, MC/DC/LVI/8, no. 17, ‘La reine Catherine a m[onsieu]r de Crussol, 23 December 1562’. ‘la nouvelle que j’avais’.

\textsuperscript{56} BNF, fr. 20783, fol. 142r-v, ‘Discours des choses advenues en la ville de Lyon pendant que monsieur de Soubize y a commande, 1562–1563’; \textit{Histoire ecclésiastique}, iii, 287. There was communication between Catherine and Odet de Châtillon during the war, as shown by a letter to Châtillon in January 1563. This letter is notable for the lack of reproach of Châtillon’s behaviour by Catherine, despite evidently joining the Protestants. Catherine noted her satisfaction with what the porteur had outlined on his behalf, and urged him to make clear ‘the effects of your good will and intention’ (‘Letter of Catherine de Médicis to monsieur le cardinal de Chastillon, 13 January 1563’, in \textit{LCM}, x, 82). ‘les effets de votre bonne volonté et intention’. Breton views this letter as Catherine wishing for Châtillon to clarify his engagement in the war, given his previous protestations of loyalty to the monarchy (Breton, ‘Pour Dieu, pour le roi, pour soi’, 344–45).
Power

Crussol shouldered a powerful and influential role in both Languedoc and Dauphiné, though his rhetoric claimed that this decision was for the defence of the provinces and the king’s loyal subjects. Pierre-Jean Souriac compares Crussol’s Protestant role with that of a lieutenant-général, although, as shown by the following chapter, the Protestant position offered Crussol a role more formidable than this charge. He had an aspiration to the title of lieutenant-général of Languedoc, as mentioned earlier. These wars were a way to increase his personal influence, providing an authority separate to that bestowed by the monarchy.57

Although Crussol had previously completed a royal mission in the region, his Protestant role was not appointed by the king, and his action can either be viewed as an altruistic defence of the king’s subjects, or a bid for power. A letter to Catherine in April 1563 highlighted this point.58 In this letter, he indicated again the importance of defending the kingdom and Charles IX’s subjects. Adopting the Protestant argument of the monarchy being held prisoner, Crussol outlined how he had safeguarded the provinces from foreigners on the crown’s behalf and protected the people from oppression. He asserted that it was the king’s powerlessness to protect the people which led him solely to take up arms, as the monarchy was held captive. For Crussol, to fight against royal armies and refrain from using the Protestant argument would mean that he was committing treason and would be guilty of lèse-majesté. The alleged absence of monarchical control therefore led him to try to restore peace, while taking up the defence of the land also meant a response to attacks on his own territories, as seen earlier.

57 Souriac, Une guerre civile, 73.
Claude Tiévant argues that the timing of Crussol accepting the charge of Protestant leader permitted him to ‘become head of a party that had already extended the boundaries of legality, without putting him in danger of being responsible’ for this transgression.\(^{59}\) While this is important, he went to significant lengths to emphasise the legality and legitimacy of his cause.

Crussol gained a considerable amount from joining the Protestants, as shown by his agreement with them. While his conditions are extremely similar to the edict of January, they are nonetheless distinct in one key aspect, namely his own role. He wished to regulate and control the Protestant movement, and there were to be no synods, colloquies, or classes without the notice or presence of the judicial officers, or Crussol’s own attendance.\(^{60}\) The officers’ presence was needed to hold consistories, as well as to sanction the ministers’ religious rulings, which would be reported to Crussol. The structure of the Reformed church was placed directly under the existing civil structure, with the Protestants being answerable to Crussol in several respects. When compared to the edict, which stated that the presence of the royal officers was needed for holding consistories, synods, and legalising Protestant decrees, he inserted himself into a significant position of authority.\(^{61}\) This edict further stated that the Protestant assemblies were to respect royal officers in attendance, again similar to Crussol’s decrees.\(^{62}\)

Through the role of Protestant protector, Crussol became leader of a vast amount of territory, which increased in January 1563 through taking command of Dauphiné. Along with a yearly pension, he could appoint governors and military captains throughout the territory under his control and approve military expeditions. He did incur considerable expense during

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\(^{59}\) Tiévant, *Le gouverneur de Languedoc pendant les premières guerres de religion (1559-1574)*, 37.

\(^{60}\) BNF, fr. 15877, fol. 354v, ‘Double des articles accordez entre monsieur le conte [sic] de Crussol et les habitans du pays de Languedoc, November 1562’.

\(^{61}\) Édit de janvier, 17 janvier 1562, articles eight, ten, and eleven, <http://elec.enc.sorbonne.fr/editsdepacification/edit_01> [accessed 13 June 2019].

\(^{62}\) Édit de janvier, article seven.
the war, although the monarchy shouldered the Protestant debts through the peace treaty in March 1563. Taking account of the powerful and influential role that Crussol held is an important part of understanding his rationale for entering the war, given the benefits of this involvement. He did, however, previously deny numerous Protestant requests to lead their cause, despite the position on offer.

Religion

Crussol’s Protestant milieu and sympathies have been previously outlined, and his mission to the Midi indicated the good relations he had with the Nîmes Protestants. He was viewed as a Protestant or at least having strong Reformed sympathies. Despite Crussol’s adherence to the Reformed movement, neither his agreement with the Protestants nor his correspondence with Catherine put forward religious convictions as being part of his rationale for joining the war. Similar to Condé’s declaration, he focused on political reasons.

Crussol portrayed himself as a legitimate protector of royal authority, not as a defender of Protestantism. As will be shown in more detail in a later chapter, he was not that dissimilar to Condé in his attitudes to the war and the peace edict. This is demonstrated in the articles agreed with the Protestants, which revealed his desire to stay within the framework of the edict of January and uphold this decree. Catherine had asserted that the Protestants could only have liberty of conscience in their houses, which reduced considerably concessions given through the edict. While Crussol reinforced a similar line of argument to Condé, fighting against the contravention of this decree, the edict itself was no longer palatable to the crown. Crussol supported a regulated Protestantism, one which was moderated and overseen by the monarchy, during a time when the crown no longer considered this to be possible.

In a conversation with the papal nuncio Prosper de Sainte-Croix in October 1564, Crussol explained his decision to enter the war, although this discussion should be viewed as
part of his return to Catholicism. According to Sainte-Croix, Crussol ‘said to me in substance that he was quite irritated that one had constrained him by necessity, and against his inclination, to throw himself into the Huguenot party, to save his life, his honour and the assets of his duché’. Crussol portrayed his decision as an unwilling move, but one that was necessary. He asserted that the pope had endeavoured to persecute him and had provoked people ‘who treated him very cruelly’, although he was not guilty of anything. He claimed that certain Catholics, enflamed by the pope, ‘had made such great assassination attempts against him that, not being able to stay at the court in safety, he was constrained to retire elsewhere’, which had culminated in joining the Protestants. Indignant at being unjustly treated, Crussol acquiesced to the forceful Protestant requests. His assets and honour, presumably viewed through the attacks on his subjects, were certainly put at risk through the activities of the Catholic nobles on his lands.

Crussol’s claim that he was forced to leave the court due to threats on his life is supported by a letter of Odet de Châtillon to the queen-mother in August 1562. In this letter, Châtillon attempted to justify his decision to quit the court, and mentioned the previous exit of Crussol and Louise de Clermont. Speaking of the strength of his own adversaries, Châtillon asserted that Catherine would have kept Crussol and Louise by her side had she been able to guarantee them from the ‘power of violence of their enemies’.

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63 Cimber and Danjou, ‘Lettres anecdotes écrites au Cardinal Borromée par Prosper de Sainte-Croix’, 160–61. ‘me dit en substance qu’il étoit bien faché de ce qu’on l’avoit contraint par nécessité, et contre son inclination, à se jeter dans le parti des huguenots, pour sauver sa vie, son honneur et les biens de sa duché’. It is peculiar that Sainte-Croix noted Crussol’s duché, given that Crussol had not yet been awarded a dukedom.
64 Ibid, 161. ‘qui le traitèrent fort cruellement’, ‘avoient fait de si grands attentats contre lui que, ne pouvant pas demeurer à la cour en sûreté, il fut contraint de se retirer ailleurs’.
66 Ibid, 607. ‘pouvoir de violence de leurs ennemys’. Other sources also illustrate the pressure on the Protestant figures at court, such as on Louise de Clermont. Sainte-Croix recorded that the king of Spain, Philip II, advised Charles to no longer have Louise and several others around him, who give him ‘poor advice’ (Cimber and Danjou, ‘Lettres anecdotes écrites au Cardinal Borromée par Prosper de Sainte-Croix’, 67). ‘mauvais conseils’. The English ambassador at the French court, Nicholas
Prosper also mentioned that Crussol stressed his Catholic faith, recording that ‘he said to me that he had always conserved inwardly the same one [faith] which he had professed for thirty years’, and that ‘he had never wanted to take communion with the Huguenots nor go to hear their sermons’. Crussol commented that ‘one would not find that he had ever signed anything in favour of their religion in their regulations... but only [decrees] for the service of the King’ and in the need to protect himself. While his agreement with the Protestants was largely based on the edict of January, which would seem to support this statement, the Nîmes Protestants, who were familiar with him, had assumed that he wished to take communion in October 1562, as noted earlier.

Despite this position put forward by Crussol, it is clear that he was conflicted about his Protestant sympathies and his service to the crown. He was troubled by taking part in Catholic processions alongside Catherine, as shown by a letter from John Calvin in July 1563, the contents of which will be analysed in more detail further on in the thesis. Sainte-Croix’s letter again raises the question of why Crussol did not join the Catholic side. He was thought of as being a Protestant at court and joining the royal armies would have meant an end to these attempts on his life. However, this action would presumably not have protected his Reformed subjects to the same extent as if he had joined the Protestants. Crussol’s reinforcement of the edict of January, to a greater extent than Condé and during a period

Throckmorton, also mentioned that the Spanish ambassador, Perronet de Chantonnay, put pressure on Catherine for several Protestant figures, including Louise (‘Madame de Coursolles’), and also Châtelion, ‘to retyre theim selves’ from the court (TNA, SP 70/35, fol. 80v, ‘Nicholas Throckmorton to Queen Elizabeth I, 6 March 1562’). Goossens correctly points out that the fact that Crussol was threatened at the court means that he was perceived publicly as a Protestant (Goossens, ‘Entre service du roi et ambition personnelle, entre protestantisme et catholicisme’, 54).

67 Cimber and Danjou, ‘Lettres anecdotes écrites au Cardinal Borromée par Prosper de Sainte-Croix’, 161. ‘il me dit qu’il avoit toujours conservé intérieurement la même dont il avoit fait profession depuis trente ans’, ‘il n’avoit jamais voulu faire la Cène avec les huguenots ni aller entendre leurs sermons’.

68 Ibid, ‘on ne trouveroit pas qu’il eût jamais signé aucune chose en faveur de leur religion dans leurs règlements... mais seulement pour le service du Roi’.

when the monarchy had moved away from this edict, indicates the place given to a heavily regulated Protestantism in his eyes.

Regional factors

Regional factors are an important part of studying Crussol’s decision to join the Protestants, to assess whether he was protecting or acting on the behalf of the inhabitants of his lands. He had numerous Reformed subjects, and he was clearly seen by the Languedoc and Dauphiné Protestants as being sympathetic to their needs. Most of Crussol’s land was based in the Protestant-controlled area of Uzès and Nîmes. Although his fiefs on the whole did not overlap significantly with the Reformed churches in Languedoc, his territories of Charmes, Bellegarde, Saint-Geniès, Saint-Quentin, Pomerols, Florensac, and Uzès all had Protestant churches before the war commenced.70 Important territories where Crussol had residences, such as in Uzès and Charmes, were strongly influenced by the new confession. A previous chapter highlighted two cases of religious upheaval in his lands. Crussol and his subjects were not able to live in peace, as shown through the attacks on Florensac, Vias, Broussan, and elsewhere, while he asserted that his own life was in danger.

Souriac interestingly remarks that the wife of Jean Ébrard, the seigneur de Saint-Sulpice, was able to obtain safeguards from both Protestant and Catholic military commanders during the second civil war, to protect the territory from the mistreatment of soldiers.71 Although Crussol tried to keep the peace on his estates, in writing to the Catholic noble Saint-Vidal, Saint-Vidal refused to leave his lands alone, while Joyeuse’s troops also stole assets despite his assurances.72

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71 Souriac, Une guerre civile, 342. This safeguard is outlined in Cabié, Guerres de religion dans le sud-ouest de la France, 83.
72 ‘Lettre de comte de Crussol à la reine mère, 14 November 1562’, in HL, xii, 644–45.
Crussol certainly faced pressure to protect the inhabitants of his lands and his own person. Pressure was exerted on him by the Catholic nobles mistreating his territories and by the Protestants who wished for him to take command. He attempted to pursue his preferred course of staying out of the war, but the repeated attacks on his subjects and territories severely reduced his options and forced him to pick a side.

Conclusion

It is extremely difficult to assess the reasons that led Crussol to join the First War of Religion, to move beyond those he put forward in his letters to Catherine and his agreement with the Protestants. It is similarly problematic to move past Crussol’s identity as presented through these documents. For Crussol, his public role as a loyal servant to the crown was of prime importance, being the overarching element in his rhetoric. Being a faithful subject was the main way in which he chose to present his identity to the monarchy.

Crussol had hoped to avoid taking part in the war but was forced to commit himself to joining the conflict in November 1562. The decision to become involved in the war was a difficult one for him. First abstaining from the conflict, Crussol is similar to Carroll’s Protestant princes, who had a hard choice to make at the outbreak of the war, in choosing between religious sympathies and loyalty to the monarchy. Protestant sympathies did not always ensure a ‘concert of interests’, given that religious convictions interacted with a variety of different motivations which could determine noble behaviour. Arlette Jouanna asserts that Crussol ‘illustre bien le cas des gentilhommes écartelés entre leurs convictions religieuses et le service des souverains catholiques’.

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73 Daussy notes the difficulty in distinguishing conviction from rhetoric in the discourse of Soubise, and affirms the importance for the Protestants in framing their resistance as an act of obedience to the king (Daussy, ‘Les huguenots entre l’obéissance au roi et l’obéissance à Dieu’, 60).

74 Neuschel, Word of Honor, 33.

75 Jouanna, ‘Crussol, famille de’, 834. ‘illustre bien le cas des gentilhommes écartelés entre leurs convictions religieuses et le service des souverains catholiques’.
sympathies and a strong sense of loyalty to Charles and Catherine. Through his application of the edict of January, he wished to put forward a regulated Protestantism, under the authority of the crown. Crussol’s emphasis on guarding this edict also explains his presence alongside Condé at Orléans.

This chapter affirms the importance of Crussol’s provincial responsibilities and given that he was no longer at the French court but residing in the southern provinces, the regional context is crucial in accounting for his entry in the war. It is necessary to consider the duties he owed to his subjects as well as the pressure on him, and his honour was infringed through the attacks on the inhabitants of his lands. His actions fitted into an expression of the noble role, in defending the king’s subjects. Entering the war on the Protestant side offered a chance to prevent these attacks on his land and gain revenge on these figures, as well as take up an influential role distinct from the Catholic leaders in the province. It is, however, curious that Crussol did not join the Catholic armies to stop the pillaging of his land and subjects. His decision enabled him to take on a role similar to that of a lieutenant-général, with control over a considerable amount of territory. His reluctance to join the war was shown through his repeated rejection of the Reformed requests, despite the clear benefits that this Protestant position would have brought him.

Crussol wished to present his behaviour as being that of a faithful servant, as shown by sending the monarchy a copy of his agreement with the Protestants. He did not see a contradiction between his proclamation of loyalty and taking up arms alongside the Protestants. Crussol did not use the Protestant argument at first, although he later adopted it in his letter of April 1563. Although Robert Harding writes that Crussol’s reason for ‘turning partisan was simply that it gave him control of the province even if he risked loss of “crédit” at court’, this approach does not take into account Crussol’s efforts to assert his loyalty, his rejection of numerous Protestant pleas before November 1562, and the other aspects
A theme of legitimacy is clear throughout his writings and actions, and he strove to highlight the righteousness of his position as a loyal servant to the king, both during and after the end of the war, even while he continued fighting following the battle at Dreux. The monarchy was not convinced by his protestations of loyalty, although it did accept that his actions were conducted on its behalf, following the terms of the peace edict of Amboise.

All four of the aspects indicated here therefore influenced Crussol’s decision to join the Protestants to varying degrees. Crussol’s loyalty to the monarchy, reacting against the abuse of royal authority, was the principal reason he put forward, while the three other elements also played important roles. His decision to enter the war after rejecting several Protestant requests brought notable benefits and enabled him to respond to pressing regional concerns. Crussol’s Reformed sympathies prevented him fighting against the Protestants, although his presented loyalty to the monarchy did not mean joining the conflict when it began, on either side, or defending the king’s Protestant subjects when they first asked for his help. His relationship with the monarchy was at its most strained during the time of his Protestant adherence, as shown by Catherine’s letter to him. Reminding Crussol of the allegiance he owed her due to his prestigious position in the kingdom, his Protestant adherence shows him searching for personal influence outside of this relationship with the crown. While it is difficult to assess conclusively the weighing of these reasons which led Crussol to join the conflict, it was clearly a decision he did not take lightly, and one which had a significant effect on his interaction with the monarchy.

76 Harding, Anatomy of a Power Elite, 58.
Chapter 4: Protestant assemblies, 1562-1563

This chapter uses the figure of Antoine de Crussol to investigate the Protestant political assemblies during the First War of Religion. In order to wage war, an extensive military structure was formed. However, these assemblies did not simply deal with military issues, but also considered a variety of financial, judicial, religious, and social decrees. Through these meetings, a Protestant reformation of society was broadly conceived. The assemblies’ decrees further our understanding of the Reformed desire to convert the kingdom of France. Religion permeated all aspects of life in early modern society, and the Protestants viewed the Reformed confession as its cornerstone, as they wished for far-reaching changes. While emphasising their Reformed identity, the Protestants nonetheless reiterated their obedience to Charles IX.

Crussol became leader of the Languedoc Protestants in November 1562 and was designated as Protestant commander in Dauphiné in January and February 1563. An analysis of his engagement with his new role in both Languedoc and Dauphiné enables a closer look, with the aid of financial accounts and correspondence, both at the effectiveness of the Protestant system and at how the assembly decrees were put into practice. Crussol’s appointment at Nîmes in November coincided with a formal structure being set up in Languedoc to wage war, at a similar time to Dauphiné. In considering this chapter within the overall framework of his relationship with the monarchy, an examination of his interaction with the crown during this charge is important in understanding his noble identity. Having taken up a role fighting against the royal armies, which gave him significant power, he attempted to frame his actions as being those of a loyal servant. News of Crussol’s decision
spread quickly, as shown by a letter from the cardinal Georges d’Armaignac to the queen-mother on 22 November.¹

Most of this chapter relates to Languedoc, as there do not seem to be any Dauphiné wartime assemblies outside of the main provincial ones, which makes it more difficult to see how the assembly decrees were put into practice.² Crussol had a more active role in setting up a military infrastructure in Languedoc than in Dauphiné, as there was already an existing structure in place in Dauphiné when he took over command. With the use of a thematic framework, the various decrees of the different assemblies will be outlined in turn, first in Languedoc, and then in Dauphiné.

Languedoc

These political assemblies shouldered the role of the provincial estates, and were indeed called estates by the Protestants, to which the Catholics objected. Adopting the structure of an estates provided increased legitimacy to the Protestants, given that it was a recognisable political institution in France.³ The articles of these assemblies ‘give us a concrete idea… of both the religious and political regime that the Protestants would have established in France, if they had succeeded in imposing themselves in a lasting way’.⁴ Hugues Daussy and Mark Greengrass have also attested to the importance of these political assemblies, and it was the Languedoc estates at Nîmes which set the benchmark for these.⁵ A major part of this chapter

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¹ BNF, fr. 15877, fol. 390r, ‘Letter of Cardinal Georges d’Armaignac to Catherine de Médicis, 22 November 1562’.
² Daussy, Le parti huguenot, 381.
³ Ibid, 364.
⁴ Auguste Dussert, ‘Le baron des Adrets et les États du Dauphiné (novembre 1562 – février 1563)’, Bulletin de l’Académie delphinale, series 5, 20 (1929), 105. ‘ils nous donnent une idée concrète… du régime à la fois religieux et politique, que les protestants auraient établi en France, s’ils avaient réussi à s’imposer d’une façon durable’. Although Dussert is referring to the Valence assembly, it is applicable to the Nîmes assembly too.
⁵ Daussy, Le parti huguenot, 364; Greengrass, ‘Financing the Cause’, 233–54. There was one regional Protestant assembly recorded as meeting before the estates at Nîmes, held at Baix in the Vivarais in October 1562, but there do not seem to be any surviving records of this assembly. The Nîmes assembly records are found in ADG, C925, No. 5, ‘1562 Novembre Assemblée Des États’; Loutchitzki,
considers how these decrees were adopted by the smaller assiettes (regional assemblies which traditionally imposed the direct royal taxes in the region, as noted earlier) in Languedoc, and the états particuliers of Vivarais, which was under the jurisdiction of the Languedoc estates.  

The Nîmes assembly articles were quickly put into place, as shown by a Nîmes conseil meeting on 21 November, which mentioned Crussol as Protestant leader. The Nîmes representatives pledged to observe these articles and obey Crussol’s commands. In the Vivarais états at Rochemaure in December, representatives of the diocese similarly swore to continue:

in the devotion and obedience of our King, and to never depart from this, in the way that true and loyal subjects should. And are held to their natural prince and sovereign lord and will hold to the content of the articles… of the agreement with the comte de Crussol, which will conform to and not contravene the word of God and Christian religion.

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‘Collection des procès-verbaux’, 506–16, 546–58. There are also extracts of this assembly elsewhere, such as in ADH, 1 B22547, ‘Extract des deliberations et et [sic] articles arrestes en lassamblée des estats ou dioceses du bas pais de Languedoc tenans la religion reformee faicte a nymes au mois de novembre mil cinq cens soixante deux par mandeme[n]t de monseigneur le comte de Crussol’. For a general outline of the assemblies, as well as several extracts, see Gordon Griffiths, Representative Government in Western Europe in the Sixteenth Century (Oxford, 1968), 254–97.

Steven M. Lowenstein, ‘Resistance to Absolutism: Huguenot Organization in Languedoc, 1621-1622’ (unpublished PhD thesis, Princeton University, 1972), 160. Although Lowenstein is writing on the 1621-1622 Protestant rebellion, it is relevant for the 1562-1563 conflict. The Vivarais états had technically been downgraded by the monarchy by the sixteenth century to the term of assiette. Both terms were used by the assembly itself (Du Boys, Album du Vivaraïs, 21–22). This is also noted in Beik, Absolutism and Society in Seventeenth-Century France, 74.

As revealed in the previous chapter, the estates had decided that all inhabitants were to take an oath of loyalty to the king, and the Rochemaure assembly organised the oath to be circulated publicly around the region and given to Crussol. A recognition of Crussol’s new command was shown too in an assiette at Montpellier in November, where the commissaires in charge of the assembly were noted as having authority ‘to hold this assiette by the comte de Crussol’.9

Military

The Nîmes assembly laid out in detail the military aspects of Crussol’s role. As Daussy asserts:

In electing Crussol, the Protestants looked to equip themselves with a military leader whose capacities need not be demonstrated, but also, and perhaps especially, to place their resistance under the authority of the king through the intervention of a noble who holds, from the sovereign himself, a legitimate authority over the province.10

Legitimacy was extremely important to the Protestants, who presented their actions as being carried out in obedience to the crown. Given Crussol’s previous royal mission, he was an ideal candidate for the Protestants in portraying themselves as loyal, as they pledged their allegiance to a figure already lawfully appointed by the monarch.

Although he had the supreme authority, Crussol had a conseil serving under him, which he had to consult before making decisions.11 The assembly sought to manage the

10 Daussy, Le parti huguenot, 367. ‘En élisant Crussol, les réformés cherchent à se doter d’un chef militaire dont les capacités ne sont plus à démontrer, mais aussi, et peut-être surtout, à placer leur résistance sous l’autorité du roi par le truchement d’un seigneur qui détient, du souverain lui-même, une autorité légitime sur la province.’
11 The conseil consisted of François d’Airebaudouze, the seigneur d’Anduze (the president of the conseil), Michel de Saint Ravy, the seigneur de Meyrargues, Guillaume Roques, the seigneur de Clausonne, Guillaume de Contour, André de Ragouze, the seigneur de Boussargues, Balthazar de
Protestant war machine in Languedoc, and he was directly involved in the formation of this military structure. Crussol was to appoint captains and governors to towns, alerting his conseil of these appointments.\textsuperscript{12} He could also appoint nobles to the assembly.\textsuperscript{13} The area of Languedoc under Protestant control was considerable and Crussol moved quickly in appointing people to positions of power in towns, regions, and strategic fortresses, through November and December.

Antoine’s brother Jacques continued as lieutenant-général of Languedoc, and was additionally named governor of Nîmes.\textsuperscript{14} Tristan de Saint-Martin, the seigneur de Courmonterral, was employed as lieutenant-général of the Vivarais while Antoine-Hector de Cardaillac, the baron de Peyre, was named governor of the Gévaudan.\textsuperscript{15} As mentioned earlier, the baron de Peyre’s son later married Antoine’s sister, which further uncovers the network of Crussol’s noble connections in the Midi. Other figures were assigned to towns such as Béziers and Bagnols, while Crussol also appointed captains to a number of important fortresses.\textsuperscript{16} This wave of appointments gave him considerable control over the movement, and over an extensive territory.\textsuperscript{17} Several figures appointed before Crussol’s charge,
including Antoine de Rapin, governor of Montpellier, and Guillaume de Guilhot, the *sieur* de Ferrières and governor of Castres, continued in their roles.\(^{18}\)

In addition, Crussol appointed Ardoin de Porcellet, the *seigneur* de Maliane, and Jacques Faret, the *seigneur* de Privat, to the assemblies.\(^{19}\) Honorat de Saint Privat was appointed as *commissaire de l’artillerie des guerres*.\(^{20}\) Crussol put people he could trust in these positions. His appointments were influenced by the changing context of the war, and his decision to move Rapin from Montpellier in December 1562 and replace him with the *sieur* de Pérault caused tension with the Montpellier consuls, as shown in the following chapter.

Crussol was asked to ‘publish good military ordonnances’ and oversee the town governors, to ensure that ‘they do not become involved in the justice and police of the towns, contenting themselves with matters of war concerning the guarding of places where they are ordered’ and other such roles.\(^{21}\) The Protestants relied on Crussol’s authority to keep these figures in check and affirmed that ‘we are the people of a holy God, hating iniquity, in order that he may walk and be present among us’. To this end, he was asked that no governor or captain be appointed without an ‘attestation of life and morals from the church’, similarly observed for the soldiers.\(^{22}\) While some of the decrees, such as troop discipline, were common in sixteenth-century France, there was certainly an increased emphasis on holy


\(^{19}\) ADG, C 925, No. 5, fol. 16v, ‘1562 Novembre Assemblée Des Etats’.

\(^{20}\) ADH, 1 B22803, ‘Mandement faict au sieur de Saint Privat, 20 May 1563’; ADH, 1 B22803,’Request of Honorat de Saint Privat to the Protestant estates at Montpellier, May 1563’. He was later assigned to the muster rolls with Maliane.


\(^{22}\) Ibid. ‘nous sommes le people d’ung dieu saint haissant l’iniquité affin Qu’il marche et assiste au milheu de Nous’, ‘actestation de vie et de meurs de l’egl[s]e’.
conduct, to be an army which God would fight alongside. Crussol had a central position in the maintenance of this Reformed war effort and behaviour. He was heavily involved in aspects such as the discipline and maintenance of soldiers.

Overseeing the supply and payment of troops was an important part of Crussol’s overall role. He was to ensure that the soldiers had ‘a reasonable wage in silver in order that they pay their host and do not abuse from now on the supplying of provisions’, which was clearly an ongoing issue, while he should also limit the number of soldiers under a captain’s command. Each diocese was to have a contrôleur des montres (muster rolls) to pay military companies, and a lieutenant de prévôt des maréchaux, the prévôt des maréchaux (provost) being responsible for the maintenance of order in an area, punishing troops if necessary. There were strict conditions for soldiers lodging in towns.

There are numerous instances of Crussol or the conseil requesting that troops be paid or fed, although two examples particularly illustrate the workings of the Protestant movement. The Vivarais états meeting at Rochemaure in December showed both the Nîmes assembly articles being quickly put into practice and the interplay between the overall leadership and the smaller regional assemblies. Crussol often gave commissions to towns to pay for troops, and with Saint-Martin, his lieutenant in the Vivarais, being present at this assembly, Crussol asked that the ‘companies ordered for the defence of the present province may be paid’, while the conseil further requested the assembly to furnish ‘artillery, powder,  

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23 Ibid, fol. 5r. ‘gaige a solde Raysonable en argent affin Qu’ilz paient le[ur] hoste et N’abusent dors en avant de la munition des vivres’.
26 ADH, 1 22803, ‘Mandement faict a mons[ieur] de sainct florens, 6 July 1563’; ADH, 1 22803, ‘Muster roll of Captain Sainte-Marie, 13 June 1563’; ADH, 1 22803, ‘Muster roll of monsieur Despondilhan, 14 June 1563’.
27 ADA, 1 Mi 17, No. 1, fols 1r-29r, ‘Actes de l’assiette generalle de viveroys tenus au lieu de rochemaure en decembre mil cinq cens soixante deux’. A detailed summary of these estates, including a considerable amount of direct transcription, is available in ADA, 52 J 58-4, p. 2-20, ‘1562, Décembre’. 

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[and] saltpetre’. Both these requests were accorded, and the assembly additionally agreed to pay seven to eight thousand livres, needed for ‘powder, saltpetre, bullets and other things required for war, and to pay the estate of the comte de Crussol’. Soldiers were paid from the ecclesiastical revenues.

Through the Béziers assiette, the interplay both between the diocese and the wider Protestant movement, and the provincial estates and the assiettes, is again evident. A soldier’s request to Crussol and the conseil for compensation was ordered instead to be paid by Béziers’ receveur in December. This receveur paid Rapin’s troops in March 1563, moved to Béziers by Crussol, while the provincial estates asked the receveur to pay certain military expenses in May. These examples show the operation of the extensive Protestant movement. The Rochemaure assembly also implemented measures to provide for troops. In order to supply the soldiers on campaign, different figures ‘were assigned and established stages for the feeding of the gendarmerie and companies retained in the present province… for the instruction and defence of the province in the towns of Viviers, Baix, Privas, Soyon, Tournon, and Aubenas’. These étapes (depots) could better organise the food supply for troops. The chosen representatives were responsible for maintaining the soldiers when


29 Ibid, fol. 5v. ‘pouldres salpestres bouletz et aut[r]es choses requises à la guerre et à payer l’estat de monseign[eu]r le comte de crussol’.

30 Ibid, fol. 27r.

31 ADH, 1 B22551, fol. 1r, ‘Request of Jehan Toulzan to the Comte de Crussol and the Conseil de Languedoc, December 1562’; 1 B22551, fol. 1r-v, ‘Payment of Lyon Malbois to Jehan Toulzan, April 1563’.

32 ADH, 1 B22551, fol 1r-4r, ‘Rolle de la companye du cap[ita]line rappin, 6 March 1563’; 1 B22551, fol. 1r-v, ‘Request of Jehan de Montredon to the conseil of Languedoc, payment of Lyon Malbois to Montredon, 17 May 1563’; 1 B22551, fol. 1r, ‘Request of Antoine Duchemyn to the conseil de Languedoc, 19 April 1563’.


34 David Potter, Renaissance France at War: Armies, Culture and Society, c.1480-1560 (Woodbridge, 2008), 246.
they passed through their territory, which shows an impressive level of organisation. The Nîmes conseil meeting of November 1562 also agreed that a list of available soldiers and weaponry was to be drawn up and given to Crussol.35

In addition, the Nîmes estates called for a report to determine the size and location of all the Protestant garrisons, along with an assessment of supplies needed for these and the fortified towns.36 Jean Philippi, a Montpellier Protestant who wrote a mémoire of the wars, noted that 400,000 livres was allocated to maintain the Protestant troops.37 To improve the security of the province, the assembly decided to raise a navy along the Mediterranean and the Rhône, and agreed that the important towns and strategic fortresses on the frontier, ‘those that the aforementioned seigneur [Crussol] recommends’, were to be fortified.38 Crussol was similarly to make arrangements to protect towns which could not be fortified without great expense. Fortifications were among the most crucial guarantees of Protestant autonomy, and he ordered repairs for the defence of Uzès and of the surrounding fortresses.39 The conseil ordered the seigneur de Maliane to visit several towns in January 1563, outlining the repairs needed there.40 Following the example at Nîmes, the Vivarais états at Rochemaure in December decided that the towns and fortresses of the region were

35 ADG, E Dépôt 36/127, fol. 292v, ‘Conseil de la ville de Nîmes, 21 November 1562’.
36 ADG, C 925, No. 5, fol. 6v, ‘1562 Novembre Assemblée Des Etats’; ADH, 1 B22547, fol. 2v, ‘Extrait des deliberations et et [sic] articles arrestes en lassemblee des estats ou dioceses du bas pais de languedoc tenans la religion reformee faicte a nymes au mois de novembre mil cinq cens soixante deux par mandeme[n]t de monseigneur le comte de Crussol’.
37 Philippi, ‘Histoire des troubles de Languedoc par Jean Philippi’, 90. Given that the Protestant assembly at Bagnols-sur-Cèze in March 1563 outlined the budget at the November assembly to be 600,000 or 700,000 livres, encapsulating the expenses of war and other necessities, this figure may not be that far off the money allocated in reality (ADG, C 925, No. 18, fol. 4r-v, ‘Proces verbal des estatz tenus a Baignolz 1563’).
38 ADG, C 925, No. 5, fols 6v-7r, ‘1562 Novembre Assemblée Des Etats’. ‘telle que lad[ict] Seigneur advizera’. Measures adopted for the navy are shown in ADH, 1 B22803, ‘Mandement a Mons[ieu]r Chaume, 8 June 1563’.
40 ADH, 1 B22551, fol. 1r-v, ‘Doble [sic] de La Comission [sic] de Mons[ieu]r de Malhanne, 26 January 1562/1563’. Improving the defence of a town could bring tension, as shown in Montpellier with Jacques de Crussol’s decision to demolish houses (AMM, BB 393, fol. 110v, ‘Conseil de la ville de Montpellier, 30 November 1562’; BB 393, fols 122v-123r, ‘Conseil de la ville de Montpellier 6 May 1563’).
to be inspected.\textsuperscript{41} This was mirrored in the Nîmes \textit{conseil} meetings, where measures were taken to better defend the town, such as two artillery pieces being casted and work continuing on its fortifications.\textsuperscript{42}

As well as responding to Crussol’s and the \textit{conseil’s} requests, the Rochemaure assembly and others made appeals of their own. The Rochemaure meeting was a place to hear grievances and pleas on a lower level than the provincial estates. The town of Bourg-Saint-Andéol had requested the assembly that it be supported in paying a military company garrisoned in the town, and also asked to be given a ‘number of ordinary companies established for the defence of the present province’, instead of this company.\textsuperscript{43} In response, the Vivarais \textit{états} sent a letter to Crussol, to ascertain his opinion on the matter, while the town itself continued to send requests to him.\textsuperscript{44} In addition, the assembly wished for Crussol to accord Saint-Martin an \textit{état} or estate, as they were satisfied with his leadership.\textsuperscript{45}

A significant part of the Languedoc Protestant war machine relied on the good relationship and active role of Crussol with the \textit{conseil} under his command. Crussol often sent requests to this council, particularly concerning the payment of military figures who had written to him.\textsuperscript{46} His numerous letters point to the important charge that he had in acting as an intermediary between the \textit{conseil} and the military commanders, as the ultimate head of

\textsuperscript{41} ADA, 1 Mi 17, No. 1, fols 26v, 19v, ‘Actes de l’assiette generalle de viveroys tenus au lieu de rochemaure en decembre mil cinq cens soixante deux’.
\textsuperscript{42} ADG, E Dépôt 36/127, fol. 293r-v, ‘Conseil de la ville de Nîmes, 21 November 1562’; E Dépôt 36/127, fol. 303v, Conseil de la ville de Nîmes, 15 February 1563’.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid; Marquis d’Albon, ‘Éphémérides de la ville de Bourg-Saint-Andéol pendant la première guerre de religion’, \textit{Revue historique, archéologique, littéraire et pittoresque du Vivarais illustrée} (1898), 274–75.
\textsuperscript{45} ADA, 1 Mi 17, No. 1, fol. 22v, ‘Actes de l’assiette generalle de viveroys tenus au lieu de rochemaure en decembre mil cinq cens soixante deux’.
\textsuperscript{46} ADH, 1 B22803, fol. 1r-v, ‘Mandement faict au capptaine bon, 9 June 1563’; 1 B22803, fol. 1r-v, ‘Mandement faict au sergent vinaigre, 9 June 1563’.
the movement. In June 1563, Crussol sent a letter to the conseil to distribute money to several soldiers wounded ‘in doing service to God’.47

The tone of his letters to the conseil could be strict, if frustrated over its slowness to carry out his orders. In a letter of March 1563, Crussol asked the conseil to reimburse a captain from Lyon, stating, ‘I gave you an express command of this several times’.48 This captain was finally paid in August, although the receiveur was ordered to pay him in April. The conseil also needed Crussol, as the authority figure in the province, to legitimise their actions. He was asked to announce the later Languedoc estates at Bagnols-sur-Cèze, which would normally be convoked by the king.49 Crussol, on the other hand, required the conseil to execute his orders and maintain the Protestant war machine generally.

Through these decrees, Crussol had a central and all-encompassing role, which included appointing figures to leadership positions, improving the security of the province, and observing that military officials carried out their duties. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Crussol took on a role similar to a lieutenant-generalship, although his power ultimately exceeded this position.

Organisation, finance, and justice

A successful operating system over such a large province as Languedoc required numerous personnel, and the Protestants either mirrored the existing royal administrative structure or adapted it for their use.50 Funding the new military organisation was a major concern. Daussy outlines seven methods of Protestant finance, four of which are seen in Languedoc: contributions from Protestant churches, seizure of Catholic church assets, use of loans, and

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47 ADH, 1 B22803, ‘Crussol to the conseil de Languedoc, and payment of Guillaume Arquier to Captain Bergonde, 8 June 1563’; ‘en faisant service à Dieu’.
48 ADH, 1 B22803, fol. 1r, ‘Crussol to the conseil de Languedoc, 3 March 1563’; 1 B22803, fol. 2r, ‘Mandement faict au capp[ital]ne salla, 30 August 1563’. ‘je vous en aie donn é expresse charge plusieurs fois’.
49 ADG, C 925, No. 18, fol. 1v, ‘Proces verbal des estatz tenus a baignolz 1563’.
50 Lowenstein, ‘Resistance to Absolutism’, 142.
the confiscation of royal and Catholic ecclesiastical revenues.\textsuperscript{51} Crussol and the conseil were in charge of granting money, through written ordonnances.\textsuperscript{52}

As ‘this poor province of Languedoc is trampled on and gnawed to the bones’, the assembly decided to take the money and assets of ecclesiastical institutions, with a careful account being made. Money was to be similarly procured from royal finances, ‘the general receipt of the king’.\textsuperscript{53} To take charge of these funds, a receveur-général was set up in every diocese, with a contrôleur to aid him.\textsuperscript{54} The receveur-général needed the command of Crussol or the conseil to use the funds.\textsuperscript{55} The Protestant desire to stress their actions as being legitimate and loyal to the king was clear in their treatment of royal and ecclesiastical revenue. These decrees also reflected the central place given to the Reformed confession in this reformation of French society, in seizing the Catholic assets.

The money from the ordinary and extraordinary royal receipts was to be accounted for in each diocese, and used to pay soldiers defending the province.\textsuperscript{56} The ordinary receipts consisted of the money the king received from his domain, such as feudal rents and variable dues, while the extraordinary revenue was comprised of three taxes; the taille (a direct tax), the gabelle (a tax on salt), and the aides (levied on commodities such as wine).\textsuperscript{57} The rest of the money was to be given to the receveur général du roi, seemingly after the conflict had ended.\textsuperscript{58} To raise further funds, the assembly decreed that a cotisation (contribution) would

\textsuperscript{51} For Daussy, these sources of income are contributions from Protestant churches, seizure of Catholic church assets, loans, impositions on occupied towns, ransomings of prisoners, money from foreign allies, and finally confiscation of municipal money, royal money and ecclesiastical revenues (Daussy, \textit{Le parti huguenot}, 329).

\textsuperscript{52} ADG, C 925, No. 5, fol. 15v, ‘1562 Novembre Assemblée Des Etats’.

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid, fols 7v-8r, ‘ce pouvre Pays de Languedoc est foullé et Rongé Jusques aux os’, ‘la Recepte generalle du Roy’.

\textsuperscript{54} Another receveur was also set up in the main towns of the dioceses.

\textsuperscript{55} ADH, 1 B2547, fols 6v–8r, ‘Extrait des deliberations et articles arretez en lassemblee des estatiz ou dioceses en bas pays de languedoc tenans la religion reformee faicte en la ville de montpellier et au mois de may mil cinq cens soixante troys par commandement de monseigne[u]r le comte de crussol’.

\textsuperscript{56} ADG, C 925, No. 5, fol. 8r-v, ‘1562 Novembre Assemblée Des Etats’.

\textsuperscript{57} Knecht, \textit{The French Civil Wars, 1562-1598}, 20.

\textsuperscript{58} ADG, C 925, No. 5, fol. 8v, ‘1562 Novembre Assemblée Des Etats’.

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be paid by the Languedoc dioceses, to the sum of 331,121 livres, 11 sols and 3 deniers.\(^59\) This cotisation became the main financial issue towards the end of the war.

The Rochemaure assembly was particularly diligent in organising the payment of the cotisation, imposed on ‘the dioceses and inhabitants of Vivarais, Mende, Uzès, Nîmes, Montpellier, Agde, Béziers, and Castres’.\(^60\) The Vivarais region was to pay 59,600 livres, 15 sols and 9 deniers, split between ‘the towns and places of this diocese’.\(^61\) Crussol had personally sent a commission to raise this money. In response, Saint-Martin had requested the consuls and bailiffs of Vivarais to attend this assembly, to divide up the money owed.\(^62\) The assembly decided to raise 64,664 livres, 9 sols and 3 deniers, using the surplus funds for the ‘ordinary expenses of the present assembly and assiette’, paid in four quarters.\(^63\)

Revenue was raised through renting out seized Catholic ecclesiastical land, through arrangements called arrentements.\(^64\) The holders of these leases (fermiers or rentiers) had the right to collect tithes from the peasantry on these lands.\(^65\) This tithe, called the décime or the dime, amounted to a tenth or twelfth of the harvest.\(^66\) These arrentements did not, however, aim to permanently alienate Catholic property rights but merely to confiscate this revenue during the war.\(^67\) Factors such as enemy control of an area, destruction of crops, or the peasants having already paid out tithes to Catholic rentiers, significantly affected tithe

\(^{59}\) ADA, 1 Mi 17, No. 1, fol. 2v, ‘Actes de l’assiette generalle de viveroys tenus au lieu de rochemaure en decembre mil cinq cens soixante deux’. This cotisation is also seen, along with a letter from Crussol, in ADG, C 629, fols 403v–404v, ‘Assemblée de l’assiette de la ville de Nîmes, 16 November 1562’.

\(^{60}\) ADA, 1 Mi 17, No. 1, fol. 2v, ‘Actes de l’assiette generalle de viveroys tenus au lieu de rochemaure en decembre mil cinq cens soixante deux’. ‘les dioceses et hab[ites] de viveroys mande uzes nysmes mo[n][t]pel[le]r Agde beziers et castres’.

\(^{61}\) Ibid, fol. 3r. ‘les villes et lieux dudit diocese’.

\(^{62}\) Ibid, fol. 3v.

\(^{63}\) ADA, 1 Mi 17, No. 2, fol. 1v, ‘Double du cayer des estat par particuliers de viveroys tenuz a rochelmaure en lannée des troubles 1562’. ‘frais or[d]inaires de pr[ese]nt estat et assiette [sic]’.

\(^{64}\) ADG, C 925, No. 5, fol. 9r, ‘1562 Novembre Assemblée Des Etats’.

\(^{65}\) Lowenstein, ‘Resistance to Absolutism’, 303.

\(^{66}\) Lowenstein, ‘Resistance to Absolutism’, 303.

\(^{67}\) Lieven, ‘Le temps des guerres de religion en France (1559-1598)’, 421.

\(^{67}\) Greengrass, ‘Financing the Cause’, 236–37.
collection.\textsuperscript{68} Arrentements and bail (leases) made prior to the Nîmes assembly were to be maintained with the consent of a magistrate.\textsuperscript{69} In addition, pensions on Catholic church land could be bought.\textsuperscript{70} The Rochemaure assembly agreed to Crussol’s request to provide a pension to the abbess of Soyon, on the revenue of her abbey which had presumably been seized by the Protestants.\textsuperscript{71} The Nîmes diocese similarly provided pensions to Catholic ecclésiastiques who converted to Protestantism and handed over their assets.\textsuperscript{72}

Surintendants were also appointed, to implement the decrees issued in the assemblies concerning finance, and to close the accounts of those who had brought in revenue.\textsuperscript{73} Reporting directly to Crussol and the conseil, they were to certify that accounts had been rendered by all those who had raised funds, punishing those who had pillaged temples and houses without inventorying the contents in the presence of a magistrate.\textsuperscript{74} Assiettes in the dioceses of Montpellier and Béziers (both in November), Nîmes (December), along with the Rochemaure assembly (December), quickly adopted this system. They appointed numerous receveurs to matters such as ecclesiastical revenue and used arrentements to raise money.\textsuperscript{75} The elected surintendants in Montpellier, Béziers, Nîmes, and Vivarais organised the rentes, while positions such as contrôleur de montres and

\textsuperscript{68} Lowenstein, ‘Resistance to Absolutism’, 164.
\textsuperscript{69} ADG, C 925, No. 5, fol. 9r-v, ‘1562 Novembre Assemblée Des Etats’.
\textsuperscript{70} ibid, fol. 15v.
\textsuperscript{71} ADA, 1 Mi 17, No. 1, fol. 19r, ‘Actes de l’assiette generalle de viveroys tenus au lieu de rochemaure en decembre mil cinq cens soixante deux’.
\textsuperscript{72} ADG, C 630, fols 16r–17r, 18r–20r, ‘Assemblee des consulz et diocesains du diocese de nismes representans icelluy diocese, 2 June 1563’.
\textsuperscript{73} ADG, C 925, No. 5, fols 9v-10v, ‘1562 Novembre Assemblée Des Etats’.
\textsuperscript{74} ibid, fol. 15v.
\textsuperscript{75} ADH, 1 B22547, fol. 1r, ‘Ordonnance of Michel de Sanravy detailing the appointment of Jehan Pons, 7 December 1562’; ADA, 1 Mi 17, No. 1, fol. 7r, ‘Actes de l’assiette generalle de viveroys tenus au lieu de rochemaure en decembre mil cinq cens soixante deux’; ADG, C 630, fol. 20v, ‘Assemblee des consulz et diocesains du diocese de nismes representans icelluy diocese, 2 June 1563’; C 630, fol. 2r-v, ‘Procès-verbaux de l’assemblée de l’assiette du diocèse de Nîmes, 14 December 1562’; Dr. Francus [alias Albin Mazon], Notes et documents historiques sur les huguenots du Vivarais (Privas, 1901), 181.
contrôleur des guerres were also assigned. For Montpellier, many agreements made by the surintendants were to be in place for three years. Gardens and fields of abbeys and other religious institutions were leased out, a classic example from the Béziers diocese being ‘Jehan Boyssiere, rentier of the garden belonging to the Saint-Nazaire chapitre’. Officials could be appointed to specific streams of revenue. In the Béziers assiette, Jehan Bartalat was elected to manage relics and ecclesiastical benefices, and relics seized by Protestants troops were sold. The accounts of Lion Malbois, the receveur of the Béziers diocese, demonstrate the important role of these officials. Malbois was active in paying out military expenses, such as the payment of soldiers, and other expenses, including the stipends of Protestant pastors. The provision of ministers was a key part of the Nîmes

76 ADH, 1 B22547, fol. 1r-v, ‘Extraict des actes de lassiette generalle tenue dans la maison consuil[air]e de la ville de montpellier le vingung[iesme] jour du moyys de novembre mil cinq cens soixante deuyx’; 1 B22547, fols 1r–20r, ‘Estat du pris et somme quont estre arrentes les benefices chappelles et aut[r]es biens ecclesiastiques et de mainmorte arrentes par les surintendens du diocese de montpellier suyvant la deliber[ai]on des gens des trois estatz tenuz a a ville de nimes au mois de novembre dernier mil cinq cens soixante deuyx, sire jehan pons receive[ur] esleu et nomme par le seigneur de sanravy...’; 1 B22547, fols 1v-13v, ‘Estat des chapellanyes et herbaiges du diocese de montpellier’; 1 B22551, 1r-7v, ‘Estat de la recepte faicte par lion malboys receiveur au nom du presant pais de languedoc et pour le diocese de beizers esleu en lassiete tenue en la ville de beizers au mois de novembre mil v c[ens] soixante deuyx’; 1 B 22551, fols 1r-26r, ‘Compte de maistre lion malboys de la ville de beizers commie par monsieur francoys du soustie consellier du roy au siege presidial estably aud[jicte] beizers...’; ADA, 1 Mi 17, No. 1, fol. 7r-v, ‘Actes de l’assiette generalle de viveroys tenus au lieu de rochemaure en decembre mil cinq cens soixante deuyx’; ADG, C 630, fol. 10v, ‘Assemblee de messieurs les consulz et diocesains du dioce[se] de nismes, 15 April 1563’.

77 ADH, 1 B22547, fol. 1r, ‘Estat du pris et somme quont estre arrentes les benefices chappelles et aut[r]es biens ecclesiastiques et de mainmorte arrentes par les surintendens du diocese de montpellier suyvant la deliber[ai]on des gens des trois estatz tenuz a a ville de nimes au mois de novembre dernier mil cinq cens soixante deuyx, sire jehan pons receive[ur] esleu et nomme par le seigneur de sanravy...’.

78 ADH, 1 B 22551, fols 2r-3r, ‘Compte de maistre lion malboys de la ville de beizers commie par monsieur francoys du soustie consellier du roy au siege presidial estably aud[jicte] beizers...’; ADH, 1 B22551, fol. 1r, ‘Preuve pour jehan bartalat pour prendre les relicles [sic] et largent des rentiers des benefices, January 1563’.

80 ADH, 1 B22551, fol. 1r, ‘Payment of Lyon Malbois to Heustace Argensson, 10 April 1563’; 1 B22551, fol. 1r, ‘Payment of Lion Malbois to Pierre Teyssieres, 13 April 1563’; 1 B22551, fol. 1r, ‘Payment of Lion Malbois to a minister of Bedarreux, 15 June 1563’.
assembly.\textsuperscript{81} Both the Vivarais \textit{états} and the Montpellier \textit{assiette} took measures to pay Protestant ministers and deacons, through the \textit{surintendants} in the case of Montpellier.\textsuperscript{82}

Salt was another important part of Protestant finance, as it brought in considerable income, and the Nîmes assembly declared that it would seize the ‘salt of Pecquais [Peccais]’ near Aiguesmortes.\textsuperscript{83} Crussol and the \textit{conseil} had control over this valuable resource.\textsuperscript{84} Crussol was similarly in charge of issues such as taxation on merchandise, measures for which were adopted by the Nîmes consuls.\textsuperscript{85} In order to raise funds, the Rochemaure assembly also collected money from wealthy inhabitants (\textit{aisés}), in the form of loans.\textsuperscript{86} As tax revenue took time to collect, and money was often needed at short notice, loans were essential.\textsuperscript{87} Towns or individuals could be persuaded to make an immediate substantial payment only if guaranteed that a general imposition on the province would follow. Similar to elsewhere, the town of Nîmes struggled to contribute all that was necessary to the Protestant movement and took out loans to cover costs.\textsuperscript{88} The town further requested Crussol and the \textit{conseil} that the surrounding villages provide money. In Béziers, funds were raised through the sale of assets seized by soldiers.\textsuperscript{89}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{81} ADG, C 925, No. 5, fol. 11v-12r, ‘1562 Novembre Assemblée Des Etats’. Ministers were also sent to areas lacking spiritual leadership.
\bibitem{82} ADA, C 1649, No. 1, fol. 12r, ‘Délibérations des états du Vivarais, 4-6 June 1563’; ADH, 1 B22547, fol. 1r-v, ‘Estat des gaiges ordonnes par les surintendans dela ville et diocese de montpellier estie payes aux ministres et diacres des egli[s]es reformees dud[ict] diocese par led[ict] pons receveur des deniers de sa recepte ch[ac]un an partiyeys payes esquales et anticipees’.
\bibitem{84} ADG, C 925, No. 5, fol. 9v, ‘1562 Novembre Assemblée Des Etats’.
\bibitem{85} Ibid, fol. 11r; ADG, E Dépôt 36/127, fol. 292r-293r, ‘Conseil de la ville de Nîmes, 21 November 1562’.
\bibitem{86} ADA, 1 Mi 17, No. 1, fol. 18r-19r, ‘Actes de l’assiette generale de viveroys tenus au lieu de rochemaure en decembre mil cinq cens soixante deux’. Souriac also details this process (Souriac, \textit{Une guerre civile}, 156–57).
\bibitem{87} Lowenstein, ‘Resistance to Absolutism’, 166.
\bibitem{88} ADG, E Dépôt 36/127, fol. 304v, ‘Conseil de la ville de Nîmes, 15 February 1563’.
\bibitem{89} ADH, 1 B22551, fol. 6r, ‘Estat de la recepte faicte par lion malboys recepveur au nom du presant pais de languedoc et pour le diocese de beziers esleu en lassiete tenue en la ville de beziers au moys de novembre mil v c[ens] soixante deux’; 1 B22551, fol. 8r-v, ‘Compte de maistre lion malboys de la
Accounts were generally audited at the end of the war or at the end of the receiveur’s role. It was in the receiveur’s interest to have the account verified, as ‘until he rendered account, each comptable was considered a personal debtor for all money or goods he had received’. Writing about the seventeenth-century religious wars, but nonetheless relevant for the sixteenth century, Steven M. Lowenstein remarks that ‘in principle, no expense was legitimate unless accompanied by a pay order (to prove it had been authorised) and by a receipt (to prove it had actually been paid)’. Pay orders were called mandements. The auditing of accounts was very strict as the auditors could cut numerous expenses from the comptable’s accounts if they were considered illegitimate. Malbois’s accounts allow us to view the two parts of an expense. The receiveur first received a mandement from a figure in authority (such as a town consul) to pay an individual, and the individual then certified that he had been paid. After the war, the Protestant receiveurs-généraux had to appear before the Chambre des Comptes in Montpellier to show that their expenses had the permission of the estates, even if it was the Protestant estates. An extensive paper trail was required to prove the legitimacy of the receiveurs’ actions.

Concerning judicial decrees, the Nîmes assembly highlighted that the Catholic Toulouse parlement was controlled by ‘presidents and councillors, authors of a cruel bloody sedition against the province, rebels against the edicts of the King’ and ‘conspirators and perturbators of the estate and liberty of the King and the government of the Queen his mother’. Given that they could not in good conscience refer Protestants to this parlement,

ville de beziers commie par monsieur francoys du soustie conseillier du roy au siege presidial estably aud[icte] beziers...’.

90 Lowenstein, ‘Resistance to Absolutism’, 143.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid, 144.
93 Ibid, 144–45.
94 Greengrass, ‘Financing the Cause’, 235n.
the assembly assumed responsibility of the justice system.\textsuperscript{96} It is unclear how this fitted in with the Protestant agreement with Crussol, which pledged that they would obey the royal magistrates. Crussol had a role to play in the justice system (also shown by this agreement) and was asked to make sure that no one provoked another to arms.\textsuperscript{97} A further assembly article concerned the safeguarding of the feudal system of the \textit{seigneur} and his vassals, as the nobles were eager to affirm that the Protestant structure did not mean abolishing the duties owed to a lord.\textsuperscript{98}

The Languedoc Protestants recognised their need for considerable funds to maintain the war effort, of which the royal and ecclesiastical revenue formed a necessary part. Given the Protestant desire to cement the Reformed confession as the cornerstone of society, the employment of the revenues of the Catholic church was a useful way to fund this reformation. Crussol did not have a major hands-on role in these decrees, although his overall influence is evident. The \textit{assiettes} demonstrated the functioning of the system set up under his command and indicated how quickly these measures were adopted, while the shouldering of the judicial decrees particularly exemplified the extensive Protestant administration.

**Religion and society**

Despite the clear religious tone throughout the assembly deliberations, there are few articles in the \textit{Nîmes} assembly concerning religion and the wider society. Other than the several military articles mentioned, the assembly decided that, rather than forcing Catholics to attend church and perhaps being tricked by ‘their hypocrisy’, it was preferable that they leave the province.\textsuperscript{99} Crussol was to have no ‘papists and temporisers’ among his following,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{96} Ibid, fols 12v-13r; Jouanna, ‘Le temps des guerres de religion en France (1559-1598)’, 129.
\item \textsuperscript{97} ADG, C 925, No. 5, fol. 14r, ‘1562 Novembre Assemblée Des États’.
\item \textsuperscript{98} Ibid, fol. 14r-v.
\item \textsuperscript{99} Ibid, fol. 14v. ‘le[ur] ypocrezie’. \textit{Surintendants} took on an advisory role in watching over Catholics in the region.
\end{itemize}
in order to ‘conform himself to the word of God and render so much more wholesome and holy conversation’, as an example for others.\textsuperscript{100} Despite these few direct references, Arlette Jouanna writes that ‘one senses in these texts [of this Nîmes assembly] the exaltation of their authors to the idea of making Lower-Languedoc an islet of Reformed purity, where the elected people will live, like a new Israel led by God’.\textsuperscript{101}

The smaller Protestant assemblies took on a more active religious role. Following a request from the prince de Condé to Crussol for prayers from the Reformed churches in November, the town of Nîmes decided that there were to be several days of public prayers, along with a general fast.\textsuperscript{102} The Nîmes consistory also sent requests to Crussol and the conseil de Languedoc during Crussol’s charge, relating to the assembly deliberations and the maintenance of ecclesiastical discipline.\textsuperscript{103} The religious decrees, including those instituted by the ecclesiastical synods, were policed by the consistories in the region. As the Protestant assemblies used the existing Reformed religious structure to further their influence, the consistories played a key role.

The Rochemaure assembly decreed that everyone was to adhere to a confession of faith, renouncing:

- all idolatries, superstitions, particularly in relation to the Mass, purgatory, invoking saints, meriting good works, and other papal compositions made by men, contrary

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid, fol. 4r. ‘papistes et temporiseurs’, ‘se confermera à la parole de dieu et rendra tant plus entier et sainte convers[ation]’.

\textsuperscript{101} Jouanna, ‘Le temps des guerres de religion en France (1559-1598)’, 129. ‘On sent dans ces textes l’exaltation de leurs rédacteurs à l’idée de faire du Bas-Languedoc un îlot de pureté réformée où vivra le peuple élu, tel un nouvel Israël conduit par Dieu’.

\textsuperscript{102} BNF, fr. 8666, fol. 179r-v, ‘Nîmes consistory meeting, 21 November 1562’. This event is also recorded in Ménard, iv, 372.

\textsuperscript{103} BNF, fr. 8666, fol. 202v, ‘Nîmes consistory meeting, 13 January 1563’.
to the word of God. And promise to live from now on in the pure law of the Gospel, following the reformation of the Christian church.\textsuperscript{104}

A previous Vivarais assembly at Baix in October 1562 had required all inhabitants to make a similar confession.\textsuperscript{105} These local assemblies had ample leeway from the overall provincial estates to attempt to enact and enforce these rulings. While the religious measures were less extensive than the other decrees outlined, the Reformed faith was nonetheless reinforced as the cornerstone of this new administration.

Furthermore, there were rival Languedoc estates during the conflict. In December 1562, the official provincial estates were held at Carcassonne, which set out the Catholic response to the Nîmes assembly. According to the estates, ‘many rebels and seditious people have undertaken, without command of the king, to convok\[e]e\[n] an assembly among themselves in the form of an estates in the town of Nîmes’.\textsuperscript{106} The Carcassonne estates themselves stressed that they had been convok\[e]ed by royal command.\textsuperscript{107} The Protestants were noted as having made ‘impositions, cotisations and division of deniers on the subjects of the king’.\textsuperscript{108} In response, the Carcassonne estates ‘have broken, revoked and cancelled and are breaking, revoking and cancelling all that was discussed and proceeded in this assembly held at Nîmes in the form of an estates’.\textsuperscript{109} Languedoc inhabitants were ordered not to obey the Protestant decrees. The estates allocated 300,000 livres to fight the Protestants, taken from the church,

\textsuperscript{104} ADA, 1 Mi 17, No. 1, fol. 12r-v, ‘Actes de l’assiette generelle de viveroys tenus au lieu de rochemaure en decembre mil cinq cens soixante deux’. ‘toutes ydolatries superstitions Singulierement à la messe purgatoire Invoca\[t]i\[o]n de sainctz merites de bonn\[es] oeuvres et aul\[tr\]es c\[on\]stitu\[t]i\[o]\[n\]s papalles faictes p\[ar\] les hommes c\[on\]\[t\]\[r\]ains à la parole de dieu Et p\[r\]\[o\]\[m\]\[e\]t\[d\]\[e\]\[z\] de vivre desormays en la loy pure de l’evangille suuyant la refforma\[t\]i\[o\]n de l’esg\[l\]i\[s\]e ch\[r\]est\[i\]enne’.

\textsuperscript{105} Ibid, fols 14v-15r.


\textsuperscript{107} Ibid, fols 12r, 5r-v.

\textsuperscript{108} Ibid, fol. 12r. ‘Impositions cottisations et despartement de deniers sur les subiectz du Roy’.

\textsuperscript{109} Ibid, fol. 12v. ‘ont cassé Revocqué et annulé Cassent Revoquet et annulent tout ce qu’a esté faict trai\[t]é et procedé en ladicte assemblee faicte aud\[icte] nysmes en forme d’estatz’.

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the inhabitants, and confiscated assets.\footnote{BNF, fr. 15877, fol. 468r, ‘Letter of Cardinal Georges d’Armaignac to Blaise de Monluc, 22 December 1562’.} The assembly also observed that judicial magistrates and officers were participating in the rebellion.\footnote{AN, H748/15, fol. 12v, ‘Procès-verbaux des états de Languedoc: December 1562’.} However, it is not clear that these decrees in any significant way affected either the Protestant movement or Crussol’s leadership of it.

The Nîmes assembly put into place an impressive Protestant war machine. Crussol had a major role in this new organisation, as he gained considerable control over the running of the movement. The assiettes in particular demonstrated how the lower levels bought into Crussol’s role as leader. The decrees set up in November were far reaching, impacting the province in numerous ways through their enforcement.

Dauphiné

In Dauphiné, Crussol became commander of the Protestants in spring 1563. The first political assembly there had met at Montélimar in December 1562.\footnote{ADD, E 3556, ‘États de Montélimar, 8 Décembre 1562’. Also in Benedict and Fornero, L’organisation et l’action des églises réformées de France, 254–79.} Elected in the place of the baron des Adrets, Crussol took command at the following assembly at Valence in January and February, which further enhanced his power in the Midi.\footnote{BG, Ms. R 7568, fols 68r–93v, ‘Assemblée des états tenue a Valence, le 26 janvier 1563’. Also in Dussert, ‘Le baron des Adrets et les États du Dauphiné’, 93–136.} He took up ‘the defence of the province of Dauphiné to conserve it for the king under his authority and obedience, against all those who wish to take it [the province] and place it into the hands of some foreign princes’.\footnote{BG, Ms. R 7568, fol. 1r, ‘Assemblée des états tenue a Valence, le 26 janvier 1563’. ‘accepté la tuition et deffence de cedict pays de dauphiné pour le conserver à la Majesté dudit seigneur souzb son authorité et obeissance Contre tous ceux qui sen vouldroient emparer et le metcre es mains de quelques princes estrangiers [sic]’.}
The Montélimar assembly had been convoked by Des Adrets to discuss peace negotiations with the duc de Nemours, which were rejected by the estates. Royal letters had designated Nemours as governor and lieutenant-général of Dauphiné, but the Protestants dismissed these due to the ‘evident captivity of the King’, among other reasons. Des Adrets was later arrested for treason for conspiring against the Protestants. Crussol played a role in his arrest and called an assembly to decide his fate in February 1563, where he wished that a fair decision be made, in ‘justice and honesty of conscience, as before God’.

Crussol had sent representatives to Montélimar, and an alliance was agreed between the provinces of Dauphiné, Languedoc, and Lyonnais. Part of the purpose of this co-operation was to avoid separate negotiations with the enemy, to help each other in time of need, to contribute mutual military aid and to have an increased unity among military leaders. A separate union was formed between the Dauphiné estates and the churches of Comtat-Venaissin (a papal territory), Provence, and the comté de Grignan.

Military

There is no complete record of the Montélimar deliberations and, given the similarity of the surviving decrees with those of the Valence assembly, it seems that numerous articles relating to military issues are missing. Unlike the Languedoc estates, the Dauphiné assemblies established two conseils: a conseil de guerre and a conseil politique (‘one for the

116 ADD, E 3556, fol. 2r-v, ‘États de Montélimar, 8 Décembre 1562’. ‘l’evidente captivitè du Roy’.
117 Ménard, iv, 376. ‘équité et rondeur de conscience, comme devant Dieu’.
118 ADD, E 3556, fols 4r-5v, ‘États de Montélimar, 8 Décembre 1562’.
119 This alliance was later reinforced at the Valence assembly (BG, Ms. R 7568, fol. 1v, ‘Assemblée des états tenue a Valence, le 26 janvier 1563’).
120 ADD, E 3556, fol. 15r-v, ‘États de Montélimar, 8 Décembre 1562’.
121 Benedict and Fornerod, L’organisation et l’action des églises réformées de France, 272n.
matters of war and the other for the political affairs and finances of the province’). While Des Adrets decided the wage of military captains, the conseil politique determined his salary and those of the other military leaders. The Valence assembly reappointed figures to the conseil politique, ‘to give order and better remove the numerous complaints and grievances’ in Dauphiné. Officials were to obey the conseil politique, and, as many of its commands were seemingly ignored, the Valence assembly decided that the conseil could use penalties such as imprisonment to enforce its rulings. Those elected to either conseil were to take an oath to undertake their charge faithfully.

Des Adrets was asked not to ‘undertake anything without the assistance of the aforementioned council [of war]’, nor to conclude any agreements with the enemy without the conseil’s advice, similar to the Nîmes articles. The Valence deliberations provide further information on this military structure. The conseil de guerre was to ‘hold him [Crussol] diligently advised of all that they know to be necessary for the protection, security, and defence of the province’, and obey his commands. Crussol was given six thousand livres per year for ‘his charge and regular estate’, and was asked to keep the conseil politique informed of all political commissions.

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122 ADD, E 3556, fol. 9v, ‘Etats de Montélimar, 8 Décembre 1562’. ‘l’ung pour le faict de la guerre et l’autre Pour les affaires politiques et finances dud[i]t pais’. The conseil de guerre was formed exclusively of nobles (Ibid, fol. 13v).
123 Ibid, fol. 14v.
124 BG, Ms. R 7568, fols 14v-15r, ‘Assemblée des états tenue a Valence, le 26 janvier 1563’. ‘donner ordre et deposer mieulx infinies occurrences plaintes et doleances’.
125 Ibid, fols 17r-18r.
126 ADD, E 3556, fol. 14v, ‘Etats de Montélimar, 8 Décembre 1562’; Ibid, fol. 17v. Notable figures on the council for war included Charles Du Puy, the seigneur de Montbrun, and Antoine de Rambaud, the seigneur de Furmeyer.
127 ADD, E 3556, fols 9v-10r, ‘Etats de Montélimar, 8 Décembre 1562’. ‘entreprendre aucune chose Sans l’assistance dud[i]t c[on]seilh’.
128 BG, Ms. R 7568, fol. 7r, ‘Assemblée des états tenue a Valence, le 26 janvier 1563’. ‘tenir led[i]ct seign[e]ur bien et diligemment adverty de tout ce qu’il cognoistro[n]t estre necc[essaire] pour la tuition seureté et defence desd[i]ct pays’. Montbrun and Furmeyer were also on this council, along with other nobles such as the sieurs de Saint-Auban and Mirabel.
129 Ibid, fols 18v-19r, 21r. ‘son plat et estat ordinaire’. The members of the conseil de guerre were paid between sixty and hundred livres per month.
Crussol had power to appoint governors and captains, as in his Languedoc position, and was to communicate his appointments to the *conseil politique*, prior to these figures commencing their roles.\(^{130}\) In addition, he was to appoint people to the positions of *commissaire* and *contrôleur général des guerres*. Crussol assigned the sieur de Montbrun to the regions of Valentinois and Diois, and put Gaspard de Pape, the seigneur de Saint-Auban, in charge of the territory between Montélimar and Comtat-Venaissin.\(^{131}\) He also employed ordinary *commissaires* and *contrôleurs* to carry out muster rolls of troops, which were to be faithfully observed by the captains.\(^{132}\) Similar to the Nîmes assembly, governors were under the overall command of the *conseil*.\(^{133}\) The Valence estates added various decrees which limited this role. Governors were not to become involved in issues of justice or police, or take up the roles of magistrates and consuls, other than ‘to give a firm hand when it is needed’.\(^{134}\) They were instead to be content with the ‘matters of war concerning the guard of places where they are ordered’.\(^{135}\)

In relation to disciplining soldiers, Gaspard de Coligny’s ordonnance and a recent ordonnance of Des Adrets were to be observed, which was reinforced by the Valence assembly.\(^{136}\) Coligny’s ordonnance was comprised of forty articles, which detailed the power of commanders and discussions with enemy troops, among other concerns.\(^{137}\) The Montélimar assembly maintained that those in charge of the military companies were to have ‘the fear of God and experience in matters of war’, again attested to at Valence.\(^{138}\)

\(^{130}\) Ibid, fol. 13v.
\(^{131}\) Arnaud, *Histoire des protestants du Dauphiné aux XVIe, XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles*, I, 178.
\(^{132}\) BG, Ms. R 7568, fols 7v-8r, ‘Assemblée des états tenue a Valence, le 26 janvier 1563’.
\(^{133}\) ADD, E 3556, fol. 10r, ‘Etats de Montélimar, 8 Décembre 1562’.
\(^{134}\) BG, Ms. R 7568, fol. 11r-v, ‘Assemblée des états tenue a Valence, le 26 janvier 1563’. ‘donner main forte quand il sera besoing’.
\(^{135}\) Ibid. ‘faict de la guerre c[on]cernant la garde des lieux ou ilz seront ordonnéz’.
\(^{136}\) ADD, E 3556, fol. 10r, ‘Etats de Montélimar, 8 Décembre 1562’; Ibid, fol. 7v.
\(^{137}\) Benedict and Fornerod, *L’organisation et l’action des églises réformées de France*, 270n.
\(^{138}\) ADD, E 3556, fol. 10r, ‘Etats de Montélimar, 8 Décembre 1562’; BG, Ms. R 7568, fol. 7v, ‘Assemblée des états tenue a Valence, le 26 janvier 1563’. ‘la Craincte de Dieu et l’experience au faict de la guerre’.
nobles had to undertake military service or send a replacement if they were unable to do so. The Valence assembly added that, among the general population, all able-bodied men were to be enrolled, while the nobles were levied at Crussol’s will. Nobles could live peacefully on their lands but needed permission to do so, and were not allowed to aid the enemy.

Towns and villages were given a prominent position in Dauphiné in the Protestant war machine. The Montélimar assembly reinforced the interplay between the towns and the overall command structure, as consuls were ordered to draw up lists of all able-bodied men and weapons. The Valence deliberations, which help fill in the gaps of the Montélimar decrees, determined that towns and villages were to supply troops enrolled from their area, equipped with weapons if needed, and that the appointed military leaders in each bailliage or sénéchaussée (the most basic unit of local government) were to levy and conduct these troops. Crussol decided where these new troops would be sent. All military commanders had to obey the conseil de guerre’s ordonnances. As ‘many of our soldiers have been killed while fleeing and abandoning their companies and ranks’, soldiers leaving their companies were to be executed. Discipline was lacking, and several articles related to troop discipline while lodging in towns and villages. Similar to Nîmes, it was important to prevent abuses from the soldiers and complaints from the inhabitants. Towns were

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139 ADD, E 3556, fol. 10v, ‘Etats de Montélimar, 8 Décembre 1562’.
140 BG, Ms. R 7568, fol. 9r-v, ‘Assemblée des états tenue a Valence, le 26 janvier 1563’.
141 Ibid, fol. 14r.
142 ADD, E 3556, fols 10v-11r, ‘Etats de Montélimar, 8 Décembre 1562’.
143 BG, Ms. R 7568, fol. 10r, ‘Assemblée des états tenue a Valence, le 26 janvier 1563’; Knecht, The French Civil Wars, 1562-1598, 16.
144 BG, Ms. R 7568, fol. 9v, ‘Assemblée des états tenue a Valence, le 26 janvier 1563’.
145 Ibid, fol. 8v.
146 Ibid, fol. 11r. ‘plus[ieu]rs de noz souldars [sic] ont esté tuéz en fuyant et abandonnant leurs enseignes et leur renç [sic]’.
147 Ibid, fols 18r-v, 21r, 25v.
expected to contribute to their garrisons, which gave them a major role in the Protestant movement.\textsuperscript{148}

The impressive administrative organisation of the party and the importance of these urban centres is also shown through Crussol’s order to the towns and villages between Valence and Grenoble, ‘to receive and grant lodging and necessary provisions to the captain La Grange’.\textsuperscript{149} The places where La Grange stayed procured receipts from him to be reimbursed. Below this order is such a receipt, in which La Grange certified that he stayed in the town of Saint-Nazaire for two days.

In relation to security, the assembly concluded that the Valence fortifications would continue, while Crussol would decide which other towns should be fortified.\textsuperscript{150} All previous and future expenses, such as for fortifications, garrisons, and equipping of troops, would be paid for by the overall provincial administration.\textsuperscript{151} Other smaller articles included soldiers taking assets, which was only permitted with a command from Crussol and the conseil politique.\textsuperscript{152} The military structure set up in Dauphiné was more extensive than its counterpart in Languedoc. These articles demonstrated the critical nature of Crussol’s charge, as he had a fundamental role in maintaining this war machine. He gained another powerful position in taking up this command and was now the chief military figure over a substantial territory.

Organisation, finance, and justice

The Montélimar assembly adopted similar financial measures to those of Nîmes. For the ordinary expenses of war, the sum of 60,000 \textit{livres} was levied on the province, with a loan

\textsuperscript{148} Ibid, fols 8r-9r.
\textsuperscript{149} ACSN, EE3, No. 11, fol. 1r, ‘Order of Antoine de Crussol to the consuls of towns and villages on the route between Valence and Grenoble, 5 April 1563’. ‘Recepvoyr et bailler logis et vivres necessaires au cappiteyne la grange’.
\textsuperscript{150} BG, Ms. R 7568, fol. 14v, ‘Assemblée des états tenue a Valence, le 26 janvier 1563’.
\textsuperscript{151} Ibid, fol. 21v.
\textsuperscript{152} Ibid, fols 12v-14r.
on the aisés providing 30,000 livres.153 These figures were to be reimbursed from the general levy, and the assembly assured the aisés that they would be repaid. This money would be used for paying military companies, always a pressing expense.

The assembly decided that the Catholic church revenues should be seized and the benefices rented out, similar to Nîmes.154 A portion of these revenues was used to support those who had been expelled from the religious institutions, while ecclesiastical pensions could be bought, like in Languedoc.155 The ministers’ salaries were to come out of the dîmes on these benefices.156 Other Catholic revenues provided for the poor and the maintenance of schools.157 The land of ‘seditious papists’ who had fled was also rented out, again reinforced at Valence.158 Those who had seized these assets were required to give them to the assembly.159 It was further decided to open a monnoye (a mint), presumably to increase revenue.160

The Valence assembly similarly decreed several financial measures. A loan of 20,000 livres would be taken from nobles and aisés, former arrentements would be renewed, more benefices would be rented out, those who had taken Catholic assets would be required to hand these over, and debtors owing rentes and pensions on church land would be constrained to pay.161 As well as taxing town merchandise, funds were raised through borrowing money from the nobles of Valentinois and Diois.162 The Valence estates

153 ADD, E 3556, fols 14v-15r, ‘Etats de Montélimar, 8 Décembre 1562’.
154 Ibid, fol. 12r.
155 Ibid, fols 8v, 13r. These measures were also taken at Valence (BG, Ms. R 7568, fols 5r, 20v, ‘Assemblée des états tenue a Valence, le 26 janvier 1563’).
156 ADD, E 3556, fols 8v-9r, ‘Etats de Montélimar, 8 Décembre 1562’.
157 Ibid, fol. 9r-v; Benedict and Fornerod, L’organisation et l’action des églises réformées de France, 267n.
158 ADD, E 3556, fol. 12r-v, ‘Etats de Montélimar, 8 Décembre 1562’; BG, Ms. R 7568, fols 20v-21r, ‘Assemblée des états tenue a Valence, le 26 janvier 1563’. ‘papistes seditieux’.
159 BG, Ms. R 7568, fol. 21r, ‘Assemblée des états tenue a Valence, le 26 janvier 1563’.
160 ADD, E 3556, fols 15v-16r, ‘Etats de Montélimar, 8 Décembre 1562’.
161 BG, Ms. R 7568, fols 19r-20r, ‘Assemblée des états tenue a Valence, le 26 janvier 1563’.
162 Ibid, fol. 22r; BG, Ms. R 80, ‘Cest le Rolle des nobles du Valennois et Diois qui sont coctizes pour lemprent de 20000 livres..., 1563’.
maintained that the money of the recette générale (the general Protestant fund) was to be divided into three parts: for war, the wages of officials and magistrates, and unforeseen expenses.  

Receveurs-généraux and receveurs-particuliers were appointed too. The aim of the Montélimar estates was to regulate the Protestant organisation generally, and all those who had been responsible for funds were to account for their charge before the conseil politique, which was affirmed at Valence. The Valence assembly detailed the closing of these figures’ accounts: the receveurs-particuliers sent them to the conseil politique, and it was the receveur-général who verified the receipts on the conseil’s behalf. Completed muster rolls were also sent to the conseil politique. These decrees demonstrate the detailed level of the Protestant financial organisation.

As in Languedoc, the Protestants took responsibility for the justice system. Those who had pillaged churches, taken ecclesiastical revenues, or searched places illegally, would be punished, again reiterated at Valence. There was a centralised effort to contain any religious zeal, and to verify that revenues went directly to the party. The Protestant movement knew it would be held accountable for its actions, and it sought to show itself as a legitimate body, acting under the king’s authority. Officials such as the sénéchal had to make a Reformed profession of faith. It would be announced through the province that injury or provoking each other to arms on the matter of religion or otherwise was not permitted,

163 BG, Ms. R 7568, fol. 18r, ‘Assemblée des états tenue a Valence, le 26 janvier 1563’.
164 ADD, E 3556, fol. 15r, ‘Etats de Montélimar, 8 Décembre 1562’.
165 Ibid, fol. 14r; BG, Ms. R 7568, fol. 18v, ‘Assemblée des états tenue a Valence, le 26 janvier 1563’.
166 BG, Ms. R 7568, fols 18v, 20v, ‘Assemblée des états tenue a Valence, le 26 janvier 1563’.
167 BG, Ms. R 7568, fol. 8r, ‘Assemblée des états tenue a Valence, le 26 janvier 1563’.
168 Ibid, fol. 17r-v.
169 ADD, E 3556, fol. 12v, ‘Etats de Montélimar, 8 Décembre 1562’; Ibid, fol. 20r.
while the Valence assembly also banned starting debates.\textsuperscript{170} Anabaptists and those who wished to abolish the feudal system were to be punished.\textsuperscript{171}

The Valence deliberations provided further judicial decrees. All judges were to reside in their offices and undertake their charge faithfully, following the Montélimar articles for the punishment of crimes.\textsuperscript{172} Protestant judges had jurisdiction over both civil and criminal matters and their judgements were seen as final, not needing to refer matters to the parlement.\textsuperscript{173} These articles aimed ‘to substitute for the absence of the sovereign court of parlement’, which had taken refuge in Savoy.\textsuperscript{174} Seigneurs bannerets (nobles who had judicial power over their lands) were required to have experienced Protestant officials in their judicature, and these officials (the juges bannerets) could seemingly bypass the parlement.\textsuperscript{175}

The elaborate Protestant organisation, seen particularly in the regulation of the receiveurs, points to the seriousness with which the Protestants viewed their wartime administration. These decrees shed more light on the Reformed shouldering of the judicial system in Dauphiné, in greater detail than in Languedoc. As shown by the need for Reformed officials, these judicial measures attested to the Protestant desire for a reform of society, and similarly the Protestant attempts to mirror the existing royal structure in the provinces.

\textsuperscript{170} ADD, E 3556, fol. 13r, ‘Etats de Montélimar, 8 Décembre 1562’; BG, Ms. R 7568, fol. 25r, ‘Assemblée des états tenue a Valence, le 26 janvier 1563’.

\textsuperscript{171} ADD, E 3556, fol. 13r, ‘Etats de Montélimar, 8 Décembre 1562’. The term ‘anabaptist’ is used in an imprecise manner, signifying someone who contested the social hierarchy (Benedict and Fornerod, \textit{L’organisation et l’action des églises réformées de France}, 275n).

\textsuperscript{172} BG, Ms. R 7568, fol. 24r, ‘Assemblée des états tenue a Valence, le 26 janvier 1563’.

\textsuperscript{173} Ibid, fol. 24r-v; Benedict and Fornerod, \textit{L’organisation et l’action des églises réformées de France}, 279n.

\textsuperscript{174} Dussert, ‘Le baron des Adrets et les Etats du Dauphiné’, 104. ‘suppléer à l’absence de la cour souveraine de parlement’.

\textsuperscript{175} BG, Ms. R 7568, fol. 25r, ‘Assemblée des états tenue a Valence, le 26 janvier 1563’. There were also other minor judicial decrees.
Religion and society

In adherence to the religion, all Dauphiné inhabitants were to attend the ‘holy assemblies that take place in the temples, to hear the sermons and prayers’. There was an emphasis on strict discipline, and all inhabitants were required to appear before the consistory if called. There were numerous other decrees: that unrepentant prostitutes and adulterers would leave the province, that the singing of profane songs or playing games of chance would be forbidden, and that those who committed blasphemy would face corporal punishment.

Similar to the Rochemaure assembly, there was an effort to prevent people from invoking the saints, and obstinate Catholics were to be removed from Dauphiné. All magistrates and consuls needed to have been members of the church for at least six months, while schoolteachers were to be examined before taking up their positions, and subscribe to the Reformed confession. True doctrine was to be preached, through pastors known to the ecclesiastical synods, and children were to be baptised.

Other articles related to the paying of ministers, and the care of the poor and disadvantaged, as shown earlier. All those returning to Dauphiné, who had previously fought against the Protestants, were to go before the consistory to demonstrate their obedience. The consistories had a more influential role in enforcing the assemblies’ decrees in Dauphiné than in Languedoc. All these articles illustrate the considerable authority that the Protestant movement sought over the province. Similar to Rochemaure,

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176 ADD, E 3556, fols 5v-6r, ‘États de Montélimar, 8 Décembre 1562’. ‘sainctes assemblées qui se font aux temples ouyr les preches et prieres’. As well as a Reformed service on a Sunday, Wednesday was designated the day of official prayers, with a sermon also taking place.
177 Ibid, fols 6v-7r.
178 Ibid, fol. 7r-v. Dancing in the manner of ‘pagans’ (‘paiens’) was also punished.
179 Ibid, fols 7r, 13r.
180 Ibid, fols 7v-8r.
181 Ibid, fols 8r, 6r-v. For baptism, parents were called to declare the birth of their child to the deacons and elders of the church, before presenting the baby at the Reformed service to be baptised.
182 Ibid, fols 8v-9v. Ministers and deacons were also to be sent to places without a current pastor.
183 Ibid, fol. 6v.
the place of religion was clear in the Montelimar assembly, which ‘unanimously made an express promise and solemn oath in the name of Almighty God to stay perpetually united and allied together, to support and maintain the confession of the pure doctrine of the Gospel until the final drop of their blood’.\textsuperscript{184}

A strong religious tone pervaded the Valence deliberations. The assembly wished that ‘a true Reformation ordered according to the word of God may be maintained and observed in this province’.\textsuperscript{185} There are very few new religious decrees compared to the surviving Montélimar records. Consul meetings or judicial courts were not to meet during the Protestants sermons if possible.\textsuperscript{186} All weekly Catholic festivals were abolished, and people were to work every day except Sunday.\textsuperscript{187} The assembly also ended with a reaffirmation of its commitment to the Protestant faith and the inter-provincial alliance. Using very similar language to Montélimar, the assembly unanimously ‘made and agreed a solemn oath and promise in the name of Almighty God to stay perpetually united and allied together to support and maintain the confession of the pure doctrine of the Gospel, until the final drop of their blood, to not depart from this alliance and union’, and to obey the articles of this assembly.\textsuperscript{188}

In contrast to Nîmes, these religious decrees emphasised in far more detail the extensive social changes envisaged, and the Protestant desire to have the Reformed

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\textsuperscript{184} Ibid, fol. 16r-v. ‘ont unanimentem fait expresse promesse et serement [sic] solemnel au nom de dieu Toutpuissant de demeurer p[er]petuelle unis et alié [sic] les ungs avec les autr[e]s soubstenir et maintenir la c[on]fession de la pure doctrine de l’evangile jusques à la derniere goutte de le[u]r sang’.
\textsuperscript{185} BG, Ms. R 7568, fol. 1v, ‘Assemblée des états tenue a Valence, le 26 janvier 1563’. ‘une vraye Reform[ati]on reiglée suyvant la parolle de dieu soit maitenue et obs[er]vée en ce pays’.
\textsuperscript{186} Ibid, fol. 4r.
\textsuperscript{187} Ibid, fol. 6v.
\textsuperscript{188} Ibid, fol. 26r. ‘faict et presté promesse et serment solemnel au nom de Dieu tout puissant de demeurer p[erpet]uelle[men]t unys et alié[es] les ungs avec les autrs soubstenir et [maintenir] la c[on]fession de la pure doctrine de [l’evangile] jusques à la derniere goutte de le[u]r sang [ne se] despartir de lad[icte] alliance et union’. Although there are some words missing in the manuscript, the close similarity between this article and the Montélimar article makes it possible to fill in the blanks.
\end{footnotesize}
confession as the cornerstone of society is clear. With their influence on aspects such as education and Catholic festivals, these decrees engaged considerably with the social landscape. However, it is difficult to evaluate their overall success. In general, these Dauphiné assemblies set up a far more wide-ranging framework than its Nîmes counterpart.

Crussol gained increased power through leading the Dauphiné Protestants, and his protestations of loyalty to the crown in November 1562 were less convincing in January and February 1563. He was again able to appoint individuals to leadership positions and direct military forces, while receiving a substantial état. He continued to nominate military leaders during his time as Protestant leader of both provinces. The town of Béziers had several commanders over the period of the war, as Crussol responded to the needs of the military situation around him, as shown in more detail in the following chapter.

Post peace edict

The news of the peace edict of 19 March 1563 brought a different impetus to the assemblies, even though the conflict continued. The final two Languedoc estates, taking place after this news, provide an opportunity to evaluate the success of the structure formalised at Nîmes. Unfortunately, if another Protestant estates took place in Dauphiné, there are no existing records. The news of peace changed the objectives of Crussol in particular, who wished for the Protestants to accept the edict, seen most noticeably in the assembly at Montpellier in May 1563.

The first of these two estates met at Bagnols-sur-Cèze on 31 March, opened by Crussol himself.\(^{189}\) During this meeting, it was not altogether certain that the peace had been signed, as Condé had sent Crussol an unsigned copy of the edict, and confirmation of the

peace only arrived after the assembly.\textsuperscript{190} The assembly had been moved from Montpellier as Crussol was still on a military campaign, and had ‘set up a camp in Comtat Venaissin which he could not leave’, being unprepared for the arrival of the peace.\textsuperscript{191} Although he was not present for the whole assembly, he was kept informed of its proceedings and his opinion was sought during the deliberations.\textsuperscript{192}

Finances and organisation

This assembly at Bagnols accentuated the dire state of the Protestant finances. A representative of the \textit{conseil} observed that at the Nîmes assembly:

\begin{quote}

it was very difficult, indeed impossible to know exactly what troops were needed for the defence of the province, and to draw up a budget of the expenses necessary to maintain them. The course and success of the affairs have well shown that one is lacking in relation to almost half the funds, as one planned for 3000 infantry and 400 horse, and there is a need for more than 6000 infantry and 700 or 800 horse. For all the expenses of war and other necessities, this administration planned for only 600,000 or 700,000 \textit{livres}, while there is a need for more than one million \textit{livres}.\textsuperscript{193}
\end{quote}

More funds were required as forces had been sent to Dauphiné (presumably to relieve the later siege of Grenoble), and Crussol had decided to form new companies and garrisons due to enemy forces on the Languedoc frontier and near the mountains of the Gévaudan, the

\textsuperscript{190} \textit{Histoire ecclésiastique}, iii, 210.

\textsuperscript{191} ADG, C 925, No. 18, fol. 1v, ‘Proces verbal des estatz tenus a baignolz 1563’. ‘faict dresser ung camp au conté [sic] de venisse lequel ne pouvoit delaisser’. The assembly had met at Montpellier, and reconvened at Bagnols (Ibid, fol. 1r-v; Daussy, \textit{Le parti huguenot}, 384).

\textsuperscript{192} ADG, C 925, No. 18, fol. 10v, ‘Proces verbal des estatz tenus a baignolz 1563’.


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Cévennes, and the Vivarais regions. Crussol’s prominent role in the Protestant military structure is shown through these actions, as certain frontier garrisons needed to be permanently retained, requiring three thousand men, while a separate three-thousand-strong force was formed to bolster Protestant power and retake captured territory.\textsuperscript{194} The Protestants did not view this uncertain peace as conclusively ending the war.

Assessing the remaining \textit{recettes particulières}, the assembly heard that with the collection of the \textit{équivalent} and \textit{grenetiers} [both taxes], the \textit{décimes}, the imposition of 300,000 \textit{livres}, and finally the income from benefices and the old \textit{arrentements}, some of this revenue was considerably smaller than anticipated.\textsuperscript{195} This result was due in part to enemy control over certain territories, which affected tax collection.\textsuperscript{196} This problem was raised in a meeting of the Nîmes diocese in April 1563, as money could not be collected from the towns of Beaucaire, Saint-Gilles, Fourques, and Bellegarde (one of the territories of Crussol) for both last year and this year, due to enemy pillaging and some inhabitants having fled.\textsuperscript{197}

Less than two thirds of the projected revenue from the benefices had been received, and there was little income from the former \textit{rentiers}.\textsuperscript{198} The aforementioned Nîmes diocese assembly further illustrated this lack of finance, as several \textit{surintendants} complained that \textit{rentiers} did not wish to pay their \textit{arrentements} ‘under pretext of the peace’ or other reasons, while some places had not yet been leased out.\textsuperscript{199} In response, measures were to be taken to secure this money by constraint if needed.\textsuperscript{200} The assembly at Bagnols had not yet received

\textsuperscript{194} Ibid, fol. 4v.
\textsuperscript{195} ADG, C 925, No. 18, fols 4v-5r, ‘Proces verbal des estatz tenus a baignolz 1563’. The imposition of 300,000 \textit{livres} seems to refer to the \textit{cotisation} (Daussy, ‘Financing the Huguenot War Effort during the Early Wars of Religion, 1562–1570’, 603).
\textsuperscript{196} Ibid, fols 5r, 11v.
\textsuperscript{197} ADG, C 630, fol. 13r, ‘Assemblee de messieurs les consulz et diocesains du dioce[se] de nismes, 15 April 1563’.
\textsuperscript{198} ADG, C 925, No. 18, fol. 5r-v, ‘Proces verbal des estatz tenus a baignolz 1563’.
\textsuperscript{199} ADG, C 630, fol. 10v, ‘Assemblee de messieurs les consulz et diocesains du dioce[se] de nismes, 15 April 1563’. ‘soubz pretexte de la paix’.
\textsuperscript{200} Ibid, fols 10v, 11v.
revenue from the salt of Peccais or the few Catholic assets that had been seized.\textsuperscript{201} Given this lack of revenue, and to avoid dangers such as mutiny among the discontented soldiers, the Languedoc conseil had decided to take money from other collected funds. A captain’s request for money to pay his already disbanded troops in Pont-Saint-Esprit emphasised the Protestant financial need.\textsuperscript{202} This was reiterated at the Vivarais états in June, where numerous commanders requested funds for their soldiers.\textsuperscript{203} These military figures were reimbursed by the Vivarais assembly, but Antoine de Solier, a member of the Languedoc conseil until May 1563, was deputised to request Crussol and the conseil that this expense be put on the province.\textsuperscript{204}

The assembly also considered the last two quarters of the cotisation, coming to 80,000 livres out of the 331,000 overall.\textsuperscript{205} This money had been promised to Condé for ‘the subsidy of war and the conservation of the state and liberty of the king and of the queen and of the kingdom’.\textsuperscript{206} On the advice of Crussol, the conseil had decided to advance the last two quarters to pay the reîtres (heavy German cavalry) coming from Lyon, further displayed by the conseil’s circular letter of 9 March 1563 to the viguerie (the Nîmes diocese was made up of eight vigueries) of Nîmes.\textsuperscript{207} This letter noted the considerable expenses that the conseil had taken to repel ‘the fury of the adversaries of the Reformed religion, [and] of the king’,
being constrained to levy new forces.\textsuperscript{208} In addition, money was owed to Lyon for supplying other Languedoc troops.\textsuperscript{209}

In this circular letter, the \textit{conseil} had urged the \textit{viguerie} towns and villages to contribute this money through collecting loans from the \textit{aisés}.\textsuperscript{210} They wished for these funds to arrive quickly, although it is not clear whether this occurred. This letter ended with a threat, outlining that to those who were reluctant to supply this money, Crussol ‘will employ such constraint and severity which is merited’, seeing these figures as ‘rebels to the king, violators and breakers of the public peace’.\textsuperscript{211} This sum was an important target to reach, as shown by the tension with the Montpellier consuls seen in the following chapter.

At an assembly in Nîmes on 9 March, Guillaume de Roques, the \textit{seigneur} de Clausonne, and member of the Languedoc \textit{conseil}, had outlined ‘the great necessity in which the Reformed churches of the province of Languedoc’ find themselves in, needing to locate funds ‘to pay the \textit{gendarmerie}’, and reiterated the requirement for a list of \textit{aisés} to be drawn up.\textsuperscript{212} Having carried this out for the town and \textit{viguerie} of Nîmes, the Nîmes consuls convened an assembly with the other places in the \textit{viguerie}, to organise the collection of this money, described as being for ‘the liberty of the king and of the queen-mother and conservation of the kingdom against foreigners’.\textsuperscript{213} This convened assembly recorded the amount owed by each town or village, and chose a representative to collect this money,

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\textsuperscript{208} ADG, E Dépôt 36/127, fol. 311v, ‘Assemblee de messieurs les consulz de la ville de nymes..., 18 March 1562/1563’. ‘la fureur des adversaire de la religion refformee du roy’.
\textsuperscript{209} ADG, C 925, No. 18, fols 11v-12r, ‘Proces verbal des estatz tenus a baignolz 1563’.
\textsuperscript{210} ADG, E Dépôt 36/127, fol. 312r, ‘Assemblee de messieurs les consulz de la ville de nymes..., 18 March 1562/1563’.
\textsuperscript{211} Ibid. ‘uzera de telle constraincte et rigueur que la chose merite’, ‘rebelles au roy et violateurs et coulpables dela paix publicque’.
\textsuperscript{213} Ibid; ADG, E Dépôt 36/127, fols 311-313r, ‘Assemblee de messieurs les consulz de la ville de nymes..., 18 March 1562/1563’. The citation is from fol. 312r. ‘la libert du roy et de la royne mere et conservation du royaulme A l’encontre des estrangiers’.
\end{flushright}
underlining the efficiency of the Protestant movement.\textsuperscript{214} However, it seems that the total sum of 8682 livres, 19 sols and 10 deniers, was not going to be collected quickly enough for the conseil.\textsuperscript{214}

The payment of the last two quarters was again addressed in a Nîmes diocese assembly in April 1563. The Nîmes consuls outlined that their town and viguerie had paid for their share, and urged others to do the same, which had also been emphasised in an earlier meeting of the diocese.\textsuperscript{215} Most of the vigueries had not paid, as ‘for reason of the peace, no-one wishes to pay’.\textsuperscript{216} Officials were later sent to constrain the vigueries of Vigan, Anduze, and Sauve to pay their share of the imposition.\textsuperscript{217}

For the Vivarais, the conseil decided to advance the last two quarters of their contribution, coming to 27,630 livres and 10 deniers.\textsuperscript{218} Crussol had sent Solier to the Vivarais assembly in March, to inform them of this contribution. This money was to be taken from the aïsés, who would be reimbursed proportionately. The états sent letters to the towns and villages to round up this money, indicating the consequences of non-payment, which could include a forced loan.\textsuperscript{219} In addition, Solier presented a letter on Crussol’s behalf, noting the pressing need for silver, in order to mint money and pay for military companies. Solier is a good example of the connection between the regional assemblies and the wider provincial command, as he brought requests from one to the other. This assembly was presided over by a representative of Jacqueline du Mas, the comtesse de Ventadour and dame de la Voute,\textsuperscript{219}

\textsuperscript{214} ADG, E Dépôt 36/127, fol. 312r-v, ‘Assemblee de messieurs les consulz de la ville de nymes..., 18 March 1562/1563’.
\textsuperscript{215} ADG, C 630, fols. 8v-9v, ‘Assemblee du diocese faicte en la ville et maison consullaire de nysmes..., 15 March 1562/1563’; C 630, fol. 11r, ‘Assemblee de messieurs les consulz et diocesains du dioce[se] de nismes, 15 April 1563’.
\textsuperscript{216} ADG, C 630, fol. 11v, ‘Assemblee de messieurs les consulz et diocesains du dioce[se] de nismes, 15 April 1563’. ‘po[u]r Ra[is]on dela paix l’on ne veult payer’.
\textsuperscript{217} ADH, 1 B22803, fol. 1r, ‘Mandement faict a francoys pavee, 6 July 1563’.
\textsuperscript{218} ADA, C 1649, No. 1, fol. 2r, ‘Délibérations des états du Vivarais, 10-11 March 1562/1563’.
\textsuperscript{219} Ibid, fol. 5r-v.
and godmother of Crussol, as noted in the introduction. This point underscores the importance of situating Crussol in his provincial context, as well as the Protestant affiliations of his noble networks.

To raise money for ‘the defence of the province against the massacres, thefts, and daily invasions by the enemies of the Reformed religion’, several measures were taken by the Bagnols assembly. Illustrating in depth the terrible state of Languedoc and the poverty of the people, ‘no imposition of money on the province’ would be carried out for this year. Income was instead collected through merchandise leaving the province, and the further sale of Catholic church land and church bells not in use.

A bleak picture of the Protestant organisation was painted overall, as many pensions had not been paid, the poor were in need, the frontier towns and fortresses were not equipped for a siege, and fortification repairs had not been completed, along with ‘many other things which remain to be done due to this lack of money’. These examples attest to the Protestant attempt to not simply form a military infrastructure, but instead adopt the existing royal provincial framework.

The Montpellier assembly, running from 11-18 May 1563, also helps us to consider the success of the decrees put forward at Nîmes. Crussol convoked this assembly to convince the Protestants to accept the peace. The war had continued in Languedoc and Dauphiné since March, and Lyon had only published the edict in June, through the actions of

220 Ibid, fol. 1r.
221 ADG, C 925, No. 18, fol. 8v, ‘Proces verbal des estatz tenus a baignolz 1563’. ‘la deffence du pays contre les massacres volleries et invasions journelles des enemys dela Religion reformede’.
222 Ibid, fol. 15v, ‘aucune Imposition de deniers sur le pays’.
223 Ibid, fols 15v-16r.
224 Ibid, fol. 6r. ‘plus[ieu]rs aut[re]s choses qui demeurent à f[air]e po[u]r ceste faulte de deniers’.
225 Daussy, Le parti huguenot, 486. An example of Crussol asking a town to send delegates to this assembly is found in AMM, BB 393, fol. 121v, ‘Conseil de la ville de Montpellier 26 April 1563’. The Montpellier estates’ deliberations survive in disparate parts, which are all in the archives départementales de l'Hérault.
François de Scepeaux, the maréchal de Vieilleville.\textsuperscript{226} Despite the appearance of the peace, the Montpellier assembly continued to plan for the future, choosing a representative for the general Protestant synod in August.\textsuperscript{227}

This assembly again considered the arrentements of benefices. The seigneur de Colans was assigned to investigate those refusing to pay. This money was needed ‘to satisfy the great sums of which the province is in debt, at the occasion of this war’.\textsuperscript{228} As shown earlier, several rentiers viewed the peace treaty as an opportunity to avoid paying outstanding debts. The reluctance of the rentiers to pay appeared again in a Nîmes conseil meeting in June, which commented that they could be thrown into prison until they provided the necessary funds, similar to the case of the Montpellier consuls in the following chapter.\textsuperscript{229}

There is one case which particularly highlights Protestant attempts to recover arrentement payments. In May 1563, the conseil ordered that the sieurs de Vissec and de l’Espinasse pay money to the receveur des biens ecclésiastiques et revenus of the Nîmes diocese.\textsuperscript{230} Vissec owed around 1085 livres, while Vallette owed 742 livres. To constrain these nobles to pay, Guillaume David was sent with twelve arquebusiers to the town of Vigan, for the ‘benefices [they] hold in arrentement of the province’.\textsuperscript{231} After David requested Valentin Cate, the receveur’s representative, to bring the money collected from the viguerie of Vigan,

\textsuperscript{226} Knecht, \textit{The French Civil Wars, 1562-1598}, 123–24. News of Crussol holding Protestant assemblies after the peace had additionally reached Paris in May, as shown by a letter of the Spanish ambassador (BNF, fr. 10193, fol. 318v-319r, ‘Letter of Perronet de Chantonnay to Philip II, 17 May 1563’).
\textsuperscript{227} ADH, 1 B22803, fol. 1r, ‘Payment of Guillaume Arquier to Rozel, 24 June 1563’.
\textsuperscript{228} ADH, 1 B22547, fol. 1v, ‘Extraict des deliberations et articles arretez en lassemblee des estatz ou dioceses en bas pays de languedoc tenans la religion reformee faicte en la ville de montpellier...’. ‘pour satisfera aux grandz sommes dont le pays est en arriere à occas[s]ion de ceste guerre’.
\textsuperscript{229} ADG, C 630, fol. 17r-v, ‘Assemblee des consulz et diocesains du diocese de nismes representans icelluy diocese, 2 June 1563’.
\textsuperscript{230} ADH, 1 B 22803, fol. 8r, ‘Mandement faicte a guill[aum]e david, 10 June 1563’.
\textsuperscript{231} Ibid, fol. 1r. ‘benefices q[u]’ils tiennent en arrentement dud[ict] pais’. See also David’s rolle of troops (Ibid, fol. 8r).
Cate outlined that he could not recover this money from the two nobles. This example again emphasises the high level of Protestant organisation.

The issue was later resolved, as Vissec agreed to pay for the arrentements and the expenses incurred by David to recover this money. After a conseil representative had viewed his accounts, it was found that Vissec only owed around 400 livres, which was seemingly paid. It is unclear what happened with Espinasse. The Protestants were not afraid to use force to recover this money, as Vissec would have been seized and brought to Nîmes if he had refused to pay, while a Vigan representative had been contacted by the conseil to ‘lend a strong hand’ to David. The potential Protestant use of force was seen elsewhere too, as the receveurs could imprison the fermiers of Catholic benefices if they refused to hand over money owed. Receveurs’ accounts were also audited at this assembly, and the strict investigation of these was shown as the auditors sought the opinion of the assembly on 23,000 livres granted by command of the conseil de Dauphiné. The Vivarais états similarly closed accounts in June. However, all surintendants were to continue in their charge according to the Montpellier assembly, presumably to collect outstanding money from the rentiers.

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232 Ibid, fol. 6r.
233 Ibid, fol. 7r.
234 Ibid, fol. 9r.
235 Ibid. ‘prester main forte’.
236 ADH, 1 B22547, fols 9v-10r, ‘Extraict des deliberations et articles arretez en lassemblee des estatz ou dioceses en bas pays de languedoc tenans la religion reformee faicte en la ville de montpellier...’.
237 Ibid, fols 2r-3v. This sum was allocated.
238 ADA, C 1649, No. 1, fols 14v, 16r, ‘Délibérations des états du Vivarais, 4-6 June 1563’; C 1649, No. 1, fol. 20v, ‘Délibérations des états du Vivarais, 21 June 1563’.
239 ADH, 1 B22547, fols 5r, 6v-7r, 4v, ‘Extraict des deliberations et articles arretez en lassemblee des estatz ou dioceses en bas pays de languedoc tenans la religion reformee faicte en la ville de montpellier...’. It is peculiar that the Vivarais états mentioned above closed the accounts of the surintendants, even though the Montpellier assembly stipulated that these figures were to continue in their positions.
Guillaume Arquier became the new provincial *receveur-général* at Montpellier, while the *conseil* was reduced to five people.\(^{240}\) Arquier’s receipts provide a good example of the Protestant movement in action. He reimbursed the *receveur-particulier* of the Uzès diocese for payments made on Crussol’s command.\(^{241}\) This money paid for soldiers and *pionniers* (men used for manual tasks such as preparing camps), muster rolls being carried out, artillery, and other expenses.\(^{242}\) Although there was a delay of several months for the *receveur-particulier* to be paid, these receipts indicate both the Protestant system being put into practice, and the effectiveness of its organisation.\(^{243}\) This example too highlights Crussol’s role in directing military affairs. There could be a considerable wait for reimbursement, as shown by the Montpellier assembly granting Beaudiné money owed from the Nîmes estates.\(^{244}\)

It is clear that the measures imposed in November 1562 had not always been carried out, due to the increased costs of war among other reasons. Collecting the revenue for the *arrentements* and the *cotisation* proved particularly difficult, and underlined a war weariness in Languedoc, where the Protestants had been forced to incur significant costs.

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\(^{240}\) The new *conseil* consisted of four figures remaining from the previous *conseil*: the *sieur d’Anduze*, the *seigneur* de Clausonne, the *sieur* de la Roche, and Guillaume de Contour. The *sieur* de Maliane, who had overseen the muster rolls, was also added to the *conseil*, and Étienne Ranchon was retained as *greffier*.

\(^{241}\) ADH, 1 B 22803, ‘Payment of Guillaume Arquier to Nicolas Tholouze, 3 July 1563’.

\(^{242}\) These documents are all in 1 B22803: ‘Muster roll of captain Sainte-Marie, 13 June 1563’; ‘Muster roll of captain Malhanes, 14 June 1563’; ‘Muster roll of monsieur Despondilhan, 14 June 1563’; ‘Receipt of payment of Nicolas de Toulouze to Monsieur Melet, 15 June 1563’. These were used for Crussol’s future military campaign at Sérignan-du-Comtat.

\(^{243}\) Another example is found in ADH, 1 B22803, ‘Roolles [sic] des monstres faictes a beaucaire mo[n]tfrin et roquemaure, July 1563’.

\(^{244}\) ADH, 1 B22547, fol. 5r-v, ‘Extraict des deliberations et articles arretez en lassemblee des estatz ou dioceses en bas pays de languedoc tenans la religion reformee faicte en la ville de montpellier…’
Justice

The Bagnols assembly further sought to improve the existing judicial system, which was not effectively punishing crimes, such as attendance at Mass. Delinquent soldiers, both captains and nobles, needed to be punished too. The conseil wished for Crussol to deal with these figures, who had avoided investigation into their activities. He was requested to publish military ordonnances, which he had not done in November. Representatives were also appointed for ‘the defence of the good [citizens] and punishment of the delinquents’. The wages of the Protestant conseillers and officers in the siège présidial at Béziers were to be paid. This is a further example of the increased number of responsibilities and expenses that the Protestant movement took on in adopting the existing royal infrastructure. While the Bagnols and Montpellier assemblies do not provide much new information concerning the running of the judicial system in Languedoc, there were some clear flaws in the model set up in November 1562.

Military

The Montpellier assembly decided that due to ‘the good duties and services’ that Crussol had carried out for the province, he would be accompanied by ‘honourable men for the security of his person’ when he went to court. One thousand livres was paid for ten gentilhommes during two months. This receipt is a good example of the Protestant organisation, as the signatures of Maliane and Anduze are seen, signing off on the expense, as well as that of the

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245 ADG, C 925, No. 18, fols 6v-7r, ‘Proces verbal des estatz tenus a baignolz 1563’. Although this decree did not appear in the Nîmes estates outlined earlier, it was perhaps in another section of the deliberations which no longer survives.
246 Ibid, fol. 7r.
247 Ibid, fol. 9r. ‘la deffence des bons et punitions des delincans’. These figures were to improve the judicial processes.
248 Ibid, fol. 19v.
250 ADH, 1 B22803, fol. 1r, ‘Mandement faict a mons[ieu]r de baudine [beaudiné], 6 July 1563’.

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greffier. As Antoine had ordered his brother Jacques to distribute the money, Jacques’s signature verified that he had received this sum. In addition, Antoine was guarded by one hundred arquebusiers (although not all troops were continually with him), with a significant number of these being from Uzès. This offer to Crussol by the Montpellier assembly provides some insight into the assessment of his performance as Protestant leader in Languedoc, and it is clear that his efforts were appreciated.

A noble escort was also provided to Coligny, who had taken command of the overall Protestant leadership after Condé’s capture. Daussy argues that the absence of an offer of troops to Condé was a sign of the Protestant discontent with the peace treaty he had negotiated. As shown earlier, the assembly representatives thought it important to continue the Protestant war machine until disarmament and the enforcement of the peace were finally concluded.

Peace

One of the major points in both the Bagnols and Montpellier assemblies was the discussion of the peace edict. As mentioned earlier, there was uncertainty at Bagnols over the edict. The conseil had heard of ‘an agreement passed... between the aforementioned lady [the queen-mother] and the connétable [Anne de Montmorency] on one side and the prince [de Condé] on the other’. The conseil was suspicious of this resolution, and proposed that the Protestants did not agree to the peace until:

251 Further examples of this decree being carried out are found in ADH, 1 B22803: ‘Crussol to the conseil de Languedoc, 6 June 1563, followed by the pay order and payment of Guillaume Arquier to the sieur de Figaret, 8 June 1563’; ‘Mandement faict a gremian et salies, 8 June 1563’; ‘Roolle [sic] de monstre faicte au capp[ital]ne hurre, 5 June 1563’.
253 ADH, 1 B22803, fol. 1r, ‘Mandement pour la partie de monseigneur le comte de beauvoys faict a m[aistre]e guilla[ume] de contour’.
254 Daussy, Le parti huguenot, 491.
255 ADG, C 925, No. 18, fol. 7r-v, ‘Proces verbal des estatz tenus a baignolz 1563’. ‘ung accord passé... Entre lad[ict]e dame et monseign[eu]r le connestable d’une part et mond[ict] s[ieu]r le prince d’aultre’.
the enemies lay down their weapons and their forces be removed and sent away, from the garrisons as well as the companies, and that after one grants the government of this province, along with the administration of the sovereign and subordinate justice system, to loyal people of our religion, and for the least that this may be limited to the lands and region that we live in.

Concerning the king, the Protestants could not ‘yet recognise [him] as being free and out of the hands of our enemies’. They were aware that these conditions could not easily be granted, and Daussy sees these requests as being part of a Protestant awareness that the peace articles might not be observed under a Catholic governor. It was decided to draw up documents (mémories) to inform the king and his conseil privé of the assembly’s intentions concerning the edict. Representatives were chosen to go to court, the seigneur de Clausonne, and Palamydez d’Ortols being among them. These figures, along with the seigneur de Colans, were to remonstrate with the king and conseil privé concerning the peace and other issues. Colans had also been sent to request the king to ban any judicial appeals relating to the Protestant decrees.

The uncertainty over the peace meant too that Crussol was asked to continue in his role. The Bagnols assembly closed with representatives thanking him for the ‘duty that he does daily for the protection of the province under the obedience of his majesty the king, and to ask him to continue until the troubles may be entirely pacified, and that the province

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256 Ibid, fol. 7v. ‘les ennemys layssent tellement les armes et forces soyent ostées et renvoyées tant des garnisons que de la compaignye et apres qu’on baille le gouverneme[n]t de ceste pro[v]ince ensemble l’administra[ti]on de la justice souveraine et subalterne à p[er]sonnaiges fidelles et de no[tr]e religion et po[u]lre le moings que cella soit restraict ez terres et pays que no[u]s habitons’, ‘encores reconoistre estre en libert est et hors des mains de nous ennemys’.

257 Daussy, Le parti huguenot, 485.

258 ADG, C 925, No. 18, fol. 9r, ‘Proces verbal des estatz tenus a baignolz 1563’.

259 Ibid, fol. 14r.

260 ADG, C 630, fol. 10r, ‘Assemblee de messieurs les consulz et diocesains du dioce[se] de nismes, 15 April 1563’.

261 ADH, 1 B22547, fol. 1r-v, ‘Extraict des deliberations et articles arretez en lassemblee des estatz ou dioceses en bas pays de languedoc tenans la religion reformee faicte en la ville de montpellier...’
may be put back in peace and tranquility, such as it was before the troubles’. Representatives similarly went to Odet de Châtillon, to thank him for ‘the assistance that he has given in this province during these troubles and the fruit’ that they have received from this. The Bagnols assembly recognised again:

the association made by some of the conseil of this [province] with those of the town of Lyon and province of Dauphiné in the town of Montélimar, to stay united and allied together under the obedience of the king and protection of the comte de Crussol and preserve the Reformed religion, purged of the papal ceremonies in these provinces.

It is noteworthy that the alliance between Lyon, Dauphiné, and Languedoc was being reinforced even after the appearance of the peace edict.

The Montpellier assembly dealt with the peace in more detail, and Daussy writes that ‘the divergence in view which remained between the great Huguenot nobles, who finally rallied to the position of Condé and accepted the edict of Amboise, and the Languedoc Protestants, who remained very reticent to apply it’, was one of the primary motives for holding the estates. Crussol certainly attempted to convince the Protestants to join Condé’s position, as shown by his later letter to Calvin. Given that the Protestant nobility was largely satisfied with obtaining a privileged religious status, the edict revealed ‘the diversity

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262 ADG, C 925, No. 18, fol. 20v, ‘Proces verbal des estatz tenus a baignolz 1563’. ‘devoir qu’il faict journelleme[n]t po[u]r la protection du pais Soubz l’obeyssance dela maiesté du Roy et le supplier de c[on]tinuer jusques les troubles soient entierement pacifiés et que le pa[is] soit remis en Repos et tranquilité telles qu’’ilz estoient avant les troubles’.
265 Daussy, Le parti huguenot, 486. ‘les divergences de vues qui subsistent entre la grande noblesse huguenote, qui a fini par se rallier à la position de Condé et à accepter l’édit d’Amboise, et les réformés languedociens, qui demeurent très réticents à l’appliquer’.
of the stakes between an elite Reformed nobility deeply worried about the nature of its relationship with the monarchy [with Crussol being a notable example], and the local authorities, municipal magistrates or nobles of modest calibre, who fight daily for their mere survival”.  

The decree also reflected the royal desire to bind noble loyalty again to the crown.

Jean Philippi described at length the grand reception Crussol, Châtillon and François de Boucard, Condé’s envoy, received when they entered Montpellier. The town inhabitants, including the consuls and judicial officers, awaited them along with four companies of infantry and their battle enseignes. There were a hundred or more children ‘singing together the psalms of David’, and on the approach to the town, ‘all the artillery was fired’. The municipality additionally gave presents to Crussol and Châtillon. These seigneurs were understood as bringing ‘peace and the end of the troubles in which one had so miserably lived for a time’. Antoine de Lévis, the comte de Caylus, was present alongside them, sent by the monarchy in April to publish the edict in the Toulouse parlement and its jurisdiction, and to convince the Protestants to lay down their weapons.

At the assembly, Boucard exhorted the representatives to obey the king and observe the edict, which was seconded by Caylus. Crussol also read out royal letters he had

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266 Ibid, 491. ‘la diversité des enjeux entre une élite nobiliaire réformée fortement préoccupée de la nature de ses rapports avec la monarchie, et les autorités locales, magistrats municipaux ou seigneurs de modeste envergure, qui luttent quotidiennement pour leur simple survie’.


269 Ibid. ‘chantans ensemble les pseaulmes [sic] de David’, ‘fut deslachée toute l’artillerie’.

270 AMM, BB 393, fol. 123r, ‘Conseil de la ville de Montpellier 6 May 1563’.


received to see the edict published. Caylus mentioned that he had published the edict at
Toulouse, Carcassonne, Castelnaudary, and Narbonne.274 He:

had an express command of the King to declare, to Crussol as well as to the residents
and inhabitants of the province making a profession of the religion [i.e. Reformed],
that the King and Queen his mother had to their liking all that they had done for their
just defence, and hold them as good and loyal subjects, indeed they thank them for
the good service that they have carried out for the benefit of the crown.275

The seigneur de Clausonne, in his response to Caylus on the assembly’s behalf,
thanked ‘very humbly the King for the honour that he did them, and for the testimony that
it pleased his majesty to render them of the duty that they had done in his service, in which
they decided to persevere always as very obedient subjects and servants’.276 After a
discussion, the assembly published the edict on 13 May.277 The estates later declared that all
the Languedoc inhabitants, ‘following the Reformation of the Gospel, wish and intend for
God and their conscience, to live and die in obedience to his majesty, to obey his edicts, and
to recognise, with humility and submission, his ministers, magistrates and messengers, as
very obedient and loyal subjects to his majesty’.278

275 Ibid, 211. ‘avoit commandement exprès du Roy de declarer, tant à Crussol qu’aux manans et
habitans du pays faisans profession de la religion, que le Roy et la Royne sa mère avoient à gré tout
ce qu’ils avoient fait pour leur juste defense, et les tenoient pour bons et loyaux sujets, voire les
remercioit du bon service qu’ils avoient fait pour le bien de la couronne’.
276 Ibid. ‘treshumblement le Roy de l’honneur qu’il leur faisoit, et du tesmoignage qu’il plaisoit à sa
majesté leur rendre du devoir qu’ils avoient fait à son service, en quoy ils deliberoient de perseverer
à tousiours comme tresobeissans sujets et serviteurs’.
277 Ibid; Jouanna, ‘Le temps des guerres de religion en France (1559-1598)’, 129. While Jouanna and
Guiraud (Guiraud, Études sur la Réforme à Montpellier, I, 288) put the date as being 13 May, Le Petit
Thalamus notes it as being 12 May (AMM, AA9, fol. 538r, ‘Le Petit Thalamus, 1563’,
2019]).
278 ADH, 1 B22547, fols 10v-11r, ‘Extrait des deliberations et articles arretez en assemblée des
estat ou dioceses en bas pays de languedoc tenans la religion reformee faicte en la ville de
montpellier...‘ ‘suyvant la Reforma[t]ion de l’evvangille [sic] veullent et entendent pour dieu et leur
conscience vivre et mourir soubz l’obeissance de sa maïsté obeyr à ses editz et Recognoistre avec
The assembly made two requests to the crown in accepting the edict. The first was that the Catholics should agree to this peace too, as they have instead reinforced garrisons, and since the publication of the edict at Toulouse, ‘many great evils have been committed and are committed every day’. The second request was that given ‘the cruel treatment that they had received from [Guillaume de] Joyeuse, having even introduced the Spanish into the kingdom, it may please the king to grant them another governor, and specifically a prince of the blood’. Joyeuse is reported as having brought foreigners into France, which was a major critique in Protestant eyes. This request is similar to the Valence consuls requesting a new governor instead of Maugiron, seen further on. Clausonne additionally thanked Boucard for his service, although he remarked that there were ‘a few harsh conditions’ in the edict. These related to the exercise of religion and the security of the Protestants, among other issues. The Protestants did not want to be held to ‘a strict observation of all the points of the edict’ before they had a chance to faire remontrance to the king and hear his will on the matter.

These remontrances, to be drawn up by Philippi and others, were to indicate that the Protestants held this assembly solely ‘for the glory of God, the service of the king, and urgent public necessity’. Ortols was one of those who would present these remontrances, ‘to remonstrate to his majesty and his conseil privé the grievances of this province drawn up at these estates, and to pursue the wish and intention of this seigneur [the king], following toute humilité et subiection ses ministres magistratz et envoyes commme [sic] tresobeissans et fidelles subjectz à sa maiesté’.

279 Histoire ecclésiastique, III, 211. ‘plusieurs grands maux s’estoient commis et commettoient tous les jours’.
280 Ibid. ‘le cruel traittement qu’ils ont receu de Joyeuse, ayant mesmes introduit les Espagnols au royaume, il pleust au Roy leur ottroyer [sic] un autre gouverneur, et nommément un Prince du sang’.
281 Ibid, 212. ‘quelques dures conditions’.
282 Ibid. ‘une estroite observation de tous les points de l’Edict’.
283 ADH, 1 B22547, fol. 10v, ‘Extraict des deliberations et articles arretez en lassemblee des estatz ou dioceses en bas pays de languedoc tenans la religion reformee faicte en la ville de montpellier…’. ‘pour la gloire de dieu service du roy et urgente necessité publicque’. This is presumably again Jean Philippi.
the articles of his delegation’. Clausonne was also charged with bringing *doléances* before Charles IX, which were dealt with in the *conseil privé* in October 1563.

Clausonne and Ortols were later mentioned as being at court ‘for the affairs of the province’, and Crussol’s secretary Mathieu Railhet gave them ‘the remonstrances drawn up by the province for the *maréchal* de Vieilleville’, to pass onto the king and his *conseil*.

However, Joyeuse nonetheless continued as *lieutenant-général*, and the appointment of Henri de Montmorency-Damville as governor of Languedoc was not viewed favourably either by the Protestants, given his father Anne de Montmorency’s hostility towards them.

The Protestants also affirmed their indebtedness to Crussol’s leadership, and ‘that in view of the threats and the ill-will of their adversaries’, again asked him to continue in his charge until peace was firmly established. He agreed to this request, promising ‘to do all that he could for their preservation under the good will of the king’. Crussol had previously declared ‘that he wished to relieve himself of the administration of the province that he had carried out up to now, considering the arrival of peace’. The extensive peace negotiations demonstrated the Protestant dissatisfaction with the edict, although Crussol’s entry to Montpellier showed the desire for an end to the war. The Protestants were aware of the lack of assurances that the announcement of the peace meant for their security, as indicated by asking Crussol to continue his role, which proved to be a wise decision.

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Railhet was also used elsewhere for carrying letters and undertaking voyages on behalf of the Protestant movement (ADG, C 925, No. 18, fol. 20r, ‘Proces verbal des estatz tenus a baignolz 1563’).

287 *Histoire ecclésiastique*, iii, 212.

288 Ibid. ‘qu’ayant esgard aux menaces et à la mauvaise volonté de leurs adversaries’, ‘de faire tout ce qu’il pourroit pour leur conservation sous le bon vouloir du Roy’.

The Bagnols and Montpellier assemblies exposed the considerable expense of the war in Languedoc and underlined the challenges in raising funds. At Montpellier, we can see Crussol’s desire to be reconciled with the monarchy, in pushing for the peace to be accepted by the Protestants. The declaration of the crown that it was satisfied with the conduct of the Protestants was important and formed part of the royal policy of a general amnesty. The Protestants did not consider the edict to have brought a definitive end to the conflict, and they made plans for the following months. This was particularly shown through the maintaining of the Protestant alliance after the peace, and the position of Crussol.

Conclusion

When peace finally arrived, the monarchy shouldered the Protestant debts.\footnote{However, the king did order in 1566 that the remaining money of the taille from the Nîmes estates in November 1562 be repaid (ADG, C 631, fol. 193r-v, ‘Assemblee de messieurs les diocezains du diocese de nymes, 22 March 1567’).} Part of the Protestant grievances, given to Anne de Montmorency and discussed at the conseil privé in March 1564, was the receveurs-particuliers’ request to render their accounts before a magistrate.\footnote{BNF, fr. 3410, fols 93v-94r, ‘Articles de la religion responduz par le roy... faict au conseil prive du roy tenu à Fontainebleau, 3 March 1563/1564’. Another copy is BNF, fr. 15879, fols 105r-107r, ‘Plaise a monseigneur le conestable remonstrer au roy pour ceulx de la religion des villes et lieux du pays de languedoc ce que sensuyt’. A transcription is found in ‘Remontrances des religionnaires du Languedoc au roi, 3 March 1564 (incorrectly dated as 8 March 1566)’, in \textit{HL}, XII, 737–42.} The experiences of Lion Malbois and Jehan Pons attested to the difficulties the receveurs had in being reimbursed, given the strict royal procedures, and despite extensive paper trails. Pons spent substantial time trying to settle his accounts. Certain expenses had not been accepted by the auditors as being directly traceable to the king’s authority and were therefore rayée (crossed out).

In 1565, Pons again asked to be reimbursed this money.\footnote{ADH, 1 B22547, fols 1r-2v, ‘Royal letter of Charles IX to gens des comptes at Montpellier, 30 (?) 1565’.} He had not been paid for items ordered by the commander of Montpellier during the war, the sieur de Pérault, and...
the auditors required proof that Péralt was sent on Crussol’s command. Pons went to
c onsiderable effort to prove the legality of Péralt’s charge. He submitted four witness
statements, undertaken by a judicial officer, verifying that Péralt was present in
Montpellier.\footnote{ADH, 1 B22547, fol. 1r, ‘Acte faict par devant le juge ordinaire de montpellier du pruvir [sic] que le
sr de perault a eu [sic] aud. montpellier durant les troubles soubz le s[ieu]r de crussol, 19 August
1566’; 1 B22547, fols 1r-3v, ‘Request of Jehan Pons to messieurs de Cezelly and Dalbenas, August
1563, with extract of accounts and comments of auditors’.
} He also provided extracts of his accounts. Furthermore, Crussol wrote a letter
in January 1567, certifying that Péralt was sent to Montpellier.\footnote{ADH, 1 B22547, fol. 1r, ‘Certification of Antoine de Crussol, 30 January 1567’.
} A copy of Crussol’s original
letter to the Montpellier consuls placing Péralt in charge in January 1563 was submitted as
more evidence.\footnote{ADH, 1 B22547, fol. 1r, ‘Letter of Antoine de Crussol to the
consuls and i
nhabitants of Montpellier, 30 January 1563’.
} The king finally ordered the auditors to reimburse Pons in February
1567.\footnote{ADH, 1 B22547, fol. 1r, ‘Royal letter of Charles IX to Jehan de Cezelly and Jean de Collias, 8
February 1567’.
} For Malbois, his accounts were originally deemed invalid, and it took a royal act in
1566 to command the auditors to pay the expenses sanctioned by Crussol and others under
his command during the war.\footnote{ADH, 1 B22551, fol. 1r, Royal act of Charles IX addressed to Jehan Césely and Jehan Albenas sieur
de Collas, 16 November 1566’; 1 B22551, fols 25r-26r, ‘Compte de maistre lion malboys de la ville de
beziers commie par monsieur francoys du soustie conseiller du roy au siege presidial estably
aud[icte] beziers...’.
} These episodes exemplified the need for the receiveurs to
justify each expense, and the difficulty they faced in securing reimbursement from the royal
auditors.

The study of Crussol’s own engagement with his charge in Languedoc and Dauphiné
sheds further light on the effectiveness of this system set up by the Protestant assemblies,
and his fundamental role in the maintaining of this war machine. The Protestants put an
extensive organisation in place to fight against the royal armies, through mirroring or
adopting the royal administrative structures already established. Despite the difficulties and
flaws in the Protestant system, the limited funds available to them, and the rapidly changing
context of war, the model set up through the assemblies is extremely impressive. Crussol
certainly played an important role in assuring the largely successful nature of this movement. The choice of Crussol supported the Protestant claims of holding legitimate assemblies, given his previous royal role in southern France. The Protestants stressed their loyalty to Charles and the validity of their actions, making careful account of the revenues they seized.

Adopting such a broad administrative structure required significant funds, which the Protestants were not able to fully procure, despite using royal and ecclesiastical revenue, among other measures. They overextended themselves in adopting such an extensive framework, as paying figures such as judicial officials inevitably increased costs. The numerous judicial articles particularly emphasised the breadth of Protestant ambition in taking up the royal administrative system. As shown through a variety of different decrees, a Protestant reformation of society was broadly conceived through these assemblies. The Reformed confession was the foundation of this society, which entailed far reaching social changes, although it is hard to see whether these measures were enforced. The Dauphiné provincial estates had a far stronger religious tone than their Languedoc counterpart, although the smaller Languedoc assiettes did issue notable religious decrees. The alliance between the provinces indicated the importance given by the Protestants to this entire war effort. The articles of the provincial estates were put into practice by the assiettes and other assemblies, and Crussoi’s authority was respected both by these assemblies and the conseils under his command.

Although the peace edict was not what the Protestants had desired, the war weariness in the provinces underlined a general desire for peace. The arrival of the edict did not necessarily mean an end to hostilities, as shown by the need for further troops, the reinforcing of the alliance, and the decision to maintain Crussol in his charge. In the eyes of the Protestants, Crussol had performed his role as leader well.
It is clear that Crussol played an essential role in the smooth workings of the Languedoc and Dauphiné Protestant administrations and was very engaged in his charge. His involvement in aspects such as appointing military figures and overseeing the discipline of the soldiers indicates the important position given to him. The appointment of military commanders also increased his own influence in these provinces. Although this role is comparable to that of a lieutenant-général, the far-reaching authority that Crussol gained in both provinces exceeded this position and was instead similar to his charge on the royal mission of December 1561. Fighting in this war provided him with a title equivalent to lieutenant-général, albeit not one appointed by the crown.

Considering Crussol’s relationship with the monarchy, he evidently fought against the royal armies, despite using the Protestant argument of fighting on the king’s behalf. He gained increased power through becoming leader of the Dauphiné Protestants, which cast doubts on his earlier pledge of loyalty to the crown. As shown in the previous chapter, he tried to frame his actions as being those of a loyal servant. The announcement of the peace provided Crussol with an opportunity to stress his loyalty, through his attempts to persuade the Protestants to accept the edict. Through these actions, his desire to be reconciled with the monarchy is apparent. He was heavily involved in the daily running of the Protestant organisation, more noticeably in Languedoc than in Dauphiné, and fully engaged with his new role in both provinces.
Chapter 5: Town relations and military campaigns, 1562-1563

Taking on board the charge prescribed to him by the Languedoc provincial estates, Crussol took a central role in the Protestant war machine. His engagement in the war is analysed in the next two chapters, studying his liaison with several of the Protestant towns, his military campaigns, and concluding with the disarmament period which ended the conflict. Crussol’s relationship with the crown forms a key part of this process. In his interaction with the towns and his conduct on the military operations, he acted as an unofficial lieutenant-général of the king.

Town relations

A crucial part of Crussol’s role as designated by the estates involved his relationship with the Protestant towns, and this interaction illustrates how both the Protestant war machine and Crussol’s charge worked in practice. Analysing how he interacted with the town leaders, and how they viewed both his authority and that of the conseils acting on his command, can only further our understanding of the Protestant movement during the civil war. Maintaining good relations with towns was important for the Protestant war machine, given that the lack of support from a major town such as Montpellier could cripple the war effort. In this section, I will focus on Crussol’s interaction with the town leaderships of Montpellier, Valence, Romans, and Béziers. These towns all played critical roles in the Protestant movement. Montpellier and Béziers in Languedoc were under Crussol’s authority from November 1562, while Romans and Valence in Dauphiné became part of his remit in January 1563.

The municipal French government, normally referred to as a consulate in southern France, was formed of figures from across a social spectrum, including noblesse de la robe (the robe nobility), lawyers, merchants, artisans, and labourers. The consuls generally

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served for one year. As will become evident in this section, French towns in the sixteenth century were characterised by a ‘keen sense of autonomy’.2

The main source used to analyse Crussol’s relations with the municipal leaders are the existing town deliberation records. There are several common themes which run through these deliberations, including financial worries and the protection of the town’s independence. It was always difficult for the monarchy to procure money from towns. S. Annette Finley-Croswhite writes that ‘negotiation was common in Old Regime France as kings asked for enormous sums but encountered cries of poverty from the towns, thus necessitating compromise’.3 I examine Crussol’s relationship with the towns through the themes of military decisions, struggle for town control, financing the war, and religious matters.

Military

One of Crussol’s most important roles as prescribed by the estates in Languedoc and Dauphiné was organising the defence and security of the Protestant-controlled territory. This entailed raising troops, requesting that towns supply or fund military companies, appointing captains or governors, and calming troubles. In December 1562, Crussol sent Michel de Saint-Ravy, one of the conseil de Languedoc, to resolve tensions in Montpellier. Crussol wrote of the ‘continual warnings’ he had of the ‘dangerous avenues, traffics, and monopolies that are brewing in the town of Montpellier, by several seditious inhabitants of the town, to the very

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2 Conner, Huguenot Heartland: Montauban and Southern French Calvinism during the Wars of Religion, 25. Town leaders were not afraid to take strong action against nobles if they felt this was necessary. One notable example of this is the La Rochelle consistory preventing the Protestant leader Henri de Bourbon, the prince de Condé, from taking communion in 1577 (John Quick, Synodicon in Gallia Reformata: Or the Acts, Decisions, Decrees, and Canons of Those Famous National Councils of the Reformed Churches in France (London, 1692), i, 122–23; Aymon, Tous les synodes nationaux des églises reformées de France, i, 133–34). Towns also wished to maintain their privileges in an era where royal power was expanding, as shown by the example of Nîmes (Ann H. Guggenheim, ‘The Calvinist Notables of Nîmes during the Era of the Religious Wars’, Sixteenth Century Journal, 3/1 (1972), 84).

3 Finley-Croswhite, Henry IV and the Towns, 163.
great danger of the public, good, and security of the town’, as he feared a riot might occur.\textsuperscript{4} To prevent this, ‘some notable and wise person with good and sufficient power’ was required, and Saint-Ravy was chosen. He was to ‘extinguish the aforementioned troubles, put back and reduce everything in the town to a tranquil and peaceful state’.\textsuperscript{5} Enquiring into these issues, he would seize the main perpetrators.

Saint-Ravy was also to certify that surintendants were elected and the articles of the November estates were put into place.\textsuperscript{6} In addition, he could use other measures to confirm that the town was at peace, and that no riots occurred.\textsuperscript{7} The sieur de Rapin, the captain and governor of Montpellier, would provide support if necessary.\textsuperscript{8} Crussol ordered the consuls and all inhabitants to obey Saint-Ravy as they would obey him ‘on pain of being said and declared rebels and perturbators of the repos public’.\textsuperscript{9} As seen elsewhere, the Protestants portrayed themselves as legitimately fighting on the king’s behalf, and not as rebels or perturbateurs du repos public, a common phrase during this period.\textsuperscript{10} This language is similar to that seen in Crussol’s mission to the Midi.

However, Rapin was not in Montpellier for long, and his move away caused consternation amongst the consulate there. Later in December, Crussol and the conseil made the decision to move Rapin and his company to Béziers. This left Montpellier ‘without captain

\textsuperscript{4} ADH, 1 B22547, fol. 1r, ‘Copy of letter of Antoine de Crussol to sieur de Saint Ravy, 2 December 1562’. ‘Continuelz advertissementz’, ‘menées dangereuses traficques et monopolles qui se brassent en la ville de Montpellier par quelques sedicieulx des habitans d’icelle au tres grand dangier de la chose publice bien et seuretté de lad[icte] ville’.
\textsuperscript{6} Ibid, fol. 1r-v.
\textsuperscript{7} Ibid, fol. 1v.
\textsuperscript{8} Rapin had been governor of Montpellier since October 1562, appointed by Jacques de Crussol (Connac, ‘Troubles de mai 1562 à Toulouse’, 334n; HL, xi, 420).
\textsuperscript{9} ADH, 1 B22547, fol. 1v, ‘Copy of letter of Antoine de Crussol to sieur de Saint Ravy, 2 December 1562’. ‘sur poyn[e] sic d’estre dictz et decl[ar]és Rebelles et perturbaturs [sic] du repos public’.
\textsuperscript{10} The Protestants also claimed to be defending the bien public (Roberts, ‘Violence by Royal Command’, 201).
and leader in command, and without troops’, according to the consuls. To solve this, the consuls sent several representatives to Crussol and his conseil, remonstrating with them to allow Rapin to stay, reminding them of the danger of moving Rapin and his company. The consuls praised Rapin’s character, including his religious convictions, and the ‘good treatment that he showed to the inhabitants’ of Montpellier. The consuls' praise for Rapin is notable, given the many complaints during this period concerning the mistreatment of a town’s inhabitants by military companies. The consuls additionally asked that if Rapin was to be moved to Béziers, that another captain and foreign governor be brought, one who ‘fears God’.

As shown by this request, the decree at the Nîmes assembly, wishing for upright and religious military leaders, was similarly advocated by the Montpellier consulate. It requested that the new governor have a company of three hundred foreign soldiers to guard the town, all of this paid by the province. The consuls also asked for another company of three hundred men, this time men from the town itself, and to which they would contribute half the costs. The next conseil meeting again reiterated its desire to retain Rapin. The consuls asserted that the enemy capture of Montpellier would be an ‘irreplaceable loss’, and stressed the town’s importance to the overall Protestant movement. In this conseil meeting, they instead requested five or six hundred foreign troops paid by the province, absolving the town of any payment.

However, Crussol decided nonetheless to replace Rapin, and the sieur de Pérault was named as the new governor, as seen in the previous chapter. Crussol informed Montpellier

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11 AMM, BB 393, fols 111v-112r, ‘Conseil de la ville de Montpellier 9 December 1562’. ‘despourveus de Capitaine et chef po[ur commander, et de forces’.
12 Ibid, fol. 112r. ‘le bon traitement qu’il a fait aud[icts] habitants’.
13 AMM, BB 393, fol. 114r, ‘Conseil de la ville de Montpellier 13 December 1562’. ‘craignant Dieu’.
14 The consuls added that several smallholdings (métairies) around the town had been pillaged, which explains their need for more soldiers.
15 Ibid. ‘perte irreparable’.
of Pérault’s appointment on 30 January 1563, due to the reports he had heard of disorder there. One month on from Crussol’s commission to Saint-Ravy to deal with disturbances in Montpellier, the situation had not improved. The consuls were asked to obey Pérault as they ‘would do to myself if I were there in person’.\textsuperscript{16} It does not seem that the consuls were granted extra companies from Crussol.

As well as requesting the provincial or regional assemblies to support troops, as shown in the previous chapter, Crussol additionally used the towns to provide military supplies. He spoke with the consuls of Valence concerning the defence of the town, asking that they pay for military companies, which they would be reimbursed for.\textsuperscript{17} They emphasised in response ‘the great poverty of the town and that, however, one will take all the money found’ to Crussol’s representative, stating that they would do everything possible to obey Crussol.\textsuperscript{18} The consuls later reiterated their lack of funds in relation to six military captains stationed in Valence, requesting that the town governor, the sieur de Changy, ask Odet de Châtillon and the conseil politique that the province might pay this instead.\textsuperscript{19} Throughout his time as Protestant leader, Crussol had to deal with numerous pleas of poverty by consuls in Languedoc and Dauphiné.

As well as managing garrisons in places such as Béziers or Montpellier, providing for troops on the move was an integral part of his role too. At the end of February, a lieutenant of Saint-Martin, his appointed governor in Vivarais, came to Valence to receive powder, shot,

\textsuperscript{16} ADH, 1 B22547, fol. 1r, ‘Copy of a letter of Antoine de Crussol to the consuls and inhabitants of Montpellier, 30 January 1563’. ‘ferez à moy mesme si j’y estois en personne’.

\textsuperscript{17} AMV, BB 6, fol. 192v, ‘Conseil de la ville de Valence 14 February 1563’.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid. ‘la grand [sic] pourêé [sic] de la ville et que cependant l’on prendra tout l’argent comptant quy se trouvera’.

\textsuperscript{19} AMV, BB 6, fol. 193v, ‘Conseil de la ville de Valence 12 March 1563’.
rope, and other items, on the order of Crussol. Crussol similarly commanded the consuls to supply food for soldiers, and several military companies were fed by the town in March.

Crussol was responsive to the needs of the towns, as shown by an episode with the Béziers consuls. Béziers was in a troubled state from January to March 1563, and the consuls had requested aid from him in January. After the death of the sieur de Montpeyroux, an influential figure who had contributed to Protestant success around Béziers, soldiers had caused trouble due to lack of payment. The new governor Rapin was currently on an expedition, seemingly on Crussol’s request. Writing to the town consuls and surintendants at the start of February, Crussol had ordered the captain La Grille, to ‘transport himself to your town to take up residence there until things may be put back into good order’. The conseil de Languedoc was also to send a commissaire with money to pay the troops’ muster rolls. However, La Grille’s residence in Béziers did not last long, as in mid-February, Crussol indicated that he would leave the town due to ‘the urgent affairs on the Rhône frontier’.

La Coste was sent to replace him, due to ‘the knowledge of such importance that she [the town of Béziers] is’, with Rapin still absent. La Coste was described as ‘prudent, vigilant and kind’, and Crussol was assured that the town would be content with him. Crussol asked the town leaders to render ‘such the same duty, reverence, and obedience concerning his charge that you would give to Rapin and wish to give me if I were there in person’.

La Coste would resolve further divisions in Béziers, where there had been a quarrel between

20 AMV, CC 35, fols 20v-21r, ‘Comptes de sieur Jacques Albi consul en 1561 et 1562 (ancien style)’.
21 Ibid, fol. 21v.
22 Histoire ecclésiastique, iii, 207.
23 ADH, 1 B22551, fol. 1r, ‘Crussol to consuls and surintendants of Béziers, 1 February 1563’.
24 Ibid. ‘se transporter en v[ot]re ville po[u]r la faire q[ue]lque residence Jusques à ce q[ue] les choses soient reiglées d’ung bon ordre’.
25 ADH, 1 B22551, fol. 1r, ‘Crussol to consuls and surintendants of Béziers, 16 February 1563’. It is unclear what events Crussol was referring to. ‘les affaires urgentes de la frontiere du Rhosne’.
Protestants native to the town, and foreigners, in February. The Béziers Protestants were not content that the foreigners managed certain affairs. The sieur de Maliane and Antoine du Chemin (one of the conseil de Languedoc) were similarly sent to resolve these differences, and remove difficult people from the town.

The original trouble caused by the soldiers continued from the month of February into the start of March. In March, the lack of payment for the troops endangered the security of the town and some soldiers may have left. Although the consuls pleaded the town’s poverty, a solution was eventually found to pay these figures. The Histoire ecclésiastique additionally outlines that there was a quarrel among the troops in February, as much for lack of payment as for some words which enraged the soldiers so much that, if the captains had not closed the town gates, they would have deserted Béziers. Crussol was conscious of the danger posed by the instability in Béziers to Protestant control in Languedoc, and used several different methods to resolve this troubled situation.

Crussol enthusiastically shouldered his role as Protestant leader in Dauphiné and Languedoc, and these examples underline the significance of his position. He was very involved in the running of the war movement and responded quickly to potential troubles, appointing officials to quell disturbances in Montpellier and Béziers. He was firm in discussions with town consuls, an example being the removal of Rapin from Montpellier, where he put the importance of the overall Protestant movement ahead of the town’s needs. Despite their complaints of hardship, he used the towns to provide for his military forces.

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27 Histoire ecclésiastique, iii, 208. La Coste seems to have stayed at Béziers until May 1563 at least (ADH, 1 B22803, ‘Mandement a mon[ieur] Coste, 5 June 1563’). Although Crussol sent the letter to the conseil to pay La Coste on 31 May 1563 from Montpellier, the mandement itself is dated 5 June 1563.
28 Histoire ecclésiastique, iii, 208.
30 ADH, 1 B22551, fols 1v–2v, ‘Verbal de noble Loys de Coste, écuyer, capitaine d’une compagnie à cheval, gouverneur de Béziers, et Ardoyn de Porcelet, écuyer, sgr de Malhane, [and others], 5–6 March 1563’.
31 Histoire ecclésiastique, iii, 208.
Crussol’s commands were respected by the consuls, though they asked him to change these orders at times.

Struggle for town control

As the towns became part of the wider Protestant war machine, there could be friction over their independence, given the considerable autonomy they were used to. Tension over town control was noticeable throughout the war, particularly relating to municipal gates. Control over the gates indicated both physically and symbolically who held the authority in the town, given their importance for security. In Valence, the consuls signalled their discontent as two of the gates had been opened without their knowledge, by permission of the governor.\(^{32}\) The consuls decided to ask Crussol ‘to order that the keys of the gates be given back into the hands of the consuls of the city, following the ancient custom and liberties’ of the town.\(^{33}\) This matter was a struggle for power, and part of Crussol’s role as outlined by the provincial estates was keeping the town governors in check.

Control over the municipal gates was similarly an issue in Romans, and Crussol was again asked to adjudicate the matter. The military companies under the governor’s command considered control of the gates to be under their jurisdiction, but the consuls were reluctant to hand over keys, and would not do so ‘without the express command of monseigneur the comte de Crussol’.\(^{34}\) Like the Valence consuls, the Romans leaders emphasised the convention behind their control of the keys, maintaining that ‘since ancient tradition the consuls of this town as administrators have had the guard and charge of the keys’.\(^{35}\) Town consuls guarded their power strictly, and this example again illustrates the

\(^{32}\) AMV, BB 6, fol. 200v, ‘Conseil de la ville de Valence 28 April 1563’.

\(^{33}\) Ibid, fol. 201r. ‘ordonner que les clefs des portes soient remises entre les mains des s[ieu]rs consulz de lad[icte] cité suivant l’ancienne coustume et libertés’.

\(^{34}\) AMR, BB 9, fol. 55v, ‘Conseil de la ville de Romans 3 May 1563’. ‘sans l’expres mandement de Monseig[neu]r le Comte de crussol’.

\(^{35}\) Ibid. ‘d’aulant q[ue] de toute Ancienneté les c[on]sulz de lad[ic]te ville c[omme] administrateurs D’icelle Ont heu la garde Et charge Des clefs D’icelle’.

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recognition of Crussol’s role in their eyes. In response to this issue, Crussol seemed to have
dismissed the company present in the town, as part of the general disarmament during this
time.

A struggle for town control was also present in a quarrel of the Romans consuls with
the Valence governor Changy and the conseil politique, which was based in Valence. In May
1563, there was still significant unrest in Dauphiné, despite the peace being signed in March.
The conseil politique was keen to have a company of soldiers in Romans, to better secure the
town, which had no current garrison. In the Romans consuls’ response, we see the familiar
trope of pleading poverty and highlighting the support the town had given the Protestant
war machine. The consuls instead wished to guard the town with its inhabitants, and avoid
this military company. They refused to receive the garrison without Crussol’s direct order,
and once ‘they have a command and direct commission from the comte, they will obey him
in all things’, repeating this despite increased pressure from the conseil politique and
Changy. The consuls later sent representatives to Crussol to know his opinion on the
matter, seeing him as an arbiter in this dispute.

This tense situation ended after an assembly of armed townspeople appeared in
Romans, which led the consuls to agree to a military company there. However, the Romans
consuls maintained their opposition to any further companies. The consuls later received a
letter from Crussol, who had heard that the town ‘does not want to obey the commands of
the conseil politique’. He asked the town ‘in his absence to give obedience to the

36 AMR, BB 9, fol. 57r, ‘Conseil de la ville de Romans 9 May 1563’.
37 Ibid, fol. 57v.
38 AMR, BB 9, fol. 64v, ‘Ilz auront mand[emen]t Et c[om]mission d’expres De mond[ic]t seigneur le comte Ilz l’obeyront En toutes choses’.
39 AMR, BB 9, fol. 62r, ‘Conseil de la ville de Romans 13 May 1563’.
40 AMR, BB 9, fols 65v-66v, ‘Conseil de la ville de Romans 21 May 1563’; Ulysse Chevalier, Annales de la ville de Romans pendant les guerres de religion de 1549 à 1599 (Valence, 1875), 37.
41 AMR, BB 9, fols 67v-68v, ‘Conseil de la ville de Romans 22 May 1563’.
42 AMR, BB 9, fol. 70r, ‘Conseil de la ville de Romans 26 May 1563’. ‘ne vouloyt l’obeyr aux mandementz de c[on]seil politiq[ue]’.
aforementioned council’. The consuls decided to send a representative to both explain the recent matters and the ‘obedience that the town wishes and intends to give to the king and to the comte [de Crussol] and to recognise the aforementioned conseil politique under the authority of the king and the comte’.

Crussol was therefore viewed as an adjudicator by the various town leaderships, to uphold their rights against the military commanders. There was a notable respect for his command and authority. However, the conseil politique in Dauphiné struggled to have a similar standing in the eyes of the consuls, which led to Crussol having to reiterate their commands. The autonomy of the towns is evident, and this section provides a clearer perspective on what Crussol’s role entailed in practice. The strong vein of independence among the towns could cause difficulties for the Protestant movement, as shown by the Romans and Valence consulates clashing with the sieur de Changy. The struggle for town control was again apparent in the third theme discussed here, the issue of finance.

Finance

Finance was a critical issue between Crussol and the town consulates, both parties requesting funds from the other during the war. Although the towns emphasised their dire financial states, they had to contribute to expenses and host military companies. Town deliberation records indicate the difficult relationship that could exist between towns in the Protestant war organisation. A familiar complaint was that other towns were not pulling their weight. The Montpellier consuls complained to Crussol about towns such as Frontignan and Lattes not fully funding military companies. As Montpellier had instead borne the cost, the consuls requested that the towns reimburse them. These complaints were echoed by the

44 AMM, BB 393, fol. 114v, ‘Conseil de la ville de Montpellier 13 December 1562’.
consuls of Tain-l’Hermitage, who asked the conseil politique to certify that the smaller villages around the town contributed to costs.\textsuperscript{45} The Montpellier consuls also requested money from Crussol and his conseil to repair the walls and ditches around the town, among other expenses.\textsuperscript{46}

It was essential that the towns contributed to the war effort, and one notable example which underscores the seriousness with which Crussol and the conseil took the raising of finances is shown in the tension between the Montpellier consulate and the conseil concerning the payment of the German reîtres coming to Lyon. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Crussol had ordered the immediate payment of the last two quarters of the cotisation to pay these troops, in March 1563. Several members of Crussol’s conseil presented this letter to the Montpellier consuls.\textsuperscript{47} Montpellier was asked to collect the money required by both the town and the diocese from the aisés, allowing them to use force to raise the money. If the funds were not provided, this remonstrance indicated that ‘they [Crussol and the council] will be forced to use the necessary constraints’ to collect these.\textsuperscript{48}

In a wider town assembly in Montpellier, most inhabitants considered that the town would only pay its own portion, as the meeting noted that it had already loaned out money to the wider diocese without recompense.\textsuperscript{49} They asked the conseil de Languedoc to both be content with the sum given on the town’s behalf and to ask directly these other places in the diocese to pay their own portions of the cotisation. As the required sum was not paid, the threat of Crussol and the conseil was carried out, and the Montpellier consuls from the

\textsuperscript{45} ACTH, EE 3, No. 69, ‘Request of the consuls of Tain-l’Hermitage to the conseil politique at Valence, 15 March 1563’.
\textsuperscript{46} AMM, BB 393, fol. 114r-v, ‘Conseil de la ville de Montpellier 13 December 1562’. It is not clear whether Crussol granted this request.
\textsuperscript{47} AMM, BB 393, fol. 117r-v, ‘Conseil de la ville de Montpellier 21 March 1563’.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid, fol. 117v-118r. ‘Ils feront Contrainctz d’uzer de Contrainctes Necess[ai]res’.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid, fol. 118r.
previous year were arrested.\textsuperscript{50} This event emphasised both the power of Crussol and the conseil, and the significance of the matter in their eyes. In response, the Montpellier consuls again tried to collect the money required, and eventually, a levy on the aînés paid this sum.\textsuperscript{51} Being a Protestant in France could be costly, especially for the richest citizens.

Crussol again took a strict approach with the town of Bourg-Saint-Andéol in late 1562 and early 1563. Despite the town officials’ numerous pleas of poverty, Bourg-Saint-Andéol had to maintain a military company.\textsuperscript{52} In Dauphiné, Crussol and the conseil politique showed more leeway in relation to the consulate of Valence. At the Dauphiné estates in January, the town of Valence was instructed to pay 2000 livres. Thinking this figure to be incorrect, the consuls sent a representative to Crussol to ask that they be allowed to decide the level of their contribution, which was granted.\textsuperscript{53}

Financial matters were always a tense subject between the wider Protestant body and the towns, as they pointed to the difference in viewpoints that could exist between local and provincial leadership bodies. While Crussol and the conseil were concerned with the success of the wider Protestant movement, town consuls could become frustrated when faced with the numerous costs placed on the towns. As shown by the previous chapter, the Protestant war machine was lacking in sources of revenue, which invariably meant that more pressure was placed on the towns to support military campaigns and the running of the


\textsuperscript{51} AMM, BB 393, fol. 119v-120r, ‘Conseil de la ville de Montpellier 30 March 1563’; AMM, BB 393, fol. 121r, ‘Conseil de la ville de Montpellier 14 April 1563’.

\textsuperscript{52} Francis [alias Albin Mazon], Notes et documents historiques sur les huguenots du Vivarais, 182–89.


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movement. The Montpellier episode especially indicates the firmness with which Crussol and the conseil carried out their charges, and Crussol’s own authority is again clear.

Religion

Religious matters were also an important concern for Crussol and the town consulates, chiefly relating to the passing of the peace edict and what this meant for the Protestants. The signing of the edict had raised a host of new questions for the Dauphiné Protestants. In April 1563, the Valence consistory had written a letter to Crussol, highlighting the Protestant churches’ concern with Laurent de Maugiron being lieutenant-général of the province, and the parlement of Dauphiné being re-established. They feared that ‘one and the other would be very harmful to all the province, or to better say it, the total ruin of the churches’.54 Aiming to use Crussol to make their voices heard at court, the consistory asked him to send a representative there to note their concerns to the king and the prince de Condé. The Grenoble Protestants had previously advised sending a representative to court on the churches’ behalf, seemingly to address these two issues.55

To support their plea, the Valence consistory asked its Romans counterpart to send a letter to Crussol concerning these matters.56 In response, the Romans consuls advised following Crussol’s will, and to ask him to obtain from the king and the conseil privé all things necessary ‘for the good, rest, pacification and relief of this province and particularly the administration of justice’.57 This was a vague response from the consuls, who were reluctant to follow the Valence consistory’s decision. Their trust in Crussol again indicates the respect given to him in his leadership role by the Protestants. The Dauphiné Protestants later

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55 Ibid, fol. 42v.
56 Ibid, fol. 42r. This request to Romans is also found in Roman, ‘Documents sur la Réforme et les Guerres de Religion en Dauphiné’, 139–40.
reiterated this request against Maugiron and the conseillers of the parlement in June 1563, remonstrating that they not be in their respective charges.\textsuperscript{58}

Crussol also enforced several conditions of the peace relating to religious matters, as shown by a strongly worded letter to the consuls of Valence in June 1563. This letter concerned several illegal actions occurring in the town, including the breaking of bells.\textsuperscript{59} The consuls protested that they did not agree to such acts taking place, which additionally included the taking of lead, presumably from church roofs. They indicated that ‘no demolition was done either by [their] command or consent’, and that the town ‘will make sure that nothing is done which contravenes the edict of the king’.\textsuperscript{60} As all these issues related to Catholic churches, these acts went against the peace edict. Crussol wished to show the crown that he was adhering to the edict’s conditions and that those under his authority were loyal to the king.

Providing for the Protestant pastors was another important part of the structure set up at the Languedoc and Dauphiné provincial estates. One example is a request from the Montpellier consuls in December 1562, who asked that Crussol and the conseil contribute to paying for Protestant ministers and the upkeep of a college for the youth.\textsuperscript{61} Crussol and the conseil did not grant this request, although the reason for this denial is unclear, and the money was ordered instead to be taken from the inhabitants.\textsuperscript{62}

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\textsuperscript{58} AMR, BB 9, fols 79r, 83r, ‘Conseil de la ville de Romans, 17 June 1563’.

\textsuperscript{59} AMV, BB 6, fol. 211r, ‘Conseil de la ville de Valence 1 July 1563’.

\textsuperscript{60} Ibid. ‘jamais aucune desmolition n’a esté f[aic]te par leur commandem[ent] ny consentem[ent], ‘gardera que aucune chose soit faicte que contrevienne à l’edict de Roy’.

\textsuperscript{61} AMM, BB 393, fols 113r-114r, ‘Conseil de la ville de Montpellier 13 December 1562’. A Montpellier assiette had originally assigned surintendants to pay these ministers (ADH, 1 B22547, fol. 1r-v, ‘Estat des gaiges ordonnes Par les SurIntendans dela ville et diocese de Montpellier estie payes aux ministres et diacres des egli[s]es Reformees dud[ict] diocese par led[ict] Pons Receveur des deniers de sa recepte ch[ac]un an partiveys payes esquales et anticipees’).

\textsuperscript{62} AMM, BB 393, fol. 119r, ‘Conseil de la ville de Montpellier 27 March 1563’.
\end{flushright}
The Protestants were naturally concerned with the state of the church in Languedoc and Dauphiné, as shown by the requests to Crussol on its behalf. The future of the Reformed churches was unsure following the edict, as the provinces dealt with the divisions caused by the conflict. Although there was no definite reply from Crussol concerning the Protestant requests about Maugiron and the conseillers, the Dauphiné Protestants regarded Crussol as having a key role, and the respect that they gave him in his leadership position is clear. He was viewed as their representative, upholding their interests at court. Crussol himself was intent on being seen to enforce the peace, following a royal command to do this, as seen in the following chapter.

Crussol directly engaged with his charge as prescribed by the Reformed assemblies, as demonstrated through his interaction with the town consulates, and along the four themes of military decisions, struggle for town control, war finance, and religious matters. His relationship with the Protestant towns, particularly their respect of his authority and command, was a key part of maintaining the Protestant war machine. The Protestant towns also played an important role in another facet of Crussol’s leadership duties, carrying out military campaigns.

Military campaigns
The Languedoc and Dauphiné Protestants conducted military campaigns to defend, consolidate, and increase the territory under their control. It was the victories of the Protestant armies which ultimately defined the success of the movement. Crussol took a central and influential leadership position, either directly or indirectly, in several military operations. Examining these campaigns again enables us to see how effectively Crussol shouldered his role of Protestant leader. It offers an opportunity to study his military objectives, assessing whether he adopted an aggressive war strategy or simply took a reactionary and defensive approach. Crussol was aware of the potential damage his actions
could have on his position at court, and more widely his relationship with the crown, after the conclusion of the war.

As outlined earlier, throughout the conflict, Crussol strove to present all his actions as being those of a loyal servant of the king. In directing military operations, he was again acting as a royal lieutenant-général. Using a chronological framework of the war, running from November 1562 until the beginning of Crussol’s disarmament in April 1563, his engagement with his Protestant charge, through the conducting of military campaigns, is analysed in depth.

November and December 1562

During the first months of his command in Languedoc, Crussol did not carry out considerable military activity, as he instead consolidated Protestant power in the regions under his control. He mainly preoccupied himself with military appointments to towns and strategic fortresses, as shown previously. By the time he entered the war, the initial Protestant success and subsequent Catholic offensive had already occurred. Although there was continued conflict, the next few months did not see the same level of Protestant or Catholic advances in Languedoc, Dauphiné, Provence and Comtat-Venaissin, until March 1563 at least.

Garrisons were set up against local Catholic commanders such as Guillaume de Joyeuse around Béziers and Jacques d’Apchier around the Gévaudan.63 The Midi was a fiercely contested area during this first war, and there was no shortage of powerful Catholic nobles fighting for the royal armies. These included Laurent de Maugiron and François de la Baume, the comte de Suze, in Dauphiné; the duc de Nemours and Joyeuse in Languedoc; Fabricio Serbeloni in Comtat-Venaissin; and Honorat de Savoie, the comte de Sommerive, in Provence.64

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63 Histoire ecclésiastique, III, 209.
64 Joseph de La Pise, Tableau de l’histoire des princes et principauté d’Orange (La Haye, 1639), 309.
Crussol recruited soldiers and collected revenue during these months. 65 The Spanish ambassador had heard of his decision to join the Protestants, and mentioned that he ‘raises money and men with all his power’. 66 He later added that Châtillon and Crussol ‘do their worst in Languedoc’, and to justify their actions, have announced that they have raised men to defend against troops levied in Spain. 67 The Protestant situation worsened considerably due to several reasons in December. On a national level, the Protestant defeat at Dreux led to the capture of Louis de Condé, with Gaspard de Coligny taking charge of the overall movement. The second issue related to the treason of the baron des Adrets, whose arrest paved the way for Crussol to become head of the Dauphiné Protestants in January 1563.

In Languedoc, the other main Protestant concern was the failure to control the town of Annonay in the Vivarais region. A Vivarais assembly held at Baix in October 1562 had decided to recover the town, and Crussol gave Saint-Martin a commission to carry this out at the end of December. 68 The Protestants had captured Annonay in summer 1562, before the Catholic commander Saint-Chamond recaptured the town in October. 69 Annonay had suffered badly with this assault, as Saint-Chamond permitted ‘the sacking of the town’ and a number of people were killed. 70 Entering the town, Saint-Martin repaired the walls and fortified the gates. 71 In response, Nemours, the main Catholic commander in the area, ordered Saint-Chamond to retake Annonay, which he duly captured in early January, backed

65 TNA, SP 70/47, fol. 162r, ‘Soubize to Madame Le Roye, December 27 1562’.
69 Histoire ecclésiastique, III, 216–18.
70 Gamon, ‘Mémoires d’Achille Gamon’, 612. ‘le saccagement de la ville’.
71 Histoire ecclésiastique, III, 219; Ibid. However, he did not succeed in recapturing a nearby Catholic garrison.
by considerable military support.\textsuperscript{72} Saint-Martin had left the town before Saint-Chamond arrived. In the wave of violence following this recapture, the town gates and walls were destroyed.\textsuperscript{73} A counter action by Crussol did not seem to occur, presumably due to the now indefensible state of the town.

Apart from Annonay, towns such as Bourg-Saint-Andéol, Aramons and Bédarieux were taken or retaken by the Protestants, while Crussol also ordered the successful capture of the town of Puylaurens.\textsuperscript{74} In addition, he moved military figures around the province, and Rapin was later transferred from Béziers to Castres. Rapin was to alert Jean-Jacques de Voisins, the\textit{sieur} d'Ambres, of the need to resupply Montauban, which had been twice besieged.\textsuperscript{75} Ambres, a cousin of Crussol, successfully carried out this mission. Crussol similarly sent letters to the town in January, promising them aid, although this seemed to be the extent of Crussol’s involvement in Montauban.\textsuperscript{76} The Catholics were also wary of Crussol disrupting the estates at Carcassonne in December 1562, although this did not occur.\textsuperscript{77}

Crussol’s military role in November and December can be largely described as consolidating Protestant power, as he captured or recaptured certain towns, and set up new

\textsuperscript{72} \textit{Histoire ecclésiastique}, iii, 219.
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid, 220–21; Gamon, ‘Mémoires d’Achille Gamon’, 613.
\textsuperscript{74} ADH, 1 B22803, Mandement faict au capp[ital]ne surian, 20 May 1563’; \textit{HL}, xi, 426–27; \textit{Histoire ecclésiastique}, iii, 205–7; La Pise, \textit{Tableau de l’histoire}, 308; Aubais and Ménard, ‘Journal de Faurin sur les guerres de Castres’, 21. Bourg-Saint-Andéol in particular was a key strategic point as it was situated beside the Rhône (Garrisson, \textit{Protestants du Midi, 1559-1598}, 169).
\textsuperscript{75} \textit{HL}, xi, 427–28; Haag and Haag, \textit{La France protestante}, ix, 532. It is unclear whether this is Pierre de Rapin or Philibert de Rapin. While Serge Brunet notes that it was Philibert de Rapin whom Crussol installed in Montpellier, \textit{La France protestante} thinks that it was Pierre de Rapin (Serge Brunet, ‘Consistoirs calvinistes et consuls méridionaux dans les premiers affrontements religieux (1560–1562)’, in \textit{Politique et religion dans la France du XVIe siècle}, ed. by Hugues Daussy and Vladimir Chichkine, special issue of \textit{Proslogion}, 1/13 (2016), 142; Haag and Haag, \textit{La France protestante}, viii, 381. Crussol’s intention to aide Montauban was also highlighted by the Spanish ambassador Perronet de Chantonnay (BNF, fr. 10193, fol. 263r, ‘Letter of Perronet de Chantonnay to Philip II, 9 January 1563’).
\textsuperscript{76} \textit{Histoire ecclésiastique}, iii, 142. Although the \textit{Histoire ecclésiastique} affirms that it was Jacques de Crussol, the\textit{sieur} de Beaudiné, who did this, it is more likely to be Antoine.
garrisons and commanders. One of the main issues with his charge is that it is unclear at times how much of an influence he had in all the Protestant seizures of towns, as the overall military commander. Crussol did not carry out an extensive military campaign in Languedoc, but several small-scale events in its place. He was certainly active in carrying out his role as prescribed by the Protestant estates during these first few months. However, his actions are rather conservative and suggest that his objective was not to gain considerable territory for the Protestants but to simply maintain their regional control.

January to March 1563

Given both the Protestant defeat at Dreux, and the change of leadership that this entailed, the national Protestant position at the start of 1563 was not very secure. Crussol and Châtillon were content to continue raising troops and revenue, and are recorded in January as having raised a new army of six thousand men and ‘for their enterteignement [sic] have seased [sic] upon the king’s rents and fynances in those provinces [Languedoc and Provence]’, to the sum of 400,000 livres.78 This seizing of royal finances was of course prescribed by the Nîmes Protestant estates. According to the Spanish ambassador in February, Crussol and Châtillon had pillaged several places, but as they did not have artillery and ‘are not armed and supplied to undertake a large military action’, no great account of them was taken in Paris.79 This observation helps to situate the military threat that Crussol posed within the wider French context, indicating the limitations of his military capabilities and his capacity to carry out an extensive campaign.

In a letter to Queen Elizabeth of England in January, Coligny wrote that Crussol and Châtillon ‘have nearly delivered this whole province of Languedoc from the tyranny of the

78 TNA, SP 70/49, fol. 198r, ‘Challoner to the Queen, 30 Jan 1563’.
79 BNF, fr. 10193, fol. 273r, ‘Letter of Perronet de Chantonnay to Philip II, 23 February 1563’.'ne sont armez et pourveuz pour faire gran [sic] cas'.
enemies of God and the king’. Antoine’s brother Jean de Crussol, the sieur de Lévis, was at Coligny’s side, mentioned as ‘a gentleman of a good house and in verey [sic] good credit [sic]’, by the English ambassador. Coligny exaggerated the extent of Crussol’s military achievements, as despite the vast territory under Protestant control in Languedoc, there was still a considerable Catholic presence, particularly in the Midi-Toulousain.

Although it is not clear whether Crussol raised an army of ‘six thousand men’, he certainly published commissions to levy troops and appoint military captains during January and February 1563. These orders shed more light on the process of Protestant recruitment and the command of Crussol. One example is a commission in Dauphiné in January, given to a figure named Rostaing. This document outlined that Crussol became military chief in Dauphiné ‘to preserve the state of this [province] in the obedience of the king’. This phrase was also seen in Crussol’s justification for joining the Languedoc Protestants, as shown earlier, which presented his engagement in the war as being part of his fidelity to the crown. Rostaing would travel to certain towns and villages and recruit soldiers from those capable of carrying weapons. This command fits directly into the articles of the Dauphiné provincial estates and shows the Protestant leadership attempting to put these decrees into practice.

A captain Labreule was similarly appointed to levy two hundred men and protect Saint-Auban-sur-l’Ouvèze and the neighbouring places in Dauphiné. These men were to be ‘God-fearing men of good morals and life’, as the provincial estates’ decrees were again followed. Labreule was to maintain the people in peace, keeping the soldiers under control,

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80 TNA, SP 70/49, fol. 187v, ‘The Admiral of France to Queen Elizabeth I, 29 January 1563’. ‘ont presque delivré tout le dict pays de languedoc de la tyrannie des ennemys de dieu et du Roy’.
81 TNA, SP 70/52, fol. 10v, ‘Nicholas Throckmorton to Ambrose Dudley, the earl of Warwick, 1 March 1563’: fol. 13r-v, ‘Admiral Gaspard de Coligny to Ambrose Dudley, the earl of Warwick, 1 March 1563’. Coligny later used Jean to try convince the comte de Rhingrave, Jean’s stepfather, to join their side, in March 1563.
82 ADD, E3380 (2 Mi 566), fol. 1r, ‘Commission of Antoine de Crussol to Rostaing, 28 January 1563’. ‘[on]server lestat d’icelluy en l’obeissance de Roy’.
83 ADD, E 3155, No. 3, fol. 1r, ‘Commission given by Antoine de Crussol to captain Labreule, 8 February 1563’. ‘gens cregnans dieu de bonnes meurs [et] vie’.
and the munitions for these troops were organised by commissaires.\textsuperscript{84} Labreule had authority granted to him by Crussol, and officials such as town consuls were to obey him as if Crussol were there in person, being declared ‘rebels, seditious people and perturbators of the public union and tranquillity’ if they did not obey.\textsuperscript{85} This was a severe threat on Crussol’s behalf, and this language is similar to his own commission in December 1561. In adopting this language, Crussol again shouldered the role of a provincial lieutenant-général, framing disobedience to his command as being an act of civil disorder and sedition. Protestant soldiers were continually on the move in Dauphiné, as shown by the example of the town of Saint-Nazaire-en-Royans, where Protestant troops often passed through or stayed in, especially from January to March 1563.\textsuperscript{86}

Although there was continued Protestant military activity in Languedoc during the first three months of the year, capturing several places around Béziers among others, it is unclear how much of a role Crussol had in these Protestant offensive and defensive manoeuvres. Following his election as leader of Protestant Dauphiné in January 1563, he spent an increased amount of time there.\textsuperscript{87} There was also certain military activity in this province during the first few months, relating mostly to Protestant seizures of places around Grenoble and Gap, and Maugiron’s movements around Grenoble, pillaging the region of Trièves.\textsuperscript{88}

In his Dauphiné role, Crussol took a more hands-on approach to his military leadership. In March, the royal armies posed an increased threat to the Protestants, and he

\textsuperscript{84} Ibid, fol. 1v.
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid, fol. 2r. ‘rebelles cedieulx [sic] et p[er]turbaturs [sic] de l’union et tranquillité publique’.
\textsuperscript{87} Histoire ecclésiastique, iii, 207–9. As well as these places captured around Béziers, there were Catholic military successes around Toulouse. An attack on Béziers was also repulsed in February 1563.
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid, 369–75; Arnaud, Histoire des protestants du Dauphiné aux XVIe, XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles, i, 179.
took measures to defend the province. At the start of the month, Crussol travelled from Valence, with artillery in tow, to relieve Grenoble. The town was under siege by Maugiron and Suze. After subjecting the town to cannon fire for several days, Maugiron and Suze retreated to Vienne when Crussol approached.

Crussol’s relief of the Grenoble siege was enthusiastically supported by the Protestant pastor Loys Normand. In a letter to the churches of Dauphiné, Normand encouraged them to send soldiers to Crussol to aid Grenoble. First reminding the churches of God’s grace in protecting them, Normand framed Crussol’s action in a wider context, as Crussol would deliver ‘all these poor churches of this province from oppression’. After entering Grenoble on 5 March, Crussol ‘gave orders relating to what was necessary for the fortification of the town’, and then travelled to Comtat-Venaissin.

Crussol raised further troops at the start of March. He asked the sénéchal of Valentinois and Diois to assemble soldiers, given the presence of Catholic troops in Dauphiné, to both protect the Protestant places and combat the enemy armies. To form a large army quickly, Crussol asked the sénéchal to travel to the areas under his command. He was to assemble all the men of fighting age in these places, and equip with weapons those capable of carrying them, acquired from the towns and villages themselves. These orders fit directly

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90 La Pise, Tableau de l’histoire, 309; Histoire ecclésiastique, iii, 374.
92 Histoire ecclésiastique, iii, 374. ‘donné ordre à ce qui estoit necessaire pour la fortification d’icelle’.
93 ACC, EE 2, No. 53, fol. 1r, ‘Ordre d’Antoine, comte de Crussol et de Tonnerre au sénéchal de Valentinois et Diois, 2 March 1563’.
94 Ibid, fol. 1v.
into the articles of the Montélimar and Valence assemblies. While the Montélimar assembly had ordered town consuls to draw up lists of all able-bodied men and weapons, presumably to help figures such as the sénéchal, the Valence deliberations determined that these places were to equip the troops with weapons if needed. The sénéchal was to have munitions organised for the soldiers and to set up étapes for the troops. Crussol commanded all officers, consuls, syndics and judicial representatives and others to hear and obey his mission, on the pain of being declared ‘rebels, seditious people, and guilty of the crime of lèse-majesté’, which again illustrated the seriousness of his threat. All figures of authority in the province were to aid the sénéchal in his charge.

While Crussol’s military activity in Dauphiné and Languedoc during January and February was not very extensive, he took decisive measures at the start of March, relieving the siege of Grenoble. From January to March, he levied a considerable number of soldiers, particularly in Dauphiné, an act which points to the tense state of the province. The Spanish ambassador’s comments from Paris indicate that while Crussol evidently posed a threat on a regional or provincial scale, it was not something to be overly concerned about on a national level. His engagement with his role was directly in line with what was prescribed at the provincial estates, such as the levying of troops. It is striking how few operations Crussol carried out himself during the opening few months of his military leadership. While relieving Grenoble was the first military campaign he personally led, it was the offensive in Comtat-Venaissin in mid-March which was the highpoint of his military combat during his Protestant adherence.

Comtat-Venaissin campaign

The extensive military operation in Comtat-Venaissin was largely successful, although it was not without its losses. In a later declaration, Crussol justified this expedition due to the

95 Ibid. ‘rebelles seditieux et coupables de crime de leze m[aiesté]’.
aggression of troops from Avignon, led by Serbeloni. As these troops had committed ‘infinite cruelties’ in capturing several towns, and advanced to enter the monarch’s territory (meaning the kingdom of France as opposed to the papal territories), he had mustered ‘the forces of his majesty to resist them’. Crussol framed this campaign as being on the king’s behalf, defending his territory against foreigners. The soldiers under his command are described as royal troops.

There had certainly been renewed Catholic activity by soldiers under Serbeloni’s command around the start of March, taking the towns of Camaret and Sérignan-du-Comtat, as Crussol was occupied elsewhere. As Comtat-Venaissin bordered lower Dauphiné, the recent Catholic offensive threatened this frontier. Apart from fighting against Serbeloni, historians have also considered a Protestant request for aid as a reason for Crussol’s campaign, following a failed Protestant attempt to recapture Orange.

Crussol combined his roles as Protestant leader in Languedoc and Dauphiné on this expedition, which underscored the advantage to the Protestants of having him in control in both provinces. Given that both Languedoc and Dauphiné bordered Comtat-Venaissin, he could procure forces and supplies from both regions. He arrived in the Comtat with two thousand infantry and six hundred cavalry, with several cannon. Crussol first besieged

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96 BNF, fr. 15878, fol. 26r, ‘Actes de declaration faict de monseigneur le comte de crussol aux capitaines estant au comtat de venisse et reponse desdits capitaines, 31 May-10 June 1563’. ‘Infiniez cruaultez’, ‘les forces de sa maiesté pour leur resister’.

97 La Pise, Tableau de l’histoire, 309; Fornery, Histoire du Comté Venaissin et de la ville d’Avignon [1909], ii, 61. This edition of Fornery is a reprint of a work from 1909, which is itself a new edition of the original work, from 1784.

98 La Pise, Tableau de l’histoire, 309; A. de Pontbriant, Histoire de la principauté d’Orange (Avignon, 1891), 73; Fornery, Histoire du Comté Venaissin et de la ville d’Avignon [1909], ii, 60. Orange had been taken by Catholics under the command of the comte de Suze and Serbeloni in summer 1562 (Perussis, ‘Discours des guerres de la Comte de Venayscin, et de la Provence’, 442; Histoire ecclésiastique, iii, 311, 314).

99 BA, Ms. 2773, fol. 103v, ‘Discours des guerres de la comté de Venayssin et de la Prouvence, ensemble quelques incidents, le tout dedié a l’illustissime et excellentissime Mgr Fr. Fabrice de Serbellingoni, cousin germain de N. S. P. et son general en ladicte cité d’Avignon et dicte comté, par le seigneur Loys de Perussis, escuyer de Caumons, subjet et vassal de Sa Sainteté (first, second, and start of third discours)’. There are varying estimates for the number of troops that Crussol brought
Sérignan, in mid-March. Serbeloni was in Orange during this siege, although a portion of his troops remained in Sérignan to defend the town. Crussol set up his military base at Pont-Saint-Esprit, near to the Protestant estates at Bagnols-sur-Cèze. Capturing Sérignan would prevent disruption to his communication lines as he continued his campaign further into the region.

Numerous financial accounts relate to Crussol’s preparations for this siege. He needed artillery, powder, and pionniers to be brought. Pionniers, as mentioned briefly in the previous chapter, were men used for manual tasks such as digging trenches, carrying munitions, preparing camps, and building fortifications. Pionniers had also been sent earlier to Crussol’s camp at Saint-Quentin-sur-Isère in Dauphiné, at the start of March. Crussol had given the consuls of Uzès a commission to raise pionniers. He sent a tense letter to them in March, wondering where these men were, and finding it strange the ‘little obedience that you rendered to the command’ that he had issued. This was quite a threatening letter, as Crussol asked the consuls to carry out the commission without excuses, or ‘you will give me occasion to make you understand how much I find this unacceptable’. He additionally asked the consuls to send as much powder as they could.

into Comtat-Venaisin. Le Père Justin and Pontbriant note that Crussol brought in 2000 infantry and 600 cavalry, while Justin also mentions that he had six cannon with him (Pontbriant, Histoire de la principauté d’Orange, 73; Le Père Justin, Histoire des guerres excitées dans le comté Venaissin et dans les environs par les calvinistes du XVle siècle (Carpentras, 1859), 177). On the other hand, Joseph de La Pise recorded that Crussol arrived at Sérignan with 1000 horse and 6000 infantry, which does not seem to be accurate (La Pise, Tableau de l’histoire, 309). While La Pise has an inherent Protestant bias, Pontbriant and Justin are undoubtedly pro-Catholic.

100 La Pise, Tableau de l’histoire, 309.
101 Le Père Justin, Histoire des guerres excitées, 177.
102 Pontbriant, Histoire de la principauté d’Orange, 73.
103 Wood, The King’s Army, 304; Knecht, The French Civil Wars, 1562-1598, 25. Ordinary French infantry were not required to perform most manual tasks.
After receiving this letter, the Uzès consuls reacted quickly, sending powder and pionniers to Pont-Saint-Esprit and Sérignan. After the receveur-particulier of the Uzès diocese had paid for these expenses, Guillaume Arquier (the provincial receveur-général) later reimbursed him for money given ‘to the pionniers sent to the camp of Sérignan following a letter of the comte [de Crussol]’, as well as money provided to Jehan Durant, the maître-poudrier (master powder maker) of Uzès. This is a further example of the impressive Protestant military organisation. Two cannons were also present at Pont-Saint-Esprit, moved into Languedoc on Crussol’s command. During this siege, Crussol similarly asked consuls of another town to bring down artillery that was in Roquemaure. Protestant military strength depended on factors such as strategic position, weaponry, supply lines, availability of rations and munitions, military financing, and evidently the armed forces themselves. As exhibited by the Sérignan siege, Crussol had an essential role in bringing together all these elements to form an effective military campaign. His own personal leadership, as shown through putting pressure on the Uzès consuls, enabled this siege to occur.

Although Crussol succeeded in routing soldiers sent by Serbeloni towards Sérignan, this action proved costly as the town garrison entered the Protestant camp, killing soldiers and capturing cannons and gunpowder. This siege additionally bore a heavy price for Crussol personally, as his brother Charles was killed. Since 1550, Charles had been the abbé

106 ADH, 1 B22803, fol. 1r-2v, ‘C[om]pte rendu par Marcellin Domergue, 20 March 1563’.
107 ADH, 1 B22803, fol. 1r, ‘Payment of Guillaume Arquier to Nicolas Tholouze, 3 July 1563’; fol. 1r, ‘Receipt of payment of Monsieur de Fossac to Jehan Durant, 21 March 1563’. ‘aux pionniers envoyez au camp de serignan Suivant une lett[re] missive de mond[ict] s[ieu]r le comte [de Crussol]’. This event was also mentioned briefly in the previous chapter.
108 ADH, 1 B22803, fol. 1r, ‘Receipt of payment by Nicolas de Toulouze to Mellet, 15 June 1563’.
109 ADH, 1 B22803, ‘Crussol to consuls of [unknown], 22 March 1563’. These are presumably the cannons mentioned as being in Roquemaure in December 1562 (Histoire ecclésiastique, III, 206).
110 Lowenstein, ‘Resistance to Absolutism’, 203.
111 Pontbriant, Histoire de la principauté d’Orange, 73–74; Le Père Justin, Histoire des guerres excitées, 177–78.
112 Pontbriant, Histoire de la principauté d’Orange, 74; Le Père Justin, Histoire des guerres excitées, 178.
of Feuillans, near Rieux-Volvestre in Languedoc. Having left this ecclesiastical life to join the Protestants, Charles died after being taken prisoner and mistreated by the Catholics, and was interred in a cemetery. Several Catholics, incensed that a Protestant was buried in holy ground, dug up the body and pulled it through the town with ropes. The historian Joseph de La Pise detailed the horrible treatment of Charles both during and after his death, and although La Pise has a clear Protestant bias, a later letter of Crussol again indicated this abuse. In comparison, Perussii's account omits this episode, claiming that Charles died of his wounds to the ‘very great regret’ of Serbeloni.

The cannons brought to Sérignan after this ambush enhanced the Protestant position, while soldiers from the Roquemaure garrison and the surrounding area also arrived to bolster Crussol’s forces. After the death of Charles, ‘the siege of Sérignan was continued with yet more vigour, by the desire that Crussol had to avenge the death of his brother’. The town capitulated following a long siege, and the Protestants massacred its garrison and inhabitants. Crussol did not have any considerable challenges in controlling the region after this event, and subsequently entered the town of Orange.

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114 Le Père Justin, Histoire des guerres excitées, 178; Pontbriant, Histoire de la principauté d’Orange, 74; La Pise, Tableau de l’histoire, 310.
115 La Pise, Tableau de l’histoire, 310.
117 BA, Ms. 2773, fol. 104r, ‘Discours des guerres de la comté de Venayssin et de la Prouvençe...’; ‘très grand Regret’.
118 La Pise, Tableau de l’histoire, 310; Le Père Justin, Histoire des guerres excitées, 178; Fornery, Histoire du Comté Venaissin et de la ville d’Avignon [1909], ii, 64.
119 Le Père Justin, Histoire des guerres excitées, 178. ‘le siège de Sérignan fut continué avec plus de vigueur encore, par le désir qu’avait Crussol de venger la mort de son frère’.
121 Histoire ecclésiastique, iii, 317; Pontbriant, Histoire de la principauté d’Orange, 74–75. Serbeloni retreated from the area following the fall of Sérignan. According to Pontbriant, Catholic houses in Orange were set on fire, but La Pise outlines that the town was exempt from pillage on Crussol’s command (Pontbriant, Histoire de la principauté d’Orange, 75; La Pise, Tableau de l’histoire, 310). Crussol may also have captured and killed a Catholic garrison to the northwest of Orange, which had caused trouble to the neighbouring areas (La Pise, Tableau de l’histoire, 310).
Having secured the Protestant position in the region, Crussol installed a garrison in Orange, handed over charge of the town and Comtat-Venaissin to Gaspard de Pape, the seigneur de Saint-Auban, and departed for Languedoc at the end of March.\textsuperscript{122} After attending the Languedoc estates at Bagnols, Crussol went to Valence. The Protestants’ advance in Comtat-Venaissin continued without him, and they took a considerable number of towns in the weeks following his departure.\textsuperscript{123} Crussol continued to have an indirect influence in the Comtat, as shown by the request of the inhabitants of Orange in the following chapter.

Crussol’s offensive in Comtat-Venaissin secured the southern frontier of Dauphiné, established a significant Protestant presence in the region, and posed a major threat to the Catholic commanders. This was his largest military operation, yet it is telling that it was carried out on papal lands, as opposed to French territory. In this way, Crussol did not fight directly against Charles IX and conducting warfare in this region meant that he could frame his actions as being very much on the king’s behalf, defending the royal territory of Dauphiné from a potential invasion. His aggressive campaign gave the Protestants a strong foothold in Comtat-Venaissin, which was to prove a major point of contention during the disarmament process. Perhaps due to the bloody nature of the conflict in Comtat-Venaissin generally, Crussol’s reputation did not seem to be harmed by the massacre at Sérignan. He used his military role in both Languedoc and Dauphiné to undergo a successful campaign in Comtat-Venaissin, as shown by his strict commands to the Uzès consuls.

Crussol took up a central position in the Protestant military campaigns and had a crucial role as the overall commander of the Protestant movement in the Midi. There was

\textsuperscript{122} Pontbriant, \textit{Histoire de la principauté d’Orange}, 75; La Pise, \textit{Tableau de l’histoire}, 310; \textit{Histoire ecclésiastique}, iii, 317; Forner, \textit{Histoire du Comté Venaissin et de la ville d’Avignon} [1909], ii, 70.

little military activity in the first few months of his command, and the appointment of military
deputies and the setting up of garrisons generally consolidated Protestant territory. However,
his became increasingly involved in substantial military operations, which culminated in the
Comtat campaign.

**Conclusion**

To conclude this chapter, Crussol played a fundamental role in maintaining the
Protestant movement in Dauphiné and Languedoc, which relied significantly on him. He fully
engaged with his charge as leader of the Languedoc and Dauphiné Protestants, through his
interaction with the towns and his central role in the military campaigns.

Crussol’s relationship with these various Protestant towns furthers our
understanding of his leadership and how the Protestant war machine worked in practice. His
governing role gave both legitimacy to the movement as a whole (as emphasised elsewhere),
and to the various conseils acting under his command. His actions can be viewed as those of
a lieutenant-général, even though he was not appointed to this position by the crown.

Through overseeing the defence of the Protestant-controlled territory, Crussol firmly
put the importance of the overall war effort ahead of the needs of the individual towns. He
had the wider objectives of the Protestant movement in mind. The town consulates fully
respected Crussol’s authority and sought to obey his commands. They viewed him as their
adjudicator in disputes, able to support their interests. Being a spokesperson for the
Protestant movement was an integral part of his role. Many of the Protestant requests went
straight to him, as opposed to the councils. The consulates did not hold the conseils in the
same esteem as Crussol, and he had to rebuke them for not obeying the conseils’ commands.
This focus on Crussol also makes clear how reliant the Protestants were on noble support for
their cause, and on their continuing loyalty throughout the war. Crussol and the conseils in
both Languedoc and Dauphiné were not afraid to take strict measures to reinforce their
authority, as shown by the imprisonment of the Montpellier consuls. The strict nature of these decrees should be seen in the wider context of the war, given the need for continual funds.

In addition, this section helps to understand the interplay between the wider Protestant movement and its urban centres, the latter cherishing their autonomy but having to supply significant resources. There could be a substantial difference in viewpoints, and the towns were not always willing to contribute funds to the wider movement. The disconnect between the views of the town consuls and the conseil or military commanders concerning what was necessary on the town’s behalf, inevitably led to tension.

Crussol’s military importance in the Protestant movement was demonstrated particularly by his level of involvement in the Comtat-Venaissin offensive. Many commands were given personally by him, to bring together all the necessary resources to carry out this campaign. He combined his military roles to aid the Protestant war movement. However, Crussol was not personally involved in every war operation during this time, one example being his lack of influence in Protestant activity around Castres.

While Crussol carried out his charge as Protestant leader faithfully, his military objectives and actions were generally quite conservative. His reactionary and defensive military strategy aimed to maintain Protestant control. The exception to this is the Comtat-Venaissin campaign, though Crussol did frame this as being a defensive measure against Serbeloni’s aggressive actions. The continued Protestant seizure of towns in the Comtat following Crussol’s withdrawal from the region shows this operation to be more than simply defensive. It was certainly notable that his most extensive military engagement of the war did not take place in the king’s territory.

Crussol was conscious of his future political fortunes. Although he seemed to have little contact with Catherine or Charles from November 1562 to April 1563, he was mindful
of the importance of his relationship with the monarchy. He was aware of the need to frame his actions as being for the service of the king, given that he would later have to explain his conduct. His justification for the Comtat-Venaissin campaign shows him acting as a lieutenant-général, directing the royal armies to protect the king’s territory and subjects from foreign invasion, as a faithful servant of the crown.

Despite a conservative approach in his military objectives, Crussol genuinely tried to fulfil and carry out his role as Protestant leader. His frustration with the consuls of Uzès underscored his commitment to the movement, while his conduct and actions are shown to be very much in line with his role as defined by the Languedoc and Dauphiné estates. Crussol was not involved in any pitched battles during his time as Protestant leader (although such battles were generally rare in the religious wars), instead being involved in siege warfare and small skirmishes.

While Crussol had been given a considerable authority, shown both in his interaction with the Protestant towns and his role in the military campaigns, he had to begin relinquishing his role following the arrival of the peace in March 1563, which meant handing over the towns and disarming his soldiers. Asserting his loyalty to the crown, while at the same time trying to resolve Protestant concerns, was one of the challenges Crussol faced in this disarmament period.
Chapter 6: Disarmament, 1563

Though the peace edict was signed in March 1563, hostilities continued into the summer, amidst negotiations for peace. Crussol played an active role in this slow disarmament process, which marked the end of his revolt against the monarchy. His relationship with the monarchy was of prime importance to him as he wound down his adherence to the Protestant movement. Crussol again attempted to stress his loyalty to Charles and Catherine and convince them of his fidelity, especially as his actions during disarmament could negatively impact his image in their eyes. He actively strove to obey the royal commands to disarm and enforce the peace edict, but did so on his own terms, stipulating certain conditions which delayed disarmament. Crussol’s desire to obey the king, and his continued Protestant adherence, also had the potential to pull him in different directions. His religious convictions again appear as a significant issue through this period, as shown by his correspondence with John Calvin.

The major themes outlined in this chapter include Crussol’s loyalty to the monarchy, his negotiations with the Catholic commanders amidst the continuing hostilities, and measures for the enforcement of the peace. His discussions with the Catholic commanders in Languedoc, Dauphiné, Provence and Comtat-Venaissin, formed a major part of this disarmament process. This chapter starts in March and April 1563 and runs chronologically through to July 1563. This period is particularly rich in correspondence and sources for Crussol, and a chronological framework enables an in-depth understanding of his response to the royal demands and the evolving situation in the three provinces. After outlining the peace edict of Amboise, Crussol’s correspondence with the crown will be discussed in each month, followed by the provincial situations.
The edict of Amboise was announced on 19 March 1563.¹ Similar to the edict of January, it stressed that the troubles of the last few years were due to ‘the diversity of opinions concerning religion and the qualms of their [the king’s subjects’] consciences’.² Its first article, and one of the most contentious, stipulated that the nobles could live on their lands (fiefs) ‘in freedom of their consciences and exercise of the Religion they call Reformed, with their families and subjects’.³ As shown earlier, this edict favoured the nobility over the general Protestant population.⁴ For this wider population, the edict decreed that in each bailliage or sénéchaussée, the Protestants could practice their faith in the faubourgs (suburbs) of a particular town.⁵

These were the only places most Protestants could worship, although ‘each person everywhere will be able to live and stay in his house freely, without being investigated nor harassed, forced nor constrained, due to his conscience’.⁶ They could also continue worshipping in all towns held by them at the start of March 1563.⁷ However, they were not allowed to retain any Catholic churches, and the clergy were to be given back their assets. Paris was exempt from any exercise of Protestantism.⁸ All foreigners, including soldiers, were to leave France, while all judgements and decrees since Henri II concerning religion and the taking up of arms were declared notwithstanding.

¹ ‘Édit d’Amboise, 19 mars 1563’, <http://elec.enc.sorbonne.fr/editsdepacification/edit_02> [accessed 21 February 2019]. This is also in Isambert et al., Recueil général des anciennes lois françaises, xiv, 135–40. All the peace edicts of the Wars of Religion may be found online at http://elec.enc.sorbonne.fr/editsdepacification/
² ‘Édit d’Amboise, préambule’. ‘la diversité des opinions pour le fait de la religion et scrupule de leurs consciences.’
³ ‘Édit d’Amboise, article one’. ‘en liberté de leurs consciences et exercice de la Religion qu’ilz disent reformée avec leurs familles et subjectz’.
⁵ ‘Édit d’Amboise, article two’.
⁶ Ibid. ‘chacun pourra vivre et demourer partout en sa maison librement, sans estre recherché ne molesté, forcé ne contrainct pour le fait de sa conscience.’
⁷ ‘Édit d’Amboise, article three’.
⁸ ‘Édit d’Amboise, article four’. 
The royal reconciliation with Louis de Bourbon, the prince de Condé, and the Protestants, was a key component of this edict. It reaffirmed Condé’s loyalty and labelled him ‘our good relative, faithful subject and servant’. The monarchy considered all of Condé’s followers as ‘our good and loyal subjects and servants’, and remarked that ‘what was carried out before by our subjects... was done towards a good end and intention and for our service.’ The edict stipulated that both Condé and those who by his command had taken royal revenue, ecclesiastical revenue, or had fortified towns, could not be investigated in the future and were not responsible for these past expenses or actions. These measures also meant that Crussol’s decision to take up arms against the royal armies was validated. However, as shown by the following chapter, Crussol still had to demonstrate his loyalty to the monarchy at court.

People imprisoned due to the war or because of religion were to be released, with the exception of those guilty of murder or theft. Another controversial article decreed that ‘all insults and offenses’ of the past be erased, and no one was to provoke another through a reproach on the past, nor to quarrel over religious matters, but to ‘live peacefully together as brothers, friends and fellow citizens’. The edict aimed to restore unity within France. No further soldiers were to be levied, or money raised, while the illegal assemblies were to cease.

April

In the month of April, several of the main themes in this chapter are apparent, such as the enforcement of the peace amidst the ongoing hostilities, and Crussol’s attempts to convince

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9 ‘Édit d’Amboise, article six’; Roberts, Peace and Authority, 32. ‘noster bon parent, fidelle subject et serviteur’.
10 ‘Édit d’Amboise, article six’. ‘noz bons et loyaux subjectz et serviteurs’, ‘ce qui a esté faict cy devant par nosd. subjectz... a esté faict à bonne fin et intention et pour nostre service.’
11 ‘Édit d’Amboise, article eight’; Roberts, Peace and Authority, 64.
12 ‘Édit d’Amboise, article nine. ‘toutes injures et offenses’, ‘vivre paisiblement ensemble comme frères, amys et concitoiens’.
the monarchy of his loyalty. Crussol started to disarm the Protestants during this month. Disarmament was a tense process, as both sides were reluctant to lay down arms and enforce the edict before the other. While the monarchy generally commanded the military leaders to disarm in order to achieve peace, royal letters to Guillaume de Joyeuse and Laurent de Maugiron in March emphasised that they should first see if the Protestants disarmed, and copy them accordingly.\(^\text{13}\) This helps to explain Joyeuse and Maugiron’s later reluctance to disarm in negotiations with Crussol. In addition, the crown sent representatives to enforce the edict. Given the sizeable territory under Crussol’s command, hostilities continued in certain areas while the peace was enforced elsewhere.

At the start of the month, the queen-mother sent a letter to Crussol via Coucault, a royal messenger who played a prominent role in disarmament negotiations.\(^\text{14}\) Crussol was commanded to disarm and negotiate with Joyeuse to see peace restored, and to hand over the money from the *gabelle* tax and other subsidies. The crown wished to claim tax revenue collected by the Protestants, and a quick disarmament would enable the collection of the first quarter of the year. Catherine similarly wrote to Odet de Châtillon, urging him to keep the Protestants adhering to the peace.\(^\text{15}\) She wrote of her assurance that both Châtillon and Crussol would strive to enforce the edict.

Crussol’s reply to Catherine, on 11 April, is his first surviving letter to the monarchy since the previous November. Responding to her request that he negotiate with Joyeuse, Crussol outlined that it was ‘impossible to negotiate with him anything for the pacification

\(^{13}\) ‘Letter of Catherine de Médicis to monsieur de Joyeuse, 13 March 1563’, in *LCM*, X, 90; ‘Letter of Catherine de Médicis to monsieur de Maugiron, 14 March 1563’, in *LCM*, x, 90. The letter to Joyeuse is also found (with a slightly different date) in *LCM*, x, 52. She informed them about the peace, even though the edict itself was not signed at this stage.

\(^{14}\) Coucault had also been sent by Catherine to Crussol during the war itself, as shown in a previous chapter.

\(^{15}\) BNF, fr. 3189, fol. 6r, ‘Letter of Catherine de Médicis to [Odet de Châtillon], 1 April 1563’. This is also found in *LCM*, II, 6–7.
of these troubles’, due to ‘the great hatred’ of Joyeuse in Languedoc.\textsuperscript{16} He doubted that Joyeuse would be able to adequately guard the places that Crussol handed over to him, as part of the disarmament process. Handing over towns was one of the major sticking points in negotiations. Crussol pleaded ignorance concerning religious matters, perhaps conscious of the Protestant dissatisfaction with the edict, which explains why he later urged Calvin to support the peace.

As shown previously, this letter was additionally a defence of Crussol’s actions during the war and reads more like a speech. Underlining his devoted royal service, he wrote that he had kept ‘these provinces safe and sound from the hands of foreigners’, delivering people from oppression. He did this while Catherine and Charles were ‘captives’, adopting the Protestant argument.\textsuperscript{17} Emphasising that he took up arms only as the crown ‘could not repress the course’ of violence of these foreigners, his decision was framed as being for the good of the monarchy and the provinces. Crussol highlighted the difficulty in maintaining peace, due to ongoing hostilities. Mentioning Catholic nobles such as the s\textit{eurs} de Saint-Vidal and Apchier causing difficulties, he had been forced to send his brother Jacques (Beaudiné) to resolve the situation. Despite this measure, he desired nothing more than ‘to see in this kingdom a good and firm peace established and weapons laid down’, with the monarchy honoured.\textsuperscript{18}

To complete this performance of loyalty, Crussol wished to hand over his leadership to some notable figure. His letter worked together with the oral reply he sent via Coucault, and he asked the crown to send a prestigious individual to bring the war to an end, ‘as by the aforementioned Coucault I have asked you’. Crussol pledged to put his life and assets


\textsuperscript{17} Ibid. ‘sainnes et sauves ces provinces des mains des estrangiers’, ‘captives’.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid. ‘ne pouviez reprimer le cours’, ‘veoir en ce royaulme une bonne et ferme paix restably et les armes mises bas’. 
towards this objective, and closed the letter as ‘your very humble, very obedient, very loyal subject and serviteur’. This letter illustrates both of the oral characteristics outlined in the thesis introduction, the role of the *porteur* and the letter being a performance.

It was important for Crussol to end the disarmament process and underscore his loyalty in person before the king. He could not be seen to obfuscate the royal plans to implement the edict. The necessity of Louise de Clermont’s, and by extension Crussol’s, presence at court was remarked in a letter from Louis de Condé to Louise on 16 April. Condé first assured her that ‘you have a very good friend near to their majesties’. He urged her to come to court, which was ‘very required and necessary’. The *porteur* would inform Louise of the events there. Condé urged her to make known to the queen-mother her desire to be near her, which Catherine wished in turn.

This letter indicated the importance of Crussol and Louise’s presence at court and raises questions over their standing there. Given the need for Louise to illustrate her affection for Catherine, perhaps Louise, similar to Crussol, too needed to repair damage done to her reputation in royal eyes through Crussol’s Protestant adherence. Louise seemingly went to court in the following month, as shown by a letter sent from John Calvin in May.

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19 Ibid. ‘comme par led[ict] Coucault je vo[yuz en ay suppl]yé’, ‘V[ost]re treshumble [sic] tresobaisant [sic] tresfidel[ic] subject et serviteur’. Although this closing subscription seems very deferential, Crussol used three adjectives on numerous occasions, not just at moments when it was important to illustrate his loyalty, such as in BNF, fr. 3186, fol. 68r-69v, ‘Letter of Antoine de Crussol to Catherine de Médicis, 23 March 1560/1561’.
20 AN, MC/DC/LVI/8, No. 18, ‘M[onsieur] de Bourbon à Madame de Crussol, 16 April 1563’. This letter is also in BNF, Nouvelles acquisitions fr. 9718, fol. 58r, ‘Letter of Louis de Bourbon to Madame de Crussol, 16 April 1563’ and Aubais and Ménard, ‘Lettres des rois, reines, princes, & seigneurs à M. de Crussol’, 90. The letter is signed Louis de Bourbon, which could refer to Condé, or to the *duc* de Montpensier. However, Louis referred to Louise as ‘my good mother’ (‘ma bonne mère’), which seems to suggest that it was Condé as opposed to Montpensier who wrote the letter, given that Montpensier and Louise were closer in age.
21 Ibid. ‘vous avez un si bon ami près de leurs majestés’, ‘bien requise et necessaire’. Calvin à madame de Crussol, 8 May 1563’, in *Calvini opera*, xx, 9–10. The *Calvini opera* editors have taken the recipient ‘madame de Crussol’ to mean Louise de Clermont, although the editors of the *Correspondance Bèze* argue elsewhere that it refers to Jeanne de Genouillac, who was also a friend of Catherine’s (‘Letter of Madame de Crussol à Calvin et Bèze, 12 September 1563’, in *Correspondance Bèze*, iv, 200n), as mentioned in chapter one. However, given that Jeanne seemed
Mentioning the ‘good services’ that God had used Louise for, and knowing that she would be solicited to ‘swim between two waters’ (referring to the pressures at court), Calvin warned that ‘when it is a question of glorifying God, He cannot suffer any neutrality’.  

He wished to reinforce Louise’s Reformed faith, which could be influenced by the atmosphere at court.

In Dauphiné, Crussol’s attempts to implement the edict were shown in a letter to the consuls of Romans. On 12 April, he announced the peace and told them that the monarchy would send a gentilhomme ‘to make known to each person the wills and intentions of their majesties’. This was seemingly a circular letter Crussol sent into Dauphiné. He requested that the consuls convene on 20 April in Valence to hold the provincial estates and hear the royal will. This assembly would discuss ways to pacify Dauphiné and provide for Protestant security. However, it is unclear whether this assembly went ahead, given that the royal representative only arrived in July. Maugiron had informed Catherine of Crussol convening the estates, although he may have been referring to the Bagnols assembly.

The peace itself
had been published in Romans on 23 March.\(^{30}\) The disarmament that came with the peace meant an end to the considerable war expenses for the Protestant towns, and the Romans consuls asked Crussol for permission to disband two military companies, citing the cost of maintaining these troops.\(^{31}\) There were, however, still troops moving through Dauphiné at the start of this month, on Crussol’s orders.\(^{32}\) On the Catholic side, a letter of Catherine to Maugiron on 30 April expressed her contentment with Maugiron’s decision to disband the majority of his military companies, and she asked him to discharge further soldiers.\(^{33}\)

While the Languedoc Protestants had postponed their acceptance of the edict at the end of March, the continuing hostilities in April increased their reluctance to lay down arms, as shown by the threat mentioned earlier by Crussol. The baron de Peyre, Crussol’s lieutenant in the Gévaudan, had requested help against Apchier and the baron de la Fare, who had besieged towns at the start of April.\(^{34}\) In response, Crussol ordered the Protestant nobles of the Vivarais, the Gévaudan, and the Cévennes to arm, and his brother Jacques and others raised these sieges.\(^{35}\) Crussol and the conseil in addition sent representatives to investigate reports of ‘excesses, murders, theft, and pillaging’ in the Gévaudan during this month.\(^{36}\)

He continued to levy troops during April in Provence, following a plea by the town of Orange for three infantry companies and one cavalry company.\(^{37}\) In this request, Crussol’s

\(^{30}\) Chevalier, Annales de la ville de Romans pendant les guerres de religion de 1549 à 1599, 33.
\(^{31}\) AMR, BB 9, fol. 29v, ‘Conseil de la ville de Romans, start of April 1563’; fol. 34v, ‘Conseil de la ville de Romans, 4 April 1563’.
\(^{33}\) ‘Letter of Catherine de Médicis to monsieur de Maugiron, 30 April 1563’, in LCM, X, 99.
\(^{34}\) HL, xi, 438; Histoire ecclésiastique, iii, 235.
\(^{35}\) HL, xi, 438; Histoire ecclésiastique, iii, 77; Haag and Haag, La France protestante, iv, 132–33.
\(^{36}\) ADH, 1 B22803, fols 2r, 8r, ‘Mand[ement] a Jacques barriere et autres, 10 June 1563’. ‘excez m[e]utres [sic] larrecins et pilleries’. The citation is from fol. 8r.
\(^{37}\) AMO, EE 32, No. 1, fol. 1v, ‘Request of the consuls of Orange to Antoine de Crussol, with his response, 12 April 1563’. Also in Pontbriant, Histoire de la principauté d’Orange, 375–77.
victory at Sérignan was described as being over the ‘seditious rebels against the king and perturbarors of the repos public’. Characterising the Catholics as seditious rebels and as those who disturb the public peace was a common element in Protestant rhetoric. To pay for the troops and fortify the town, the town consuls requested permission to ‘take, levy, sell, and trade all the fruits, revenues, and profits of the seditious rebels’ assets’, and ‘all the revenues of the ecclesiastical assets, rights, and profits that had belonged to the Roman [Catholic] beneficiaries’, in the diocese and the neighbouring towns. The consuls outlined the strategic position of Orange, acting as a buffer for Dauphiné, and added that in granting these requests, ‘Dauphiné will be provided with a good and sure rampart, relieved of many damages and expenses’.

In response, Crussol sought the opinion of Gaspard de Pape, the seigneur de Saint-Auban, who advised him to adopt these measures. Reiterating the town’s poor state, Saint-Auban agreed that Orange should take revenue from Catholic and rebel assets, but considered that some places should be exempt, such as regions badly damaged by the war. He concurred with the number of soldiers requested, underlining the proximity of numerous enemy troops, and indicated the need for funds and muskets. He made clear that this improved fortification would enable both a solid defence and the collection of revenue,
which the Protestants still intended to gather. As a result, Crussol granted the town’s wishes.44

Through April, hostilities and peace-making took place in equal measure. While Dauphiné was moving towards peace, Languedoc and Provence were still hostile territories. Given this overall lack of progress, the monarchy decided to send their own representatives. Crussol certainly attempted to enforce the peace in Dauphiné, while he carried out defensive measures in Languedoc. His decision to bolster the Orange garrison was a defensive manoeuvre, given that the troops were not specifically for a military campaign. Although Crussol professed his loyalty to the king, he was reluctant to negotiate with Joyeuse and hand over the Protestant-controlled towns, though he did promise to give collected funds to the monarchy during the next month.

May

The month of May saw further progress in disarmament, with lengthy negotiations taking place, while the crown increased its own efforts for peace. Crussol again described in detail his loyal conduct for the monarchy during this month. In a letter written to him on 6 May, Charles IX outlined his satisfaction with Crussol’s ‘desire’ to see ‘the affairs of the province[s] of Languedoc and Dauphiné at peace and rest’, despite later news at court of Crussol’s demands to Avignon for the handover of towns.45 He was again ordered to disarm, with similar requests sent to Maugiron, Joyeuse, and Fabricio Serbeloni.46 The king wished for

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46 BNF, fr. 15875, fol. 509r-v, ‘Letter of Charles IX to Antoine de Crussol, 6 May 1563’. The request to Maugiron was mentioned by Catherine in a letter to him at the start of May 1563. She referred him to a letter being sent to him presently by Charles, which asked Maugiron to disarm and disband his troops, the same having been asked of Crussol, Joyeuse, and Serbeloni (‘Letter of Catherine de Médicis to Monsieur de Maugiron, 5 May 1563’, in *LCM*, x, 100).
reconciliation between Crussol, Maugiron, and Joyeuse, and desired that commerce resume.47

Charles asked Crussol to give the sieur de Malras the 200,000 livres that he held, ‘in order that we may be aided in the dismissal and sending away of foreigners’, speaking of foreign troops.48 Crussol had assured Coucault of giving the crown both the gabelle money, and another 200,000 livres if there was a general laying down of arms in May.49 The monarchy was thus eager to see this edict enforced, and receive a sum coming to one million livres according to Catherine, as shown by a letter to Anne de Montmorency. Catherine had sent Coucault to Montmorency to explain the situation, ‘who having seen all, can give you a good account of it’.50 This example illustrates the usefulness of porteurs, as Coucault could expand on issues raised by the queen-mother’s letter.

Charles mentioned that François de Scepeaux, the maréchal de Vieilleville, would be sent to re-establish the peace in Dauphiné, Provence, and Languedoc.51 The monarchy had taken Crussol’s advice of sending an influential figure.52 Crussol was asked, awaiting Vieilleville’s arrival, ‘to give such good order from your side to conveying this peace that when he arrives’, Vieilleville only had to continue his work.53 Although the edict had justified the actions of the Protestant commanders, this statement shows Charles IX specifically

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47 BNF, fr. 15875, fol. 509r, ‘Letter of Charles IX to Antoine de Crussol, 6 May 1563’.
48 Ibid. ‘Affin [sic] que nous en puissions estre secouruz au Licentiement et renvoy des estrangers’.
49 BNF, fr. 15879, fol. 212r, ‘Letter of Catherine de Médicis to Anne de Montmorency, 28 April 1563’.
50 Ibid. ‘qui po[u]r avoir le tout ve[u]s en pourra Rendre bon compte’.
51 BNF, fr. 15875, fol. 509r, ‘Letter of Charles IX to Antoine de Crussol, 6 May 1563’.
52 In letters to Anne de Montmorency from the monarchy on 28 April 1563, the monarchy had first suggested sending Anne’s son François to settle these provinces (BNF, fr. 15879, fol. 212r, ‘Letter of Catherine de Médicis to Anne de Montmorency, 28 April 1563’). This letter is also in LCM, II, 76–77 (incorrectly mentioned as being 28 July 1563) and ‘Lettre du roi au connétable de Montmorency, gouverneur de Languedoc, 28 April 1563’, in HL, xii, 665–66. The HL mentions Charles IX as being the author, which does not seem to be the case, as Charles wrote a letter to Montmorency on the same date, and both letters deal roughly with the same subject material. Charles’s letter (BNF, fr. 15879, fol. 213r-v, ‘Letter of Charles IX to Anne de Montmorency, 28 April 1563’) is also in LCM, II, 22–23, where it is incorrectly mentioned as being of 24 April 1563 and sent by Catherine de Médicis.
53 BNF, fr. 15875, fol. 509v, ‘Letter of Charles IX to Antoine de Crussol, 6 May 1563’. ‘donner si bon ordre de vo[t]re costé à cest acheminement de Paix Que quand Il sera arrivé’.
recognising Crussol’s position as Protestant leader. As the administrative and judicial bodies, along with the *gouverneurs* and *lieutenants-généraux*, were unable to enforce the peace, the crown had decided to send a great noble.\(^{54}\) Charles sent the *maréchals* (one of the highest military positions) on tours of inspection around the kingdom.\(^{55}\)

Vieilleville was formally appointed to this mission on 8 May.\(^{56}\) Catherine described his charge as being:

> to put back in their first liberty the towns and places of his [the king’s] provinces of Languedoc, Dauphiné, and Provence, which have been until now occupied by those of the *religion prétendue réformée*, and to provide for all that will be necessary for the complete observation and establishment of the peace, union, and reconciliation between his subjects.\(^{57}\)

However, Vieilleville never entered Languedoc, only going to Dauphiné, Provence, and Comtat-Venaissin, via Lyon.\(^{58}\)

In a letter to a correspondent in May, Catherine remarked that in the provinces under Vieilleville’s charge, people had still not laid down their weapons.\(^{59}\) She wrote that ‘each apologising that they cannot trust those who have charges in the provinces’, these figures have asked for a great noble to be sent to execute the edict, speaking directly of Crussol among others.\(^{60}\) This lack of trust between military commanders was similarly viewed

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\(^{54}\) Knecht, *The French Civil Wars, 1562-1598*, 123.

\(^{55}\) Roberts, *Peace and Authority*, 66. Apart from Vieilleville, the *maréchals* Imbert de la Platière, the *seigneur* de Bourdillon, and François de Montmorency were similarly commissioned.

\(^{56}\) Knecht, *The French Civil Wars, 1562-1598*, 123.


\(^{58}\) *HL*, xi, 447; Ménard, *iv*, 381.

\(^{59}\) *LCM*, ii, 42.

\(^{60}\) Ibid. ‘s’excusant les ungs et les aultres qu’i[l]z ne se peuvent fier de ceulx qui ont les charges desdictz pais’.
in the later negotiations of Crussol and Joyeuse. Montmorency also advised the king to send Vieilleville quickly and requested that soldiers be maintained in Narbonne and Aiguesmortes, to protect the towns. It is notable that while the king wished for a general disarmament, Montmorency did not think this was viable.

Concerning Languedoc, the edict had been published at the Montpellier assembly in May, and shortly after in Bezières by Crussol and Caylus. The focus now turned to peace negotiations between Crussol and Joyeuse. Throughout their negotiations, Crussol and Joyeuse accused the other of disloyalty, in disobeying the royal order to lay down arms and dismiss troops. Crussol was particularly adept at presenting his loyalty to the crown. Two letters of Joyeuse on 21 May outlined his own motivations. One of these was addressed to Charles, while the other detailed instructions for the seigneur de Convertis, who would present this letter to the king. A comparison of these letters illustrates the importance of orality in the disarmament process, as the porteur was a vital part of Joyeuse’s performance to underscore his loyalty.

Joyeuse had endeavoured to ‘make your poor subjects live in some rest and peace’, and remarked that following the arrival of Caylus, he had published the edict in all the towns under his command. He mentioned in contrast that Caylus was going to the Protestant towns to make known to them the king’s will. Informing Charles of the Protestant assembly at Montpellier, he asserted that the Protestants and Crussol did not intend ‘to give the towns

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62 Histoire ecclésiastique, iii, 213.
63 BNF, fr. 15881, fols 433r-434r, ‘Instructions au seigneur de convertis pour les affaires de monseigneur le vicomte de Joyeuse lieutenant general pour le Roy en languedoc’; ‘Lettre du vicomte de Joyeuse au roi, 21 May 1563’, in HL, xii, 669–71. Joyeuse’s letter to the king is also found in Barthélemy, ‘Correspondance inédite du vicomte de Joyeuse’, 82–85, while his instruction to Convertis is found too in ‘Instruction du vicomte de Joyeuse au seigneur de Convertis, 21 May 1563’, in HL, xii, 671–75.
64 ‘Lettre du vicomte de Joyeuse au roi, 21 May 1563’, in HL, xii, 669. ‘faire vivre vos pauvres sujets en quelque repos et pacification’.
that they held into my hands’. 65 Joyeuse questioned the truthfulness of the depicted image of him in the writings of Crussol and the assembly (such as a hatred of Joyeuse in the region), ‘having never desired anything so much as the good and increase of your estate, and rest of your poor subjects’. 66 Joyeuse had sent Convertis to challenge the negative Protestant image and ‘testimony’ given of him, and to attest to his loyalty. 67 This letter highlighted Crussol’s disloyalty in depth, while Joyeuse reiterated the ‘zeal and fidelity that I have to your service’ and his willingness to satisfy the king’s command. 68

Concerning the royal order to disarm and dismiss his soldiers, Joyeuse stated that Crussol refused to do this and daily reinforced his companies. Although he had dismissed most of his soldiers, Joyeuse retained certain troops to protect the king’s subjects. He mentioned that there was discontent among the discharged companies, due to no recompense for their services, and in seeing the continued employment of the Protestant soldiers, who were paid through the king’s finances. Joyeuse outlined that the Protestants were fortifying themselves, and were forcing the king’s subjects to pay ‘the tailles imposed by them’ advanced for the entire year, which were substantially more than the king’s taxes. 69 They had constrained these subjects to feed their troops and supply loans. 70 The Protestants still controlled the gabelle and profits from the ecclesiastical assets according to Joyeuse. 71 Given these numerous issues, he requested that the king intervene.

When compared to the instructions, Convertis was to outline these issues in more detail. The Protestant image of Joyeuse, only mentioned in the original letter, is described in depth in the instructions, referring to him as ‘a tyrant, thief, and murderer’ who is hated by

65 Ibid. ‘de remettre les villes qu’ils occupent entre mes mains’.
66 Ibid, 669–70. ‘n’ayant jamais rien tant désiré que le bien et augmentation de vostre estat, et repos de vos pauvres sujets’.
67 Ibid, 670. ‘témoignage’.
68 Ibid. ‘zèle et fidélité que j’ay eus à vostre service’.
69 Ibid. ‘les tailles par eux imposées’.
71 Ibid, 671.
the people. The porteur was to point to the falseness of this picture. Joyeuse’s concern for the king’s subjects was particularly illustrated, who are portrayed as being oppressed by the Protestants. Convertis was to tell Charles IX that Caylus had told Crussol and the Protestants of the royal will that they should hand over the towns under their control to Joyeuse, and to empty the garrisons, but that they had refused this command. Crussol is depicted as obeying the king’s commands when he desires.

The porteur was to additionally inform the king of the situation at Aiguesmortes and Narbonne, where the ongoing warring of the Protestants required extra troops, as mentioned by Montmorency. The Reformed activity was considerably more thorough in Convertis’s instructions, and Protestant misconduct was contrasted with Joyeuse’s eagerness to hear the king’s orders. Convertis’s role as porteur was to expand on points raised in the original letter and promote Joyeuse’s loyalty. He put forward Joyeuse’s concern for the royal subjects and carrying out the king’s will. These porteurs acted as witnesses on behalf of the senders, the next best thing to the sender’s physical presence.

A short time after, Crussol and Joyeuse finally commenced peace negotiations. These discussions were not conclusive and led to further attempts by both parties to discredit the other before the crown. Crussol had clearly not forgotten Joyeuse’s treatment of his lands during the war. He first sent Coucault to Joyeuse with a list of places where both he and Joyeuse could dismiss troops and empty garrisons, in the Catholic- or Protestant-controlled towns respectively. This list illustrated the scattered nature of Protestant and Catholic

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72 BNF, fr. 15881, fol. 433r, ‘Instructions au seigneur de convertis pour les affaires de monseigneur le vicomte de Joyeuse lieutenant general pour le Roy en languedoc’. ‘ung tiran un pillard et un murt[ier [sic]].’

73 As Crussol did later hand over control of the towns to Caylus and Vieilleville, he evidently did not think of offering to hand over the towns to Caylus at this stage, or perhaps Caylus first required royal permission to receive these towns.

74 Ibid, fol. 433v.

control in Languedoc. One example is while Béziers, Agde, and Bédarieux were noted as being Protestant, there were Catholic forts around these places.

Following this, Crussol sent Odet de Châtillon with his conditions for peace. Crussol queried Joyeuse’s efforts towards peace, and questioned whether Joyeuse had control over those who called themselves ‘lieutenant of the king’, to see the edict enforced, and the king’s subjects put back in their assets. Crussol would ‘put down these arms and empty all the garrisons of the towns and places of the province which he commands under the authority and good pleasure of the king’, on the same day that Joyeuse did likewise. As a result, Crussol could hand over the towns he controlled to Vieillerville, the province having been pacified. He evidently did not wish to hand over control of Languedoc to Joyeuse under any circumstances. He had removed all his forces in the province, only retaining what was necessary to guard places so that they may not be ‘surprised, forced, plundered and sacked’, similar to Joyeuse’s own claims. Crussol had published the peace everywhere, and ‘guards it very strictly’. As the edict required there to be a Protestant place of worship in a designated town in each sénéchaussée, he asked Joyeuse to assign these towns.

Crussol proposed that they arrange a specific day to restore assets and positions to the Protestants and Catholics, and to free those imprisoned due to these troubles or their religious convictions. Following the royal command, he suggested assuring the Languedoc

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76 BNF, fr. 15875, fols 509v-510r, ‘Memoire à coucault po[u]r le faict du Licentiement des Soldatz et garnisons tant de la part de Mons[ieu]r le Comte de Crussol que Mons[ieu]r de Joyeuse’. This list is also reproduced in ‘Premiers articles envoyez à M. de Joyeuse par le sieur de Coucault’, in HL, xii, 677–79.


80 Ibid. ‘surprises forcées vollées et saccagées’, ‘le faict garder tresestroictement’.

81 Ibid, fol. 510r-v.

82 Ibid, fol. 510v.
inhabitants that they could restart commercial enterprises. Crussol promised to follow Joyeuse’s example in applying these suggestions to enforce the peace edict. In this document, Crussol mentioned three times that if Joyeuse was not obeyed by his lieutenants in implementing the peace, or obeyed in every bailliage in assigning a town for Reformed worship, or able to free all those imprisoned, then Crussol would alert the king. This was surely a jab at Joyeuse’s authority.

Joyeuse’s reply emphasised the distance in viewpoints between the two nobles. He outlined his desire to see ‘the execution and complete fulfilment of the will of his majesty’, the edict published in Languedoc, and ‘the rest and tranquillity of his [the king’s] subjects with the obedience that they owe to him’. Responding to Crussol’s query over his lieutenants, Joyeuse remarked that individuals such as these were certainly obeyed in Languedoc, and that he would write to the lieutenants-particuliers to strictly apply the king’s commands, although these had been enforced anyway.

Joyeuse had already dismissed most of his troops, and would have continued troop reduction had he not heard that the Montpellier estates had decided to maintain two thousand infantry and four cavalry companies, while there were also five or six thousand soldiers near Avignon, ‘who hold this province in great suffering and fear’. He asserted that the Protestants continued to take the Catholic ecclésiastiques’ assets, destroying their temples and houses since the edict’s publication. Joyeuse made clear that, without a new royal command, he could not disarm entirely until Crussol dismissed his troops and resolved

83 Ibid, fols 510v-511r.
84 Ibid, fol. 510r-v.
86 BNF, fr. 15875, fol. 511r, ‘Responce du sieur de Joyeuse sur les articles precedens, 27 May 1563’.
87 Ibid. ‘qui tiennent ced[ict] pays en grand payne et soupçon’. These soldiers near Avignon are mentioned in more detail further on in this chapter.
the aforementioned issues, ‘to not place the good and loyal subjects of his majesty in despair’. When Crussol wished to send nobles into each sénéchaussée, he would do the same, to see the edict fulfilled everywhere.

There was clearly a disconnect between the intentions of Joyeuse and Crussol, particularly concerning the handover of towns. This document outlined that when all the towns, castles, and fortresses are as they were before the war, ‘in the hands of the sieur de Joyeuse’ and the soldiers dismissed, Joyeuse would ensure that everyone lives peacefully in the province.88 Joyeuse saw himself as the legitimate royal commander in the province, and insisted on taking control of the towns. Concerning Crussol’s request that Joyeuse establish a town in each sénéchaussée for Protestant worship to take place, he outlined that he had not received a royal command about this.89 He would also give orders that everyone could buy and sell goods freely, and stated that when the Protestants sent him a list of those held as prisoners, he would procure their freedom.

In response to Joyeuse, Crussol sent a formal document called a protestation, publicly signalling his discontent. This protestation was drawn up in the presence of witnesses and read aloud.90 He declared Joyeuse’s disloyalty to the king’s will and defended his own conduct. This document asserted that Crussol, ‘immediately after having received a command of the king and queen through the sieur de Coucault’, had prepared a list to dismiss soldiers and empty garrisons in places he commanded ‘under the authority and good

89 Ibid, fol. 511v. In addition, Joyeuse suggested that the Protestants bring the matter before the king.
pleasure of his majesty’ in Languedoc. He sent this list via Coucault to Joyeuse, so that they could simultaneously disarm and pacify the province.

As Joyeuse did not take account of Crussol’s action, he wrote up the aforementioned set of articles, given to him in Coucault’s presence. Crussol outlined that Joyeuse had sent a confused and ambiguous response, as if he did not wish to enact the edict. He made clear his desire to give the Protestant-controlled places to Vieilleville instead of Joyeuse, following the royal command he had received, certified by Coucault. While there is no surviving record of this order, its mention in the protestation points to its validity. Crussol remarked that his conditions all conformed to the edict’s articles. He refused to take responsibility for the edict not being entirely observed, and the king obeyed.

Crussol protested against Joyeuse’s conduct, outlining ‘the disobedience to his majesty, delay of his [the king’s] service; injury, mistreatment, and oppression of his subjects; violation of the edict; perturbing of the repos public; and other infinite evils and difficulties’ that occur. If Joyeuse responded clearly and wished to obey the king’s command, to lay down arms, empty the garrisons, and obey the edict, then Crussol would do the same. Joyeuse sent a further response clarifying his position, and although a letter to Châtillon referred to an agreement being made, these negotiations were not completely successful, as shown by Crussol’s complaints regarding Joyeuse in the following month.

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92 Ibid, fols 511v-512r.
93 Ibid, fol. 512r.
94 Ibid. ‘la desobeissance à sa magesté [sic] retardement de son service moleste folle [sic] et oppression de ses subjectz Infraction dud[ict] edict troublement du repoz public et aultres Infinis maux et Inconvèniens’.
95 BNF, fr. 3182, fols 15r-16r, ‘Mémoire de Guillaume de Joyeuse sur les affaires du Languedoc, 30 May 1563’; fols 17r-18v, ‘Letter of Guillaume de Joyeuse to Odet de Châtillon, 30 May 1563’. The issue over the handover of the Protestant towns is notably absent in Joyeuse’s mémoire, although he did clarify that he had freed some prisoners.
Concerning Comtat-Venaissin and Provence, a letter to Condé sheds significant light both on Crussol’s motives in the disarmament process and his general religious convictions.\textsuperscript{96} In an earlier despatch sent from Condé, Crussol was asked to return the towns that he held in the comté of Avignon (Comtat-Venaissin) to the papal ministers.\textsuperscript{97} Crussol outlined to Condé why the towns could not be handed over. He argued that the article permitting the Protestants to have ‘free exercise’ of their religion was not being observed, and thought it was necessary to enter the region and impose the edict.\textsuperscript{98} He hoped that Condé did not intend that he ‘may be denied reimbursement of expenses that of my own money I made, as much for the reparations, food, and supplies of war as [for] the garrisons and other necessary things, for the defence and preservation of these places since I held them’.\textsuperscript{99} Crussol pointed to his numerous expenses in these papal territories. In addition, he stressed, ‘I have neither affection nor duty’ to the pope, asserting too that the pope was no friend to Condé.\textsuperscript{100} His own relationship with the pope appeared again in a later conversation with the papal nuncio Prosper de Sainte-Croix. Inhabitants of the region had also made requests to Crussol, as people had been murdered and houses burned.

Obeying the letter, Crussol had negotiated with the vice-legate and Serbeloni, offering to give back the towns if they allowed free exercise of Protestantism and reimbursed him for his expenses in guarding these places.\textsuperscript{101} Firmly rejecting Crussol’s offer, which was

\textsuperscript{96} BNF, fr. 15879, fol. 257r-v, ‘Letter of Antoine de Crussol to [Louis de Condé], 5 May 1563’.
\textsuperscript{97} Ibid, fol. 257r; Granget, \textit{Histoire du diocèse d’Avignon}, ii, 121; Le Père Justin, \textit{Histoire des guerres excitées}, 182. Condé had sent the comte de Vaux with a letter for Crussol, and it seems that Vaux was Condé’s representative to see these towns handed over. The Avignon vice-legate had earlier requested the monarchy that the Protestant-held towns in Comtat-Venaissin be given back, to which the king had agreed (Henry Layard, ed., ‘Letter of Marc-Antonio Barbaro to the Doge of Venice, 12 April 1563’, in \textit{Despatches of Michele Suriano and Marc’ Antonio Barbaro}, 87).
\textsuperscript{98} BNF, fr. 15879, fol. 257r, ‘Letter of Antoine de Crussol to [Louis de Condé], 5 May 1563’. ‘libre exercice’.
\textsuperscript{99} Ibid. ‘sois frustré du remboursement des frais que de mes propres deniers J’ay faictz tant po[u]r les reparations vivres munitions de guerre que garnisons et autres choses necessaires po[u]r la defence et conservation desd[ict]es places depuis q[ue] Je les ay tenues’.
\textsuperscript{100} Ibid, fol. 257r-v. ‘Je n’ay ny affection ny debvoir’.
\textsuperscript{101} Ibid, fol. 257r.
not favourable to Avignon, they asserted that they would rather see the region destroyed than suffer Protestantism there.

Crussol asked Condé not to find it wrong that he, fearing this new danger, held a firm position due to three reasons; ‘the glory of God’, the money he was owed, and ‘the cruelty employed against one of my brothers by the soldiers of the pope who having captured him and recognised him for my brother, killed him in cold blood and having interred him, unburied him to drag him through the ways and streets of Orange’. Due to this ‘cruel and infamous’ act, he wrote that before there was peace, ‘I will hope in brief with the aid of my bons amis to have a very good revenge’. This letter provides an increased understanding of Crussol’s religious convictions, indicating his dislike for the pope, certainly linked to the death of his brother, and his desire to have revenge. Crussol had now refused to hand over Protestant-controlled towns in both Languedoc and Comtat-Venaissin.

There was still considerable war activity in Comtat-Venaissin. At the start of May, it was reported that Crussol had seized several places near Avignon. However, while the Protestants certainly captured a number of places and levied soldiers, Crussol did not seem to be in the province. The Catholic estates of the region, meeting mid-May, sent representatives to Crussol and François d’Agoult, the comte de Sault, to prevent further Protestant incursions. Underlining the ruin of the province, they asked that the Protestant

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103 Ibid. ‘infame et cruel’, ‘j’espererons [sic] bien en brief avec l’ayde de mes bons amys en avoir tresbonne revencihe’.
troops retire to their houses. However, only a suspension of arms for several days was obtained, after which hostilities recommenced.\textsuperscript{107} Despite their pleas for peace, these estates requested more troops, which came from Honorat de Savoie, the \textit{comte} de Sommerive, and Serbeloni.\textsuperscript{108} Crussol’s demands to Avignon were voiced at court by the vice-legate’s representative at the end of May, who additionally remarked that Crussol was destroying Catholic churches and planning to seize further places.\textsuperscript{109}

The main issue in Comtat-Venaissin concerned the presence of numerous Protestant soldiers there. These were Provençal soldiers coming from Lyon.\textsuperscript{110} As their return to Provence was blocked by Serbeloni, they stayed in Comtat-Venaissin, in the town of Mornas and the surrounding area.\textsuperscript{111} These troops did not wish to disarm, given the hostility in Provence towards Protestants.\textsuperscript{112} The \textit{parlement} at Aix had decreed at the end of March that Protestantism was to be banned, Catholic soldiers would remain armed, and that the Protestant officials and leaders who had fled would not be received back into the province.\textsuperscript{113}

On 31 May, Crussol issued a declaration concerning these troops.\textsuperscript{114} He proclaimed that he had taken his leadership role in Dauphiné ‘under the good pleasure of the king, for the nobility and people of the province of Dauphiné, to help them in their defence against the unjust violence and oppression, massacres, sackings, and pillaging that many seditious people’ attempted to carry out in the region, and to protect the province from foreign

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{107}{BA, Ms. 2773, fol. 107r, ‘Discours des guerres de la comté de Venayssin et de la Prouvence...’; Fornery, \textit{Histoire du Comté Venaissin et de la ville d’Avignon} [1909], ii, 73.}
\footnotetext{108}{Fornery, \textit{Histoire du Comté Venaissin et de la ville d’Avignon} [1909], p. 73-74.}
\footnotetext{110}{\textit{Histoire ecclésiastique}, iii, 277–78, 396–406; Nicolas Regnault, \textit{Discours véritable des guerres et troubles avenus au pays de Provence} (Lyon, 1564), xiii. These soldiers had fled Provence in 1562.}
\footnotetext{111}{\textit{HL}, xi, 446. This episode is also recounted in Le Père Justin, \textit{Histoire des guerres excitées}, 186–87; Lambert, \textit{Histoire des guerres de religion en Provence} (1530-1598), i, 198.}
\footnotetext{112}{BNF, fr. 20783, fol. 153r, ‘Discours des choses advenues en la ville de Lyon Pendant que Monsieur de Soubize y a Commandé », 1562-1563’.
\footnotetext{113}{\textit{Histoire ecclésiastique}, iii, 465.}
\footnotetext{114}{BNF, fr. 15878, fols 26r-30v, ‘Actes de decla[rt]ion faicte par monseig[neur] le co[m]te de crusol aux cap[pittai]nes estant au co[m]tat de venisse et reponse desd[icts] cappittaines, 31 May-10 June 1563’.}
\end{footnotes}
troops.\footnote{Ibid, fol. 26r. `soubz le bon plaisir du roy Pour la Noblesse et peuple du pays de daulphiné de les ayder en leurs defeences Contres [sic] les Injustes violances et oppressions massacres saccagementz et pilheriez que plusieurs seditieux`.} This had entailed fighting in Comtat-Venaissin, as shown earlier. However, when Coucault informed him of the royal will, Crussol ordered the military captains in the Comtat ‘to cease all operations and withdraw the artillery’.\footnote{Ibid. ‘cesser toutes entreprinses et retirer l’artilherie’.} He claimed that he was not in command of these Provençal troops.\footnote{Ibid, fol. 26v. `Je desir et affection qu’avons À luy obeyr et satisfaire en toutes choses À ses commandementz`, ‘Nous n’entendons ne voulons plus no[u]z mesler du faict et affaires dudict Comtat et Nous en descharg[eons] entierement et plainement’.} In order that Catherine might know ‘the desire and affection that [we] have to obey her and satisfy, in all things, her commands’, he emphasised that ‘we do not intend nor wish to involve ourselves anymore in the matters and affairs of the Comtat and we relieve ourselves of this charge entirely and completely’.\footnote{‘Letter of Catherine de Médicis to Monsieur l’evesque de Lymoges, 3 April 1563’, in \textit{LCM}, X, 98n.} Crussol asked the Provençal captains to undertake no further hostile actions or contravene any royal orders. The declaration was drawn up in the presence of Joyeuse’s envoy Chefdebien, \textit{conseiller} of the king and \textit{général de ses finances} in Languedoc, to show Crussol’s sincerity.

In the province of Dauphiné itself, there was an ongoing royal concern about the Protestants. Although the monarchy had told all commanders to disarm at the start of the month, Catherine ordered Maugiron in mid-May not to disarm until Valence and other towns in Dauphiné had laid down arms.\footnote{AML, EE 103, No. 5, fol. 1r, `Letter of Antoine de Crussol to Laurent de Maugiron, 11 May 1563`.} Given that Maugiron had dismissed most of his troops, Catherine referred to the remainder that was left. Crussol himself detailed the measures he had taken for peace in a letter to Maugiron at the start of May, contrasting these with Maugiron’s actions. He promised to deal with cases of Protestant misconduct, had written to certain communities to see the edict enforced, and had dismissed many companies.\footnote{Ibid. `l’establissem[en]t de q[ue]lq[ue] bonne paciffication`.} Crussol wanted to see ‘the establishment of some good peace’ and obedience to the royal commands, wishing to discharge the province from the damage caused during the conflict.\footnote{Ibid. `l’establissem[en]t de q[ue]lq[ue] bonne pacification`.
The sieur de Boucart, Condé’s envoy seen earlier at the Montpellier estates, was also sent to execute the edict.\textsuperscript{122} The Protestants were slow to trust the peace in Dauphiné, although Boucart assured them of the edict being observed.\textsuperscript{123}

Crussol outlined that while he was discharging the province of military companies on one side, Maugiron’s troops were pillaging the other, ‘under your commission which I find more strange’, and which made him doubt Maugiron’s promises.\textsuperscript{124} He commented that while he had dismissed troops near Romans, Maugiron still maintained a company under the command of François de la Baume, the comte de Suze, who pillaged the surrounding towns. Crussol urged Maugiron to make clear that he did indeed desire peace. Catherine herself had earlier mentioned her desire for Maugiron to disband Suze’s troops.\textsuperscript{125}

In another letter to Maugiron, written the following day, Crussol again stressed his wish to see the edict enforced. Maugiron had written to the town of Gap to warn them of meetings held against them by the Valence consistory.\textsuperscript{126} Crussol dismissed this report, referring to the Protestants as ‘those of our religion’, which further uncovers his own religious affiliations during this time.\textsuperscript{127} Concerning the ‘wrong’ done by a Protestant commander named Pierre de Theys La Coche to dismissed troops of Maugiron, he commented that he was ‘very frustrated about this’, and promised to find out what had happened.\textsuperscript{128} Crussol did not want the peace violated by ‘those who are under my charge’.\textsuperscript{129}

\textsuperscript{122} BNF, fr. 20783, fol. 149r-v, ‘Discours des choses advenues en la ville de Lyon Pendant que Monsieur de Soubize y a Commandé », 1562-1563’.
\textsuperscript{123} Histoire ecclesiastique, iii, 376–77.
\textsuperscript{125} ‘Letter of Catherine de Médicis to monsieur de Maugiron, 30 April 1563’, in LCM, X, 99.
\textsuperscript{126} AML, EE 103, No. 5, fol. 1r-v, ‘Letter of Antoine de Crussol to Laurent de Maugiron, 12 May 1563’.
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid, fol. 1v. ‘ceux de n[otre] religion’.
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid, fol. 1v; Chorier, Histoire générale du Dauphiné, ii, 581. ‘tort’, ‘j’en suis bien marry’. La Coche (the governor of Grenoble for a time) seemed nonetheless to cause further trouble (‘Letter of Catherine de Médicis to monsieur de Maugiron, 13 August 1563’, in LCM, ii, 83).
\textsuperscript{129} AML, EE 103, No. 5, fol. 1v, ‘Letter of Antoine de Crussol to Laurent de Maugiron, 12 May 1563’. ‘ceux qui sont soubz ma charge’.
It was difficult to persuade the Protestants and the Catholics to lay down arms, with Catholics levying new troops and both sides mistreating the other.\textsuperscript{130} Crussol emphasised that there was much occasion to distrust Maugiron’s actions, mentioning that dismissed Catholic companies only regrouped and committed further hostilities.\textsuperscript{131} He commented that if Maugiron did not try combat their designs, ‘I will not be able to believe that you may be such a lover of the peace’.\textsuperscript{132} In both these letters, he asked Maugiron to work faithfully towards the peace, being suspicious of his actions.

In a letter to Maugiron on 27 May, Crussol underscored his desire to see the royal will carried out, and as ‘the affairs here [were] accommodated with monsieur de Joyeuse’, he would go into Dauphiné to do likewise.\textsuperscript{133} There was still tension in Dauphiné. The Protestant leader Jacques Rambaud, the 	extit{seigneur} de Furmeyer, had disarmed on Crussol’s command, but later informed him that Maugiron’s troops would not immediately disband. Crussol reiterated to Maugiron that he would not allow his forces to be responsible for continuing the hostilities. He wished that Maugiron’s troops would have such good conduct that there would be no reason to question his sincerity. He expressed his contentment with Maugiron’s decision concerning Suze’s company, Maugiron presumably having dismissed these troops.

Crussol also requested John Calvin to endorse the edict. He wished for Calvin to tell Condé of his support for the peace, so that the Protestants would roundly accept it. Calvin was unwilling to do so, and asked Crussol to ‘forgive me if I have not followed the way that you wanted very much’.\textsuperscript{134} This letter indicates Crussol’s backing of the edict, before he

\textsuperscript{130} Ibid, fols 1v-2r.
\textsuperscript{131} Ibid, fols 2r.
\textsuperscript{132} Ibid. ‘Je ne pourray croyre q[u]e vo[u]z soiez [sic] tant amate[ur] de la paix’.
\textsuperscript{133} AML, EE 103, No. 7, fol. 1r, ‘Letter of Antoine de Crussol to Laurent de Maugiron, 27 May 1563’. ‘les affaires accommodez deca [sic] avec Monsieur de Joyeuse’.
\textsuperscript{134} ‘Calvin à [Antoine de] Crussol, 7 May 1563’, in \textit{Calvini opera}, xx, 8. Calvin’s criticism of the edict is also remarked in Daussy, \textit{Le parti huguenot}, 482. Calvin expressed his dissatisfaction with the edict to Condé himself too. ‘pardonnez moi si ie n’ay pas suyvy le stile que vous eussiez bien voulu’.
advocated for its acceptance at Montpellier. Calvin also urged him to spare nothing in God’s service, as ‘God gave you this honour in placing you as an example and mirror’.\textsuperscript{135} Crussol’s conduct was important in dissuading the Protestants from continuing to fight, and to instead accept the peace. In a letter to Soubise on 25 May, who was unsure about whether to continue fighting, Calvin discussed Soubise’s dissatisfaction with the edict’s conditions.\textsuperscript{136} He discouraged Soubise from this route and advised him to write to Crussol and Châtillon, given that they had influence in the Lyonnais and the surrounding region, to discover their intentions concerning the edict and disarmament.

The month of May reinforced the drawn-out process of disarmament. Crussol obeyed the royal command to disarm, but on his own terms. He commenced negotiations with Joyeuse and published the edict in Montpellier and Béziers. Crussol and Joyeuse accused the other of disloyalty, and the animosity between them was evident. Joyeuse claimed that Crussol had refused to disarm and detailed the terrible behaviour of the Protestants, while Crussol pointed to Catholic misconduct and his own efforts to disarm soldiers. Peace was eagerly awaited in the Midi, and the consuls of Nîmes sent a request to Crussol asking that another gate be opened in the town, given ‘that it pleased the king, through his edict, to command his subjects to live in peace and rest under his obedience’.\textsuperscript{137} However, despite their expressed desire for peace, the Nîmes Protestants nonetheless demolished a monastery and several Catholic churches in May and over the following months.\textsuperscript{138}

\textsuperscript{135} ‘Calvin à [Antoine de] Crussol, 7 May 1563’, in \textit{Calvini opera}, xx, 8. ‘Dieu vous a faict cest honneur de vous mettre en exemple et miroir’. Although only two letters remain between Calvin and Crussol (the other one mentioned later in the chapter), the correspondence between them seems to have been more extensive than this.


\textsuperscript{137} ADG, E Dépôt 36/127, fol. 314r, ‘Conseil de la ville de Nîmes, 7 May 1563’. ‘Qu’il A pleu Au Roy par son edit Commander À ses subiectz vivre en paix et Repos soubz son obeissan[ce].’

\textsuperscript{138} Ménard, iv, 380.
Crussol was very adept at affirming his loyalty to the crown, using the presence of Coucault to underscore his fidelity. The handover of the Protestant towns was the major point of contention. Crussol wished to give these towns to Vieilleville, with the accordance of the monarchy, while Joyeuse affirmed that Caylus had told Crussol to hand the towns over to him. The crown had presumably changed its order at Crussol’s request.

Hostilities continued in Dauphiné, and Crussol again declared his loyalty and his efforts for peace. His conduct was contrasted with that of Maugiron, whom Crussol accused of maintaining troops, although Crussol’s relationship with him seemed far warmer than his relationship with Joyeuse. Both Maugiron and Joyeuse were not viewed favourably by the Protestants. Comtat-Venaissin was, in addition, far from peaceful. Crussol was at first reluctant to hand over the towns and blamed others for the situation there. He used the declaration at the end of the month to make clear his loyalty to the monarchy and innocence concerning the Provençal troops, while absolving himself of responsibility in Comtat-Venaissin.

June

Several of the principal themes in this chapter are similarly apparent in June. Through his letters informing the monarchy of the peace negotiations, Crussol affirmed his own loyalty to the crown, and heavily criticised the Catholic commanders. His efforts to enforce the peace and obey the crown are clear in this month. In a letter to Catherine on 1 June, Crussol wrote, ‘I thought, Madame, to send you my secretary especially, to make known to you at length all that has happened’, speaking of these efforts.139 His despatch illustrated the useful role of the porteur, and sending his secretary signalled the letter’s importance. This report

139 BNF, fr. 15876, fol. 102r, ‘Letter from Antoine de Crussol to Catherine de Médicis, 1 June 1563’. This letter is also found in ‘Lettre du sieur de Crussol à la reine mère, 1 June 1563’, in HL, xii, 687–90. There are some differences between these, however, as at least one passage is not reproduced from the original. ‘J’ay pensé Madame de vo[u]z despescher ce mien secrétaire exprez pour vo[u]z f[air]e bien au long entendre comme le tout s’est passé’.
was clearly a performance, as Crussol detailed his substantial activity on the king’s behalf, having completed ‘every duty, that things may be maintained according to your will [and] every private emotion disregarded for the good of the service of your majesties’.140 Crussol’s secretary would indicate how, having received these royal letters, he immediately dismissed all soldiers, only retaining some to guard town gates. He would highlight ‘the entire dismissal’ of troops that Crussol offered via Coucault to Joyeuse, outlining the ways that Crussol tried to negotiate with him, while waiting for Vieilleville’s arrival.141 Similar to Joyeuse’s porteur, Crussol’s secretary would summarise these events in more detail than was outlined in the letter.

To emphasise his loyalty, Crussol attached the peace articles sent to Joyeuse, ‘in order that your majesty may see by these the integrity with which I went to execute your commands’. He attached a physical document to present his service on the crown’s behalf, as in November 1562. By Joyeuse’s response, Catherine could see how little Joyeuse and those around him are ‘lovers of the obedience of your commands, rest and tranquillity of your subjects’.142 Crussol mentioned that he was going to Dauphiné to confer with Maugiron, obeying the royal order, where thankfully most matters had been resolved. Crussol had told Maugiron of his intention the previous day and hoped that their meeting would aid ‘the peace of the province’.143

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141 Ibid. ‘licentieusement entier’.
143 AML, AA 36, No. 59, fol. 1r, ‘Letter of Antoine de Crussol to Laurent de Maugiron, 31 May 1563’. According to a correspondent of Maugiron’s at the start of June, Crussol would arrive soon in Valence, to arrange meeting Maugiron and to discuss how to bring an end to the troubles (ADI, 1 J 1451, No. 1, ‘Letter of San Marc to Laurent de Maugiron, 5 June 1563’). ‘le repoz du pays’.
Concerning the sum of 200,000 livres that Charles and Catherine asked Crussol to give to Malras, Crussol had informed them how to recover this money, but now made clear that he was no longer able to recover this sum. This was due to several reasons, such as inhabitants not wishing to pay due to the behaviour of Joyeuse. This example shows Crussol again publicly criticising Joyeuse’s conduct. Regarding the gabelle revenue, if Malras had come as Crussol had asked him, the monarchy would have had a great sum. Crussol cleared himself of blame for this incident. Concerning the handover of towns in Comtat-Venaissin, he mentioned that his secretary would highlight ‘the indignities of which, by the ministers of the pope, in this place I was irritated’, such as the death of his brother and the expenses he paid out. His secretary would have therefore detailed these events, maintaining the legitimacy of his position, before stating that, ‘all this disregarded for your will’, Crussol had removed his troops and was no longer involved in the region. He absolved himself of authority there, and had avoided handing over the towns. Crussol’s performance of loyalty included an important part played by his secretary, who asserted his fidelity to the crown.

Crussol wished to voluntarily hand over command to Vieilleville, to show that ‘ambition or any other greed did not move me to take [this charge], or to retain it until now, but only the good of your service and command’. Afterwards, he wanted to ‘kiss the hands of your majesties’, and to inform them of his actions both during the war, and in Provence in 1562, referring to his mission in the Midi. He wished to justify his conduct, and hoped that:

if I was so driven by desire, since my absence from your majesty, that all my actions have not ceased to be slanderous towards you, I will make such a good proof of the

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144 BNF, fr. 15876, fol. 102r, ‘Letter from Antoine de Crussol to Catherine de Médicis, 1 June 1563’.
145 Ibid, fol. 102r-v.
146 Ibid, fol. 102v. ‘les Indignitéz dont par les ministers du pape en yceluy J’ay esté agassé’.
147 Ibid. ‘tout cela post posé à v[ot]re volunté’, ‘ambition ou autre aulcune cupidité ne m’a meu à la prendre Ou Jusques ycy la retenir mais le seul bien de v[ot]re service et commandement’.
148 He was evidently unable to do this when he originally returned to the court.
sincerity in which I have walked in these [events], that the king and you, on the contrary, will know to not have had a more faithful subject and devoted serviteur.\textsuperscript{149}

Crussol received a letter from the queen-mother on 2 June, before his letter would have arrived, in which she pointed to Joyeuse’s complaints.\textsuperscript{150} Catherine sent two other letters on 1 and 3 June, which have not survived. In one of these, Catherine reiterated the command to cease hostilities and hand over the Protestant-held towns in the Comtat.\textsuperscript{151} In her letter of 2 June, Catherine wrote that Vieilleville was starting his mission, going first to Lyon and Dauphiné.\textsuperscript{152} He arrived in Lyon on 5 June, spending one month there, before entering Dauphiné in July.\textsuperscript{153}

Catherine had heard complaints from Catholics chased from the Protestant-controlled towns, and had been notified (by Joyeuse) that revenue from a taille ‘that you have at the last estates imposed on the province’ had been collected, while funds from ecclesiastical benefices were still being accumulated.\textsuperscript{154} She asserted that with the outcome of the peace, neither Crussol nor the Protestants had the right ‘to touch the money of the king’.\textsuperscript{155} If a taille had been levied, this money should be given to the receveurs-généraux.\textsuperscript{156} In addition, she raised another complaint, that people had still not had their assets returned,

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{149} Ibid. ‘baiser les mains de voz ma[jes]téd’, ‘sy J’ay esté tant pourchassé d’envyes puis mon absence de v[o]t[e]re Ma[jes]té que toutes mes actions n’ayent cessé d’estre calomniées envers vo[u]z Je feray sy bonne preuve de la sincerité que J’ay en Icelles cheminé que le Roy et vous au contraire connoistrez n’avoir point heu de plus fidelle subject et devot serviteur’.\footnote{150} Apart from this letter, further information is also provided in BNF, fr. 15881, fols 296r-299v, ‘Instruction au s[ieu]r cornelo de fiesque sen allant en lyonnoys et languedoc [June 1563?]’. It was Cornelio de Fiesque who brought a number of letters to Crussol.\footnote{151} Henry Layard, ed., ‘Letter of Marc-Antonio Barbaro to the Doge of Venice, 4 June 1563’, in Despatches of Michele Suriano and Marc’ Antonio Barbaro, 97, cxxii–cxxiii. \footnote{152} ‘Letter of Catherine de Médicis to Antoine de Crussol, 2 June 1563’, in LCM, II, 50. \footnote{153} BNF, fr. 15878, fol. 60r, ‘Letter of Antoine de Crussol to Catherine de Médicis, 25 June 1563’; Roman, ‘Documents sur la Réforme et les Guerres de Religion en Dauphiné’, 134n. Robert Knecht incorrectly gives the date of Vieilleville’s arrival at Lyon as being 15 June 1563 (Knecht, The French Civil Wars, 1562-1598, 123). \footnote{154} ‘Letter of Catherine de Médicis to Antoine de Crussol, 2 June 1563’, in LCM, II, 51. ‘que vous avez aux derniers Estatz imposée sur le pays’. \footnote{155} Ibid. ‘toucher aux deniers du Roy’. \footnote{156} This command is also mentioned in BNF, fr. 15878, 13r-14v.
\end{footnotes}
and would be impeded in bringing in the harvest on their lands. Catherine asked Crussol for the truth of all these issues.\(^{157}\) She had been informed that while the Catholics had been disarmed, the Protestant-controlled places in Languedoc were reinforced daily. The queen-mother asked Crussol ‘to give order to and watch over this, and to satisfy what you know to be for the rest of the poor people, for the good of his [the king’s] service, and for my contentment’.\(^{158}\)

In response, Crussol sent a long letter on 25 June.\(^{159}\) He stated that he had sent a noble to Vieilleville in Lyon, to enquire when Vieilleville would arrive in Languedoc, Crussol indicating his desire to obey the royal commands.\(^{160}\) Languedoc representatives were also ready to start discussions with Vieilleville, although he never arrived in the region.\(^{161}\) Crussol defended his loyalty against the complaints raised. He assured Catherine that the Protestants were not chasing Catholics from towns or going to seize the harvest.\(^{162}\) He had agreed to each request to have assets restored. He mentioned, conversely, that the Catholic towns refused to restore Protestant assets, while in places such as Toulouse, people were forced to make a Catholic confession of faith.

He reiterated his attempts to make peace with Joyeuse. Making clear that Joyeuse’s response did not seem ‘according to your intention’, it was Joyeuse’s fault that disarmament had not occurred, as Crussol desired ‘nothing so much than to be discharged of all these

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\(^{158}\) Ibid, 52. ‘d’y donner ordre et regarder en cela et de satisfaire à ce que vous congoistrez [sic] estre pour le repos du pauvre peuple, pour le bien de son service et pour mon contentement’.

\(^{159}\) BNF, fr. 15878, fols 60r–61v, ‘Letter of Antoine de Crussol to Catherine de Médicis, 25 June 1563’. Part of this letter is also found (incorrectly dated) in Roman, ‘Documents sur la Réforme et les Guerres de Religion en Dauphiné’, 134–35.

\(^{160}\) BNF, fr. 15878, fol. 60r, ‘Letter of Antoine de Crussol to Catherine de Médicis, 25 June 1563’.

\(^{161}\) ADH, 1 B22803, ‘Mandement de mess[ieu]rs de c[on]seil faict a mess[ieu]rs de s[a|nc]t veran et autres, 20 June 1563’. Crussol also asked the Vivarais états, via Antoine de Solier, to provide an état de finances to give to Vieilleville when he arrived (ADA, C 1649, No. 1, fol. 20r, ‘Délibérations des États du Vivarais, 21 June 1563’).

\(^{162}\) BNF, fr. 15878, fol. 60r, ‘Letter of Antoine de Crussol to Catherine de Médicis, 25 June 1563’.
negotiations and to see the *repos public* restored to this province*. He denied Joyeuse’s claim that a *taille* was imposed at the Montpellier estates, arguing that this assembly was instead convoked to hear the king’s commands, which would lead to the royal will being more swiftly satisfied.

Crussol outlined that, some time before, he had mentioned to Chefdebien that he would grant to him the *état* (account) relating to the Protestant financial deputies’ management of affairs. Crussol had said that the Protestant money might not be readily available, and although this matter is difficult to understand, he heavily criticised Chefdebien’s conduct. This matter presumably related to the crown’s ability to collect the Protestant revenue. He similarly denied responsibility for these claimed *tailles*, affirming that the Protestant deputies were directly accountable if they had levied money since the arrival of the edict.

He further claimed that he had never managed the Protestant money, underlining that ‘I only took this charge to defend your subjects, to conserve them and your provinces’ under the obedience of the crown, reiterating his supposed primary motivation for joining the Protestants. Crussol argued that Joyeuse could not protect the provinces and wanted instead to maintain the troubles in Languedoc. He contrasted Joyeuse’s disloyalty with his own desire that Vieilleville might arrive to find the province at peace. Crussol had mentioned to Caylus that he would hand the towns over to him instead of Vieilleville if he arrived sooner. Crussol had retained some forces to prevent ‘your subjects put in despair for fear of being murdered and pillaged, as those of the Roman religion threaten them every day’. In

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163 Ibid. ‘sellon v[ot]re Intention’, ‘Je ne desire rien tant que d’estre dischargé de tous ses negoces Et veoir le repoz publicq remys audict pays’.
164 Ibid, fol. 60v. ‘seullement J’ay prins ceste charge pour defendre voz subiectz conserver eulx et voz pays’.
165 Ibid. ‘voz subiects mis en desespoir pour craince d’estre murtris [sic] et pillés Comme ceulx dela Relligion romaine les menassent tous les Jours’.
referring to ‘those of the Roman religion’, he was clearly separating himself from the Catholics.

Concerning Comtat-Venaissin, Crussol asserted that he had for a long time commanded the captains there not to undertake any military actions, ‘as Coucault will be able to testify to you’, underlining the importance of Coucault’s testimony in judging his truthfulness. To make proof of his sincerity and loyalty, he mentioned that he had declared through a notarial act (a protestation, which he also attached), that he did not wish to be involved in the region, asking the captains and provençaux to cease their actions.

Responding to evident complaints from Avignon, Crussol detailed the poor conduct of Serbeloni and the vice-legate, in declaring that ‘however, God knows how your subjects of these places and the neighbouring places are treated by them and their soldiers’. Crussol reiterated his desire to avoid having any role in religious matters, as the monarchy had asked him to grant a Protestant place of worship outside Orange. He wrote, ‘I cannot involve myself in matters of this [Reformed] religion for many good reasons’. The crown evidently considered that Crussol, similar to his previous royal missions, would be able to grant a place of worship to the Protestants without any difficulties. It is curious that Crussol again did not wish to become involved in these matters and rejected this royal request. He perhaps viewed his position for the Protestants as being solely a military role.

Crussol also attested to the obedience of the Protestants, stressing ‘the good will that I know [is] in your subjects of the Reformed religion, to render themselves more and

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166 Ibid. Serbeloni later defended his behaviour towards Protestants returning to the province before the king’s conseil privé during the royal tour (BNF, fr. 18156, fol. 87r, ‘Meeting of the conseil privé, 31 August 1564’). This event is also mentioned in Noël Valois, Le conseil du roi aux XIVe, XVe et XVIe siècles: nouvelles recherches, suivies d’arrêt et de procès-verbaux du Conseil [1888], Reprint (Geneva, 1975), 351–52). ‘comme coucault vous pourra tesmoigner’, ‘Dieu scaict comme cependant voz subiectz de [ces] lieux et les circonvoisins sont par euxx et leurs soldatz traictés’.

more obedient to your majesties’. He notably does not refer to French Protestantism as ‘la religion nouvelle’, which seems to indicate his Protestant sympathies, although it would have been peculiar to refer to the Protestants by a derogatory title while still being their commander. Crussol wished ‘to go before you to speak of my actions and to tell you, Madame, that the affairs occurred differently to what one makes known to you, and that what one says to you of me are pure deceptions and slanders’. He wanted to dispel rumours of his conduct in person, which would have been more convincing than both a letter and Coucault’s testimony.

Crussol maintained several times that he had disbanded troops in Languedoc and Dauphiné, which is supported by financial records. He discharged soldiers in May and June. In the Vigan region of Languedoc, a military garrison was paid for one month, ‘following the reduction of the gendarmerie of Languedoc carried out by this comte [de Crussol]’. This dismissal of troops was also seen through the payment of muster rolls in Languedoc, in various towns at the start of June, again noted as being part of the ‘account and reduction of the gendarmerie of Languedoc carried out by the comte de Crussol’. Additionally, troop numbers were cut in Montpellier and the surrounding area. At Romans in Dauphiné, Crussol requested that the governor disband a military company at the start of May.

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168 Ibid. ‘la bonne volonté que Je cognois en voz subiects delad[icte] Relligion Refformee de se rendre de mieulx en mieulx obeissantz à vos Maiestés’.
169 Ibid, fols 60v-61r. ‘de m’en aller devers vous Po[u]r respondez de mes actions Et vous fere conoistre Madame que les affaires sont passés tout aultrement que ce qu’on vous a faict entendre Et que ce qu’on vous a dict de moy sont pures Impostures et calomnies’.
170 ADH, 1 B22803, fol. 1r, ‘Montre de la compagnie du capitaine Sanseux and payment, 29 May 1563’. ‘suyvant la Reduction de la gendarmerie de languedoc faicte par led[jct] s[ieu]r Comte [de Crussol]’.
172 AMR, BB 9, fol. 55v, ‘Conseil de la ville de Romans 3 May 1563’.
Catholic troops formerly under Maugiron’s command were similarly dismissed during this time.174

Security was an ongoing issue in June in Languedoc and Dauphiné. The Vivarais états requested Crussol that Saint-Martin retained soldiers, underlining ‘the great number of adversaries’ against them.175 The town walls of Uzès were another concern and needed repair.176 There was still tension in Dauphiné due to the continued presence of troops, with trouble being caused by Catholic soldiers.177 Towards the end of the month, Crussol ordered the Valence consuls to only have one or two of the town gates open. In response, the consuls additionally decided to form a company of eighty men ‘having the fear of God’ to assist with guarding these gates.178

Although Vieilleville entered Dauphiné at the start of July, his arrival there had been awaited by the Protestants since the beginning of June. The conseil politique had ordered all the villages in the Valentinois region to send an envoy to Valence when he arrived, to render obedience to him and aid the pacification of the province.179 On 19 June, Crussol similarly ordered the Romans consuls to confer with the other towns at Valence, about their meeting with Vieilleville.180 The Protestants decided to request the king that Antoine de Clermont, the comte de Clermont, be lieutenant-général instead of Maugiron, as seen in the previous

174 Ibid, fol. 56r.
175 ADA, C 1649, No. 1, fol. 18r, ‘Délibérations des États du Vivarais, 4-6 June 1563’. ‘l’affluence des adversaires’.
176 AN, 265 AP 57, Dossier 3, No. 155, ‘Request of the consuls of Uzès to Crussol, June 1563’. The need to repair fortifications of Protestant towns was also noted in the earlier political assembly at Bagnols.
177 AMR, BB 9, fol. 69r, ‘Conseil de la ville de Romans 24 May 1563’.
178 AMV, BB 6, fol. 210v, ‘Conseil de la ville de Valence 22 June 1563’. ‘aiantz la craincte de dieu’.
179 Nicolas Danjaume, ‘La ville et la guerre. Valence pendant la première guerre de religion (vers 1560-vers 1563). Tome 1’ (Université Pierre Mendès France (Grenoble II), 2009), 164. For an explanation of the region of Valentinois, see p. 21.
180 AMR, BB 9, fol. 82r, ‘Conseil de la ville de Romans 19 June 1563’.
Representatives from Valence also presented to Vieilleville the town’s obedience to the king and his commands in Lyon, at the end of June. The Provençal troops again caused disruption within Provence and Comtat-Venaissin. Sommerive sent a request to the king, seemingly in May, which was answered by the conseil privé in mid-June. He pointed to a fear in Provence of Protestant groups carrying arms on the frontiers, referring to these Provençal troops, which meant that people were unwilling to lay down weapons. Similar to Joyeuse, Sommerive expressed his desire to dismiss soldiers, but was requested by Avignon to provide troops, as mentioned earlier. This was due to ‘the great need’ Avignon had, ‘having before them the sieur de Crussol with great forces, who never wishes to disband’. In response, the king wrote that when Crussol disarmed, the forces under Serbeloni’s command should be dismissed.

After seeing Crussol’s troops on the Provence frontier, Sommerive had asked him to discharge these soldiers, ‘following the will of the king’. Crussol responded that he did not intend to lay down arms or dismiss companies in the Comtat, as he had not yet given up regional command there. In response, the king desired to hear what Sommerive and Crussol had advised together to pacify Provence. The Provençal Catholics were reluctant to have Protestant preaching take place, and Catherine later urged Sommerive to make sure that the returning Protestants were restored to their assets and the edict was enforced.

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181 Ibid, fol. 83r. In response to the Protestant complaints against Maugiron’s charge, and the request for him to be removed from this position, Catherine had signalled the royal satisfaction with his role in April (‘Letter of Catherine de Médicis to monsieur de Maugiron, 30 April 1563’, in LCM, X, 99).

182 AMV, BB 6, fol. 211r, ‘Conseil de la ville de Valence 1 July 1563’.

183 BNF, fr. 15878, fol. 52r, ‘Memoires au s[ieu]r de vaquieres Qui sen va a la court Pour les affaires du Roy de la part de Monseigneur le conte [sic] de sommerive’.

184 Ibid. ‘le grand besoing’, ‘ayant en teste le s[ieu]r de crussol avec grandz forces qui ne c’est [sic] vollu [sic] Jamais desbander’.

185 Ibid. ‘suyvant la vollonté du Roy’.

186 Ibid, fol. 52v; BNF, fr. 15878, fols 54r-55r, ‘Catherine de Médicis to the comte de Sommerive, 20 June 1563’. This second letter is also found in LCM, ii, 60–62.
Crussol’s declaration, which stated that he was no longer in command in Comtat-Venaissin, had been given to Saint-Auban (whom Crussol had put in charge), on 8 June.\textsuperscript{187} Outlining his execution of Crussol’s commands to protect the Comtat and the king’s subjects, Saint-Auban promised to carry out no further activities and to pursue peace. He wished to stay in the region at the request of fifty three Protestant-controlled walled towns, that he did not want to abandon until he had an express royal command.\textsuperscript{188} These towns had asked the king for protection from Serbeloni and his soldiers.\textsuperscript{189}

Two days later, the Provençal troops sent a request to Crussol. They highlighted their loyalty to the king, as shown by having taken up arms ‘by the express command of monseigneur the comte de Tende’.\textsuperscript{190} Attesting to their faithful conduct regarding the town of Lyon, they had left the town since the edict was published, noting the royal decree that ‘each person withdraw to his house and enjoy the benefit of the peace’.\textsuperscript{191} Arriving at Comtat-Venaissin, which they needed to pass through, their enemies had levied two thousand men ‘to impede their entry’.\textsuperscript{192} They were nonetheless able to enter the region by force, and underlining their desire not to contravene the peace, asked Crussol for provisions.\textsuperscript{193} They had sent a gentilhomme to the same end to Avignon, and awaiting Vieilleville’s arrival, declared that they had never intended to attempt any hostile acts in the Comtat, had they instead been allowed to retreat to their houses.

\textsuperscript{187} BNF, fr. 15878, fol. 27r, ‘Actes de declara[t]ion faicte par monseig[neur] le co[m]te de crusol aux capp[ittai]nes estant au co[m]tat de venisse et reponse desd[icts] cappittaines, 31 May-10 June 1563’.
\textsuperscript{188} Ibid, fol. 27r-v.
\textsuperscript{189} Ibid, fol. 27v.
\textsuperscript{190} Ibid, fol. 28r. ‘Par l’expres Commandement [sic] de Monseigneur le Comte de tende’.
\textsuperscript{191} Ibid. ‘se retirast ung ch[asc]ung en sa maison et jouyst du benefice dela [sic] paix’.
\textsuperscript{192} Ibid, fol. 28r-v. ‘pour Empescher leur entrée’.
\textsuperscript{193} Ibid, fol. 28v.
As both Crussol and Avignon denied their request, the Protestants maintained themselves on papal territory until they could return to Provence.\textsuperscript{194} Their new location was worryingly close to Avignon, as mentioned by Joyeuse, and the Protestants carried out sorties and defeated Catholic troops.\textsuperscript{195} While Crussol had publicly declared that he was no longer involved in the province, hostilities in Comtat-Venaissin continued until September.\textsuperscript{196}

The month of June did not see much progress in disarmament. Crussol was relatively consistent in his behaviour, in wishing to disarm on his own terms, trying to emphasise his loyal actions to the crown, and refusing to give the towns to Joyeuse. It is unclear how much of a role the wider Protestant movement had in Crussol’s decisions as leader during this period in Languedoc and Dauphiné. Crussol rebuffed Joyeuse’s complaints put to him by Catherine and twice indicated his desire to explain his actions before the monarchy. He again pointed to Catholic misconduct and Joyeuse’s disloyalty. The king’s expectation of receiving a substantial sum from the Protestants also vanished during this month, for which Crussol denied any responsibility. Handover of the Protestant-controlled towns in Languedoc and Dauphiné had not yet occurred, as Crussol awaited the arrival of Vieilleville or Caylus to complete this action. Disarmament was certainly underway in these provinces, although the security of the Protestant towns was still an issue due to the Catholic threat. As Crussol did not accuse Joyeuse of maintaining large numbers of troops, like Joyeuse’s claim of Crussol, Joyeuse had presumably disbanded most of his soldiers. While there was continued tension in Dauphiné, the situation there was largely peaceful.

\textsuperscript{194} Lambert, \textit{Histoire des guerres de religion en Provence (1530-1598)}, i, 198; Le Père Justin, \textit{Histoire des guerres excitées}, 187; Fornery, \textit{Histoire du Comté Venaissin et de la ville d’Avignon} [1909], ii, 75. They established themselves at several other towns, given that Mornas was not defensible.

\textsuperscript{195} Lambert, \textit{Histoire des guerres de religion en Provence (1530-1598)}, i, 198. It is not clear whether these other towns were taken before their request to Crussol of 10 June.

\textsuperscript{196} Le Père Justin, \textit{Histoire des guerres excitées}, 203.
In Comtat-Venaissin, Crussol gave up authority instead of following the royal command to hand over the towns. He therefore removed himself from a complicated situation, in which he would have disappointed either the monarchy or the Protestants. Following his resignation, Crussol refused any responsibility for the ongoing conflict. In commanding Saint-Auban to no longer commit hostile acts, he still evidently had political influence in the Comtat. As the troubles continued, there was a significant disconnect between what was said in writing and what happened in practice. Given Crussol’s previous desire to have a ‘very good revenge’, he was presumably not overly concerned with the continued Protestant activity in the region.

July

At the start of July, Crussol relinquished control of the Protestant towns of Languedoc and Dauphiné to Vieilleville and Caylus, on the same day and accompanied by several nobles.  

For Languedoc, Crussol handed over ‘this province into the hands of the maréchal and the sieur de Caylus’ at Valence on 6 July. Handover was carried out with acts of remission being given to the royal representatives. Caylus later mentioned that he possessed ‘the acts of obedience which were rendered to you [Catherine] in the towns that monsieur de Crussol gave me’. Disarmament had not yet completely occurred, and a messenger would be sent

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197 ADH, 1 B22803, fol. 1r, ‘Mandement of Guillaume Arquier to Baron de Portes, Baron d’Alles, and the sieur de Roche-gude, 6 July 1563’.
198 ADH, 1 B22803, fol. 1r, ‘Mandement fait a mons[ieu]r de sainct florens, 6 July 1563’; 1 B22803, ‘Mandement au seigneur de la roviere, 6 July 1563’, 1 B22803, ‘Mandement de Guillaume Arquier to Baron de Portes, Baron d’Alles, and the sieur de Roche-gude, 6 July 1563’; BNF, fr. 3410, fol. 93v, ‘Articles de la religion responduz par le roy... Faict au conseil privé du roy tenu à Fontainebleau, le ille jour de mars 1563 (1564)’. This citation is from the first reference. ‘led[ict] pais es mains du[ict] s[ieu]r mareschal et du s[ieu]r de caylus’.
199 BNF, fr. 15878, fol. 120v, ‘Antoine de Lévis, comte de Caylus to Catherine de Médicis, 29 August 1563 [incorrectly noted as Jacques de Lévis]’. These acts are also mentioned in ADH, 1 B22803, ‘Mandement faict a bernard de laur, 6 July 1563’. ‘les actes de l’obeissan[ce] qui vous à [sic] esté rendue aux villes que Monsieur de Crussol m’a baillées’.
to all garrisons on the Languedoc frontier, which were to ‘promptly put down arms, leave these places [the garrisons] and restore them to full liberty’.  

For the Dauphiné handover on this date, Crussol was again accompanied by provincial representatives. He had requested these figures to be present, to see that he had, in all his actions, proceeded with ‘your good advice’. Vieilleville would outline the royal will and Crussol would be discharged ‘of my duty towards the king’, underlining that he had upheld the promise he made. Similar to his relationship with the crown, Crussol was eager to point out his faithfulness to the Protestants.

The end of the disarmament process had also evidently raised questions for Crussol concerning his future role in the royal administration as chevalier d’honneur, as revealed by a letter from Calvin to Crussol on 31 July. This letter sheds considerable light on Crussol’s religious convictions and loyalty to the crown during disarmament, or at least how he presented these aspects. Crussol had enquired whether he could take part in the Catholic religious processions and other ceremonies, as a Protestant. According to Calvin, Crussol had asked that ‘if having made a widely known declaration of your Christianity, it would be permitted for you to accompany the Queen both in certain processions and in other acts of

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203 Ibid. ‘envers le roy de mon debvoir’.


205 These processions were important for the nobles in marking publicly their positions of precedence in the kingdom (Sandberg, Warrior Pursuits, 169).
idolatry'. It is notable that in Calvin’s eyes, Crussol was certainly a Protestant, and had shown himself publicly to be one.

Calvin thought that Crussol would not wish to conceal himself as ‘swimming between two waters’, using similar language to his earlier letter to Louise. He made clear that Crussol had to take into account two things; firstly to not upset ‘the children of God’, scandalise them or let them down, and secondly to not give an opportunity to the ‘enemies of truth’ to rejoice. Scandal could occur as many would follow Crussol’s example in taking part in these ceremonies, and Calvin concluded that this act of Crussol would offend God.

He put forward the example of Naaman from the Old Testament. After Naaman, an Aramite, was healed of his leprosy by the Israelite prophet Elisha, he declared his belief in the Israelite God. However, he asked Elisha if God would forgive him when the king of Aram entered the pagan temple, leaning on Naaman’s arm, and bowed down, meaning that Naaman bowed down too. Elisha in response told Naaman to go in peace. Although this example does have some resemblance to Crussol’s case, Calvin asserted that this outcome could not be applied to his situation. Crussol could not take part in these processions as a Protestant.

Calvin similarly addressed whether Crussol should rather leave his position as chevalier d’honneur, to avoid displeasing Catherine in this manner, although it is unclear whether Crussol asked this question of Calvin. He wrote ‘I see well what profit it is to the

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207 Ibid. ‘nageant entre deux eaux’, ‘les enfans de Dieu’, ‘ennemis de verité’.
208 2 Kings 5:1-19.
Church that you hold this position, and what damage it is necessary to fear, if you do not.'

For Calvin, aiding the church was the main objective.

Given that Catherine was not unaware that ‘according to the religion that you hold’, Crussol could not join these ceremonies ‘without offending God’ and for reasons of conscience, Calvin maintained that she would not mind him being absent for three days of the year. This example again underscores the point that Calvin believed Crussol to be properly converted. He considered that once Crussol had reflected on these issues, he would be of the opinion that one could not both participate in Holy Communion and ‘show ourselves among idolatries’. Whether or not Crussol asked Calvin for advice concerning both the Catholic ceremonies and his role as chevalier d’honneur, it is clear that Crussol was conflicted about his Protestant faith and his royal position at court, which meant that he had a crucial decision to make on his return there.

The month of July finally saw a winding down of Crussol’s role in the disarmament process, as he handed the towns over to Vieilleville and Caylus. He no longer had an official charge or role in these territories, being discharged from his Protestant leadership. This left him free at last to go to court. Passing through Romans on the way, the consuls decided to prepare the town’s best wine and suitable lodgings, and to fire a gun salvo at his arrival, in recognising ‘his importance and the good that he has done for the town in the past as

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211 Ibid. ‘selon la religion que vous tenez’, ‘sans offenser Dieu’.
212 Ibid, 113n.
213 Ibid, 113. ‘nous montrer parmy les idolatries’.
214 Jules Bonnet thought that Crussol was inclined towards a public profession of faith at this point, but he was already viewed by Calvin as Protestant (Jules Bonnet, ed., Lettres de Jean Calvin: lettres françaises, 2 vols (Paris, 1854), ii, 525).
protector of the province’. This example attests to the beneficial role played by Crussol in the eyes of the Dauphiné Protestants, who appreciated his services to the Reformed movement.

Despite the handover of the Protestant towns, the Midi was still not at peace and hostilities continued. Catherine’s letters to Maugiron in August illustrated that Dauphiné was still not pacified. Vieilleville returned there after time in Provence and Comtat-Venaissin, before travelling once more to the Comtat. This explains why Vieilleville did not enter Languedoc, where disarmament generally took place smoothly amidst some tension, as shown by the letters of Caylus to the queen-mother in August and September. The Protestants had dismissed the garrisons and restored the Catholics to their assets and churches. Caylus published the edict or saw it enforced in certain Protestant towns in Languedoc, such as in Castres, although he noted that there were still Catholic towns that did not wish to receive Protestants. In mid-September, his mission was almost at an end.

Concerning Provence and Comtat-Venaissin, the Provençal troops were finally able to return to Provence at the end of August, with the edict published in the province, as it was in Comtat-Venaissin in the following month. While the monarchy also used commissaires to enforce the edict, they did not play a role in Crussol’s disarmament, generally arriving too late.

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215 AMR, BB 9, fol. 99r, ‘Conseil de la ville de Romans, 2 August 1563’. ‘sa grandeur et les biens qu’il a fauct [sic] à la ville par le passé comme protecteur de pays’.
217 BNF, fr. 15878, fols 120r-121v, ‘Antoine de Lévis, comte de Caylus to Catherine de Médicis, 29 August 1563’; fols 134r-135v, ‘Antoine de Lévis, comte de Caylus to Catherine de Médicis, 13 September 1563 [incorrectly noted as Jacques de Lévis]’. These letters are also seen in ‘Lettres du sieur de Caylus à la reine mère, 29 August 1563 and 13 September 1563’, in HL, xii, 699–701.
218 BNF, fr. 15878, fol. 120r, ‘Antoine de Lévis, comte de Caylus to Catherine de Médicis, 29 August 1563’.
219 Ibid; BNF, fr. 15878, fol. 134r, ‘Antoine de Lévis, comte de Caylus to Catherine de Médicis, 13 September 1563’. Contrary to what he had said earlier, Crussol thus did not publish the edict throughout Languedoc, although he had little involvement generally in the area around Castres.
220 BNF, fr. 15878, fol. 134r, ‘Antoine de Lévis, comte de Caylus to Catherine de Médicis, 13 September 1563’.
221 Lambert, Histoire des guerres de religion en Provence (1530-1598), i, 203–6; HL, xi, 447.
late to these provinces. These figures were to enforce an amnesty for acts of war, restore confiscated property, inspect local town officials, locate sites for Protestant worship, and punish those who contravened the edict.

**Conclusion**

The disarmament process following the peace edict was slow in the Midi, and hostilities continued for several months. This chapter has outlined how Crussol responded to the royal demands and the evolving situation in the three provinces. He took a central role in disarmament, and certainly attempted to obey the royal commands to disarm and enforce the edict, as well as obey other various orders of the crown. However, he did delay the peace process, through refusing to hand over the towns to Joyeuse. It is difficult to assess whether Crussol’s stipulated conditions in disarming reflected his own opinions or those of the Protestants. It seemed to be a mixture of the two, as shown by both the Protestants and Crussol disliking Joyeuse, and it is hard to see how the Protestants would have been satisfied with Joyeuse overseeing the handover of the towns. As this example indicates, Crussol’s desire to obey the king did not particularly clash with his continued Protestant adherence. He was, however, firmly against any involvement in religious matters on the crown’s behalf towards the Protestants. Crussol was overall consistent in his aims during this period, especially in relation to the handover of towns.

Concerning his relationship to the crown, Crussol strove to present his actions as those of a loyal subject of Charles and Catherine, and not as a regional leader who sought to maintain his power for as long as possible. He presented his loyalty to the monarchy as the most important part of his identity. It is unclear whether the disappearance of the promised tax revenue affected the opinion of Crussol in royal eyes. The king’s recognition of Crussol’s

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223 Knecht, *The French Civil Wars, 1562-1598*, 123; Ibid, 64. These figures had similar roles to those seen earlier during Crussol’s Midi mission.
authority, seeing this as a legitimate position as opposed to one of rebellion, in asking him
to continue in his charge until Vieilleville’s arrival, was a significant marker for him. This
action of the monarchy was consistent with the peace edict itself, and this recognition helped
validate Crussol’s proclamations of loyalty to the crown throughout the war, as shown in
more detail through his later return to court.

Crussol’s relationships with the Catholic commanders in the region defined much of
the peace process. There was a similar rhetoric in his letters to Maugiron and Joyeuse in
particular, in affirming his devoted actions on the crown’s behalf, usually contrasted against
their own behaviour. The quarrel with Joyeuse both dominated and delayed the peace in
Languedoc. Crussol was adept at shifting the blame onto others for the slow disarmament
process, notably Joyeuse. While he had better relations with Maugiron, the return of
Vieilleville to the province highlighted the difficulty in seeing the peace enforced. Attempts
in Provence to negotiate with Serbeloni or Sommerive did not lead to any firm results.
Absolving himself of command in Comtat-Venaissin permitted him to take no responsibility
for the continuing hostilities there. After the initial attempt to disarm, Crussol simply awaited
the arrival of Vieilleville and Caylus to hand over the towns of Dauphiné and Languedoc.

Regarding Crussol’s religious convictions, his animosity towards the pope was clear,
and it is notable that he referred to the Protestants as being of ‘our religion’ and those of
‘the Reformed religion’, while he described the Catholics as ‘those of the Roman religion’.
However, these are not conclusive points, as he was nonetheless a Protestant commander
at this stage. Calvin’s letter to Crussol illustrated the tension for him in having strong
Protestant sympathies, or a definite faith, while fulfilling his role as Catherine’s chevalier
d’honneur. Crussol had clearly reflected on this matter, and evidently chose to take up his
role at court.
In determining the view of Crussol through Protestant eyes, the episode from Romans on his journey to court indicates his good standing with the Protestants. A close relationship between Crussol and the Valence consuls was similarly viewed in October, when he sent his secretary Railhet to alert them of the king coming to the province on the royal tour. Railhet underlined that ‘in the same way that the seigneur comte in a time of necessity, took up the protection and defence of the present province under the obedience of his majesty the king, by stronger reasoning, in times of peace, he wishes always to continue his good will towards this province’, in telling them of the king’s arrival and the royal desire for the peace to be observed. Crussol urged them to live in peace and obey the edict, and the consuls thanked him for his concern.

Viewing early modern letters as oral sources also enhances our understanding of this disarmament process, seen through the significant role of the porteur and the letter being part of the noble performance. Porteurs proved to be very useful, particularly one such as Coucault, who could provide vital information to the crown about the peace negotiations. The porteur was like having the letter sender present, and Joyeuse’s instructions to Convertis conveyed the absolute trust that the nobles had in their porteurs to accurately convey their wills, given that the nobles could not always go to court. Crussol’s and Joyeuse’s porteurs had to portray the sincerity of their masters’ motives and make clear that they were following the king’s commands.

Crussol and Joyeuse used porteurs to build on aspects mentioned in their correspondence, and to promote their own devotion to the crown. Viewing these letters as part of a performance to the monarchy furthers our understanding of the wider context in which they were written. Crussol’s performance of loyalty affirmed that he was at war on

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224 AMV, BB 6, fols 221v-222r, ‘Conseil de la ville de Valence 23 October 1563’.
the crown’s behalf, defending the king’s faithful subjects, despite fighting against royal armies. Now that peace had arrived, he was eager to carry out the royal will. He was more adept than Joyeuse in promoting the righteousness of his position, often attaching copies of documents to prove his sincerity. Letters only provide a snapshot of the relationship between two persons, and we should be wary about placing too much emphasis on the specific wording of a letter, given that the porteur could have more detailed instructions. Our knowledge of a situation is limited through generally being ignorant of the porteur’s orders.

This period of disarmament, due to the considerable amount of source material, enables us to perceive most clearly Crussol’s motivations, over any other moment in the civil war. He was intent on highlighting his loyalty to the crown and fulfilling his promises to the Protestants, while seeking his own interests too, particularly in Comtat-Venaissin. This chapter illustrates the complicated nature of disarmament, and although Crussol contributed to the delay of this process, he played an important role in finally bringing peace to the provinces under his command.

To conclude the second part of the thesis, Crussol’s ‘revolt’ against the monarchy, Crussol gained significant power through his adherence to the Protestant movement. Entering the war due to a mixture of motives, he fully engaged with his charge as prescribed by the Protestant assemblies, which included appointing military commanders and directing the general war effort. His leadership was accepted by the Protestants, and his relationship with the town consuls indicated their respect for him. His role for the Protestants was not a passive one, as shown by the military campaigns carried out at Grenoble and in Comtat-Venaissin. The war did affect Crussol personally, as he lost two brothers. After the end of his Protestant adherence, the question was now how he would be received at court.
Section 3: Return to favour

Chapter 7: Return to court and royal favour, 1563-1567

Following the end of his time as Protestant leader in Languedoc and Dauphiné, Crussol finally travelled to court, to resume his role as the queen-mother’s chevalier d’honneur. This post-war period was important in restoring his relationship with the monarchy following the conflict. Given Catherine’s displeasure at his decision to join the Protestants, this return to court was a worrying time for him, having been absent since at least June 1562.¹ In considering the relationship of Crussol with the crown, this chapter explores his return to royal favour. As well as studying his rehabilitation at court, his religious convictions (for which this period provides useful information), and his multifaceted court role, are further examined.

These responsibilities at court included his own position as chevalier d’honneur, his other noble relationships and networks, and his membership of the conseil privé, the administrative body of the kingdom. Through his relationships with Bertrand-Raimbaud de Simiane, the baron de Gordes, and Jean Ébrard, the seigneur de Saint-Sulpice, acting on their behalf, it is possible to see Crussol acting as a typical noble at court. The interplay between his role with the monarchy and his relationships with other nobles can also be viewed.

This chapter argues that in the period 1563-1567, Crussol’s fortunes were tied firmly to the monarchy, and his return to favour led to the end of his Protestant adherence, instead putting forward a Catholic faith. His court role, which included carrying out favours and informing correspondents of news at court, affirmed his usefulness to both the monarchy and his amis. There was no longer any question of Crussol rebelling against the crown, and

¹ This date is according to David Potter’s estimation of the date on which the list of nobles who joined the prince de Condé at Orléans was drawn up (Potter, ‘The French Protestant nobility in 1562: The “Associacion de Monseigneur Le Prince de Condé”’, 307–328).
he did not maintain Protestant sympathies. His rehabilitation can alternatively be viewed as
the monarchy using royal favour to restore noble loyalty after the civil war. The major event
of this chapter is the momentous royal tour around France, which forms the backdrop for
the themes outlined above. Through this voyage, the crown aimed to reassert royal authority
by enforcing the peace edict and healing the fractures caused by the civil war. This chapter
will again be chronological.

Crussol’s rehabilitation

Although Crussol had finally disarmed and handed over control to the royal representatives
by August 1563, he returned slowly to the court, meeting Catherine in September.² His court
return, similar to that of the other Protestant commanders, was not straightforward, given
the ill-feeling caused by the conflict. The bitter feud between the Guise family and Gaspard
de Coligny is a notable example of this hostility which followed the war, due to the latter’s
alleged involvement in the assassination of the duc de Guise.³ By the time Crussol arrived at
court, Coligny and his brother, François de Châtillon, the sieur d’Andelot, had retired to their
estates, although they later returned in November 1563.⁴ Louis de Condé was similarly
absent. This considerable tension at court only increased Crussol’s own efforts to highlight
his loyalty to the monarchy.

As shown in the previous chapter, there was a royal amnesty for acts committed
during the war, and the king had justified the actions of the Protestant leaders through the
peace edict, emphasising that these were for his service. Crussol’s own positions of
command had also been recognised. However, he was extremely aware of the rumours

² Crussol stopped in Tonnerre en route to the court following the end of the conflict (Elisabeth
<https://tonnerrehistoire.wordpress.com/2015/05/08/le-tumulte-de-la-porte-saint-michel-1/>[
accessed 29 January 2020]).
⁴ Daussy, Le parti huguenot, 545. The sieur de Soubise, who was also implicated in this event, had
withdrawn to his estates (Haag and Haag, La France protestante, vi, 341).
surrounding his own actions, in which he was painted as an untrustworthy royal subject. He fought hard to defend his behaviour as being on the crown’s behalf, wishing to have his conduct publicly exonerated. Crussol’s full rehabilitation took place in October 1563. As already demonstrated in his letter to Catherine in June 1563, he had wished to justify his actions against the ‘pure deceptions and slanders’ being said and provide Charles IX with a summary of his activities since the Midi commission. The rumours over Crussol’s behaviour had clearly lasted several months.5

Crussol’s correspondence with Saint-Sulpice, the French ambassador in Spain, offers a useful snapshot of his own perception of the return to court.6 These letters further attest to the negative view there of his previous conduct, and the measures he took to illustrate his faithfulness to Charles IX and the queen-mother. In a letter to Saint-Sulpice in October, Crussol reported his favourable reception at court. Having gone with Louise to see Catherine at the end of September, he stated that ‘we were welcomed very warmly by the king and her [Catherine], which has not changed for the worse, continuing my accustomed position and the acquired rank in this company [referring to his role as chevalier d’honneur] without reduction in anything’.7 According to him, there were no adverse consequences due to his part in the war, and he was quickly able to take up his role. Crussol was aware of the possibility of being negatively received by the king and the queen-mother.

He also added that having explained his actions to both of them in the conseil privé, they had ‘great satisfaction’ concerning what ‘to serve them I had completed both in my command in Provence as well as in other things carried out by me since’. Crussol’s behaviour

6 Saint-Sulpice was the French ambassador at the Spanish court until 1565 (Cabié, Guerres de religion dans le sud-ouest de la France, vi).
in Provence had been controversial, particularly the massacre at Barjols, and his actions had then been highlighted at court. Catherine and Charles declared that ‘I had carried out everything for the good of their service and according to their intention’, being satisfied with his conduct.\(^8\) Crussol affirmed his pleasure with this decision, ‘seeing the falseness of the slanders with which one wished to charge me, and the loyalty that I have always observed’, pointing to his own integrity. He wrote to Saint-Sulpice because, ‘being such a good friend to me’, he would take comfort from this news.\(^9\) He clearly counted Saint-Sulpice as one of his amis.

Crussol’s letter to Saint-Sulpice in November further revealed his return to court. Having received a letter from Saint-Sulpice, he was satisfied with the affection that Saint-Sulpice held for him, as even ‘at the strongest weather of the storm you did not neglect to make a demonstration’ of this.\(^10\) Crussol was keen to recover his cr\^edit at court, which was evidently affected by his Protestant adherence. Speaking at length about their friendship, he expressed his gratitude to Saint-Sulpice for ‘shooting down the slanders that you see spread about me’.\(^11\) These two citations present clearly the negative view of Crussol, which was not a small matter for him. Like other nobles, Crussol was jealous of his honour and prestige, and wished to uphold these before the monarchy. He viewed these slanders as an affront to his honour. As shown in the thesis introduction, honour manifested itself through noble

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\(^8\) ADT, 17 J 5, ‘Letter of Antoine de Crussol to Jean Ébrard, seigneur de Saint Sulpice, 13 October 1563’. ‘gr\[an\]d contentement’, ‘pour le[s] servir j’avais faict tant en ma charge de Provence que autres choses par moi depuis administrées’, ‘je n’avais rien fait que pour le bien de leur service et selon leur intention’.

\(^9\) Ibid. ‘voyant la faulceté des calomnies dont l’on m’a voulu charger et la fidelité que j’ai toujours garder’, ‘m’etant si bon ami’.

\(^10\) ADT, 17 J 5, fol. 1r, ‘Letter of Antoine de Crussol to Jean Ébrard, seigneur de Saint Sulpice, 16 November 1563’. Different parts of this letter are transcribed in Cabié, Guerres de religion dans le sud-ouest de la France, 34–35; Edmond Cabié, Ambassade en Espagne de Jean Ébrard, seigneur de Saint-Sulpice, de 1562 à 1565, et mission de ce diplomate dans le même pays en 1566 (Albi, 1903), 178–79. ‘au plus fort temps de l’orage vous n’avez délaissé de faire démonstration’.

\(^11\) ADT, 17 J 5, fol. 1r, ‘Letter of Antoine de Crussol to Jean Ébrard, seigneur de Saint Sulpice, 16 November 1563’. ‘rabattant les calomnies que vous voyez semer de moi’.
conduct, as it was based on acts. Honour was a personal dignity formed of the esteem of others, and Crussol’s dignity was being attacked by these untrue criticisms of his behaviour. Nobles were ‘highly sensitive to anything said about them in public or to rumours about their conduct’.

This letter shows the close relationship between Crussol and Saint-Sulpice, the latter showing his loyalty to the former through supporting him against these slanders. Their friendship was also demonstrated through an earlier draft of a letter from Saint-Sulpice to Catherine. Saint-Sulpice had praised the loyal service of Crussol to the crown and defended it against criticism. Crussol’s example reinforces the difficulties that could arise with the return of the Protestant commanders to court following the war and warns against underestimating the depth of religious feeling among the nobility.

Crussol’s correspondence additionally attests to the measures he took to clear his name and present his actions as being on the monarchy’s behalf. He had requested that a report of his actions be drawn up in the conseil privé, which was followed by a royal declaration underlining his faithful conduct. Crussol was certain that Saint-Sulpice would rejoice over this declaration too. Crussol wished for a public proclamation of his actions, which would note these as being for the king’s service. His notable efforts to demonstrate his fidelity help to explain the end of his Protestant adherence after the war. He wished to remain publicly loyal to Catherine and Charles, and not be subjected to slanders over his conduct.

This report investigated ‘all my actions both during my first expedition of Provence as well as things carried out by me during the last troubles in the provinces of Languedoc and

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12 Sandberg, Warrior Pursuits, 164.
13 Jouanna, Le devoir de révolte, 237.
14 Carroll, Blood and Violence in Early Modern France, 52.
15 ADT, 17 J 5, No. 4, ‘Letter draft of Jean Ébrard, seigneur de Saint Sulpice to Catherine de Médicis, [December 1561?]’. However, the final letter sent may not have had this exact language.
Crussol remarked that Saint-Sulpice’s porteur could tell him of the crown’s recognition of Crussol’s actions as being for its service, which again indicates the importance of the messenger’s role, in supplementing what was mentioned in correspondence. He added that ‘messieurs de Guise and those who seemed most hostile to me’ attended the conseil too.\(^{17}\) Given that the Guise family represented the hard-line Catholics on the conseil privé, it was this group on the conseil that Crussol identified as his enemies, presumably due to his previous conduct against the Catholics in Comtat-Venaissin and Provence.

The royal declaration itself, in October, provides further information on Crussol’s efforts to persuade the monarchy of his loyalty. This document was a proclamation of his conduct, summarising his actions since the mission to the Midi.\(^{18}\) Similar to what Crussol told Saint-Sulpice, the document recorded that after informing the king of all that had happened, he asked that to justify himself, he might outline the events in the conseil privé. Although the king did not doubt Crussol’s zeal, Charles agreed and ordered that all his documentation (procès and procès-verbaux) be investigated. It was found that his conduct fitted with his own defence, and that he had acted according to what ‘a good, faithful, and loyal subject should do’. The letters thus declared that ‘what was carried out and executed by our cousin the comte de Crussol and by his command and order’ in Dauphiné, Provence and Languedoc, both during the Midi mission and the war, was completed ‘for the good of our service, [and] the rest and tranquillity of our subjects’. The king instructed that no further inquiry be allowed into these matters. Crussol, in desiring to present his conduct before the king’s conseil, wanted to definitively end all rumours about his actions.\(^{19}\)


\(^{17}\) Ibid. ‘mess[ieu]rs de Guyse et ceux qui me sembloient plus contraires’.

\(^{18}\) AN, 265 AP 53, Dossier 11, No. 5, ‘Royal letter of Charles IX, 15 October 1563’.

The document first indicated the disorder in Dauphiné, Provence, and Languedoc, and the choice of Crussol to resolve the situation, ‘as much for his virtues as the great confidence that we have in him, accompanied by the testimony’ that the king has of his affection and service for the crown.\textsuperscript{20} This language repeated that of the original documents of December 1561. Mentioning Crussol’s work with the lieutenants-généraux to bring order and maintain the people in peace and obedience to the crown, his assignment to Dauphiné and Languedoc is shown to be a success. He brought peace to the provinces and restored the Catholic ecclésiastiques to their religious benefices, with the help of the commissaires. However, this document passed over the later commissaire reports of Protestant disobedience to these commands. This is a useful royal assessment of Crussol’s conduct, especially as his actions in Dauphiné are less well known, seemingly having simply passed through the province on the way to Languedoc.

Having heard about the worsening situation in Provence, with the assembling of an army there, Crussol went to the region. Crussol and the comte de Tende had sent several representatives to urge these soldiers to disperse, reminding them ‘of their duty and obedience’. After this troop pillaged the king’s subjects, Crussol and Tende assembled forces, and destroyed the army at Barjols. With ‘all the honest and most gracious ways’, the province was thus pacified and put back into ‘the peaceful obedience that we intended following our edict of the month of January’, which the monarchy had asked Crussol to enforce.\textsuperscript{21} Given that this document ignored the massacre at Barjols and the continued Protestants disobedience, it was not an in-depth investigation of Crussol’s actions, and instead formed part of the royal attempt to forget the war.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid. ‘Tant pour ses vertuz que la fiance grande que nous avons en luy accompagnée du tesmoignage’.

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid. ‘de leur devoir et de l’obeissance’, ‘tous les honnestes et plus gratieux moyens’, ‘la paisible obeissance q[ue] no[u]s Intendions Suivant n[ot]re edit de moys de Janvier’.

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Barjols, however, was mentioned in a later list of grievances by the Provençal Catholics to the conseil privé, which proved that this event had not been forgotten. They asked that those who were murdered and executed ‘through an ignominious death’ at Crussol’s capture of the town might be declared ‘outside of every stain of infamy and rebellion’, having ‘endured such a death for the defence of the Catholic religion and service of his majesty’. They also asked that Durand de Pontevès, the sieur de Flassans, and others would be pardoned under the peace edict. The conseil privé wrote in response that ‘all that was carried out on behalf of religion is excused if pardoned following the edict [of Amboise]’. As shown by this response, the general pardon of this edict similarly applied to the conflict preceding the official start of the war, including Crussol’s mission to the Midi.

The royal document additionally claimed that Crussol had intended to render an account of the mission to the monarchy in person, but due to the religious troubles, was unable to do so. By the king’s ‘permission and command’, Crussol retired to Languedoc. This document does not mention the reasons for his departure from court, or his later presence at Orléans alongside Condé. When the troubles recommenced, and the royal subjects were mistreated and unable to send grievances to the king, these inhabitants of Languedoc and Dauphiné urged Crussol ‘as far as threats of his life and assets’, to take up their defence. Charles claimed that the Protestants threatened Crussol in urging him to take command, while Crussol’s original justification noted the threats from the Catholic commanders. Crussol agreed to join the Protestants, moved by the ‘singular and perfect affection that he carries towards our service and to preserve and guard from ruin and

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23 Ibid. ‘Tout ce qui a esté faict po[u]r le fait de la Religion est Remis si pardonné suivant l’edict’.

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damage’ the poor subjects. This rhetoric is extremely similar to that of his justification for taking up arms in November 1562, underscoring the mistreatment of his lands and subjects. The main Protestant argument, fighting to free a captive king, was not repeated in this document, though Charles IX had denied this line of reasoning during the conflict itself. Through Crussol’s service, these provinces were maintained in the king’s obedience, and the royal subjects protected, as testified by Caylus and Vieilleville. Crussol’s actions were framed as being on the king’s behalf, and he was shown to be obedient to Caylus and Vieilleville’s commands, which was the case.

Similar to the other Protestant commanders’ actions during the war, the king’s verdict to allow no further inquiry into Crussol’s conduct could be contentious due to ongoing grievances referred to the conseil privé from the provinces. This decision should be viewed through the royal desire to move past the conflict, instead of judging the Protestants guilty of lèse-majesté or treason. This royal policy of amnesty was similarly displayed in the granting to Languedoc Protestants, in December 1564, of lettres de déclaration, to prevent being investigated for the money levied and other incidents, up until the towns were handed over to Caylus. The Protestants had feared they would be held liable for these actions.

Crussol’s rehabilitation at court was mentioned too by the English ambassador in October, who wrote that Antoine and Louise ‘begin to be in their olde trayne of favo[u]r w[i]th the Queene Mother’. There was still a strained atmosphere at court, as there were rumours that the Guise would leave when Condé arrived. Due to a significant effort on

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25 Ibid. ‘Jusques à menaces de sa vye et biens’, ‘singuliere et parfaicte affection qu’il porte à n[ot]re service Et pour conserver et garder de Ruyne et dommage’.
26 BNF, fr. 18156, fol. 12v, ‘Meeting of the conseil privé, 21 January 1563/1564’. This incident is also discussed in Valois, Le conseil du roi aux XIVe, XVe et XVIe siècles, 330–31.
27 Ménard, iv, 383. A related issue had appeared in April 1564, when the Languedoc Protestants offered to give to the Catholic churches half of the price of the arrentements from the Catholic benefices (BNF, fr. 18156, fol. 63v, ‘Meeting of the conseil privé, 7 April 1564’. This incident is similarly mentioned in Valois, Le conseil du roi aux XIVe, XVe et XVIe siècles, 341–42).
28 TNA, SP 70/64, fol. 15v, ‘Nicholas Throckmorton to Queen Elizabeth I, 5 October 1563’.

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Crussol’s part, and through the royal extension of favour to heal the divisions of the civil war, he was firmly re-established in the eyes of the crown by the start of the royal tour in January 1564, also shown by him receiving a pension of 500 livres for three months.29

Crussol’s example illustrates both the difficulty for a Protestant commander to have his conduct validated following the civil war, and the tense court atmosphere. While his actions were justified through the peace, there was a negative view of his behaviour, which pushed him to have his actions publicly exonerated. Crussol’s correspondence with Saint-Sulpice offers his own perception of these events, and he was clearly irritated over these ‘slanders’. The royal declaration provides an official explanation for his entry into war, which generally corresponded to his own justification.

Religious convictions

This period further illuminates Crussol’s religious convictions, or how he wanted these to be viewed. He presented a Catholic faith instead of his previous Protestant sympathies. As shown later on in the chapter, this emphasis on his Catholic sympathies formed part of his attempt to reinforce his loyalty to the monarchy, particularly on the royal tour. On this voyage, the crown strengthened its own commitment to Catholicism. Crussol had indicated his strong Protestant sympathies up to the end of the war and was publicly perceived as being a Reformed noble. While public perception can be useful in assessing noble faith, it was not necessarily always accurate. Nobles such as Blaise de Monluc and Charles de Coucis, the sieur de Burie, were accused of being Protestants too, as mentioned earlier, because they were seen as being sympathetic to Reformed populations, although they were firmly Catholic.30

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29 BNF, fr. 27432 (Pièces originales 948), fol. 78r, ‘Certification of Antoine de Crussol for having received a pension, 17 May 1564’.
30 Accusing your political opponent of adopting measures favourable to Protestantism could also evidently be a way to discredit them.
In a letter of the papal nuncio Prosper de Sainte-Croix to the cardinal Borromée in October 1564, noted in an earlier chapter, Crussol’s move towards Catholicism was suggested.\(^{31}\) Sainte-Croix had heard that Crussol ‘is not so ill-intentioned nor so obstinate concerning the Catholic religion that many have believed him [to be]’, and met with him secretly to bring him onto the right path.\(^{32}\) According to Sainte-Croix, Crussol was clearly viewed as an enemy of Catholicism. The reasoning he had put forward for joining the war, due to Catholic threats on his life, was in complete contrast to the public Catholic view, which focused on his Protestant sympathies to explain his entry into the conflict. Crussol insisted to Sainte-Croix that he had always conserved inwardly a Catholic faith. This is an interesting revelation but raises the question why he corresponded with John Calvin. His letter to Condé at the end of the war, in which he took a severely anti-papal stance, similarly challenges the validity of this statement. Crussol had given this testimony to Sainte-Croix so that the nuncio could inform the papacy, and because he wanted to know how he should deal with the papal ministers in the Midi.\(^{33}\) He wished for the pope to change his opinion about him. Sainte-Croix refuted Crussol’s claim that the pope wished to harm him but noted that Crussol spoke with sincerity.\(^ {34}\)

Crussol did not wish to write to the pope without knowing his opinions, as he had been wary of the pope revealing his letters, which would have disgraced him ‘with his amis’, and afterwards refused him entry into the Catholic party.\(^ {35}\) This claim is difficult to understand; his letter to the pope, mentioning the pope’s negative opinion towards him, or Crussol’s claim to always having had a Catholic faith, could presumably have reflected badly

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\(^{31}\) Cimber and Danjou, ‘Lettres anecdotes écrites au Cardinal Borromée par Prosper de Sainte-Croix’, 160–65. This letter is written from Avignon, and they presumably met while Crussol was in Avignon accompanying the royal tour.

\(^{32}\) Ibid, 160. ‘n’est pas si mal intentionné ni si obstiné touchant la religion catholique que plusieurs l’ont crue’.

\(^{33}\) Ibid, 161–62.

\(^{34}\) Ibid, 162–63.

\(^{35}\) Ibid, 163. ‘chez ses amis’. 
on him if the pope had revealed it. In any case, he was aware of the effect writing to the pope would have had on his noble networks and did not wish to be disgraced in the eyes of his amis. He also did not want to expose himself to this danger for the états which he possessed, referring most likely to his role alongside Catherine, being eager to guard this position of favour.  

Crussol pledged to Sainte-Croix that:

not only would he no longer take up arms against his Holiness, but that he would impede all those who wish to do so; and that if he could not persuade them amicably to remain at peace, he promised to arm himself in favour of the pope and for the maintaining of his interests, on the condition that this would not harm the obedience and fidelity that he owes to his most Christian majesty [Charles IX].  

However, though the papal forces did fight in the later wars alongside the royal armies, Crussol nonetheless largely abstained from the conflict. According to Sainte-Croix, the monarchy was greatly pleased at hearing his news of this meeting, and Crussol himself had already written to Catherine or Charles on this subject.  

While this interview sheds significant light on Crussol’s thinking, there are a few discrepancies with how he presented his conduct to Sainte-Croix. Crussol’s reasoning for joining the Protestants, even considering the pressure on him at court, is not convincing. Monluc’s observations about this decision of Crussol are noteworthy. According to him, Crussol:

was no more than myself of the new religion, and [I] believe that he joined rather for some discontentment than for devotion, because he was no more a great

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36 It could also have referred to Crussol’s own territories.
37 Ibid. ‘non-seulement il ne porteroit plus les armes contre Sa Sainteté, mais qu’il en empêcherait tous ceux qui les voudroient prendre; et que s’il ne pouvoit pas les obliger amicalement à demeurer en repos, il promettoit de s’armer lui-même en faveur du Pape et pour le maintien de ses intérêts, à condition que cela ne préjudicieroit point à l’obéissance et à la fidélité qu’il doit à Sa Majesté très chrétienne’.
38 Ibid, 164.
theologian than I was; but I saw many who through contempt joined this religion, and after it knocked them over, they repented of it.\(^{39}\)

There is a common theme of discontent present in Monluc’s observations and Sainte-Croix’s conversation with Crussol, although Crussol’s adherence to the Protestants was more multi-faceted than this. While discontent helps to explain his taking up of arms during the war (as mentioned earlier), especially given his attendance at Orléans in 1562, it does not explain his Protestant sympathies generally. Even if Crussol maintained that he had conserved a Catholic faith his whole life, his correspondence with Calvin signalled his interest in the Reformed confession. The termination of the Council of Trent in December 1563 and the ratification of its decrees in the following year may too have influenced Crussol’s decision to become Catholic.\(^{40}\) Given that this council had now defined what constituted Catholicism, the earlier religious fluidity of the period was firmly in the past, and Crussol was forced to present either a Protestant or a Catholic faith.\(^{41}\)

What is clear from Crussol’s conversations with Sainte-Croix is that he wished to present himself as a loyal Catholic noble, both in the eyes of the monarchy and the pope, in the very different religious atmosphere following the war. Although he had been perceived as a Reformed noble, Crussol made a conspicuous effort to highlight a Catholic faith.

Noble relations

Crussol’s multi-functional and extensive court role further illustrated his relationship with the monarchy and his noble networks generally, as shown through his correspondence. These court functions included his position as Catherine’s chevalier d’honneur and his seat

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\(^{39}\) Ruble, Commentaires et lettres de Blaise de Monluc, II, 346. ‘n’estoit non plus que moy d’este [sic] religion nouvelle, et croy qu’il s’en feist plustôt pour quelque malcontentement que par dévotion, car il n’estoit pas grand théologien non plus que moy; mais j’ay veu plusieurs par despit se faire de ceste religion, et après il leur tomboit dessus, et s’en sont bien repentis’.


\(^{41}\) Breton, ‘Pour Dieu, pour le roi, pour soi’, 300.
on the conseil privé. He was in close proximity to the monarchy, which made him a useful figure to secure favours for his amis.

The first part of Crussol’s court role is viewed through his correspondence with Gordes and Saint-Sulpice. The period 1563-1567 offers an opportunity to see him acting as a typical noble, in aiding his amis at court. Carrying out favours would in turn lead to benefits for himself. Crussol wished to hear his correspondents’ reports, while he kept them informed of the news at court. Sharing news was a major part of noble correspondence, and this knowledge was vital for the monarchy in maintaining control in the kingdom. The news Crussol received could be passed onto the crown, which could in turn increase his own favour in the king’s eyes. This correspondence also provides further information about his noble links and friendships.

Crussol’s amicable relationship with Gordes had been seen in a letter during the disarmament process of the first war. Mentioning a financial matter between Gordes and the conseil politique in Dauphiné, Crussol wished to act as the ‘most sure and affectionate brother that you may have’. This letter is quite personal, and as well as reinforcing his friendship with Gordes, Crussol passed on the greetings of his wife. In noble correspondence, terms such as amis were multi-purpose words and can be difficult to take as proof of a close noble friendship. However, Crussol’s referral to himself as a ‘brother’ of Gordes’ indicates such a friendship.

In an aforementioned letter to Saint-Sulpice in November 1563, Crussol asserted that Saint-Sulpice would never have a relative or friend more at his command, using similar language in his later letters to Gordes. Crussol attempted to intervene on Saint-Sulpice’s
behalf at court. He regretted that Saint-Sulpice had not alerted him sooner to the fact that Catherine had promised him the bishopric of Cahors, which had instead been conferred on another figure.

Reminding Catherine of her promise, Crussol had attested to the services that Saint-Sulpice had given the monarchy. The queen-mother regretted that she could not uphold this promise, but would give the first unoccupied bishopric to Saint-Sulpice. Catherine spoke to Crussol ‘with a very honest intention’ of the satisfaction she had of Saint-Sulpice’s services, and her desire to recognise these. Crussol stressed that he would solicit often the monarchy on Saint-Sulpice’s behalf. Crussol himself had been promised a profitable abbey in the bishopric of Condom in 1564 or earlier, along with the sieur de Gonnor, worth seven to eight thousand livres, although this promise by Catherine was not kept. He told Saint-Sulpice of the efforts he had made on his behalf, and this example shows Crussol using his close position alongside Catherine to good effect, which could evidently benefit him in the long-term. A later letter to Saint-Sulpice again reiterated their friendship and Crussol’s desire to aid him.

A letter to Gordes during the royal tour in February 1565 provides further understanding of Crussol’s noble networks, and the importance placed on being notified of current events. Crussol updated Gordes on the current news of the royal tour. He had also heard of certain incidents in Dauphiné but was assured of Gordes’s authority there.

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44 Cabié, Guerres de religion dans le sud-ouest de la France, v. This would be for Saint-Sulpice’s brother, who was in religious orders.
46 BNF, 500 Colbert 395, p. 237-240, ‘Letter of Jean de Morvillier to Bernardin Bochetel, 29 September 1564’. This section of the letter is also found in Castelnau, Les mémoires de Messire Michel de Castelnau, seigneur de Mauvissière, 1, 504.
47 ADT, 17 J 6, ‘Letter of Antoine de Crussol to Jean Ébrard seigneur de Saint Sulpice, 16 April 1564’. A section of this letter is found in Cabié, Ambassade en Espagne de Jean Ébrard, 253.
49 It is possible that Crussol mentioned these events to warn Gordes that they were known by the court.
urged Gordes to count him as one of his most affectionate friends and asked to be kept informed of events. As Crussol told Gordes of the news he had at his disposal, he wished for Gordes to do likewise.

In another letter in March 1565, Crussol again provided an update on the court’s progress and asked for Gordes’s news. He stressed to Gordes that he would never have a more obedient friend. Crussol spoke again of rumours of trouble in Dauphiné but reiterated his confidence in Gordes’s control over affairs. He mentioned that he was writing to his ‘brother’, the bishop of Gap (although a Protestant), Gabriel de Clermont, the brother of Louise, and asked Gordes to intervene with Clermont on Crussol’s behalf. In the postscript, written by Crussol’s own hand, he wrote, ‘above all I urge you to go every day to Mass and the Lenten fasts, in order that one does not say that you are a Huguenot, because one already says everywhere that you are a *homme de bien* and quite capable to be one of them’. He urged him to take guard.

This postscript is notable for what it says about Crussol himself and makes clear that there was a close friendship between the nobles. It helps to explain Crussol’s own religious convictions. Crussol warned his friend against being seen as a Protestant, which Crussol did not seem to consider himself to be. Although Dauphiné had a strong Protestant presence, he urged Gordes to take certain actions to emphasise his Catholicism. While Gordes had familial

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51 There also seemed to be trouble in Languedoc at this time, according to Crussol.


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links with the leaders of the Protestant party, which was an advantage in trying to pacify Dauphiné, it was necessary for him to assert his Catholic faith.54

A further letter to Gordes in February 1566 showed the importance of noble networks for the crown. Crussol first outlined the reconciliation of Coligny and Guise, and referenced the disruptive nature of this feud for the kingdom and the court.55 In supporting the royal will, he also endorsed the porteur, who was recommended to a position in the province by the monarchy.56 He asked that Gordes show him favour for Crussol’s sake, stressing that he would be in Gordes’s debt. Numerous letters left the court in February with the aim of recommending this porteur to Gordes, including from Charles IX, the queen-mother, and other nobles.57 This episode illustrates how the king’s wishes were conveyed to the frontiers, using Crussol’s court role and his noble networks to implement these.

An additional letter in June 1566 showed Crussol’s attempts to carry out favours for his friends. Being present at Saint-Maur-des-Fossés with the court, he asked if he could raise any issues with the monarchy on Gordes’s behalf or carry out any services for him, given the long royal stay there.58 As in his earlier correspondence with Saint-Sulpice, he affirmed his desire to aid Gordes as an ami, given their relatively similar social standing. An act of Crussol on behalf of the lieutenant-général of Dauphiné (since 1565) could evidently provide him with an opportunity to ask a favour in return, and consequently increase his own power.

54 Gal, Greengrass and Rentet, Bertrand de Gordes, lieutenant général du roi en Dauphiné, 31, 50. Two of Gordes’s own brothers were Protestant.
56 Ibid, fol. 176r-v.
58 BC, Série K, tome 5, fol. 246r-v, ‘Letter of Antoine de Crussol to Bertrand-Raimbaud de Simiane, baron de Gordes, 18 June 1566’. This letter is peculiar in that Crussol signed it as ‘Antoine de Crussol’ instead of merely as ‘Crussol’.

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Saint-Sulpice did recognise Crussol’s service to him, in a letter of March 1566.\(^5^9\) He and his wife thanked Crussol for intervening on the latter’s behalf at court, and reinforced their desire to serve him in return.\(^6^0\) Offering oneself to the other to serve them was a common trope in noble letters. Saint-Sulpice mentioned that he was unable to visit Louise de Clermont when his wife had visited her but hoped to do so soon, and this letter illustrates an affectionate noble friendship between the two families.

Crussol’s close relationship with Gordes was shown too in July 1566.\(^6^1\) Reporting his own news, he again expressed a desire to hear Gordes’s updates. Although Crussol wanted to visit Gordes, he did not wish to leave the present company for a long journey, preferring to remain alongside Charles IX and the queen-mother. A letter of Gordes to Crussol in November highlighted several of the characteristics seen in Crussol’s letters. Speaking of Crussol’s secretary Railhet, Gordes asked Crussol to preserve him in his rights in the province and help him obtain recompense.\(^6^2\) Similar to Crussol’s correspondence, Gordes mentioned passing on the news he had heard to Crussol. He signed off the letter as ‘your brother, humble friend and servant’.\(^6^3\)

Crussol also asked a request of Gordes in December 1567, while stressing that he would return the favour. This letter was concerned with the children of François d’Agout, the comte de Sault, who had been killed in the third religious war.\(^6^4\) Sault’s father had married the daughter of Crussol’s godmother, which may explain why Crussol wrote on the behalf of

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\(^5^9\) ADT, 17 J 7, ‘Letter of Jean Ébrard, seigneur de Saint Sulpice, to Antoine de Crussol, 7 March 1566’. This letter is partly transcribed in Cabié, Guerres de religion dans le sud-ouest de la France, 58.

\(^6^0\) Cabié, Guerres de religion dans le sud-ouest de la France, 57.

\(^6^1\) BC, Série K, tome 6, fol. 82r-v, ‘Letter of Antoine de Crussol to Bertrand-Raimbaud de Simiane, baron de Gordes, 12 July 1566’.

\(^6^2\) ADI, B2913 (2 Mi 50), fols 348r-349r, ‘Letter of Bertrand-Raimbaud de Simiane, baron de Gordes, to Antoine de Crussol, 12 November 1566’. Further information about this request (including Railhet being mentioned by name) is found in ADI, B2913 (2 Mi 50), fols 349r-351r, ‘Letter of Truchon to Monsieur de Valence, 11 November 1566’.

\(^6^3\) ADI, B2913 (2 Mi 50), fol. 349r, ‘Letter of Bertrand-Raimbaud de Simiane, baron de Gordes, to Antoine de Crussol, 12 November 1566’. ‘Votre frère humble amy et serviteur’.

\(^6^4\) Haag and Haag, La France protestante, vii, 454–55.
Sault’s children.65 As Crussol had ‘loved the late monsieur de Sault like myself’, he wished that his children were not harassed or impeded in their assets.66 He had already written to the comte de Tende, and asked that Gordes would write to Tende and monsieur de Carcès ‘in the most affectionate way that you can’, asking them to have the children in ‘particular esteem’.67 Crussol sought to use his friendship with Gordes to see this request carried out.

While considering Crussol’s role at court, and specifically his noble relations, it is important to take into account Louise’s role too, given that these were evidently linked. Louise had a close relationship with Catherine, which had originally resulted in Crussol gaining a position of influence near her. Having a prominent place at court, Louise was a useful ally for the queen-mother, given that she was, in addition, mentioned as being a messenger between Catherine and the Protestants. Although Louise was among Catherine’s fidèles, she wished to carry out services for, and provide news to, Queen Elizabeth of England.

In a letter to Elizabeth in February 1565, Louise had heard of ‘the good opinion’ that Elizabeth had of her.68 She emphasised her desire to carry out ‘some service being near to the Queen my mistress’, to maintain the friendship that was between Catherine and Elizabeth. Louise remarked that Catherine ‘loves you and thinks [of you] as the most perfect sister and friend that she has in the world’. This citation is a good example of the affectionate, yet misleading, language used by the nobility. If Elizabeth was satisfied with Louise’s suggestion, she would not pass up any occasion to ‘send you news’.69 Louise wished to act as an intermediary between Catherine and Elizabeth, and keep Elizabeth informed of events

68 TNA, SP 70/76, fol. 147r, ‘Madame de Crusol to Queen Elizabeth I, 29 February 1565’. ‘la bonne opinion’.
69 Ibid. ‘quelque service estant pres de la Royne ma maistresse’, ‘vous ayme et estime com[m]e la plus parfaicte seur et amye qu’elle aye au monde’, ‘vous mander des nouvelles’.
in France. This role could provide Louise with significant influence. Louise was not writing in secret, as Catherine was aware of her letter to Elizabeth.\footnote{David Potter, ed., ‘Letter of Michel de Castelnau, Sieur de Mauvissière to Catherine de Médicis, [9] May 1565’, in The Letters of Paul de Foix, French Ambassador at the Court of Elizabeth I, 1562–1566, Camden Fifth Series (Cambridge, 2019), LVIII, 251–55.}

In Elizabeth’s response in June, she pointed to the high esteem that she had heard Catherine held Louise in, and praised her ‘singular wisdo[m] and vertue [sic]’.\footnote{TNA, SP 70/78, fol. 164r, ‘Queen Elizabeth I to Madame De Crusole, 18 June 1565’. This letter is also in (written in French) AN, MC/DC/LVI/8, no. 20, ‘Lettre de la Reine d’Angleterre à Madame de Crussol, 18 June 1565 (incorrectly listed as 8 June)’; BNF, Nouvelles acquisitions fr. 9718, fol. 58r-v, ‘Letter of Elizabeth, Queen of England, to Madame de Crussol, 18 June 1565’; Aubais and Ménard, ‘Lettres des rois, reines, princes, & seigneurs à M. de Crussol’, 90.} She noted her obligation to Louise, if Louise employed herself to conserving the ‘syncer[e] and sisterly amity [friendship] th[a]t is betwixt us and the Quene [sic] [Catherine]’.\footnote{TNA, SP 70/78, fol. 164r, ‘Queen Elizabeth I to Madame De Crusole, 18 June 1565’.} This letter hinted at an international role for Louise, in maintaining close relations between Elizabeth and Catherine. This relationship had been tested through the English support for the Protestants during the civil war.

This relationship between Louise and Elizabeth continued for several years, though there was seemingly no more direct correspondence. In a letter written from Francis Walsingham to Lord Burghley in September 1571, he remarked that Elizabeth was ‘veary muche beholding’ to Louise.\footnote{TNA, SP 70/120, fol. 47r, ‘Francis Walsingham to Lord Burghley, 16 September 1571’.} Louise’s name is written in code, as the English did not wish her name to be widely known in connection to them. Walsingham asserted that Louise earnestly defended Elizabeth’s honour and thought of herself ‘muche bounde’ to Elizabeth.\footnote{Ibid.} He thought that thanks from Elizabeth would win Louise over to being a ‘good instrument’ for hearing of important news from France, the need for which he was well aware. He also made clear that Catherine was ‘muche governed’ by Louise, and thus suggested that
Elizabeth gave Louise a ring, stressing the profit that could come from this in the future. It is evident that Louise was viewed as an extremely useful source at the French court for the English crown and as having significant influence over the queen-mother in particular. While Catherine was aware of Louise’s original attempts to gain Elizabeth’s friendship, the English wished for this continuing relationship to be carried out in secrecy.

In winter 1571, Elizabeth’s thanks were finally passed on by Henry Killegrew, for the ‘good offices’ accomplished by Louise, who was asked that she continue these. In response, Louise indicated that where it pleased Elizabeth to employ her or her ‘husband’, interestingly involving Crussol, they would be ‘redy [sic] allways [sic]’ to carry out services. Louise’s and Crussol’s names were again written in code. She similarly offered to help the English in December 1571, and Killegrew recommended that a jewel be given to her, noting the importance of intelligence coming from such sources.

In a letter to Lord Burghley in January 1572, Killegrew wrote that Louise had assured him that Catherine wished for a ‘p[er]fayct [sic] amytye [sic]’ with Elizabeth, and recommended that Elizabeth send her a letter. This small extract is useful in showing the role played by Louise for Elizabeth, in improving the Anglo-French relationship. Killegrew recognised the need to maintain these links, through either a letter or a gift being sent to Louise. Between Crussol’s and Louise’s roles at court, it is clear they could wield considerable influence. Louise recognised the benefits of being a mediator for Elizabeth and Catherine, as well as providing the latest news to the English, although the overall success of her endeavours is difficult to gauge.

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75 Ibid. Walsingham stressed a similar point in a following letter (TNA, SP 70/120, fol. 87r, ‘Walsingham to Lord Burghley, 19 October 1571’).
76 TNA, SP 70/121, fol. 56r, ‘[Henry] Killegrew to Lord Burghley, 8 December 1571’.
77 Ibid.
78 TNA, SP 70/121, fols 105r-106v, ‘Henry Killegrew to Lord Burghley, 28 December 1571’.
79 TNA, SP 70/122, fol. 130r, ‘Henry Killegrew to Lord Burghley, 23 January 1572’.
Crussol’s correspondence with Saint-Sulpice and Gordes, along with Louise’s correspondence with Elizabeth, show them acting as typical French nobles. These interactions were an essential aspect of their roles at court. They offered favours for other nobles and informed them of news, in a clear expectation of the return being offered. Asking favours of other nobles was a key part of furthering noble power, while the importance given to passing on news from the court and elsewhere is evident. As shown through these letters, Crussol had close friendships with Saint-Sulpice and Gordes in particular. Proximity to Catherine and Charles meant a position of influence for him, and he was a useful asset for his amis. The monarchy also used the noble networks of Crussol and others to carry out its will, as shown by the example of the porteur of Crussol’s letter to Gordes.

Royal tour

Along with his correspondence with Saint-Sulpice and Gordes, the royal tour further shows Crussol acting out his court role, in accompanying the monarchy. This tour demonstrated the tightening of links between him and the crown. The royal tour commenced in January 1564, concluding in May 1566.\(^{80}\) The importance of pacifying the kingdom through enforcing the peace on the tour was highlighted by Charles IX, who wished ‘to bring order to all things necessary for the maintenance and observation of our peace edict’, which had not easily been accepted throughout France.\(^{81}\)

The royal tour went through most of the kingdom, concentrating on the major towns, as well as the peripheries and frontiers.\(^{82}\) The king had a considerable following during this voyage. Attending the tour could be expensive for the nobles, given their entourage, and most of them were not present for its entirety. Charles held conseil privé meetings regularly

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\(^{80}\) Daussy, Le parti huguenot, 534.
\(^{82}\) Roberts, Peace and Authority, 69.
and received ambassadors, as the court continued as normal.\textsuperscript{83} The king visited the \textit{parlements} and intervened in local elections, including in Nîmes.\textsuperscript{84} There were several \textit{lits de justice}, where the king personally sat in the \textit{parlement} to reinforce his authority and see the edict passed.

Royal entries into towns and collective urban festivities were an important part of this tour, which demanded extensive preparation on behalf of the towns. Charles IX performed a series of acts which emphasised his Catholic faith, including processions. Linda Briggs argues that he aimed to communicate that his religion should be the same as the people, and sought to legitimise his rule by carrying out rituals performed by his predecessors.\textsuperscript{85} Charles IX went to a cathedral or church to say the \textit{Te Deum} during the royal entries, and both he and Catherine attended Mass every day during the tour.\textsuperscript{86} Reformed practices were to be suspended in towns during the king’s presence.\textsuperscript{87} In light of Charles visibly presenting Catholicism as the true faith, it is important to consider what effect this had on Crussol. The king’s actions influenced his reasoning and behaviour after the conflict, and Crussol’s efforts to underline his Catholicism to Sainte-Croix and the monarchy occurred ten months into the tour.

Crussol’s attendance on the tour was sporadic according to the records of the \textit{conseil privé}, discussed in a later section. He was mainly present on the tour in his capacity as Catherine’s \textit{chevalier d’honneur} and as a \textit{conseiller} of the \textit{conseil privé}, though neither he nor Louise were overly visible on this voyage. The timing of his attendance was nonetheless significant. His consistent presence on the tour in the Midi in particular, such as in Languedoc

\textsuperscript{83} Jouanna, \textit{La France du XVIe siècle}, 422.
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid, 422–23.
\textsuperscript{86} Boutier, Dewerpe and Nordman, \textit{Un tour de France royal}, 295, 302.
and Dauphiné, indicated his importance in reinforcing the monarchy’s attempts to see the peace edict adhered to. Crussol’s accompaniment of Charles IX and the queen-mother could help to end provincial resistance to the edict’s application, given his authority during the war. As a member of the conseil, he could support the crown through his attendance at the *lits de justice* too. It was essential for Crussol to be visible on the tour to affirm publicly his loyalty to the monarchy, especially in the areas under his power as Protestant leader, and to respond to the criticisms of his previous conduct. The tour gave him the chance to repeatedly demonstrate his fidelity to the crown. In addition, his presence at Bayonne during the voyage revealed his political standing at court, as outlined further on.

Crussol was mentioned at Charles IX’s visit to Avignon in September 1564. Perussis recorded that the seigneur de Flassans had the honour to *faire la révérence* (greeting with respect someone who is ‘held in high consideration’) to Charles, and Fabricio Serbeloni, in presenting Flassans to the king, made them embrace at the same time as Crussol.88 Taking into account the importance of public actions, the embracing of Flassans and Crussol by the king at the same time both validated Flassans’s earlier conduct in the Midi, and lessened Crussol’s actions on his mission of December 1561, during which he had acted on the monarchy’s behalf. This may have been a deliberate move on Serbeloni’s part. For the king, this was an attempt at keeping the regional peace, as he sought to reconcile the opposing sides in Provence and Comtat-Venaissin.

Serbeloni had earlier defended his own conduct in a meeting of the *conseil privé* against numerous complaints.89 Crussol attended this meeting and could not have forgotten Serbeloni’s role in the death of his brother Charles. He was not present for the royal stay in

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88 BA, Ms. 2395, fol. 105r, ‘Entrée du roi Charles IX’. This is also in Aubais and Ménard, ‘Histoire des guerres du comté Venaissin, de Provence, de Languedoc par Louis de Perussis’, 74. The definition for *faire la révérence* was taken from <http://www.cnrtl.fr/definition/reverence>, [accessed 15/03/19]. ‘tient en haute considération’.
89 BNF, fr. 18156, fols 86v-87r, ‘Meeting of the conseil privé, 31 August 1564’.
Aix-en-Provence, according to the conseil privé records at least.\textsuperscript{90} He was presumably not a well-liked figure in the town, given his actions there in spring 1562.

Crussol also fulfilled a provincial role for the king in Languedoc. On 12 December 1564, Crussol and Louise prepared a meal at the château de Saint-Privat.\textsuperscript{91} After the meal, he presented ‘a pleasing collection of confitures to the king, and to all his company’, given by ‘nymphs’ hidden on the Pont-du-Gard.\textsuperscript{92} Charles then slept at Crussol’s territory of Florensac in the following month.\textsuperscript{93}

Additionally in December, the Spanish ambassador Francès d’Alava noted that he did not see Crussol attend a general procession through Montpellier.\textsuperscript{94} The Protestants had not been constrained to join this event.\textsuperscript{95} Alava’s observation is not enough to completely discount Crussol’s presence at the procession, but does raise interesting questions over his religious convictions, particularly as these ceremonies were one of the issues Crussol had raised with Calvin. Crussol’s efforts to highlight a Catholic faith in October had not yet meant that he was universally seen as a Catholic. His absence from the procession could suggest an awareness of his Protestant role in relation to his subjects, given that Montpellier was close to his Reformed-influenced territories. His general presence in the city may have been an attempt to aid the king in seeing this edict enforced, as mentioned earlier. Crussol’s provincial role was further illustrated through his intervention on behalf of Uzès in January.

\textsuperscript{90} The conseil privé records, are not, however, a completely reliable indicator of Crussol’s presence in a place.
\textsuperscript{91} Boutier, Dewerpe and Nordman, \textit{Un tour de France royal}, 157; Pierre Champion, \textit{Catherine de Médicis présente à Charles IX son royaume}, 1564-1566 (Paris, 1937), 181. This castle was partly owned by Crussol, who had ceded half of the castle and domaine of Saint-Privat to Jacques Faret in 1555 (Jules Bonnet, ‘La réforme au château de Saint-Privat’, 549n). Crussol also rendered hommage to Charles IX here (Bonnet, ‘La réforme au château de Saint-Privat’, 549).
\textsuperscript{92} Abel Jouan, \textit{Recueil et discours du voyage du roy Charles IX} (Paris, 1566), fol. 29v. ‘une belle collation de Co[n]fitures au Roy, et à toute sa compaignie’, ‘Nymphes’. This event is similarly mentioned in Champion, \textit{Catherine de Médicis présente à Charles IX son royaume}, 1564-1566, 181. Jouan, \textit{Recueil et discours du voyage du roy Charles IX}, fols 31v, 29r; Bonnet, ‘La réforme au château de Saint-Privat’, 548. The king stayed at Serignac or Sernhac in December, which may too have been a territory belonging to Crussol.
\textsuperscript{93} Champion, \textit{Catherine de Médicis présente à Charles IX son royaume}, 1564-1566, 191.
\textsuperscript{94} Philippi, ‘Histoire des troubles de Languedoc par Jean Philippi’, 112.
1565, as shown by a letter of Catherine to Henri Montmorency-Damville, the governor of Languedoc. She asked Montmorency-Damville to remove the garrison in Uzès, as Crussol had informed Catherine of the town’s poverty and assured her that there would be no more civil disorder.\(^{96}\)

Crussol’s role as Catherine’s chevalier d’honneur, and as a member of the conseil privé, was displayed in his support for Charles IX’s enforcement of the edict in the parlements. He accompanied the king and Catherine into the Toulouse and Bordeaux parlements during the king’s lits de justice, in February and April 1565 respectively.\(^ {97}\) In Bordeaux, Crussol was to help investigate a request relating to the conciergerie and other issues, although these were of minor importance.\(^ {98}\)

However, the event of the tour which best illustrated the close ties between Crussol and the monarchy was the former becoming the duc d’Uzès, at Mont-de-Marsan in May 1565. His key role in the kingdom was now marked by a prestigious position. It is worth exploring why Crussol was given the title at this particular moment.\(^ {99}\) As the monarchy met the Spanish representatives shortly after at Bayonne, the king and the queen-mother could have used the awarding of Crussol’s duchy to signal the restored unity of the kingdom, following the civil war. Additionally, they used this act to tie Crussol’s loyalties firmly to the crown, underscoring his reliance on them. Although Crussol had emphasised his Catholic faith, this decision perhaps also sought to separate him from the Protestant faction at court.

Crussol had devoted considerable effort to present his actions as being loyal to the king, and the tour enabled Catherine to cement Crussol’s fortunes to those of the monarchy. It is not

\(^{96}\) BNF, fr. 3202, fol. 66r, ‘Letter of Catherine de Médicis to Henri de Montmorency-Damville, 14 Jan 1564/1565’. This letter is similarly found in LCM, II, 251.

\(^{97}\) Théodore Godefroy and Denis Godefroy, eds., Le cérémonial François, II, 589, 578. As Crussol was in Dijon during the royal tour in May 1564, he presumably also attended the king’s lit de justice there.

\(^{98}\) Ibid, 585.

\(^{99}\) The court stayed fifteen days in Mont-de-Marsan (Jouan, Recueil et discours du voyage du roy Charles IX, fol. 41v). 

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clear whether anyone else was raised to a title at this time, although a new host of nobles had been appointed into the order of Saint-Michel while the court was in Toulouse.

This royal act, which raised the *vicomté d’Uzès* to a *duché*, highlighted the grandeur of Crussol’s family, praising its prior royal service, and presented Antoine’s own loyalty. It recorded one hundred and fifty *seigneuries* and territories being in the *vicomté*. Most of these properties and jurisdictions were located around Uzès, although there were some important places further afield, such as Florensac and Pomérols near Agde. His future purchases of alienated church land complemented these existing possessions. The *duché* would return to the monarchy if Antoine, Jacques, and Galiot (his remaining brothers), all died without male heirs. Having a current yearly revenue of 10,000 *livres tournois*, Antoine’s new territory was calculated as providing a future revenue of 15,000 *livres* per year. The act additionally noted the judicial privileges he had on his land, which included appointing officers to the judicature.

As mentioned earlier, Crussol was also present for the discussion with the Spanish representatives at Bayonne in summer 1565, at which the Protestants nobles were absent. Although Catherine had told Philip II that neither Condé nor Jeanne d’Albret would be present at Bayonne, the Spanish ambassador Alava was shocked to see Crussol and Jean de

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100 ADHG, B 1907, fol. 24r–v, ‘Lettres [sic] patentes du Roy Contenant érection du vicomte d’uzès en duché en faveur de mess[ieu]r anthoine de crussol’. Other copies of this act are found in AN, 265 AP 53, Dossier 2, No. 3, ‘Copy of an act of Charles IX raising the viscount of Uzès to a duchy, 26 May 1565, and its publication in the Toulouse parlement’; ADD, B32 (2 M1 102), ‘Erection de la viscomte d’uzes en duche au mois de mai 1565’. It is also printed in Albiousse, *Histoire des ducs d’Uzès*, 329–34; Sainte-Marie and Fourny, *Histoire généalogique et chronologique de la maison royale de France*, III, 740–42. There are minor differences between these documents. The AN copy includes a discussion of the text in the parlement at Toulouse before it agreed to publish the decree, the parlement finally publishing it on 26 March 1566, almost a year later. The act was to be published in the *Chambre des Comptes* at Montpellier and in the sénéchaussée of Beaucaire and Nîmes too.

101 It outlines both the *terres* and *seigneuries* under Crussol’s control, as well as those he simply had jurisdiction over.


103 This prediction of 15,000 *livres* took further purchases into account, although it is unclear whether this was set as a limit for Crussol’s income from his territories.

104 Ibid, fol. 25v.
Monluc, the bishop of Valence, lodged in the town. While the monarchy saw Crussol as a moderate, not part of the Catholic or Protestant factions at court, this opinion was not shared by the ambassador, who viewed him as a ‘heretic’. In order to combat these factions, Catherine wished to advance nobles who relied on the crown, such as Crussol and Monluc. Crussol’s presence here was significant as it indicated his separation from the Protestant faction, and may have been an attempt to distance himself from being viewed as a Protestant generally. After July 1565, he was not mentioned as being on the royal tour until January 1566. This section of the tour was less relevant to Crussol, as the king left the Midi shortly after Bayonne. He returned for the influential assembly at Moulins in the following year, where his role as a powerful noble at court was again shown.

Present at Moulins from December 1565 to March 1566, the crown wished to ‘cap its programme of administrative and judicial reform by means of a major ordinance’. Thus, an assembly of great nobles was called in January 1566, Crussol being among those attending. Coligny’s innocence in the death of the duc de Guise was also proclaimed by an arrêt of the conseil privé on 29 January, Crussol being present at this séance. Although this event did not mark the end of this feud, it was now declared settled by the monarchy.

The royal tour thus sheds considerable light on the various roles of Crussol for the monarchy. His official positions as Catherine’s chevalier d’honneur and on the conseil privé were displayed through his support for the monarchy during the lits de justice. As well as bolstering support for the crown in these charges, Crussol fulfilled a provincial role in the

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105 Champion, Catherine de Médicis présente à Charles IX son royaume, 1564-1566, 259.
107 Boutier, Dewerpe and Nordman, Un tour de France royal, 277.
109 De Thou, Histoire universelle, v, 178–79; Ibid. De Thou mentions the presence of ‘Jacque [sic] comte de Crussol’, but this is surely a mistake.
southern provinces through lending authority to the monarchy’s attempts to enforce the edict, given his previous position as Protestant leader in Languedoc and Dauphiné. In Avignon and Bayonne, Crussol acted as a visual sign of the reconciliation and restoration of unity in France following the war, particularly through the meeting with his main adversary in Comtat-Venaissin, Serbeloni. Welcoming the court to his territories was another part of his provincial role. The tour tied Crussol’s fortunes even closer to the monarchy, most notably shown through his new title of duc. The extended period of time with Catherine and Charles enabled Crussol to reinforce his loyalty, and their satisfaction with him was clear.

In addition, the royal emphasis on the Catholic identity of the monarchy on the tour influenced Crussol’s decision to stress his Catholic faith in his conversations to Sainte-Croix. The presentation of Catholic sympathies was part of his attempt to affirm his obedience to the monarchy. Visiting the sites of his rebellion against the crown, and presumably hearing complaints against his actions, was uncomfortable for him, though the tour did not dent Crussol’s image in the eyes of the monarchy. While the period of the voyage shows again the difficulty in defining Crussol’s religious convictions generally, he put forward a Catholic identity, even if he was not present at the Montpellier procession.

Conseil privé

Concluding the analysis of Crussol’s multi-dimensional role at court, his attendance on the conseil privé helps to form a more rounded picture of this position. While the conseil des affaires was the most intimate circle of nobles around the king, dealing with matters of governance, the conseil ordinaire or conseil privé dealt with administrative or financial issues. Crussol’s first time on the conseil privé was under Charles IX at the start of his reign,

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on 7 December 1560.\textsuperscript{112} This new conseil represented a change from the rule of François II, as Catherine gained significant power in the government due to the young age of Charles IX.\textsuperscript{113} The queen-mother had control over opening the king’s letters, which gave her increased influence over royal policy.\textsuperscript{114}

At the Estates General at Orléans, which shortly followed Charles’s accession to the throne, a group of nobles expressed their preference for Catholic conseillers being on the conseil privé, wishing to omit those ‘who do not have the honour of God and of the holy Catholic church... in consideration’.\textsuperscript{115} In their request, they removed six names from the conseil privé. According to Noël Valois, the names removed were of nobles who were leaning towards Protestantism, and Crussol was one of those omitted.\textsuperscript{116} While Valois is correct in drawing this conclusion, which indicates that Crussol was not viewed as a firm Catholic in late 1560, it is curious that Coligny, despite his clear Protestant position, was nonetheless included in their list, perhaps as he was too important a figure to be omitted from the conseil.

Conseillers were to say an oath upon taking up their new roles, and generally had a wage of two thousand livres, sometimes with a supplementary pension.\textsuperscript{117} Other privileges included lodging at court, a place at the king’s table, and certain tax exemptions. Conseillers were to regularly attend the conseil and to act with discretion concerning conseil proceedings.\textsuperscript{118} They were to receive pensions solely from the king, and not from other

These conseils are also outlined in David Potter, A History of France, 1460-1560: The Emergence of a Nation State (Basingstoke, 1995), 99–103.
\textsuperscript{112} BNF, Clairambault 647, fol. 46r-v, ‘Seance de ceulx du Conseil du Roy l’an, 1560, au commencement du regne du Roy Charles IX, 7 December 1560’; Valois, Le conseil du roi aux XIVe, XVe et XVIe siècles, 181. Crussol does not seem to have been among those in the conseil des affaires under any king.
\textsuperscript{113} Valois, Étude historique sur le conseil du roi, 92.
\textsuperscript{114} Boutier, Dewerpe and Nordman, Un tour de France royal, 214.
\textsuperscript{115} Louis-François Barrois, Recueil des cahiers généraux des trois ordres aux états-généraux. Tome Premier: États d’Orléans en 1560 (Paris, 1789), 262. ‘qui n’ait l’honneur de Dieu et de la sainte église catholique... en recommandation’.
\textsuperscript{116} Valois, Étude historique sur le conseil du roi, 93.
\textsuperscript{118} Valois, Étude historique sur le conseil du roi, 115.
nobles. Conseil privé records remain for the period between November 1563 and September 1567. Valois has analysed these remaining procès-verbaux and has drawn up a list of the noble attendance, which is overall poor. Out of the two hundred and five séances which took place, only five conseillers attended at least half these meetings. Crussol himself was present at sixty-one meetings. His attendance was irregular, and he was absent for long stretches of time.

In an attempt to reduce the number of people attending the conseil privé meetings, Charles removed over twenty figures from the conseil in February 1566, Crussol being among these. However, as he was barely present at the meetings from July 1565 to February 1566, this was not a great loss to the conseil. As shown by his removal from the conseil, Crussol was a fidèle of Catherine as opposed to Charles. Despite being removed, Crussol was present at two conseil meetings in January 1567, and at later meetings in September 1568, November 1569, and October 1570. This analysis supports that of Valois, who noted that the king’s ruling did not have any effect, as these figures continued to be present.

The conseil privé continued to convene during the royal tour, on an average of once a week, although there were large intervals between some séances. The most influential group on the conseil was the politiques or the moderates, which included Crussol. He did

119 Ibid.
120 Valois, Le conseil du roi aux XIVe, XVe et XVIe siècles, 187–88.
121 Ibid, 189.
122 BNF, Clairambault 647, fol. 48r-v, ‘Les noms de ceulx qui nentreront plus au conseil prive pour y avoir este mis depuis la mort du roy henry, 21 February 1566’; Valois, Étude historique sur le conseil du roi, 103, 103n.
124 Valois, Le conseil du roi aux XIVe, XVe et XVIe siècles, 192. This is also supported by the example of the sieur de Gonnor, who was present at conseil meetings in November and December 1566, despite being removed from the conseil privé.
125 Boutier, Dewerpe and Nordman, Un tour de France royal, 198; Ibid, 187. Out of 196 places in which the king stayed during the tour, the conseil only met in twenty-seven of these.
126 Valois, Le conseil du roi aux XIVe, XVe et XVIe siècles, 195, 197.
not attend all the conseil meetings in the particular places the court was staying, presumably due to being preoccupied with his role for Catherine.\textsuperscript{127} However, not all the great nobles were ever present, and some of the conseil meetings were quite small. As highlighted earlier, Crussol dipped in and out of the tour, being present at the start and the end, and in most of the main stages in between, especially in the Midi.\textsuperscript{128}

The conseil records also offer an opportunity to view Crussol’s relative importance, stemming from his title as comte de Crussol, and then as duc d’Uzès. When Crussol is noted as the duc d’Uzès, he appears on the list of conseil attendees ahead of the maréchaux de France and the bishops. However, he is behind Henri d’Anjou (the king’s brother), the cardinal de Bourbon and the duc de Montpensier (both princes of the blood), the cardinal de Guise, the duc de Nevers (presumably for the reason that Nevers became a duc first), the connétable, and the chancelier Michel de l’Hôpital.\textsuperscript{129} As the sieur de Crussol, he was noted after the admiral, the maréchaux, and several other conseillers, including certain bishops.\textsuperscript{130} Crussol is only referred to as the duc d’Uzès in conseil privé meetings from January 1567 onwards, while in February 1566 he was still noted as the sieur de Crussol. It is difficult to say why he was still referred to by his former title almost a year after becoming the duc d’Uzès.

\textsuperscript{127} For example, although the court spent a significant amount of time in towns such as Toulouse and Troyes, Crussol was not present for all these conseil meetings.

\textsuperscript{128} According to the conseil privé records, he was present for most of the main stages. He was at Paris in January 1564 at the start of the tour; Troyes in March and April; Châlons-en-Champagne in April; Langres, Chartres and Dijon in May; and Mâcon and Lyon in June and July. He was present in Romans and Valence in August, which is unsurprising given the proximity of Valence to his territory of Crussol. He was in Avignon in October, at Montpellier in December, and at Toulouse in February and March 1565. He accompanied the court at Bordeaux in April and May, and Saint Jean de Luz in July. He was present in Moulins in January and February 1566. Out of the months of the royal tour, Crussol was present in January 1564, March-June 1564, August 1564, October 1564, December 1564, February to May 1565, July 1565, and finally January to February 1566.

\textsuperscript{129} BNF, fr. 18156, fols 201v-202v, 'Meeting of the conseil privé, 2 January 1567'; fol. 216r-v, 'Meeting of the conseil privé, 31 January 1567'.

\textsuperscript{130} BNF, fr. 18156, fol. 1r-v, 'Meeting of the conseil privé, 3 January 1563/1564'; fols 115v-116v, 'Meeting of the conseil privé, 7 July 1565'; fols 154v-156r, 'Meeting of the conseil privé, 22 February 1566'.
Crussol had a prestigious position in serving on the conseil, and similar to his role as Catherine’s chevalier d’honneur, being on this body gave him access to the king. Unfortunately, it is difficult to gauge the role Crussol played on the conseil, which is not outlined by the records themselves. Whatever his influence on the conseil consisted of, it was not considerable enough to attend after February 1566, despite his new title. It is unclear how much of a slight on his character this decision would have been. Although he was back on the conseil a few times after this date, he was not an integral part of the conseil generally. Overall, Crussol had a very limited role in the governance and administration of the kingdom, also being absent from the conseil des affaires. The opposition of the Catholic nobles to Crussol’s appointment to the conseil privé in 1560 again reinforced the public perception of Crussol as a Protestant, some time before the first civil war.

Conclusion

Through the years 1563-1567, Crussol’s fortunes were tied firmly to those of the monarchy, while his return to favour marked an important step in the restoration of his relationship with Charles and Catherine. Crussol’s presentation of a Catholic faith was part of his attempt to emphasise his loyalty to the crown after the war, with his Protestant adherence firmly in the past. There would be no further question of Crussol rebelling against the monarchy.

In his rehabilitation before Catherine and Charles, Crussol was keen to defend his conduct, and more generally his honour, in the tense atmosphere at court. As shown by his letter to Saint-Sulpice, Crussol wished to justify his actions against several slanders. To protect his honour, Crussol relied on the support of amis such as Saint-Sulpice. While this period marked the end of Crussol’s Protestant sympathies, his statements to the nuncio Sainte-Croix are not overly convincing concerning both his reasoning for entering the war and his Catholic faith generally. As this chapter has revealed, Crussol was publicly perceived as a Protestant, both before and after the war.
The royal tour allows us to view the main chapter themes being played out. Crussol’s presence on the tour increased his standing in the eyes of the monarchy and indicated his importance in aiding the crown to enforce the edict, in a provincial role. This voyage had a defining part in Crussol firmly emphasising a Catholic faith, following the overt religious behaviour of Charles. The monarchy used royal favour to restore and bind noble loyalty, as shown through Crussol’s rehabilitation and new title, which increased his social standing significantly. Catherine wished to promote figures who owed their favoured position to the monarchy as opposed to one of the powerful court factions.

Crussol’s multi-dimensional court role, seen through his noble relationships, his position as Catherine’s chevalier d’honneur, and his presence on the conseil privé, further outlines his interaction with the monarchy. His friendships with Gordes and Saint-Sulpice, along with Louise’s relationship with Elizabeth, were useful for both the monarchy and Crussol and Louise’s amis. These roles including carrying out favours and informing correspondents of news at court, which could extend Crussol and Louise’s own influence. Although, as mentioned earlier, the use of affectionate language in noble correspondence makes it difficult to determine the nature of noble relationships, Crussol had a close friendship with Saint-Sulpice and Gordes.

Having a prestigious position as a conseiller in the conseil privé, Crussol should be viewed as one of the moderates on this body, and was indeed a moderate before the war, not being particularly zealous despite his Protestant sympathies. The extensive procès-verbaux of the conseil do not provide much information on his general position at court, where he was certainly a powerful figure, due to his wide-ranging and varied role. By the end of this period, 1563-1567, Crussol is shown to be a loyal servant of Catherine and Charles, with his religious convictions now aligned with those of the crown and his Protestant adherence firmly in the past.
Chapter 8: A trusted relationship, 1566-1573

Being firmly back in royal favour with the conclusion of the grand tour, Crussol’s influence at court only increased. During the last years of his life, 1566-1573, he reached the high point of his prestige, becoming a peer of the kingdom. In considering the overall theme of Crussol’s relationship with the monarchy, it is during this period that his loyalty is shown to be very securely fixed to the crown. This was a trusted relationship. There was no question of Crussol joining the Protestants in the second, third and fourth wars, and the restoration of royal confidence in Crussol since his participation in this first conflict was now complete. Although he was often absent from court during these years (despite his role as Catherine’s chevalier d’honneur), the monarchy was nonetheless certain of his obedience.¹

Keeping in mind this royal trust in Crussol, this chapter considers his relationship with the crown through a variety of themes. Crussol proved useful to the monarchy in dealing with several important issues. His role at court, as chevalier d’honneur or as a member of the order of Saint-Michel, first saw him take part in a number of royal or civil ceremonies, while his prominence further increased through becoming a peer. The resumption of the civil wars provides an opportunity to see how the monarchy employed Crussol: through his support of the edict of Saint-Maur in 1568, intervening on the monarchy’s behalf to prevent his brothers joining the wars, and aiding the siege of La Rochelle in 1573.

This chapter also examines Crussol’s provincial power and how this interacted with his royal role, such as his intervention to aid a favourite of Catherine’s and his charge from the towns of Valence and Nîmes. He could act as a conduit for the provinces towards the monarchy. While these events highlighted Crussol’s personal authority, they stressed, in addition, his integral provincial role on the crown’s behalf. The reception given to him in Valence, Nîmes, and Uzès, similarly illustrated his prestige. Finally, this period shows Crussol

¹ Albiousse, Histoire des ducs d’Uzès, 79.
maintaining or extending his own influence, outside of his royal role and in a solely provincial capacity. This was carried out through the safeguarding of his territories, his appointment of provincial figures, and most notably his purchases of alienated Catholic church lands. Crussol did not now rely on Catherine as much for advancement, being a prestigious figure in his own right. Despite the numerous royal tasks he accomplished, his relationship with the queen-mother in particular was less tightly bound than in previous years. These themes additionally shed further light on his attitude to the Protestants. After outlining these aspects, the chapter will finish in 1573 with Crussol’s death, following his involvement at La Rochelle. Crussol was centrally involved in many important events of this period, and his actions provide more information about the wider context of France during this time.

Role at court

Crussol’s primary role at court was his position as chevalier d’honneur, which involved taking part in numerous royal and civil ceremonies. For instance, he was present alongside Catherine at the king’s entry into Metz in February 1569, during the third civil war. It was here that the king received word of the royal victory at the battle of Jarnac, which resulted in the death of Louis de Condé. For the marriage ceremony between Charles IX and Elisabeth of Austria in November 1570, Crussol led the queen-mother to the church at Mézières.

Crussol’s membership of the order of Saint-Michel meant that he took part in at least two royal ceremonies during these years. In September 1570, he attended a general procession from the abbey of Saint-Geneviève in Paris, wearing a large collier to signify his

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3 Jouanna, La France du XVIe siècle, 462; Godefroy and Godefroy, Le cérémonial François, ii, 25. During the meal following the ceremony, Crussol acted as panetier to the queen-mother, serving her bread. Charles and Elisabeth also had high nobles serving them as panetiers (Godefroy and Godefroy, Le cérémonial François, ii, 26).
membership of the order.\textsuperscript{4} The procession concluded with a Mass in Notre-Dame.\textsuperscript{5} Crussol similarly attended the \textit{fête} of the order of Saint-Michel, in September 1572 at Paris.\textsuperscript{6} Given that processions were specifically mentioned by Crussol in his correspondence with John Calvin, it is notable that he was fully participating in Catholic processions by this date.

Crussol’s position as chevalier d’honneur was also highlighted in the marriage negotiations between Henri de Navarre and Marguerite de Valois in August 1572. He was involved in the closing stages of the discussions between Catherine and Jeanne d’Albret, Henri’s mother. Armand de Gontaut, the seigneur de Biron, had conducted marriage negotiations on Catherine’s behalf since early 1571, and Crussol took over this role from Biron by March 1572.\textsuperscript{7} Given that these final discussions were face to face, it is understandable why Crussol would have taken an increased role, given his position alongside Catherine. He had the honour of leading the queen-mother to the marriage itself, which took place in August.\textsuperscript{8} His involvement in the marriage was similarly indicated by a cryptic letter to the king, seemingly following the wedding, in which he mentioned that Marguerite had locked herself in her room.\textsuperscript{9} Although the details of this incident are unclear, Crussol’s role alongside Catherine, whom he promised to bring safely back to Charles IX, is emphasised.


\textsuperscript{5} This procession was ordered by the king to ask God to stop illnesses and the current bad rains (Godefroy and Godefroy, \textit{Le cérémonial François}, II, 958).

\textsuperscript{6} Albousse, \textit{Histoire des ducs d’Uzès}, 81.


\textsuperscript{9} BNF, fr. 3189, fol. 35r, ‘Letter of Antoine de Crussol (« M[onsieur] d’Uzès ») to Charles IX, 1572’. Although Jacques de Crussol is noted as being the author in the BNF catalogue, it seems more likely to be Antoine.
The infamous Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacres followed the celebration of this royal wedding. Despite his position at court, Crussol did not overly appear in these events. However, there were more family losses for him, as although his brother Jacques was saved, Galiot was assassinated. François de Cardaillac, the seigneur de Peyre and the husband of Antoine’s sister Marie, was killed too. Unfortunately, we can only speculate about the effect of these deaths on Crussol, who had now lost three brothers to civil-war-related violence.

As demonstrated in the previous chapter, his proximity to Catherine made him a useful figure for those who wished to solicit favours from the queen-mother. This position was recognised by Charles IX, who asked him to intercede with her on his behalf in July 1573. Charles wished that someone be provided with the office of receveur, as Catherine was responsible for filling this position. Crussol’s favour in Catherine’s eyes meant that Charles could benefit from this relationship.

Crussol’s role for the monarchy was primarily recognised through the raising of the duchy of Uzès to a pairie, or peerage, in January 1572. Being a pair of France was the highest noble rank and a considerable honour. This award was the crowning moment of Crussol’s

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10 Concerning Crussol’s role in these events, he was seemingly absent from the conseil privé meetings when it was decided to assassinate the Protestant nobles, on 23 August, although he was in Paris at this time (Jouanna, The Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre, 104, 104n). He was not among the nobles who were with the king when he went to see Gaspard de Coligny after he had been shot (Denis Crouzet, La nuit de la Saint-Barthélemy: un rêve perdu de la Renaissance, Chroniques (Paris, 1994), 383).

11 Du Boys, Album du Vivarais, 93; De Thou, Histoire universelle, vi, 402, 411; Janine Garrisson, 1572: La Sainte-Barthélemy (Paris, 1987), 193; Crouzet, La nuit de la Saint-Barthélemy, 406. While Du Boys mentions that Jacques was saved after being alerted by Antoine, De Thou asserts that he was spared on the order of Catherine, at the consideration of Antoine, and by the Guise. Janine Garrisson argues that it was Henri de Guise who saved him. However, Albin Mazon argues that Jacques escaped death through sheltering in Antoine’s room, and by promising to abjure his faith (Francus [alias Albin Mazon], Voyage autour de Crussol, 182).

12 Albiousse, Histoire des ducs d’Uzès, 56.

13 AN, MC/DC/LVI/8, No. 28, ‘Le roi Charles à M[onsieu]r le Duc d’Uzès, 3 July 1573’.

14 Richard A. Jackson, ‘Peers of France and Princes of the Blood’, French Historical Studies, 7/1 (1971), 28. Only six families had the prestige of being a duc and pair by 1589, a role which had a number of benefits (Goossens, ‘Entre service du roi et ambition personnelle, entre protestantisme et catholicisme’, 106).
relationship with the crown. From being the *baron* de Crussol and *vicomte* d’Uzès in 1556, he had become the *comte* de Crussol, the *duc* d’Uzès, and a *pair* of the kingdom by 1572. It was a remarkable rise in power, over a short period of time. Crussol’s impressive elevation sets him apart in this period for such a rapid increase in influence, perhaps with the exception of Louis de Gonzague, the *duc* de Nevers. Being listed among the *pensionnaires du Roy*, Crussol also received 10,000 *livres* in this year.\(^\text{15}\)

In the official document conferring the title, Crussol is mentioned as being a *chevalier de l’ordre du roi* [of Saint-Michel], captain of fifty *hommes d’armes*, and *conseiller* in the king’s *conseil privé*.\(^\text{16}\) The king granted him the title of ‘*pair de France*’ due to the service of his predecessors and that of his own family. After discussing the matter in the *conseil privé*, Charles IX decreed that Crussol and his successors would hold the duchy of Uzès ‘in all rights, names, titles, rank, privileges, precedence, pre-eminence and rights of peerage’.\(^\text{17}\) Similar to the ducal act in 1565, if Antoine, Jacques, and Galiot died without male children, these titles would return to the crown. This rise in power rewarded Crussol’s devotion to the monarchy, especially since the civil wars had started again in 1567. As outlined further on in the chapter, he did not take up arms against the crown. Although he was not provided with any official positions during this time, such as a lieutenant-generalship, and was seemingly denied the governance of Metz, he was nonetheless rewarded for his obedience to the crown.\(^\text{18}\)

Crussol was involved in numerous events due to his court role, generally through his position as *chevalier d’honneur*, accompanying Catherine to two notable marriages, and playing a role in marriage negotiations in 1572. He had an influential position at court, as

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\(^{15}\) BNF, fr. 7007, fol. 68v, ‘Estat des pensionnaires du Roy e[n son] espargne... en lannee mil cinq cens soixante douze’.

\(^{16}\) Sainte-Marie and Du Fourny, *Histoire généalogique et chronologique*, III, 743–44. Crussol is mentioned as a *conseiller* of the *conseil privé*, despite being taken off this body in 1566.

\(^{17}\) Ibid, 744. ‘en tous droitz, noms, titres, qualitez, prérogatives, presséances, prééminences et droits de Paire’.

\(^{18}\) *Histoire ecclésiastique*, III, 598.
shown through the king’s request to him concerning the office of receiveur, his continued command of a military company, and numerous incomes received from the crown.\textsuperscript{19} His participation in the processions at Paris as a member of the order of Saint-Michel marked him as a close companion of the king, and underlined his prestige. Becoming a peer of the kingdom completed his rise to power and validated his continued show of loyalty to the crown since his Protestant adherence.

Civil wars

Crussol played an important royal role during the second, third and fourth civil wars. These conflicts illustrated his close links with Catherine in particular, and his value to the crown. Having been heavily involved in the first civil war, he was only indirectly engaged in the second and third conflicts (1567-1568 and 1568-1570 respectively), while he intervened directly in the fourth war (1572-1573).\textsuperscript{20}

Along with supporting the royal edict of Saint-Maur, Crussol was employed by the monarchy to convince his brothers to abstain from war, and he also aided the crown’s efforts to capture the Protestant stronghold of La Rochelle. These wars showcased the importance of Crussol’s royal role. During this period he was still being reminded of his previous position as Protestant leader in the first civil war, due to the royal investigation into the Protestant receiveurs’ accounts in January 1567, as shown earlier.\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{19} BNF, fr. 20507, fol. 108v, ‘Estat Abreige du Paiement dela gendarmerie Po[u]r trois quartiers de lannsee mil v c[ens] soixante six’; BNF, fr. 3410, fol. 88v, ‘Departement des Compaignyes de gendarmerye et des lieus ou elles sont ordonnees po[u]r tenir garnison Ensemble des Gentilhom[mes] depetzes par le Roy a en faire les monstres Pour les quartiers de [left blank], 23 March 1567’; BNF, fr. 27432 (Pièces originales 948), fol. 82r, ‘Certification of Antoine de Crussol for having received a pension, 6 June 1567’; BNF, fr. 27432, fol. 83r, ‘Certification of Antoine de Crussol having received his estate, 30 November 1567’; BNF, fr. 27432, fol. 85r, ‘Certification of Antoine de Crussol for having received his estate, 12 July 1569’.

\textsuperscript{20} According to La Popelinière, Crussol played a role in the third war in winter 1568, in destroying the bridges in the Loire region to prevent the Protestants from crossing the river, among other defensive measures. However, this is difficult to verify (La Popelinière, L’histoire de France, 1, fol. 74).

\textsuperscript{21} ADH, 1 B22547, fol. 1r, ‘Certification of Antoine de Crussol, 30 January 1567’.
various times during the second and third civil wars, he was largely based on his own territories.\textsuperscript{22}

Crussol’s support for the crown was first displayed through his presence at Saint-Maur-des-Fossés, near Paris, along with other members of the conseil privé, in September 1568. The conseil privé was not complete at this time, due to the absence of the Protestant leaders. Here, Crussol witnessed the king signing the edict of Saint-Maur, which reversed previous royal policy and implemented much stricter conditions for Protestants. The edict revoked the peace of Longjumeau which ended the second war in March 1568. Reformed worship was banned and pastors were to leave France, although liberty of conscience was allowed.\textsuperscript{23} This edict was stated as being a lasting decree, which demonstrated Charles’s intentions towards the Protestants, who were described as ‘rebels’.\textsuperscript{24} Given that Charles was now capable of leading his own government, these harsh restrictions perhaps expressed his own opinion towards the Reformed confession.\textsuperscript{25}

The edict provided the full list of nobles present at its signing, which emphasised the noble support for these articles. Most of the other edicts relating to the wars did not have a complete list of the conseil members present. Crussol’s attendance again reinforced the severe break with his previous Protestant adherence, making clear his support for both the edict and its conditions against the Protestants. As he had been taken off the conseil privé in 1566, and only attended intermittently since then, his presence here suggests that the crown wished to affirm the support it had for this edict, especially given the absences of those who had left the conseil due to the war, either to join the Protestants or retire to their estates.

\textsuperscript{22} Crussol was certainly absent from court in May 1570, being in Tonnerre, and he asked the seigneur de Saint-Sulpice to pass on a letter to Catherine, for which he would be in his debt (ADT, 17 J 7, ‘Letter of Antoine de Crussol to Jean Ébrard seigneur de Saint Sulpice, 19 May 1570’). A summary of this letter is also found in Cabié, Guerres de religion dans le sud-ouest de la France, 155.


\textsuperscript{24} Daussy, Le parti huguenot, 606. ‘rebelles’.

\textsuperscript{25} Turchetti, ‘Middle Parties in France during the Wars of Religion’, 176.
Crussol was also mentioned in a conseil meeting in November 1569, hearing a royal representative report his discussions with the Protestant leaders.26

Perhaps the most notable of Crussol’s charges for the monarchy concerned his brothers, who fought with the Protestants during the wars.27 Another reflection of the degree to which the crown now entrusted him was that Catherine used Crussol to prevent his brothers joining the war. In a letter to him in February 1567, the queen-mother had heard that his brothers Beaudiné and Galiot had assembled an ever-increasing number of troops, with these soldiers perhaps being on the move soon. They additionally sought to levy funds daily.28

Beaudiné referred to Jacques de Crussol, although Galiot was in possession of the title at this time.29 Jacques took on the name of Assier or Acier after the death of his mother, Jeanne de Genouillac, in May 1567.30 Following Jeanne’s death, Antoine was now the official head of the family, although, perhaps crucially, not at the time of Catherine’s letter in February. Her death meant that he could take a firmer stance in preventing his brothers fighting against the crown, having more authority in family affairs. Catherine’s letter to him is a good example of the tense situation in France, bringing news of Protestant mobilisation, as it was written seven months before the outbreak of the conflict.

Speaking of this action on their part, Catherine wrote ‘I am assured [that you] would not advise them [to do this] if [you] were there, but on the contrary would make them walk

26 TNA, SP 70/109, fol. 18r, ‘Advertisements from France, 24 November 1569’.
27 As referring to Antoine de Crussol in this section by the name ‘Crussol’ would become confusing given that his brothers feature heavily here, I will refer to him as Antoine throughout.
29 Galiot had this title by the year 1566 at the latest (ADV, 2 E 9 /110, No. 11, fol. 1v, ‘Testament of Jeanne de Genouillac, 31 December 1566’).
another way’. While Catherine was assured that ‘they will obey all that [you] command to
them’, she asked him to write them a letter, remarking that this action was not the king’s
intention, and did not follow his laws. In a postscript, she urged him to ‘make known clearly
to your two brothers that they might govern themselves in another way and that they might
follow your path and not do what it is said they are doing’. She additionally alluded to the
consequences of his brothers’ present course. Catherine hoped that they would follow
Antoine’s advice, which had always been for ‘the service of the king and the peace of the
kingdom’.

This letter attested to the crown’s view of Crussol’s role, seeing his actions and
advice as being on its behalf. He is shown to be its loyal subject and was asked to intervene
in this provincial and family matter. His path is portrayed as the correct one in this letter.
Given his authority, the monarchy wished for him to resolve this issue and prevent his
brothers from joining the war. Galiot was a guidon and homme d’armes in Antoine’s
company, which raised the question whether he would not have known about Galiot’s recent
actions. Catherine was perhaps admonishing him for not paying enough attention to
Galiot’s behaviour. Unfortunately, the role of Antoine’s company during these latter wars is
unclear.

Despite Catherine asking Antoine to persuade his brothers to abstain from war,
Jacques nonetheless raised troops in the Vivarais, while he and Galiot informed Nîmes about

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31 BNF, Nouvelles acquisitions fr. 9718, fol. 59v, ‘Letter of Catherine de Médicis to Antoine de
Crussol, 22 February 1567’; ‘je m’assure [vous] ne leur conseillerez [sic] pas si [vous] étiez de par
dela, mais au contraire les ferez marcher d’une autre façon’.
32 Ibid. ‘ils croiront du tout ce que [vous] leur manderez’, ‘bien faire entendre à vos deux frères qu’ils
se gouvernent d’autre façon, et qu’ils suivent votre chemin et non pas de faire ce que l’on dit qu’ils
font’. This letter and its copy in ‘Lettres des rois, reines, princes, & seigneurs à M. de Crussol’ has
‘votre chemin’, while the AN copy has ‘autre chemin’. The former seems more likely.
33 BNF, Nouvelles acquisitions fr. 9718, fol. 59v, ‘Letter of Catherine de Médicis to Antoine de
Crussol, 22 February 1567’. ‘le service du Roi et repos du Royaume’.
34 AN, MC/DC/XCIII/2, No. 25, ‘Receipt of payment to Galiot de Crussol for his état of guidon and
homme d’armes, 8 June 1567’.
the Protestant uprising planned for September.\textsuperscript{35} Jacques also carried Condé’s orders through the regions of the Bourbonnais, the Auvergne, the Vivarais and Lower Languedoc.\textsuperscript{36} Antoine’s brothers, in taking up a differing position to his own stance and disregarding his order to avoid entering the conflict, marked a clear divide in the Crussol family. Jeanne’s position as head of the family when Catherine sent this letter gave Jacques and Galiot more freedom in disobeying Antoine, although Antoine presumably reiterated this royal order following his mother’s death. Antoine’s relationship with his brothers was reflected through his relationship with the crown, and this is a good example of how his royal position interplayed with and influenced his provincial and family roles. There could be conflict between noble family ties and loyalty to the crown, which were difficult to reconcile. Antoine’s obedience to the king took precedence over his family loyalties. Taking up an opposing side to the head of the family was often a way for a younger noble to achieve his own prominence.

Antoine was also involved in the third war through paying Jacques’s ransom, after he was captured at the battle of Moncontour in October 1569.\textsuperscript{37} He was taken hostage by the comte de Santa-Fiore, and Antoine agreed to pay 10,000 écus, a considerable sum.\textsuperscript{38} Santa-Fiore, the papal commander, protected Jacques’s life against the express papal orders he had not to spare any Protestants.\textsuperscript{39} In November, Jacques was handed over to Charles IX,

\textsuperscript{35} Tulchin, \textit{That Men Would Praise the Lord}, 161; Du Boys, \textit{Album du Vivarais}, 93.
\textsuperscript{36} Daussy, \textit{Le parti huguenot}, 577. During the third war, Jacques was in charge of an army of 22,000 men and 1500 horse, while Galiot led a regiment of soldiers (Du Boys, \textit{Album du Vivarais}, 33, 93; Jean de Serres, \textit{Mémoires de la troisième guerre civile, et des derniers troubles de France} (Unknown, 1571), 228).
\textsuperscript{37} AN, 265 AP 54, Dossier 22, No. 3, ‘Request of Jacques de Crussol to Charles IX, 1570’.
\textsuperscript{38} AN, 265 AP 54, Dossier 22, No. 1, ‘Pour la prison de ... seigne[u]r d’Assier en lan 1569 contenant promesse par led[i]c[t] s[ieu]r faicte au ... Roy de ne bouger de prison sans son expres coma[n][d]emen[t]’.
\textsuperscript{39} Haag and Haag, \textit{La France protestante}, iv, 134; De Thou, \textit{Histoire universelle}, v, 639.
who gave him to Antoine as prisoner. Jacques promised to remain Antoine’s prisoner until freed by the king. He pledged not to hinder the king during his captivity through aiding the Protestants. The king permitted Jacques to retire to Antoine’s territory of Tonnerre. Following the peace edict of Saint-Germain in 1570, Jacques asked to be set free from this imprisonment without paying a ransom, as according to this edict, Charles freed Jacques in response, noting that he had fulfilled the conditions set out when he became a prisoner. However, the king ordered that Jacques nonetheless pay this ransom. Antoine played an important role in this process. His confidence in the eyes of the monarchy made him very useful to Charles and Catherine in forming an agreement with Jacques, who was, at the time, one of the most influential Protestant military leaders.

Although a lack of sources prevents a full outline of Antoine and Jacques’s relationship, there does not seem to have been any tension between them. A good example of this is Antoine’s pledge to pay Jacques’s ransom. Similar to the noble Lacger family in Raymond Mentzer’s study, religious divisions were not permitted to disrupt family solidarity. Further evidence of an amicable relationship is displayed in the marriage of Jacques to Françoise de Clermont, the niece of Louise and daughter of the vicomte de Tallard, in 1568. This marriage was carried out through Antoine’s consent as head of Jacques’s family,

40 AN, 265 AP 54, Dossier 22, No. 1, p. 3, ‘Pour la prison de ... seigne[u]r d’Assier en lan 1569 contenant promesse par led[ic]t s[ieu]r faicte au ... Roy de ne bouger de prison sans son expres coma[n]d[emen]t’.
42 AN, 265 AP 54, Dossier 22, No. 3, ‘Request of Jacques de Crussol to Charles IX, 1570’.
43 AN, 265 AP 54, Dossier 22, No. 4, pp. 2-7, ‘Letter of Charles IX to Jacques de Crussol, 5 October 1570’.
44 Ibid, p. 5. Although some historians mention that Jacques did not have to pay a ransom, this is incorrect. While La France protestante mentions that Jacques had to pay a ransom (Haag and Haag, La France protestante, iv, 134–35), most sources consider that no ransom was paid (De Thou, Histoire universelle, v, 639–40, Albiousse, Histoire des ducs d’Uzès, 97–98, Daussy, Le parti huguenot, 620).
45 Daussy, Le parti huguenot, 620.
and attempted to maintain the alliance between the houses of Clermont and Crussol, given that Antoine and Louise had no children.47

The royal worry over Jacques’s engagement in war again appeared during Antoine’s presence at the siege of La Rochelle. In a letter in April, Charles informed Crussol that he had heard that Genevan pastors had been appealing to the Dauphiné Protestants, spreading false news, and that some Protestants were now preparing to fight against him.48 Charles had learned that Jacques had been strongly solicited to join them, but had responded negatively to their offer. However, the pastors continued to put pressure on him. Although Charles expressed his confidence that Jacques would not betray the oath he had sworn to Antoine, the king asked him to prevent Jacques joining the Protestants. This oath had been pledged by Jacques in September 1572. Jacques had asked Antoine to assert his loyalty to the king and had pledged to obey all of Charles IX’s commands and edicts, only taking up arms on his order.49 This example again reiterated the confidence that the monarchy had in Antoine’s loyalty. Antoine’s proximity to the crown meant that Jacques could more readily emphasise his fidelity and earn royal favour.

There was evidently a fear that Jacques would again join the Protestants, and Antoine proved a useful royal conduit for having an assurance of Jacques’s loyalty. In May 1573, Catherine wrote that the king had investigated Jacques’s stance, presumably through Antoine, with which he was satisfied.50 Charles’s worry that Jacques would join the

47 ADV, 2 E 9/82, ‘Mariage de Messire Jacques de crussol et dame francoise de Clermont, 20 August 1568’; Haag and Haag, La France protestante, iv, 135. Jeanne de Genouillac was opposed to this potential match, although her reasons for this are unclear. In her will of 1566, she made Jacques the main inheritor of her estates, on the condition that he would not marry Françoise (ADV, 2 E 9 /110, No. 11, Testament of Jeanne de Genouillac, 31 December 1566’). Antoine had been the main inheritor of their father’s estates.
48 AN, MC/DC/LVI/8, No. 27, ‘Le roi Charles à M[onsieur]r le Duc d’Uzès, 15 April 1573’.
49 AN, 265 AP 54, Dossier 22, No. 6, ‘Certification of Jacques to Crussol, 6 September 1572’.
50 BNF, fr. 2704, fol. 60r-v, ‘Letter of Catherine de Médicis to François de Mandelot, 25 May 1573’. This letter is also in LCM, x, 318–19.
Protestants was in the end unfounded.\textsuperscript{51} Catherine herself did not doubt that the Protestants had often appealed to him to join their party.

Antoine had been very aware of the danger of Jacques fighting for the Protestant cause, as revealed by a letter in November 1572. Writing to Honrar de Savoie, the marquis de Villars, and now the admiral of France and the lieutenant-général of Guyenne, he spoke of his dissatisfaction with the Protestants having captured some of Jacques’

\textsuperscript{52} s territories. Antoine mentioned that if he thought that Jacques’s presence would aid Villars, Jacques would employ himself there willingly, a statement which highlights Antoine’s authority in his family. In Antoine’s opinion, however, given that Jacques had ‘made a Catholic profession of faith’, it would not be a good idea to send him.\textsuperscript{53} This letter suggests that Antoine did have an underlying concern about Jacques joining the Protestants.

What is striking in the royal correspondence with Antoine concerning his brothers is that, as mentioned earlier, Charles and Catherine had significant confidence that he would not join the Protestants a second time, which again illustrates the close relationship between the monarchy and Antoine. Although he similarly retired to his lands during at least some of these wars, the monarchy did not consider that he would take up the Protestant defence, and sought instead to use his family influence to prevent Jacques and Galiot taking part in the conflict.

The final aspect of the wars in which it is possible to see Crussol fulfilling a royal role was his presence at the siege of La Rochelle. The Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacres had led into the fourth civil war, and a royal siege was launched on the town, which began properly in February 1573. For the first time since 1563, Crussol was directly involved in the

\textsuperscript{51} Du Boys, \textit{Album du Vivarais}, 94.
\textsuperscript{52} BNF, fr. 3257, fol. 39r, ‘Letter of Antoine de Crussol to Honorat de Savoie, the Marquis de Villars, 12 November 1572’.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid. ‘faict profession Catholique’.
wars. In January, Henri de Valois, the duc d’Anjou, and lieutenant-général of France, requested the great French nobles to bring their military companies to La Rochelle before the end of the month, using all means necessary to bring the troops on time and avoid delays. However, Anjou, having left Paris with Crussol and a host of nobles, only arrived there in February.

In a letter to Crussol in March, who was still at the siege, Charles IX mentioned the recent death of the duc d’Aumale there. As the king’s brothers had not been thinking of their own welfare, and had put themselves in danger, the king wished for Crussol to speak to his brothers on this matter. He was to show them a good example in rendering service to Charles. In the later letter to Antoine in April, Charles signalled his contentment with his service alongside his own brother at the siege, which he urged him to continue. Crussol clearly had an important advisory role, also reflected by the peace of La Rochelle, or the édit de Boulogne, which ended the fourth civil war in July. In the preamble of this edict, he is among the nobles mentioned as advising Anjou about the peace articles.

Crussol carried out several essential functions for the monarchy during these civil wars. As well as supporting the edicts of Saint-Maur and Boulogne, his influence over his

54 BNF, fr. 15556, fol. 139r-v, ‘Letter of Henri de Valois, the duc d’Anjou to the duc d’Alençon, the marquis du Pont, the comte de Vaudémont, monsieur de Tavannes, duc de Nevers, duc d’Uzès, Monsieur de Mortemart, Monsieur de La Tour, 27 January 1573’; De Thou, Histoire universelle, vi, 634. This letter is also in Pierre Champion, Michel François and Jacqueline Boucher, eds., Lettres de Henri III, roi de France, 8 vols (Paris, 1959-2018), I, no. 715. The letter seemingly reiterated an earlier command of Anjou to these nobles.
56 AN, MC/DC/LVI/8, No. 26, ‘Le roi Charles à M[onsieur] le Duc d’Uzès, 8 March 1573’.
57 Charles gave the same task to the duc de Montpensier (Desormeaux, Histoire de la maison de Bourbon, iv, 548).
58 Crussol also received 550 livres in April 1573 during this siege, for his état of military captain and for three months quarter (BNF, fr. 27432 (Pièces originales 948), fol. 84r, ‘Certification of Antoine de Crussol having received estate and pension, 8 April 1573’).
younger brothers was employed to persuade them not to join the Protestant war effort, although this attempt was unsuccessful at first. While the monarchy was satisfied with Crussol’s general abstention from the wars, it nonetheless attempted to use his authority for its benefit. Given that Crussol was from a Protestant milieu and had numerous Reformed areas of control in his territories, withdrawing from the wars was not altogether straightforward and it was important for him to maintain good relations with the Protestants. While Crussol’s presence at La Rochelle was due to a general convocation of the nobility, the king clearly viewed him as a figure of influence, using him to speak to Henri, as well as to his own brother Jacques, all to aid the war effort. These examples reinforce Crussol’s authority as a prestigious noble, who could carry out useful tasks for the crown.

Royal role in the provinces

Crussol’s royal position also intersected with his considerable power in Languedoc and Dauphiné. He maintained royal interests in these provinces, as reflected through the examples of Catherine’s request concerning Simon Fizes and his own appeal to the baron de Gordes. Crussol acted as a conduit for the provinces towards the crown, in Valence and Nîmes. As illustrated by his activities on behalf of these towns, he was a voice for the provinces at the court. His entries into Nîmes and Uzès likewise demonstrated his elevated position in the kingdom.

Given Crussol’s prestige in the southern provinces, he was a suitable figure for upholding the royal will. In September 1566, Catherine asked him to intervene in a situation involving Simon Fizes, a secrétaire d’État, and Guillaume Pellicier, the bishop of Montpellier. The queen-mother had heard of certain efforts to prevent Pellicier and Fizes

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60 AN, MC/DC/LVI/8, No. 22, ‘La reine Catherine à Mr le Duc d’Uzès, 8 September 1566’. This letter is also in LCM, x, 180. Crussol’s absence from court in August 1566 is shown by a letter of Catherine to him (AN, MC/DC/LVI/8, No. 21, ‘La reine Catherine à Mr le Duc d’Uzès, 8 August 1566’).
carrying out security measures concerning the barony de Saulve. Fizes had bought this barony from Pellicier through the sale of ecclesiastical assets in 1563.\textsuperscript{61} As this acquisition was disputed, and Catherine had heard that those who were pursuing Fizes claimed they had Crussol’s favour, she asked him not to support these people. Unfortunately, Crussol’s response to Catherine does not survive. Catherine saw him as useful in resolving issues in Languedoc, although he did not have an official position there. There could be tension between Crussol’s provincial interests, and those of the crown, if these conflicted. This episode can additionally be viewed as a reprimand by Catherine, making clear the superiority of the royal will.

Crussol’s royal role in the provinces could also be seen through his correspondence with Gordes, as the crown again used this relationship to carry out its will. In May 1570, Crussol asked Gordes for a favour relating to the place of Châteauvieux, near to Gap.\textsuperscript{62} Louise de Clermont presumably had a considerable amount of influence in this area, given its proximity to her family’s territory of Tallard, while her brother was the bishop of Gap, as seen earlier. Antoine first thanked Gordes for the help he had given at Châteauvieux, presumably relating to military relief. He asked that Gordes would always have Châteauvieux ‘in consideration’, seemingly in relation to a judicial matter concerning the conseillers of the parlement, and a criminal process of which the king had taken jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{63} He outlined the pleasure that the king would take from Gordes’s actions. Crussol’s closing subscription in this letter reiterated his closeness to Gordes, describing himself as ‘your obedient brother,

\textsuperscript{61} Louise Guiraud, Le procès de Guillaume Pellicier, évêque de Maguelone-Montpellier de 1527 à 1567 (Paris, 1907), 171n; Jouanna, La France du XVIe siècle, 427. Pellicier had originally given the land to a noble, but Fizes acquired it by adjudication publique (Guiraud, Le procès de Guillaume Pellicier, évêque de Maguelone-Montpellier de 1527 à 1567, 171n).
\textsuperscript{63} BC, Série K, tome 12, fol. 254r, ‘Letter of Antoine de Crussol to Bertrand-Raimbaud de Simiane, baron de Gordes, 1 May 1570’. ‘en Recommanda[tion]’.
companion and perfect friend’. This minor example again highlights the crown’s use of noble networks to carry out its commands.

Both Crussol’s royal role in the provinces and his own extensive provincial influence are demonstrated through the attitude of the town of Valence towards him. He was evidently still in favour with the consuls during the second civil war, when the Protestants again controlled the town, and long after his own Protestant adherence. He was mentioned in the consul deliberations in January 1568, during the war, being given a gift of wine for the ‘many favours for the town’ he had carried out. Although Crussol’s elevated position demanded respect, it is notable that these Protestant consuls during wartime viewed him favourably, and he did not have a hostile relationship with the Protestants generally. This was perhaps due to Crussol being viewed as a Protestant, as reflected in his later letter to Gordes, or the continued benefit to be gained by the Protestants from his position at court.

Crussol was residing on his lands at Charmes during this time, which was extremely close to Valence. The consuls decided to visit Crussol often, mentioning the amitié (friendship) that he had for the town.

At the end of February, as the Valence consuls had learned that Crussol would leave soon for court, they met him before he departed. Crussol was presumably heading to court to witness the signing of the edict of Longjumeau, which ended the second war, in March 1568. Accompanied by a number of important figures from the town, the consuls would faire la révérence to Crussol, and ask him ‘to have in particular consideration the poor town of Valence’ at court. The consuls wished for him to highlight the town’s plight, recognising the

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64 Ibid. ‘v[ot]re obaissant frère Compagno[n] et parfit [sic] amy’.
65 Arnaud, Histoire des protestants du Dauphiné aux XVIe, XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles, 1, 218.
66 AMV, BB 8, fol. 55v, ‘Conseil de la ville de Valence, 7 January 1568’. beaucoup [sic] de faveurs à la ville’.
67 AMV, BB 8, fol. 68r, ‘Conseil de la ville de Valence, 27 February 1568’.
68 Ibid. ‘d’avoir en singuliere recomenda[t]ion la pauvre ville de valen[ce].
value of using him as their voice at court. Crussol was an asset to the crown in bringing up such provincial issues, alerting it to the requests from the provinces and keeping it informed of the most current news, as well as providing these regions with a conduit. It is notable that Crussol was not solicited by the Protestants to join their side, as was the case during the first civil war.

At Crussol’s entry into Nîmes in June 1567, the consuls had debated how they should receive him. These deliberations are again useful in seeing how consuls viewed the role of powerful nobles vis-à-vis the fortunes of the town. It was decided by the conseil that the consuls and several others would give him a present of wine and fruit, going to his lodging to faire la révérence, and asking him to have the town ‘in consideration’, similar to the request from Valence. The consuls remarked that Crussol was a ‘voisin’ to the town, for which he could ‘do a lot of good’, both in court and elsewhere. The deliberations also stressed the ‘grandeur’ of Crussol’s social standing, being a duc, a chevalier de l’ordre du roi, and on the conseil privé. He was still viewed as a member of this conseil.

Crussol’s prestige was further affirmed through his arrival at Uzès in June 1567, shortly before or after his entry into Nîmes. This was clearly a large event. He was accompanied by Louise de Clermont, her brother Gabriel de Clermont, the bishop of Gap, and a madame de Thoury, who was possibly another relation to Louise. Along with these figures, he was accompanied by ‘many other great seigneurs and ladies, captains and gentilhommes’, town magistrates, consuls, and inhabitants, amounting to over two thousand people. A sonnet was presented to him, which praised, among other aspects, his noble

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69 ADG, E Dépôt 36/128, fol. 172r, ‘Conseil de la ville de Nîmes, 13 June 1567’. ‘en Recomanda[t]ion’.
70 Ibid. ‘f[air]e beaucop [sic] de bien’.
71 ADG, 2E 71 322, fols 299r-300v, ‘Entree d’Anthoine comte de crussol et de tonnerre et premier duc duzes aud[ict] uzes, 15 June 1567’.
72 Haag and Haag, La France protestante, III, 502–3.
qualities. This considerable welcome emphasised how much Crussol had acquired through royal favour, which had provided him with a high position in the province.

These examples indicate the useful provincial role that Crussol played for the monarchy, maintaining its links with Languedoc and Dauphiné, through Crussol’s voice on the provinces’ behalf, as well as its interests. The situations relating to Fizes and Gordes demonstrated the interplay between royal and regional influence in Languedoc, as the crown sought to carry out its will using noble networks, perhaps superseding Crussol’s own wishes in the case of Fizes. These examples additionally show the prestige that Crussol had gained through his fidelity to the monarchy, and the importance of viewing him in his provincial context. His royal relationship had led him to becoming a duc and peer of the kingdom, which reflected well on Uzès and Lower Languedoc. While this thesis views Crussol primarily through his interaction with the crown, it is nonetheless necessary to consider his position as a high noble in his own right.

Provincial influence and interests

During this period, Crussol also attended to provincial administrative matters, along with increasing his own personal authority in the provinces. He maintained his properties through appointing figures to govern them, and through his attempts to protect these territories from the effects of war. His extensive purchase of land increased his prestige in the region and provided him with a substantial zone of influence.

Antoine and Louise’s comté of Tonnerre was more practical for their attendance at court than their southern territories. This comté was an important region which needed to be administered correctly. Crussol appointed Nicolas Pithou, one of his clients, to the
position of bailli and governor of the comté in 1572. Pithou, a Protestant lawyer, later fled France due to the Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacres. His brother Pierre, who had abjured the Reformed faith, took over this position in his stead. It is notable that Antoine and Louise originally placed a strong Calvinist figure in this position, especially since the town of Tonnerre remained Catholic in this period, and this decision would have caused tension.

The renewal of the civil wars posed a new threat to the safety of Crussol’s own territories and subjects. In the third war, he made arrangements to protect his lands in Crussol through the états particuliers de Vivarais in August 1569. His influential court role meant that he could not always see to provincial affairs, such as attending these états particuliers or the Languedoc provincial estates. A representative was often sent in his place, as mentioned in the first chapter. At this assembly in 1569, his deputy presented letters of safeguard, which exempted his lands of Crussol from the passing of soldiers. The états in reply stressed that they did not intend to impede Crussol in these letters being enforced.


77 Grosley, Vie de Pierre Pithou; avec quelques mémoires sur son père, et ses frères, I, 161.


79 Auguste Le Sourd, Les États du Vivarais, de leurs origines à la fin du XVIe siècle (Chalon-sur-Saône, 1899), 2; Abel Hugo, France Pittoresque, 3 vols (Paris, 1835), I, 161. Sending a representative in your stead was not always straightforward, as shown by Crussol’s representative being turned away from the 1570 Languedoc estates due to an invalid procuration (ADHG, 1 C 2282, fols 188v–189r, ‘Estats Generaux du pais de Languedoc Assembles du Mandement de Monseigneur de dampville mareschal de france en la ville de beaucaire au Moys de Novembre mil cinq cens soixante dix (1570)’).

80 ADA, C 333, fol. 70r, ‘Délibérations des États du Vivarais, 17 August 1569’.
There were also royal soldiers stationed in his lands during the war, in his castle at Charmes.\(^8^1\)

The timing of Crussol’s presentation before the assembly, in the midst of the war itself, suggests that his lands had already witnessed the passing of troops, which he intended to prevent in the future.

However, in a revealing letter to Gordes a month after this request to the états, Crussol was outraged at attacks by royal troops on his territory.\(^8^2\) He informed Gordes that his houses had been ‘sacked and pillaged’, with his subjects ‘killed, massacred, and put to ransom’. He was aware that these soldiers, instead of executing ‘faithfully the king’s service’, ‘carry out many violences [sic] and oppress the good subjects of his majesty’. Crussol was seemingly referring to his lands in Dauphiné. In order ‘to avoid such disorders and keep my subjects in peace under the authority and obedience’ of the king, he sent a representative with a royal commission to be in command there.\(^8^3\) Similar to the first civil war, royal troops had mistreated Crussol’s lands and subjects, and it is notable that he did not adopt the same measure he previously used to maintain his subjects in peace, taking up arms against the crown.

In a postscript, Crussol added ‘do not fear any longer to write to me because monsieur de Montpensier [presumably Louis de Bourbon, the duc de Montpensier] loves me well and, also, I am not a Huguenot as all have thought, because I am good and Catholic, French and Christian’.\(^8^4\) Although the connection with Montpensier is not clear (presumably relating to him in his role as governor of Dauphiné), Crussol firmly asserted that he was not

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\(^8^1\) ADA, C 333, fol. 120r, ‘Délibérations des États du Vivarais, 16 December 1569’. He was not paying these troops, having obtained a royal exemption.

\(^8^2\) BC, Série K, tome 12, fol. 71r, ‘Letter of Antoine de Crussol to Bertrand-Raimbaud de Simiane, baron de Gordes, 12 September 1569’.


\(^8^4\) ibid. ‘ne creignes [sic] plus de m’escrire car monsieur de Montpensier m’ayme bien Et aussi Je ne suis pas huguenot Com[m]e tous a pensé Car Je suis bon et Catolique francoys et Crestien’.
a Protestant.\textsuperscript{85} This perception of Crussol as a Protestant had evidently continued until 1569, and perhaps resulted in his territories being sacked. He viewed himself as being Catholic and ‘Christian’, as well as ‘French’, the inference being that a Protestant did not share these characteristics.\textsuperscript{86} Crussol’s closeness to Gordes was affirmed as he again closed the letter as ‘your very good brother, companion and perfect friend always’.\textsuperscript{87} His territories were once more captured during the fourth civil war, as the Protestants occupied Pomerols and Florenscac.\textsuperscript{88}

Although Crussol’s influence was largely defined through his proximity to the crown, and to Catherine in particular, the chief method that he used to increase his own prestige and provincial importance in this period was through his considerable purchase of Catholic church land. His most notable acquisition was the principality of Soyons near to his lands at Crussol, becoming the prince de Soyons. Extensive Catholic land was sold throughout France to pay for the substantial royal debts during the Wars of Religion, through seven different aliénations.\textsuperscript{89} The Catholic clergy had signed the ‘Contract of Poissy’ in October 1561, in which they had offered to aid the king in writing off royal debts over a period of sixteen years.\textsuperscript{90} However, as this agreement did not provide Charles IX with the necessary funds, he decided to sell church land in May 1563. The amount sold was to create rentes of a total value of 100,000 écus per year.\textsuperscript{91}

\textsuperscript{85} Knecht, The French Civil Wars, 1562-1598, 313.
\textsuperscript{86} However, Catholic does not necessarily mean Roman Catholic, and the French Catholic church had maintained a strong degree of independence from Rome during the sixteenth century.
\textsuperscript{88} Knecht, The French Civil Wars, 1562-1598, 179.
\textsuperscript{90} Mark Greengrass, Governing Passions: Peace and Reform in the French Kingdom, 1576-1585 (Oxford; New York, 2007), 289; Jouanna, La France du XVIe siècle, 567.
\textsuperscript{91} Jouanna, La France du XVIe siècle, 426–27. According to Jouanna, one écu was worth 2 livres and 10 sous at this time. The interest on this was just over eight percent.
The aliénations were a type of rente foncière, where a perpetual annual income was given to the person who alienated the land, by its new proprietor.\textsuperscript{92} The value of landed property was usually assessed at thirty times its annual revenue.\textsuperscript{93} The sum assigned for each aliénation was divided up between the different ecclesiastical dioceses, and Protestants were among those who purchased land in the first aliénation.\textsuperscript{94} The second aliénation, which was accorded by a papal bull, took place in August 1568, which was quickly followed by a third later that year.\textsuperscript{95} The money raised was to be used for war and the maintenance of the royal armies, and this property was not allowed to be sold to Protestants, unlike in the first aliénation.\textsuperscript{96} The assets available for purchase generally included land and property, as well as judicial and economic rights.\textsuperscript{97}

Crussol bought clerical assets especially during this third aliénation, in 1570 and 1571.\textsuperscript{98} Most of these purchases were in the diocese of Uzès, along with others in the diocese of Nîmes and in the province of Dauphiné. The majority of his acquisitions were from priories or abbeys, although he also purchased property from the bishops of Uzès and Valence. Among the documents that made up each sale, there was a royal act ratifying the purchase, a similar act of the cardinals who signed off on the sale, and an act by the commissaires who

\textsuperscript{92} Ralph E. Giesey, ‘Rules of Inheritance and Strategies of Mobility in Prerevolutionary France’, \textit{American Historical Review}, 82/2 (1977), 273. This annual income was based on a percentage of the land’s worth, which corresponded to the interest. There were two types of rentes, or annuities, in early modern France, the rente foncière and the rente constituée. While the former was a perpetual annuity received in exchange for the alienation of land or property, the latter was instead exchanged for a capital sum (Ibid).

\textsuperscript{93} Potter, \textit{Foreign Intelligence and Information in Elizabethan England: Two English Treatises on the State of France, 1580-1584}, 14.


\textsuperscript{95} While the second aliénation permitted the king to raise 150,000 livres of revenue, the third wave of aliénations sanctioned 50,000 écus of rente (Cloulas, ‘Les aliénations du temporel ecclésiastique’, 19–20).

\textsuperscript{96} AN, 265 AP 62, Dossier 4, No. 670/4, p. 4, ‘Liste et Comission [sic] des biens temporels Exposés en vente, 20 April 1569’.

\textsuperscript{97} Cloulas, ‘Les aliénations du temporel ecclésiastique’, 25.

\textsuperscript{98} However, Crussol did order an enquiry into the assets of the bishopric of Uzès in October 1563, seemingly without making any acquisitions (AN, 265 AP 62, Dossier 4, No. 670/2, ‘Enqueste faicte par nous francois Ranchin.... Pour la partie de Messire anthoine conte [sic] de crussol et tonnerre, 19 October 1563’).
had agreed the auction of the property. The property belonged to Crussol and his heirs in perpetuity.\textsuperscript{99}

Crussol generally did not make expensive acquisitions. He often bought \textit{seigneuries}, which comprised of a ‘landed estate of variable size and a judicial area’, along with economic rights.\textsuperscript{100} As outlined by Arlette Jouanna, the \textit{seigneurie foncière} (referring to the land itself), could be separated from the \textit{seigneurie publique}.\textsuperscript{101} The judicial system was part of the \textit{seigneurie publique}. It is not always clear whether Crussol bought both parts of a \textit{seigneurie}, or simply one of them. Most of his purchases were to acquire seigneurial jurisdiction, gaining either outright or shared jurisdiction in fourteen towns or villages, although the mention of several economic rights indicates that he also acquired land.\textsuperscript{102} These purchases provided Crussol with extensive influence in these territories and cemented his regional importance.

Taking over seigneurial jurisdiction meant accepting control over the seigneurial courts, which were run by officials known as \textit{baillis}, \textit{procureurs}, and \textit{greffiers}.\textsuperscript{103} Crussol often purchased the \textit{haute}, \textit{moyenne} and \textit{basse} jurisdiction of a town. \textit{Haute} or high justice enabled the \textit{seigneur} to judge civil and criminal cases, and could include death sentences.\textsuperscript{104} \textit{Moyenne} or middle justice included the adjudication of cases which imposed fines of up to sixty \textit{sols}, while \textit{basse} or low justice dealt with incidents having maximum fines of six \textit{sols}.\textsuperscript{105}

\textsuperscript{99} AN, 265 AP 62, Dossier 4, No. 670/7, ‘Liste des biens temporels Exposes en vente, 8 May 1570’.
\textsuperscript{100} Knecht, \textit{The French Civil Wars, 1562-1598}, 9; Salmon, \textit{Society in Crisis}, 39.
\textsuperscript{101} Jouanna, \textit{La France du XVIe siècle}, 98.
\textsuperscript{102} An example is found in AN, 265 AP 62, Dossier 4, No. 663/5, ‘Royal letter ratifying Antoine de Crussol’s purchase from the priory of Les Vans, 13 February 1571’; No. 663/6, ‘Letter of the cardinals of Lorraine, Bourbon, and Pelleve, ratifying Antoine de Crussol’s purchase from the priory of Les Vans, 6 February 1571’; No. 663/4, ‘Letter of the commissaires ratifying Antoine de Crussol’s purchase from the priory of Les Vans, 29 November 1570’.
\textsuperscript{103} Knecht, \textit{The French Civil Wars, 1562-1598}, 9.
\textsuperscript{104} Salmon, \textit{Society in Crisis}, 40.
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid. One acquisition of Crussol provided him with \textit{moyenne et basse} jurisdiction, with \textit{haute} only in cases of adultery (ADG, H 139, No. 11, fol. 1v, ‘Extraict de la vante [sic] du temporel de 1570 fait au profit du s[ieu]r de Crussol de la justice moyenne et basse de s[ain]t bonnet’).
Seigneurial justice was not sovereign, and it was possible to appeal sentences.106 Taking charge of this judicial system additionally meant being responsible for paying its officials.

There were various seigneurial privileges attached to Crussol’s purchases, which could include economic rights.107 These rights included the cens, rentes, and exaction of tolls (péages).108 The cens was the annual rent paid by those who cultivated the seigneurial land.109 Crussol also sometimes purchased the albergue, another type of rente.110 Through the albergue, Crussol received homage (hommage) from individuals who had previously rendered this to the ecclesiastical institutions.111

His principal acquisition was the town, land, seigneurie, and principality of Soyons in 1570.112 This purchase included all the seigneurial and judicial rights, rentes, and other privileges of this territory. Crussol did, however, have to pay homage to Jean de Monluc, the bishop of Valence and Die, as part of this territory’s conditions. With the purchase of the principality completed, there was a formal act by Crussol’s representative or procureur, taking possession of the town.113 The town representatives, including consuls and military

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111 One example is AN, 265 AP 62, Dossier 4, No. 662/1, ‘Royal letter ratifying Antoine de Crussol’s purchase from the priory of St Dézéry, 12 February 1571’; No. 662/2, ‘Letter of the cardinals of Lorraine, Bourbon, and Pelleve, ratifying Antoine de Crussol’s purchase from the priory of St Dézéry, 6 February 1571’; No. 662/3, ‘Letter of the commissaires ratifying Antoine de Crussol’s purchase from the priory of St Dézéry, 29 November 1570’.
112 AN, 265 AP 184, Dossier 1, No. 1/2, ‘Letter of the cardinals of Lorraine, Bourbon, and Pelleve, ratifying Antoine de Crussol’s purchase from the bishopric of Valence, 4 October 1570’.
113 AN, 265 AP 184, Dossier 1, No. 1/1, pp. 28-31, ‘Notary act recording Antoine de Crussol’s taking possession of the principality of Soyons, 31 October 1570’.

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figures, took an oath to obey Crussol and pay homage to him, as well as promising to accord him all the other seigneurial rights.\textsuperscript{114}

Another example of this formal act of possession survives for the towns of Euzet and Monteils in 1570. Here, Crussol’s representative reinstated the current \textit{bailli} in the judicature, which was seemingly a temporary measure.\textsuperscript{115} He asked that the inhabitants grant to Crussol the seigneurial rights previously given to the bishop, which were accorded. In a further example, the \textit{sieur} de Novecelle was informed about Crussol’s purchases from the Novecelle priory and agreed to accord him the seigneurial rights, and to pay him the revenue from an \textit{albergue}.\textsuperscript{116} As indicated by the purchases of Crussol from the bishop of Uzès and the priory of Garrigues, his representatives also requested all the \textit{titres, instruments} (meaning acts), and \textit{reconnaissances} relating to his acquisitions and rights in these areas.\textsuperscript{117}

An act of \textit{reconnaissance} outlined the services due to the \textit{seigneur} by a tenant.\textsuperscript{118}

However, there could be conflict in taking possession of the land, as exhibited by Crussol’s purchases in Mons, bought from the bishop of Uzès. In August 1570, some inhabitants protested against the \textit{haute, moyenne et basse} jurisdiction, the \textit{censives} (lands on which a \textit{cens} was paid), and other seigneurial rights bought by Crussol. They claimed that they had purchased these rights from the \textit{commissaires} sent from the princes de Condé and Navarre to sell the church assets, while the money from the \textit{censives} had been given to these

\textsuperscript{114} Ibid, pp. 30-31.
\textsuperscript{115} AN, 265 AP 62, Dossier 4, No. 668/8, ‘« Acte de prinse de possession po[u]r mess[i]re anthoine de crussol duc duzes » – Euzet, 24 August 1570’; No. 668/10, ‘« Acte de prinse de poussession [sic] pour messire anthoine de crussol duc duzes » – Monteils, 24 August 1570’.
\textsuperscript{116} AN, 265 AP 62, Dossier 4, No. 666/6, ‘Notary act recording Antoine de Crussol’s taking possession of purchases from the priory of Novecelle, 28 September 1571’.
\textsuperscript{118} Zeller, \textit{Les institutions de la France au XVIe siècle}, 32.
Henri de Navarre and Louis de Condé had organised the sale of ecclesiastical assets to fund the Protestant war machine during the third war, and this action evidently led to tension. The edict to end this conflict was signed in the same month. Crussol’s procureur protested these obstacles and requested that an act be drawn up concerning these issues. There was a similar situation in Vacquières, where the sieur de Bouquet asserted that he had acquired these rights from the Protestant commissaires. These examples make clear the hostility that could arise through the Protestant seizure of assets, as both the crown and the Protestants claimed revenue from this land.

As well as making numerous acquisitions, Crussol also inherited territory. Crussol and Louise inherited assets and land from Louis de Tonnerre, seemingly a relative of Louise, as prescribed in his will of 1570. They were to receive a seigneurie from Louis, as well as the remaining assets and rights once his other wishes had been fulfilled. As this will was drawn up when he was confined to bed, it seems likely that Crussol and Louise received this land before Crussol’s own death three years later. He similarly obtained land from his aunt, Marie de Crussol, according to her will in 1569.

While Crussol’s influence was mainly tied up with his position near the monarchy, he could not neglect his own provincial territories. He appointed figures to govern his lands and attempted to safeguard his estates. He needed to maintain his strong provincial authority.

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120 Daussy, Le parti huguenot, 626; Ménard, V, 48.
122 As shown by a document given by Crussol to the commissaires in the diocese of Uzès, he intended to buy more than he evidently did (AN, 265 AP 62, Dossier 4, No. 670/8, ‘List of properties or seigneuries that Antoine de Crussol intended to buy from the diocese of Uzès’).
123 AN, 265 AP 57, Dossier 1, No. 120, ‘Will of Louis de Tonnerre, 20 October 1570’. Louis de Tonnerre was a Protestant, as shown by this will, wishing to be buried in the Reformed manner.
124 ADV, 2 E 9/112, No. 1, fols 4v–5r, ‘Copie non signee du testament de dame marie de crussol, 8 September 1569’.
The civil wars could greatly damage his territories and harm his subjects. This threat required Crussol’s intervention in the états de Vivarais and a separate royal commission to protect his lands, perhaps due to the public perception of Crussol as a Protestant.

His extensive purchase of land and seigneuries, the principality of Soyons being the most notable of these, increased his prestige and provided him with a substantial zone of control. The acquisition of Soyons added to his adjacent territories of Crussol and Charmes, while the numerous properties around Uzès increased his powerbase in Lower Languedoc. These purchases additionally enabled him to appoint a variety of judicial and administrative officials, which further extended his power in these regions. The formal act of taking possession of these lands highlights the feudalistic nature of early modern France. The multiple claims on these territories, by the Protestants and the crown, emphasised the challenges raised by the civil wars. Although Crussol owed much of his prestige and high standing to his relationship with Catherine in particular, he tried to augment this position through these numerous purchases.

Conclusion

Despite the resumption of the civil wars, the monarchy had complete confidence in Crussol, and this chapter notes the variety of themes through which the trusted relationship between the crown and Crussol is demonstrated. He is shown to be a loyal servant of the monarchy, and he rose to his greatest rank during this period, becoming a peer of the kingdom. This title was a recognition of his loyalty, which was not in doubt during these years. Although Crussol now had a powerful enough position to act more independently of the crown, he was still closely linked to the monarchy due to his position as chevalier d’honneur and his overall court role. His prestige was confirmed through his accompaniment of Catherine to the royal marriages, and his participation in other ceremonies.
Although sources for this period of Crussol’s life are far less abundant than his earlier years, there was no longer tension between his religious convictions and his loyalty to the monarchy. This is displayed particularly through his presence at the confirmation of the edict of Saint-Maur, with its harsh conditions for Protestants. While Crussol was not part of the hard-line Catholic faction at court, and was instead among the moderates, his relationship to Protestantism had clearly changed. The letter to Gordes in September 1569 affirms that Crussol was no longer willing to take up arms against the monarchy in the face of royal troops pillaging his territories, while it is again noticeable that despite the emphasis on his Catholic faith, he was still publicly perceived as a Protestant.

Crussol’s intervention with his brothers on the monarchy’s behalf underlines the significance of his royal position in defining his family and provincial relationships. This intervention also indicated the interplay between his royal role and his other responsibilities as a noble, and it is important to view Crussol first and foremost through his royal service in this period. On the subject of his brothers, Charles’s and Catherine’s correspondence with Crussol made clear his favoured position in their eyes and praised his conduct. Given the allegiances of his family, Antoine was the outlier in not joining the Protestants. He had a good relationship with his brother Jacques in particular, who was now the only brother left following the death of Galiot in 1572. Crussol preferred to abstain from the wars and retire to his lands, which the monarchy was satisfied with, although he was present at the siege of La Rochelle.

Crussol’s provincial influence and prestige proved very useful for the crown, as it intersected with his royal role. He provided a link between the provinces and the monarchy, particularly at the court. Crussol could advance the royal will, as reflected through his close friendship with Gordes. However, there could be tension between Crussol’s provincial interests and those of the monarchy, as in the example of Simon Fizes. Crussol was clearly...
an asset for the crown, in keeping it informed of the requests from the provinces. Despite his geographical proximity to the theatre of war, and the Protestant sway in his own territories, he also maintained good relations with the Protestants, as displayed by his interaction with the consuls of Valence during the second conflict. Given these two factors, abstaining from the war was not a straightforward matter for Crussol. Crussol’s reception in Nîmes and Uzès highlights the importance of viewing him not just as a noble at court, but as a prominent regional figure, in large part due to the high position given to him by the monarchy.

Crussol could not neglect his provincial role, as shown by his attempt to protect his lands and subjects from war, both through the Vivarais estates and the commission sent to preserve royal obedience in his territories. He maintained his interests through provincial appointments, both administrative and judicial, in Tonnerre and on his acquired Catholic church land. Expanding the web of loyalty around him through these posts only increased his provincial reach. While he was still very tightly linked to the monarchy, he strove to strengthen his regional authority. These purchases furthered his influence in Dauphiné and around Uzès especially, with the new title of prince de Soyons adding to his prestige. However, taking control of these new acquisitions was not always straightforward, given the Protestant claim on these territories.

The period of 1566-1573 terminated with Crussol’s death in August 1573. He died of illness, seemingly contracted at the siege of La Rochelle, and Jacques became the new duc d’Uzès. Louise later unsuccessfully attempted to buy the Maison Carrée in Nîmes as a tomb for Crussol and herself. The final period of Crussol’s life shows him to be firmly tied to the

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125 Ménard, v, 153.
126 De Thou, Histoire universelle, vi, 666; Aubigné, Histoire universelle, iv, 176; Albiousses, Histoire des ducs d’Uzès, 84.
monarchy, with his Protestant adherence in the past, and underscores how he had been considerably rewarded for his loyalty to Catherine and Charles.
Conclusions

By studying the career of Antoine de Crussol, this thesis sheds further light on the nobility’s relationship with the monarchy in sixteenth-century France. In particular, when considering the identity of the French nobility who joined the Protestant movement, incorporating aspects such as fidelity to the king, religion, and family networks, Crussol is a useful case study. He viewed his identity chiefly in terms of his relationship to the king, Charles IX, and the queen-mother, Catherine de Médicis, to whom he stressed his loyal conduct, during the first civil war and beyond. Analysing this relationship before, during, and after his adherence to the Reformed movement, it becomes clear that Crussol was a trusted figure in royal eyes, despite his period as Protestant leader. On the other side of this relationship, this interaction highlights the inner workings of the French state, through the crown’s use of Crussol to carry out the royal will.

Religious convictions were a critical part of Crussol’s identity, although the precise nature of these are complex and problematic to determine. It is similarly difficult to move past his presentation of his own conduct during this period. In assessing Crussol’s religious convictions, it is necessary to acknowledge the religious fluidity of the late 1550s and early 1560s, which evidently affected him, as well as the Reformed leanings of his family. These leanings started off as an interest in Catholic reform, as shown by Crussol’s will of 1556, but developed, both for Crussol, and his wider family, into Protestant sympathies.\(^1\) He was widely perceived to be a Protestant before and after the first religious war, even until 1569, although he never made a public profession of faith.\(^2\)

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\(^2\) ‘Calvin à [Antoine de] Crussol, 7 May 1563’, in *Calvini opera*, xx, 7n.
When considering the margin for manoeuvre that Crussol had in terms of committing himself to the Reformed confession, or Protestant movement as a whole, it is important to take account of his dependence on the monarchy, and the sizeable Protestant presence on his territories. However, substantial evidence demonstrates that Crussol had strong Protestant sympathies. His links with the Reformed pastor Jean Mutonis in 1560, his favour towards the Protestants (as shown by a letter to Catherine in April 1561), his attendance at the Reformed church at court in November 1561, and his correspondence with Calvin (especially in July 1563), provide support for this argument.\(^3\) This is supplemented by Crussol’s close relations with the Nîmes consistory, particularly shown through its decision to wait for him and his wife Louise to arrive before holding communion in October 1562, and the warning it received from Gaspard de Coligny, Louis de Condé, François de Châtillon, the sieur d’Andelot, and Crussol, of the potential for war in March 1562.\(^4\) Finally, his use of language, such as referring to the Protestants as being of ‘our religion’ in 1563 and the Catholics as those of the ‘Roman religion’ in 1561 and 1563, further indicate his religious leanings.\(^5\)

Calvin’s letter reveals the tension for Crussol in his role as Catherine’s chevalier d’honneur. Similar to other Protestant nobles, his conscience meant that he could not attend Catholic religious processions and uphold the Reformed faith. While he did attend Mass before the first war, religious events such as these posed a problem for him following the conflict. Crussol clearly reflected on the public element of his role, in discussing these

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\(^4\) BNF, fr. 8666, fol. 158v, ‘Nîmes consistory meeting, 2 October 1562’; fol. 92r, ‘Nîmes consistory and conseil meeting, [mid-March 1562?]’.

processions, at which his non-attendance would have been noted. Crussol evidently did not consider it possible to simply attend Mass and have a Protestant chaplain on his lands either.

Nevertheless, Crussol’s Reformed sympathies were useful for the crown in carrying out royal missions towards the Protestants, and Catherine trusted him to implement her orders. He was certainly favourable to the Protestants on the royal mission of December 1561, though these were figures with whom he was already well-acquainted in a regional context. Crussol’s taking up of arms against the monarchy in the first civil war was an aberration, as he otherwise remained loyal to Catherine and Charles. His behaviour was quite similar to the prince de Condé’s own actions during the conflict, being discontented with the breaking of the edict of January, and satisfied with the peace of Amboise, though it was not so beneficial to his Protestant subjects.⁶

Above all, Crussol was reluctant to join the civil wars. The conflict, as for other nobles with Protestant sympathies, forced him to choose a side. Before the outbreak of war, his allegiance to the crown and religious faith fitted well together, as exhibited in the mission to the Midi, where he put forward a regulated Protestantism as prescribed by the king, along the lines of the edict of January. All four aspects of loyalty, religion, power, and regional factors influenced Crussol’s decision to enter the conflict. Although the tension between religious convictions and devotion to the crown had made him originally abstain from the war, he gained extensive power through his adherence to the Protestant movement. It is unclear whether the Reformed presence on his territories was significant enough for him to only join the Protestants in the conflict, and not side with the Catholics. Crussol’s joining of the Protestant movement fitted well with the traditional noble role of defending the monarchy, helped by the Protestant argument that the king was being held captive, while

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⁶ Although it could be argued that Crussol’s acceptance of the peace was simply due to the Protestant nobles, despite their misgivings (voiced most notably by Gaspard de Coligny), all finally accepting the edict, Crussol’s letter to Calvin asking him to support the edict suggests that he was content with the peace (‘Calvin à [Antoine de] Crussol, 7 May 1563’, in Calvini opera, xx, 7-9).
his justification for entering the war also underscored the supposed abuse of royal authority, and his efforts to prevent this occurring.

While the close of the first war marked the end of Crussol’s Protestant sympathies, his statements to Prosper de Sainte-Croix do not convincingly demonstrate a Catholic faith.⁷ After this conflict, Crussol acted like a Catholic noble, and he vehemently reiterated his Catholicism to the baron de Gordes in 1569.⁸ Stéphane Gal’s study of François de Bonne de Lesdiguières affirms the political uses of a change in religious position, and while this is not to cast doubt on Crussol’s religious convictions, the political value for him in emphasising his Catholic faith in 1563 was clear.⁹

The first religious war evidently had a considerable effect on Crussol’s thinking. Following the war, he was no longer interested in a regulated Protestantism. Whether it was due to the hardening of confessional boundaries following the conflict (as shown through the Council of Trent) and the effect this had on his margin for manoeuvre, or due to other reasons, Crussol decided that presenting a Catholic faith fitted with his position of loyalty to the crown. He viewed the Protestant faith as being incompatible with his primary allegiance to the monarchy, and the traditional noble responsibilities that this allegiance entailed. His presence at the signing of the edict of Saint-Maur in 1568, with its severe articles for Protestants, emphasised the distance from his previous position, as did his appearance at the siege of La Rochelle in 1573.

Studying Crussol’s engagement with his charge as Protestant leader in Languedoc and Dauphiné uncovers the impressive Protestant structure in which he played a

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fundamental role. He had an important part in maintaining the smooth running and efficiency of the movement during the first war. He was fully committed to this position and provided legitimacy to the Protestant war machine. His authority was certainly respected by the Protestants, as exhibited through the actions of the town consulates, and the political assemblies’ decrees were put into practice. Crussol’s activity was shown through his numerous appointments, his interaction with town consuls, and his conducting of military campaigns. He combined his military roles in Languedoc and Dauphiné to aid the Protestant war movement, although he generally had conservative military objectives. He was seen as the Protestant spokesperson at court, and as an adjudicator between disputes at times. Crussol adhered completely to the Protestant movement during the conflict, which was always subject to his obedience to the crown. He respected the conditions of the agreement he made with the Protestants, as he had endeavoured to show in the handover of Protestant towns in July 1563. He upheld their interests throughout the disarmament period, and his actions during this time help to explain the continued Protestant friendship with Crussol in the following years.

Viewing Crussol’s Protestant leadership role as being that of an unofficial lieutenant-général, not being appointed to this role by the monarchy, helps to explain his entry into the war, and his actions during the conflict. He acted as a royal lieutenant and portrayed himself as a faithful servant, protecting the king’s territory and subjects against invasion and oppression. Similar to the position of a lieutenant-général, Crussol extended his own influence through numerous military appointments, conducting military campaigns, and responding to requests and grievances from the town consulates among others.

Concerning his relationship with the monarchy, the period of instability in France in the years preceding and during the civil wars provided nobles such as Crussol with a significant opportunity, to be someone on whom the monarchy relied. He could achieve a
more notable position at court than in a time of peace, as the crown needed a solid group of
*fidèles* around it to counter the powerful religious factions at court, led by some of the great
nobles, such as the *duc* de Guise or Condé. Due to this disruption caused by Protestantism,
Crussol and other political moderates could achieve considerable influence. As a result, there
was a growing reliance of the crown on Crussol for implementing royal commands,
particularly in the years 1560-1563. He carried out missions which could have important
implications for the kingdom.

Crussol was a trusted servant of the queen-mother in particular. His tight links to
Catherine as her *chevalier d’honneur* was one aspect of his multi-dimensional court role,
which also consisted of his position on the *conseil privé* and his membership of the order of
Saint-Michel. His influence at court continued to rise during this period. He was a powerful
figure there, as shown by his accompaniment of Catherine to the royal marriages. His
friendships with Gordes and Saint-Sulpice indicated his useful position at court for both the
monarchy and his *amis*.

Crussol was very loyal to the crown on the whole and strove to highlight his
allegiances to Charles and Catherine. His actions before and during the mission to the Midi,
show him obeying the monarchy’s commands. He faithfully executed these royal missions,
in which he was more than a simple messenger, playing a leading role. His behaviour during
the first war is best understood within the framework of his loyalty. Crussol went to
substantial effort to show the righteousness of his position as a loyal servant to the king,
during and after the conflict. He framed his conduct as being for the service of the crown. He
continually stressed his devotion during the disarmament period, as he was conscious of his
future political fortunes.

Viewing letters as oral sources is essential in understanding Crussol’s performance
of allegiance to the crown, which included attaching copies of documents to prove his
sincerity. In disarmament, he managed to uphold promises to both the monarchy and the Protestants. The royal acknowledgement of Crussol’s role in May 1563, as Charles IX asked him to continue his charge until the maréchal de Vieilleville arrived, was important in validating his efforts during the first civil war. This act formed part of the royal amnesty following the conflict, as did the king’s declaration in October 1563, which noted his satisfaction with Crussol’s actions.

After the end of his Protestant adherence, Crussol was quickly rehabilitated at court, and there was no question of further rebellion against the monarchy. The crown extended its favour to reinstate Crussol, giving him the title of duc d’Uzès, as the exercise of royal favour attempted to heal the divisions caused by the war, both at court and throughout France. This period saw the restoration of Crussol’s relationship with Charles and Catherine. His displays of Catholicism were part of his attempt to emphasise his obedience to the crown, with his Protestant adherence being placed firmly in the past. This thesis sheds further light on the return of nobles to court after their time as Protestant commanders, as they, like Crussol, struggled to counter rumours about their behaviour. Crussol strove to have his conduct viewed as being that of a devoted royal subject, and by 1573, he was seen as a faithful servant of the monarchy. Despite the royal trust in Crussol, it is curious that he was never granted a lieutenant-generalship in Languedoc or Dauphiné, unlike his father, which could raise questions over his fidelity in royal eyes. However, the crown may have been reluctant to award this title given the ongoing public perception of Crussol’s Protestantism.

Crussol’s interaction with the crown similarly defined his family and provincial relationships, as shown by the royal request asking him to prevent his brothers Jacques and Galiot joining the Protestants in 1567. The royal correspondence during this period affirms the confidence which the monarchy placed in Crussol. It is interesting to consider how

10 BNF, fr. 15875, fol. 509v, ‘Letter of Charles IX to Antoine de Crussol, 6 May 1563’.
conflict between Crussol’s family ties and loyalty to the crown were or were not reconciled, and there was certainly tension between these two aspects when his brothers fought against the monarchy in the second and third religious wars. It was not uncommon, however, for noble family members to be on opposing sides during the conflict. Religious tensions did not affect the bonds between Crussol and his brothers, similar to the Lacger family (as outlined by Raymond Mentzer), although the Crussol family was not defined by confessional identity in the same way as the Lacgers.\textsuperscript{11}

Given his status in the kingdom, Crussol had a prominent position in the southern provinces and his own territories, which could interact with his royal role. It is important to view Crussol in a regional context. He kept the monarchy updated with current affairs, such as the Montpellier estates in 1561, and the requests of Valence and Nîmes in 1567-1568.\textsuperscript{12} He provided a link between the provinces and the monarchy, particularly through his good relations with the Protestants, as there was a considerable Reformed presence on his estates. While his authority was generally tightly bound to that of the monarchy, he also increased his personal prestige through the extensive purchase of alienated Catholic church land. Crussol’s Protestant adherence similarly showed him searching for influence outside of the royal relationship. Just as the war brought an opportunity for nobles to showcase their loyalty to the crown through avoiding the religious factions at court, engagement in the religious parties offered another form of political power outside of the royal sphere. Nevertheless, it was through Crussol’s obedience to the monarchy that he rose to his greatest rank in the kingdom during this period, becoming a peer of France.

\textsuperscript{11} Mentzer, \textit{Blood & belief: family survival and confessional identity among the provincial Huguenot nobility}, 157, 188.
\textsuperscript{12} BNF, fr. 3186, fols 68r-69v, ‘Letter of Antoine de Crussol to Catherine de Médicis, 23 March 1560/1561’; AMV, BB 8, fol. 68r, ‘Conseil de la ville de Valence, 27 February 1568’; ADG, E Dépôt 36/128, fol. 172r, ‘Conseil de la ville de Nîmes, 13 June 1567’.
Crussol’s life underlines both the significance of the noble relationship with the crown, and the disruption to noble life which was caused by the introduction of Protestantism into France. His experience is similar to that of several other French nobles in this regard, which emphasises the value of this study for the wider historiography. He is perhaps most like Odet de Châtillon. Although they had quite different careers, Châtillon being an ecclesiastical figure closely connected to the Protestant leadership through his brothers, and a powerful noble in his own right, there are certain parallels. Châtillon was influenced too by the religious fluidity of the period, before the Council of Trent and the first religious war helped to entrench clear Reformed and Catholic divisions. The importance of this conflict should not be underestimated for how it forced nobles to pick a side and brought a stricter religious orthodoxy.

Like Crussol, Châtillon was publicly perceived as a Protestant, although he (at first) indicated that he remained Catholic. Being among the political moderates at the royal court could lead to suspicions of having sympathies with the Reformed faith, which emphasises the confused nature of the religious differences in France on the eve of the conflict. The outbreak of the first war raised difficult questions for these figures about which path to take, with both first retiring to their estates, before taking up roles in the war. Both Châtillon and Crussol were well-known for their loyalty to Catherine, but their career trajectories took on different paths following the war, as Châtillon became more tightly connected to the Protestant leadership.

Charles de Coucis, the sieur de Burie, also a religious moderate, is another useful comparison to Crussol. Although Burie remained Catholic, he too was suspected of having Reformed sympathies, given his relaxed conduct towards the Protestants, before the start

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of the first civil war.\textsuperscript{14} Blaise de Monluc, who served with Burie in Guyenne, is another example of a Catholic noble who was believed to be a Protestant at one stage, and was even secretly approached by the Protestants for his support, prior to this war.\textsuperscript{15} As noted earlier, both these figures, similar to Crussol, attempted to pacify the Midi on the king’s behalf, which contributed to the accusations of Protestantism. As shown by these comparisons, Crussol’s conduct was typical to a significant extent, before the first war at least, in being perceived as a Protestant through carrying out the royal will. However, his Reformed sympathies were far more evident than those of Burie and Monluc.

Antoine de Crussol’s interaction with the monarchy influenced a range of aspects in his life. These included his family and provincial networks and responsibilities, as well as his religious convictions. While he briefly sought power outside of the royal sphere through his Protestant command during the first religious war, he generally exploited the opportunity offered by the fractures in the state, to pledge his loyalty to the crown. Despite his initial reluctance to enter the conflict, he subsequently fully engaged in his Protestant leadership position. Nevertheless, Crussol consistently presented his actions as being those of a devoted servant, carried out on the crown’s behalf, and he was a trusted figure for the monarchy. This was a reciprocal relationship, as the crown relied on him to accomplish important missions, taking advantage of his Protestant links and his provincial authority to further royal control.

While Crussol’s Protestant sympathies could be useful for the monarchy, they led to tension with his royal role, and although his later presentation of Catholicism does not appear particularly convincing, it was good enough to secure the crown’s trust. Although Crussol became a prestigious figure in his own right, his primary marker of identity was his

\textsuperscript{15} Carroll, ‘Political Justice and the Outbreak of the Wars of Religion’, 183.
relationship with the monarchy through the years 1559-1573, which influenced both his position at court and in the provinces. Ultimately, his choices were vindicated, as he was handsomely rewarded for his adherence to the crown.
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