The role of opposition parties in
African hybrid regimes

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Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in Politics and International Studies

University of Warwick
Department of Politics and International Studies (PAIS)

December 2020
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Acknowledgements

I am immensely grateful to my two wonderful supervisors, Renske Doorenspleet and Gabrielle Lynch, for their guidance and support throughout this journey. Renske took my ill-defined project on board over six years ago and showed nothing but enthusiasm and encouragement from our very first meeting. Over the years, she knew to nudge me when I needed directions, and to let me thrive when my path was set. Gabrielle was a tireless advisor who helped me navigate the currents of fieldwork and writing. Her astute comments led me to push the boundaries of my own research, and her kindness reminded me to care for myself as well as my thesis. I feel incredibly lucky to have had these two strong, kind, and inspiring women as mentors. They have become role-models and friends to whom I am forever indebted. I will make sure to pay this debt forward.

I am equally beholden to the countless people in Uganda and Burkina Faso who have offered me their time and insights, and without whom this thesis would not exist. This includes the politicians, activists, journalists, and others who have selflessly agreed to be interviewed for this project – and who will remain unnamed. It also includes individuals who facilitated the conduct of fieldwork in both countries and provided invaluable help, contacts, and wisdom throughout this process. For this, I thank Michael Mutyaba, Isaac Elakuna, Ronald Kasamba, Johncation Muhindo, Anna Namakula, Sylvia Budembe, Alex Kasenke, Albert Nakoulma, Nachor Sogho, Fabrice Sawadogo, and Abdoul Karim Saidou.
My research was facilitated by a range of institutions. The Centre for Basic Research (CBR) in Uganda and the Institut pour la Gouvernance Démocratique (IGD) in Burkina Faso hosted me officially, and the Institut National des Sciences des Sociétés (INSS) in Ouagadougou offered me a chance to present my work and attend their seminars. I have received financial support from several institutions: the British Council’s Entente Cordiale programme, the British Institute in Eastern Africa (BIEA), the Institut Français de Recherche en Afrique (IFRA-Nairobi), the Association for the Study of the Middle East and Africa (ASMEA), and the University of Warwick’s Doctoral College.

The PhD journey can be a solitary adventure, something exacerbated by doing it part-time and mostly away from campus. This is why I am so thankful for the kind souls and curious minds whose paths I have crossed, in particular Nina Wienkoop, Dan Eizenga, Amanda Edgell, Michael Mutyaba, Dan Paget, Hannah Waddilove, Sam Wilkins, Molly Arrioti, and Rachel Strohm. I feel blessed for the brilliant friends I have made along the way, thinking particularly of Nicole Beardsworth, Tereza Jermanová, and Tongnoma Zongo. All these wonderful humans made this voyage less lonely, and academia is a better, friendlier world thanks to them.

I am humbled by the support and inspiration I have received from all corners of academia. Nic Cheeseman has been an incredible mentor and uplifting collaborator, and I am very grateful indeed for all the doors he held open for me. Susan Dodsworth, Johanna Söderström, Phil Clark, and Sebastian Elischer provided helpful guidance. The PAIS department at Warwick was a nurturing place to study and work, particularly thanks to Ben Clift, Özlem Atikcan, Alexandra Homolar, and Kay Edsall. I was heartened by the kindness, solidarity, and combativeness of my brilliant comrades within Warwick UCU and Warwick Anti-Casualisation. Finally, I may not have started
this academic journey were it not for Leonardo Arriola. It was while reading his course material at Berkeley ten years ago that I first thought how exciting it could be to read and think about African politics for a living – and I have not yet changed my mind.

I am lucky to have so many friends scattered around the Earth. They have, each in their own way, provided encouragement and kept me grounded in the real world. I am grateful for those who lent me a shoulder to cry on, an ear to talk to, or just a life-long friendship to cherish. I also thank those who have welcomed and sheltered me during my incessant travels. These friends are too many to name them all, and I hope that they recognise themselves. Four people warrant a special mention: Sarah, who played a huge part in making the UK feel like one of my homes during my nomadic years; Jamie, brilliant partner and friend who shares my love for African books, travels, and waragi; Emna, whose kindness and prose have been constant sources of inspiration during the long hours spent writing this thesis; and Paul, my ‘koro’ who helped me face my slightly crazy self. They are all living proofs that true friendships can endure despite time and distance, and I am thankful for this.

Last, but far from least, I am grateful for the support of my family, without whom I could simply not have done any of this. My Mum and Papa, from whom I got so much of what I am, including my attachment to Burkina Faso, my fairness and loyalty, and my stubbornness. My sister Caroline, who shares my love for the best anti-stress remedies: cats and sewing. Luke and Leia, for the comforting cuddles and fluffy distraction. And of course, Ale, who just makes my life full of life, love, and pasta. I cannot wait for our next chapter.
Declaration

I declare that this thesis was composed by myself and that the work contained herein is my own except where explicitly stated otherwise in the text. I confirm that this work has not been submitted for any other degree or qualification.

No part of this thesis has appeared in print before this thesis was completed. However, material arising from work on the thesis has been presented at academic conferences over the past six years, and is included in articles currently or soon-to-be under review.
Abstract

This dissertation seeks to understand what role opposition parties play in a hybrid regime, focusing on sub-Saharan Africa. Opposition parties can curtail incumbents’ control over the pace of democratisation (e.g. Bunce & Wolchik 2010; LeBas 2013; Loada 2020). However, it is still unclear to what extent they actually do so, and a common preconception is that these opposition parties are ‘weak’ (e.g. Olukoshi 1998a; Randall & Svåsand 2002c; Rakner & Van de Walle 2009). In this dissertation, I explore this notion empirically by assessing various dimensions of opposition party weakness described in the literature, including their non-programmatic and short-lived nature, lack of local structures, under-performance, and fragmentation.

Based on a comparative, qualitative, and inductive approach, I study four opposition parties across two countries, Burkina Faso and Uganda. This allows me to observe hybrid regimes in their diversity. My research is based on extensive fieldwork in both countries, which notably included 146 semi-structured interviews in capital cities and opposition strongholds.

By unpacking what opposition parties are formed around, how they are organised and how they operate, I analyse the complex dynamics driving opposition parties’ ability to endure and to coalesce in order to effectively challenge the incumbent and influence regime trajectories. The analysis shows that even ‘weak’ opposition parties can play a part in challenging the incumbent’s control over institutions.

My dissertation contributes to a new wave of empirical research on (opposition) parties in Africa (e.g. Souaré 2010; Bob-Milliar 2012b; Kelly 2014; Beardsworth 2018). It identifies new sources of a party’s organisational identity, defined as their ‘core’, and analyses how this informs a party’s survival chances. It investigates both internal organisational processes and external mobilisation strategies used to engage the regime, and concludes that opposition parties perform key functions within a hybrid regime, and therefore contribute to a non-linear democratisation process.
Abbreviations

4GC: For God and My Country. A coalition of Ugandan activists that replaced the A4C after it was banned.

A4C: Activists for Change. Coalition of opposition politicians in Uganda, spearheading the Walk-to-Work protests.

ADF: Alliance pour la Démocratie et la Fédération. Ex-political party in Burkina Faso. See ADF-RDA.


BPN: Bureau Politique National. Party organ equivalent of the National Council

BSB: Bloc Socialiste Burkinabè. Former political party in Burkina Faso. Fused with a wing of the FFS to form the CPS in 2000.

CBR: Centre for Basic Research. Research Institute based in Kampala, Uganda.

CCM: Chama Cha Mapenduzi. The ruling party in Tanzania.

CDP: Congrès pour la Démocratie et le Progrès. Political party in Burkina Faso, founded in 1996 with the fusion of the ODP-MT and smaller parties. Ruling party until October 2014.

CENI: *Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante*. Independant Electoral Commission of Burkina Faso

CFOP: *Chef de File de l’Opposition Politique*. Institution regrouping opposition parties in Burkina Faso. It also designates the Head of the Opposition, who is the leader of the opposition party with the most seats in the National Assembly.

CGD: *Centre pour la Gouvernance Démocratique*. Research institute based in Ouagadougou.


Collectif: *Collectif des Organisations de Masse et des Partis Politiques*. Also known as the CODMPP. Coalition of opposition parties and civil society organisations after the assassination of Norbert Zongo.


CPS: *Convention Panafricaine Sankariste*. Former political party in Burkina Faso. Founded in 2000 with the fusion of the BSB and a faction of the FFS. Fused with the UNIR-MS in 2009 to form the UNIR-PS.


DRC: Democratic Republic of Congo

EC: Electoral Commission of Uganda

FCO: UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office.


FOCAL: Forum Citoyen pour l’Alternance. Forum organised by Zéphirin Diabré in 2009, which led to the creation of the UPC.


IGD: Institut pour la Gouvernance et le Développement Tiemoko Marc Garango. Research institute based in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.


IPOD: Inter-Party Organisation for Dialogue. A platform set up in 2010 by the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy in Uganda to promote dialogue between political parties.

IYOP: Inter-Party Youth Platform. A cooperation framework of the youth leagues of seven major political parties in Uganda, set up in 2011 with the support of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, a German foundation.

KAS: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. German foundation.

LC1/3: Local Council 1/3. Subnational units in the Ugandan decentralisation system.
   LC1 corresponds to the village; LC3 to the sub-county.


MP: Member of Parliament.

MPP: Mouvement du Peuple pour le Progrès. A political party in Burkina Faso.
   Founded in January 2014. Won the post-transition elections in November 2015 and currently in power.

MPS/PF: Mouvement du Peuple pour le Socialisme/Parti Fédéral. Political party in Burkina Faso founded by Emile Paré.

NDC: National Democratic Congress. One of the two main parties in Ghana, which was in power between 1992 and 2001, then again between 2009 and 2017.


NGO: Non-Governmental Organisation.


NPP: New Patriotic Party. One of the two main parties in Ghana, which was in power between 2001 and 2009.

NRM: National Resistance Movement. Ruling party of Uganda. The NRM is the political offshoot of the NRA. Between 1986 and 2005, it was an encompassing movement to which all Ugandans belonged. After multipartyism was restored, it was officially transformed into a political party (NRM-Organisation, or NRM-O) but is still referred to as NRM.


ODP-MT: Organisation pour la Démocratie Populaire-Mouvement du Travail. A former political party in Burkina Faso. Founded in 1989, it merged with other smaller parties to form the CDP in 1996.

PAFO: Parliamentary Advocacy Forum. A parliamentary pressure group which formed the basis for the FDC’s creation.

PAREN: Parti pour la Renaissance. Political party in Burkina Faso founded by Laurent Bado.

PCF: Parti Communiste Français. French communist party.


PDP: People’s Development Party. Ugandan party founded by Abed Bwanika


PDS: Parti pour la Démocratie et le Socialisme. Known as PDS-Metba since 2012. A political party in Burkina Faso.

POMA: Public Order Management Act. A law passed by the Ugandan parliament in 2013. It was nullified by the Constitutional Court in March 2020.

**PRA**: *Parti pour le Regroupement Africain*. Ex-political party in Burkina Faso.

**PS**: *Parti Socialiste*. Political party in Senegal.


**RDA**: *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain*. Ex-political party in Burkina Faso. See ADF-RDA.

**RDC**: Resident District Commissioner. Local representative of the president and the government in Uganda.

**RDS**: *Rassemblement pour la Démocratie et le Socialisme*. Political party in Burkina Faso.

**RSP**: *Régiment de Sécurité Présidentielle*. Praetorian guard in Burkina Faso.

**RTB**: *Radio-Télévision Burkinabè*. State radio and television broadcasting company in Burkina Faso.


**TDA**: The Democratic Alliance. Opposition coalition attempted ahead of the 2016 elections in Uganda.

**UNCST**: Uganda National Council for Science and Technology

**UNDD**: Union Nationale pour la Démocratie et le Développement. Founded in 2003 by Hermann Yaméogo.

**UNDP**: United Nations Development Programme.

**UNIR-MS**: *Union pour la Renaissance – Mouvement Sankariste*. Political party in Burkina Faso. Founded in 2000 following a split from the CPS. Transformed into UNIR-PS in 2009.
UNIR-PS: *Union pour la Renaissance – Parti Sankariste*. Political party in Burkina Faso. Founded in 2009 following the fusion of the UNIR-MS, the CPS, and a wing of the FFS.


UPDF: Ugandan Police and Defence Forces.


URA: Uganda Revenue Authority.

Figure 1: Map of Burkina Faso*

Figure 2: Map of Uganda

Introduction

‘... quand bien même les partis d’Afrique seraient faibles et la démocratisation en demi-teinte, ces situations méritent d’être explorées plus en avant. Les partis ne pourraient-ils pas être des objets de recherche intrinsèques et un site d’analyse utile des transformations ou des contraintes qui pèsent sur les processus politiques en Afrique ? En un mot, ne faut-il pas étudier les partis sans préjugés, le temps de montrer l’intérêt scientifique d’une telle étude.’ (Gazibo 2006: 10)

‘... regardless of the weakness of African parties and the mixed success of democratisation, these situations deserve to be scrutinised further. Can’t parties be primordial objects of research and a site for the useful analysis of the transformations and constraints weighing on political processes in Africa? In a nutshell, should we not study parties without prejudice, to demonstrate the scientific interest of such a study.’ (My translation)

In 2006, Mamoudou Gazibo made a vehement case in favour of returning to the study of political parties in Africa, until then largely overlooked. For a long time, both comparativists working on political parties and Africanist researchers tended to ignore or side-line African parties, particularly those in the opposition. The former because they found them ill-fitting in pre-existing typologies and definitions (e.g. Diamond & Gunther 2001b), and the latter because they often perceived opposition parties as a weak link in the democratisation process on the continent (Randall & Svåsand 2002c). These scholars focused instead on other stakeholders such as civil society, social movements, or ‘big men’ in their analyses of political dynamics and democratisation in Africa (Bayart et al. (eds) 1992; Bratton & Van de Walle 1997; Chabal & Daloz
1999). African opposition parties have received even less attention than ruling parties, and have long been perceived as mere vehicles for individuals looking for patronage opportunities, empty shells created to provide the regime with legitimacy, or weak actors incapable of playing a major role in their country’s politics (e.g. Chabal & Daloz 1999; Van de Walle & Butler 1999; Randall & Svåsand 2002c; Manning 2005). African citizens themselves appear to share this sentiment, as illustrated by the low level of trust in opposition parties across the continent (Logan 2008; Bratton & Logan 2015). Rakner and Van de Walle (2009: 109) summarised this predicament when they argued that ‘the persistent weakness of the opposition is both a consequence of democratic deficits and a cause of their continuation’.

The last decade has seen a shift, however, both on the ground and in academic studies. In October 2014, opposition-led protests toppled the 27-year-old regime of Blaise Compaoré in Burkina Faso. Meanwhile, opposition parties unexpectedly defeated incumbents at the polls in Nigeria (April 2015) and The Gambia (December 2016). Moreover, while opposition parties elsewhere have not been so successful at bringing about change and democracy, they are still at work. Opposition protests and their violent repression by the state are a regular feature of Ugandan political life, while defeated opponents have successfully challenged election results in court in Kenya (September 2017) and Malawi (February 2020).

These events have been accompanied by a renewed academic focus on African parties, with a new generation of scholars driving this momentum. In particular, Elischer’s (2013) and LeBas’s (2013) influential books have paved the way for more grounded and comparative research, and have quickly become ‘classics’ in the field. Elischer’s comparative review of political parties across the continent demonstrated the great diversity in the nature of parties across the continent. Meanwhile, LeBas
argued that parties could derive organisational strength from having historical roots in pre-existing institutional structures, such as labour movements, and overturned the idea that opposition parties are necessarily ‘weak’. Other researchers have conducted doctoral work following in their footsteps, producing high-quality empirical and theoretical knowledge and contributing to an emergent field of literature on African parties. For example, Souaré (2010, 2017) and Beardsworth (2018) have shed light on opposition coalition-building processes across the continent using a comparative approach. Other academics have worked on political parties more broadly but in single countries, such as Paget’s (2018) fine-grained analysis of the use of rallies as an electioneering strategy in Tanzania, Bob-Milliar’s (2011, 2012b, 2014, 2019) extensive work on Ghanaian parties, and Kelly’s (2014, 2020) inquiry into the motives behind party proliferation in Senegal. Meanwhile, Perrot (2016), Wilkins (2018) and Collord (2019) have contributed to our understanding of ruling parties and institutions through their work on Eastern African countries.

All these scholars and others have contributed to an improved appreciation of how political parties are formed and how they operate (see Chapter 1). Yet further research is still required in order to properly understand African parties, what they do for citizens within the confines of the space they inhabit, and how they can contribute to democratic transition or consolidation. In particular, the role and capacity of opposition parties in hybrid regimes is under-explored. This is despite Bunce and Wolchik’s (2010) finding that opposition parties’ strength and strategy is a decisive factor in explaining change in competitive authoritarian regimes – contradicting a lasting tendency to focus on the role of incumbents (Levitsky & Way 2010a).

This dissertation addresses this gap by unpacking the role of opposition parties in African hybrid regimes. In this introduction, I lay out the research questions my thesis
aims to answer and the main arguments I present. I then outline the methods used to conduct my research. Finally, I provide the reader with an outline of the seven empirical chapters that make up this thesis.

Research questions and argument

This thesis seeks to understand the role that opposition parties play in the context of a hybrid regime, which in essence does not meet the minimum threshold of democracy but can neither be considered fully authoritarian. More specifically, the dissertation looks at how opposition parties exist and operate within the purview of the existing system and constraints that they face. In doing so, I unpack the ‘weakness’ generally attributed to opposition parties in hybrid regimes, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, and provide insights into how opposition parties may actually be able to contribute to regime change and democratisation.

My research deals with opposition parties in hybrid regimes located in Africa, therefore combining two overlapping but distinct foci: a conceptual one (contributing to knowledge of opposition parties in hybrid regimes around the world) and a geographical one (improving the analysis of African political parties). Hybrid regimes combine elements of a democracy (usually a liberal constitution, regular elections in which opposition parties are allowed to run, a more or less active civil society, and some level of freedom of the press) with practices of an autocracy, such as nepotism, corruption, electoral fraud, executive control over the legislative and judicial branches, political violence, and elimination of opponents (Ottaway 2003; Schedler 2006; Bogaards 2009; Levitsky & Way 2010a). The scholarship on hybrid regimes has flourished since the end of the 20th century, leading to the proliferation of concepts and catchphrases to qualify and describe these regimes, often summarised as
‘democracy with adjectives’ or ‘authoritarianism with adjectives’ (Collier & Levitsky 1997; Bogaards 2009; Gilbert & Mohseni 2011).

Earlier authors optimistically considered those regimes as incomplete forms of democracy in transition and used concepts such as ‘semi-democracy’ (Diamond et al. 1988) and ‘illiberal democracy’ (Zakaria 1997). However, it soon became clear that the enthusiasm characterising the transitional paradigm was at odds with regimes in which incumbents retained power and could not be removed by democratic means (Carothers 2002). Even though these regimes are more open than full-blown autocracies, they are not democratic, not even partially, at least when referring to a substantive definition of democracy.

Indeed, democracy has been defined in various ways, some conceptualisations being broader and others narrower. Some scholars have defended a minimalist definition of democracy focused on procedural aspects such as competitive elections (see e.g. Schumpeter 1942; Dahl 1998; Przeworski 1999), sometimes also including civil liberties as a necessary component of a liberal democracy (e.g. Zakaria 1997; Diamond 1999). In contrast, other scholars, including prominent Africans and Africanists, have argued for a more substantive definition encompassing not only procedural matters but also social and economic outcomes (see Ake 1996; Lumumba-Kasongo 2005; Zuern 2009). Nwosu (2012: 12) demonstrated how the procedural approach to democratisation allowed many authoritarian incumbents in Africa to ‘mimic the formal requirements’ of a minimalist conception of democracy and to retain power or pass it on to an appointed heir or proxy, therefore reproducing authoritarian rule. As these authors argue, I believe that a substantive approach to democracy is necessary when we consider what people actually want and how they define
democracy on the ground (Zuern 2009), something that has long been ignored in the conceptualisation and measurement of democracy (Doorenspleet 2015).

Hybrid regimes are therefore not democratic. Furthermore, they are not necessarily transitioning towards democracy either: as Levitsky and Way (2010a: 4) have argued, ‘the assumption that hybrid regimes are (or should be) moving in a democratic direction lacks empirical foundation’. The persistence of those regimes led some scholars to emphasise their authoritarian traits, and to the emergence of terms such as ‘semi-authoritarianism’ (Ottaway 2003), ‘electoral authoritarianism’ (Schedler 2006), and ‘competitive authoritarianism’ (Levitsky & Way 2010a). These authors argue that hybrid regimes adopt some level of a democratic façade but without endangering – and on the contrary, in order to sustain – authoritarian governance.

While Ottaway (2003: 15) highlights that ‘elections are not the source of the government’s power’ and do not enable transfer of this power to a new elite, Schedler (2006: 3) argues that they are ‘instruments of authoritarian rule’ rather than of democracy, manipulated as to contain the uncertainty of their outcome, and used as opportunities to distribute patronage, reinforce the ruling coalition, and project a legitimate image. Levitsky and Way (2010a: 297) define competitive authoritarian regimes as ‘civilian regimes in which formal democratic institutions exist and are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but in which incumbent’s abuse of the state places them at a significant advantage vis-à-vis their opponent’. They characterised the incumbent’s significant advantage as an ‘uneven playing field’, which makes the existing political competition unfair and undemocratic.

This overlap of a conceptual and a geographical foci should not be confused with an association of hybrid regimes and African states: some African countries can be
considered democracies or closed autocracies, and hybrid regimes can be found in other parts of the world. However, the focus on African hybrid regimes is well-suited to my enquiries due to the prevalence of such systems on the African continent (Lynch & Crawford 2011; Bogaards & Elischer 2016). As in the rest of the world, hybrid regimes in Africa became prominent after the Cold War when the combination of external factors (disappearance of the Eastern bloc, rise of aid conditionality, hegemony of liberal democracy) and internal pressures finally brought in the so-called Third Wave of Democratisation (Huntington 1993; see also Doorenspleet 2000).

However, instead of democracies, the autocracies of the past gave way, in many cases, to hybrid regimes which became the most prominent regime type in sub-Saharan Africa. At the outset of my research, in 2014, 25 out of 44 African countries included in the Polity IV dataset were considered ‘anocracies’, meaning mixed or incoherent authority regimes.3 Though multiparty elections are now regular occurrences across the continent, former autocrats have, in many cases, managed to hold on to power far beyond their mandate, such as Yoweri Museveni in Uganda or Paul Biya in Cameroon. Others have arranged their succession, often keeping it in the family such as in Togo or Gabon (Nwosu 2012), or by making a last-minute deal with a former opponent as in the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (see Berwouts & Reyntjens 2019).

The utility of the hybrid regime concept has been obscured by the multiplication of categorisations, which all highlight different significant features but not drastically

3 Polity IV is a data series covering 167 countries between 1800 and 2014 to monitor regime change and assess regime types annually based upon criteria measuring executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority and political competition. The ‘Polity Score’ captures the regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). The Polity scores can also be converted into regime categories in a suggested three-part categorization of ‘autocracies’ (-10 to -6), ‘anocracies’ (-5 to +5), and ‘democracies’ (+6 to +10).
distinct categories. This rich literature has refined our collective understanding of the complex ways these regimes work, by highlighting different dynamics at play and discussing subtle conceptual differences. However, the proliferation of terms has also led to a confused conceptual debate which has hampered fine-grained comparison (Morlino 2009; Cassani 2014).

Aside from these conceptual debates, the literature on hybrid regimes generally aims at analysing these regimes’ ability to resist democratisation pressure and to endure or not (Lindberg 2006b; Brownlee 2009; Smith 2014). While the quantitative approaches used by these scholars have the benefit of drawing from larger datasets, their findings have often been contradictory, hampered by conceptual disagreements and differing classifications (Cassani 2014). They have also tended to focus on institutions and incumbents, giving little consideration to the strategies of opposition parties, beyond binary variables such as the decision to boycott an election or to form a pre-electoral coalition (Wahman 2013; Smith 2014).

In contrast, qualitative analyses have been better able to analyse a broader range of strategies adopted by opposition parties and other stakeholders within hybrid regimes, and their effects (Bunce & Wolchik 2010; Mazeppus et al. 2016). The use of in-depth case studies has allowed researchers to account for historical legacies (LeBas 2013), while others have used process tracing methods to explain regime trajectories (Wienkoop 2019). These approaches have their own weaknesses however, in particular the limited number of cases they can account for and the difficult replication or generalisation of their findings (Landman & Carvalho 2017: 83). Yet, they allow us to have a more complex and comprehensive understanding of how hybrid regimes work, how institutions and stakeholders operate within them, and how they can be sustained or challenged over time – something my thesis builds upon.
Some scholars have criticised the hybrid concept itself, arguing that so-called full autocracies also included features such as local elections or parties, and have therefore favoured broad categories such as non-democracies (see in particular Wilkins 2018: 29–30). Still, I believe the hybrid regime framework remains useful because it underlines that there is space available to opposition parties – albeit a limited and shifting one. It is true that institutions in hybrid regimes tend to be manipulated by incumbents to their advantage: for example, they organise elections to please the international community (Schedler 2006: 13) and to enable some controlled circulation of elite (Wilkins 2018), but they also use various strategies to ensure their own power base is not threatened (Cheeseman & Klaas 2019). They tolerate a parliament, which can be a way to distribute patronage and bargain with elites (Collord 2016), but they retain control of debates and votes through patronage and party caucuses. Yet, these institutions still provide an avenue for meaningful engagement of the regime by the opposition. Moreover, in my view, the hybrid nature of the regime must be explored to understand opposition parties. Those parties do not exist and operate in a vacuum, but have to adapt to the shifting and restrictive environment they exist and operate in. This is why it is also important to address this context and understand how it impacts opposition parties’ formation, organisation, and activities, and more broadly what role they end up playing.

Observing opposition parties in hybrid regimes presents a double puzzle. On the one hand, hybrid regimes offer a very limited chance to opposition parties to access power through elections and other processes inscribed in their constitutions, mostly because of the lack of a level playing field (Levitsky & Way 2010b; Helle 2016). Yet opponents still organise themselves as parties and have, in many countries, discarded boycott as a strategy in order to take part in elections and legislatures. On the other
hand, opposition parties often criticise the regime as a whole, and its lack of democracy and transparency, as a way to criticise the ruling elite and to attract support. As a result, the distinction ‘between opposing the state and opposing the ministers of the state’ observed by Parry (1997) in Western parliamentary history is less applicable to hybrid regimes. Nonetheless, the opposition still participates in the system, by registering as recognised parties, running candidates in elections, sitting in national institutions, and sometimes receiving public funding (Bardall 2016: 55). Many opposition leaders also belonged to the state apparatus or ruling party before switching sides. Despite Cheeseman’s (2015: 151) observation that ‘widespread repression encouraged the opposition to form links with militias or factions of the military in order to resist – and in some cases overthrow – the government’, in many cases, opposition parties have favoured non-violent means, such as participation in election, civil disobedience, or a mix of both.

The question of what role opposition parties actually play in hybrid regimes – either towards democratisation or within the system – is therefore an important one. Because hybrid regimes have specific characteristics and provide a different space to opposition parties from democracies, the role of opposition parties within hybrid regimes is likely to be different as well. Even if they might have the same aims, the restrictions inherent to hybrid regimes will affect their role. In the context of hybrid regimes, the distinction between ‘classic’, ‘loyal’ or ‘legitimate’ opposition who recognise the rules of the games on the one hand, and ‘principled’, ‘anti-system’, or ‘irresponsible’ opposition who challenge the regime on the other (e.g. Dahl (ed.) 1966; Sartori 1966; Parry 1997) becomes blurred.

The argument I build throughout this thesis is three-fold. First, I argue that opposition parties’ weakness must be considered in context: opposition parties have to
adapt to face a fused incumbent-state, which should be considered a key characteristic of hybrid regimes rather than a case-specific historical legacy. This quasi-fusion of state institutions and the ruling party allows the incumbent to derive power either from monopolising the capacity of the state apparatus or by benefitting from the ruling party’s organisational strength. The Ugandan National Resistance Movement (NRM) illustrates the first model of a rather weak ruling party relying on the control of public resources for coercion or patronage distribution purposes, while Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) in Tanzania has benefited from investments into party institutionalisation during the single-party era that contribute to its dominance today (Morse 2014; Collord 2019). This fusion of the state and the incumbent blurs the line between loyal and irresponsible opposition: it forces opposition parties to use a mix of protest and participation, and to be loyal and anti-system at the same time. These parties take part in formal institutions and attempt to manipulate them to their advantage (e.g. by using electoral campaigns as a platform to criticise the regime or by using their seats in Parliament to relay information and obtain resources), whilst they concomitantly use informal, anti-system strategies such as boycott, protests, or civil disobedience to maintain pressure on the incumbent.

Second, while it is undeniable that opposition parties tend to be poorly organised, prone to fragmentation, and to have low mobilisation capacity outside of a few strongholds and apart from electoral periods, I question the way they have been portrayed as universally ‘weak’, and argue that opposition parties across African hybrid regimes are diverse and complex. Some are better organised than others, some have a stronger identity that contribute to their institutionalisation, and some have higher mobilisation capacity for protests. They have an organisational identity that goes beyond ethnic ties, clientelist endeavours, or personal charisma. They display
various levels of internal organisation, which need to be unpacked to better understand the way in which they operate. They use various strategies to resist and confront the regime they face, adapting to the restrictive environment they operate in. I paint a multi-faceted portrait of how these opposition parties emerge, organise, and operate, contributing to a more complex and fine-grained understanding of what these parties do and what they can achieve.

Finally, despite various weaknesses, opposition parties can endure as organisations, and play a role in pushing for change. These parties perform important functions that enable them to, at least, embarrass the regime. At best, it allows them to offer an alternative and defeat the incumbent – either at the polls or in the streets. Understanding the factors driving individual parties’ endurance and their ability to coalesce is important to assess the role they can play for the regime’s trajectory overall.

As such, this dissertation makes a series of theoretical contributions. While they are further discussed in the conclusion, I outline them briefly here. First, my research adds to a growing but still very limited literature on African political parties: these parties have indeed been largely ignored by party comparativists and Africanist scholars, and it is only in the last decade that we have seen a meaningful shift (see Chapter 1). Second, I dismiss a series of overused tropes that tend to bias our analysis of African parties: that they are universally ‘weak’, necessarily ‘ethnic’, only ‘personalistic’, and not ‘programmatic’. Instead, I analyse what these parties actually do in an inductive manner, rather than what they should do based upon normative expectations, and find that these parties have an identity and legitimacy rooted in a certain ‘core’ and can perform important functions. Third, in contrast to the prevalent literature on hybrid regimes which focuses on how incumbents manipulate democratic institutions (Ottaway 2003; Levitsky & Way 2010a), I observe how opposition parties fare and
operate within these regimes, a dimension until now too little explored. Finally, I contribute to our collective understanding of democratisation processes by outlining the role that opposition parties, weak as they are, can play in them. This dissertation also makes empirical and methodological contributions, which I outline after providing an overview of my research methods.

**Overview of methods**

This dissertation is based upon a comparative and inductive approach to research. It revolves around two country-case studies where I collected primary qualitative data during extended periods of fieldwork. The first case is Uganda under Yoweri Museveni, 1986 to present, with a particular focus on the period since 2005, when the Movement system was abandoned and political parties could again participate in the country’s politics. The second is Burkina Faso under Blaise Compaoré, from the return to multipartyism in 1991 to the popular insurrection that toppled him in 2014. Both have been recognised as hybrid regimes in indices such as Polity IV and Freedom House’s score, as well as by respective country experts.

Uganda has been governed by Museveni since he assumed power in 1986 in the midst of a rebellion. Though once acclaimed by Western allies for bringing stability and economic growth to Uganda, his involvement in neighbouring conflicts and the political restrictions characterising his regime are reminders of the nature of his rule (Tripp 2004). He first set up a ‘no-party democracy’, in which parties existed, but saw their activities curbed. These restrictions were lifted in 2005 by a referendum, which also repealed constitutional term-limits. Despite the formal abandonment of the Movement system and the official recognition of political parties’ rights to fully participate in Ugandan politics, Museveni’s NRM has maintained a strong grip on
power and Uganda is still considered a hybrid regime (Kiiza et al. (eds) 2008; Tripp 2010; Keating 2011; Perrot et al. (eds) 2014a; Makara 2016).

Meanwhile, Burkina Faso under Compaoré was a prime example of a hybrid regime (Hilgers and Mazzocchetti (eds) 2010; Harsch 2017; Loada 2020). He gained power in 1987 through a coup d'état and set up a new constitutional regime in 1991, which opened the door to multiparty politics. He successfully manipulated the country’s institutions and used various co-optation mechanisms and divisive tactics to remain in power for 27 years. However, his last attempt to extend his rule, which required a change of the constitution’s term-limits, led to a popular uprising that forced Compaoré to resign in October 2014. This was followed by a one-year political transition involving ad-hoc institutions and an inclusive government. Elections were held in November 2015, and brought to power Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, a former official of Compaoré’s party who had defected to the opposition shortly before the 2014 insurrection. Because the transition did not involve a ‘ruling majority’ and an ‘opposition’ as such, and considering the reconfiguration of the party landscape following the 2015 elections, I decided to focus on opposition parties during Compaoré’s regime (1987-2014) in order to allow for both a longer-term and comparative analysis.

Despite the fact that both regimes share features as hybrid regimes, they simultaneously display different contexts and dynamics, which allows me to draw a broader picture by comparing these cases. This country selection, which will be further explained in Chapter 2, was based upon several considerations including a different colonial history and linguistic legacy, and the absence of ongoing conflict. The temporal difference between the two regimes under study – one ending in 2014 and the other being contemporary – creates difficulties for comparison, but these are
minimised in several ways. My focus is on long-term processes over the course of the regime, and on dynamics that have not significantly changed over the time-period between the 2014 uprising in Burkina Faso and the time of data-collection, though I have remained aware of such changes (e.g. the increasing role of social media and new technologies in the activities of parties). I have also taken steps to avoid ‘rewriting history’ in Burkina Faso during data collection and analysis (see Chapter 2).

In each country I collected data on the activities of, and rhetoric used by, two opposition parties: one which emerged from a split within the ruling party and one older, historical opponent. The parties under study in Burkina Faso are the Union pour le Progrès et le Changement (UPC) which was created following a split from the ruling Congrès pour la Démocratie et le Progrès (CDP) in 2010, and the Union pour la Renaissance-Parti Sankariste (UNIR-PS), a smaller party that draws upon the legacy of the 1980s’ Sankarist revolution. In Uganda, the spotlight is on the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) founded in 2004 by disgruntled members of Museveni’s NRM around the figure of Kizza Besigye, and the Democratic Party (DP), Uganda’s oldest party founded prior to independence, in 1954.

I have used qualitative methods, relying chiefly on semi-structured interviews with 146 key informants (see Appendix 1 for a full list). These include opposition party elites and activists, as well as other political observers (such as academics, journalists, and civil society activists). The information collected through these interviews was complemented with a review of the media’s political coverage in each country, as well as party resources and secondary literature. The second chapter of this dissertation provides a more detailed account of the methodological framework used, and addresses issues of case selection, empirical methods, fieldwork logistics, and ethical considerations.
The approach I used makes important empirical and methodological contributions. This dissertation provides new empirical knowledge about political dynamics in Uganda and Burkina Faso, and more specifically on four little-studied political parties. The DP in Uganda has previously been analysed by Carbone (2003), but this was during the Movement era. While Besigye as an individual, and the opposition in Uganda more broadly, have received some attention (see Kalinaki 2014; Beadsworth 2018), we know little about the FDC and other opposition parties as organisations. For their part, Burkinabè political parties have not been studied in depth, except for a rather dated research note produced by the *Centre pour la Gouvernance Démocratique* (CGD 2009).

Methodologically, I depart from an unfortunate tendency in the comparative study of the African continent, which has been to remain within the boundaries of regional and linguistic realms. Focusing on neighbouring countries who share a colonial legacy, a common language, and membership of the same regional organisations can be justified by a most-similar-system design requiring such a case selection. But a case selection cutting across both regional and linguistic boundaries avoids the pitfall of generalising dynamics found in a handful of rather similar and over-studied cases to the rest of the continent (Briggs 2017). My case selection also enables me to bring together the francophone and anglophone bodies of literature, still very much divided by linguistic and epistemological differences (see Cheeseman 2018). Colonial history has influenced the predominant interests in each circle, while differences in academic traditions, linguistic barriers, and the still limited number of collaboration opportunities have constrained exchanges of ideas and mutual influence. There are of course a few important exceptions, scholars whose interests have developed outside of the traditional sphere of their national scholarship and who have been willing and able
to publish their work and collaborate outside their circles (see for example the work of Van de Walle (2009) on democratisation and development, Bach (2011) on neopatrimonialism, and more recently Perrot (2016) on Ugandan elections). Still, my work contributes to a very small pool of studies cutting across both regional and linguistic lines (Doorenspleet and Nijzink (eds) 2013; Riedl 2014).

Outline of the thesis

As Rakner and Van de Walle (2009: 108) have argued, the ‘strength and strategies [of opposition parties] are intrinsically linked to the dynamics of contemporary democratization in Africa’. This dissertation therefore analyses the role that opposition parties actually do and can play by unpacking the perceived ‘weakness’ of opposition parties. This attributed ‘weakness’ has referred to a range of different issues. For example, opposition parties are often considered weak because they are seen as mere vehicles used to promote individual and parochial interests (Randall & Svåsand 2002c: 42; Chabal & Daloz 1999: 151; Van de Walle & Butler 1999); because they are poorly organised and scarcely present across the national territory (Randall & Svåsand 2002c: 37); because they fail to perform expected functions derived from the classic literature (Randall & Svåsand 2002c: 30–31); or because they suffer from fragmentation and a lack of endurance, and fail to coalesce (Van de Walle & Butler 1999; Van de Walle 2006). By addressing each of these dynamics throughout this dissertation, I refine our understanding of how opposition parties emerge and operate within hybrid regimes and how they can contribute to regime change. This thesis comprises seven chapters, and an additional conclusion.

The first chapter lays out the theoretical framework in which my work is located. I start by reviewing how and why African parties have been relatively neglected in the
literature, as Gazibo – quoted at the start of this introduction – lamented. I then highlight how a new generation of scholars, including Elischer (2013), LeBas (2013), and Bob-Milliar (2012a, 2014, 2019), but also Beardsworth (2018), Souaré (2017), and Kelly (2020), have challenged long-standing assumptions that African party politics can be reduced to an ethnic census or clientelist exchanges. I then draw from the existing literature on political parties to assess the role parties may be expected to play in a hybrid regime and how their contribution to democratisation has been rated. The chapter reveals how, aside from a few exceptions such as LeBas (2013), opposition parties have been largely treated as universally weak, a conception I unpack over the course of this dissertation.

The second chapter provides details of my methodological framework. I start by offering an overview of my qualitative, inductive, and comparative approach, and explain the selection of my country- and party-cases. I then introduce the methods used for data collection and analysis. In a third section, I discuss the conduct of ‘fieldwork’, in terms of logistics, safety, and local collaboration. Finally, I discuss the ethical considerations of this research project, in particular the protection of participants and my own positionality and potential biases.

The third chapter analyses the political environment in Uganda and Burkina Faso and the specific constraints faced by opposition parties, and argues that the uneven playing field that characterises hybrid regimes (Levitsky & Way 2010a) is fuelled by a state-incumbent fusion. I first provide an overview of each country’s political history since independence, to equip the reader with the necessary background information on important dynamics and key events relevant for the rest of the thesis, and demonstrate why these countries can be considered to be hybrid regimes. I then compare the main obstacles faced by opposition parties in both countries, and argue that these difficulties
are connected with the fusion of state institutions, the incumbent party, and the
governing elite. While this dynamic has been acknowledged and explained by
historical legacies, I argue that it should be recognised as a common trait in such
political systems.

In Chapter 4, I analyse the ‘core’ of opposition parties, or the substance that they
are formed, and mobilise, around. A notion related to a party’s brand (Lupu 2016) or
goals (Strøm 1990), the idea of a party ‘core’ is nonetheless distinct and focuses on
what parties are built upon, and on what provides them with a coherent identity and
legitimacy. Existing research has shown that some opposition parties emerge from pre-
existing structures, such as rebel groups (Manning 1998) or labour movements (LeBas
2013) From my empirical research, I find that opposition parties can derive such
identity and legitimacy from two other types of core. Some parties, such as the DP in
Uganda and the UNIR-PS in Burkina Faso, are built around historical values that these
parties publicly commit to. Others, such as the Ugandan FDC and the Burkinabè UPC,
are formed, first and foremost, around an ill-defined but appealing idea of change, and
position themselves as credible actors able to bring this change about, drawing from
their elite’s experience, networks, or resources. These cores better capture a party’s
identity than classic cleavages such as ideology and sectional identity, and demonstrate
how these parties are more than just a vehicle for an individual leader. In fact, issues,
ethnicity, or personalistic ties are shown to be used to mobilise activists and supporters
in connexion with the party’s core, rather than being the cleavages around which
parties are organised in the first place. This analysis enables us to move beyond the
narrow view of political parties as either (rarely) ‘programmatic’ or (more often) not
so, and to understand parties as more complex organisations.
Chapter 5 investigates how opposition parties are built within a hybrid regime. Contributing to a growing scholarship on party formation processes (Manning 1998; LeBas 2006; Osei 2016; Paget 2019b), it focuses on a little explored aspect: the relations between the party in central office and the party on the ground, to use the framework devised by Katz and Mair (1993). Analysing how parties are organised internally allows us to understand what type of party they are, and how power is shared within the organisation. I focus on three key aspects of party organisation, which are particularly important elements for a party to operate: the set-up of local structures, its financial resources, and decision-making processes. I look at these three elements from a broad perspective, instead of focusing on their operations solely during electoral campaigns. I find that while these parties tend to be structured in a top-down manner and funded by their elite like cadre parties, they also need to mobilise support – during and outside elections – across the country and, therefore, to set up some sort of party branches, which helps to give rise to local party figures. These local leaders have more or less control over their local structures, and can leverage this control vis-à-vis the central leadership. This consideration of how local and national dynamics are intertwined echoes the work of other young scholars using a similar approach, in particular Wilkins (2018) and McLellan (2019).

In Chapter 6, I turn my attention to what opposition parties actually do, what functions they perform through their activities. As I discuss in Chapter 1, opposition parties are generally considered weak because they fail to perform classic party functions such as representing and aggregating voters’ interests or holding governments to account (Randall & Svåsand 2002a). Worse, they arguably play a part in sustaining the authoritarian regime by providing legitimacy and diffusing dissent (Albrecht 2005). Yet, I argue that opposition parties’ functions should be analysed
differently, based upon the contribution they can make in pushing the boundaries of the hybrid regime, and ultimately in favouring democratisation. While opposition parties may use a broad range of activities, I focus in this chapter on four types of activities that emerged as particularly important in my research: electoral boycotts, election campaigns, parliamentary representation, and anti-incumbent protest. These tactics, and others, enable opposition parties to carve out and defend a space for themselves within the constrained system and to play a role in pushing for regime change. I analyse this role by addressing three functions that these parties perform: the *denunciation* of the regime, the *mobilisation* of dissent, and the preparation for *succession*. I assess the capacity of opposition parties to achieve this in Uganda and Burkina Faso. Furthermore, I argue that while participation and protest strategies are sometimes seen as contradictory and counter-productive, as in Uganda, these approaches can also sustain each other and intersect positively, therefore posing a real threat to the regime, as in Burkina Faso.

The seventh chapter addresses the implications of opposition parties’ foundations, internal organisations, and activities on their ability to endure as individual parties and to perform as a collective opposition. Party endurance and opposition coordination are seen as desirable outcomes to promote democracy, yet the relation between the two is not necessarily as straight-forward as it seems. I first argue that the capacity of opposition parties to endure within a hybrid regime is informed by a combination of inter-related elements: the sustainability of their core, their ability to detach from their founding leader, and the nature – rather than the amount – of their financial resources. Then, I analyse patterns of opposition coordination and how this may contribute to democratisation within such systems. Opposition parties can arguably bring forth a regime change either through the ballot box – by defeating the incumbent in an election
– or following sustained protests leading to an insurrection. Both these scenarios require a level of coordination among opposition parties and with other stakeholders. From the cases of Uganda and Burkina Faso, I find that inter-party collaboration is easier when it is about protests than about participation. Building upon Beardsworth’s (2018) argument that coalition-building can be undermined by internal party processes, such as factionalism and the leverage of newly-elected party presidents, I find that inter-party cooperation cannot be understood without considering individual parties’ organisational identity and interests, as well as the internal power dynamics at play among factions and between the party’s centre and its periphery.

Finally, a short conclusion summarises the key points of this thesis, highlights its theoretical contribution, and paves the way for further research on the subject of opposition parties in African hybrid regimes. Throughout this dissertation, I demonstrate the diversity at play among opposition parties in terms of their capacity to mobilise cohesive support, develop institutions and branches, and meaningfully engage the regime, calling in to question the universal ‘weakness’ commonly attributed to them.
My work contributes to a long tradition in the literature interested in political parties. Indeed, parties are a classic object of research in political science, and have now been studied for over a century. The simply massive amount of scholarly work on the subject has been reviewed elsewhere, for example by Montero and Gunther (2004: 3–4) who painted this portrait of the state of the literature on the topic:

'We must begin by conceding [...] that there is no shortage of books and articles on parties. As Strøm and Müller have noted (1999: 5), 'the scholarly literature that examines political parties is enormous'. Indeed, parties were among the first subjects of analysis at the very birth of modern political science, as exemplified by the classic works of Ostrogorski (1964 [1902]), Michels (1962 [1911]) and Weber (1968 [1922]). Over the following years, a number of extremely important works were published (e.g. Merriam 1922; Schattschneider 1942; Key 1949), but it was really in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s when studies of parties fully blossomed as a subfield in political science. Such works as those of Duverger (1954), Ranney (1954), Neumann (1956), Eldersveld (1964), Sorauf (1964), La Palombara and Weiner (1966, which included Kirchheimer’s seminal contribution), Epstein (1967), Lipset and Rokkan (1967a) and Sartori (1976) established the conceptual and empirical bases for countless studies in comparative politics.'
From the creation of the first African political parties in the 1860s in Liberia (Kaydor 2014: 19–20), through to the ‘explosion of political parties in all African countries’ around the time of decolonisation (Mozaffar 2005: 395), and the ‘spring of political parties’ taking place in Burkina Faso and elsewhere in the early 1990s (Ouattara 2014: 59), Africa has had a long history and wide variety of political parties. Yet, comparatively African parties have long been under-studied – something particularly true for opposition parties. Erdmann, Basedau and Mehler (2007: 9), among others, have decried the lack of sound empirical research on the development and functioning of political parties on the continent. Indeed, until the last decade, research on parties remained scarce, and work on opposition parties specifically rarer still. Parties in Africa tended to be side-lined by scholars working on parties more broadly, but also by ‘Africanists’ more interested in other actors.

This chapter locates this thesis within the broader literature on political parties. I start by analysing why some authors, such as Gazibo (2006), have considered African parties a ‘neglected’ research object, and explain the relative side-lining of African parties in the party and Africanist fields alike. This omission can be explained by a Western bias in the political science literature and long-standing assumptions in the study of Africa, both of which have been challenged in the last decade. Led by young scholars, a new wave of research has reinvigorated the literature on African parties and shed new light on their organisation and activities, which my own work builds upon.

The second half of the chapter focuses on the role opposition parties can be expected to play based upon existing scholarship. The functions of political parties are indeed a classic topic in the political science literature, and have been studied both in the context of democracies and, to a lesser extent, in autocracies. After a brief review of this important scholarship, I look more closely at the potential role opposition parties may
have in democratisation processes. As we will see, opposition parties have often been dismissed as weak actors with no real ability to contribute to democratisation – a misconception I unpack and challenge in this dissertation.

1.1 Political parties in Africa: a ‘neglected’ research object?

*A relative side-lining of African parties*

The literature on political parties has primarily derived from the study of liberal democracies in Europe and America (Montero & Gunther 2004). Leading scholars interested in political parties have often failed to engage with the African continent. The side-lining of African parties was particularly surprising in broad comparative work, such as the foundational volume edited by Diamond and Gunther (2001b) on parties and democracy. In the introduction to this collection, they claim that:

’One of the strengths of this volume is that it includes empirical studies of parties in a wide array of democratic systems, in Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Latin America, Japan, India, Turkey, and Taiwan, as well as more theoretically oriented pieces with no specific geographical focus’ (Diamond & Gunther 2001a: xiv).

In the light of this broad geographical coverage, Africa’s absence is conspicuous. Not only is there no specific case study located in Africa – in a volume published 40 years after most African countries gained independence, and a decade after the new wave of multipartyism across the continent – the comparative chapters opening and concluding the volume also fail to do more than mention a couple of African countries in passing.

The lack of attention to African parties by party scholars may be explained by the fact that African parties did not always fit existing definitions and typologies. Indeed,
some accepted definitions of political parties, such as that of Downs (1957: 25), LaPalombara and Weiner (1966: 6–7)\(^4\), or Sartori (1976: 63) would not apply to many African parties. The emphasis on the necessity of contesting elections, for example, excludes single parties in one-party regimes, as well as opposition parties boycotting elections in multiparty systems, a problem previously highlighted by Osei (2012: 26).

The classic party models, such as the cadre/elite and mass party (Duverger 1981), the catch-all party (Kirchheimer 1966), and the cartel party (Katz & Mair 1995, 2009) were also all heavily connected to the European context that saw them emerge.

Elite parties were seen as minimally organised outside of their parliamentary caucus, displayed a weak ideology, and were associated with a context of restricted suffrage (Duverger 1981: 121). While some of these characteristics are reminiscent of many African parties – the distribution of privileges as the main objective, the low ideological cleavage and weak organisation (e.g. Kelly 2020) – the context is fundamentally different. Furthermore, political parties in contemporary Africa – at least the larger and most enduring ones like those at hand in this thesis – do attempt to mobilise support (for elections and other activities such as protests) more broadly than an elitist clique, even though their official membership is often difficult to assess.

Mass parties came about to represent the emerging and recently enfranchised working class, and were therefore much broader and membership-centred (Duverger 1981: 119). Parties in Africa are clearly very different from this kind of organisation that is built from the bottom up, funded by members’ fees and contributions, and displays a strong ideological stance.

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\(^4\) LaPalombara and Weiner’s volume still included two chapters on political parties in Africa, whose authors used a less restrictive definition.
The catch-all party concept describes a field of parties whose ideological difference has become blurred, with electoralist strategies revolving around effectiveness arguments rather than real policy alternatives. The ‘catch-all’ denomination has been used to describe some African parties, such as Elischer’s (2013: 29) refined ‘ethnic catch-all’ category, and Erdmann’s (2004: 79) description of the CCM in Tanzania and the Parti Socialiste (PS) in Senegal. Yet, ideological uniformity does not mean that there is no difference on other fronts between the ruling and opposition parties.

Finally, the cartel party identified by Katz and Mair (1995, 2009) presupposes that all parties get into power at some point, and that there is therefore some kind of cooperation between the alternating ruling and opposition parties, translated into public funding being the main source of income for parties. Once again, this is not the case in African hybrid regimes, where turnovers are rare and opposition parties generally stay in the opposition unless they are co-opted by the dominant party, and where public funding is extremely limited and monopolised by the ruling party, as we will see in Chapter 3. Even when hybrid regimes experience a turnover – such as the cases of Kenya, Nigeria, Zambia, or Senegal – new elites benefit from the uneven playing field they inherit, but it does not necessarily lead to cooperation between parties disconnected from society. Overall, scholars’ focus on the European party models and formal institutions made their approach ill-adapted to studying African parties, which led comparativists to either exclude African parties from their field of study, or to create new categories (e.g. ‘quasi-parties’ or ‘semi-parties) in an uneasy attempt to fit them into their typologies (Erdmann 2004; Quantin 2009: 173–174).

This failure to incorporate African parties into broader typologies was compounded by a relatively mild interest in these parties by researchers specialising in African affairs as well. Following the independence of most countries across the continent in
the 1960s, researchers interested in political development in Africa did look at the role of parties. Leading scholars in the field such as LaPalombara and Weiner (1966) and Huntington (1968) had acknowledged the importance of parties for the political development of new states. Some authors saw African ruling parties as possible agents of national unity (Zolberg 1960; Wallerstein 1966) and of the struggle against ‘idleness’ and ‘under-development’ (Decraene 1963: 9–11). A few scholars produced mostly descriptive accounts of the main political parties emerging across the continent, such as the works of Sklar (1963) on Nigeria, Morgenthau (1967) on Francophone West Africa, and Leys (1967) on the Acholi region in Uganda. However, apart from the very succinct overview produced by Hodgkin (1961), no systematic and comparative study of African parties came out during that period, and knowledge of their actual operations and organisation remained limited (Erdmann et al. 2007: 9; Elischer 2013: 11).

With the rapid demise of these electoral experiments and the set-up of many military or single-party regimes across Africa, research on parties on the continent became nearly impossible, either because parties were banned, or because the closed regimes tended to limit the access scholars needed to study parties empirically (Gazibo 2006: 7–8). Aside from a few attempts to explain shifts to single-party regimes (Coleman & Rosberg 1966; Debasch 1966; Mueller 1984), interest turned away from parties to other aspects of political realities, even in the few countries exhibiting (limited) multipartyism such as Burkina Faso in the 1970s and Senegal in the 1980s. Since the so-called third wave of democratisation (Huntington 1993; see also Doorenspleet 2000), the literature has started to encompass parties in new democracies around the world, notably in post-communist Eastern Europe (Pridham et al. 1996; Markowski 1997; Lewis 2000), Latin America (e.g. Cott 2005; Lupu 2014; Barndt
2016; Levitsky et al. 2016) and Asia (e.g. Mitra et al. 2004; Hellmann 2011; Tomsa & Ufen 2013). Meanwhile, research on African (opposition) parties has remained relatively scarce.

From the continent, two edited volumes provide an important share of the collective knowledge available: a book edited by Olukoshi (1998b) on the politics of opposition, which emerged from a conference held in Accra, Ghana, in 1995, and an edited volume compiled by Salih (2003) on African political parties. The African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa is a special case that has received its fair share of attention (e.g. Dubow 2000; Lissoni & Soske 2012; Booysen 2018). A few other monographs have been written on selected parties (e.g. Fofona 2009; Lwanga-Lunyiigo 2015), but they remain scarce and poorly distributed outside of their country of interest. Apart from these, research on the internal organisation and strategies of African parties, especially in the opposition, remained rather limited. Of course, important exceptions exist, such as the work of Manning (1998) on Angola, Carbone (2003) and Makara (2009) on Uganda, LeBas (2006) on Zimbabwe, and Larmer and Fraser (2007) and Cheeseman and Hinfelaar (2010) on Zambia. Meanwhile, others scholars have studied party systems rather than the internal organisation of parties themselves (Bogaards 2000; Manning 2005; Mozaffar & Scarritt 2005; Carbone 2007; Doorenspleet & Nijzink 2014). However, these contributions are drops in the ocean when it comes to such a broad topic as the formation, operation, and contribution of political parties across the African continent over time.

Even though opposition parties proliferated from the early 1990s, attention initially failed to shift in their direction. The growing literature on democratic backsliding or consolidation, hybrid regimes, and regime change, tended to focus instead on the impact of international actors (conditionality), people (protests), or incumbents
(strategy or lack thereof) (Bratton & Van de Walle 1997; Levitsky & Way 2010a). The few scholars who have pondered the role of parties for democratisation prospects have usually found them rather ‘weak’ (Van de Walle & Butler 1999; Randall & Svåsand 2002c; Carothers 2006; Rakner & Van de Walle 2009).

Scholars such as Erdmann (2004; see also Basedau et al. (eds) 2007) in Germany and Carbone (2006, 2007) in Italy made foundational contributions to the study of African parties and paved the way for further research on the matter, whereas in neighbouring France, classical political objects, including political parties, were overwhelmingly ignored by African Studies scholars. Indeed, as Quantin (2009: 167) and Cheeseman (2018: 16) have previously pointed out, the Africanist scholarship in France has been built on an anthropological tradition and heavily influenced by Bayart, Mbembe and Toulabor’s (1992) ‘politics from the bottom’ approach. Gathered around the journal Politique Africaine from the late 1970s, they attempted to explain dynamics of political expression by focusing on popular means of political action, sometimes also called ‘Unidentified Political Objects’ (Martin 1989), such as art or religion, and leaving aside institutions such as political parties. This context led Gazibo (2006) to argue in favour of ‘rehabilitating’ the study of parties in Africa in an issue of Politique Africaine that was specifically focused on African parties as a neglected topic. It is rather telling that two of the four articles included in this collection were translations rather than original francophone pieces (Carbone & Larouche St-Sauveur 2006; Osei & Pommerolle 2006), and that the few French scholars working on parties still tend to publish in Anglophone journals (e.g. Perrot 2016).
Long-standing assumptions challenged by a new research wave

This relative side-lining of parties in studies of African politics, and the particular dismissal of opposition parties as uniformly weak, has been driven by long-standing assumptions and research prisms used in the study of African politics, which have been challenged in the past decade. In particular, the reduction of African politics to either an ethnic census (Lever 1979; Horowitz 1985) or clientelist ties (e.g. Chabal & Daloz 1999) – or a mix of both – weighed heavily on the study of parties for a long time. Several authors presented culturalist arguments that looked predominantly at ethnicity to explain party dynamics on the continent, a feature long exaggerated by scholars. Horowitz (1985), Bratton and Van de Walle (1997), and Arriola (2013), for example, have considered African parties as inevitably ethnic in nature and, as such, detrimental to democratisation.

However, scholars such as Gazibo (2006: 12) warned that it was time to put aside such prejudices to see what came out of field research. Meanwhile, Elischer (2013), in the first broad comparative study of African parties, showed that, although ethnic parties do exist, they do not dominate African politics, and non-ethnic parties are also important players across the continent. Van de Walle and Butler (1999) have also argued that not all party politics in Africa are necessarily ethnic, though they are intensely personalised. Burkina Faso is a prime example of a country where, despite a very diverse population – over 60 different ethnic groups – ethnicity is not a significant politically salient identity. Indeed, Stroh (2010: 9) argued that voting behaviour in Burkina Faso was more informed by local ties than by ethnic affiliation (see also Basedau & Stroh 2012).
Meanwhile, the predominant neopatrimonial view of the African state has led to the conclusion that African parties were devoid of programmatic values and chiefly revolved around clientelist ties with voters and supporters (Bratton & Van de Walle 1997; Chabal & Daloz 1999). African political parties are often analysed through the lens of patron-client relationships, which are deemed to be a ‘persisting feature of African politics from the advent of independence until recently’ (Osei 2012: 86). Clientelism is usually understood as a dyadic, personal relationship between patrons and clients, bringing individual benefits to the latter (Erdmann & Engel 2007). In this view, the persistence of clientelist dynamics encourages big men with local influence and popularity to either join the ruling party – to enjoy favours and prebends deriving from holding power – or to create their own party to further their own political advancement (Randall & Svåsand 2002c: 34). Osei (2012: 255–256) has studied party-voter linkage in Senegal and Ghana and shown how politicians engage in ‘proximity politics’ – directly targeting voters – or count on local intermediaries, such as chiefs and marabouts.

This can contribute to the dominance of the ruling party and to the fragmentation of the opposition. For example, Kelly (2020: 88) has argued that party proliferation in Senegal was fuelled by politicians’ desire not to contest and win elections, but rather to access state patronage. The endurance of clientelism and patronage networks contribute to the idea that parties are built around a person, rather than around a particular ideology, and are therefore perceived as mere ‘vehicles for ambitious politicians’ (Randall & Svåsand 2002c: 42; see also Chabal & Daloz 1999: 151; Manning 2005: 715).

However, while it is undeniable that leaders are important pull factors and are often their party’s main financial backer, and that clientelism can be an important feature of
parties’ behaviour, it is equally important to recognise that there are resilient opposition parties – large and small – across the continent, which cannot be reduced to their individual leader. Examples include Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (Chadema) in Tanzania, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in Zimbabwe, the DP in Uganda, or the Alliance pour la Démocratie et la Fédération–Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (ADF-RDA) in Burkina Faso. While ethnicity and clientelism remain dimensions that need to be taken into account in studies of African politics, I agree with scholars such as Elischer (2013), who demonstrated that political parties are organised in a variety of ways, and use diverse strategies to mobilise support.

This realisation has led a new generation of scholars to start tackling these issues in the last decade. My thesis therefore builds upon this growing body of literature on political parties’ internal organisation, political manoeuvring, and mobilisation strategies. This has included work on mobilisation manoeuvres (Larmer & Fraser 2007; Koter 2013; Cheeseman & Larmer 2015; Taylor 2017), on partisan activities at the local/decentralised level (Green 2011; Muriaas 2011; Wilkins 2016; McLellan 2019), and on opposition coalition-building (Souaré 2017; Beardsworth 2018).

Furthermore, recent doctoral work by Collord (2016, 2019) and Wilkins (2018, 2019) provides a complex understanding of the inner working of ruling parties and institutions in East African countries. Other scholars have looked at the motivations of politicians and parties. For example, Bob-Milliar (2011, 2012b, 2019) has produced a rich body of literature on Ghanaian party dynamics, looking at the two main parties as well as at smaller Nkrumahist organisations. Cooper (2014) has discussed the Namibian opposition’s strategic choice to pursue a parliamentary foothold, while Alfieri (2016b) has studied the motivations of party activists in Burundi. Bleck and
Van de Walle (2011) have sought to understand parties’ positioning and raised the question of their assumed lack of programmatic discourse, building a ‘theory of non-mobilisation’ based upon data from Francophone West Africa (see also Bleck & Van de Walle 2013). Authors such as LeBas (2013), Riedl (2014, 2016), and Paget (2019b) have provided fascinating accounts of parties’ formation processes from across the continent using well-needed historical approaches. Finally, some authors have produced important reviews of the study of African parties as part of collective handbooks. For example, Stroh (2019) has highlighted the necessity for better empirical data on individual parties and a proper discussion of their programmatic foundations, and argued that flexibility is an important and overlooked aspect of party systems (see also Bogaards 2013; van Wyk 2018).

This rich empirical work, emerging from long-term and embedded fieldwork in a variety of countries across the continent, has opened the door for a better understanding of political parties, multiplied the questions and topics to be studied, and contributed to theoretical debates more inclusive of the actual dynamics at play across Africa. This is why I refer to many elements of this new wave of scholarship throughout my dissertation. Yet, despite this burgeoning literature, there is still a gap waiting to be filled in the literature. Opposition parties specifically have received less attention, and when they have been studied, much of the focus has been on the workings of inter-party coalitions rather than on their internal dynamics – though work on coalitions, especially that of Beardsworth (2018), has certainly uncovered and taken into account such internal dynamics. Meanwhile, most of the existing research is based upon individual case studies, while comparative work remains very much focused on particular regions (say Francophone Africa or East Africa). While this makes sense methodologically, this is a missed opportunity to bring together distinct bodies of
literature and research traditions and to compare and contrast cases with less similar historical legacies and cultural features.

1.2 The role of opposition parties in hybrid regimes

The literature provides suggestions as to what the role of parties is in a democracy and, to a more limited extent, in an authoritarian setting. This has often taken the shape of lists of functions that parties should perform in order to sustain the regime. The role that opposition parties, in particular, can play in the grey area represented by hybrid regimes is less clear, especially as the stated purpose of opposition parties in such a context usually involves regime change rather than its survival. Yet, the scholarship on democratisation has been rather dismissive of opposition parties’ contribution, feeding an emphatic categorisation of these parties as universally weak.

Functions of opposition parties in democracies and autocracies

As I mentioned earlier, the role of political parties has been predominantly studied in democratic contexts. Political parties have been recognised as an important, even ‘indispensable’ component of democracy contributing to democratic competition and government (Lipset 2000), while the development of an integrative and competitive party system is seen as a key indicator of democracy (Clapham 1993). Parties are ‘ubiquitous’ because ‘they perform functions that are valuable to many political actors’ (Strøm & Müller 1999: 1).

Different authors have compiled different lists of party functions, some broader than others, at times itemising activities rather than actual functions necessary for the system’s survival. I focus here on the most salient functions political parties perform.
in a democracy and which have formed the basis of what parties are expected to do more generally, drawing particularly on the work of Gunther and Diamond (2001) and Randall and Svåsand (2002a).

One of these functions is representation, which designates the fact that parties organise and take part in competitive elections, represent the aspirations of their constituents, and help them articulate their interests in political terms. This relates to what Gunther and Diamond (2001) call issue structuring. This function is considered key in consolidating democracy, as parties who fail to represent the interests of their constituents and address their preoccupations lay the ground for undemocratic takeovers.

A second important function is integration and mobilisation: political parties integrate citizens into the democratic system and mobilise them to enhance political participation, which is sometimes considered a defining characteristic of democracy. Indeed, if people feel integrated into the system – which can translate into higher voter turnout and political expression through accepted mechanisms like political parties – they will have an interest in ensuring its perpetuation and will be less likely to allow the democratic system to fall (Gunther & Diamond 2001: 8).

A third function parties often perform is that of interest aggregation: parties combine the demands of groups or individuals into coherent programmes, which is deemed fundamental to ensuring the coherence of public policy (Randall & Svåsand 2002a: 5–6). However, whether this function is being fulfilled even within established democracies has been questioned (Randall & Svåsand 2002c: 33).

Fourth, political parties are responsible for the recruitment and training of the elite: they identify and groom political leaders, by attracting and channelling political
representatives or focusing their ambition and by accustoming them to democratic processes and rules.

Fifth, another key function of political parties in a democracy is that they facilitate government accountability: ruling parties channel popular demands and inform government decisions, and can therefore be held responsible for the government’s actions. While left aside by Gunther and Diamond, another party function of organising opposition is included by Randall and Svåsand (2002a) who see it as fundamental to ensuring horizontal accountability (see also Erdmann 2004: 69). This aspect is central as even parties that are unlikely to win power can monitor the government’s actions, present alternatives, and mobilise opposition, and thus contribute to democratic consolidation even in the absence of political turn-overs (Van Eerd 2017).

In authoritarian settings, studies on the role of parties have focused largely on ruling parties. Authors such as Brownlee (2007), Gandhi (2008), Ezrow and Frantz (2011), or Pepinski (2014) have found that parties can help to consolidate an autocrat’s hold on power in various ways: parties may contain factional conflict among ruling elite, therefore preventing regime crises, by providing mechanisms to resolve disputes and to organise leadership succession (Brownlee 2007: 33; Gandhi 2008: 79–80; Ezrow & Frantz 2011). Political parties may also mobilise popular support for the regime by creating patronage and public good provision networks between the elite and opponents, and between the elite and citizens (Gandhi 2008: 76–77; Gandhi & Lust-Okar 2009: 410; Ezrow & Frantz 2011: 4).

Opposition parties have received far less attention from scholars working on non-democratic settings. In the case of single-party, personalistic, or military regimes, the
reason why is rather self-explanatory: there is simply no opposition party to speak of – though opposition forces can exist in other forms. In other types of authoritarian regimes, this is more surprising. One exception is the work of Albrecht (2005, 2013), who studied how political opposition (including tolerated opposition parties, but also political NGOs and anti-system movements) contributed to the survival of Mubarak’s authoritarian regime in Egypt. Albrecht contends that the opposition does so by performing five functions which contribute to the legitimacy of the authoritarian regime and serve ‘as a mechanism for societal control beyond pure repression’ (Albrecht 2005: 391). He argues that the opposition helps to sustain the authoritarian regime by providing it with increased legitimacy domestically; improving its international image therefore allowing it to receive development funds (rent-seeking); enabling the co-optation of opposition leaders from parties and civil society; channelling societal dissent; and moderating the opposition and de-radicalising domestic resistance. Albrecht’s research unintendedly echoes the work conducted over thirty years earlier by Lavau (1969) on the French Communist Party (PCF) and his argument that the PCF, an anti-system party in the French Fifth Republic, actually performed regime-sustaining functions such as providing legitimacy, serving as a tribune, and diffusing dissent.

While scholars have investigated the role of opposition parties in democracies and autocracies, their functions within hybrid regimes have been largely ignored. This may be due to difficulties in figuring out how to approach it. Opposition parties could play a role in sustaining the regime, but also in disrupting it and contributing to democratisation.
A role to play for democratisation?

The return to multipartyism in sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s was accompanied with a proliferation of studies on democratisation, its causes, manifestations, and hurdles. Yet, within this scholarship, the role of political parties initially remained of little interest. As Elischer (2013: 261) notes, ‘Parties are the inevitable by-product of democratization, yet the reverse relationship is rarely, if ever, analyzed’. This may be partly explained by their notable absence in the period leading up to democratic transitions, as repressive conditions prevented parties from existing or being politically active, except for ruling single parties in one-party regimes. In this context, other actors – such as civil society, trade unions, and international partners – inevitably played a more important role at the start of the democratisation process and have consequently attracted more attention in the literature (e.g. Bratton & Van de Walle 1997; Daloz and Quantin (eds) 1997; Joseph 1999).

Various authors have argued that opposition parties were weak and consequently could not contribute to democratisation processes in their country. For example, Rakner & Van de Walle (2009) identified opposition weakness as a key factor impeding ‘democratisation by election’ on the continent (see Lindberg (ed.) 2009). Levitsky and Way (2010a: 69–70), in their influential book on competitive authoritarianism, argued that the strength or weakness of an incumbent is a more important factor than the capacity of the opposition in explaining why some incumbents lose power and not others. Lotshwao (2011), in his study of Botswana, suggested that opposition parties were so weak that democratisation efforts should simply ignore them and focus instead on increasing internal democracy within the ruling party.
Yet, the idea that opposition parties fail to meaningfully contribute to regime change and democratisation has been challenged. Bunce and Wolchik (2010) see opposition parties’ use of novel and sophisticated strategies as a key factor in explaining incumbent defeat and electoral change in competitive authoritarian regimes. Meanwhile, Van Eerd (2017) found a positive effect of opposition competitiveness on democratic consolidation prospects in dominant party systems, even when opposition parties were too weak to actually win elections and take power. But a real pioneer who has looked at opposition parties in a new light, and in the specific context of hybrid regimes, has been LeBas. In her book *From Protest to Parties* (2013: 7), she argues that:

‘Opposition parties play two roles in the ‘hybrid’ or semi-democratic regimes that have become prevalent in the late Third Wave of democracy. They compete in elections, but they also coordinate the popular mobilization and protests that push political change forward’.

It means that in addition to fulfilling some of the same functions as their counterparts in established democracies, as listed earlier, they also play an important role in criticising the regime and leading battles for democratisation. It shows distinctively the paradox in which opposition parties find themselves within hybrid regimes: while they take part in the system, they also protest against it.

In contrast to the prevailing trend in the democratisation scholarship, which has been to emphasise the role, strategies and skills of incumbents, LeBas assumes that regime change is primarily driven by popular mobilisation, which is why she focuses on protest and its links with party formation, even though such mobilisation can also feed conflict, violence and repression. She argues that the strength of opposition parties is a determining factor in whether a state enjoys competitive elections, which is itself
necessary for rooted and accountable government. She therefore argues that opposition parties can contribute to democratisation processes and that the weakness of opposition parties is the primary cause of authoritarian persistence. In her view, strong opposition parties lead to democratisation because they make it harder for incumbents to stay in power, while weak opposition parties enable incumbents to retain control of the pace and extent of democratisation, leading to semi-authoritarianism.

At the core of the debate over opposition parties’ ability to contribute to democratisation is their perceived weakness. Many authors define the strength or weakness of the opposition in electoral terms, reducing it to their share of parliamentary seats (Rakner & Van de Walle 2009: 109; Lotshwao 2011: 104). They also pin this underperformance on opposition parties’ own failures, such as poor leadership and power struggles, lack of internal democracy, and their inability to form coalitions (Lotshwao 2011; Katundu 2018). However, are these features causes of opposition’s underperformance, or symptoms of their so-called weakness? Once again, LeBas adopts an insightful approach. She (2013: 23) defines party strength as ‘quite simply, the ability to effectively organize and represent societal interests’ and challenges the main paradigm that African opposition parties are universally weak. Indeed, this generalisation that prevails in the literature obscures some successes that show that the political opposition can matter: as has been said earlier, some opposition parties have been able to bring about presidential turnovers in their country, while others have enjoyed a stable and significant share of the votes and parliamentary seats or have managed to organise mass protests.
Conclusion

In a nutshell, this dissertation contributes to a limited but growing scholarship on (opposition) parties in Africa and hybrid regimes more generally. While this regime type has been analysed with a focus on incumbents (Levitsky & Way 2010a), opposition parties on the African continent have been side-lined in the literature, due to the predominance of prisms such as ethnicity and clientelism, and to a stronger focus on other political stakeholders. However, the last decade has been marked by a shift, with a new generation of scholars becoming interested in political parties on the continent and starting to study them in a less dismissive manner. Authors such as Elischer (2013) and LeBas (2013) have quickly become classics in the field, and a new wave of partisan research has emerged from Europe, America, and the African continent itself (e.g. Alfieri 2016a; Kwofie & Bob-Milliar 2017; Souaré 2017; Beardsworth 2018; Paget 2018; McLellan 2019; Kelly 2020).

Yet, the role of opposition parties in (African) hybrid regimes remain little or poorly explored. Except for the odd exception, such as the work of LeBas (2013) and Van Eerd (2017), scholars have tended to use an approach skewed by a normative component, focusing on what opposition parties should be doing to enable a democracy to emerge, and not interested in what parties actually do. Their role in democratisation processes was studied in this manner, based upon expectations derived from the role of parties in liberal democracies, which led to their dismissal as soon as they did not fit into the classic model. Van Eerd (2017) and LeBas (2013) provide much-needed alternatives to this discourse. It is undeniable that strong parties are needed to expand political participation in a stable, sustainable manner. This was highlighted by Huntington (1968: 409–410), who associates a party’s strength to its
institutionalisation, operated by its ability to survive its founder, the complexity of its internal organisation, and its capacity to mobilise support.

But we need to look empirically at how opposition parties are founded, how they are organised and operate, and how they engage the regime they face – instead of hiding behind an ill-described ‘weakness’ shortcut. In doing so, I contribute to a broader scholarship that looks at how institutions actually work, including bureaucracies (Bierschen and De Sardan (eds) 2014), decentralisation processes (Mahieu & Yilmaz 2010; Waddilove 2019), legislatures (Barkan (ed.) 2009; Collord 2019; Opalo 2019), and democratic institutions more broadly (Cheeseman (ed.) 2018; Villalón and Idrissa (eds) 2020). The theoretical contribution of this dissertation is discussed further in the conclusion – the intervening chapters providing an empirical analysis of how opposition parties emerge and operate in Burkina Faso and Uganda. Before diving into these empirics, however, the next chapter lays out the methodological framework used for this research.
Before diving into the empirical heart of this thesis, I review in this chapter how the research was conducted – from the theoretical premises to the actual data collection and analysis processes. I first describe the methodological approach used for this project, a combination of qualitative research, induction, and comparison, and explain in detail how I selected the countries and parties used as case studies. I then describe my empirical methods, covering data collection, sampling, and analysis process. Afterwards, I discuss research logistics in Burkina Faso and Uganda. Finally, I address the potential ethical issues related to my project.

2.1 A qualitative, inductive, and comparative approach

This doctoral thesis is built upon a qualitative, inductive, and comparative approach, which I outline in this section.

Qualitative research is a broad concept, an ‘umbrella term for a rich array of research practices and products’ which enable the researcher to ‘explore, describe, or explain social phenomenon; unpack the meanings people ascribe to activities, situations, events, or artefacts; build a depth of understanding about some aspect of social life’ (Leavy 2014: 2). In order to explore and assess opposition political parties’ organisation, institutionalisation, and mobilisation capacities and to unpack their attributed ‘weakness’, it appeared necessary to collect in-depth accounts from
stakeholders within or surrounding these parties. As already stated at the outset of this thesis, qualitative approaches have been better suited to analyse such questions than quantitative methods, because they can account for historical legacies and the complex ways regimes work and parties operate in a broader manner (Introduction).

My approach involved extensive ‘fieldwork’, meaning a period of time during which I conducted research in the countries I was studying. During this time, I met and interviewed stakeholders to collect qualitative primary data, gathered secondary data such as locally published books and party documentation, and familiarised myself with the political context and culture through press monitoring and day-to-day interactions. ‘Fieldwork’ as a concept and as a term has been the subject of debates (see for example Strohm 09/12/2019; Mertens et al. 27/01/2020). It is certainly problematic as far as it contributes to othering and denying the agency of the stakeholders involved in the research subject, by creating a dichotomy between ‘the field’ and ‘not-the-field’ (the researcher’s home country or institution for example), and fuels power hierarchies within academia.

In my case, living for extended periods of time in Uganda (10 months) and Burkina Faso (2.5 years), including beyond the period of data collection, has blurred the difference between the field and not-the-field. Yet, despite the issues related to the ‘fieldwork’ concept, I believe it remains important to recognise the value of human and physical data collection – as opposed to doing research remotely from one’s subject. The process of traveling to and getting to know the country one studies beyond the specific research question; using research methods that allow stakeholders to have voice and agency in sharing their accounts; and the acquisition of in-depth knowledge of the context and local dynamics all make a valuable contribution to one’s research findings and promote inter-connexion of researchers and stakeholders (Wood 2009).
This research was conducted in an inductive manner. I started out by enquiring about what opposition parties actually do, rather than by checking whether they did what they arguably ‘should’ do. Therefore, I collected information about parties’ own stated objectives and perceived role, as well as the constraints they face and means they use, in order to understand their internal organisation, the way they mobilise and engage the regime, and the functions they end up playing within this context. This approach follows in the footsteps of recent work reconsidering the significance and performance of institutions in a similar manner, such as the collective volumes edited by Bierschenk and De Sardan (2014), and Cheeseman (2018).

Finally, my research approach is comparative. By comparing and contrasting different cases, a researcher can formulate findings that go beyond a single case-study and explain similar or divergent outcomes on the backdrop of similarities and differences in terms of context and attributes. My research rests upon a two-level comparison framework: I compare opposition parties across countries, and I compare opposition parties within countries. This allows me to analyse similarities and differences among different parties operating within the same system, and also to confront similar types of parties in different national settings. I have opted for a small-N comparison, focusing on two country-cases and two party-cases in each country (so four party-cases in total). This allows for in-depth research and the consideration of historical dynamics which a higher number of cases would hamper, enabling a ‘lower level of abstraction and [the] inclusion of historical and cultural factors’ (Landman & Carvalho 2017: 277). I lay out hereafter the case selection process at each level.
Identifying country-cases

Comparison across countries must follow a certain logic. Hybrid regimes can be found on all continents – the 35 competitive-authoritarian regimes listed by Levitsky and Way (2010a: 21) include for example Russia, Peru, Mexico, Taiwan and Cambodia. Yet, I decided to focus on a specific world region particularly dominated by this type of regime: sub-Saharan Africa. In 2014, the Polity IV index classified 25 of 44 sub-Saharan African states as anocracies, defined as mixed or incoherent authority regimes, and thus as hybrid regimes (see also Bogaards & Elischer 2016). The spread of multipartyism across the continent from the early 1990s led to the emergence of many hybrid regimes that display an uneven playing field and enable old autocrats to hold onto power. In all the open presidential elections that occurred between 1990 and 1994, 15 incumbents were re-elected, while 14 were replaced (Bratton & Van de Walle 1997: 8). More recent data shows that between 1990 and 2015, 29 countries have not experienced an electoral alternation at all, and in only 21 cases was an incumbent actually defeated at the ballot box (Bleck & Van de Walle 2018: 56).

The scope of my research is therefore limited to sub-Saharan Africa, a region which, despite its heterogeneity, has been characterised by common experiences such as colonialism, independence, authoritarianism and the third wave of democratisation. Still, in order to take into account a wide range of factors and to look at hybrid regimes in their diversity, I decided to select two countries as different from each other as possible among the African cases available, loosely drawing from the Most Different

5 In another 16 cases, an opposition party won in an open election, where the incumbent was not standing. Bleck and Van de Walle’s dataset includes a total of 184 elections overall.
Systems Design or Method of Agreement (Mill 1843; Przeworski & Teune 1970). This consists in selecting cases exhibiting different characteristics – or independent variables – but similar outcomes. The Method of Agreement is sometimes considered as ‘inferior’ to the Most Similar System Design due to its ‘tendency to lead to faulty empirical generalizations’ (Moses & Knutsen 2010: 102). However, it is better suited to my enquiry, which is to understand what role opposition parties can play in a hybrid regime in an inductive manner, rather than to ‘test’ causal mechanisms between set ‘variables’. This approach therefore allows me to unpack the dynamics behind opposition parties’ simultaneous weakness and endurance within African hybrid regimes.

The case selection cuts across colonial legacies and linguistic lines, as it includes a Francophone former French colony and an English-speaking country that was formerly part of the British Empire (an approach also used by Osei 2012). To confront and contrast bodies of literature and local dynamics, I also decided to go beyond a sub-regional cluster, and to select my cases from two different regional blocs (Western and Eastern). This approach also enabled me to avoid the ‘Galton problem’ inherent to studying inter-connected states with high degrees of diffusion between them (Naroll 1965; Ross & Homer 1976): similar patterns may be explained by borrowing and value diffusion across cases, a risk increased by geographical proximity and interacting within regional organisations in the present case. I avoided countries with an ongoing conflict, as it might affect the dynamics under study and the data collection process, as well as those whose multiparty system were set up or restored too recently to have a significant timeframe to explore.

I also favoured countries which had received relatively less attention than most, so that the empirical data collected in itself would be a worthy contribution. Based upon
these considerations, among the 25 African countries classified as hybrid regimes in the Polity IV index in 2014, I selected Burkina Faso (under Compaoré) and Uganda (under Museveni) as case studies. Burkina Faso was selected first, motivated by my personal connections and pre-established knowledge of this country (where I had previously lived and worked), as well as the realisation that it was a particularly under-studied case, especially in the Anglophone literature. Uganda was selected through a logical process of elimination based upon the considerations outlined above. As detailed hereafter, these two countries have different colonial legacies, are located on opposite sides of the continent, have had different historical trajectories leaving disparate legacies, and display different levels and kinds of ethnic, religious, and regional cleavages. Yet both regimes can be considered hybrid and one-party dominant.

Burkina Faso, a former French colony, landlocked in the heart of West Africa, achieved independence in 1960. After the 1966 coup that removed its first President, Maurice Yaméogo, Upper Volta (as it was then called) was ruled by a succession of military regimes, though limited multipartyism subsisted under Sangoulé Lamizana’s Third Republic in the 1970s. In 1987, Compaoré came to power through the sixth successful coup in the country’s history, putting an end to the revolutionary regime of Captain Thomas Sankara (1983-1987). In 1991, Compaoré restored a constitutional order with the set-up of the Fourth Republic, which is the regime under study in this dissertation. Scholars who have worked extensively on Burkina Faso have unanimously described Compaoré’s regime as hybrid, and often also favoured Ottaway’s more specific concept of semi-authoritarianism (Englebert 1996; Hilgers and Mazzocchetti (eds) 2010; Loada 2010). Compaoré was toppled by a popular
insurrection in October 2014, shortly after the start of my research project, giving way to a political transition and turnover beyond the scope of this thesis.

On the other hand, Uganda is located in East Africa and formerly part of the British Empire. After independence in 1962, the first executive leader, Milton Obote, banned political parties in 1966, and was toppled by Idi Amin Dada in 1971 who installed a famously cruel regime. Following Amin’s removal by an alliance of Tanzanian troops and an Obote rebellion, elections were organised in 1980. The polls, widely acknowledged as fraudulent (Willis et al. 2017), re-instated Milton Obote as President and kickstarted a six-year Bush War led by Museveni, which brought him to power in 1986. Museveni first installed a ‘no-party democracy’ in which all political activities were held under an encompassing National Resistance Movement (NRM), the civilian outcome of the National Resistance Army. Political parties existed during that time but were seriously weakened, and it is only in 2005 that multipartyism was officially restored.

Just like Burkina Faso, Uganda under Museveni has been described as a hybrid regime by country specialists (Tripp 2010; Perrot et al. (eds) 2014b; Makara 2016). But important differences exist between the two countries, aside from colonial history and geographical location. Ethnic and religious cleavages appear more salient in Uganda than in Burkina Faso, illustrated by the Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups scores employed by Posner (2004: 856) and by the historical ties between Ugandan parties and Christian churches (Ward 2005). Pre-electoral coalitions are a regular feature of Ugandan elections, despite their systematic collapse (Beardsworth 2018), but not in Burkina Faso. Uganda has experienced extensive civil conflicts in the past,
contrary to Burkina Faso; while civil society and trade unions appear stronger and more political in Burkina Faso than in Uganda (Oloka-Onyango & Barya 1997; Loada 1999; Barya 2010). The selection of these two countries therefore enabled me to study hybrid regimes in their diversity and to observe a variety of dynamics affecting opposition parties’ formation and operations. A more detailed overview of each country’s political history is provided in Chapter 3.

A common weakness of small-N studies is selection bias (Landman & Carvalho 2017: 280), especially when the cases are selected based upon their outcome. Because my own research was inductive and did not have a clear set of variables at the start, this particular bias was avoided. While opposition parties in both Burkina Faso and Uganda can be considered to be weak, the two countries are characterised by different party and regime trajectories. The longevity of the DP in Uganda, for example, is unparalleled in Burkina Faso. More strikingly, the popular insurrection that took place in Burkina Faso in October 2014 – the outset of my PhD – denotes a regime change that remains elusive in Uganda. The occurrence of this insurrection created a distinct set of challenges, and made me consider a change in my case studies. However, I decided to retain Burkina Faso as a case, but took steps to avoid ‘rewriting history’ in a post-facto bias: I ensured a triangulation of sources using secondary literature and press reports in addition to interviews; I regularly reminded interviewees that the focus was on the Compaoré era and asked them to reflect on the similarities or differences between that period and the time of research; and finally, I considered my pre-existing knowledge about the political dynamics at hand, notably derived from conducting research for my Master’s thesis (Bertrand 2011) and informal observation of the 2012

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6 Since 2016, an armed insurgency with ties to Islamist groups in the Sahel has affected Burkina Faso, but this falls outside of the research focus.
electoral campaign in Ouagadougou. I address the methods used more thoroughly later in this chapter (see 2.2).

Selecting party-cases

Analysing political parties requires some sort of typology; however, existing typologies, heavily influenced by the Western mass party model, were not very useful to observe African parties. The universal typology designed by Gunther and Diamond (2001) to allow international comparability is too wide to be applicable in my project with its 15 categories. A few other typologies or categorisations have been offered since the return of multiparty politics in sub-Saharan Africa. For example, Van de Walle and Butler (1999: 19–21) identified three categories of parties: ‘ex-single parties’, ‘historic parties’, and ‘new parties’. This typology, while useful to analyse founding elections just after the fall of authoritarian regimes, has become less relevant with time, as the distinction between an ex-single party and a new party in power gaining access to state resources has become increasingly blurred (Erdmann 2004: 77). Gyimah-Boadi (2007: 24) divides African parties into two groups: ‘older parties that emerged victorious from the liberation and independence movement’ and ‘new parties cobbled together out of pro-democracy groups and opposition movements’; but this categorisation leaves out many parties across the continent that do not fit into one of those descriptions. Moreover, those existing typologies rarely enable us to distinguish various types of opposition parties, which is why I used a different approach in selecting the parties under focus in my research.

When observing the party systems in place in my two country-cases, Uganda and Burkina Faso, a significant cleavage distinguishing different opposition parties appeared to be their links with the ruling elite. In both countries, we can distinguish
parties that have been in the opposition from the start, from parties that have been created following a split of the ruling party. This led me to ponder whether these parties could organise and operate in different manners. Historical opponents, meaning parties and political figures never associated with the ruling elite and who have always presented themselves as an alternative, may have a different way to organise and mobilise from political organisations who emerged from a split in the ruling party and joined the opposition after having been closely associated with the governing elite. This is not a dynamic found only in Uganda and Burkina Faso: Riedl (2014: 148–149) illustrates the same trend in the case of Senegal:

‘The PS dictated the legal existence of a “party of contribution” rather than “opposition” at the outset. The ruling party, facing domestic and international incentives to liberalize, conjured up a strategy to allow a young PS militant who was dissatisfied with his own rise within the party – blocked by the dominating presence of party elders – to spin off from the ruling party to form the PDS with the stringent agreement that the incumbents would decide what an appropriate contribution to the national political discourse. Those who became early members of the PDS opposition leadership were already members of the political elite who possessed a certain access to the state but sought new routes for their own participation – they did not seek a democratic opening for the sake of political liberalization, but rather a means of improving their personal trajectory.’

Opposition parties, depending on whether they have emerged from the ruling elite or, on the contrary, have never been associated with the regime, may position themselves differently towards it and frame their opposition in a different manner, because of characteristics that make them act or be perceived differently. Whereas historical opponents may be more trusted by a core group of members – though not
large enough to have ever raised them to power – due to their resistance to co-optation, ruling party spin-offs may be perceived as opportunistic defectors and therefore less trustworthy. On the other hand, the latter may be seen as more capable of governing, as their leaders have often held high executive or legislative positions giving them a comparative valence advantage, whereas long-standing opponents may lack actual experience, except at the local level (see Bleck & Van de Walle 2018).

For this reason, I selected two opposition parties in each country: one considered a historical opponent – meaning that the leadership did not come from the ruling party – and one originating from a split with the ruling party. To be selected, the parties had to be clearly in the opposition. This means that they were not, during the period under study, part of an electoral or ruling coalition or alliance with the ruling party, either formal or informal. In Burkina Faso, that excluded the ADF-RDA, a long-standing moderate opposition party which joined the cabinet in 2000 and supported Compaoré’s re-election bid in 2005 and 2010. It also excluded the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) 7, founded by former president Milton Obote, because a wing of the party, led by Obote’s son Jimmy Akena, allied with the NRM and joined the government in 2016. Parties selected also had to be politically relevant at the national level: for this criterion I used parliamentary representation as an indicator. A party could still be relevant without representation, and some authors have provided great analyses of minor parties, too often overlooked (Bob-Milliar 2019; Kelly 2020). Still, the ability to get at least a handful of Members of Parliament (MPs) elected is a good indicator of a party’s territorial penetration and mobilisation capacity, and its ability to influence

7 The reader should note the potential for confusion between the Burkinabè Union pour le Progrès et le Changement (one of the case studies) and the Ugandan People’s Congress (not a case study, but a relevant party in Uganda), as both share the same acronym, UPC. The context should normally inform the reader about the country referred to.
public debates if not policies, and this criterion allows me to observe a broader range of party activities. Selected parties had to be represented in parliament during the most recent legislature, and their support base had to come from more than one region.

Based upon these considerations, I selected the following parties: in Burkina Faso, the *Union pour le Progrès et le Changement* (UPC) founded by former Minister of the Economy Zéphirin Diabré in 2010, and the *Union pour la Renaissance–Parti Sankariste* (UNIR-PS), a historical opposition party built around the legacy of Thomas Sankara. UNIR-PS is the product of a series of splits and fusions among a longer line of organisations claiming to further Sankara’s heritage. Because of this complex history, my research is interested in the broader web of inter-related Sankarist organisations succeeding each other throughout the 1990s and 2000s rather than focusing solely on the post-2009 party. Leaders of both UNIR-PS and UPC held, in turn, the title of *Chef de File de l’Opposition Politique* (Leader of the Political Opposition, CFOP), a status created in 2009 (see Chapter 7 for more details). As mentioned earlier, ADF-RDA was left aside because of its alliance with Compaoré after 2000. The *Mouvement du Peuple pour le Progrès* (MPP), founded in January 2014 by former figures of Compaoré’s party and which went on to win the post-transition elections in November 2015, was also discarded as too recent to provide much insight into opposition dynamics throughout Compaoré’s regime.

In Uganda, I have studied the Democratic Party (DP), the country’s oldest party, which was founded in 1954, prior to Uganda’s independence. Despite taking part in Museveni’s broad-based government in the early years of the Movement era, the DP left the coalition in 1996 after the no-party provision was inscribed in the 1995 Constitution and has been in opposition ever since. The second party under study is the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), which was founded in 2004 by disgruntled
members of Museveni’s NRM and led by Besigye, who has repeatedly and unsuccessfully stood against Museveni in presidential elections since then. In addition to the UPC, I left aside the Justice Forum (JEEMA) and the Conservative Party (CP) because they have failed to obtain more than one parliamentary seat over the years. Prior to the 2016 presidential elections, the NRM suffered a new defection, with former Prime Minister Amama Mbabazi running against Museveni. However, Mbabazi did not officially leave the NRM and instead ran as an independent, with the support of a movement known as ‘Go Forward’ rather than an established party.

Table 1 Key information on party-cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIR-PS (Burkina Faso)</th>
<th>UPC (Burkina Faso)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Union pour la Renaissance – Parti Sankariste**
  - Founded in 2009 after multiple fusions and splits involving the UNIR-MS (created in 2000), the CPS (2000), the FFS (1996), the BSB (1990), and other parties.
  - Presided by Bénéwendé Sankara.
  - Won 4 seats in the 2012 legislative elections. |

| **Union pour le Progrès et le Changement**
  - Founded in 2010.
  - Presided by Zéphirin Diabré.
  - Won 19 seats in the 2012 legislative elections. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DP (Uganda)</th>
<th>FDC (Uganda)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Democratic Party**
  - Founded in 1954 (pre-independence).
  - Has 15 seats in the 10th parliament (2016-2021) |

| **Forum for Democratic Change**
  - Founded in 2004
  - Has 37 seats in the 10th parliament (2016-2021) |

Source: Compiled by the author
The selection of these four parties as case studies allowed me to draw a broad picture of opposition party dynamics in hybrid regimes, taking into consideration their diversity – in size, origins, organisation, and success – and their shared constraints.

2.2 Empirical methods: data collection and analysis

My research has involved primary data collection in Uganda and Burkina Faso over the course of three years (2016-2018). During this period, I built a network of informants, observed political dynamics on a day-to-day basis through news and press reports and informal conversations, and conducted interviews. This embedded and long-term approach allowed me to observe political events more informally and gave me time to uncover and understand historical and cultural aspects underpinning political dynamics. The length of my fieldwork was influenced by my part-time mode of study. In parallel to my doctoral research, I worked as a consultant and undertook a series of assessments and evaluations in Burkina Faso and the broader Sahel region on behalf of international Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). These activities were clearly distinct from my PhD research to avoid potential confusions, as I explain later in this chapter (see 2.4). However, these experiences allowed me to have a more in-depth understanding of political dynamics in Burkina Faso and the region, and sharpened my research skills such as conducting interviews and focus group discussions.

8 This included a study on youth employability and drivers of migration in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger for Plan International; an evaluation of a development programme on women’s engagement in agricultural policy making in Burkina Faso for Oxfam; an assessment of governmental policies against child labour in Burkina Faso and Liberia for Winrock International; as well as other desk-based assignments.
Data collection consisted mainly of semi-structured interviews with opposition party officials and activists, MPs, local councillors, civil society representatives, journalists, and other political observers. In total, interviews were held with 146 stakeholders across the two countries, including 89 in Uganda, and 57 in Burkina Faso (see Appendix 1). I used semi-structured interviews with selected party leaders and activists from each of the four opposition parties under focus in order to gain an in-depth understanding of their party’s history, aims, organisation, mobilisation strategies and internal dynamics, as well as their perception of the political environment that they operate in. The interviews explored the motivations of the party, the internal decision-making processes, the conception of opposition, and the positioning of the interviewee’s party. I developed a semi-structured interview guide which allowed enough uniformity and preparation to ensure consistent and relevant data collection, whilst also encouraging in-depth and fluid discussions on key issues arising during the interview. This guide was a living document and was updated during the fieldwork process to reflect my evolving analysis and refine the focus of the research when needed.

By interviewing both party officials and activists, I wanted to avoid an elite bias and take into consideration the perceptions of lower-level actors of the party. I talk about ‘activists’ rather than ‘members’ or ‘supporters’ because I believe it is the most relevant category. Membership – as a more formal than behavioural category (Heidar 2006) – does not properly reflect participation, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Erdmann (2004: 65) argues that membership data is unreliable ‘because there is either no formal membership or in many cases multi-memberships’. Supporters or voters of the selected parties would be difficult to identify due to ballot secrecy. Party officials were selected among the executive members of each party’s organs and elected
figures, while activists were identified through the officials’ assistance among the unelected, non-executive supporters having actively taken part in party events.

In order to have a more complete picture of the opposition dynamics in each country as well as avoiding the potential biases and tendencies to rewrite history by the interviewed party figures, I also conducted semi-structured interviews with other key informants including politicians from other parties, academics, journalists, and civil society activists. Interviews covered topics around the perception of opposition parties’ role, activities and constraints, as well as on relations between opposition parties and other stakeholders such as the media or civil society organisations. In Uganda, I met a few representatives of the ruling party, with mixed results. The two NRM interviewees from Kasese proved interesting, one because she was a historical figure with a deep knowledge of local politics since the early years of the Movement system, the other because he was the only NRM agent holding an important seat in this opposition-controlled area. Other NRM interviews were less useful, except to assess NRM figures’ lack of consideration of the opposition’s role and constraints in Uganda. For example, an NRM legislator stated that there was no reason for opposition parties to face a financial barrier, saying ‘There is no need for funding really, all parties are funded to campaign. Here in Parliament the money is distributed equally’ (int. UG33, Kampala, 08/12/2016). In reality, as we will see in Chapter 3, the NRM monopolises the limited public funding available to political parties, distributed proportionally based upon legislative representation. In Burkina Faso, I was not able to arrange interviews with CDP officials or with former dignitaries of the Compaoré regime now in government under the MPP banner.

Interviewees were identified and contacted during the preparatory phase at the outset of the field research and during its course, using targeted and chain sampling
methods. For each country, an initial list of contacts was established drawing from my own and fellow researchers’ networks. Over the course of the research, respondents suggested additional people within their networks. I was careful to ensure my sample was balanced as to the parties under focus in each country, and to have a broad range of other stakeholders too. Within each party, I targeted various categories of people, from party officials at the national level to local activists, through members of parliament and local councillors. This enabled me to include the views and perceptions of a broad sample in terms of age, social class, and level of responsibility within the party. I also made sure to interview people from the different factions making up each party to ensure a fair and balanced coverage of internal dynamics. In both countries, women represented a small minority of interviewees (15 percent on average), as was expected based upon the low rate of women’s representation in political parties. I was able to interview a slightly larger proportion of women in Uganda (17%) than in Burkina Faso (13%), partly explained by the existence of reserved parliamentary seats for women at the district level in Uganda.

Interviews were predominantly conducted individually, but on rare occasions two or three individuals were interviewed jointly. In these occasions, interviewees had agreed (or requested) to proceed in that fashion, and efforts were made to ensure they all felt comfortable responding to questions in this setting. In addition to the interviews, four focus group discussions were conducted in Burkina Faso with party activists. Interviews were all recorded – except for one interview in Uganda, because the interviewee declined it. Most interviews were conducted in English (in Uganda) or French (in Burkina Faso). One interview in Uganda was conducted in Luganda with the help of a fixer/translator; group discussions and one interview in Burkina Faso were at least partly conducted in Mooré with the help of a fixer/translator. Because the
fixers were not necessarily unbiased – usually belonging to the same party as the interviewee – transcription into French or English was then carried out independently by a research assistant not affiliated with any party. The two research assistants also contributed to the transcription of other interviews (see section 2.3). In this dissertation, quotes from interviews and discussions conducted in Burkina Faso, as well as francophone newspaper articles and other sources are provided in their English translation, done by me.

The extended time spent in both Uganda and Burkina Faso also allowed for more informal conversations and daily observations, hard to quantify or codify, but nonetheless pivotal in my understanding of each country’s underlying political dynamics. Fieldwork also consisted in a regular review of press coverage of opposition parties’ activities, during which I collected press articles from online archives dealing with opposition party activities and organisation from a sample of news outlets, ensuring a balance between state-owned and private media. It also gave me the opportunity to conduct participatory observation of a couple of party events in Uganda.

Erdmann, Basedau and Mehler (2007: 11) have argued that ‘[p]roper party research requires field work in Africa, and it should not be confined to the party headquarters in the capital’. Following their recommendation, I have undertaken research in various locations. In addition to the capital cities – Kampala and Ouagadougou – and their surroundings (Wakiso and Namasuba, districts bordering Kampala in Uganda), I have also gone to secondary towns in both countries, and a couple of rural locations in Burkina Faso. This allowed me to speak with local officials and activists in various opposition strongholds and to assess local dynamics beyond a capital-centric approach.
In Uganda, I targeted five towns which display a certain support for opposition parties: Soroti, Gulu, Kasese, Masaka, and Mukono.

Soroti is a town of about 50,000 people (Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2016: 63) located in Teso, in the Eastern Region. Teso was previously dominated by Milton Obote’s UPC. It was an armed opposition area until the mid-1990s and was later affected by incursions by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). This insecurity has fuelled anti-government sentiments and led to the FDC’s success. While the NRM has regained ground in the Teso sub-region since 2011, partly through defections from the opposition studied by Perrot (2016), Soroti has remained an FDC stronghold, illustrated by the fact that in 2016, Besigye obtained 56.9% of the vote in the district.

Kasese is a town of over 100,000 inhabitants located at the foot of the Rwenzori mountains in the Western region. Like Soroti, it is dominated by the FDC. It is perceived as a long-standing opposition stronghold: Museveni was popular there when he opposed Milton Obote, but the government’s refusal to recognise the Rwenzururu kingdom when it restored others (including the neighbouring Tooro kingdom) in 1993 fuelled resentment. Despite the government’s finally changing its mind in 2005, Besigye still came ahead of Museveni in the 2006 presidential polls. As a local civil society figure argued, ‘It was too late, people had already defined their relationship with the government and opposition’ (int. UG62, Kasese, 15/05/2018). The area has also been affected by violence, notably due to spill-overs from the civil conflict in the neighbouring DRC involving the Allied Democratic Forces (see Scorgie 2011), but also ethnic clashes fuelled by a broad range of political, historical and socio-economic drivers (Reuss & Titeca 2017). Today, all MPs from the district belong to the FDC, and the local Woman MP, Winnie Kiiza, was the Leader of the Opposition in Parliament (LOP) between May 2016 and August 2018.
Gulu is the largest town in the Northern region, with around 150,000 inhabitants. This area was heavily impacted by civil war from the 1990s with the LRA’s violence fuelling internal displacement. Once a small provincial town, Gulu was transformed into the largest displacement camp in the region after the government’s forced displacement of the whole rural Acholi population in 1996 (Branch 2013: 3153). Gulu is the cradle of the DP: in the 1950s, a group of Catholic civil servants working in Northern Uganda, feeling marginalised, came together to form a political force. In the words of an elder from the DP, ‘the idea started in Gulu’, and was then conveyed by one of these civil servants originally from Central Uganda who was asked ‘to come and sell the idea down south in Kampala’ (int. UG03, Kampala, 20/04/2016), which led to the official formation of the DP in 1954. While the DP has long been – and remains – grounded in the Buganda kingdom, Gulu is one of the few places where the party has retained a pocket of support. This is partly explained by the fact that it is the home of Norbert Mao, the current party president. In 2011, when Mao contested the presidential elections, most of his support came from Gulu and Pakwash districts in the Acholi sub-region – though he obtained less than 2 percent of the vote nationally (Beardsworth 2018: 99–101). The two members of parliaments currently representing constituencies in Gulu belong to the DP, while the local administration is headed by an FDC District Chairman and dominated by the opposition.

Masaka is a town of over 100,000 people at the heart of the Buganda kingdom. It is a long-standing DP stronghold, where DP values and membership are passed on from

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9 Buganda is a subnational kingdom comprising Uganda’s central region, including the capital city Kampala, which gave its name to the country. A semi-autonomous kingdom at independence, it was abolished in 1966 by Obote and restored in 1993 by Museveni, and currently retains a degree of autonomy and an important influence on Ugandan politics. The reader should note that inhabitants of Buganda are the Baganda (singular Muganda).
generation to generation. Currently, two of the three directly elected MPs in the district as well as the local Woman MP were elected on a DP ticket.

Finally, Mukono is a town of around 160,000 inhabitants only 27 kilometres away from the capital city, Kampala. Like Masaka, it is in the Central region and historically a DP stronghold. In 2010, Betty Nambooze was elected as MP for the municipality, defeating the NRM incumbent.

Figure 3 Fieldwork locations in Uganda

Source: Compiled by the author using Google Maps
In Burkina Faso, I conducted research in three areas in addition to the capital: the Passoré province, the Boulgou province, and the town of Koudougou. The first two are the home regions of the UNIR-PS and UPC party leaders respectively, which contributes to each party’s strength locally, both in terms of electoral results and of organisational grounding (see Stroh 2010). Koudougou has historically been considered a rebellious town (Hilgers 2006).

In the Passoré province (North region), I conducted research in the main urban centre, Yako, and in two rural villages, Bokin and Minissia. In 2012, the UNIR-PS obtained one of the three legislative seats in the province, as well as 126 municipal seats out of 472. While losing limited ground in 2015, the party still obtained 26.2% of the vote at the legislative polls in the province, its highest score nationally. This province is a Sankarist stronghold for two reasons. First, it is where former president Thomas Sankara originates from: his father’s village is Bokin. Therefore, resentment towards Compaoré is high, and Sankarist messages receive a particular echo in the area. In addition, several figures of the UNIR-PS are also local figures, including the party president Bénéwendé Sankara. The Mayor of Bokin is the former leader of the Convention Panafricaine Sankariste (CPS), which fused with the Union pour la Renaissance – Mouvement Sankariste (UNIR-MS) to form the UNIR-PS in 2009. This allowed me to consider the internal divisions within the UNIR-PS and the broader historical network of Sankarist organisations.

I also went to the Boulgou province (Centre-East region), specifically to the town of Tenkodogo and the rural locality of Garango. Tenkodogo was the first capital of the

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10 No family relation with Thomas Sankara. To avoid confusion, both Bénéwendé Sankara and Thomas Sankara are referred to by their full name throughout this dissertation, contrary to other politicians who are referred to by their last name only after the first occurrence.
Mossi Kingdom, dating back to the 12th century and to the Legend of Princess Yennenga, but the Bissa lived in the area earlier. Contrary to the highly hierarchical Mossi society, the Bissa are an acephalous society. Historically, tensions have existed between the two groups due to the Mossi practice of capturing Bissa as slaves during the Empire’s expansion, and land issues which have persisted to this day (Faure 2002). While Diabré was born in Ouagadougou, he is a Bissa, which has been seen by some observers as a political handicap (Sahelien.com 11/12/2015; int. BF26 05/04/2018). In the first elections the UPC took part in, in 2012, the party obtained 148 of 699 municipal seats in the province and one of four legislative seats. In the 2015 legislative elections, it had become the first political force in the province where it got its highest score – 53.1% (Bemahoun et al. 2016).

Finally, I conducted interviews in Koudougou, the third largest city in Burkina Faso and long considered a rebellious town and an opposition stronghold. When Thomas Sankara was killed in the coup that brought Compaoré to power on 15 October 1987, a group of soldiers led by Boukary Kaboré organised an armed resistance in the Koudougou camp. In 1998, when the journalist Norbert Zongo was assassinated, protests were particularly virulent in Koudougou, the hometown of the slain reporter (Hilgers 2010). The wave of protests that shook Compaoré’s rule in 2011 also started there after a student named Justin Zongo (no relation) died whilst in police custody. The town is also the birthplace of Maurice Yaméogo, the country’s first president (1960-1966), and of his son Hermann Yaméogo, leader of the opposition party ADF-RDA until 2003.11 However, despite this reputation, opposition parties such as the UNIR-PS and the UPC, have failed to obtain legislative or municipal seats in the

11 After 2005, the ADF-RDA, under the leadership of Gilbert Noël Ouédraogo, was co-opted by Compaoré and joined the government.
constituency, with Yaméogo’s parties – first the ADF-RDA, then the National Union for Development and Democracy (UNDD) – being the real challengers to the ruling CDP there. In Koudougou, I only interviewed three people from UNIR-PS (jointly) and one representative of the UPC due to limited time.

Figure 4 Fieldwork locations in Burkina Faso

![Fieldwork locations in Burkina Faso](image)

Source: Compiled by the author using Google Maps

I used my own coding system adapted to my specific project, using QSR’s NVivo software to centralise and code all sources. I used 130 units grouped into theme-nodes to sort the information collected during interviews, for example information related to each political party, respondents’ reasons to join their party (e.g. inspired by leaders, attracted by the party’s actions or manifesto, family heritage, etc.), or the different aspects of internal party organisation (candidate selection, local structures, leadership, internal divisions etc). I started the codification with a shorter list of nodes developed based upon the interview guides’ main themes and expected categories derived from
the literature, and I expanded the coding system in line with the actual data collected. This system allowed me to compare responses from different respondents addressing similar themes to identify patterns. The final codebook is included as Appendix 2.

2.3 Conducting fieldwork: logistics, safety, and local collaboration

As stated earlier on, my research involved an extended period of fieldwork in both Burkina Faso and Uganda. Understanding the conditions in which data was collected is important to contextualise and appreciate the findings contained in this dissertation. I therefore address hereafter how my research was conducted logistically. I highlight in particular the safety concerns and related measures taken, and how I collaborated with local stakeholders. The following section looks at other ethical considerations.

Data collection in Uganda was conducted in two phases. I lived in Kampala, Uganda, for ten months starting just after the February 2016 elections, which enabled me to obtain the necessary research permit, familiarise myself with the political environment, and identify and interview respondents. While research was mostly concentrated in the capital, Kampala, I also had a two-day research trip to Mukono, and observed a training of DP local councillors in Masaka. I returned to Uganda for a shorter, more intensive follow-up trip in May 2018. Then, I spent three weeks conducting additional interviews in Kampala and surrounding districts (Wakiso, Namasuba), and two weeks visiting four peripheral towns: Soroti, Gulu, Kasese, and Masaka (see 2.2).

The research in Burkina Faso, on the other hand was spread between January 2017 and December 2018. Contrary to Uganda where my research was contemporary – focusing on opposition parties in the current regime headed by Museveni – in Burkina
Faso, my research dealt with the pre-2014 regime of Compaoré. The occurrence of the insurrection, a critical juncture, meant that interviewees could potentially be tempted to ‘rewrite history’ in the light of what happened in 2014, or be influenced by their own position shift, such as the UNIR-PS who had been a long-time opposition party throughout the Compaoré regime, but is now part of the ruling coalition. At the same time, despite the regime change of 2014, there was also continuity at some level, especially regarding internal processes and dynamics. This meant that interviewees sometimes had to be steered back to the past when they tended to discuss current events, and were asked about what changes and continuities existed before and after the insurrection. Most of the research in Burkina Faso was conducted in the capital, Ouagadougou. In addition, I conducted three short research trips to areas where opposition parties are relatively strong: the Passoré province for UNIR-PS (urban site Yako, rural sites Bokin and Minissia), the Boulgou for UPC (urban site Tenkodogo and rural site Garango), and the town of Koudougou.

During my fieldwork, I had to contend with security considerations. While the protection of participants was of the utmost importance (see 2.4), protecting myself as an individual and as a researcher was also a crucial issue. This aspect was given particular consideration, both by myself and my supervisors, due to events that had highlighted the risks, sometimes under-estimated, faced by researchers and other professionals in doing this kind of work. In particular, the death of Cambridge DPhil candidate Giulio Regeni during his fieldwork in Egypt had a great echo in British academia and forced universities to re-assess the security of their staff and students (Times Higher Education 12/02/2016). Another, less grim but still meaningful, event that influenced my own behaviour was the arrest of two European journalists in Burundi while they were interviewing an opposition leader in January 2016, only a
couple of weeks before the start of my fieldwork in Uganda (Le Monde 29/01/2016). While they were released after 24 hours, their equipment (mobile phones, cameras) were seized and kept by the police. These events informed my strategy and attitude to ensure my own safety and that of my research participants. The security concerns during my research were of a different nature in each country: in Uganda, it had to do with conducting research of a political nature in the context of a hybrid regime; in Burkina Faso, it concerned the progressive deterioration of security across the country during the period of fieldwork resulting from the increasing activity of Islamist armed groups.

I arrived in Kampala in February 2016, just after the elections had taken place. The capital city was characterised by a heavy military presence, illustrated by the army camp set up on Kololo Airstrip – a large public square in the middle of a posh neighbourhood. The main opposition candidate, Besigye, had been put under house arrest the day after the election, so as to prevent him from contesting the results – either in court or in the streets. This context may have appeared less than favourable to conducting research on opposition politics.

Yet, Kampala also hosted universities and research centres which have been doing political and critical research, and a relatively outspoken private press. Other researchers, including fellow PhD students and one of my supervisors, had been conducting research about political parties and the elections in the country the previous year without any particular problem. These two realities standing side-by-side are, in my view, very reflective of the hybrid environment my research is focused on. As Bunce and Wolchik (2010: 60) have noted, hybrid regimes feature ‘fluid political characteristics’ and ‘ever-changing rules of the political game’. Contrary to a democratic setting, where clear rules and functioning institutions provide researchers
with certainty about what they can, should, and must (not) do, and differently from a closed-up authoritarian regime which may be inaccessible, conducting research on opposition politics in Uganda has been an ambiguous experience. A level of uncertainty fuelled by relatively open, but potentially fast-changing, circumstances regarding my own and my interviewees’ safety and the reception of my enquiries and findings meant that I had to adapt and adjust my research practices, whilst always retaining a focus on what might happen in the short to medium term.

Upon my arrival in Kampala, I obtained an affiliation with the Centre for Basic Research (CBR), a reputable Ugandan research institute, and applied for a research permit from the Uganda National Council for Science and Technology (UNCST). This application included my research proposal, which clearly laid out that I was researching the role of opposition parties, and that my data collection would include interviews with opposition figures. However, I toned done the description of Uganda as a ‘hybrid regime’ to avoid hurting sensibilities. As a French citizen, I also registered with the French embassy as a resident in Kampala to obtain consular protection if need be.

Other steps I took included using an encryption software to protect interview recordings and transcripts – in case my laptop was either hacked or seized. I also decided not to try and interview the most high-profile opposition figures early on, in case it would draw attention to the project, and could make it more difficult for me to continue my research later on. Finally, I also elected not to attend campaign events because of their volatility. Indeed, during my second trip to Uganda in May 2018, a by-election was taking place in Rukungiri – the home district of FDC’s Besigye. While attending and observing the campaign rallies would have certainly be informative and
fascinating, the high prevalence of police repression around these campaigns led me to stay away.

In Burkina Faso, risks related to my research topic were a lot lower than in Uganda, due to a different political context. Following the 2014 insurrection and the political transition, the environment was more open, and it was easier for people to talk about the past and for a researcher to ask open questions. My personal knowledge of the country and my past experience of living in Ouagadougou also contributed to making me feel at ease and safe throughout my fieldwork. However, unfortunately, the period of my fieldwork in Burkina Faso coincided with a steady deterioration of the security situation in the country, with a growing threat of terrorist attacks in the Northern and Eastern parts and, to a lesser extent, the capital city where I resided.

In this context, I monitored security recommendations made by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs regularly. I was registered with the French Embassy and received regular updates from the Consulate. I also discussed security risks and advisable precautions with Burkinabè and international contacts in the security sector in Ouagadougou, especially ahead of trips outside of the capital. I conducted my fieldwork in the Passoré and Boulgou provinces at a time when it was advisable to do so – and would have cancelled if it had been considered a risk.

In both Uganda and Burkina Faso, I made efforts to ensure local collaboration, both formal and informal. In both countries, I obtained an official affiliation with a research institute: the CBR in Kampala, and the Tiemoko Marc Garango Institute for Governance and Development (IGD) in Ouagadougou. In Uganda, the local affiliation was necessary to apply for and obtain a research permit from the UNCST, and had a
USD150 fee. In Burkina Faso, there is no similar requirement, and the affiliation was provided freely. Less official but more significant relationships were built with individual researchers in both countries, who shared useful contacts, perspectives and opinions on local political dynamics and played an important role in shaping my research (see Jenkins 2018). In Burkina Faso, such relationships allowed me to present some of my findings during a seminar organised by the National Institute of Social Sciences (INSS). In most locations outside of the capital, a local fixer helped me identify respondents and setting up appointments, and provided valuable insights on internal dynamics and local issues. These fixers were civil society or party activists from the local area where I conducted my research. One of them, in Burkina Faso, was a local councillor that I had previously interviewed in the capital. I was introduced to the others by fellow researchers, and I interviewed them later on. One research assistant in each country also helped with the transcription of interview recordings and, when necessary, their translation. These two individuals were non-partisan postgraduate students. They were briefed on the confidentiality of the data they handled and their duty not to share any file with anyone or divulge information contained within the interviews to a third-party. In the case of interviews and discussions held in a local language and interpreted by the fixer, they were asked to pay particular attention to the interpretation of questions and answers and highlight discrepancies and reformulations by the fixer, which could have an impact on the data collected.

Through these relationships, and in line with the long-term, embedded approach to fieldwork described previously, I was able to build a research community around myself, instead of doing research in isolation, going straight in and out of the country. The research assistants I collaborated with were adequately compensated for their
work, but beyond this our relationship was built and maintained based upon a mutual acquaintance and, at times, friendship.

2.4 Ethical considerations: protection and positionality

As for any research project, ethical considerations must be taken into account before, during, and after the research is conducted. In that regard, I followed the departmental procedures in place at the University of Warwick. As part of the department’s first-year review and upgrade process, I was required to submit an Ethics Form, which listed the measures I was foreseeing in the conduct of my research. I updated this Ethics Form prior to starting my fieldwork.

The protection of the many people who have generously agreed to give their time for my research and to share their experiences and insights was of paramount importance. This issue was especially crucial considering the political environment I was doing my research in – that of hybrid regimes with limited liberties – and the topic of my research – opposition politics. Due to these concerns, participants were facing possible risks – in the immediate and/or more distant future – regarding their safety. Consequently, I gave particular attention to respondents’ confidentiality and anonymity for data protection purposes. Interviews were conducted in a location chosen by the interviewee – and where I felt comfortable too – to ensure a feeling of safety. Most often, this location was their office or a public café; other times, we would meet at party headquarters or, on rare occasions, the interviewee’s home.

Anonymity was standardly guaranteed, following a decision taken ahead of the fieldwork phase. While anonymisation may contribute to erasing the contribution and agency of research participants (Moore 2012: 332), I have deemed it preferable to
ensure this anonymity, even when participants did not request it. The main reason behind this decision was the length of time that would elapse between the actual interviews and any publication of research finding – as the present dissertation, journal articles, or other outputs – and the volatility of the political environment in both countries. While a respondent may feel comfortable stating some things on the record one day, it is difficult to foresee the consequences and possible (mis)interpretations of these statements several years later. Moreover, for such a research project, the precise identity of each respondent I quote in my work – beside their general position and location – would not add, in my view, credibility or positionality that would justify taking any risks. Therefore, data has been systematically anonymised, and I have used only categories and party affiliation to identify interviews quoted in this dissertation. It should be noted that most interviewees did not request to be anonymous, particularly individuals with a known status such as local and national party officials, members of parliament, and journalists.

However, anonymity appeared reassuring for some participants, especially some party activists in Uganda who appeared more concerned than their equivalents in Burkina Faso. Consequently, quotes throughout this thesis are attributed to anonymous interviewees referred to by a unique code, with their positionality indicated so that the reader can place the information provided. The positionality includes the respondent’s party affiliation if applicable, and their status (e.g. party official or activist, MP, civil society representative, etc.). I also provide the date and place of the interview, except in one case where it would make the respondent identifiable. A full, anonymised list of interviews conducted is included as Appendix 1.

For each interview, I asked the respondent’s permission to record our discussion so as to allow for a more informal conversation and ensure accurate transcription and
quotes. On one occasion, the interviewee declined being recorded, and on a few others, respondents made additional comments at the end of the interview after I had switched off the recorder. Either I or, on some occasions, a research assistant, later transcribed the recording and/or notes into individual interview reports. As stated earlier, the research assistants tasked with transcription were postgraduate students with an understanding of ethical concerns, and were briefed on the confidential nature of this work and their related responsibly.

A written statement of consent (in French or English) was signed by participants, explaining the purpose of the research, how the data would be used, and confidentiality measures. For group discussions, consent was provided orally after the participants were given the same explanations, with help from the fixer/interpreter. Interview recording and transcripts were anonymised and stored electronically on an encrypted drive to avoid breach of confidentiality.

A researcher must question their own positionality vis-à-vis their research topic and the participants they interview, and consider how this may affect the responses gathered and potential biases in the analysis. This starts with a comprehensive self-reflexion. Mine leads me to paint the following picture: I am a young white woman, a French citizen, and affiliated with a British university. I have grown up in Burkina Faso, lived in the United Kingdom, Belgium, and the DRC prior to starting my fieldwork. I have worked for peacebuilding and development NGOs before starting my PhD and conducted consultancy work for similar organisations during my fieldwork. Politically, I am left-wing, but I am not a member of any party or other organisation. This multi-faceted identity was translated into various positionalities over the course of my research.
During interviews, my white and Western status sometimes created certain attitudes or expectations. Some stakeholders would ask that I conveyed to ‘my’ government – either French or British depending on the occasion – the necessity to help their organisation or to stop supporting the government. In those occurrences, I would reiterate the purview of my research and my lack of influence or access to convey such messages. On other occasions, and especially in rural settings, I would sometimes be perceived as someone able to support service-delivery for the community. I would again explain my status as a researcher and the fact I was not affiliated with any charity or donor. My work for NGOs, unrelated to my PhD, was not disclosed in these settings where this could create confusion and set unrealistic expectations. My consultancy activities were clearly distinct and separated from my doctoral research, with no overlap in terms of research sites and interviewees.

My positionality in Burkina Faso can be analysed through the concept of ‘hybrid insider-outsider’ researcher explored by Van Hooft (2019). I grew up in Ouagadougou and have spent ten years in the country in total. Moreover, my parents lived and worked in the country – my father as a technical adviser at the Ministry of Transports and at the Ouagadougou City Hall – and were there during the Sankarist revolution. Finally, I have travelled around the country and have some notions of the Mooré language. When discovering some of these facts – which I often disclosed as part of my introduction or later in the discussion – interviewees would tend to shift their behaviour and become more informal, treating me as an ‘insider’, a quasi-Burkinabè.

While this could present risks – for example interviewees wrongly assuming previous knowledge on my part, which I addressed by asking for details when relevant – this position was advantageous for several reasons. People often appeared more at ease after I had established myself as a quasi-insider, illustrated by the fact that they
would sometimes shift from addressing me with the formal ‘vous’ to the informal ‘tu’. They would also be less wary of revealing informal practices and internal dynamics than to a clear outsider.

In Uganda, while I lived in Kampala for ten months, I was rightly perceived as an outsider researcher. This position can come with some challenges, such as a difficulty in gaining access or build trust, and a lack of pre-existing knowledge (van Hooft 2019: 38). I addressed these obstacles by spending enough time in Uganda to build networks that helped me to access interviewees, including with MPs and stakeholders outside of the capital, in ways that were more likely to encourage trust.

Finally, a reader might raise the issue of a potential bias towards a party due to my own political beliefs. Despite living for an extended period of time in both countries, and despite my partial sense of belonging in Burkina Faso due to my personal history in the country, I have never been associated with or felt close to a political party there. In Uganda, the FDC and DP are ideologically and financially associated with conservative parties in Europe, in contrast to my own political leanings. Similarly, Burkina Faso’s UPC defends liberal economic policies promoting a strong role for the private sector, which I am critical of. Even in the case of UNIR-PS, whose Sankarist values I am partly sympathetic to, I have never felt any kind of political closeness or preference.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has laid out the methodological framework used to conduct my research project. This dissertation is based upon a comparative, qualitative, and inductive approach. I compare four opposition parties across two countries: the UNIR-
PS and the UPC in Burkina Faso, and the FDC and the DP in Uganda. The country-case selection cuts across regional, linguistic, and colonial cleavages and allows me to observe hybrid regimes in their diversity. Meanwhile, the party-case selection reflects a relevant dimension of opposition party formation in these two countries, by including a historical opponent and a newer organisation that emerged from the ruling party in each country.

My empirical methods have involved semi-structured interviews with 146 people, including party officials and activists, MPs, local officials, civil society and NGO representatives, journalists and other informants (see Appendix 1). I have also conducted four focus group discussions with party activists in Burkina Faso. My research was done in each country’s capital city (Ouagadougou and Kampala), and in areas considered opposition strongholds across the country (see figures 3 and 4). My fieldwork was conducted over an extensive period between 2016 and 2018 – due to my part-time status and independent activities as a consultant. During data collection, I gave the utmost consideration to the safety of interviewees and local collaborators (five fixers/translators and two research assistants who helped with transcription), as well as to my own safety in sometimes challenging circumstances. I have addressed above issues of positionality and potential biases, and have been as transparent as possible during every step of this PhD, from the design, via the data collection and analysis, to the writing of this dissertation.

The inductive approach outlined in this chapter has enabled me to understand and analyse how the four parties under study were formed, the constraints they face in the environment of hybrid regimes, how they are organised, and how they operate. As such, this dissertation contributes to a better understanding of opposition parties in a broad manner, beyond their reductive qualification as universally weak. The next
chapter addresses the challenging environment provided by hybrid regimes, rooted in a quasi-fusion of the ruling party, the state administration, and the incumbent. It provides the reader with an important overview of the regimes at hand (Burkina Faso under Compaoré, 1987 to 2014, and Uganda under Museveni, 1986 to date), in order to set the scene for the rest of the dissertation.
‘C’est pas facile!’: State-incumbent fusion and the unlevel playing field

In order to understand how opposition parties operate in the context of a hybrid regime, it is necessary to first observe these regimes and the manner in which they hamper the formation and activities of opposition parties. In this chapter, I start by placing the hybrid regimes in focus – Uganda under Museveni and Burkina Faso under Compaoré – and the specific parties at hand in their historical context. To this end, I provide a brief overview of each country’s political history since independence, before turning to the specific ways in which these regimes constrain opposition parties’ operations. I argue that these constraints stem from the hybrid or quasi-fused nature of the state, the incumbent, and the ruling party, a key aspect of hybrid regimes too often perceived as an individual historical attribute rather than a comparative feature.

This state-incumbent fusion creates an unlevel playing field, to use the expression popularised by Levitsky and Way (2010a, b), which creates particular challenges for opposition parties, both directly and indirectly. While Levitsky and Way focus on the strength of the governing party and state institutions, they fail to consider the other side of the coin: what this entails for the opposition’s organising and mobilising

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12 ‘C’est pas facile’ is a common interjection in Burkina Faso that can be translated as ‘It ain’t easy’. It is used in everyday discourse, and was employed by a large number of interviewees. For example, a UNIR-PS local councillor exclaimed at the start of our interview ‘At the time of Blaise [Compaoré], we were in the opposition. It wasn’t easy at all!’ (int. BF27, Bokin, 06/04/2018).
capacities, and how the two are related. This is why I analyse how this state-incumbent fusion creates or increases a set of challenges for opposition parties. These difficulties are heightened by the uncertainty and constant shifting of the rules typical of a hybrid regime. Indeed, incumbents can shift between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ powers (Golooba-Mutebi & Hickey 2016), and feature ‘quite fluid mixtures of authoritarian and democratic politics’ (Bunce & Wolchik 2010: 59). These circumstances mean that ‘While an opposition victory is not impossible in a hybrid regime, it requires a level of opposition mobilization, unity, skill, and heroism far beyond what would normally be required for victory in a democracy’ (Diamond 2002: 24).

This chapter places the two regimes under study in historical perspective and analyses how the state-incumbent fusion at play in both cases creates a specific set of difficulties for opposition parties. It is structured in three sections. In the first two, I discuss each country case – first Burkina Faso, then Uganda – and provide the reader with an analytical overview of key events and dynamics relevant for the empirical discussions found in this thesis. This allows me to describe and analyse the hybrid nature of Compaoré’s and Museveni’s regimes since the return to multipartyism, but also to provide a brief overview of each country’s political history since independence, introducing important actors, events, and concepts that are necessary to understand the regime’s political context. Along the way, I also address how the four parties under focus in this dissertation came to life and how they have fared over the years, to ensure the reader is familiar with these organisations before going into more details about their formation processes and operations in the following chapters. In the third part of this chapter, I bring out various ways that state-incumbent fusion in both countries can restrict opposition parties’ operation. I focus on four dynamics particularly important
in both countries: repression and violence; the monetisation of politics; electoral fraud and malpractices; and divisionary tactics.

3.1 Compaoré’s Burkina Faso in context

Burkina Faso, a Sahelian country located in the middle of West Africa, has had a tumultuous political history since its independence from France on 4 August 1960. Compaoré’s 27-year long regime was in sharp contrast to the tumultuous decades of instability that preceded it, but his regime ended abruptly in October 2014 when Compaoré was toppled by a popular insurrection. This section reviews the country’s political history, drawing mainly from the monographs by Englebert (1996) and Harsch (2017), the collective volume edited by Hilgers and Mazzocchetti (2010), and the work of Augustin Loada (1998, 1999, 2020) and others.

Burkina Faso was known as Upper Volta until 1984.13 At its independence in 1960, the multiparty system inspired by the French model originally set up was quickly turned into a de facto single party regime by President Maurice Yaméogo. Indeed, the only sizable party that could have presented an opposition to Yaméogo’s Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA), the Parti pour le Regroupement Africain (PRA), joined the government that same year (Englebert 1996: 44). In the absence of a political opposition emanating from political parties, trade unions were the strongest counterweight to the government. A massive general strike on 3 January

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13 The country was renamed in 1984 on the first anniversary of the Sankarist revolution drawing from the three main vernacular languages spoken in the country. ‘Burkina’ means ‘upright people’ or ‘people with dignity’ in Mooré, the language of the Mossi who make up about half of the population; ‘Faso’ means ‘land’, ‘country’ in Dioula, widely spoken in the West of the country. The country’s name can therefore be translated as ‘the land of upright people’. The suffix –bè added to ‘Burkina’ to designate the country’s citizens comes from the Fulani word for ‘inhabitants’. ‘Burkinabè’ is therefore invariable and used for both genders.
1966 eventually led to Maurice Yaméogo’s resignation and invited the military to step into the political arena for the first time.

Colonel Sangoulé Lamizana took the lead in the country’s first military regime and remained as the head of state for 14 years. This period was marked by the experimentation of various political models authorising diverse levels of competition, but always maintaining a military oversight. Political parties’ bickering led Sangoulé Lamizana to conclude that they could not be trusted, and trade unions continued to be the main source of opposition to the regime. Their activism weakened Lamizana’s third republic which was finally toppled by segments of the army led by Colonel Saye Zerbo on 25 November 1980. This was the start of a tumultuous decade marked by no less than three further successful coups in 1981, 1983 and 1987, and three alleged unsuccessful ones in 1984, 1985 and 1989. These coups were mainly driven by generational and ideological factionalism within the army (Englebert 1996: 53).

The most memorable of the soldiers who ruled over Burkina in that decade was Captain Thomas Sankara, who presided the *Conseil National de la Révolution* (CNR). Briefly Minister of Information under Jean-Baptiste Ouédraogo’s regime after Saye Zerbo’s dismissal (1981), he became head of state and launched a revolution in 1983 following a coup engineered by his friend Captain Compaoré. The revolutionary regime borrowed ideological credentials from Marxism-Leninism, though its communist nature has been questioned (Kongo & Zeilig 2017: 204). Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDRs) mushroomed at all levels of society, from public administrations to rural villages, to organise and mobilise people into the revolutionary process (Harsch 2017: 81). Despite the short nature of the revolution – four years – and some political shortcomings, Sankara’s idealism, his anti-imperialist rhetoric, charisma and simplicity have appealed to many young people across the continent who
still see him as an African Che Guevara (Murrey 2018: 75). He was assassinated on 15 October 1987 in a coup which brought Compaoré, then his second-in-command, to power. Compaoré launched the ‘Front Populaire’, allegedly a ‘rectification’ of the revolution that took over the CDR structure. The remaining core leaders of the Sankarist revolution, Captain Henri Zongo and Major Jean-Baptiste Boukary Lingani, were accused of plotting a coup in 1989 and executed. Compaoré finally initiated a liberalisation process that culminated in the return to a constitutional republic in 1991.

After the tumultuous 1980s came a contrasting stability under Compaoré. Indeed, he was able to fortify a hybrid regime and remain in power for 27 years. This stability was first achieved through a return to constitutional order and civilian rule – even though Compaoré himself never officially resigned from the army and the military did not completely step away from politics (Sampana 2013). The constitution of the Fourth Republic, devoid of any remaining reference to socialism or revolution, was adopted through a national referendum in 1991 despite widespread abstention. World Bank-backed structural adjustment plans were also launched, while Compaoré tried to appease society through concessions towards customary authorities, economic operators, unions, and political figures such as Maurice Yaméogo (Otayek 1992). Compaoré also renounced the demonstrative austerity promoted by Thomas Sankara, leading to unprecedented levels of corruption (Hilgers & Mazzocchetti 2006: 8).

However, Compaoré’s refusal to follow the example set by neighbouring Benin and to organise a national conference (see Banégas 1995), so as to keep a tight control over the liberalisation process, led the opposition to boycott the first presidential elections held in 1991. Compaoré, unopposed, won with 86.19% of the vote despite a record abstention rate: only one registered voter in four went to the polls, amounting to less than 10% of the total population at the time. Compaoré was re-elected in 1998 with
87% of the vote. Throughout this period, the National Assembly was dominated by Compaoré’s party, first the *Organisation pour la Démocratie Populaire-Mouvement du Travail* (ODP-MT) founded in 1989, then the *Congrès pour la Démocratie et le Progrès* (CDP) that emerged in 1996 from the fusion of the ODP-MT and nine smaller organisations. During the first legislature (1992-1997), the ODP-MT controlled 78 of 107 seats, and in the second (1997-2002), the CDP had 101 seats, with only ten seats held by other parties. This domination was known as ‘*tuk guili*’ (Loada 2006: 23), literally ‘take everything’ in Mooré, the national language most spoken in Ouagadougou, the capital city. The ruling party’s electoral results were so high that they became embarrassing for the regime and more suited to monopolistic parties than to an apparent democracy (Loada 1998: 69).

Shortly after the 1998 elections Compaoré faced an unprecedented crisis caused by the death of an investigative journalist, Norbert Zongo. First described as an accident, his death quickly appeared to be a political assassination orchestrated by the Presidential Guard and which implicated Compaoré’s own brother and economic advisor, François (Harsch 2017: 129). This sparked an unprecedented movement uniting opposition parties, trade unions, and civil society organisations into a coalition known as the *Collectif*.14 Compaoré appeased tensions through a mixture of compromise and co-optation: he agreed to various reforms that strengthened the opposition’s political chances – in particular reforming the electoral code and adding term limits to the constitution – while co-opting some moderate organisations by

14 Officially known as the Collective of Mass Organisations and Political Parties (CODMPP), but often referred to simply as ‘*le Collectif*’. 86
bringing key politicians and parties into a national-unity government, and fracturing a union among opposition parties known as the G14 (Hilgers & Mazzocchetti 2006: 9).

The 2002 legislative elections saw opposition parties benefit from the reformed proportional system, and the ruling CDP nearly lost its majority. Opposition parties secured 49% of the seats (Santiso & Loada 2003: 405), but Compaoré quickly manoeuvred to re-secure a tight control of the parliament, by co-opting the largest opposition party, the moderate ADF-RDA, which had previously agreed to take part in a union government. As soon as he was back in control, Compaoré reversed the electoral reform in 2004. He was then re-elected twice more in 2005 and 2010 – with recently-adopted term limits brushed aside after the Constitutional Court stated that the amendment was not retroactive in October 200515 (Loada 2006: 21).

One of the parties under focus in this thesis, the \textit{Union pour la Renaissance-Parti Sankariste} (UNIR-PS), emerged in 2009 following a series of splits and fusions among the many parties claiming the legacy of Thomas Sankara. The first to come to light had been the \textit{Bloc Socialiste Burkinabè} (BSB), founded in 1990 by Ernest Nongma Ouédraogo, who had been a minister in Sankara’s cabinet. At that time, the word ‘Sankarist’ was not used by the party as it would not have been accepted by the authorities. In mid-1999, the BSB fused with a faction of the \textit{Front des Forces Sociales} (FFS), another Sankarist party founded in 1996 by Fidèle Kientega, and other smaller groups to form the \textit{Convention Panafricaine Sankariste} (CPS). Meanwhile, a young lawyer named Bénéwendé Sankara – with no family connection with Thomas Sankara, but who had been involved in the CDRs – was approached to join the party. He had

15 The length of the terms was reduced to five years instead of seven at the same time as term limits were introduced.
worked on high-profile cases involving opponents (including Ernest Nongma Ouédraogo), journalists (such as Norbert Zongo, a friend of his before he was assassinated), and workers (notably employees of a former public textile company, Faso Fani, which was the largest employer in the town of Koudougou and was shut down in 2001). Bénéwendé Sankara was also involved in the Collectif formed after Nbert Zongo’s death as a lawyer and a member of civil society. In 1999, Bénéwendé Sankara joined the CPS, but broke away the following year when the party’s leadership decided to join the unity government suggested by Compaoré as a way out of the Zongo political crisis. He founded the Union pour la Renaissance – Mouvement Sankariste (UNIR-MS) in November 2000. At the 2002 legislative elections, UNIR-MS obtained 3 seats, and so did the CPS. In the 2005 presidential elections, Bénéwendé Sankara came second with a score of 4.88%, while incumbent Compaoré hoarded over 80% of the vote. In 2009, what had remained of the CPS reconciled with UNIR-MS, which became UNIR-PS following a slight name change. A faction of the FFS, led by Nestor Bassière, also joined UNIR-PS. In the 2010 presidential election, Compaoré was once again re-elected with over 80% of the vote. Bénéwendé Sankara came in third position (6.34%), just behind another opposition figure, Hama Arba Diallo, Mayor of Dori and candidate of the Parti pour la Démocratie et le Socialisme (PDS) (8.21%).

The late 2000s were marked by a series of union-led protests against rising living costs (see Engels 2015b), but the second real test for Compaoré’s regime was the wave of protests and mutinies that broke out in 2011 (see Chouli 2012; Dwyer 2017). The death of a high-school student, Justin Zongo, in February 2011 in the town of Koudougou triggered a series of disparate protests affecting various sectors. Students in Koudougou marched first, to demand justice about Justin Zongo’s death, and were
later followed by their peers across the country coming out in solidarity, soon turning into full-blown riots. Meanwhile, in the capital, the condemnation of five soldiers in an unrelated case and their dishonourable discharge from the army in March 2011 sparked a mutiny that spread through the capital’s barracks.

The government’s reactions – freeing the jailed soldiers and smoothing over the damages occasioned by the mutinies – respectively angered the justice personnel and business operators, leading to strikes and marches, while trade unions reignited their protests against inflation (Chouli 2012: 133). New mutinies broke out across the country, including in the barracks of Fada N’Gourma (East), Gaoua (South-West), and Bobo-Dioulasso (West), spreading to the presidential guard on 14 April 2011. This unit, known as Régiment de Sécurité Présidentielle (RSP) and described as ‘an army within the army’ (Sampana 2015: 37), was the best trained and equipped but also the most loyal to Compaoré. This mutiny pushed the regime to its limit, with Compaoré fleeing to his hometown of Ziniaré for a few hours. Ultimately, Compaoré restored his grasp on power through his usual mix of coercion and co-optation, illustrated by the payment of promised indemnities to the RSP, which then went on to quash the mutinies persisting in Bobo Dioulasso in June 2011 (Chouli 2012: 256).

In the midst of this multipronged social movement, the political opposition made an unsuccessful attempt to pull the disparate grievances into a coherent revolutionary action, inspired by the Arab Spring at play across the Sahara. Opposition parties had managed to obtain an institutional status known as Chef-de-File de l’Opposition Politique (CFOP) in 2009, which provided them with a cooperation framework, a strengthened platform, and some public resources (Bertrand 2018). The CFOP designates both an institution including all registered political parties (with and without parliamentary representation) who decide to be affiliated with the opposition,
and an individual – the leader of the opposition party with the most seats in the National Assembly – who acts as the opposition’s spokesperson. In April 2011, the CFOP, in the figure of Bénéwendé Sankara, leader of the UNIR-PS, called for a rally in the capital to demand Compaoré’s resignation: a complete failure which barely mobilised a few hundred people and was scoffed by unions, civil society, and some opposition parties (Chouli 2012: 153).

While the 2011 crisis failed to bring down the government, the seeds of turnover were already planted. This was illustrated by the quick implantation of a new opposition party founded in 2010, the Union pour le Progrès et le Changement (UPC). It was formed by Diabré, a former member of the CDP who had been a Minister in Compaoré’s government between 1992 and 1996. Diabré had been elected to Parliament in the first legislative elections of the Fourth Republic, in 1992, on an ODP-MT ticket and was soon appointed to the government, first as Minister of Industry (1992-1994), then Minister of Economy and Finances (1994-1996). He was then nominated as Head of the Economic and Social Council (CES), a consultative assembly advising the government. Despite being re-elected in the 1997 legislative elections, Diabré then distanced himself from national politics and started an international career leading him to Harvard University, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the French company AREVA.

Diabré returned to Burkina Faso in 2009 and started organising in favour of a political renewal, positioning himself as an alternative to Compaoré, first within civil society with the holding of a civic forum on alternance – political turnover – then with the creation of the UPC. The party decided not to take part in the 2010 presidential elections, as they were not yet properly established throughout the country, nor did they back any other candidate (int. BF49, Ouagadougou, 14/12/2018). In the
legislative and local elections held in 2012, the party fielded candidates in 41 provinces out of 45, illustrating an impressive groundwork to establish party branches across the country. They obtained a record of 19 seats, becoming the largest opposition party, and Diabré took over the position of CFOP from the UNIR-PS which had only obtained four seats.

Soon afterwards, anti-regime mobilisation flared up again over Compaoré’s attempts to remove term limits from the constitution. Protests erupted first when Compaoré’s tried to create a partly appointed Senate in 2013, which was perceived as a ploy to ensure a two-third majority to pass a constitutional amendment. The mobilisation continued in 2014 when the government announced plans for a referendum on the constitution’s Article 37 setting term-limits. In January 2014, key figures from the CDP defected and founded a new party, the *Mouvement du Peuple pour le Progrès* (MPP). These included Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, former President of the National Assembly and head of the CDP, Salif Diallo, a key political strategist and former minister, and Simon Compaoré, the ex-Mayor of Ouagadougou. These defections reinvigorated the opposition protests led by the CFOP and largely supported by a vibrant civil society (Chouli 2015; Engels 2015a; Wienkoop 2019). This finally culminated in the seizure and arson of the National Assembly building by protestors and the resignation of Compaoré on 31 October 2014. Compaoré fled to Côte d’Ivoire with help from France, giving way to a one-year political transition. Despite a bumpy road and a coup attempt perpetrated by the Presidential Guard – who remained loyal to Compaoré – in September 2015, elections were finally held in November of that year, returning the country to constitutional order.

In the 2015 elections, the UPC’s Diabré obtained 29.65% of the vote and lost to the MPP’s Roch Marc Christian Kaboré in the first round, while his party obtained 33
seats in the legislature, therefore remaining at the head of the CFOP. Meanwhile, despite the resurgence of Thomas Sankara’s ideas and figures during the 2014 protests, the UNIR-PS failed to reap the fruits of the insurrection after the transition. In the 2015 elections, Bénéwendé Sankara, branded as the ‘candidate of the insurgents’, came in fourth position with a meagre 2.77% of the vote, and the UNIR-PS got only five parliamentary seats. With the winning MPP short of a majority, having obtained only 55 out of 127 seats, and the runner-up UPC (33) and ex-ruling CDP (18) in the opposition, the UNIR-PS found itself in an awkward position. They decided to join the MPP-led presidential majority alliance, arguing that they could not sit in the opposition with the CDP, but also acknowledging they could not risk losing their few seats in a fresh election if the newly-elected president Kaboré failed to obtain a majority and decided to dissolve the National Assembly (int. BF20, Ouagadougou, 09/02/2018). They obtained two cabinet positions and an ambassadorship in exchange for their support, and Bénéwendé Sankara became Vice-President of the National Assembly.

To summarise, scholars who have worked extensively on Burkina Faso have unanimously described Compaoré’s regime as hybrid or semi-authoritarian (Englebert 1996; Hilgers and Mazzocchetti (eds) 2010; Loada 2010; Hilgers & Loada 2013). The apparent liberalisation process of the early 1990s, like in many other countries across the continent, failed to produce a meaningful democracy in Burkina Faso. The Fourth Republic did provide for a formally democratic normative framework featuring a Constitution, an electoral code and other pieces of legislation (CGD 2008). Presidential, legislative, and local elections have occurred regularly since 1991. Opposition parties were allowed to form, take part in elections and pursue their activities; independent media outlets existed and voiced criticism and satire of the government; and civil society organisations such as trade unions and human rights
movements were prolific and well organised. From the outside, Compaoré’s regime appeared like a democracy being consolidated, and the fact that it had come about through a coup and was maintained with some level of repression was often overlooked (Hilgers & Mazzocchetti 2006: 12).

Yet, the level playing field deemed necessary by Levitsky and Way (2010b) for a regime to constitute a democracy, was very much lacking in Burkina Faso. The CDP’s ultra-dominance is a case in point: as a Burkinabè think tank reported,

‘As a general rule, there is no suspense, the only question being that of the scale of [the winning party’s] victory. This is why the political regime of the fourth republic is based not so much upon a multiparty system but rather on an ultra-dominant party system’ (CGD 2008: 3).

Compaoré’s CDP has been built upon the Front Populaire’s legacy and the CDR structure from the revolution, and is therefore better implanted in rural areas than any other party. It also used state resources during and outside electoral campaigns meaning that it had a massive financial, logistical and visibility advantage on the opposition. Each campaign illustrated the resource gap between the CDP and its opponents (Hilgers & Mazzocchetti 2006: 15).

The apparent freedom of the press was curtailed by self-censorship and a ‘journalistic resignation’ in some newsrooms, explained by the precarious nature of the media job market and the decrease of militancy among media professionals (Frère 2010: 241). It was particularly true for state-owned media such as the Sidwaya newspaper or the RTB radio and television stations: in 2013, in the midst of popular protests against the creation of a Senate, many journalists took part in a protest against the Ministry of Communication’s interference in the treatment of information by
public media. Even if the time for assassinating journalists seemed past, the lack of justice in the Zongo affair contributed to the pressure felt by the media (Loada 2010: 287).

Finally, the apparent democracy was distorted by the neopatrimonial nature of the Burkinabè state under Compaoré, illustrated by widespread clientelism and entrenched patronage from the highest spheres of the government to local elites. In this context, elections were not a means for democratisation, but rather a tool to maintain the elite’s hegemony through the distribution of seats and position to the friends of the regime, while the country’s economy was controlled by friends and relatives of Compaoré’s himself (Loada 2010: 291; Bertrand 2011). Compaoré’s regime therefore fluctuated between co-optation, compromise and repression over the years, responding differently to various threats and crises in order to maintain the status quo, in a typical fashion for a hybrid regime.

3.2 Museveni’s Uganda in context

Uganda, a similarly landlocked country in the Eastern part of the continent, has also had its fair share of military regimes and instability, but also of violent conflicts. Museveni, who secured power a year before Compaoré in Burkina Faso, resisted the liberalisation process much longer, and it is only in 2005 that multipartyism was officially restored in Uganda. This section draws from a rich secondary literature, including – but not limited to – historical monographs (Lwanga-Lunyiigo 2015; Mutibwa 2016), books on Museveni’s regime (Rubongoya 2007; Carbone 2008; Tripp 2010), and collective volumes centred on elections (Kiiza et al. (eds) 2008; Perrot et al. (eds) 2014a; Oloka-Onyango and Ahikire (eds) 2016).
Uganda became an independent state on 9 October 1962. The year before, a
government had been formed by the DP. The DP was founded in 1954\(^\text{16}\)\(^{\text{\textsuperscript{16}}}\) and, under
the leadership of Benedicto Kiwanuka, won the elections held in March 1961. The
founders of the DP were civil servants whose goal was to fight for independence and
to defend the interests of Catholics, a relative majority in the country under-
represented in public offices (Mutibwa 1992: 15). However, fresh elections were held
in April 1962, in which representatives from the Buganda region were appointed by
the King instead of being elected. With the aim of keeping the Catholic-leaning DP
out of power (Lwanga-Lunyiigo 2015: 77), this allowed an alliance between Milton
Obote’s UPC – at the time perceived as a Protestant party – and the Buganda-appointed
MPs gathered in ‘Kabaka Yekka’ (‘The King only’). The Buganda King, Edward
Mutesa II, became the country’s first (non-executive) President, while Obote was
appointed as the Prime Minister, effectively holding power.

While the immediate post-independence period has been described as a prosperous
time characterised by thriving multipartyism, economic well-being, and government
accountability (Makara 2009: 60), it should be noted that following the DP’s defeat,
most of its 24 MPs crossed to the ruling UPC. Only six of them remained in the party
by the time Milton Obote banned political parties in 1969 (Lwanga-Lunyiigo 2015:
103). Obote had previously staged a coup in 1966, putting an end to the UPC’s
coalition with Kabaka Yekka, and abrogated the Constitution. He declared himself
President, suspended elections, dismantled the traditional kingdoms including
Buganda, and turned the country into a one-party state.

\(^{\text{16}}\) Some accounts place the DP’s formation in 1956, after Kiwanuka returned to Uganda from his
studies in the UK (see Karugire 2010: 158–162).
In 1971, Idi Amin Dada overthrew Milton Obote in a military coup. Amin’s regime would prove to be one of the most violent dictatorships across the continent, characterised by mass murders, political disappearances and violent repression (Mutibwa 1992: 120). Benedicto Kiwanuka, the DP’s leader, disappeared in 1972 and the party was severely weakened during that time. In 1979, Amin was himself deposed by a rebel army, the Ugandan National Liberation Front (UNLF), supported by neighbouring Tanzania. Subsequent elections in December 1980 returned Milton Obote to power. The official results attributed 47.18% of the vote and 74 seats to the UPC, and 47.04% of the vote and 51 seats to the DP. However, the 1980 elections have been widely acknowledged as fraudulent (Makara 2009: 61; Willis et al. 2017) and the official narrative of the DP heavily lingers on the fact that they have been cheated out of power twice – first in 1962, then in 1980.

The contestation of these results sparked political instability as well as a five-year civil war (1981-1986) between the State and the newly founded National Resistance Army (NRA). This rebel group was led by Museveni, who had run in the 1980 elections under the banner of the Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM). The Bush War led to the death of several thousand people and crippled the economy, and ended with Museveni’s accession to power in January 1986 (Carbone 2008: 1).17 Museveni’s regime quickly expressed a deep mistrust towards political parties, which were considered as the source of factionalism and instability affecting Uganda since independence (idem: 3). On the model of Resistance Councils (RCs) established in NRA-controlled villages during the war, Museveni wanted to set up a system based upon ‘individual merit’. This meant that though political parties were not exactly

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17 Obote had been deposed in a coup in July 1985, and a short-lived regime was headed by General Tito Okello until Museveni’s accession to power (Mutibwa 1992: 167).
banned, they were severely limited in what they could do: they could not have local branches, organise delegates’ conference, or sponsor candidates for elections (Carbone 2003).

The NRM, the political offspring of the NRA, was therefore the only organisation allowed to mobilise for popular support and all political activities were officially conducted under the Movement umbrella. The DP initially joined Museveni’s unity government, and the party’s president, Paul Ssemogerere, was appointed to the cabinet. But when the ‘no-party’ arrangement, originally envisioned as a temporary feature, was inscribed in the new Constitution in 1995, the DP left the government. Ssemogerere challenged Museveni in the 1996 elections – officially as an independent as parties were still barred from fielding candidates, but backed by the DP and the UPC – and obtained 23.7% of the vote. The party also called for a boycott of the subsequent 1996 legislative elections, still officially held under individual merit, though some candidates decided to run anyway (Carbone 2008: 143; Beardsworth 2018: 79).

The Movement system has been described by Carbone (2003: 487) as follows:

’something closer to a hegemonic party-state system... neither a fully-fledged one-party state (or a situation of political monopoly) nor a three-party system (a pluralist political context), but a situation of political supremacy exercised by a single organization, with smaller opposition groups not able, so far, to put up any significant challenge’.

Furthermore, the NRM was not distinguished from the State by the 1995 constitution or the 1997 Movement Act (Makara 2009: 63). Rubongoya (2007: 139–141) described this period as a ‘return to presidentialism’, with parliamentary oversight being crushed by the executive, illustrated by the passing of the Movement Act (1997) and the
Referendum Act (1999) without the required two-third quorum. Meanwhile, the NRM itself appeared increasingly fractured, with a growing call to return to multipartyism and to put a stop to the regime’s corruption emanating from movement veterans such as MP Winnie Byanyima\(^\text{18}\) (Rubongoya 2007: 137). The Movement system was upheld in a referendum in 2000 that was boycotted by pro-multipartyists (Bratton & Lambright 2001).

In that context, old parties such as the DP were severely constrained. This has had consequences on their formalisation until today (Carbone 2003: 490–491). Even though the DP’s leadership is well-known and it has thousands of supporters in the capital, its membership base in rural areas is largely inactive and scantily informed, despite efforts known as Kakuyege (‘small termites’ in Luganda) which consisted in sustaining an underground network through everyday practices to connect the leadership and the grassroots (Carbone 2008: 117–118). The party’s weak organisation has been supported both by its youth organisation, the Ugandan Young Democrats (UYD), and by the Foundation for African Development (FAD), a formally independent NGO created by DP leaders in 1980 whose budget is partly used for activities benefitting the DP such as training workshops and policy-making seminars. Yet, despite its long history, the DP has become weak within the Ugandan political spectrum. Whereas the DP was the main opposition force during the 1980s, its power base has decreased during Museveni’s regime and it has lost ground to new opposition forces (Beardsworth 2018).

\(^{18}\) Winnie Byanyima is a daughter of Boniface Byanyima, a former figure of the DP. She joined the NRA rebellion and after 1986 served in the Constituent Assembly and as an MP until 2004. She became a vocal dissenter of the Movement system’s corruption and broken promises and is a founding member of the FDC, created around the figure of her husband, Kizza Besigye. Since 2004, she has distanced herself from domestic politics and been working for international institutions (African Union, UNDP) and organisations (Oxfam). She is currently the Executive Director of UNAIDS.
Indeed, with the old parties – the DP and the UPC – weakened, it was an NRM insider who presented a challenge to Museveni in 2001. A new figure, Besigye – who had been part of the NRA and served as Museveni’s personal doctor during the Bush War – retired from the army and contested the 2001 presidential elections as an independent, criticising Museveni for breaking the promises made in the NRM’s ten-point plan. The DP rallied behind Besigye at that time – though Francis Bwengye, the former secretary general, decided to run anyway. This decision had the unintended consequence of leading many of their supporters to defect to the FDC at its creation several years later.

In 2003, in an apparent U-turn, the NRM’s National Executive Committee (NEC) recommended a return to multiparty politics and a transformation of the NRM into a political party (Rubongoya 2007: 171; Makara et al. 2009). This recommendation was based on two main arguments: the first was to rid the NRM of internal opponents, in order to address the weakening ideology and discipline within the movement; the second was that Uganda had to follow the historical trend of political liberalism affecting the rest of the region since the early 1990s. Museveni manoeuvred to tag the removal of term limits to the return to multiparty politics, which led Makara (2009: 66) to argue that the move towards political pluralism was ‘more of a self-service measure than a genuine conviction on the NRM administration to work towards greater democratisation of the state’. Keating (2011) further argued that the return to multipartyism allowed Museveni to undermine the weight of the legislature and impose party discipline over MPs.

Despite the formal abandonment of the Movement system and the official recognition of political parties’ right to fully participate in Ugandan politics, Museveni’s NRM has maintained a strong grip on power. The new Constitution
actually increased executive dominance just as multipartyism was reintroduced. Indeed, since 2006, the parliament can be dissolved by the president, and it no longer has the power to vet the president’s ministerial appointments or to censure ministers for corruption or incompetence. The legislature has been weakened through bribery, the judiciary has been intimidated by force, and the press has suffered harsh repression, with independent media outlets such as KFM and the Daily Monitor being temporarily shut down (Mwenda 2007: 25). As will be shown, the NRM has also used incumbency to ensure that no other political party can represent a viable threat to its rule.

The 2006 elections were the first to be organised under the new multiparty framework, but they gave very little time to the opposition to organise. An opposition coalition attempt, known as the Group of Six (G6), quickly collapsed (see Beardsworth 2018: 82–87). Besigye came back from self-imposed exile in South Africa in October 2005 to run under the banner of the newly created FDC. The FDC had been officially formed in December 2004, bringing together the Reform Agenda, the pressure group which had backed Besigye’s 2001 candidacy, and the Parliamentary Advocacy Forum (PAFO) – a group of legislators founded in 2001 to push for reform from within Parliament. It was therefore made up of a mix of disenchanted NRM historical figures – including Besigye and Mugisha Muntu – and ex-members of older parties such as the DP.

The 2006 campaign was disrupted by Besigye’s trial for treason and rape, for which he was arrested and charged in November 2005 in an attempt to bar him from running (Kalinaki 2014). In December, despite government pressure, the Electoral Commission (EC) agreed to nominate Besigye in absentia, and he was released on bail in early January. However, the campaign period was still marked by regular court hearings and a smear media campaign portraying him ‘as an HIV-positive rapist and
adulterer, as a traitor and terrorist, and as a forger of school certificates’ (Gloppen et al. 2006: 17). In the end, Museveni was credited with 59.28% of the vote, and Besigye 37.36%.

Historical parties such as the DP and the UPC received insignificant support in the presidential polls (DP’s candidate Ssebaana Kizito, a Protestant and the Mayor of Kampala who had taken over as head of the party in 2005, got 1.59% of the vote, and Milton Obote’s widow, standing for the UPC, came last with 0.82%). However, they managed to get a few parliamentary seats. The DP got eight MPs elected in the Central Region, while the UPC got as many in the Northern region and another in the East. The FDC as a party fared less better than Besigye as an individual, harnessing 37 MP positions (12% of the share of seats).

In 2010, the DP’s leadership experienced a drastic shift with the election of the 43-year-old Chairman of Gulu district in the North to the party’s presidency. Mao became the first non-Baganda to lead the DP – taking over from Ssebaana Kizito, who had been the first non-Catholic in this position. Mao’s election triggered factionalism within the party, with some Baganda figures such as Kampala Lord Mayor Erias Lukwago and Mukono Municipality MP Betty Nambooze joining the Suubi pressure group – an electoral lobby formed to defend the Buganda Kingdom’s interests – which backed Besigye in the 2011 presidential race and stirred divisions in the old DP stronghold (Brisset-Foucault 2013: 514). In the 2011 elections, which the opposition again contested divided following the collapse of the Inter-Party Coalition (IPC), Museveni was re-elected with 68% of the vote. Besigye’s presidential score declined to 26% – dashing expectations that Museveni’s support was fading and that the opposition could deny him an absolute majority and force a run-off (Beardsworth 2018: 98). Meanwhile, the DP’s Mao received a meagre 1.86% of the vote.
Contrary to their two previous encounters, this time Besigye did not challenge the results in court. Instead, the opposition attempted to take to the streets, but protests called by the opposition to denounce the elections had little traction (Branch & Mampilly 2015: 128). However, in early April, the opposition formed a pressure group called Activist for Change (A4C) and launched a new movement with broader demands regarding living costs and poverty, in a context of soaring inflation partly resulting from the monetisation of the elections. This focus on very real issues – such as the cost of transport and food – instead of abstract concerns regarding election rigging, and the fronting of an independent activist group, rather than polarising parties and politicians, had a resounding appeal that was branded by Branch and Mampilly (2015: 128) as a ‘stroke of genius’. Opposition figures and activists took to the streets to denounce the high inflation affecting the cost of transport, and started to ‘walk to work’ in solidarity with poorer Ugandans. This led to massive arrests and beatings of protestors, which themselves resulted in further mobilisation and unrest (Perrot 2014: 426). The movement petered out after Besigye was shot in the arm and evacuated to Kenya on 29 April 2012.

Following the Walk-to-Work protests, Besigye became increasingly disenchanted with party politics, shifting his interest towards direct action and civil disobedience. He stepped down as party president in November 2012 in an apparent attempt to move the FDC away from personality politics (Beardsworth 2018: 108). An internal contest to replace him pitted Retired Major General Muntu, another NRA historical and a rather austere figure running on the necessity to build party structures, against Nathan Nandala Mafabi, then the Leader of Opposition in Parliament (LOP) who hailed from the Eastern region. Muntu was elected, but his presidency was marked by increasing division over his leadership style – apparently focused on building the party behind
the scene rather than promoting the party through high-profile actions. More specifically, a growing schism appeared between ‘organisers’ who defended Muntu and ‘activists’ who supported Besigye and promoted the defiance strategy (Mutyaba 2018). Meanwhile, the DP has continued losing electoral ground to the FDC and suffered from internal infighting – for example, Erias Lukwago created a splinter group known as the Truth and Justice Platform in 2015, though others like Betty Nambooze appeared to have come back into the DP’s fold – despite persisting tensions (The Observer 30/05/2018). Still, the party retains a sizable group of vocal legislators in Parliament and a relative stronghold in the Central region.

The 2016 elections saw yet again an attempt to form an opposition coalition, known as The Democratic Alliance (TDA) and again that attempt failed (Beardsworth 2016; Kayunga 2016). Like in 2001, a regime insider decided to challenge Museveni: former Prime Minister Mbabazi announced that he would run in the upcoming elections in June 2015 (Oloka-Onyango 2016). A few months later, he was selected as the TDA candidate after fraught negotiations (Beardsworth 2016). Even though Besigye had proclaimed in 2013 that he would not contest the next elections, he still stood to be the FDC’s flagbearer (winning against Muntu), then refused to back Mbabazi and the FDC left the coalition. This left Mbabazi to run with the support of smaller parties – including the DP, which was itself divided over the issue, as many of the party’s supporters on the ground backed Besigye (int. UG05, Kampala, 14/06/2016). The campaign was once again characterised by violent repression of opposition activities, with Besigye and Mbabazi both being routinely arrested, and their supporters scattered by security forces (Nkuubi 2016).

Museveni officially won with 60% of the vote – a result heavily distrusted by the opposition (Daily Monitor 22/05/2016). Besigye was placed under house arrest prior
to the results’ announcement and remained so for six weeks. Mbabazi challenged the results in court but the case was dismissed by the Supreme Court. Meanwhile, Besigye was sworn in as ‘the People’s President’ in a mock ceremony, launching a civil disobedience campaign called ‘Defiance’ – an extension of the election campaign to maintain mobilisation levels (*Daily Monitor* 22/05/2016).

This activist approach to politics has also been embraced by a new political figure, slum musician-turned- MP Robert Kyagulanyi, known by his stage name Bobi Wine. He was elected to parliament in 2017 in a by-election for the Kyaddondo East constituency, a popular neighbourhood on the outskirts of Kampala. Since then, he has built a movement known as ‘People Power’ and has regularly been arrested and beaten up for holding political rallies (*The Observer* 24/07/2019).

Meanwhile, the FDC has continued to suffer from internal divisions. In November 2017, Muntu failed to be re-elected as party president, losing to Patrick Oboi Amuriat, the pro-defiance candidate backed by Besigye. In August 2018, Amuriat dismissed figures close to Muntu from parliamentary positions, including the LOP Winnie Kiiza who was replaced by Betty Aol Ochan. The following month, Muntu quit the party and formed a new party known as the Alliance for National Transformation (ANT) in March 2019, but has so far failed to attract durable support (*The East African* 06/05/2019). In contrast, the DP attempted to launch a reunification process under the banner of the UYD in 2018, with the creation of a DP Bloc uniting the DP, the Social-Democratic Party (SDP) – founded in 2005 by DP defector Michael Mabiike – and the People’s Development Party (PDP) of Abed Bwanika (*Daily Monitor* 13/07/2019). Museveni is set to contest for another term in 2021 – having removed the age-limit contained in the Constitution in December 2017 – and both Bobi Wine and Besigye are likely to challenge him.
Museveni’s regime, characterised by repression, patronage, and a blurred distinction between the NRM and the State’s institutions, can therefore be described as hybrid – a label attributed to the regime by many researchers (Tripp 2010; Perrot et al. (eds) 2014a; Makara 2016). Contrary to Burkina Faso, where Compaoré developed more subtle strategies over-time and where violent repression generally decreased from the 2000s onward, Museveni has continued to resort to violence against opponents. This led Freedom House to change Uganda’s status in 2019 from ‘Partly Free’ to ‘Not Free’, citing the government’s attempts to restrict free expression. The unlevel playing field in Uganda has been conceived as a legacy of the ‘no-party era’ and of the Movement Act (Wild & Golooba-Mutebi 2010). As I argue in the next section, this kind of state-incumbent fusion is a common feature of hybrid regimes designed by the incumbent and creates a particular set of constraints for opposition parties.

3.3 State-incumbent fusion and opposition constraints

As we have already seen in Chapter 1, African opposition parties are generally branded as weak. In a large number of countries, they have been blamed for their internal divisions, lack of internal democracy, low resources and disparate presence on the ground (e.g. Olukoshi 1998b; Lotshwao 2011; Katundu 2018; Kelly 2020). Opposition weakness has been considered a chief obstacle to democratisation (Olukoshi 1998b; Randall & Svåsand 2002c; Erdmann et al. 2007; Rakner & Van de Walle 2009). Yet, it is difficult to understand these weaknesses without considering the political environment these opposition parties operate in, and the lack of a level playing field described in the previous section. Authors such as Levitsky and Way (2010a) have described this unlevel playing field whilst focusing on what it means for
incumbents and their capacity to resist opposition challenges, while others have analysed opposition’s constraints in specific countries and linked these to specific historical legacies – such as the Movement system in Uganda (Wild & Golooba-Mutebi 2010).

I argue here that the challenges faced by opposition parties in hybrid regimes must be understood as consequences of the fusion of the incumbent and state institutions. These are often intertwined in a way that prevents the emergence of a ‘loyal’ opposition and instead consider opposition parties as enemies of the state rather than adversaries of the incumbent. In this section, I start by explaining this concept of state-incumbent fusion, before discussing in turn various ways in which it constrains opposition parties’ activities. I review the violence and repression they face, the monetisation of politics that affects their capacity and citizens’ expectations, subtle and not-so-subtle electoral malpractices, and the divisionary tactics used by the regimes in both countries.

Opposition parties in Burkina Faso and Uganda, like in other hybrid regimes, face a range of obstacles that prevent them from fulfilling their objectives. Some of these difficulties are directly imputable to the actions of non-democratic incumbents. For example, electoral fraud prevents opposition parties from winning elections even if they have support, while violence and repression prevent them from organising and mobilising. Others appear to be internal weaknesses, such as opposition parties’ lack of resources and local structures and their own divisions and leadership squabbles (Randall & Svåsand 2002c). Yet, even these internal issues cannot be disassociated from the environment in which opposition parties exist and operate. This environment is characterised by a lack of clarity regarding where the ruling party ends and where
the state begins, and both of these realms are closely connected with the incumbent’s figure and personal circle.

In Uganda, this fusion of the NRM and the state has been considered as a legacy of the Movement system. The NRM and the state were effectively one and the same at that time, and the ruling party has never disentangled itself from the state’s institutions (Wild & Golooba-Mutebi 2010: 5). This fusion concerns every layer of the state, from Parliament and local councils to security forces and parastatal companies, effectively meaning that ‘institutions have been turned into defenders of the regime’ (int. UG05, Kampala, 14/06/2016). It also allows Museveni and the NRM to ‘grab’ elections by abusing state resources, blurring the line between their own pockets and the public coffers (Helle & Rakner 2013). This fusion creates a situation in which opposition parties ‘are competing against the state and all its machinery’, as a DP MP puts it, ‘in that one thing lie all [the] other obstacles’ that they face (int. UG89, Constituency, 2016). The NRM itself is intrinsically linked to the persona of Museveni. As Vokes and Wilkins (2016: 586) argue: ‘The idea of the NRM is inseparable from the personality of the president, who truly owns its history and values in a way that no other national NRM elite comes close to matching’. Within the parliamentary arena, Museveni attempts to control NRM MPs through the NRM caucus, and regularly resorts to buying the support of recalcitrant legislators through executive patronage (Muhumuza 2009; Collord 2016).

In Burkina Faso, we find the same dynamics, with the ruling party intertwined with the institutions at all levels, and blurry boundaries between personal, partisan, and institutional spheres. This can be seen though the politicisation of the administration, illustrated by the top positions being reserved for ruling party members: as a civil society leader explained: ‘You needed the [CDP] party card, otherwise you could not
build a career, even if you were competent’ (int. BF09, Ouagadougou, 06/04/2017). A 
UPC activist further complained that ‘the administration was politicised, appointments 
were political even among technicians, who shouldn’t have a political agenda. It 
means the administration is not efficient’ (int. BF31, Koudougou, 17/04/2018). 
Cabinet positions were also used to provide patronage to one’s constituency, for 
example in the form of development projects.

Like in Uganda, Compaoré and the CDP had the distinct upper-hand in election 
campaigns due to their abuse of state resources (Loada 2010; Bertrand 2011). The 
party-state-person fusion was also demonstrated by the dominance of Compaoré’s 
close personal circle over the economy, in particular his wife, Chantal, and his 
deals with economic operators also contributed to blurring the line between the party and 
the state: ‘Economic operators would rather put their money into the CDP and 
expected kickbacks such as public contracts or concessions in return’ (int. BF09, 
Ouagadougou, 06/04/2017). By the end of the 1990s, this situation had created, 
according to critics, a ‘virtual party-state […] with the ruling party machine using 
public power and resources to co-opt potential challengers and reduce the 
parliamentary opposition to just a token 10 (out of 111) seats in the legislature’ 

While Compaoré’s CDP also benefitted from a historical legacy – much like 
Museveni’s NRM – in regard to its implantation across the country, the short-lived 
Front Populaire (or the previous Sankariest Revolution) fails to provide a satisfactory 
justification to this quasi-fusion at every level. More convincingly, the hybrid nature 
of their respective regime has enabled both Museveni and Compaoré to manipulate
state institutions, aggregate political and social forces into a mega-party through a mix of coercion and co-optation, and pose as the ultimate referee on the political field.

As I describe in the following sections, the hybridity of the regime translates into a particularly volatile environment, as the government may repeatedly shift their stance between appearing more open in order to release pressure and increasing repression to contain threats to preserve their grasp on power, therefore denying the kind of predictability that democratic rule of law would entail. This kind of shift in tactics can be explained by both domestic and international pressures. Museveni has faced less pressure than Compaoré to appear more democratic due to the relative strategic interest his regime represented for international partners, for example due to Uganda’s pivotal role in the War on Terror and its heavy contribution to the AMISOM mission in Somalia (Fisher 2012).

I now review a series of ways this state-incumbent fusion plays out and affects opposition parties’ activities. This list is not meant to be exhaustive, but presents four key aspects that have emerged from my research as being particularly constraining for the opposition, both in Burkina Faso and Uganda. I focus on aspects that restricts the opposition’s capacity, rather than those that give the incumbent an advantage, such as the support received from international donors (e.g. through aid or muted criticism) (Fisher 2013) or the control and credit of development projects (Muhwezi-Mpanga 2016). I address the following four key dynamics: repression and harassment; the monetisation of politics; electoral rigging; and divisionary tactics.
The fear factor

The most straight-forward constraint that opposition parties face in a hybrid regime is the threat of violence. Opposition parties and actors in hybrid regimes suffer from repression and harassment by the regime, even though the intensity of repression and the kind of threat they face can evolve over time.

The Front Populaire instituted by Compaoré when he first came to power in 1987 was a military regime, with the associated threat of violence that such a regime entails. While Compaoré took conciliatory measures to obtain support from certain segments of the population – especially those that had been side-lined or frustrated by Thomas Sankara, such as traditional chiefs, economic operators, and civil servants – the Front Populaire was still characterised by violent repression. In particular, this period was marked by the violent quelling of a military rebellion in Koudougou in 1987 and the execution of potential challengers, such as Henri Zongo and Jean-Baptiste Lingani, in 1989 (Englebert 1996: 62–64; Harsch 2017: 113–114). On 9 December 1991, several opposition figures were attacked by unidentified individuals, killing Oumarou Clément Ouédraogo, former general secretary of the ODP-MT, Compaoré’s party, and injuring Moctal Tall, leader of a small opposition party (Harsch 2017: 120). Another prominent death in that period was that of student union leader Dabo Boukary in 1990 (Mazzocchetti 2006: 98).

While the 1991 Constitution did allow for a return to civilian rule and the official liberalisation of the political environment, the following decade was still characterised by high levels of repression. Indeed, a UNIR-PS leader argued that ‘the democratic

19 As stated earlier, Zongo and Lingani were, with Blaise Compaoré, the most prominent figures of the Revolution’s National Council (CNR) headed by Thomas Sankara (1983-1987).
opening did not fundamentally change the repression in itself. It became more insidious, more sneaky’ (int. BF40, Ouagadougou, 10/07/2018). Describing that period, a civil society activist explained: ‘it was very difficult for the opposition... There was no space for opposition during the first ten years’ (int. BF06, Ouagadougou, 28/03/2017). A journalist similarly recalled the authoritarian roots of Compaoré’s power and argued that, despite the adoption of a liberal constitution in 1991, ‘people were still tense, there was no real opposition until 1998’ (int. BF02, Ouagadougou, 17/03/2017) An activist from the PDS-Metba, a small opposition party at the time, further argued that ‘everything was done to smother the opposition’ (int. BF11, Ouagadougou, 26/04/2017). A UNIR-PS official described security measures taken within the party to protect the party headquarters and its officials’ homes from reprisals (int. BF40, Ouagadougou, 10/07/2018). Several interviewees have described receiving death threats during that period.

Political repression culminated on 13 December 1998 with the assassination of journalist Norbert Zongo. His death was significant because of what he and his newspaper represented. According to a Burkinabè journalist, at that time, ‘the action of political parties was marginal. A newspaper served as a counter-power: N’obert Zongo’s L’Indépendant’ (int. BF02, Ouagadougou, 17/03/2017). As I previously described, his death marked a turning-point for Compaoré’s regime and for his opponents, as it triggered an unprecedented wave of protests bringing together opposition parties, trade unions, and civil society organisations to demand that the truth be uncovered and justice be served on the ‘Zongo affair’. Norbert Zongo’s death also shed light on the authoritarian nature of Compaoré’s regime internationally, in particular through the advocacy work of Reporters Without Borders (RSF 1998).
To respond to this crisis, Compaoré shifted gears and adopted a more subtle approach to deal with dissent, co-opting certain opposition parties to break the coalition of opposition parties known as ‘G14’, and agreeing to limited democratic reforms, such as a change to the electoral code and a re-introduction of constitutional term-limits (Santiso & Loada 2003; Hilgers & Mazzocchetti 2006; Loada 2010). The relative opening of the political space was particularly well illustrated by the growing public interest in Thomas Sankara’s legacy. As mentioned previously, in the early years of Compaoré’s regime, the first Sankarist party, the BSB, used ‘socialist’ in its name rather than ‘Sankarist’ because Sankara’s name was very taboo. Over the next decade, the authorities eased up and even attempted to appropriate this heritage, as described by Harsch (1998: 625):

‘Initially small and subject to police harassment, the annual pilgrimages to Sankara’s gravesite gradually began to attract thousands. By the tenth anniversary, it was a major national event. The Burkinabè press gave pages to assessments of Sankara’s life, achievements, and political legacy; even the government-owned daily ran a commentary acknowledging Sankara as a ‘national hero.’

Yet, the harassment of opponents continued, even if in more subtle ways. For example, private operators known to be in or to support the political opposition were passed over for contracts, in a context where a large majority of opportunities came from the public sector (int. BF10, Ouagadougou, 25/04/2017). For civil servants, including teachers and administrators, career progression was dependent on political affiliation, as being a CDP card-carrying member was an informal but real prerequisite to access top-level positions in the administration. As Loada (2010: 271) explained at the time, ‘the quasi-totality of administrative and economic elites are, or
believe to be, forced to join the ruling party to exist or subsist. In electoral periods, high-ranking civil servants are asked to demonstrate their loyalty toward the party.’

A UNIR-PS activist from Yako reported that he was once laid off from a project he was working for, and instructed to go and see the CDP’s regional coordinator in Ouahigouya when he asked for an explanation: ‘I was told to choose between my work and the UNIR, that if I wanted to keep my job I had to leave the UNIR and join the CDP’ (int. BF24, Yako, 04/04/2018). In the end, he was able to remain a member of UNIR but had to give up his regional responsibilities within the party in order to keep working. Teachers active in opposition parties have described how they were frequently transferred to inconvenient postings (for example far away from their family) as a result of their political affiliation. As a UNIR-PS leader argued, ‘If you wanted to evolve in your career, you had to not belong to a Sankarist party’ (int. BF39, Ouagadougou, 10/07/2018). These career impediments hurt individuals in an attempt to demobilise or co-opt them personally, but it also impacted opposition parties as organisations and increased their financial difficulties by making their leaders and activists financially insecure and limiting the support they could receive from private operators.

After 2009, it appears that operating as an opposition party in Burkina Faso became easier. The UPC, founded in 2010, benefitted from a much more favourable environment than the UNIR-PS and other parties created in earlier years. This has been acknowledged by UPC activists themselves: ‘UPC activists were rather protected, compared to other opposition parties. People knew that hurting a UPC member was dangerous’ (int. BF15, Ouagadougou, 11/01/2018). The fact that the regime tolerated better the UPC than previous opposition parties has been interpreted by some as evidence that the regime had supported its creation for its own motives. According to
one UNIR-PS leader: ‘It seems that the creation of the UPC was supported by the power in place, with money, so that radical parties such as UNIR-PS could not get in power’ (int. BF43, Ouagadougou, 24/07/2018). But once again, repression did not completely disappear. For example, UNIR-PS activists I interviewed still reported being beaten up by CDP supporters during this period (int. BF16, Ouagadougou, 17/01/2018), while the government violently repressed a military mutiny in Bobo Dioulasso amidst a national wave of protests in 2011 (Chouli 2012: 70; Dwyer 2017: 160). In 2014, a judge sitting in the Constitutional Court, Salifou Nébié, was found dead in suspicious circumstances – an enquiry is still open. Nébié was considered close to the MPP, and was known to oppose the modification of term-limits (le faso.net 30/05/2014). The anti-government protests in October 2014 were also characterised by violent repression (Amnesty International 2015).

Overall, we can therefore see that Compaoré’s regime progressively turned away from blatant violence to more subtle harassment and repression, accompanied by a rise of co-optation techniques detailed in the next section. This echoes a more global trend, as Cheeseman and Klaas (2019: 25) have argued: ‘authoritarian governments have a strong incentive where possible to swap violent forms of rigging for other, less blatant strategies’. Still, throughout the period, journalists have practiced self-censorship, especially those working for state-controlled media. Those investigating corruption and abuses faced unfavourable libel laws placing the burden of proof on the defendant, as stated in Freedom House’s (e.g. 2010) Freedom of the Press annual reports.

While the political space progressively became more open for opposition parties – illustrated by the affirmation of Sankarist parties owning the once-tabooed name and the UPC’s comparatively higher freedom of operation after 2010 – epitomised violence was still used when Compaoré started to lose control. This was the case in
1998 when Norbert Zongo threw unwanted light on the authorities’ murky actions and encouraged opposition unity within the G14; or when the army – upon which Compaoré’s power was highly reliant – rebelled in 2011 as hands-out appeared insufficient to calm the mutinies (Chouli 2012); and finally in the last hours of Compaoré’s tenure in October 2014 (Engels 2015a).

In contrast, in Uganda, repression has generally been less subtle than in Burkina Faso, with Museveni regularly resorting to arbitrary arrests of opposition leaders and violent suppression of protests until today. The army is visibly involved in politics in various ways, leading to a ‘militarization of politics’ (Muhumuza 2009: 7; see also Kagoro 2016). For example, ten parliamentary seats are reserved for army members who ‘are strictly supposed to toe the NRM line’ (Muhumuza 2009: 7), and the army is regularly deployed around election time in a threatening fashion (Nkuubi 2016: 418). Army officials have also made worrying statements on various occasions, such as when the Chief of Defence Forces, Aronda Nyakairima, reportedly claimed that the army ‘[would] not allow bad characters coming back to power’ in August 2008 (Tangri & Mwenda 2010: 44) and threatened to stage a palace coup in 2013 at a time when parliament was pushing back against the executive on corruption: ‘The message was well taken for those to who it was intended. Stand warned. Stand advised. Should you not change course, other things will be brought into play. Let no one return to the past’ (Daily Monitor 24/01/2013).

Despite the return to multipartyism in 2005, new legislation was passed to effectively maintain restrictions on opposition activities. In particular, the Public Order Management Act (POMA), passed in 2013, was used and abused to curtail the
opposition’s mobilisation capacities (Nkuubi 2016: 427). POMA required political parties to obtain authorisation from the police chief before organising and holding any rally or meeting. POMA was used by the police as a justification to systematically ban or disrupt opposition meetings, including during the 2016 electoral campaign, leading the Ugandan press to claim that ‘across the country, police have waved the law like a conventional flag in a war zone signalling ‘cease-fire’ to, especially (sic) Opposition activities’ (Daily Monitor 14/07/2015). Security forces and civilian militias more or less controlled by the government have been used against the opposition to maintain an environment of fear (Kagoro 2015; Nkuubi 2016; Tapscott 2016). Museveni himself has regularly made veiled (and at times not so subtle) threats about the opposition, such as stating that his opponents would end up ‘six feet underground’ (Kalinaki 2014: 168).

Repression has been particularly harsh on opposition flagbearer and FDC founder Besigye since he decided to challenge Museveni in 2001. These elections were marred by violence – leading to 12 deaths and 742 cases reported to the police – which prompted investigations by international organisations (e.g. HRW 2001) as well as the Ugandan Parliament (Kalinaki 2014: 168–171). The 2006 campaign was notably marked by Besigye being charged for rape and treason, which meant that he spent over half the time of the campaign in jail or in court (int. UG02, Kampala, 08/04/2016). The 2011 elections went more smoothly, with ‘cases of actual violence during the campaign and the elections remain[ing] localised’, but armed forces were widely deployed, especially in Kampala (Golaz & Médard 2014: 54). The Walk-to-Work

20 It should be noted that POMA was struck as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court on 26 March 2020 following a petition filed in December 2013 by opposition MPs, human rights organisations, and a retired Bishop (Chapter Four 29/03/2020; The Guardian 28/03/2020).
protests, organised by Besigye and other opposition activists to denounce rising food prices and poverty on the back of the 2011 elections, were met with brutal violence (HRW 2011; Branch & Mampilly 2015: 130–132).

In a similar pattern, the 2016 elections demonstrated lower levels of recorded violence than previous polls, despite an ‘omnipresent threat of violence’ (Oloka-Onyango & Ahikire 2016: 3). Yet events held as part of the Defiance campaign launched by Besigye after the elections were violently repressed, and Besigye himself was once again charged with treason after he had sworn himself in as the ‘People’s President’ (The East African 11/05/2016). Recently, Bobi Wine has become another target of violent repression, notably during the by-election in Arua Municipality in August 2018 where his driver was shot dead as Bobi Wine was arrested and allegedly tortured (Daily Monitor 03/09/2018). Overall, the repression is sometimes so high that an FDC activist argued that Ugandan opponents ‘have to prepare for battle instead of preparing for elections’ (int. UG29, Kampala, 05/12/2016).

We therefore notice a different trend in the two countries, with violent repression giving way to more subtle co-optation and less apparent militarisation of politics in Burkina Faso overtime, while Museveni has continued to rely of security forces up until today. Yet, a common trait shared by both the Burkinabè and the Ugandan oppositions is that they have been considered and treated as an enemy by the ruling elite. A young opposition activist in Burkina Faso explained that ‘the opposition was seen as an enemy that had to be taken out’ (int. BF11, Ouagadougou, 26/04/2017), while a DP leader argued that ‘in Uganda, the opposition is not seen as a competitor, it is seen and regarded [as] – and it has been explicitly stated so that it is – an enemy force’ (int. UG03, Kampala, 20/04/2016). This is reinforced by the past occurrence or mere threats of electoral violence by incumbents who portray the opposition as
troublemakers and present themselves as the guarantors of peace and security (Lynch et al. 2019; Jenkins 2020).

This should also be related to the fact that both these regimes find their own roots in violence: they both obtained power by force – through a coup in Compaoré’s case and after a civil war in Museveni’s – and have therefore been unwilling to step down through democratic means. The 2014 insurrection in Burkina Faso illustrated this: while the regular Army refused to shoot down the peaceful protestors marching on the National Assembly building, the presidential guard did otherwise. Nineteen protestors were killed, and another 500 injured, mainly near the Presidential Palace of Kosyam housing Compaoré, and the residence of his brother François. Tripp (2010: 1), in the opening of her book on Museveni’s Uganda, highlighted how hybrid regimes’ perversion of democracy and reliance on patronage and violence to remain in power creates a vicious circle:

‘Because leaders have sought power through violence and patronage, they cannot leave power; the personal consequences would be too great. Because there is no easy exit, they must continue using violence and patronage to remain in power.’

This description fits Compaoré’s regime equally well, as its last attempt to quell the insurrection shows. Yet repression and violence are not the only obstacles that

21 As mentioned earlier, François Compaoré was implicated in the assassination of the journalist Norbert Zongo in 1998. He was later positioned as a potential successor by Blaise Compaoré, leading to the defection of key CDP figures in January 2014. François Compaoré and his mother-in-law, Alizéta Ouédraogo, were particularly unpopular among the Burkinabè population. François Compaoré was arrested in France in October 2017 and Burkina Faso has requested his extradition to prosecute him in the Zongo murder case.
opposition parties face. As Tripp (idem) point out, another way these regimes use to remain in power is ‘patronage and largesse’, a dynamic I discuss next.

The monetisation of politics

During interviews in Burkina Faso and Uganda, the lack of resources was systematically cited as the chief constraint faced by opposition parties. This difficulty must be analysed on the backdrop of the high monetisation of politics in both Burkina Faso (Kibora 2019) and Uganda (Muhumuza 1997; Conroy-Krutz & Logan 2012; Wilkins 2016), as well as across the rest of the continent (e.g. Kramon 2017; Okunloye 2018). While it is not the sole factor, money does play a major role in politics. As a Burkinabè civil society activist and researcher argued:

‘When we look at political parties’ electoral results, what we see is that there is a correlation between their score and their financial means. The richer parties always have the highest scores. It is true money is not everything, but it is the most decisive variable’ (int. BF07, Ouagadougou, 05/04/2017).

Vote-buying or electoral corruption is considered a normal part of politics and is a clear expectation from voters. In Uganda, a survey found that 74% of young people were vulnerable to electoral bribery; 39% further stated they would only vote for a candidate who bribed them (Awiti 2016: 2). In Burkina Faso, any politician going to a village to campaign has to stop by the village chief to pay their respects, and to leave an ‘envelop’ (Kibora 2019: 81). A young UNIR-PS leader and local councillor explained: ‘When I was a candidate for local elections, village chiefs told me outright that if I wanted to get the votes in their village, I had to put my money where my mouth was’ (int. BF16, Ouagadougou, 17/01/2018). At meetings people expect water, food, and gadgets, sometimes a gas refill for their motorcycle or transportation costs. As a
UPC MP argued, ‘When you have a meeting, you lay out the political programme, it is completely useless; the conclusion people are waiting for is how much you are going to give them’ (int. BF38, Ouagadougou, 05/07/2018).

This means that the costs of running for elections are ever increasing, as ruling parties mobilise increasing war chests (Koter 2017). In Burkina Faso, Compaoré’s re-election campaign in 2005 officially cost around one billion CFA Francs (FCFA)\(^{22}\) – a figure greatly under-estimated according to political observers (Loada 2006: 26). In Uganda, a study estimated that legislative candidates spent between 150 and 500 million Ugandan shillings (USh)\(^{23}\) on electioneering in the 2016 campaign (Golooba-Mutebi 2017: 8) – while the average monthly cash income that year was USh416,000\(^{24}\) according to the Ugandan Bureau of Statistics (The Observer 04/10/2017). Campaign costs are inflated by the NRM’s ability to use the public budget – through the use of government facilities by Museveni and other NRM figures, the spending of a discretionary ‘presidential donations’ budget (amounting to USD10.2 million in 2011\(^{25}\)), and the wide patronage networks of the NRM (Helle & Rakner 2013: 164). As an example, a study on campaign financing released in January 2016 found that President Museveni had spent USh27 billion in just two months of campaigning ahead of the February 2016 election, compared with the USh1.3 billion spent by independent candidate Mbabazi, and Ush976 million by FDC’s Besigye (New Vision 22/01/2016)\(^{26}\).

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\(^{22}\) Around £1 million at the time (November 2005). All historical exchange rates were retrieved on OANDA [https://www1.oanda.com/currency/converter/].

\(^{23}\) Around £30,000-100,000 (February 2016).

\(^{24}\) Around £84 (February 2016).

\(^{25}\) Around £6.4 million (February 2011).

\(^{26}\) Around £5.3 million for Museveni’s campaign, £250,000 for Mbabazi, and £192,000 for Besigye (January 2016).
As Helle and Rakner (2013: 166) have argued, this massive spending by the ruling party can fuel skyrocketing inflation, as in 2011 when the Consumer Price Index reached a 18.7% annual increase – which in turn triggered the Walk-to-Work protests. This does not necessarily mean that incumbents simply ‘bought’ their re-election: based upon opinion surveys, Conroy-Krutz and Logan (2012) have argued that Museveni’s re-election in 2011 was due to widespread public satisfaction with a growing economy and peaceful dividends in the Northern region, and that ultimately the money spent by Museveni in vote-buying did not make a decisive difference in the election’s outcome. Yet, the lavish spending by incumbents increases the cost of entry into politics and forces candidates to raise funds and take on massive debts (Wilkins 2016; Golooba-Mutebi 2017; Koter 2017)

In this context, the low financial capacity of opposition parties is a real issue. Their meagre resources make the development of party structures particularly challenging, as money is necessary to organise rallies and meetings, maintain party headquarters and full-time staff, and conduct activities. As a Burkinabè researcher and activist explained:

‘People are attracted to a political party based upon realism. They are not looking at the quality of ideas, but at the mobilisation capacity, the financial means. If a small party has good ideas and clean, honest people, but people believe it does not have the means to campaign, they will prefer to be with a party, maybe a little less clean, but which realistically is more likely to obtain a few parliamentary seats’ (int. BF07, Ouagadougou, 05/04/2017).

In both Uganda and Burkina Faso, resource mobilisation is hampered by the absence of a political culture of paying membership fees. In Burkina Faso, ‘cotisations’ – or the regular financial contributions party members are expected to
make to the organisation – are rarely paid, except by those aspiring to be candidates, or those with political or elected responsibilities. As one UPC MP argued: ‘no party has activists who pay membership dues because Blaise Compaoré used to give them money. If you go and ask them for money, even as an opposition party, they won’t understand it’ (int. BF38, Ouagadougou, 05/07/2018). Similarly in Uganda, a civil society representative described how ‘we have created a tradition in this country in the last fifteen years where party supporters expect to get from the party, instead of them giving to the party’ (int. UG01, Kampala, 06/04/2016).

One notable exception is the display of financial contribution by individual supporters to Besigye and the FDC in Uganda during rallies in the run up to the 2016 election. According to the Ugandan newspaper The Observer (03/02/2016), individual supporters may have contributed up to USh112 million\(^{27}\) during the campaign, not counting additional contributions in nature, including chickens, rabbits, fish, and vegetables. However, this kind of contribution remains ad-hoc and falls short of the real costs involved in campaigning. There is also a lack of transparency and accountability in terms of how much money the party actually gets in this manner, and how those funds are spent.

Public funding for political parties is inscribed in the law, but greatly limited and often monopolised by the ruling party. In Uganda, the Political Parties and Organisations (Amendment) Act of 2010 includes a provision for public resources to be awarded to political parties or organisations represented in Parliament for elections and the conduct of their normal day to day activities. While campaign financing is officially distributed on an equal basis, regular funding is calculated based upon

\[^{27}\text{Around £22,600 (February 2016).}\]
numerical representation in parliament. It is therefore largely monopolised by the ruling party considering its ultra-dominance in number of seats. The large number of independent MPs (who are more numerous than MPs affiliated to opposition parties) also affects the division of available resources. The actual disbursement of funds is irregular, as illustrated by the Electoral Commission’s announcement that there would not be funding for political parties for the 2018-2019 financial year due to a budget shortfall \((The\ Observer\ 20/01/2018)\). In 2016, out of the USh10 billion envelope awarded, less than USh2 billion\(^{28}\) was split among the five opposition parties represented in the ninth parliament \((Daily\ Monitor\ 03/05/2016)\).\(^{29}\)

Similarly in Burkina Faso, there are two streams of public funding but with different distribution rules: regular funding for day-to-day activities is allocated based upon the latest legislative election results (\% of votes obtained), while funding for election campaigns is awarded based upon the number of candidates a party fields (Law \n°12-2001/AN of 28 June 2001).

In Uganda, it is particularly difficult for opposition parties to raise money, due to obtrusive legislation. For example, the NGO Act (2016) has reduced the ability of political foundations to provide funding to political parties – except indirectly through the organisation of trainings and workshops. For example, the DP receives some financial and technical support from a German political foundation, the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), to organise training workshops (see Erdmann 2006). All parties also benefit from capacity-building through programmes such as the Inter-Party

\(^{28}\) USh 10 billion = around £2 million; USh 2 billion = £408,000 (May 2016).

\(^{29}\) While legislative elections had taken place in February 2016, the resulting tenth legislature only sat on 17 May for the first time. These funds were awarded at the beginning of May 2016, therefore based upon representation in the ninth parliament (2011-2016) which included the NRM (259 MPs), FDC (37), DP (15), UPC (10), Jeema (1), CP (1).
Youth Platform (IYOP), the Inter-Party Organisation for Dialogue (IPOD), or the Democratic Governance Facility (DGF).  

In addition, the Political Parties and Organisations Act (PPOA, 2005) places a ceiling of USh400 million on funds a party can get from foreign sources. This makes it very difficult to evaluate the diaspora’s contribution to opposition parties’ finances in either country. An FDC activist stated that the party had chapters abroad contributing financially to the party, notably in the United States, the United Kingdom, and South Africa (int. UG86, Kampala, 26/05/2018). Meanwhile, a civil society activist in Soroti indicated that the FDC received discreet support from the diaspora – for example by distributing it to young people who then reversed the funds to the party as individual contributions (int. UG38, Soroti, 07/05/2018). Yet, assessing the actual amount of these contributions is impossible at this stage.

It is the same in Burkina Faso, where party officials rarely acknowledged the diaspora as a source of funding. However, the Sankarist parties have in the past received financial contributions from Mariam Sankara, Thomas Sankara’s widow exiled in France (L’Observateur Paalga 15/10/2007a). Meanwhile, a researcher stated that parties did receive unofficial – and unaccounted for – contributions from abroad, for example through ideology-based international connexions with European parties or due to ethnic solidarity ties with politicians in the sub-region (int. BF07, Ouagadougou, 05/04/2017).

30 This is acknowledged on these programmes’ websites or social media pages: https://www.facebook.com/Interparty-Youth-Platform-IYOP-215134021927161/; https://nimd.org/programmes/uganda/; https://www.facebook.com/DGFuganda
31 Around £84,000 (April 2020).
Contributions from domestic and foreign supporters are, however, hampered because these supporters often have an interest in remaining anonymous. The Ugandan legislation requires the disclosure of sources of funding, therefore ‘violat[ing] the anonymity that businessmen, soldiers and other big funders would need to be safe when they give funds’ (Ssenkumba 2007: 18–19). A DP leader stated that the party has ‘well-wishers who contribute to the party, [but] most of them have to do it anonymously because they fear reprisals, because the government thinks that supporting an opposition party amounts to treason’ (int. UG87, Kampala, 28/05/2018). A particular risk for private operators is that their business can be targeted as a punishment for funding the opposition. In Burkina Faso, a UNIR-PS leader asked: ‘Who will fund you if you are not friends with those who manage state power? They are the ones awarding public contracts, they are the ones sustaining private companies’ (int. BF17, Ouagadougou, 18/01/2018). Similarly in Uganda, a DP member of parliament stated that ‘any businessman here who associates with us will be visited by URA [Uganda Revenue Authority] to remind him he owes taxes to the government’ (int. UG89, Constituency, 2016).

In this context, parties are heavily reliant on key individuals among the party’s leadership to use their own resources to fund the party’s activities, including conducting electoral campaigns and building and maintaining local structures. MPs tend to be the ones paying for the local party headquarters in their constituency and greatly contribute to party activities at the local level, and at the national level, the party’s leadership is responsible for financing a large part of the party’s activities. The party’s capacities are therefore closely connected to the personal means of its leaders.

Politicians who have taken part in government have been able to extract resources from their political positions and have built economic foundations they can rely on to
create and sustain their party, but it is more difficult for opposition leaders with limited means to accumulate a financial base. For example, as a civil society representative explained, ‘a party like the UNIR-PS has not, since the time of Thomas Sankara, directly participated in state power and has not been able to constitute a large enough financial base’ (int. BF04, Ouagadougou, 27/03/2017). The UPC’s founder, Diabré, had more resources than UNIR-PS officials, though it should be noted that he accumulated these resources through his international clout and network more than from his brief time in government. When the party is mainly funded by its leader, it can be a problem. Indeed, this inevitably creates a situation where the party ‘belongs’ to the leader rather than the members, and the dependence of parties on key contributors can prevent internal democracy and leadership renewal, something I will come back to when discussing party-building processes (5.2) and parties ability to endure (7.1).

Financial difficulties are obviously a major hurdle for opposition parties: limited funding prevents them from setting up local structures and maintaining offices and staff, holding rallies and conducting activities, and responding to the population’s widespread expectations for handouts. While a lack of funding could be considered as an internal weakness, in the context of a hybrid regime it is mostly fuelled by the political environment: repressive legislation, threats towards opposition supporters, and the monopolisation of public funding by ultra-dominant ruling parties all contribute to opposition parties’ financial troubles. This must also be considered against the backdrop of the widespread use of public resources by incumbents in hybrid regimes such as Burkina Faso and Uganda, which widens the gap between the ruling party’s and the opposition’s financial capacities. This gap is particularly ostentatious during election campaigns – which I focus on next.
Electoral malpractices

True to their hybrid nature, the Ugandan and Burkinabè regime have failed to offer a level playing field to opposition parties, especially when election time came. As Cheeseman and Klaas (2019) neatly demonstrated, authoritarian incumbents have a large toolbox to choose from when they wish to rig an election, and can adapt their strategies over time, for example in the face of domestic pressure or international criticism. These tactics range from the gerrymandering of constituencies and efforts to influence the voter register to the use of threats and money, multiple voting, and vote-buying, to ballot box stuffing and result manipulation.

In both Burkina Faso and Uganda, there is evidence of outright fraud affecting election results during the period under study. For example, in the 2016 general elections in Uganda, several NRM stronghold districts logged improbable turnouts nearing or reaching 100%, creating high suspicions of ballot-stuffing or vote count tampering (Beardsworth & Cheeseman 16/03/2016). Presidential results have systematically been described as fraudulent by the opposition, with evidence of voter bribery, multiple voting, pre-ticked ballot stuffing and alterations of results. These allegations were the subject of court challenges in 2001, 2006, and 2016. On these occasions, contradictory judgements acknowledged frauds, but upheld Museveni’s victories based on ‘substantiality’ arguments (Kabumba 2016).

In Burkina Faso, the opposition alleged ‘massive frauds’ in the 1992 legislative and 1995 municipal elections, but some observers have pondered whether these allegations were mere attempts at justifying their defeat (Loada & Otayek 1995: 138). Still, Harsch (2017: 131) lists a variety of irregularities reported throughout the 1990s:
‘faulty voter lists, issuing voting identification cards to underage youths, transporting voters from one polling station to another, withholding cards from entire villages suspected of opposition sympathies, using chiefs’ homes as voting places, and ‘indelible’ ink that could be easily washed off, allowing multiple voting’.

During my research in Burkina Faso, several interviewees recalled instances of such methods being used (int. BF10, Ouagadougou, 25/04/2017; int. BF54, Tenkodogo, 18/12/2018).

This kind of ostensible rigging diminished in the next decade, as the CDP’s efficient political machine, its use of public resources, and the opposition’s divisions it fostered (discussed later) were enough to guarantee Compaoré’s re-election. Yet, the CDP could still resort to these practices in selected constituencies as needed – like in Bokin during the 2012 local elections. Bokin is Thomas Sankara’s birthplace and consequently a Sankarist stronghold. It is a rural commune encompassing a chef-lieu (known alternatively as Bokin or Téma-Bokin) and sixty villages. A couple of local councillors are elected in each village and are brought together in the communal council of Bokin which counts a total of 81 councillors. A local councillor affiliated with the UNIR-PS recounted that his party was proclaimed as the winner in Téma-Bokin on the evening of the election, but the results were inverted the next day to give the majority to the CDP: ‘We got the vote, but they confiscated our victory. It’s Blaise [Compaoré] who took this victory away from us’ (int. BF29, Bokin, 06/04/2018).

The leader of the UNIR-PS, Bénéwendé Sankara, reported in the press that the definitive results proclaimed by the Conseil d’Etat on 29 December 2012 and published on its website – which gave two of the Téma-Bokin seats to UNIR-PS and the third to the CDP – were ‘corrected’ on 8 January 2013, reversing the results in
Téma-Bokin, after ‘a boss who belongs to the CDP came and asked to modify the results because there had been mistakes’ (le faso.net 11/01/2013). The government also cancelled the results in one of the villages where the UNIR-PS had obtained the two councillor seats, Guoera, and re-organised the election which returned one seat to the UNIR-PS and one to the CDP. Through these ploys, the CDP obtained a short majority in the Bokin communal council (41 councillors against 40 for the UNIR-PS), denying the Sankarist party control over one of their strongholds.

Elections are also disrupted by more subtle malpractices, including delays in dispatching voting materials and opening polling stations in known opposition strongholds. For example, in 2016 the opening of some polling stations in Kampala and Wakiso was delayed by over six hours (EU EOM 2016). Ballot secrecy has regularly been undermined in both countries: Golaz and Médard (2014: 77) illustrate this in the case of the 2011 Ugandan elections with the issue of ballot design: ‘Besigye’s name on the first line and Museveni on the last did not do much to provide confidentiality. Individual efforts to keep the vote secret could be viewed as attempts to conceal a vote in favour of the opposition’. More blatantly, in the 2018 local elections, voting was done by lining-up behind one’s preferred candidate (Mwesigye 04/07/2018), with the NRM announcing in January 2020 that they would adopt this voting method for their next primary elections (New Vision 24/01/2020). In Burkina Faso, opposition activists have reported that in some villages, polling stations were sometimes set up in front the chief’s courtyard, or the chief himself would stand by the polling station’s entrance to influence voters – usually in favour of the CDP (Beucher 2010: 48).

But frauds and malpractices are not happening solely on election days. In Burkina Faso, the voters’ roll has long been a source of contention. For the 1997 legislative
elections, it had been hastily put together based upon raw census data, leading to widespread fraud (Meunier 1998). Ahead of the 1998 presidential poll, two investigative journalists from *L’Indépendant* demonstrated the authorities’ manipulation of the voters’ roll by visiting registration offices across the capital and obtaining twenty official voting cards between them (Harsch 2017: 131). In 2007, the voters’ registry was itself falsified to allow under-aged voters to take part, or enable some people to vote multiple times (Loada 2010: 278). Because of these issues, the opposition made biometric registration one of their key demands, leading to the development of a cleaner roll based upon biometric registration ahead of the 2012 elections. As a UNIR-PS leader argued: ‘In 2010, the electoral system had to be reset, we made as much noise as possible to switch to a biometric system, we succeeded […]. This has enabled parties such as UPC to benefit from transparency to get a spot under the sun’ (int. BF17, Ouagadougou, 18/01/2018).

In Uganda, similar shortcomings of the voters’ roll affected elections. For example, the register used in the 2001 elections ‘was widely criticised as inflated with duplicate registrations, ghost voters, the underage and non-citizens, opening for possibilities of vote rigging’ (Gloppen *et al.* 2006: 10). Despite a review of the electoral roll prior to the 2006 elections, problems remained, especially as a number of voters were not issued a voter’s card.

Discrepancies on the voters’ roll are also used to disqualify opposition candidates from standing, such as occurred when DP leader Mao attempted to stand for the MP seat in Gulu municipality (Namae 2016). Uganda introduced biometric voter registration and verification ahead of the 2016 elections, however this did not prevent the improbable 100% turnout figures in NRM strongholds mentioned earlier. Cheeseman, Lynch, and Willis (2018) raise the important point that new technology
in itself cannot ensure election credibility, and that it tends to have a positive outcome in more democratic settings but can have damaging consequences in more authoritarian contexts.

Another practice to manipulate elections used in Uganda has been gerrymandering. This has involved the incessant creation of new districts (electing a Woman MP) and constituencies (for directly elected MPs). As an example, a total of 33 by-elections have been held across the country between August 2016 and October 2018: nearly half of them (15) were organised to fill newly-created seats, while 10 followed a court challenge cancelling previous results and 7 after the seat became vacant due to the MP’s resignation, illness, or death. While the opposition has been able to pull resources and win half of the seats put in play after a court challenge (notably catching three seats previously held by the NRM, in Jinja East (FDC), Rukungiri (FDC), and Arua (Independent)), in the case of new districts, only two seats out of fifteen have been won by opposition parties – Kyotera District (DP) and Bugiri Municipality (JEEMA). This pattern had previously been highlighted as beneficial to the NRM in the 2011 elections (Golaz & Médard 2014: 68).

In Burkina Faso, Compaoré manipulated the electoral rules in a different way. As the country uses a party-list proportional representation system (PR) rather than first-past-the-post, the government tweaked the size of electoral districts. Following the Zongo Affair, Compaoré made concessions to the opposition and the electoral district changed from the province to the region (a larger administrative unit), while the index of proportionality used was also modified. This led to unprecedented gains by opposition parties in the 2002 election (Loada & Santiso 2002). In 2004 – when Compaoré had regained control with the co-optation of the moderate ADF-RDA –
these provisions in the electoral code were reversed, in order to re-give the CDP its electoral advantage (CGD 2008: 41).

The capacity and independence of key institutions, such as electoral commissions, has also been questioned in both countries, especially in Uganda. Indeed, in this country the Electoral Commission (EC) is not independent, not even by name. Commissioners are appointed by Museveni, without any input from the opposition, and are therefore answerable to Museveni himself who can dismiss them at any time (Fisher 2013). He has, for example, declared the EC to be ‘full of rotten people’ and that ‘they should get out’, following NRM losses in by-elections in 2018 (Daily Monitor 28/08/2018).

In Burkina Faso, the opposition successfully fought to be better represented in the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI). Legislative reforms were made to eliminate the problem of political nomadism – illustrated by the ADF-RDA’s representative at the CENI sitting among the five opposition commissioners when the party was part of the majority and officially backed Compaoré’s presidency. From 2009, the CENI was recognised as truly independent: according to Afrobarometer data from 2012, 41% of the population trusted the CENI ‘a lot’ and another 20% ‘somewhat’ (CGD 2012: 37). This positive perception was also illustrated by the fact that the CENI’s composition was not modified after the 2014 insurrection to organise the 2015 election (CENI 2016: 51).

While opponents often claim elections are marred by frauds, and there is some evidence of it, it is still important to keep in mind that the government retained a large support base in rural constituencies (representing the vast majority of voters), where they are sometimes unchallenged and often are the only party with an effective
presence down to the village level. In Burkina Faso, Compaoré’s hold on rural votes was facilitated by the co-optation of influential customary chiefs. In both countries, as I have argued in the previous section, elections and the wider political field have been skewed by vote-buying, and more broadly by the monetisation of politics. Electoral dynamics must also be studied taking into account the repressive environment described earlier. A UNIR-PS leader argued that the way it was set up, ‘you wouldn’t in your right mind not vote for Blaise Compaoré, not vote for the CDP. There are entire villages which were punished because they did not give a majority to Blaise or the CDP’ (int. BF40, Ouagadougou, 10/07/2018). This illustrates the unlevel playing field, as does the violent repression of the opposition’s electoral campaigns in Uganda. Incumbents also have an advantage when they face a divided opposition, which they often do, as I discuss next.

**Divide and rule**

Opposition parties are further weakened by deep divisions within and between them. As a leader from the DP explained, speaking about Ugandan opposition parties:

‘They fight each other, before they fight the regime. A lot of effort is spent on fighting first of all themselves internally within the parties, then fighting each other, and little effort is spent at collectively putting up a front as an alternative’

(int. UG03 20/04/2016).

In Burkina Faso, electoral coalitions have not managed to take hold. Even among the Sankarist parties – supposedly sharing common values and manifestos, unity has never been able to take hold, as a UNIR-PS leader despaired: ‘There are over a dozen Sankarist parties. We, ourselves, neutralise each other on the ground’ (int. BF20 09/02/2018). In Uganda, Beadsworth (2018: 60) has shown that ‘despite the
recognition that coalitions are necessary, they almost invariably collapse’, often due to inter-party competition over the same pool of voters, newly-elected party presidents willing to test their own electoral viability by standing on their own ticket, and intra-party factionalism that disrupts coalition negotiations (see Chapter 7 for further details).

Factionalism and party splits have plagued opposition parties in both countries. In Burkina Faso, a UNIR-PS official despaired that among all opposition parties, ‘there wasn’t one month, two months without a split with the creation of a new party’ (int. BF40, Ouagadougou, 17/04/2018). The history of Sankarist parties illustrates this issue too well, with internal divisions and frequent splits harming their credibility (Harsch 2013: 359). Party splits in Burkina Faso can usually be explained by one of two reasons: either a disagreement between two wings of the party over joining the government or not; or frustrated ambitions leading aspiring party leaders to create their own organisation due to lack of elite circulation within the party. An example of the first scenario was the break-up of the CPS and the creation of the UNIR-MS in 2000, because of the CPS leadership’s decision to join a ‘unity’ government of Compaoré (int. BF20, Ouagadougou, 09/02/2018; int. BF25, Yako, 05/04/2018).

An illustration of the second is the creation of the Convergence de l’Espoir by Jean-Hubert Bazié and other UNIR-MS members in 2004. Frequent floor-crossing, or ‘political nomadism’ (see Meunier 1998: 149), also affects Burkinabè opposition parties, with leaders and activists frequently co-opted by the ruling party (Loada 2010: 280–282). Money can also play a role in triggering these splits. In Burkina Faso, a financial dispute over the use and distribution of a sum of money given to the party by Mariam Sankara, the widow of former president Thomas Sankara, led to the BSB’s division into three parties in 2000 (L’Observateur Paalga 15/10/2007b).
In Uganda, though splits have been less frequent, both the DP and FDC have suffered from entrenched factionalism and divisions. The DP, the country’s oldest party, suffered from massive floor-crossing during Milton Obote’s regime in the 1960s. Its decision to join Museveni’s unity government in 1986 and, later, to back the presidential candidacy of Besigye in 2001, also led to the loss of some of its members to the NRM and FDC respectively. In 2005, the DP suffered a split when then MP Michael Mabiike created the SDP: a UYD leader explained that ‘even before the Besigye factor, there was already an uprising among the young people in DP around Ssemogerere’s leadership style. This had led Mabiike to go and create the SDP’ (int. UG08, Kampala, 30/06/2016). More recently, the DP was still characterised by factionalism, which could be interpreted in two ways. One is to see the opposition from a section of strong Baganda leaders to the party’s president Mao along ethnic lines. Mao, a northerner, was elected president of the party in 2010 thanks to the support of party representatives from Northern, Western, and Eastern Uganda, breaking the dominance of the Central region where the DP’s Baganda core constituency is found. However, the people involved have defended themselves from these claims:

“At one time, we pushed Mao because of the way he organised the elections, but people said it was about tribe, that we were against him because he wasn’t a Muganda. But it wasn’t the case. The issue was that he had rigged himself into power. But when we raised it, he said we were saying this because of his tribe. It was like the party went out hunting for a non-Muganda and they stole him into leadership just to satisfy the voices that were demanding for a non-Muganda leader’ (int. UG89, Constituency, 2016).

Another interpretation has more to do with the party’s strategy and objectives vis-à-vis the regime and the rest of the opposition. Indeed, there have been frictions over
whether to form alliances with other parties and, more particularly, whether to support Besigye as the opposition’s flagbearer. This issue, particularly controversial within the DP, reflects wider divisions among the opposition, which build upon competition for the same constituencies and a fear by smaller parties that they will be swallowed by the FDC (Beardsworth 2016). This fear is particularly justified by past experience in the case of the DP, as Beardsworth (2016: 758) explained: ‘Mao has repeatedly stated that he holds the FDC and Besigye responsible for much of the instability within DP, particularly through the informal alliance forged between Besigye and Lukwago’s Suubi group in 2011’.

While Lukwago held a parallel party conference in 2015 to launch the ‘Truth and Justice Platform’, and ran for re-election on an independent ticket in 2016 (Beardsworth 2016: 758), others have re-entered the DP fold, such as MP Nambooze, despite continuous frictions – Nambooze was for example suspended from holding party activities, in spite of being a party Vice-President, for three months in 2017 (Daily Monitor 20/04/2017).

The FDC has also suffered from factionalism after Besigye stepped down from the party presidency and was succeeded by Muntu in 2012 in a contested election (Beardsworth 2016: 757), with growing disagreements over Muntu’s leadership and strategy, leading to Muntu’s defeat against Amuriat in the 2017 party leadership contest.

Moreover, while Besigye’s decision to step down as party-president in 2012 was ‘broadly commended as an attempt to move beyond the personalisation of the party’ (Beardsworth 2016: 757), he still stood as the FDC’s ‘flagbearer’ (presidential candidate) in 2016. This flagbearer status has undoubtedly been extended way beyond
the electoral period, especially in light of Besigye’s swearing-in as the ‘People’s President’ in May 2016 (Daily Monitor 17/02/2019). This led the party to be, in effect, double-headed and deeply affected by factionalism, with some voices within the party going as far as accusing Muntu of being an NRM mole – which in the end led Muntu to split from the FDC in September 2018 and form a new party (The Observer 25/09/2018).

Though opposition parties bear the responsibility for these divisions driven by personal interests, strategic disagreements, or financial disputes, the regime has also played a part in fuelling mistrust and enmities in both Uganda and Burkina Faso, abiding by the old divide and rule tactic. In Uganda, Museveni reportedly stated after his swearing-in ceremony in 2016 that he would ensure there would be no more opposition by 2021 (The Observer 05/04/2017). In Burkina Faso, a regime cadre, Salif Diallo32, then a Minister in Compaoré’s government, admitted to a journalist: ‘From time to time, if we can accelerate [the opposition’s] internal decomposition, we do it, it makes sense. Personally, I cannot say that I am as white as snow in that matter’ (L’Evénement 10/02/2008). These divisions have therefore been actively fuelled by the regime, through a broad range of tactics. In both Burkina Faso and Uganda, the government have co-opted individuals, factions, or whole parties, usually in exchange for a government seat. The ADF-RDA’s participation in the broad-based government from 2000 led to the ex-opposition party to officially support Compaoré’s re-election bid in subsequent presidential elections. In Uganda, the UPC’s faction led by Jimmy

32 Salif Diallo later resigned from the CDP to form the MPP in January 2014, along with two other CDP heavy-weights, Roch Marc Christian Kaboré and Simon Compaoré. Diallo became President of the National Assembly following the 2015 elections, until his death in August 2017.
Akena was similarly co-opted by Museveni in 2016 by including key members in the government.

The authorities have also distributed financial gifts to opposition politicians to foster disputes and discredit them. For example, in 2005, Laurent Bado of the Parti pour la Renaissance (PAREN) admitted he had received FCFA30 million\(^{33}\) from Compaoré, and accused other opposition leaders, including Emile Paré of the Mouvement du Peuple pour le Socialisme/Parti Fédéral (MPS/PF), of having received a similar gift from the President. This scandal tarnished the image of the opposition ahead of the presidential elections. Moreover, perhaps not unrelatedly, the Burkinabè opposition’s attempt to build a unified front – the Opposition Burkinabè Unie (OBU) – collapsed after Laurent Bado and Emile Paré decided to run on their own (Loada 2006: 29).

In this political climate, rumours that some opposition parties or leaders are in collusion with the authorities spread easily. Muntu, at the time when he was the president of FDC, was branded as an NRM mole by people within his own party (Daily Monitor 08/12/2017). While it is difficult to assess whether the regime itself has a hand in fuelling these kinds of accusations, Museveni’s and Compaoré’s regular resort to co-optation and infiltration give credit to these rumours, even if they are baseless.

**Conclusion**

In summary, Compaoré’s regime in Burkina Faso and Museveni’s in Uganda are two examples of hybrid regimes, characterised by an unlevel playing field and a quasi-

\(^{33}\) £32,000 (November 2005).
fusion of the state, the ruling party, and the incumbent. This creates or worsens a set of constraints for the formation and operation of opposition parties. The incumbent, who has the state’s security forces at his disposal, can repress opposition parties’ activity violently – or credibly threaten to do so. Opposition activists and officials risk being harassed, beaten, and arrested due to their affiliation to an opposition party. The incumbent also has access to the state’s resources more broadly, and can use public coffers to fund his electoral campaigns and patronage networks. This fuels the monetisation of politics and drives up the costs of running for office. Meanwhile, opposition parties may find it difficult to raise money, due to curtailing legislation or the fear of business operators to offend the ruling elite and lose public contracts. Consequently, opposition parties tend to have limited resources and to be financially dependent on a few individuals, a problem I will come back to later on (see Chapter 5).

Incumbents in hybrid regimes also employ a range of tactics to rig elections – from outright fraud to meddling with the electoral code and controlling the electoral commission. This makes defeating them through the ballot an impossible task – yet opposition parties still take part in them, as I will further discuss later on (see Chapter 6). Finally, opposition parties within these regimes are further weakened by their inability to unite, as illustrated by the failure of coalition-building attempts and the internal factionalism that plagues all the parties at hand. Yet these divisions are often fuelled by the regime itself. Defections and disputes are triggered by the co-optation of individual opponents, while the hybrid nature of the regime leads to disagreements over strategy, which fosters divisions. This echoes the observation by Bunce and Wolchik (2010: 60) that opposition parties in post-communist hybrid regimes are often
‘self-destructive’ because of the inherently divisive strategic choices they have to make:

‘Because of their fluid political characteristics, given weak institutions, ever-changing rules of the political game, and the extraordinary difficulties such regimes pose with respect to reading both popular sentiments and regime capacity, competitive authoritarian regimes present oppositions with unusually diverse, difficult, and, therefore, inherently divisive strategic choices’.

Hybrid regimes therefore present a set of challenges to opposition parties, not exhaustively covered here, and it is necessary to understand and consider these constraints when talking about the ‘weakness’ of opposition parties. The quasi-fused incumbent, ruling party, and state institution they face make it extremely difficult not just to win an election, but to exist and operate as opposition parties on a daily basis. It is with these circumstances and the simultaneous survival of opposition parties in mind that I know turn my attention to what these parties are formed around, how they are built as organisations, and how they engage the regime in place.
Party cores: what are opposition parties about?

Opposition parties in hybrid regimes operate in a particularly difficult environment. In order to understand the role that they can play within these settings, it is necessary to analyse what makes these parties what they are: what do these parties exist for? Too often, the study of what parties are about is limited to a binary analysis of whether these parties can be considered as programmatic (a good thing), or not (a bad thing). Indeed, programmatic parties, structured around clear and ideological commitments, are thought to be ‘a crucial element of enabling adequate democratic representation’ (Luna et al. 2014: 1).

Yet most African parties are seen as non-programmatic, as scholars have argued that ‘ideological and programmatic debates have been muted and rare’ across the continent (Van de Walle 2003). Instead, African parties are often considered either as catch-all parties mobilising around valence issues (Bleck & Van de Walle 2013), as particularistic parties formed around identity-based cleavages such as ethnicity (Horowitz 1985; Cheeseman & Ford 2007), or as mere clientelist vehicles (Chabal & Daloz 1999). However the programmatic nature of a party should be seen on a spectrum, rather than as a binary variable (International IDEA (ed.) 2014: xii), and parties can combine programmatic and non-programmatic mobilisation strategies (Cheeseman & Paget 2014). Such an approach therefore tells us little about the nature of political parties.
In order to understand these aspects better, my research set out to apprehend what constitutes the ‘core’ of the parties under study (\textit{noyau} in French). Somewhat related, but not corresponding exactly, to the mainstream party goals (Strøm 1990) or social base, I define the core as the element a party is formed around, what it derives its identity and legitimacy from, and what glues it together despite constraints and factionalism. My use of the word ‘core’ differs from Manning’s (1998: 170) conception of a party’s core as its hierarchy, in her study of Renamo’s transformation into a political party in Mozambique. Here, it is close to the concept of \textit{party brand}, defined by Lupu (2014, 2016: 18–19) as the image that voters have of the party and of who it stands for.

This consumerist metaphor, centred around the prototypical voter or supporter of the party, is useful in analysing how parties attract voters and partisan attachments more broadly, but it does not necessarily capture what parties stand for and are built around. While such a brand is solely outward-focused, my interest is what is inside the party. Why do people found or join it, and around which ideas, concepts, and objectives? I consider that this core constitutes the party’s specific identity and provides it with a level of legitimacy, therefore fuelling its endurance as an organisation – something I will come back to at the end of this thesis (see Chapter 7). Rather than focusing on electoral mobilisation (why people vote for the party), this encompasses why people belong to it – either as leaders, officials, or activists – as a broader organisation.

Existing classifications of parties in Africa and beyond (Gunther & Diamond 2001; Elischer 2013: 12–22) as well as discussions of African parties in the literature (e.g. Kitschelt (2000); Horowitz (1985)) often focus on three things that could be considered the core of a party: ideology and programmatic ideas, identity-based cleavages such as
ethnicity and religion, and personalistic attributes. Gunther and Diamond (2001: 9–11), for example, explicitly list ‘ideologically-based’, ‘religious-based’, and ‘ethnicity-based’ parties. They also include a ‘personalistic’ party-type aimed at retaining power for an individual, while the ‘elite party’ they describe also revolves around personal resources and relations. Souaré (2017: 66–76), in his own review of the literature on African parties, discusses in turn the issue of leadership and the consideration by some party leaders of the party ‘as their property’, ethnic and regionalist parties, and parties exhibiting (or not) an ideology and a ‘society project’.

Most scholars agree that ideological cleavages tend not to be relevant in explaining party formation in Africa. Elischer’s (2012: 657) study of party manifestos across the continent confirmed this, while Manning (2005: 715–716) argued that the weakness of ideological bearings on party formation and competition in sub-Saharan Africa could also be explained by structural adjustment programmes and high aid dependency constraining policy options. This disdain for ideologies is sometimes embraced by parties themselves, which the Burkinabè UPC illustrates very well. Indeed, the manifesto drawn up at the party’s creation stated that ‘The particularity of our party is that it refuses to claim any ideology, as seems to be fashionable, but instead aims at solving our people’s problems through pragmatic solutions guided by solid values’ (UPC 2010). This has led to the over-bearing perception that African parties were generally either formed around an ethnic core (Horowitz 1985) or an individual (Chabal & Daloz 1999; Randall & Svåsand 2002c; Manning 2005), as was already discussed in Chapter 1.

However, my research in Burkina Faso and Uganda has shown that it is impossible to consider the parties at hand solely as either ‘ethnic-based’ or ‘programmatic’ or ‘personalistic’ and to categorise them along these lines. Instead, all parties use a mix
of these cleavages to define themselves and to mobilise support. The DP in Uganda has been in turn called a Catholic and a Baganda party (Lwanga-Lunyiigo 2015), and it is undeniable that the party has been influenced by and been popular amongst Catholics and Baganda throughout its history. Yet, defining the party as just that, a religious or ethnic-based party, neglects the fact that the party’s aims and strategies were never dictated by the Church (Kassimir 1998: 13), nor by the Kabaka – illustrated by the KY’s alliance with UPC in 1962, or the Suubi pressure group backing Besigye in 2011. These parties are still drawing from certain traditions and legacies – such as the Sankarist revolution in Burkina Faso – and mobilising around certain issues or values, such as impunity and corruption, *alternance*, or federalism. And while partisan politics across the continent is certainly highly personalised and leaders are important pull factors, none of the parties I observed can be reduced to their individual leader. Indeed, the appeal of party leaders go beyond personal ties, charisma, and clientelist networks, and is intertwined with broader values and promises these leaders come to embody, and which form the real core of these parties.

In a nutshell, issues, identity, and personal ties are mobilisation tools linked to a broader party core that needs to be defined. Based upon my empirical research, I identified two kinds of cores and, therefore, types of parties: value-based parties, whose legitimacy derives from historical credentials and the perpetuation of loose but institutionalised values; and credible change-bearers, whose attractiveness is fuelled by a mix of partisan and personal qualities making them ‘credible’ leaders to deliver an ill-defined ‘change’. I address each model in turn, discussing how these cores are defined and their effect on parties mobilisation.
4.1 Truth, Justice, and Integrity: Historical values’ trustees

Some opposition parties, often founded earlier or having roots in an older party lineage\(^{34}\), are built and do their mobilising around a core set of values and a sense of history. This is the case of the DP in Uganda, and the UNIR-PS in Burkina Faso, for example. Activists from both of these parties routinely state that they joined up because of the party’s values.

As a DP MP argued, ‘this is the only party that believes in values, and it is brought forward by the most ordinary supporters: it is a party founded on values. People believe in justice, rule of law, and constitutionalism’ (int. UG89, Constituency, 2016). As stated earlier, the DP is Uganda’s oldest party. It was founded in 1954, in a context marked by the struggle for Uganda’s independence and the political marginalisation of Catholics, and around the values of ‘Truth and Justice’ – the party’s motto. These values have contributed to the DP’s endurance as a party during the no-party eras of Idi Amin and the Movement System, and to be resilient up until today. Indeed, a former DP leader stated that: ‘The core values of DP are truth and justice, human rights, social justice, constitutionalism, non-violence. These values and principles have enabled the party to survive’ (int. UG32, Kampala, 07/12/2016).

These values are grounded in the DP’s history, and, according to a Ugandan academic, ‘historical attachment has made the party survive, it is their social capital’ (int. UG31, Kampala, 07/12/2016). DP meetings and events usually include a speech

\(^{34}\) A succession of fusions and splits can result in a party officially founded recently but drawing from the legacy of a broader party family tree, in terms of leaders and personnel, symbols, and/or political history. For example, the UNIR-PS, founded in 2009, cannot be studied without considering the broader lineage from the creation of the BSB in 1990 leading to a number of inter-related Sankarist parties until today.
that goes back to the party’s official history, marked by the independence struggle, the party’s marginalisation and the robbery of their election victories throughout the post-colonial period (int. UG02, Kampala, 08/04/2016). The DP’s historical values and partisan identity are also transmitted across generations, which helps to explain why the DP retains support in some historical strongholds across Buganda.

Many DP activists and officials I interviewed explained that their parents had been in the party and had transmitted those values, and that they were therefore born or had grown up within the party. For example, an MP stated: ‘I was born in a DP family and I chose to remain because of the party’s values: peaceful coexistence, truth and justice. Everything we do must fit into the values’ (int. UG18, Kampala, 12/10/2016). The party has allowed for a loose understanding of these broad values so that each candidate could adapt them to the local reality of their constituency, as the same DP MP suggested: ‘Values are interpreted similarly but adapted to the context based upon the needs of the people’ (int. UG18, Kampala, 12/10/2016). Overall, as Juma (2010: 113) noted, the ‘Democratic Party (DP) has the least capacity to engage in muscular battles, but it has always stuck to its principle of truth and justice’. These values, around which the DP was founded over sixty years ago, are still the motto of the party and continue to resonate among the party’s leaders and activists, who systematically refer to them when talking about the party.

The lineage of Sankarist parties in Burkina Faso can be analysed using the same lens. Even though Burkinabè stakeholders sometimes designate Sankarism as an ideology, it is more accurate to describe it as a set of values. It is important to remember that ‘Thomas Sankara was a man of action, he wasn’t an ideologue’ (int. BF09, Ouagadougou, 06/04/2017). He has not left any writing behind and Sankarism has been defined by his disciples on the basis of his most famous speeches, first and
foremost the *Discours d’Orientation Populaire* given on 2 October 1983, which outlined the revolution’s guiding principles (Sankara 2007). When asked to define Sankarism, respondents tend to provide a list of values: integrity, hard work, justice, fairness, patriotism, all embodied by the (mythicised) figure of former President Sankara.

These values attract two categories of people into the party. On the one hand, an older generation which was directly involved in the revolution and knew Thomas Sankara, and therefore wish to further his legacy. On the other, a younger generation who have not known him or experienced the revolution directly, but are inspired by the values he embodies – often glossing over some aspects of the revolution’s history and magnifying Sankara as a hero. A young UNIR-PS leader explained:

‘There are several generations of activists in UNIR. The first generation of activists is the outcome of the previous attempts at creating a Sankarist party, looking for leaders, notably some former members of Sankara’s cabinet... Other generations have come from love for the man, like us who are trying to see how to best revive Sankara’s legacy’ (int. BF17, Ouagadougou, 18/01/2018).

This interviewee belongs to the second group, as he further says: ‘I belong to a generation that have not known Thomas Sankara, but that carried him in our hearts in high school, through the movies and his speeches, anecdotes shared by our parents. We found it interesting and we had this Sankarist leaning’ (ibid.).

While the Sankarist revolution suffered from both authoritarian excesses and revolutionary short-comings (Kongo & Zeilig 2017: 181-182, 205-206), its legacy remains important in Burkina Faso, particularly in how it shapes the Burkinabè national identity. As Harsch (2017: 80) argues, the revolution made unprecedented
efforts in terms of nation-building, resulting in the fact that ‘years after that
government’s demise, significant sectors of the population, including leading critics
of the CNR, seemed to readily accept their identification as citizens of Burkina Faso,
as Burkinabè’. The values associated with Sankarism, most prominently ‘integrity’ but
also hard-work and justice, are also values associated with the Burkinabè people more
broadly, and Sankarist parties – and recently, other parties too, as we will see below –
have attempted to tap into and claim to be the legitimate guardians of these values.
Both DP and UNIR-PS therefore have appropriated a set of values to define themselves
and to derive legitimacy.

While the appropriation of these values by parties such as DP and UNIR-PS has
played an important role in attracting supporters and making parties resilient, it has
proved a weakness for some reasons. First, it is hard to have a monopoly on these
broad values. The multiplication of Sankarist parties with their own interpretation of
what being Sankarist means is a case in point. Pushing values to the fore is also
dangerous because it sets a higher standard for these parties. This is once again well
illustrated by Sankarist parties and leaders who are compared, not to the other parties
and the government, but to (the mythicised version of) Thomas Sankara himself – an
ascetic President notably remembered for driving a Renault 5 (the cheapest car
available at the time), earning less than his civil servant spouse, and leading the fight
against domestic corruption and the foreign debt. ‘People are extremely demanding
toward us because they want to compare us with Sankara, so their expectations exceed
what we can possibly do’ a UNIR-PS official lamented (int. BF17, Ouagadougou,
18/01/2018).

Furthermore, it may not be enough to respond to voters’ aspirations and to convince
people the party can be elected and effectively govern. A civil society activist leader,
talking about the UNIR-PS, argued that ‘When you are running for election, it is not enough to be named Sankara, or to have Sankara posters behind you. You also need to offer something responding to the population’s deep aspirations. Whereas now, Sankarism does not offer much. “Give the people their dignity back”, what does it mean? There is no clear substance. This weakness of the Sankarist offer beyond catchphrases deprives them of a real foothold’ (int. BF04, Ouagadougou, 27/03/2017).

Similarly for DP, while they have been resilient and have maintained some support in a few strongholds, it is unquestionable that they have lost a lot ground, both to the NRM and the FDC, as their historical legacy has faded. The DP is increasingly perceived as a party turned towards the past, failing to attract young people, who represent the largest share of eligible voters. Indeed, a DP MP acknowledged that the ‘DP has been here for so long and it has baggage. [...] People get excited with new ideas, new things’ (int. UG89, Constituency, 2016).

This analysis of those parties’ cores as rooted in historical values does not mean that leadership, ethno-religious identities, or programmatic cleavages are irrelevant, but rather that they are framed in a way that taps into the explicit values of the party. Party leaders’ character and charisma certainly play a role in attracting supporters and activists. However, the leadership dynamics and leaders’ popularity are connected to the values at hand.

This is well illustrated by the case of Bénéwendé Sankara, who has built a reputation prior to joining politics as a lawyer who took on prominent cases nobody else would, such as the assassinations of Thomas Sankara and Norbert Zongo. An academic and civil society activist explained that ‘he was seen as someone courageous, who was bringing new ideas, who was taking risks to defend noble
Indeed, a UNIR-PS activist praised him saying, ‘before he created his party, he was on all fronts to defend widows and orphans’ (int. BF33, Koudougou, 17/04/2018). While he may not compare to the mythicised figure of Thomas Sankara himself, as previously discussed, he was still perceived as someone who embodied the values of justice, fairness, and integrity.

In the case of the DP, its Catholic roots are still used to mobilise its base in relation to the values. A DP MP, for example, stated that the DP ‘embraces Christian values and has the backing of the Catholic Church’, and connected this to the party’s ‘track record of non-violence, of refusing to kill to get power’ (int. UG17, Kampala, 04/10/2016). Religion continues to be an important tool of mobilisation in Uganda, with church services and prayer services commonly used by politicians, but this mobilisation is done in a way that reflects the original values defended by the DP.

While both parties were able to endure despite a range of difficulties highlighted in Chapter 3, and DP in particular has certainly partly institutionalised – something we will discuss in Chapter 7 – these older, ‘historical’ opposition parties have lagged behind newer organisations that managed to present themselves as opposition frontmen, despite having their own roots within the system.

4.2 Reform and alternance: Credible change bearers

My empirical analysis led me to identify a second type of party core. Uganda’s FDC and Burkina Faso’s UPC can both be seen to have built their identity and their legitimacy on the ideas of ‘change’ and ‘credibility’.

The UPC was founded by a group of people surrounding Diabré, a former member of Compaoré’s government who had distanced himself from domestic politics after
1997 and who went on to have an impressive career in international management. He came back to Burkina Faso in 2009 and, according to an international NGO representative, ‘felt that there was a vacant seat: room for an alternative, and to attract back people disappointed with Compaoré’ (int. BF03, by phone, 23/03/2017). From the start, the UPC mobilised around the idea of alterance.

Meaning ‘turnover’ or ‘rotation’, alterance is ‘a French term that has become associated with the transfer of power from one party to another in parts of francophone West Africa’ (Cheeseman et al. 2019). It has become an important political issue across the region within the context of entrenched, and seemingly immovable presidents such as Abdou Diouf in Senegal or Compaoré in Burkina Faso. After the 2002 legislative elections held in Burkina Faso – which saw unprecedented gains for the opposition following electoral reforms – Loada and Santiso (2002: 5) believed that political alterance had become ‘not only possible, but also feasible as a strategy for conducting opposition politics and, eventually, conquering power’. Yet in 2006, a year after Compaoré successfully ran for his third term, the French journal Politique Africaine published a special issue entitled ‘Burkina Faso: the impossible alterance’35. But it was in 2009 that the concept truly became a hot topic in Burkinabè political debates.

In May 2009, Diabré organised a Citizens’ Forum for Alternance bringing together civil society activists and political actors. Diabré opened the ceremony with those words: ‘Any democracy remains incomplete as long as it has not produced a transfer of power. Our democracy belongs in that category’ (L’Observateur Paalga 21/12/2009). Following this forum, and based upon the recommendations that emerged from its proceedings, a formal civil society organisation was created the same

35 ‘Burkina Faso : L’alternance impossible’.
year, bearing the same name: the *Forum des Citoyens et Citoyennes pour l’Alternance* (FOCAL). A political party was then founded in March 2010 to directly engage the fight for *alternance* and the conquest of power: the UPC. A women’s leader from the party explained: ‘*the first time we talked about alternance, it was in 2009. People didn’t believe in it, they thought we were kidding, or that we were bought-off*’ (int. BF49, Ouagadougou, 14/12/2018).

The UPC’s core was therefore built upon the idea of ‘change’, a change in how the country was governed. A UPC MP indeed stated: ‘*What federates people is the UPC’s discourse, built around change, real change – not a mere substitution*’ (int. BF15, Ouagadougou, 11/01/2018). Yet, while the Sankarist parties such as the UNIR-PS were tapping into the legacy of the Revolution, the UPC clearly positioned itself as a reformist organisation. They denounced the ‘*locked democracy*’ and the ‘*de facto monopartyism*’ in their manifesto, but the party’s motto was the following: ‘*Improve what is already done. Rectify what is done badly. Achieve what has not been done yet*’ (UPC 2010). The party’s analysis was that a real democracy requires a transfer of power – a consideration reminiscing of Huntington’s (1993) two-turnover test – and that the Burkinabè people was ‘*thirsty for progress and change*’ (UPC 2010).

The FDC also emerged around similar ideas of change and reform. Besigye was in the NRA between 1981 and 1986, and served as Museveni’s personal physician in the bush. When the NRM came into power, Besigye was appointed to the government as Minister of State for Internal Affairs. In 1999, still a Colonel in the army, Besigye wrote a missive entitled ‘*An Insider’s View of How the NRM Lost the Broad Base*’, which criticised the nature of the Movement system. He wrote:
'All in all, when I reflect on the Movement philosophy and governance, I can conclude that the Movement has been manipulated by those seeking to gain or retain political power, in the same way that political parties in Uganda were manipulated. Evidently, the results of this manipulation are also the same, to wit: factionalism, loss of faith in the system, corruption, insecurity and abuse of human rights, economic distortions and eventually decline. So, whether it’s political parties or Movement, the real problem is dishonest, opportunistic and undemocratic leadership operating in a weak institutional framework and a weak civil society which cannot control them’. (PML Daily 07/07/2017)

In 2001, after having retired from the army, Besigye challenged Museveni in the presidential elections – still held under a no-party dispensation – and formed the Reform Agenda, a civil umbrella organisation which, along with a group of pro-multiparty MPs gathered in the Parliamentary Advocacy Forum (PAFO), would form the bedrock of the FDC in 2004. An FDC activist explained: ‘We try and advocate for change. There has been no turnover since I was young, all turnovers happened through the guns’ (int. UG86, Kampala, 26/05/2018). The FDC’s 2011 Manifesto was entitled Together for Change and three out of the five sections contained the word ‘change’ (‘Change the economy’, ‘Change society’, and ‘Change politics’). The most recent manifesto, ahead of the 2016 elections, contained the slogan ‘Power to the People – The Change we Deserve’. But beyond this ill-defined idea of change, the core of Burkina Faso’s UPC and Uganda’s FDC – and what has partly explained their quick positioning as opposition frontmen – is rooted in the party’s and leaders’ ‘credibility’.

In Burkina Faso, according to the UPC’s manifesto, the transfer of power that was so necessary to achieve real democracy was prevented by Compaoré’s manipulation of the democratic institutions to remain in power, but also by the weakness and lack of organisation of the existing opposition parties. This enabled the party to position
itself as a more credible contestant. As a UPC official argued to explain his party’s quick popularity:

‘There was a thirst for change that traditional parties were not able to embody. At that time, the main opposition party was the UNIR-PS. As they did not manage to somewhat embody this thirst, they were not able to mobilise people because, I believe, of a lack of credibility.’ (int. BF57, Ouagadougou, 19/12/2018).

In both countries one dimension of credibility is one’s ability to mobilise enough support to obtain power (through the vote or otherwise). Considering the high monetisation of politics described in Chapter 3, the party’s founder or leader’s financial means is an important factor. Both Besigye and Diabré have been their party’s chief funder, especially at the beginning. Their financial means made their party more competitive than smaller, poorer organisations. But credibility goes beyond financial strength: it answers the deeper question of why they are perceived as more viable alternatives than the older parties such as the DP and UNIR-PS. An FDC activist described the FDC as ‘the only promising party that you see is capable of turning things around’ (int. UG24, Mukono, 17/11/2016). A local official elected on an FDC ticket further explained that when ‘Besigye arrived in 2001, he made people believe in him as a challenger’ (int. UG54, Gulu, 12/05/2018).

Part of that was due to the FDC’s vigour in mobilising support, as opposed to older parties such as the DP and UPC: an FDC activist in Soroti argued that ‘at least FDC was very shrewd, very aggressive, and projected the agenda that the country is looking forward to’ (int. UG51, Soroti, 10/05/2018). But the FDC’s credibility has a lot to do with the figure of Besigye himself – first as a former NRM insider, then as a beacon of hope willing to suffer for the ‘Struggle’. A civil society representative explained that ‘Besigye is willing to go through torture and harassment, which leads to media


coverage and increases the popularity of FDC’ and that therefore ‘people see him as a leader’ (int. UG05, Kampala, 14/06/2016). In the case of Diabré, his stay in government – short and discreet enough to avoid a tarnished image – and, above all, his international career has been used to promote the image of a ‘very good manager’ (int. BF07, Ouagadougou, 05/04/2017) who would be able to manage the country’s resources better.

The personal career of these officials, either within the NRA and the government in the case of Besigye, or within the administration and in international organisations for Diabré, is perceived as evidence that they have the necessary experience to be credible contenders for the executive, as opposed to opposition party candidates without this kind of experience. The fact that opposition leaders with roots in the ruling parties tend to appear as more credible echoes the ‘liability of newness’ described by Bleck and Van de Valle (2018: 11–12) as providing incumbents with a valence advantage of most policy issues and creating uncertainty around the opposition’s capacity to govern.

In both cases, there is something to be said about the fact that people have come to associate ‘real change’ with leaders once associated with the regime. They have successfully built on both an anti-incumbent cleavage at a time of growing dissatisfaction with the regime and on the weariness with older parties seen as either inexperienced, or inefficient, corrupt, and part of the system. However, the sustainability of this cleavage and credibility is in question, with new actors – either parties or independents – able to rise and question the legitimacy of these parties and their ability to actually bring about the change they advocate. The rise of independent musician-MP Bobi Wine in Uganda since 2017, and the break-away of key CDP figures to form the MPP in Burkina in 2014 illustrate this point (see Chapter 7).
Conclusion

My research has led me to identify these two types of opposition parties, based upon what I define as their core. The DP in Uganda and the UNIR-PS in Burkina Faso can be seen as trustees of historical values around which they were founded, while the UPC in Burkina Faso and the FDC in Uganda are credible change bearers built upon the idea of reform and turnover, and credentials making them stronger contenders.

This analysis contradicts the common perception of opposition parties as simply personalistic endeavours centred around an individual leader (Chabal & Daloz 1999: 151; Randall & Svåsand 2002c: 42; Gunther & Diamond 2003: 187–188; Manning 2005), even though personal traits are still important in the parties under study, and smaller personalistic parties do exist in Burkina Faso and Uganda. Burkina Faso’s political landscape does suffer from a proliferation of parties deeply affected by personalistic tendencies. This is illustrated by the fact that leadership transitions within political parties are extremely rare, and systematically controversial when they do occur.

The lack of opportunities within parties and the emergence of a new generation fuels internal frustrations, which often end up in party splits – like those that the UNIR-PS suffered from over the years. This is true for both the UPC and UNIR-PS, with Diabré and Bénéwendé Sankara respectively playing an important role in attracting support. The personalistic tendencies of Burkinabè parties is also illustrated by the fact that their strongholds tend to be located in the home region of the party leader, and other powerful figures. A researcher and civil society activist explained that ‘a party’s founder or president has always been supported by people from their region... Everyone has a stronghold at home’ (int. BF07, Ouagadougou, 05/04/2017). And
indeed, UNIR-PS activists in Minissia, a village close to Yako (Nord region, Burkina Faso), exclaimed: ‘Maître Sankara\textsuperscript{36} is from Toéssin, he is one of us, he is a relative. We cannot push him aside and vote for someone coming from somewhere else’ (dis. 2, Minissia, 05/04/2018). Stroh (2010) described this as the ‘power of proximity’, and argued that party leaders in Burkina made rational strategic decisions on where to compete based upon the presence of high-ranking ‘fils du terroir’ (‘sons of the soil’) in the party’s leadership.

Yet, contrary to small and ephemeral parties that completely revolve around their founder, both the UNIR-PS and UPC have a broader core than their respective leader. Even if Bénéwendé Sankara and Diabré are central figures in their respective parties, we cannot reduce their parties to them. The parties are able to compete and win seats in other regions than their own home bases, especially in urban areas, and activists and leaders who join the party have other objectives than access to patronage, such as competing for power, advancing values, or fighting for change.

In Uganda, the DP has proven that it is more than a person’s vehicle, as can be seen from its longevity – since the 1950s – and the multiple leadership changes the party has experienced. A Ugandan researcher argued that the ‘strong man syndrome is not a factor for DP’ (int. UG31, Kampala, 07/12/2016). The FDC has also experienced leadership changes, even though the party has had more difficulty in detaching itself from the figure of Besigye. As one FDC leader explained, Besigye is ‘an icon which FDC can rally around’ (int. UG28, Kampala, 24/11/2016), and remains ‘a unifying factor and people believe in him’ (int. UG19, Kampala, 07/11/2016). Yet, despite the

\textsuperscript{36} Maître is the French title used to address lawyers.
importance of Besigye’s figure in the party, the party’s core is more what Besigye represents, than just who he is. Besigye is a popular figure because he has come to embody the ‘Struggle’ for change described in this chapter.

My research also dismisses the idea that ethnicity is necessarily the main cleavage around which parties are formed. As already pointed out in Chapter 1, authors such as Horowitz (1985), Bratton and Van de Walle (1997), and Arriola (2013), for example, have considered African parties as inevitably ethnic in nature. Yet, Elischer’s (2013) comparative work demonstrated that ethnic parties are actually not as prevalent as often assumed, confirming previous findings by Basedau and Stroh (2012) on four francophone West African countries, including Burkina Faso (see also Stroh 2010; Posner 2004).

Ethnicity does not constitute the core of party formation, even though it can be a political mobilisation tool and important ethnic-based social processes and conventions permeates the political sphere in both countries. In Burkina Faso, for example, the highly-hierarchical Mossi Empire sees politicians co-opt influential customary chiefs who play a pivotal role in mobilising votes in their locality, and increasingly run for office themselves (Hagberg 2007; Kibora 2019; Kouraogo 2019). Additionally, ‘joking kinships’ (parentés à plaisanterie) at play in Burkina Faso and neighbouring countries are mobilised in the course of electoral discourse.37 Ethnic prejudices are sometimes used to disqualify one’s opponent – the UPC’s Diabré has, for example, been affected with social prejudices depicting the Bissa (his ethnic group) as favouring their own extended family and community.

37 This peculiar mechanism regulates conflicts between communities by turning co-existing ethnic groups into allies or even allegorical parents, and diffuses potential tensions through a performative – and regulated – use of insults and stereotypes between them (see Badini 1996; Hagberg 2006).
In Uganda, the weight of traditional kingdoms, their recognition and the issue of federalism have affected party politics since independence. A prominent example is that of Buganda royalism, which has continued to influence politics through the mobilisation of Baganda identity and loyalty to gather popular (and electoral) support (Brisset-Foucault 2013). The Suubi pressure group, created by Buganda royalists ahead of the 2011 elections, is a good illustration of this persistent influence.

Kingdom issues have also been prominent outside of Buganda, for example in Western Uganda’s Rwenzururu Kingdom where the demand for recognition – ignored by the government until 2009 – became a ‘dividing line’ upon which people in Kasese have ‘defined their relationship with the government and opposition’ (int. UG62, Kasese, 15/05/2018), and fed the opposition’s popularity, in particular the FDC (Reuss & Titeca 2017: 134). The DP continues to be seen as a ‘selling card’ in certain areas in Buganda (int. UG08, Kampala, 30/06/2016), but its appeal has faltered in the face of growing multi-ethnic organisations such as the FDC and the ruling NRM, with regional and ethnic voting patterns decreasing over time (Beardsworth 2018: 65–66). Overall, ethnicity does have an influence on politics in Uganda and Burkina Faso, yet in both countries it does not have a direct causal relationship with party formation dynamics.

In this chapter, I have identified two types of party core: historical values, and credible change prospects. This contributes to a broader understanding of the nature of opposition parties across sub-Saharan Africa. These cores add on to – rather than replace – existing arguments regarding opposition party formation in other countries, such as Riedl’s (2018) focus on anti-incumbent cleavages during the democratic transition, and LeBas’s (2013) work on opposition parties’ origins in protest movements. The core of opposition parties needs to be considered when explaining
why and how opposition parties endure and perform the way they do within the context of a hybrid regime – an important question I address in Chapter 7 of this thesis. But beforehand, we still need to understand how parties are built as organisations, which is what I turn my attention to in the next chapter.
Opposition party-building in a hybrid regime

The previous chapters have demonstrated that opposition parties in hybrid regimes face a range of constraints fuelled by the quasi-fusion of the state and the incumbent. I have also shown that historical values or credible ideas of change can form the core of an opposition and be the source of its identity and legitimacy. I now turn my attention of a different aspect of opposition party formation: how are these parties organised internally, and how they are built and spread on the ground.

I have previously highlighted how African opposition parties are often perceived as weak, poorly institutionalised, and personalistic (Van de Walle & Butler 1999: 15). One of the weaknesses explaining their poor electoral results is said to be their poor ‘territorial penetration’ (Randall & Svåsand 2002c: 37), meaning their lack of local structures able to organise and mobilise during and outside electoral periods. Indeed, Olukoshi (1998a: 32) argued that opposition parties were ‘extremely weak when it came to reaching out to people in the rural areas, where the bulk of the population – and of the voters – are concentrated’.

This has led some parties to actively promote the building of a local presence across the country, such as Chadema in Tanzania (Paget 2019b), the UPND in Zambia (Beardsworth 2020), and the UPC in Burkina, as described later in this chapter. Importantly, Paget (2019b) argues that Chadema was forced to launch a massive and costly branch-building effort to disseminate its message and to present itself as a
credible rival to the ruling CCM in the absence of social actors able to act as proxies for the party. Meanwhile, Le Bas (2006: 432), in her study on the emergence of the MDC in Zimbabwe from the labour movement, argues that the violent state response forced the party to close branches and go partly underground, with party structures turning into *'more amorphous, socially embedded networks'*. This echoes the ‘Kakuyege’ strategy of the DP during the no-party era, described by Carbone (2003: 491) as:

*the secret politics of furtive individual contacts and the shrewd use of any social occasion – e.g. a funeral or a seminar – as an opportunity to meet members and followers. The aim is to keep active the party’s ‘silent’ membership by building a fragile and intermittent underground network to link the top leadership with the grassroots, Kampala with the countryside’.*

Another important contribution to a better understanding of internal party dynamics is the work of Osei (2016) in Ghana. She argues that formal and informal structures co-exist in both the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the National Democratic Congress (NDC), but highlights differences in these parties’ ability to control informal networks and argues that party hierarchies can sometimes be by-passed by informal and local centres of power. All these authors contribute to our collective understanding of the diversity of intra-party dynamics and organisation strategies across the continent. This chapter makes a further contribution, which – by adding a comparative element going beyond a single party or country – reveals the importance of internal dynamics of party-building and of understanding the relations between the party’s centre and local branches.

This chapter is based upon an approach adopted by Hodgkin (1961). In his succinct yet rich overview of political parties at the time of independence across Africa,
Hodgkin (1961: 124) discusses the structure and organisation of parties and highlights the complexity of the internal political systems within African parties, and the necessity to understand ‘where, in any given party, does power lie?’. He also demonstrates the importance of local structures and the different ways power can be distributed between the party’s central leadership and its local branches. I argue that these considerations are still applicable to contemporary African parties. This raises a series of questions: how do opposition parties set up structures and branches, considering their lack of resources and the repression they face? What are the relations between the central party and local branches? How are decisions taken, and leverage distributed?

My analysis of party-building processes is particularly focused on the dynamics between ‘the party in central office’ and ‘the party on the ground’ (Katz & Mair 1993), meaning between the national leadership and activists. I observe in turn three aspects of party organisation. First, I discuss how parties consider the building of local branches, and what their strategies are. Parties have had different approaches depending on the context, their capacity, and their political analysis. In some cases, such as that of the FDC in Uganda, the mere topic of building structures has been the subject of controversies that has fuelled internal factionalism. Second, I look at the financial sources of political parties. While the party’s founder and/or leader is often a major contributor to the party at the national level, candidates, MPs, and other local leaders are often instrumental in funding local branches, therefore creating a decentralised party elite. Finally, I observe how decisions are made within the party, and the level and direction of the consultations that exist. Decision-making is generally a top-down process, with few functioning mechanisms to ensure a meaningful consultation of the grassroots. However, leaders and activists at the local level can
sometimes push back on unpopular decisions, and are increasingly demanding to be listened to when it comes to nominating candidates for office.

These dynamics are not the only dimensions of opposition party-building at play: rallies, youth wings and women’s groups, personal networks, community events and, increasingly, social media are also important aspects of how parties work. Yet, this chapter focuses on these three particular aspects (local branches, funding, and decision-making) because they emerged from the research as particularly significant factors for opposition parties’ cohesion or factionalism and, ultimately, for their capacity to endure and perform (see Chapter 7). Related issues such as mobilisation strategies and the use of election campaigns by candidates to organise beyond formal structures are addressed in the next chapter.

5.1 Why and how build local branches?

All opposition parties face constraints in establishing local structures across the country – as we have seen in Chapter 3. The combination of a repressive environment and meagre financial resources at the opposition’s disposal means that in large parts of the country, the ruling party is the only player with an active presence (Wahman 2017). This is especially true in rural areas, where both the NRM and CDP benefitted from previous institutions – the Revolutionary Defence Committees (CDRs) in Burkina Faso and the Resistance Councils (RCs) in Uganda, that they could build upon when setting up a party presence. Ruling parties may also rely on existing local elite, such as traditional leaders or local councillors. In Burkina Faso, customary chiefs had been vilified by the Sankarist revolution, and were eager to support Compaoré when he made conciliatory gestures towards them (Otayek 1997; Bado 2015: 28).
In both countries, local councils are overwhelmingly controlled by the ruling party. In Uganda, in particular, the regime simply did not organise elections for the lowest levels of administration (village (LC1) and sub-county (LC3)) between 2001 and 2018, leaving movement-era administrators in post for seventeen years. Museveni also has a vast network of appointed Resident District Commissioners (RDCs) throughout the country (Tapscott 2017). Because opposition parties cannot rely on key local figures such as chiefs or local administrators to build a local presence, it makes it difficult for them organise and mobilise on the ground.

This situation of monopoly obviously represented an advantage for the ruling party. As a Burkinabè civil society figure argued: ‘Only the CDP could, at the time, claim to be present in the 8,000 villages [Burkina Faso counts]. When you are the only ones to be there, you have a head start to get a large share of the vote in this village, you are the only political option they know of and can access’ (int. BF04, Ouagadougou, 27/03/2017). Similarly in Uganda, Wilkins (2018: 120) has described the NRM’s monopoly on political competition in lower level of politics, and argued that while it does not mean ‘that opposition activity does not exist at all in the rural south, […] for the vast majority of the population the forum culture of politics pioneered in the Movement System remains in place today’.

When the ruling party is ultra-dominant in areas of the country, and opposition parties are unable to have a local presence, these opposition parties will not be able to field candidates in these constituencies and to conduct campaign activities on the ground. In the 2007 legislative elections in Burkina Faso – held under a PR system – only five out of 47 parties taking part actually ran in all 45 provinces. In Uganda, where parliamentary elections are held in single-seat constituencies, one in five seats in the 2016 election were not contested by an opposition candidate (Beardsworth 2018: 115).
Local structures are also important because they are ‘a centre of vigilance’ that can raise people’s awareness during elections and protect the vote from rigging (int. UG14, Kampala, 20/09/2016).

Social media is also increasingly used by political parties across the continent, shaping in yet unclear ways the organisation and mobilisation tactics of these parties. Researchers have started investigating these dynamics (Dwyer and Molony (eds) 2019; Gadjanova et al. 2019; Hitchen et al. 2019), generally finding that social media complements rather than replaces traditional mechanisms. While these studies have often focused on political mobilisation (especially during electoral campaigns) rather than organisation, they point out the emergence of new roles within parties, such as that of social media entrepreneurs or communicators (Gadjanova et al. 2019: 11; Hitchen et al. 2019: 21). The role of social media in party activities in further discussed in Chapter 6.

The main difficulty opposition parties have in setting a local presence is their lack of resources. Paget (2019b: 3) demonstrated this in the case of Tanzania, where Chadema was able to set up branches only after it had raised enough private finance. A leader from the FFS argued that ‘setting up a structure at the departmental level is very expensive, because the cell needs to be kept active, otherwise it is pointless, it dies out. But this requires means, and we don’t have them’ (int. BF35, Ouagadougou, 02/07/2018). This is true for the broader Sankarist family, including the UNIR-PS, as a founding member explained:

‘The strategy was to become established, so the UNIR’s leaders set up structures everywhere they could, in provinces as well as in some villages where the ideas of Thomas [Sankara] thrived. It was this strategy to occupy the field. This work
was conducted in successive phases due to the lack of means’ (int. BF39, Ouagadougou, 10/07/2018).

Yet, those local structures have remained sparse and weak, as a young leader admitted: ‘we may have one or two representatives in a province, but it does not work. The leaders are not accessible, there are no structures’ (int. BF16, Ouagadougou, 17/01/2018). The party also has difficulties maintaining local headquarters outside of the capital. For example, the local branch in Koudougou (115 kilometres from Ouagadougou) had been unable to cover the rent of their office for the past seven months at the time of my research, and their request for help to the national level had remained unanswered (int. BF33, Koudougou, 17/04/2018).

The UPC has had a much more proactive approach to local party-building. As an MP explained, ‘at the party’s creation, our strategy was to communicate, to set up structures across the country in order to have respondents’ (int. BF41, Ouagadougou, 11/07/2018). The founding members produced a memo laying out a process to set up local structures across the country, from the village up to the national level. Potential local leaders were identified and co-opted at the regional and provincial level to set up the party in their area. A national secretariat was in charge of supervising the process. A UPC founding member explained that ‘where we had committed and competent activists, we trusted them, they did their work, they set up the local bureau and sent us a report so that we could compile everything’ (int. BF49, Ouagadougou, 14/12/2018). Local leaders were identified and selected based upon their foothold in the community, and the (financial) means they could contribute. An MP explained:

‘Most of us, MPs, we were a sort of neutral elite who had previously worked in other fields in our respective regions, as the president of an association or
something like that, and so we had our own networks as well’ (int. BF46, Ouagadougou, 02/08/2018).

Once co-opted, these leaders were entrusted to set up the party at their level. An MP explained that in his province, he went to each village, gathered people interested, and had them elect their local bureau. After doing this in all the villages, the village representatives elected the party bureau at the level above. In his province, this process took four months (int. BF47, Ouagadougou, 08/08/2018). In other areas, the provincial correspondent identified and co-opted local leaders at the municipality level to be the party’s respondent in their locality and to mobilise and organise support at the village level. As another MP argued:

‘The grassroots committees were not yet set up because we did not have the time to do it. But considering the Burkinabè social fabric, where the person matters much more than the organisation, we thought that if you have focal points, good people, you have an 80% chance of success even where you don’t have any structures.’ (int. BF46, Ouagadougou, 02/08/2018)

This has enabled the UPC to expend its presence across the country very quickly – illustrated by its impressive results in the 2012 election: just two years after its foundation, the UPC obtained 19 seats in Parliament. Even more significantly, the party was able to compete in 68% of municipalities in the same election cycle – one of only 3 parties, among 67 competing, having fielded candidates in at least half of the municipalities – and obtained 1,615 local councillors (figures compiled by the CENI).

In Uganda, the Movement era had devastating consequences on the organisation power of the two oldest parties, the DP and UPC. As a Ugandan researcher explained:
'They spent twenty years in limbo; by the time they were allowed again [in 2006], most old parties had lost their supporters because they hadn’t been mobilised; because parties hadn’t been soliciting financial contributions from supporters; and because [local] leaders had died or joined ranks with the NRM’ (int. UG30, Kampala, 06/12/2016).

This partly explains why the DP has an uneven organisation across the country. Before the return to multipartyism, Carbone (2003: 190–191) described the DP as having an ‘extremely weak – at times and places […] hardly detectable – presence’ composed of a ‘well-known party-leadership and thousands of supporters in the capital’ and ‘largely inactive up-country membership’.

The DP has made efforts to remobilise support and build structures across the country, including outside Buganda. In Gulu or Mukono, for example, the party has a functional office – supported by the local MP – which is used to coordinate activities across the county, but this does not extend to lower administrative levels and failed to meet the expectations raised by Mao’s accession to the party presidency. According to a Ugandan civil society activist, ‘when Norbert Mao was elected, it created a belief that DP would be able to expend outside of the Central region and attract young people, but that hasn’t been the case’ (int. UG26, Kampala, 21/11/2016).

In particular, the DP has lost ground in the capital, with figures like Besigye or Bobi Wine attracting the support of urban youths. This was well illustrated by the decision of Erias Lukwago, Kampala’s Lord Mayor, to distance himself from the DP – and instead campaign alongside Besigye – and stand on an independent ticket for re-election in 2016. The factionalism prevailing in the DP after Mao’s election – with Baganda heavyweights such as Lukwago questioning his legitimacy and holding
parallel activities – distracted the party’s leadership from the necessary efforts to strengthen the party structures.

In the FDC, the building of party structures has become the subject of an intense debate. In 2012, Muntu was elected president of the party on a platform focusing on building those structures. At that time, Besigye was stepping down as per the party’s term limits, but also because he was dispirited with party-building efforts and became increasingly interested in civil disobedience. Some FDC members and political observers saw progress under Muntu’s leadership, with a Ugandan civil society activist arguing that ‘Muntu is very strong on institutionalising the party, and for the last three or four years that’s what he has been doing. He has covered around 60% of the country in terms of having a structure in every district’ (int. UG01, Kampala, 06/04/2016). But these efforts have been conducted ‘very quietly’ and ‘without any leading speeches’ (int. UG02, Kampala, 08/04/2016), and others have been frustrated about what they perceive as slow progress. As one activist wondered, the ‘FDC has structures, but the question of the day is how functional are they, are they operating?’ (int. UG48, Soroti, 09/05/2018).

At the same time, observers have noticed the lack of engagement of some FDC figures in those efforts. As an international NGO representative argued:

‘Muntu won on a ticket promising to reorganise the party and he was hoping to do that, and the party MPs went “fair enough, you get on with that”, they didn’t see that they should be involved, [that] it was part of their larger responsibility’ (int. UG02, Kampala, 08/04/2016).

Some in the party have actually argued against building party-structures, seeing it as pointless or counter-productive. For example, one FDC activist in Soroti said that:
‘Organisation would be good, but in the way Uganda is running, under a dictator, even if you try and organise yourself he will come and disorganise you, if you try and create structures, [Museveni’s] emphasis will be to target structures, intimidate members, buy them off or even kill them’ (int. UG48, Soroti, 09/05/2018).

Perrot’s (2016) work has indeed shown that the hegemonic NRM regularly co-opts opposition structures.

This is why the FDC – as part of the Defiance campaign – has started to create ‘covert structures, which are not known, so even the government cannot target them because nobody knows about them’ (int. UG48, Soroti, 09/05/2018). These informal structures include the Power 10 initiative – which aims to set up a group of ten young people per village whose role is to mobilise support at the lowest level – and the regional ‘People’s Assemblies’ set up as parallel government structures following the national ‘People’s Government’ introduced by Besigye after the 2016 elections (Daily Monitor 17/02/2019). This echoes the MDC’s strategy in Zimbabwe to create parallel ‘action committees’ to coordinate and mobilise faster in response to state repression (LeBas 2006: 434).

This disagreement has fuelled factionalism throughout Muntu’s party presidency, with an internal polarisation between the ‘party-building’ approach defended by Muntu, and the ‘Defiance’ promoted by Besigye. This factionalism deeply hurt the party – with Muntu himself being branded as an ‘NRM mole’ by some FDC figures (Daily Monitor 08/12/2017), and later quitting the party a few months after failing to be re-elected at the head of the party in 2018 (The Observer 25/09/2018).
Overall, opposition parties face severe constraints when attempting to expand their presence across the country, and the two main ones are the lack of resources – discussed in the next section in more detail – and the repressive environment due to the hegemonic ruling party (see Chapter 3). When repression is high, opposition parties have to use informal, underground tactics. In Uganda, where repression has remained particularly intense, this has been illustrated by the DP’s Kakuyege approach during the no-party era, and more recently by the ‘covert structures’ mentioned by FDC activists. Similarly in Burkina Faso, the Sankarist organisations had to use informal tactics with a hidden agenda – such as playing tapes of Thomas Sankara’s speeches under cover – during the first decade of Compaoré’s regime, characterised by political repression. The UPC, which emerged in a much more favourable environment, was able to use a more open approach of co-opting local figures and setting up branches.

Meanwhile, the push to create local branches tends to come from the top of the party. In Uganda, both Muntu and Mao were elected as party presidents on a platform of building and expanding party structures, with the expectation that they would then go on and do that themselves. In Burkina Faso, the initial group that founded the UPC laid out a road map and started the process of identifying local figures who could be co-opted and relied upon to set up a branch in their area. This approach, and especially its financial implications detailed in the next section, have led to the creation of a ‘party franchise’38 with local party leaders sharing ‘ownership’ of the party with the national leadership.

38 This concept is the subject of a paper in preparation, in collaboration with Dr Nicole Beardsworth. The phrasing ‘franchise party’ emerged from discussions with Dr Dan Paget.
5.2 Follow the money

Building party structures, and especially local branches around the country, requires financial resources. A local presence requires office space; while it can be staffed by volunteers, they still need resources to conduct their activities, ranging from phone credit to liaise with members to the costs associated with organising rallies or meetings. Campaign financing has received some attention in the literature (Lindberg 2003; Arriola 2013; Ukase 2016; Kramon 2017), but the issue of party financing outside of electoral periods remains largely unexplored. This is why I focus here not on campaign spending, but on parties’ financial resources more broadly. Obtaining reliable information about parties’ resources and funding mechanisms is difficult, partly because they are at the discretion of a few individuals (Elischer 2013: 19). Sources of funding at a party’s disposal tend to be the following (in no particular order): membership dues and fees; personal resources of the party president and other officials; public funding allocated to political parties; donations from supporters (domestic or in the diaspora); and money raised or contributed by candidates. As already discussed in Chapter 3, public funding is very limited in both countries, and heavily monopolised by the hyper-dominant ruling party. Donations, either from domestic supporters or the diaspora, are impossible to properly assess and tend to be done under the cover of anonymity.

Membership dues, prominent in the funding of mass parties, are rarely paid in all parties under study – except by high-profile figures and those wishing to run for office. In Burkina Faso, someone wishing to become a party member must pay a small registration fee, then membership dues on a regular basis (monthly or annually). These dues are sometimes adjusted to the financial situation of the member, as some parties
have discounted fees for students and the unemployed. In effect, even though regular members may pay the registration fee to obtain the party’s card, it is rare for people to pay their cotisations regularly, except when they wish to run for office – for which they must demonstrate they are up-to-date with their membership dues. An UPC MP explained:

‘People tend to pay [the membership fees] when they need to be a candidate, because it requires to prove one’s membership to the party. Some activists are proud to show the document, the party’s card. But generally, it is not in the Burkinabè’s culture to pay membership fees’ (int. BF45, Ouagadougou, 31/07/2018).

In Uganda, the membership dues are even less institutionalised. In 2006, FDC reportedly launched party cards, sold for USh1,000 for ordinary members, USh1,500 for a laminated card, and USh5 million for so-called corporate membership (New Vision 13/11/2006). A survey conducted in 2007 found that ‘DP reported to have sold 500,000 party cards. FDC estimated its party strength at between four to five million people’ (Ssenkumba 2007: 20). Over the course of my research, no interviewee was able to provide a number of actual party members, even at the branch level.

Considering the small amount that membership dues represent in each party’s finances, it is usually the leadership that contributes the most. Parties are often financially carried by their founder, especially in their early years. A young UNIR-PS leader explained: ‘it is him [the party president] who supported the party for a dozen

39 Around £0.30 for ordinary members; £0.45 for a laminated card; and £1,400 for the corporate membership (November 2006).
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years before we started having MPs who contributed too’ (BF17, Ouagadougou, 18/01/2018). Similarly, regarding the UPC, a party leader stated that:

‘At the beginning, it was difficult to talk about funding, because the party didn’t have any external funding. It was the contributions of the board members between 2010 and 2012, the personal contribution of founding members and “resource persons”, and above all the financial support of the party’s president.’ (BF49, Ouagadougou, 14/12/2018)

Souaré (2017: 66), in his work on opposition parties in West Africa, argued that because a large majority of parties are created by a few wealthy individuals who become and remain their main ideologues, strategists, and donors, these people tend to consider the party as their property. As a Ugandan civil society activist put it:

‘If your party is like FDC where Besigye has been one of the biggest individual funders, it creates a patronage system. People will then push him to run because he has the money, he can finance activities. A lot of people elect leaders that they think have money and they can support the party activities, and that is distorting the interpretation of what kind of leadership you get for the party.’ (int. UG01, Kampala, 06/04/2016)

Yet, it is not only the party’s founder or individual leader who has to actively finance the party’s activities: other officials such as regional or local party executives and figures holding an elected position (MPs, councillors, etc.) have both formal and informal financial obligations towards the party and the membership. For a start, the membership dues of these individuals are much higher than the regular dues described earlier, and usually amount to a set percentage of the earnings associated with the position to be reversed to the party. A Burkinabè MP from the UNIR-PS explained that prior to being elected, he was a civil servant and a regular member, and therefore
used to pay a monthly membership fee of FCFA2,000; as an MP, he has to pay FCFA150,000 as per the party’s statutes, amounting to 10% of his parliamentary salary\textsuperscript{40} (int. BF44, Ouagadougou, 26/07/2018). Similarly in Uganda, DP MPs make monthly contributions worth USh250,000 to a pool for party activities\textsuperscript{41} (int. UG73, Masaka, 18/05/2018).

These figures also tend to be the ones maintaining the local office if there is one (int. BF47, Ouagadougou, 08/08/2018; int. UG52, Gulu, 11/05/2018), and are often expected to help out party activists and local citizens more broadly, as respected local figures. This may involve helping with school fees or donating for wedding or burial processes (Kibora 2019: 80; see also Gadjanova 2017). In the case of the UPC in Burkina Faso, the set-up of local structures was done, from the start, by local leaders using their own means to develop the party and position themselves as viable candidates.

As said earlier, local correspondents were co-opted and tasked with setting up a local presence. An MP explained that: ‘the condition to be a party correspondent is to agree to work without the party’s help and to establish the party using one’s own means and relations’ (int. BF46, Ouagadougou, 02/08/2018). According to some UPC MPs, the fact that local correspondents do not receive funds from the party’s national structures to establish local branches is a good thing, because it makes people ‘work more as it were for themselves’ rather than ‘sit waiting for money from the party’ (int. BF46, Ouagadougou, 02/08/2018) and fosters a perception of mutual interest and buy-in into the organisation.

\textsuperscript{40} FCFA2,000 = £2.65; FCFA150,000 = £200 (April 2020).
\textsuperscript{41} USh250,000 = £52 (April 2020).
Another MP argued that, ‘at the provincial level, I spend money too based upon my capacity and my position, it is a fair contribution so I consider that I own the party as much as the President’ (int. BF38, Ouagadougou, 05/07/2018). But that also means that local structures tend to be loyal to the individual more than to the party. The same MP\textsuperscript{42} also argued vehemently:

‘It is not the UPC that was elected in [this province], it was me. In the neighbouring province, the candidate with the same logo, the same contribution from the party, was not elected. I am the one going out bearing the logo, doing the work, canvassing the villages, with my own money.’ (ibid)

The sources of party financing are important to consider when looking at party organisation because leverage derives from resources, especially in a context of cash-strapped parties operating in a highly monetised political environment. Contrary to a mass party, the parties under study here do not rely on members’ dues, which even when they formally exist are not paid regularly. Both Uganda and Burkina Faso have provisions for public funding of parties’ activities, but this funding is scarce and tends to be largely monopolised by the incumbent.

This leaves the responsibility of maintaining the party to the party’s elite. However, contrary to the context associated with the emergence of cadre parties (Duverger 1981: 119), characterised by restricted suffrage, here parties have to build a presence across the country (see section 5.1). In most parties, this leads to scattered, top-down attempts to build party structures, which have very weak foundations. If the party manages to get an MP elected in the area, he or she can then maintain the party’s presence using

\textsuperscript{42} At odds with the party’s leadership at the time of research.
their parliamentary wages. If not, the local structures usually dwindle, as in the case of the UNIR-PS in Koudougou.

The UPC provides a slightly different model. While party-building is still triggered from the top, it relies on the co-optation of local figures with resources to invest into the party themselves. This ‘franchising’ model enables the party to build a national presence more quickly, as long as it can co-opt affluent enough local figures. This requires access to private finance, echoing the arguments of Arriola (2013) on opposition coalitions, Koter (2017) on legislators’ wealth, and Kelly (2020) on party formation. It is also facilitated by a less restrictive environment, as it supposes that local figures not yet engaged in politics will not feel threatened to associate with an opposition party. The formation of the UPC in Burkina Faso fits this pattern very well. Yet, while this allows for a faster party-building process – as illustrated by the relative success of the UPC in the 2012 election – it also raises questions about the institutional sustainability of the branches, and the capacity of the party’s central office to control the party’s periphery. Indeed, the local elite financially supporting the party enjoys substantive leverage, which begs the question of how power is distributed within the party and how decisions are made.

5.3 Decision-making

I turn now to the relations between the party’s centre and periphery when it comes to making decisions. As in the case of party finances, the question of decision-making has tended to be analysed with a focus on electioneering – how parties decide whether to form coalitions (Arriola 2013; Beardsworth 2018) or how they select the candidates they field (Öhman 2004; Bob-Milliar & Bob-Milliar 2010; Daddieh & Bob-Milliar 2012; Vokes 2016), rather than how parties make decisions in a broader sense. While
I do touch upon these dynamics here, I consider the decision-making processes as a whole and analyse the relations between the party’s centre and local branches over these decisions.

Nationally, all parties have formal decision-making organs inscribed in the party constitution, such as a National Executive Committee (NEC) or Secrétariat Exécutif National in French to run the party day-to-day, a broader National Council (Bureau Politique National (BPN)) formulating policies, and a National Delegates Conference (Congrès National) held periodically or exceptionally to ratify the most important decisions. Officially, there are mechanisms for the grassroots to be consulted during decision-making, and for a mutual exchange of ideas between the centre and the periphery. In Burkina Faso, provincial coordinators (in the UNIR-PS) and correspondents (in the UPC) go to BPN meetings in the capital and report back to their branch. A UNIR-PS local leader explained:

‘Together at the national level we gather and talk clearly and find solutions. Then upon my return, I go to the municipalities. When there is some information, I get in touch with the activists by phone or by going to their locality to spread the information.’ (int. BF24, Yako, 04/04/2018)

They also organise consultations at the lower levels, usually in a top-down approach: the proposition comes from the national level and is discussed by local branches. A UNIR-PS MP explained ‘we receive directives from the national level, we gather the militants, we lay out the position, we ask them what they think, we write a report and we send it up’ (int. BF44, Ouagadougou, 26/07/2018). When asked, no respondent offered examples where the local structures challenged decisions made by the national leadership. Similarly, a UPC activist explained that, ‘the correspondent comes down with the talking points, we discuss, and if there are ideas, she goes back
up with these ideas. But it is not an effective strategy. [...] Often, at the grassroots, it is difficult. If you start at the grassroots, you will never be done’ (int. BF31, Koudougou, 17/04/2018).

In Uganda, similar mechanisms exist to allow for the consultation of the base and the transmission of information between the centre and the periphery. A local official in Soroti explained that locally-elected FDC people met every two months to discuss future prospects and share their views with the NEC (int. UG43, Soroti, 08/05/2018). Another FDC activist, still in Soroti, described the meetings as opportunities to receive information from the party’s leadership and, at the same time, to provide them with information about the reality on the ground:

‘For example, two weeks ago there was a meeting called at the national level to tell us what is happening, what is our point, how do we emphasise it to the people, we have documented information we share. Also, during these meetings, we share what we have got on the ground, maybe the levels of poverty, of services given to the people. We inform the party and they also inform us, so it’s bottom-up and top-down.’ (int. UG46, Soroti, 09/05/2018)

The nomination of candidates is usually a distinct process, but involves the same channels and principles. In Burkina Faso, the identity of the presidential candidate is rarely in question, but the candidacy of the party’s president usually is formally endorsed by the party congress. In Uganda, opposition parties have regularly attempted to form electoral coalitions and field a joint presidential candidate, though these attempts tend to quickly collapse (Beardsworth 2018). In the case of the DP, the party president is automatically the party’s presidential flagbearer if the party decides to contest the election (int. UG81, Namasuba, 22/05/2018; New Vision 22/01/2020). In contrast, the FDC holds elections to designate the party’s national flagbearer, who is
not always the party’s president. Indeed, while Besigye stepped down as party
president in 2012, he was selected as the party’s flagbearer again for the 2016 elections
(something I will come back to in Chapter 7).

The selection of candidates at lower levels, either for parliamentary or local
elections, is conducted differently in each party. In Burkina Faso, the local branches
have obtained to be more involved in the process, and the nomination of parliamentary
candidates is officially decided by consensus locally. In UNIR-PS, activists from Yako
complained that the candidate ‘was imposed by the top of the party’ in 2002 and 2007,
‘but in 2012, we said that we would propose the candidate among ourselves, that
nobody would impose someone from the top’ (int. BF25, Yako, 05/04/2018). Yet, other
activists in the rural village of Bokin continued to highlight internal disagreements
over the process. Bokin and Yako are in the same province, the Passoré, where three
parliamentary seats are contested. Each branch was therefore competing to have their
local leader nominated at the top of the list – as chances were slim to have more than
one MP elected. As no consensus emerged, it was the BPN in Ouagadougou that had
to make the final decision.

In the UPC, those wishing to be selected as candidates are supposed to consult each
other and decide among themselves who will run, and their respective positioning on
electoral lists. Only if no consensus emerges, a selection commission sitting in the
party headquarters in Ouagadougou hears each candidate’s motivations and
positions and decides. As an MP explains:

‘If we don’t manage to agree on the list at the provincial level, we transfer the
applications to Ouagadougou where an ad-hoc commission is set-up to hear us.

We were first received collectively, the thirteen candidates, then individually.

Each one of us had to state what their respective contribution to broadening the
In Uganda, the process is different again. FDC tends to organise party primaries, which have been described as ‘free and fair’ and giving the party the ‘moral high ground’ in some instances (The Guardian 20/10/2010), but violent and chaotic in others (The Observer 02/11/2015). Sometimes, primary losers decide to run as independents, and are therefore automatically excluded from the party, but this is less frequent than in the ruling party (Wilkins 2019: 9). Yet, candidate selection is still often done through back-door negotiations rather than open and democratic primaries, as Mugambe Mpiima (2016: 31) argues: ‘The politics of ring-fencing and building consensus replaced many would-be primaries and thus denied FDC a chance to bring new talent into national political office’.

The DP, on the other hand, does not hold primaries and the process is less clear. Two DP figures from the same area gave different accounts of this process. The first, a local official, explained that ‘it is the constituency committee which nominates the MP [candidates]’ (int. UG72, Masaka, 18/05/2018), while the second, an elected MP in the area, stated that ‘you have to get endorsement from the headquarters’ (int. UG73, Masaka, 18/05/2018). Despite the fact that parties use distinct processes, candidate-selection remains an opaque process in most parties, characterised by an uneven inclusion of local party structures, and by the fact that the final word usually belongs to the central office.

Overall, decisions about policy and strategy are usually taken in a top-down fashion: these are made by central organs and, sometimes, the information is disseminated to local branches through the local representatives. Even candidate-
selection tends to be guided by the national leadership. Local officials act as intermediaries, but the consultation they perform is often geared towards information-sharing, rather than meaningful participation of the grassroots. The lack of resources and high illiteracy are obvious challenges for such participation to be implemented.

Yet, even though formal mechanisms do not really allow for the branches to challenge decisions made by the party’s central organs, informal practices still exist to express this kind of disagreement. A very good example of this was the consequence of the DP’s decision to back Mbabazi, and not Besigye, in the 2016 elections following the collapse of the TDA coalition (Beardsworth 2016). When Mbabazi was selected as the coalition candidate, the FDC pulled out and Besigye announced he was running as well. The DP faced a choice of backing one or the other.43 Their choice to align with Mbabazi can be explained in several ways. Beardsworth (2016: 756) has argued that ‘as an independent candidate who originates from the NRM-dominated Western Region, Mbabazi did not pose a threat to the DP or UPC presidents or their electoral support’. This contrasted with Besigye, who undoubtedly funnelled supporters of the old parties into the FDC, and at times actively courted DP members into the party, for example through the Suubi pressure group in 2011. As an international NGO representative exclaimed, ‘No surprise that when offered the chance to stab Besigye in the back, Mao chose to support Mbabazi!’ (int. UG02, Kampala, 08/04/2016).

Another consideration that may have brought the DP to back Mbabazi was the expectation that he had resources to share and spend on the campaign. Another NGO employee argued that ‘a few people walked out with him, but mostly it was the

43 Mao could not have run for office as he was prevented from registering on the electoral lists. He initially intended to contest the legislative election in Gulu Municipality.
opposition parties who welcomed him, especially DP, thinking that Mbabazi was rich and he would support DP candidates’ (int. UG05, Kampala, 14/06/2016). Or, as an FDC activist puts it more crudely: ‘people supported Mbabazi thinking he had stolen enough money to be able to fund their campaign’ (int. UG54, Gulu, 12/05/2018). This hope was quickly dashed, however, as Beardsworth (2016: 759) explained:

‘Despite the initial momentum that the campaign appeared to have, it lost steam by early December as Mbabazi’s spending declined by 41% [...]. The facilitation funds promised to mobilisers and coalition candidates never materialised and their commitment waned’.

The decision made by the DP’s leadership to back Mbabazi was questioned by many MPs (Uganda Radio Network 17/11/2015; int. UG89, Constituency, 2016) and local councillors (obs. 1, DP workshop, Masaka, 09/04/2016). Some prominent DP candidates also strayed from the party line and openly backed Besigye, in some cases because they knew that their voters supported Besigye and that backing Mbabazi would hurt their own electoral chances (int. UG24, Mukono, 17/11/2016). DP officials involved in the decision were also punished by voters during the elections, as this DP elder explained:

‘In the countryside, because people hadn’t been consulted, they didn’t see the rationale of supporting Mbabazi, and they didn’t support him. There was no vocal disagreement, people kept silent, but people knew that [in] the countryside they had been suffering, they had been suffering with Besigye, and Mbabazi had been at the centre of the regime that was causing them to suffer. So since nobody had gone to them to explain otherwise, they just saw Mbabazi as part of the regime that had been oppressing them. [...] It created anger at the leadership of the party. During the recent elections, all the members of the NEC of DP, whenever
they stood, they lost. [...] That shows that people were angry and were ready to punish them for having taken them for granted.’ (int. UG03, Kampala, 20/04/2016)

Official processes fail to provide local activists meaningful channels to influence the decisions of the party’s central office, yet the parties’ central hierarchies should not take the support of local branches and activists for granted. All parties display poor internal democracy, despite formal consultation and accountability mechanisms, and loyalty may lie with local-level branches and figures, rather than the central party. In Burkina Faso particularly, local networks appeared tightly controlled by a local figure. In the case of the UPC, the ‘franchising’ model of party-building has led local figures to use their own resources to promote the party in their constituency in exchange for a parliamentary ticket. Because they were the ones setting up the party in their area, they see the local party as loyal to them, and that makes it difficult for the central party to control branches. But this is not unique to the UPC. In the case of the UNIR-PS, local tensions have affected the party in the Passoré province, one of its strongholds. This has mainly flared up when legislative candidates’ lists were being drawn up.

As mentioned earlier, this dynamic was illustrated by a conflict over the selection and positioning of candidates which opposed two camps: those from the town of Yako – the provincial capital – and those from the village of Bokin. This conflict reveals deeper divisions within the party dating from the 2000 scission of the CPS and the uneasy patching-up of the Sankarist forces into the UNIR-PS in 2009. The Yako section is close to the UNIR-PS president Bénéwendé Sankara and historically belonged to the UNIR-MS after the 2000 split. The Bokin section, on the other hand, is headed by the Mayor of Téma-Bokin, Ernest Nongma Ouédraogo, the former President of the CPS. During a group discussion with party activists in Bokin, a young
man argued: ‘it is because of [Ernest Ouédraogo] that I am still a member, otherwise I would have left a while ago’. When discussing decisions made by the party’s executive, another added ‘If Ernest agrees with them, we follow. If he pulls out, we pull out’ (dis. 3, Bokin, 06/04/2018). This local control over the party branch illustrates the ‘power of proximity’ at play in Burkina Faso described by Stroh (2010), though his argument was focused on vote mobilisation rather than party organisation. These dynamics matter for the endurance of the party, which I will address further toward the end of this thesis (see Chapter 7).

Conclusion

This chapter’s focus has been limited to key dimensions of opposition parties’ internal organisation, feeding into a broader discussion of parties’ mobilisation strategies, such as political rallies (Paget 2018) or appearances at social events (funerals, weddings, church services) – a platform commonly used by politicians from all sides in Uganda (int. UG46, Soroti, 09/05/2018; int. UG73, Masaka, 18/05/2018).

As I have argued in this chapter, opposition parties in Uganda and Burkina Faso have had to organise themselves facing a range of challenges, making it particularly difficult to set up local structures, a necessity to mobilise supporters and expand their grasp nationally. Parties’ central leadership have promoted the expansion of their local structures, with MPs and local figures playing an important role in setting up and maintaining branches. The financial resources of a party are intrinsically connected to its internal organisation, as funding is required to set up branches. MPs tend to be responsible for maintenance of the party structures in their constituency, giving them leverage over these structures and making MPs important stakeholders in the party – similarly to the findings of Osei (2016) in Ghana. Finally, decision-making processes
in all parties at hand tend to be top-down mechanisms, despite the existence of formal consultation processes. This obscures the role that local party elite can play, and the tensions that can exist if they contribute greatly to the party at the local level but have little power. It also overlooks the fact that activists and supporters themselves can express dissent toward central decisions, by shifting their loyalty.

In a nutshell, local party elite, who can be branch officials, MPs, councillors (or all at once) can play an important role within parties. This is particularly the case when the local party elite have influence over the activists in their branch, and independent resources they can invest in the party and are therefore able to mobilise the local structures. While we often consider resources and directives to flow from the centre toward the periphery, it is crucial to consider the resources invested by local elite into the party, and the leverage that they derive from it.
So far, we have seen what opposition parties are formed around (Chapter 4) and how they are built as organisations (Chapter 5), taking into consideration the constraints inherent to the hybrid regime they operate in (Chapter 3). We now turn our attention to what opposition parties actually do. What kinds of activities do they perform? What purpose do they serve?

The limited scholarship on opposition parties’ activities tend to focus on their electoral strategies, such as the decision to contest or boycott the polls (Lindberg 2006a), the building of electoral coalitions (Van de Walle 2006; Wahman 2011; Arriola 2013; Beardsworth 2018), or their campaign methods (Cheeseman & Hinfelaar 2010; Cheeseman & Larmer 2015; Paget 2018, 2019a). This has meant leaving aside other activities, both reflecting and feeding the perception that opposition parties become active around election time and then hibernate until the next electoral campaign starts. This perception is not completely misguided – opposition parties tend to have less resources to maintain branches and party offices outside election periods (e.g. Bob-Milliar 2012b: 680). Yet, some opposition parties are still active in other ways. They may sit in Parliament, local councils, and other institutions; they can organise consultations, press conferences and meetings with national and international stakeholders; they might challenge election results and controversial laws in court; or
they may sometimes organise or take part in protests. What do these actions amount to, and what can opposition parties achieve through them? How do some apparently contradictory tactics, such as taking part in elections and denouncing their fraudulent nature, intersect? This chapter addresses these questions by taking a broad and inductive approach about what these parties actually do on the ground.

Most people I interviewed over the course of my fieldwork stated that the role of opposition parties in Uganda was, or should be, to provide alternative policy options, mobilise people around issues, and hold the government to account. Those expectations are in line with the traditional roles of opposition parties according to the liberal democratic model, from which most of the party literature has been derived and described in this thesis’s first chapter (Gunther & Diamond 2001; Erdmann 2004). Overall, (opposition) parties in African hybrid regimes only partially fulfil functions such as representation, integration, elite recruitment, and – in a very limited way – accountability facilitation (Randall & Svåsand 2002c) The very nature of the regime restricts their capacity and resources (see Chapter 3).

Other scholars, such as Albrecht (2005), have considered the authoritarian nature of the regime, but focused on how opposition parties contributed to sustain it. Certainly, ‘briefcase’ parties or ‘alibi-candidates’ can provide the regime with a democratic cover, and real opposition parties can also inadvertently contribute to the survival of the regime they oppose by legitimising it or diffusing dissent. However, when looking at the cases of Burkina Faso and Uganda, it is clear that Museveni’s and Compaoré’s persistent hold on power has mainly been fuelled by other variables, such as the control of security forces (Kibandama 2008; Hilgers & Loada 2013: 194; Tapscott 2016), a strategic regional position making them agents of stability for the international community (Meunier 1998; Fisher 2014; Niang 2016), and fairly sizeable
support among the population’s rural majority fuelled by patronage (Loada 2006; Wilkins 2016). Looking at opposition parties’ role solely in terms of how they contribute to sustaining the regime is a narrow approach, which overlooks the other functions they can perform in such a context.

Consequently, I investigate here the various ways opposition parties can engage the regime, and analyse what broader contribution this enables them to perform. Based upon the empirical evidence I gathered, I identified three key functions that opposition parties in Burkina Faso and Uganda can perform, and which are likely to be important within other hybrid regimes as well. Contrary to the functions addressed by authors such as Randall and Svåsand (2002a) or Albrecht (2005), and covered in Chapter 1, the functions I discuss here do not relate to sustaining the regime, but rather to opposing it. These functions are the denunciation of the regime; the mobilisation of dissent; and the preparation for succession.

Denunciation can be considered a limited version of horizontal accountability facilitation, in a context where the government is de facto unaccountable to their citizens. At the lowest level, denunciation is a way to embarrass the regime. As a UNIR-PS figure stated, ‘We were looking to piss Blaise Compaoré off, that’s it, and we were satisfied when we had pissed him off. We could do nothing, he controlled the situation, he knew all the tricks’ (int. BF28, Bokin, 06/04/2018). ‘Pissing off’ the incumbent and exposing the regime’s flaws were the least that powerless opposition parties could do at times of high repression and firm regime control. As such, it echoes what Jung and Shapiro (1995: 272) describe in a democratic setting as ‘asking awkward questions, shining light in dark places, and exposing abuses of power’.
The mobilisation of dissent broadens the mobilisation function described by Erdmann (2004: 67–68), which focuses largely on elections. In a hybrid regime, this mobilisation does not contribute to integrating people into the system, but on the contrary to fuelling dissent and keeping a certain level of pressure on the regime. A DP legislator explained the importance of having opposition MPs in the following way: 'At least being there in itself is important. Just the 15 of us in DP, joining others on the opposition to make about 60 of us, just our presence there is very important. It keeps the dream alive' (int. UG89, Constituency, 2016). ‘Keeping the dream alive’ is important to prevent political apathy in the face of the system and its abuses.

Finally, succession refers to the preparation of an alternative by opposition parties, ready to take over after the fall of the current regime. It is related to both elite training and opposition moderation. Because of the existing constraints that they face, opposition parties may not be able to successfully topple the dictatorship despite their efforts at denouncing the regime and mobilising against it. However, they can still prepare themselves to take over when the opportunity arises. Successions within the regime, for example, are often a major challenge to the regime’s continued hegemony (Ottaway 2003: 159; Maltz 2007; Cheeseman 2010: 143), but to exploit this kind of opportunity, opposition parties must be organised and appear credible.

Opposition parties have a broad range of activities at their disposal, from the classic political rally, studied in great depth by Paget (2018) to new forms of mobilisation through social media (Nyabola 2018; Dwyer & Molony 2019; Gadjanova et al. 2019; Hitchen et al. 2019). They sometimes control local governments (McLellan 2019), may sit in independent electoral commissions, and can introduce court challenges against election results and controversial laws. It is impossible to address them all
within the scope of a single chapter, and I therefore focus here on four principal approaches opposition parties used to engage the regime in Burkina Faso and Uganda.

I start by discussing the boycott option, which has been used by opposition parties in both Burkina Faso and Uganda but later discarded. I then analyse how electoral campaigns allow opposition parties to denounce the regime and mobilise support, even though they are unlikely to (be allowed to) win the presidency or a legislative majority. Third, I analyse the actions of opposition legislators sitting in parliaments heavily dominated by the ruling party. Finally, I discuss the key role opposition parties play in organising anti-incumbent protests, a role often over-shadowed by their civil society counterparts, more prominent in the study of social movements. These four approaches provide a broad overview of opposition parties’ activities, both during and outside electoral cycles. Mobilisation strategies, like rallies or social media, can be used as part of these activities. For each of these approaches, I discuss how they contribute to performing the functions outlined above.

6.1 Staying out: Election boycotts

In both Uganda and Burkina Faso, boycott has been used as a strategy by opposition parties at some point but later dismissed. The boycott of elections refers to the decision of a political party or faction to refuse to take part in an election and to actively mobilise its supporters for non-participation. Scholars such as Beaulieu (2006), Lindberg (2006a), and Schedler (2009) have looked at why opposition parties choose to boycott and what effect boycott can have on democratisation outcomes and hybrid regimes. Opposition parties may choose to boycott elections they know are rigged to try and push for increased fairness in the long run, or they may use it as a strategy to mask their own weakness (Smith 2014: 749–750).
In Uganda, the DP called for a boycott of the 1996 legislative elections. This followed the defeat of its President Paul Ssemogerere in the presidential elections, held under the Movement system. Ssemogerere was running on behalf of a pro-multipartyist alliance between the DP and UPC, the Inter-Political Forces for Cooperation (IPFC). He lost to Museveni with only 23.7% of the votes. The IPFC accused the regime of fraud in the presidential polls and withdrew most of its parliamentary candidates (Muhumuza 1997: 175). However, the alliance’s presidential campaign made serious strategic mistakes, such as overestimating the popular support for a return to multipartyism and not realising the fears and resentment toward Milton Obote’s UPC in some regions (Beardsworth 2018: 78). In spite of the boycott, some DP and UPC candidates still contested for legislative seats (idem). However, this decision to boycott the parliamentary elections has been a source of regret within the party, as it has been blamed for the DP’s atrophy. The current DP President Mao stated in 2014 that ‘DP boycotted the 1996 parliamentary elections and we lost most of our constituencies. We don’t want to repeat that mistake’ (New Vision 04/03/2014).

While other factors have certainly played a part in explaining why the DP lost so much ground – including the ill-fated alliance with the UPC in the 1996 presidential polls, internal squabbles over leadership, or the decision not to front a candidate in 2001 (see 3.2 and Beardsworth’s (2018) work) – this analysis has led to the abandonment of boycott as a strategy. Meanwhile, FDC flagbearer Besigye has said several times that running was pointless without electoral reform, but has nevertheless challenged Museveni in all four elections since 2001 (see 3.2). An FDC local official explained that Besigye was chosen as the party’s flagbearer despite his arguing against contesting, on the condition that he would abide by the party’s decision to take part in
the polls: ‘He had to come back to the ground and say OK, this is an electoral period so we have to go for election’ (int. UG70, Kasese, 17/05/2018).

In Burkina Faso, opposition parties boycotted several elections between 1991 and 2000. In the first presidential elections of the regime, held in 1991, opposition leaders refused to participate, in protest against Compaoré’s refusal to hold a national conference, like the one that occurred in neighbouring Benin (see Banégas 2003: 135–171). Officially, Compaoré was re-elected unopposed with 86% of the vote, but with abstention reaching 75%. A law specialist explained that ‘the boycott of the 1991 elections led President Compaoré to be ‘poorly-elected’, as some say his score was 25%, and that he didn’t really have any legitimacy’ (int. BF09, Ouagadougou, 06/04/2017).

Most of the opposition once again boycotted the 1998 presidential election. Two candidates appeared to run against Compaoré but openly supported the president and later joined his cabinet. They were ‘alibi-candidates’ (int. BF39, Ouagadougou, 10/07/2018) whose role was to avoid the undemocratic outlook of a plebiscite-like election, as in 1991, even though Compaoré was similarly re-elected with 87.5% of the vote, with a turnout of 56%. The objective of the opposition’s boycott was to deprive Compaoré’s regime of a democratic legitimacy. A UNIR-PS leader explained:

‘At some point we thought that by participating in elections, we would be cautioning him. People would believe that we had campaigned and that he had beaten us democratically. But we didn’t agree, it wasn’t true, he didn’t beat us democratically. But he did beat us anyway. So by boycotting, it was a form of resistance.’ (int. BF28, Bokin, 06/04/2018)
Many opposition parties also boycotted the local elections in 2000, arguing that, as a UNIR-PS MP stated, ‘then, the electoral commission was solely made up of known and acknowledged friends of the President, the voters’ registry was skewed, everybody already knew it was rigged’ (int. BF30, Ouagadougou, 10/04/2018).

The boycott strategy in Burkina Faso was more efficient than in Uganda, as it did deprive Compaoré of legitimacy. Yet, ironically, it was the 1997 legislative elections – which opposition parties contested – which gave the ruling party a ‘monopolistic’ hold over the Parliament: with the CDP controlling 101 out of 111 seats, then deputy Secretary General of the CDP, Salif Diallo, admitted that ‘from an external point of view, it is rather embarrassing for a democracy’ (Loada 1998: 69). Still, with or without a boycott, such figures were indeed embarrassing, especially when foreign donors – on whom Burkina Faso was financially dependent – were demanding democratic reform as a condition for cooperation (Bolle 2001). This led foreign diplomats, and especially the French ambassador at the time, to intervene and convince the opposition that it was time for opposition parties to fully participate in elections (int. BF39, Ouagadougou, 10/07/2018).

While some people believe this boycott strategy was useful in exposing the regime’s undemocratic nature and bringing about some reforms, they also realised that, as a journalist put it, ‘some things remain the government and ruling elite’s prerogatives. It is therefore more pertinent to go and sit in decision-making institutions like the National Assembly, so as to have an eye there and to influence policies’ (int. BF02, Ouagadougou, 17/03/2017). The boycott of the 2000 local elections, for example, allowed the ruling CDP to control all the municipal councils, which have the authority to allow or ban demonstrations. As the same journalist argued, in the context of the social movement that followed the assassination of journalist Norbert Zongo,
this proved an obstacle to later organising protests. Opposition parties therefore decided to take part in the 2002 elections, benefitting from the electoral reform Compaoré had been forced to concede following the ‘Zongo Affair’ crisis.

In both countries, boycott has been discarded as a strategy for several reasons. First and foremost, some stakeholders have argued that it was ineffective. As a DP MP argued for the Ugandan case: ‘Museveni is shameless. He isn’t somebody who will get embarrassed just because you have boycotted an election’ (int. UG89, Constituency, 2016). Similarly in Burkina Faso, a PDS-Metba activist argued that an empty-chair policy ‘can work in a democracy, but here it worked for the power, the military regime did not care about it’ (int. BF11, Ouagadougou, 26/04/2017). If the regime has other sources of legitimacy than democratic-looking elections – e.g. control of the armed forces, strategic weight vis-à-vis foreign donors, development projects – an electoral boycott is unlikely to bring about a regime change, or even electoral reform.

A Ugandan researcher also argued that, ‘Even if you boycotted ... the ruling party will manufacture one or two other parties to compete against it’ (int. UG31, Kampala, 07/12/2016) to satisfy international demands for democratic credentials – just like Compaoré did in the 1998 elections. In 2009, there were 33 registered parties in Uganda (Makara 2009: 67), while Burkina Faso counted some 137 (CGD 2009: 27) – well above the handful represented in each national parliament. Many of these organisations can be considered ‘briefcase parties’ existing solely on paper and aiming at obtaining funding from the state, or even proxies of the ruling party (CGD 2009: 27; Makara 2010: 45). In Burkina Faso, Compaoré also actively co-opted opposition parties into taking part in elections in exchange for various inducements: the ADF-RDA was therefore convinced to break away from the G14 opposition coalition in 2000 and field candidates in the local elections, in exchange for positions in a broad-
based government. Similarly, a section of the Sankarist CPS, led by its president Ernest Nongma Ouédraogo, went against the boycott call on the eve of the polls. This effectively led to the scission of the CPS, with Bénéwendé Sankara and his supporters – who had defended the boycott – creating the UNIR-MS.

Meanwhile, the lack of coordination between opposition parties creates a zero-sum-game situation where no party is willing to take the risk of boycotting the institutions because they are afraid another party will use this opportunity to supplant them. Lindberg (2006a: 128) noted that ‘even when it comes to protesting against an incumbent (as opposed to uniting for a common platform in electoral alliance), opposition forces cannot unite’. The individual decision to boycott by one party may be perceived by another as an opportunity to consolidate its base. An FDC activist, for example, argued that ‘if FDC did not participate […] we were not sure that DP would not come to fill the gap. During presidential elections, small candidates contested but were in fact sponsored by NRM. If we stepped down, some other people could have taken our place’ (int. UG20, Mukono, 15/11/2016). This echoes the work of Beardsworth (2016: 756) on opposition coalition-building. She argues that intra-opposition competition for the same anti-incumbent pool of voters is a key factor undermining coalition-building between opposition parties. In my view, the same logic also prevents a common boycott strategy.

The issue of boycott is divisive within parties as well, as MPs at the individual level have an interest in keeping their seat and sometimes decide to compete anyway (Carbone 2008: 111). Competition and manoeuvring, both among parties and between factions of one party, therefore make it difficult for opposition parties to work together and present a united front, either as an electoral coalition, or through a united call for boycott. On that subject, a UNIR-PS leader shared a telling – though maybe
embellished – anecdote from the 1991 election in Burkina Faso, for which the three main opposition leaders at the time – Ernest Nongma Ouédraogo, Gérard Kango, and Hermann Yaméogo – had agreed to boycott in the election. But, she said:

‘as there was distrust [among them], each prepared their candidacy registration, and each went to stand in a corner of the courthouse, to be able to see the entrance doors. If one saw another coming forward with his registration, the others would have filed theirs too, and they waited like that until the last hour.’

(int. BF39, Ouagadougou, 10/07/2018)

Ultimately, the decision to discard the boycott strategy was about surviving as political parties. In addition to the regime’s attempt to manufacture a fake opposition, and to other parties’ seizing the opportunity to expend their networks, which I have already mentioned, parties also feared losing their meagre resources and local support if they were not seen as active organisations. As a PDS-Metba activist in Burkina Faso said, ‘by continuing to boycott, parties were going to disappear; they had to participate to promote themselves and continue to exist’ (int. BF11, Ouagadougou, 27/04/2017). By boycotting elections, opposition parties were denouncing the regime’s flaws, but the strategy proved unsuccessful and too risky, which led them to reconsider and decide to take part in elections.

6.2 Running: Electoral campaigns

Electoral campaigns provide opposition parties with rare opportunities to reach out to voters across the country, down to the grassroots. This is especially important in a context of high repression described in Chapter 1 where political activities are generally heavily restricted. A DP MP indeed argued that ‘The only time when we can talk to the people around the country is during elections’ (int. UG17, Kampala,
04/10/2016). An FDC leader corroborated that ‘elections are the easiest way to reach people’ especially in the countryside: ‘In urban areas, people have access to the media, but in rural areas, the only way to reach people is through meetings and rallies’ (int. UG20, Mukono, 15/11/2016). The same is true in Burkina Faso, where elections also provided opposition parties with an opportunity to criss-cross the country to spread their ideas. ‘Being able to campaign meant to go to the grassroots, which wasn’t easy’, a UNIR-PS leader argued, adding that though their means were far behind those of the ruling party, it was important to ‘be able to go to the grassroots and defend the ideas we were fighting for’ (int. BF39, Ouagadougou, 10/07/2018).

As discussed previously, the use of social media has become increasing widespread in recent years across Africa (Dwyer and Molony (eds) 2019), and may shift these dynamics in future elections. However, existing research has shown that social networks complement rather than replace traditional forms of mobilisation – such as rallies and door-to-door campaigning – and still requires a network of activists on the ground. In Burkina Faso, social media registration rates are relatively low compared to neighbouring countries (Saidou 2019), and while social networks – in particular Facebook – have been used during the mobilisation that led to the 2014 insurrection, their impact should not be exaggerated (Sawadogo 2017: 87). In Uganda, Chibita (2016) has shown that digital activism has been curtailed by the government, especially during protests and elections. In July 2018, the Ugandan parliament passed the ‘Over-The-Top’ bill, more commonly known as the Social Media Tax bill: it
imposed a USh200 daily tax\textsuperscript{44} to be able to use a range of mobile applications, including Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp (\textit{Wired} 19/07/2018).\textsuperscript{45}

Over the course of my research in Uganda and, more so, in Burkina Faso, social media did not emerge as a factor that significantly affected the way parties were organised – though it appears to be changing fast, as illustrated by the mobilisation strategy employed by Bobi Wine in Uganda (Ephraim 27/08/2018). Moreover, Gadjanova \textit{et al.} (2019: 13) have shown that contrary to expectations, social media does not necessarily help to close the gap between larger and smaller parties, and on the contrary has increased the costs of campaigning. This means that even though social media can increase opposition parties’ ability to reach out to citizens outside of electoral cycles and their capacity to mobilise support, elections still provide a valuable opportunity to convey their message.

Elections provide such an opportunity for several reasons. First, many interviewees stated that they were freer to conduct activities around elections that at other times. For example, an FDC activist said that ‘if now [Besigye] came to Soroti and said he wanted to talk to the people, he would be blocked, tear-gassed [whereas] when there is an election, he’s fairly free to go and talk’ (int. UG48, Soroti, 09/05/2018). This does not mean that repression ceases altogether during campaigns. Indeed, in the most recent elections held in February 2016, a large number of opposition campaign rallies were either banned by the police under POMA or violently repressed when they went

\textsuperscript{44} £0.04 (July 2018).

\textsuperscript{45} Museveni proclaimed this was aimed at discouraging ‘gossip’ and ‘idle talk’, but opposition and civil society activists have denounced it as an attempt to curtail free speech. This sparked a protest led by Bobi Wine, but also led to a massive reduction of subscription to these services, though many people may have resorted to VPNs to circumvent the tax (\textit{The Guardian} 27/02/2019; \textit{DW} 21/07/2019).
ahead anyway. Besigye, in particular, was repeatedly arrested and detained, only to be released without charge later (Nkuubi 2016: 427).

Second, election cycles provide fundraising opportunities for political parties, which enables them to conduct more activities than outside electoral campaigns. Parties and candidates themselves receive donations from family, friends, and business operatives to contribute to their campaign costs (Golooba-Mutebi 2017: 9–10). In Burkina Faso, all presidential candidates also receive an equal amount of public funding, though this amount is far below the real costs of a competitive campaign (Loada 2006: 26). In Uganda, however, a similar provision was abolished in September 2015 (EU EOM 2016: 18).

Campaigns give opposition parties a platform to speak to voters, as a way to mobilise but also to educate and sensitise them. A DP MP stated that during campaigns, ‘the opposition has to explain the political environment, how it is impossible to win an elections; it is a front to advance the cause, to try to change how people think’ (int. UG17, Kampala, 04/10/2016). This echoes the survey findings of Conroy-Krutz (2016), who argued that the 2011 electoral campaign in Uganda was a learning opportunity as citizens’ exposure to parties’ electoral activities – e.g. door-to-door canvassing, political communications, and politicised media content – increased their knowledge on candidates, office holders, and institutions, including among groups who usually had less access to such knowledge, such as women, rural dwellers, and poorer or less educated people. Opposition activists therefore use campaign events as opportunities to denounce the regime’s authoritarian practices. As an FDC activist put it, ‘We believe that by the time we go to elections, we shall have time – two or three months before the elections – to go around the country telling people about the evils of the government’ (int. UG51, Soroti, 10/05/2018). This message may be reinforced
by the repression they suffer. Indeed, the disruption of campaign rallies by security forces and the repeated arrests of opposition leaders – including presidential candidates such as Besigye – give credit to their denunciation of the regime’s authoritarian nature (Nkuubi 2016).

Running in elections also gives opposition parties an opportunity to expose electoral malpractices themselves. As a UNIR-PS leader argued, it gave the opposition arguments to demonstrate ‘the non-democratic situation of these elections which are repeated and are systematically won by the same person’ (int. BF40, Ouagadougou, 10/07/2018). In Uganda, this was further demonstrated by systematic legal challenges of election results, both at the presidential and parliamentary levels. Admittedly, the tight deadline (ten days) to file the court challenge and fact that the heavy burden of proof rests on the petitioner makes it very difficult for the opposition to obtain the invalidation of the results at the presidential level. In addition, the Supreme Court judges seem to have ‘feared upsetting President Museveni’ and gave in to pressure from the executive. This led to contradictory judgements which admitted the occurrence of frauds but considered they were not substantial enough to warrant cancelling the results (Kabumba 2016).

After Besigye unsuccessfully petitioned against the re-election of Museveni in 2001 and 2006, he decided to abandon court challenges and focus on an activist denunciation of fraudulent elections, through the Walk-to-Work protest in 2011 and the Defiance campaign in 2016 (see Section 6.4). In 2016, Besigye was placed under house arrest on Election Day for 43 days, effectively preventing him from filing a petition, even if he had intended to. It was Mbabazi, the third-placed presidential candidate with only 1.4% of the vote, who challenged the results. The Court once again dismissed the challenge and upheld the results (Kabumba 2016). Even if court challenges at the
presidential level are unlikely to be successful – Kenya and Malawi providing unexpected exceptions in recent years – it can be argued that they are still useful as they contribute to illustrate the regime’s lack of legitimacy. As Twinomugisha (2016: 450) writes:

‘By presenting the evidence of malpractices in court, the petitioner exposed Museveni’s victory as hollow. It also exposed the judges who fear to exercise their judicial independence boldly and creatively and are interested in maintaining the status quo where the Constitution and electoral rules are violated with impunity’.

Moreover, court petitions have had some success at the parliamentary level in Uganda, with the invalidation of the 2016 election of at least ten MPs on account of voter bribery or lack of required academic qualification leading to by-elections for these seats – not an insignificant outcome for opposition parties which tend to be more competitive in by-elections (Perrot 2014: 438).

In Burkina Faso, court challenges have been less frequent, partly because voters may fear to denounce malpractices (CGD 2008: 31) and because courts were seen as deeply corrupt and co-opted by the regime (Harsch 2017: 166–169). In 2010, four opposition candidates challenged the election’s outcome in court, on the basis that voter’s cards did not conform to the law – they did not bear the place and full date of birth of the voter as required. The Constitutional Court dismissed the case (lefaso.net 04/12/2010). In 2012, the UPC introduced 21 challenges concerning the legislative election results, mainly regarding results from polling stations in the Kadiogo Province. The Constitutional Court however dismissed the case, not even bothering to read their decisions’ justification during the public audience (L’Evènement 30/12/2012).
In summary, opposition parties participate in unfair elections as a way to reach and mobilise people across the country, sensitise them about the regime’s authoritarian nature, and shed light on repressive and fraudulent practices. While they may not come to power through the ballot box, they do gain entry in institutions such as parliament – yet another mobilisation and denunciation platform.

6.3 Sitting: Opposition MPs

With the discard of electoral boycotts, opposition parties gained representation in institutions such as the legislature, local governments, and other committees – albeit in rather small numbers.

A few authors have made impressive contributions to our understanding of how opposition parties have engaged with devolution processes, and the constraints they face within local governments, such as McLellan (2019) in Tanzania, Lambright (2014) in Uganda, Waddilove (2019) in Kenya, or Barry and Hagberg (2019) in Burkina Faso. Local councillors in Burkina Faso and Uganda told me that by participating in, and sometimes controlling, local governments, they could gain experience (int. UG80, Masaka, 19/05/2018) and deliver services to the population (dis. 4, Tenkodogo, 17/12/2018; int. UG69, Kasese, 17/05/2018). A DP councillor also argued that their performance at the local level could demonstrate what their party could do more broadly: ‘we are trying to give people an example of what DP can do when it gets state power’ (int. UG79, Masaka, 19/05/2018).

However, my focus here is on the national legislature in each country. The role of opposition MPs within parliaments heavily dominated by the ruling party has received little attention. Yet, it is an important institution, and findings about the role of the
opposition in this national arena can certainly inform our understanding of the opposition’s action at lower levels.

The ruling party’s dominance over the parliamentary arena obviously restricts the capacity of opposition MPs. In the Ugandan parliament, Museveni’s NRM currently occupies 306 seats. If we combine the four other parties represented in this Parliament (the FDC, DP, UPC, and JEEMA), they only amount to sixty MPs. This is even less than the number of independent MPs⁴⁶—a large number of which are NRM-leaning politicians who lost the party primaries but still contested the parliamentary election (see Wilkins 2018). In Burkina Faso, the ruling party ODP-MT, turned into the CDP in 1996, was ultra-dominant throughout the 1990s after its incorporation of various smaller parties. This culminated in 1997 with the CDP winning 101 out of the 111 parliamentary seats. Even though the opposition made gains in subsequent elections, Compaoré co-opted the ADF-RDA to regain control over the National Assembly (see 3.1).

Benefitting from two-third majorities, both Compaoré and Museveni have been able to pass legislation suiting them, even when it was widely unpopular. Indeed, in 2018, Ugandan MPs passed the Age Limit Bill which removed the minimum and maximum age threshold to stand for election—therefore enabling Museveni to stand for a sixth time in 2021. This occurred despite widespread opposition among the population⁴⁷, so

⁴⁶ These figures were shared by the EC and are accurate as of 1 November 2018. They differ from parliamentary results from 2016, as they take into account a series of by-elections which took place since then for various reasons (court challenge, seat vacant, new constituency or district). These figures exclude representatives of the Ugandan Police and Defence Forces (UPDF) and Ex-Officio members, as they are unelected, but do include indirectly elected representatives of special interest groups (workers, youth, persons with disabilities).

⁴⁷ An opinion survey conducted by a Ugandan company, Research World International, in October 2016 found that 73% of the respondents thought that the constitution should not be amended to allow a person over 75 years old to contest for President (UNNGOF 2016: 27).
much that even NRM MPs had to be induced with both money and an extension of their current term by two years to vote for it\(^48\) (New Vision 26/07/2018). In Burkina Faso, the leader of a small opposition party argued that ‘in 2014, if there hadn’t been the popular insurrection, the National Assembly would have voted the modification of the Constitution’ (int. BF10, Ouagadougou, 25/04/2017) – an hypothesis widely shared, which led protestors to storm and burn down the parliament to physically prevent the vote from taking place (Burkina 24 30/10/2014).

The capacity of opposition MPs (or lack thereof) to influence policies and make the government accountable is also informed by the independence and capacity of the legislature itself vis-à-vis the executive. The Ugandan Parliament was considered among the strongest legislative institutions on the continent during the Movement era (Barkan (ed.) 2009). Despite its paradoxical taming since the return to multipartyism (Keating 2011; Goodfellow 2014), it has retained a certain assertiveness (Collord 2016). The Ugandan legislature is characterised by a high number of independent MPs who make up 15% of the legislators, reducing parties’ ability to control the debates. Even the NRM caucus is a weak institution, illustrated by Museveni’s need to regularly buy the support of his own MPs (Collord 2016), though their bargaining power is diminished by a high turnover and ever-growing campaign expenditures, which make them more vulnerable to financial inducement (Wilkins 2018: 11).

Some Ugandan MPs interviewed argued that they had been able to influence policies. For example, an FDC MP stated: ‘Sometimes it does not look like the opposition is making any headway, but sometimes the pushing, the pressure the opposition puts on the ruling party makes the ruling party to bend a bit, and they have

\(^{48}\) The parliamentary term extension was struck down by the Supreme Court.
been bending’ (int. UG27, Kampala, 24/11/2016). The MP gave specific examples of the Juba talks between the government and the Lord’s Resistance Army rebel group in 2006, and of the holding of the 2005 referendum over a return to multipartyism, which, she claimed, opposition pressure in parliament contributed to make happen. However, this positive view of what the opposition can achieve through these means is not shared across the board, and the party’s flagbearer Besigye himself is generally very dismissive of parliamentary politics. Furthermore, it is debatable how much these decisions can really be attributed to opposition pressure. The reintroduction of multipartyism in 2005, for example, worked in Museveni’s interest as it enabled him to remain in control of the transition process, to purge the NRM of opponents, including Besigye, and to remove term limits at the same time (Makara et al. 2009; Keating 2011).

Yet, even though they may not be able to block legislation when it comes to a vote, opposition MPs may still play an oversight role, especially in terms of shedding light on policy-making and opening debates over some issues. Indeed, sitting in parliament provides the opposition with some protected space to call out the regime and expose the government, and with visibility when doing so. MPs have some kind of immunity to express their views, in a way ordinary citizens cannot – a dynamic that transpired throughout the data collection, during which local activists attached more importance to anonymity than MPs and party officials. A DP MP explained that ‘Parliament is a platform, it gives immunity for what we say’ (int. UG17, Kampala, 04/10/2016). Opposition MPs use it to move motions, engage in debates, and hold press conferences. An FDC mobiliser, who unsuccessfully ran for parliament in 2016, also argued ‘When I am a Member of Parliament, government gives me respect. I am given a car and I
am given a right to go and talk to people. [...] If I am not an MP and I try to mobilise people they call it an illegal rally’ (int. UG51, Soroti, 10/05/2018).

Opposition parties can also play an (albeit limited) oversight role. As the main opposition party, FDC gets to appoint a Leader of Opposition in Parliament (LOP) to head a Shadow Cabinet. The LOP position was created by the Constitutional Amendment of 2005 that reinstated multipartyism, though a similar position had existed under Obote’s two regimes. The LOP’s purpose is to provide leadership and act as a spokesperson for opposition MPs, and to present alternative policies to those of government. The shadow cabinet includes MPs from other opposition parties as well as independents. Unlike the CFOP institution in Burkina Faso, which is rooted in parliamentary representation but whose mandate goes beyond the legislative arena, the LOP in Uganda has no real clout outside of the legislature (int. UG70, Kasese, 17/05/2018).

The LOP is appointed by the main opposition party, namely the FDC, following a decision by the party’s NEC. The first LOP, appointed in 2006, was Morris Ogenga Latigo, an MP from Acholi. Latigo failed to get re-elected in the 2011 elections, which saw the NRM make inroads in Northern Uganda (Daily Monitor 20/02/2011). He was replaced as LOP by Nathan Nandala Mafabi, an MP hailing from the Eastern region. Amidst tensions within the FDC between Mafabi and newly-elected party president Muntu – who had defeated Mafabi in the internal election – he was removed from the post in 2013 and replaced by Philip Wafuila Oguttu (Uganda Radio Network 04/02/2014). Oguttu lost his seat in the 2016 election and was replaced as LOP by the Kasese District Woman MP, Winnie Kiiza. In 2018, following the breakaway of the Muntu faction from the FDC, Kiiza was replaced by the Woman MP from Gulu District, Betty Aol Ochan, in a process marred by miscommunication and internal
conflict (New Vision 05/08/2018). The appointment as LOP appears to recognise the political weight of certain regions within the party, but also the factionalism at play within the FDC.

The opposition also heads the three accountability committees in Parliament: the Public Accounts Committee; the Committee on Commissions, Statutory Authorities and State Enterprises; and the Committee on Local Government Accounts. The Parliament’s oversight function has been deemed weak because committees work slowly and their recommendations are often ignored by state institutions, making the Parliament not so effective, despite a strong and enabling legal framework (Titriku 2020: 93). Yet, in the words of a Kampala-based civil society figure, ‘Weak as it is, opposition parties still provide this platform: they help to raise concerns on government excesses, they run oversight committees, they raise issues for reform and accountability’ (int. UG26, Kampala, 21/11/2016), even if these accountability committees have limited capacity (Collord 2016: 648). This oversight role is also carried out more informally, by voicing disagreement and raising issues. In this vein, a DP MP summarised her role as follows: ‘We are watchdogs. Yes, we cannot win when it comes to voting in Parliament, but you can look at the debates we put up. And when we talk, the country hears. This is important that there are still some sane voices coming out of that house’ (int. UG89, Constituency, 2016).

In contrast, the National Assembly of Burkina Faso under Compaoré was much more subservient to the executive. Until 2002, the ruling party, originally known as the ODP-MT, routinely swallowed small parties to ensure its hegemony, culminating with the formation of the CDP in 1996, becoming ‘an “ultra” majority party’ (Harsch 2017: 123). After the 2002 elections, it relied on the support of the ADF-RDA and smaller parties belonging to the ‘presidential current’ (idem: 134). In the words of a
young opposition activist, ‘**MPs from the Majority were controlled remotely**’ by the executive (int. BF11, Ouagadougou, 26/04/2017), while a law scholar similarly argued that ‘**party discipline was such that these MPs could not be expected to hold a position different from what the executive wanted**’ (int. BF09, Ouagadougou, 06/04/2017).

Meanwhile, the controlling power of parliamentary commissions have been described as ‘**broadly fictitious**’ because of the ruling party’s influence and disruption from the Ministry of Justice (Delavallade 2007: 284).

When opposition MPs entered the National Assembly in large numbers in 2002, it appeared to shake the legislature: a UNIR-PS member of Parliament argued that

> ‘for the first time the population was interested in parliamentary debates. Before that, [MPs] were just people who went to sleep in the House, but after 2002 [...] a number of figures gave importance to the parliamentary debates.’ (int. BF30, Ouagadougou, 10/04/2018)

The same MP also argued that opposition legislators headed inquiry commissions that helped to shed light on corrupt practices, for example in the health sector and in the attribution of public contracts, though the real impact of this oversight has been limited, as previously stated (Delavallade 2007).

Other people have argued that, while opposition parties had attempted to take part in processes at first, they had ended up being demoralised. As a young UNIR-PS official argued:

> ‘at the beginning, [opposition MPs] were speaking out and everybody applauded. But there is a vote in the end, and two cannot vote against one hundred. Eventually, one doesn’t have the motivation to speak anymore.’ (int. BF17, Ouagadougou, 18/01/2018)
The role of opposition MPs then becomes one of relaying information outside of the parliamentary arena, to enable public debate and inform mobilisation through other means. Most stakeholders described their action in these terms: opposition legislators had access to ‘internal’ information about policies and governance and could serve as ‘informants’. Indeed, a civil society leader argued that ‘We must not desert the National Assembly because it allows us to get the information out’ (int. BF06, Ouagadougou, 28/03/2017), while another stated that ‘at least it made it possible to open up the internal political debate to public opinion’ (int. BF09, Ouagadougou, 06/04/2017).

This linkage role between the National Assembly and the broader opposition has been strengthened by a particular institution known as the CFOP since 2009. Its acronym stands for ‘Chef de File de l’Opposition Politique’ in French (literally ‘head of rank’ of the political opposition), making this standing that of a convenor and spokesperson rather than a leader. Moreover, it designates not only a person – the president of the largest opposition party – but also a formal framework for all opposition parties. The position is held by the leader of the opposition party with the most seats in the National Assembly, which means that the CFOP is not necessarily a parliamentarian themselves, but their legitimacy is grounded in their party’s weight in the legislature.

The CFOP as an institution, on the other hand, gathers all political parties registered in the opposition, including those without parliamentary representation. Within this framework, MPs were considered the opposition’s ‘ambassadors in the Parliament: they brought us back information and expressed discontent by leaving the room [during parliamentary debates]. They were truly the intermediaries between the CFOP and the Parliament’, in the words of a UPC official (int. BF15, Ouagadougou,
11/01/2018). The way it was set up meant the CFOP was rooted in the legislature yet not restricted by it, and could have a broader role in the political sphere (see Chapter 7).

Entering parliament can be a double-edge sword, especially for parties denouncing the government’s poor governance and projecting a ‘clean’ image. In Burkina Faso, notably, opposition MPs have been tarnished by corruption scandals and for happily enjoying the perks awarded to them while claiming to defend probity. A civil society figure made the following statement:

‘These parties pretended to be clean enough, but when they got into Parliament and these stories came out about the FCFA3 million [each MP] received to celebrate [the winter holidays], people weren’t angry towards the CDP – those are the CDP’s habits – but towards those who were pretending to embody change while sustaining the same practices.’ (int. BF04, Ouagadougou, 27/03/2017)

Their counterparts in Uganda have at times tried to avoid this issue, for example in the 2018 age-limit debate when some MPs publicly refused to receive USh29 million49 to hold consultation meetings – which they denounced as a bribe50 (The Observer 27/10/2017).

Overall, the opposition’s participation in the legislature has a range of benefits for the parties’ involved. As we have seen, by sitting in parliament, opposition parties gain a platform and a status, enabling them to denounce the regime. This status gives them more leeway to hold rallies – though they may still be prevented from doing so, as the case of Bobi Wine demonstrates (Daily Monitor 03/09/2018). It also provides them with a position of authority, from which they can hold press conferences and are likely

49 Around £6,000 (October 2017).
50 Though others preferred to keep the money and vowed to spend it on their constituency’s demands such as health and education infrastructure and equipment.
to be interviewed by the media. For example, in Uganda, the LOP and the Shadow Cabinet have regular press conferences during which they tackle the government’s actions (Uganda Radio Network 31/03/2020).

Opposition parties also gain financial resources through their representation in parliament: a fixed share of MPs’ wages go into the party’s coffers and they tend to support the party’s structures and activities in their constituency using their parliamentary income and benefits, while state funding for political parties is calculated based upon parliamentary representation. This feeds their mobilisation capacity. Taking part in the state’s institutions, such as sitting in parliament, occupying positions in the shadow cabinet or in oversight committees, is also a way for opposition parties to present themselves as credible successors to the incumbent. These activities provide MPs with the opportunity to get experience and a local status. They develop an understanding of how governing works and acquire practical skills useful to conduct parliamentary activities. Indeed, an FDC legislator stated: ‘[then FDC party president] Muntu says the regime will collapse and we need to continue to train, in order to be ready. […] We need to prepare ourselves to govern.’ (int. UG29, Kampala, 05/12/2016).

Opposition parliamentarians also obtain a status in their constituency through their position as an MP, and their ability to reinvest financial and political capital back into their community. Through these means, they build their credibility as an alternative governing elite. An activist from the People’s Development Party (PDP), a smaller opposition party in Uganda, argued that ‘As opposition we need to increase the numbers in parliament and build a larger local government control. We can groom people to become MPs and then challenge Museveni’ (int. UG49, Soroti, 10/05/2018).
motions in parliament, they are able to expose some of the regime’s faults and mobilise dissent within and outside the parliament. They can also provide an alternative narrative, even if there are too few of them to actually win a parliamentary vote. In the end, it is all about occupying a space which is available, so that, as a DP politician puts it, ‘you don’t allow the state to take everything’ (int. UG17, Kampala, 04/10/2016).

These findings echo the argument made by Loidolt and Mecham (2016: 998) about opposition parties in Egypt, in which they argue that even within ‘rubber-stamp’ parliaments, opposition MPs can ‘gain both short- and long-term benefits’ such as monitoring the government’s performance, gaining popular legitimacy, collecting information, benefitting from protection, and projecting a political agenda.

6.4 Marching: Anti-incumbent protests

While opposition parties have participated in the regime’s institutions – including elections and the legislature – they have also engaged in mobilising against the institutions. One way of doing so has been to mount legal challenges against laws or practices. Uganda recently provided a successful example when the Supreme Court struck down POMA, a law passed in 2013 routinely used by the regime to ban opposition rallies and meetings (Chapter Four 29/03/2020). However, such challenges are constrained by the (real or perceived) lack of independence often characterising the courts (Twinomugisha 2016; Harsch 2017: 166–169).

Another way to mobilise against the institutions is through protests and civil disobedience. Protests may take many forms, and involve more than ‘marching’. But the most prominent forms of protests in both Uganda and Burkina Faso have involved people taking to the streets in demonstrations. The 2011 Walk-to-Work movement in
Uganda led analysts to talk about ‘political walking’ (Branch & Mampilly 2015), and more recent protests led by Besigye or Bobi Wine usually involved rallies and impromptu marches (*The Observer* 07/11/2019). In Burkina Faso, the largest protest movements against the Compaoré regime have involved marches organised by either trade unions, student organisations, or opposition parties.

In the context of hybrid regimes, opposition parties have to push the boundaries of the political space they have, at risk of being pushed back violently by the state. Indeed, protest in hybrid regimes can be outrightly banned, or violently repressed – sometimes leading to fatalities among protestors. As Branch and Mampilly (2015: 6) have observed, ‘it is indisputable that, again and again, protests across Africa seem unable to effect substantive reform in national politics despite their success in bringing tens of thousands of people into the streets’. Yet, Burkina Faso provides a striking example of what protests can achieve. Even when protests ultimately fail to achieve their stated objectives, they can have a lasting impact on a country’s political dynamics and consciousness (Branch & Mampilly 2015).

Contrary to the institutional approaches we discussed so far, protests can be performed by other actors than just political parties. In particular, civil society has been a prominent actor that received much attention in the democratisation processes of the late twentieth century (Bratton 1989; Lewis 1992; Harbeson *et al.* 1994; Bratton & Van de Walle 1997). Civil society is a broad concept that has been diversely interpreted (see Seteolu & Okuneye 2018). I borrow here its definition by Diamond (1994: 5) as ‘the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or a set of shared rules’. In this dissertation, civil society includes a range of organisations, from trade unions to domestic NGOs and community associations.
In Uganda, the succession of repressive regimes and the absence of a history of corporatism or ideological battles have left a certain void. The trade union movement has been completely co-opted by the NRM regime (Barya 2010). Meanwhile the legal framework governing NGOs has forced an otherwise active and diverse civil society to work in a mostly apolitical and technical manner (Branch & Mampilly 2015: 120; Nassali 2016: 282; Tripp 2018: 91), though more recently, a few human rights organisations have organised to promote civil liberties and good governance, illustrated by the court action against POMA (The Guardian 28/03/2020; see 3.3).

In contrast, the Burkinabè civil society has long been more vibrant, politically engaged, and ideologically driven. The Sankarist revolution obviously left its mark on the Burkinabè elite, but activists – especially in the labour movement – also draw from a longer history of successful mobilisation (Kabeya Muase 1989). Yet these organisations have often shown mistrust and contempt toward opposition parties and have been wary of being instrumentalised.

Opposition parties in Burkina Faso and, even more so, in Uganda have played a key role in leading and coordinating protests against the Compaoré and Museveni regimes. In Burkina Faso, Compaoré’s regime was faced with a long series of social movements. Three episodes are particularly interesting to unpack in terms of the implication for opposition parties, as this demonstrates a progressive ‘coming of age’ of the Burkinabè political opposition: the 1999 mobilisation following the assassination of journalist Norbert Zongo (‘Trop c’est trop’), the 2011 wave of mutinies and protests that ended with the failed ‘Blaise Dégage’ rally (hereafter the 2011 crisis), and the 2013-2014 series of marches and rallies against the creation of a Senate and the modification of the Constitution’s Article 37 culminating in the ousting of Compaoré on 30 October 2014 (the 2014 insurrection).
The ‘Trop c’est trop’ movement in 1999 was spearheaded by a Collectif made up of three opposition streams: the radical trade unions and associations influenced by the clandestine, Marxist-Leninist Parti Communiste Révolutionnaire Voltaïque (PCRV), less politicised associations of intellectuals (lawyers, medical doctors, academics, etc.), and finally a dozen opposition parties. The radical civil society was the real driver of the coalition—illustrated by the fact that the Collectif’s President and Vice-President both came from its ranks. The assassination of Norbert Zongo brought these groups together for the first time for two reasons: it forced so-called apolitical NGOs working on democracy promotion in broad terms to become more engaged now that the regime had shown its true colours, and it led the more radical organisations to agree to work with political parties they did not really trust (Loada 1999). Most opposition politicians at that time had been discredited by their association with Compaoré at one time or another, and they saw this movement as an opportunity to bounce back (Loada 1999; Sanou 2010). The movement indeed forced the executive to conduct some reforms, including a change of the electoral code which enabled opposition parties to get a record number of seats in the 2002 legislative elections.

The 2011 crisis was much less cohesive than Trop c’est trop. As described earlier, it was a disparate series of protests and mutinies affecting a range of social sectors (see 3.1). Contrary to the protests a decade earlier, discontent in 2011 was expressed through disorganised and fragmented protests, without coordination by a specific organisation and without a clear platform of demands (ICG 2013: 30). Protests were disorganised riots at first, then marches called for by various unions, and finally mutinies within military barracks. Opposition parties played only a minor role in this mobilisation, even though they were accused—both by the government and protest activists—of taking advantage of the crisis to promote themselves.
Still, opposition parties published communiqués denouncing the repression, and some of their local figures were arrested for having encouraged young protestors to riot. At the end of April 2011, the opposition’s chef de file, Bénéwendé Sankara, attempted to build upon the disparate movement and turn it into a political opportunity to topple the government. On behalf of the opposition, he called for a rally against Compaoré himself with the slogan ‘Blaise Dégage!’, a reference to the Tunisian Jasmine Revolution. Contrary to the movement a decade earlier, there was no real coordination between civil society and political parties. On the day of the rally, less than 400 people gathered – a disgrace for an opposition counting 34 parties.

Yet, the next couple of years demonstrated a real coming-of-age of the Burkinabè opposition, with a wave of new protests starting in mid-2013 and ultimately leading to Compaoré’s resignation. This movement genuinely started with an opposition-led rally against the creation of a Senate – but with broader demands as well around living conditions and good governance – held on 29 June 2013 that brought around 50,000 protestors together in the capital. Throughout the second half of 2013 and the better part of 2014, marches and rallies were organised by the CFOP to maintain pressure on the government on the connected issues of the Senate on the one hand, and the term-limit provided by the Constitution’s Article 37 on the other (see Wienkoop 2019).

The old civil society organisations which had been at the forefront of the Trop c’est trop! movement in 1998 refused to be formally associated with these actions, preferring to hold parallel protests focusing on living conditions, once again showing their mistrust of opposition parties (Harsch 2017: 197). Yet, even though unions and parties acted separately, their parallel actions contributed to maintaining a continuous pressure on the government.
Civil society then also included new actors coming to light at that time, in particular activists networks such as *Balai Citoyen*, the *Comité Anti-Référendum* (CAR), and the *Front de Résistance Citoyenne* (FRC). This section of civil society, while remaining autonomous from the political opposition, acted in coordination with the CFOP and played an important mobilising role. Yet, the attention given to the *Balai Citoyen* and its peers, by both scholars and journalists, has tended to overstate their role (Chouli 2015: 326) and ignore the fact that the insurrection was in large part driven by the political opposition. A scholar active one of these structures acknowledged that:

‘The movements in 2013-2014 were mainly the work of political parties. Never, for example, has the Balai Citoyen been able to organise a meeting alone. All the large rallies against the Senate and against the modification of Article 37 were called by the UPC, which was the nucleus [of the mobilisation]. The citizens’ movements came in support.’ (int. BF07, Ouagadougou, 05/04/2017).

This corroborates claims of UPC figures that they – as the main opposition party and through the CFOP institution – were the ones driving the contestation (int. BF15, Ouagadougou, 11/01/2018).

That time around, the political opposition was able to play a stronger role than on previous occasions for several reasons. First, the protests were from the start of a political nature, aimed at stopping the creation of a Senate and the removal of constitutional term-limits, which made political parties the logical front-runners of the contestation. Second, and most importantly, the UPC and, after the defection of key figures of the CDP in January 2014, the newly-created MPP had unprecedented financial resources at their disposal – the former drawing from their own personal earnings and parliamentary salaries, the latter by putting to use the wealth they had
accumulated during their years in power (int. BF20, Ouagadougou, 09/02/2018). This allowed for an efficient coordination and mobilisation of protestors against the regime.

Protesting enabled Burkinabè opposition parties to perform the various functions discussed earlier in this chapter. Marches and rallies contributed to the denunciation of the regime’s wrong doings, such as political violence and impunity, poor governance and corruption, and the absence of *alternance*. They also contributed to the mobilisation of dissent throughout the country: the mobilisation of protestors themselves, who took to the streets and marched, but also of the population more broadly through the press coverage of the demonstrations. Finally, it contributed to the succession function by allowing the opposition to be perceived as an alternative, assuming positions of leadership within the mobilisation. The protests can also have practical consequences that contribute to this function, such as the electoral reform that resulted from *Trop c’est trop* and, most importantly, the resignation of Compaoré in 2014 that precipitated a regime change.

In Uganda, Museveni’s regime has also been faced by waves of protests. The most significant has been the Walk-to-Work movement that occurred in 2011, and since then, a section of the opposition has been keen to use protests as extensions of electoral periods and to build a defiance movement. The Ugandan civil society is not as politicised as in Burkina Faso. The mobilisation has therefore mostly been coordinated by political parties – or at least by political figures.

Following the February 2011 elections, Besigye decided not to challenge the results in court, but instead attempted to take to the streets. The opposition called for protests to denounce the election’s outcome, but these calls had little traction. However, in April, the opposition formed a pressure group called Activists for Change (A4C) and
launched a new movement with broader demands regarding living costs and poverty, in a context of soaring inflation partly resulting from the monetisation of the elections.

This focus on very real issues – such as the cost of transport and food – instead of abstract concerns regarding election rigging, and the fronting of an independent, activist group rather than competing political parties and politicians had a resounding appeal (Branch & Mampilly 2015: 128). Opposition figures and activists took to the streets in an innovative manner: denouncing the sky-rocketing prices of fuel, taxi and boda-boda\(^{51}\) fares, they started to ‘walk to work’ in solidarity with the poorer Ugandans no longer able to afford another means of transport. The violent reaction from security forces – arguably expected and even counted on by the organisers – took the form of massive arrests and beatings, themselves leading to further mobilisation and unrest (Perrot 2014: 426). Branch and Mampilly (2015: 130–131) provide a good picture of this routine:

‘Monday and Thursday were established as Walk-to-Work days. On these days, a few local political figures would begin walking, only to be met by a swarm of police. The radio, heard constantly in the shops and roadsides of urban Uganda, would announce opposition leaders having been arrested. This would bring large numbers of people into the streets, and running battles would erupt, involving stone-throwing, erecting barricades, and physical clashes between police and protesters.’

The 2011 Walk-to-Work protests were not the first instance of urban protests in Museveni’s Uganda. The arrest of Besigye in 2006 had already caused some unrest, and other notable outbursts with more specific causes include the protests to save

\(^{51}\) Moto-taxis popular in Uganda.
Mabira Forest in 2007 (see Chibita 2016: 79) and the Buganda riots in 2009 (see Golooba-Mutebi & Sjögren 2017: 11–12). But the Walk-to-Work protests appeared to be more organised that previous mobilisations. Indeed, even prior to the 2011 elections, the opposition appeared to be talking about protests, and Besigye himself was already stating he would not go to court to redress electoral injustices but would instead take to the streets (Branch & Mampilly 2015: 125). The Walk-to-Work protests also appeared to have a broader agenda than the 2007 and 2009 events. They have been considered particularly meaningful despite being concentrated in the capital and a few major urban centres and involving a limited number of people, because they were the ‘longest demonstration yet initiated by opposition leaders’ and due to the widespread coverage – by national and international media – of the state’s violent response, which helped to further tarnish Museveni’s image (Perrot 2014: 426–427).

The Walk-to-Work protests illustrate a broader trend which sees urban riots becoming more recurrent in Uganda since the return to multipartyism (Goodfellow 2014: 760), a trend that, according to Golooba Mutebi and Sjögren (2017), is due to the fact that social, economic, and political grievances have only been partially channelled through party politics. In fact, political parties themselves contribute to this trend, as a section of the opposition has proclaimed that it is ready to abandon party politics in favour of an alternative centred around civil disobedience. This was illustrated by Besigye’s own decision to step down as FDC president in 2012 and his growing disillusion with partisan participation. In his biography of Besigye, Kalinaki (2014: 312) describes that:

‘As he drove home from the meeting with donors, Besigye was convinced it was time to declare a new war against abuse of office and the corrupt entrenchment’
of power. Unlike 1981, this war would be fought not with arms but through people power and a campaign of defiance and resistance’.

As Mutyaba (2018: 4) puts it, ‘the protests left a lasting sentiment in Uganda’s opposition that protest, as opposed to elections and legislative politics, was perhaps a more realistic route through which to seek political change’ (see also Branch & Mampilly 2015: 147–148). The next few years saw little activity, as the ‘For God and my Country’ (4GC) network, which succeeded A4C when it was banned, proved unable to carry out activities at the same scale as that of the Walk-to-Work protests. This failure has been attributed to the massive repression imposed by security forces, and to the movement’s inability to reach areas beyond the capital and the Central and Southern regions (Perrot 2014: 430).

It was around the next election that protests became salient again. A section of the opposition, spearheaded by Besigye himself, increasingly believed in an activist approach to defeat the regime, and saw elections and other institutions as pointless. Museveni was re-elected in 2016 with official results giving him over 60% of the vote. However, the FDC, who claimed to have parallel results showing that Besigye won with a 52% score, did not file a court challenge. Whether Besigye had wanted to or not – having shown his mistrust to the process in 2011 – he was prevented from doing so by being put on preventative arrest for 43 days. This also barred him from organising street protests, while rallies organised across the country to demand his release were thwarted by the police and army (Nkuubi 2016: 425–426).

In response, Besigye launched what has been known as the Defiance campaign, an extension of the electoral campaign aimed at keeping his base mobilised through civil disobedience and a series of targeted actions. As a civil society figure argued:
‘The Defiance campaign can act as a rallying point for membership mobilisation, for continuing the civic engagement outside of government structures. That is important for organising, for keeping the party base and party membership energised and engaged in non-election periods.’ (int. UG 27, Kampala, 21/11/2016)

However, there was a lack of clarity on what defiance actually is, lamented the same person, which left the ruling party able to define it. For example, Security Minister Mary Karooro Okurut stated that the Defiance campaign meant:

‘[C]ausing riots, overall civil disobedience and general mayhem with a basic objective in mind; cause so much chaos that it is impossible and impracticable to hold elections or in the alternative impossible to govern the country after elections by organising insurrections’ (Daily Monitor 22/05/2016).

This was a serious shortcoming for the campaign, which also suffered from a lack of appropriation by the opposition as a whole, making it clearly less successful than the Walk-to-Work protests had been. This was acknowledged by political figures involved in the Defiance campaign themselves. For example, a DP MP, close to Besigye, stated that:

‘It seems that we as leaders in the opposition haven’t been able to build a consensus about the defiance project, not even within FDC. I can tell you that the majority of FDC MPs don’t subscribe to the Defiance campaign. This is the debate I want to start, the conversation we should have. I think the people are ready to defy this government but for various reasons we are failing to give them leadership.’ (int. UG25, constituency, 18/11/2016)

At the top, defiance was carried out through high-profile actions such as the mock swearing-in ceremony of Besigye as the ‘People’s President’ in May 2016, which was
videotaped and posted on social media platforms, planned or impromptu protests surrounding his multiple arrests and court appearances, and food distribution in famine-struck districts in April 2017. But at the grassroots level, defiance was more abstract, with FDC activists around the country defining in the following terms. In 2016, a party figure in Mukono stated that ‘in concrete terms, non-compliance means we oppose most of what they say [...] It translates in trying to mobilise masses, especially in big cities’ (int. UG26, Mukono, 18/11/2016). A young party activist, meanwhile, explained that ‘at the lower lever, we do it at the personal level because we are oppressed by the police. We are bearing in mind that our government and president are in Kasangati [Besigye’s home]’ (int. UG24, Mukono, 17/11/2016). A year and a half later, defiance did not appear to be defined more precisely. In Soroti, a party mobiliser simply stated that ‘defiance is just saying no’ (int. UG49, Soroti, 09/05/2018), while in Gulu, a local official defined it as ‘message or sign or indicator which is given to the government so that they know that what they are doing is wrong’ (int. UG56, Gulu, 12/05/2018).

Despite this rhetoric, there has not been any significant protest to the scale of Walk-to-Work since 2011 (Mutyaba 2018: 6), possibly due to an increasingly repressive environment, characterised by the adoption of POMA in 2013 (Goodfellow 2014: 768), the recruitment of so-called crime preventers in 2015 (Nkuubi 2016: 409; Tapscott 2016), and the re-emergence of state-inspired disappearances (idem: 420). Even the adoption of the Age Limit Bill, removing the last constitutional provision barring Museveni to run again in 2021, did not spark more than a scuffle.

Whereas in Burkina Faso such an attempt led to a full-blown insurrection in 2014, Ugandan stakeholders seemed to perceive Museveni’s candidacy in 2021 as a fait-accompli, when the 2016 elections had just been concluded, possibly due to a lack of
confidence in the Parliament and the courts to stop it, and the recognition that the opposition was unable to mobilise enough dissent around political issues to reach an insurrection just yet. For example, an NGO representative interviewed in 2016 expressed doubt that large-scale protests like Walk-to-Work could happen again then, even if Museveni attempted to change the constitution: ‘I think unless the economy depreciates and breaks down, any constitutional issues involving how politics will be run cannot be an effective rallying point for people to come to the streets’ (int. UG15, Kampala, 21/09/2016).

The wave of protests to protect term-limits and others constitutional means to guarantee turnover across the continent (see Durotoye 2016; Wienkoop 2019) does not appear to have had the same impact as the Arab spring on Ugandan minds. Yet, this does not mean that protests have been discarded by the political opposition in recent years. Quite the contrary, Besigye’s activist approach has continued. It has also been replicated by new opposition figures. In particular, the popular musician and independent MP Bobi Wine has spearheaded a movement known as ‘People Power’ and has continued to organise popular rallies and concerts (often blocked by the police) even after getting elected to parliament (The Observer 19/10/2017).

From these events, we can see that Ugandan opposition parties have played an important role in organising protests, in a context where other actors such as civil society organisations have been wary of being seen as involved in politics due to a constraining environment. The Walk-to-Work protests, the Defiance campaign and the more recent protests around the figure of Bobi Wine are ways to denounce the authoritarian nature of the regime and its failings. The violent repression of those protests – and the coverage in national and international press of arrests and beatings – further feeds this denunciation efforts and mobilise discontent among civil society
and the broader civil society. As previously argued, opposition figures such as Besigye and, more recently, Bobi Wine, are perceived as credible and trustworthy opposition leaders partly because of their treatment by the state: they are beaten, arrested, tortured but continue to oppose the regime, which gives them credibility as challengers and alternatives to Museveni.

Yet, the increasing focus on protest and defiance as a strategy by a section of the opposition has also been accompanied by the perception that political parties are not relevant institutions that deserve to be strengthened, as far as they are not able to topple Museveni’s regime through institutional means. This has created a rift between those supporting activism and defiance on the one hand, and those defending participation and organising on the other, as if they were necessarily contradictory approaches.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has discussed some of the key ways opposition parties engage the regime in Uganda and Burkina Faso. While boycott has been used as a strategy in both countries at some point to try and deprive the government of a democratic-like legitimacy, opposition parties soon realised that they risked losing relevance by using this approach. By participating in elections and sitting in parliament, opposition parties may not be able to meaningfully compete for power and to influence governance, but they can use these institutions as platforms to engage citizens and denounce the regime. Meanwhile, protests have also been used by opposition parties in both countries. This is not an exhaustive coverage of opposition parties’ activities, which is beyond the scope of this chapter. For example, opposition parties also use the courts to challenge electoral results and pieces of legislation, sometimes in association with civil society organisations. Opposition figures travel abroad to lobby international partners through
foreign visits (*Daily Monitor* 08/09/2016) and participation in international party federations (int. BF57, Ouagadougou, 19/12/2018). As I have stated previously, social media is also an increasingly popular platform used by opposition figures (Ephraim 27/08/2018).

The combination of these disparate strategies, some of them involving participating in the regime’s institutions (elections, parliament, courts) and others taking the form of (sometimes illegal) protests, begs the question of how they intersect. While they can feed each other and be complementary, these approaches can also be pitted against one another and lead to divisions. In Uganda particularly, the fact that the opposition was taking part in elections and institutions and, at the same time, calling for civil disobedience has been used to discredit them. A civil society activist described this predicament as such:

‘They [FDC] find themselves in a very tricky situation. While on the one hand they are saying they should defy this government because it is illegitimate, they were happy to appoint a shadow cabinet in Parliament. That has been used against them to say: “You’re not sincere. You either defy or you don’t, you cannot defy and cooperate.”’ (int. UG26, Kampala, 21/11/2016)

As Mutyaba (2018) pointed out, both factions of the FDC have kept proclaiming that both approaches are equally important and complementary and that they were willing to find a middle ground – a position echoed by many party stakeholders I met myself in 2018. However, this discourse has not been accompanied by concrete actions. With the ‘defiance’ faction winning over the ‘organisers’ in the 2017 leadership contest, the party has strengthened its own brand in terms of protest and change – which I have previously argued is the core of the FDC (see 4.2), but has also seen the ‘organising’ wing of the party led by Muntu defect (*The Observer* 25/09/2018).
Yet the 2014 insurrection in Burkina Faso illustrates how protest and participation can intersect positively and pose a real challenge to the regime. By sitting in the legislature, opposition MPs were able to monitor and report on the government’s moves – especially about Compaoré’s ploy to amend the Constitution. This allowed them to mobilise outside parliament by other means, including protests and civil disobedience. This juncture between participation and protest is exemplified by the Kombissiri Address, a declaration made in May 2013 by the CFOP calling the population to use civil disobedience to oppose the creation of the Senate and the removal of term-limits:

‘The MPs of the parliamentary groups ADJ and UPC reject the set-up of the Senate; call upon their activists and supporters, women, young people, pupils and students, unions, civil society organisations, and the whole people to mobilise against the set-up of the Senate which constitutes the first step in the process to modify the Article 37.’ (lefaso.net 10/05/2013)

The parliamentary opposition therefore were the ones calling for civil disobedience, and opposition MPs played a key role in the resistance in the streets, by providing both funding and intelligence to organise the protests. Indeed, during this period, each opposition MP was making a special contribution amounting to FCFA100,000\(^{52}\) per month to the CFOP to cover the costs of protests (int. BF49, Ouagadougou, 14/12/2018), while slogans and directives were formulated based upon the information that they provided (int. BF19, Ouagadougou, 24/01/2018).

Whereas participation and protest appeared contradictory and counter-effective in Uganda, they are in fact complementary. In order to adapt to a shifting environment,

\(^{52}\) £119,000 (October 2014).
opposition parties must combine and mix boycott and participation, protest and party-building to engage the regime, just like the ruling elite mixes ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ strategies to remain in power (Golooba-Mutebi & Hickey 2016). Through these activities, opposition parties perform a set of functions, outlined in this chapter’s introduction, that can contribute to a regime change.

The function of denunciation is performed quite well by all opposition parties dealt with in this thesis. Indeed, by boycotting elections, through campaign rallies and protest marches, or during parliamentary debates, opposition parties denounce the regime’s wrong doings, ranging from poor service delivery to human rights abuses, election fraud, and corruption. It is a way to make people aware not just of the government’s failings, but of the flaws of the wider system, the skewed rules of the game. According to a young official in the UNIR-PS, popular expectations towards his party were mainly to perform this kind of denunciation, not to obtain power: ‘We are asked to play the role of a sentinel, to be there to hit when things get messed up’ (int. BF17, Ouagadougou, 18/01/2018). The denunciation function plays out domestically, but also internationally. Foreign partners notice opposition boycotts and the repression of rallies and marches, and opposition leaders have also taken to travel abroad and lobby foreign stakeholders themselves (Daily Monitor 08/09/2016).

A second function that opposition parties perform is the mobilisation of dissent, though with uneven success. The 2011 Walk-to-Work protests in Uganda and the 2014 insurrection in Burkina Faso are key instances of parties’ capacity to mobilise support, but the Defiance campaign (Uganda, 2016) and the ‘Blaise Dégage’ rally (Burkina Faso, 2011) have been much less successful. Yet, despite a repressive political environment and other obstacles, opposition parties continue to organise protests, even outside of election periods. In Uganda, this has led a section of the opposition to
perceive itself more as a liberation movement than as political parties and to favour an activist – yet non-violent – approach.

Opposition legislators also play such a mobilising role within parliament, by putting up debates, providing a sane voice, and keeping the dream alive (int. UG89, Constituency, 2016). The mobilisation capacity of opposition parties’ depends on their individual spread and resources, as local branches, activist networks, and money are all important components of any mobilisation strategy. Mobilisation is also enhanced by inter-party collaboration, and coordination with other actors, such as civil society organisations, trade unions, and, in Uganda, independent politicians. The 2014 insurrection in Burkina Faso is a case in point. I will address these cooperation dynamics in more detail in the next chapter (see 7.2).

A third function that opposition parties can perform to contribute to regime change is the preparation for succession. This function is partly performed by taking part in the state’s institutions, such as sitting in Parliament, occupying positions in the shadow cabinet or in oversight committees. These activities provide MPs with the opportunity to get experience and a local status. They develop an understanding of how governing works and acquire practical skills useful to conduct parliamentary activities. They also obtain a status in their constituency through their position as an MP, and their ability to reinvest financial and political capital back into their community. Through these means, they build their credibility as an alternative governing elite. This is also performed through the building of the party as an organisation, the development of a supporters’ base, and the design of policy proposals. The argument made by this DP activist illustrates this point:
'If we may ask ourselves; what is our plan after Museveni? Ugandans should now prepare themselves; how are we going to move on after Museveni? [...] If we disagree with the system then we should think of changing the system not just the man.' (int. UG52, Gulu, 11/05/2018)

Finally, appearing as a committed opposition to the regime (in Parliament or in the streets), and arousing popular support, places the opposition (as parties or as individuals) in a good position to claim legitimacy after the regime’s fall. Yet, the extent to which this function is actually performed should be tempered. As Kelly (2020: 137) demonstrated in the case of Senegal, turnovers are often performed not by opposition parties but rather by regime insiders, who benefit from previously accumulated resources and name recognition. We can see the same dynamic at play in Burkina Faso, with the MPP splitting from the CDP less than a year before the insurrection and getting elected in the post-transition elections of 2015. Despite their best efforts at denouncing the regime and mobilising dissent, opposition parties still suffer from low confidence levels across the continent (Logan 2008; Bratton & Logan 2015). Opposition parties’ capacity to endure and coordinate are important elements to consider, particularly in order to assess their ability to perform the functions at hand and promote democratisation. This is why I address these issues in the last empirical chapter of this dissertation.
Party endurance and opposition coordination

This dissertation has addressed various aspects of opposition parties’ operation in hybrid regimes such as Burkina Faso and Uganda, from the constraints that they face to their internal organisation and their approaches to engage the regime. Their poor performance is also often attributed to their volatile and fragmented nature. For example, Randall and Svåsand (2002c: 38) argue that African parties ‘tend to be ephemeral as organizations and fail to establish themselves as credible alternatives in the eyes of the voters’. Van de Walle (2006: 77), meanwhile, argues that ‘divided opposition expend energy and political capital in internal squabbles. They criticize each other publicly as much as the incumbent and the ruling party and inevitably lose some legitimacy in the process’.

This leads me to analyse these dynamics in the last chapter of my dissertation: what in the nature and operation of opposition parties enable or hamper their endurance as individual organisations? How do these individual parties collaborate amongst themselves and with other stakeholders to form a collective and coherent political opposition? And, ultimately, how does it affect the regime’s trajectory in each country?

The organisational endurance of political parties is closely related to the concept of institutionalisation. Party institutionalisation was defined by Huntington (1968: 12) as ‘the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability’. The institutionalisation of political parties and party systems has been shown to be a key
element of democratisation in other parts of the world (Diamond 1989; Lewis 1994; Dix 2016). Randall and Svåsand (2002b: 8), in their work on African politics, highlight how the institutionalisation of individual parties and that of the party system as a whole can sometimes be at odds. In particular, an uneven institutionalisation of political parties – with the ruling party benefiting from historical legacies and controlling public resources – often leads to institutionalised but uncompetitive party systems that are detrimental to democratisation prospects.

Consequently, the institutionalisation of opposition parties is important, in terms of the functions they can perform both within the regime, and in helping to bring about and consolidate democratisation. Even though party system volatility is not necessarily a bad thing in a democracy (Riedl 2014: 4), volatility of opposition parties within a one-party dominant system is more problematic. As Nijzink and Doorenspleet (2013: 199) have argued, the opposition’s ability to galvanise growing popular dissatisfaction informs the endurance (or not) of a one-party dominant system, with Namibia, Tanzania and South Africa being cases in point where that did not happen.

In order to galvanise such dissatisfaction, opposition parties need to be cohesive and socially-rooted (LeBas 2013). Considering the high level of fragmentation among opposition parties in Uganda, Burkina Faso and much of the rest of the continent, cohesion requires cooperation among opposition parties. For their action to be socially rooted, they need to build ties with other structures in civil society. Widner (1997) has shown that in general, African political parties have rarely tried to mobilise civil society organisations, because these organisations had little capacity to deliver their member’s votes or were wary of taking a political stance.
This last chapter examines how the dynamics addressed throughout this dissertation – parties’ core, internal structuration, and activities – influence the performance of opposition parties when it comes to the critical areas of party endurance and opposition coordination, and what it means for the regime’s trajectory in each country.

7.1 Surviving in a hybrid regime: the endurance of opposition parties

The endurance of opposition parties is an important factor in understanding what role they are able to play. As Randall and Svåsand (2002c: 38) explain, ‘To offer voters a choice between alternatives and provide them with an opportunity to evaluate past performance, parties need to endure’. While party endurance is a concept closely related to party institutionalisation, I prefer the first phrasing. As Stroh (2019) has convincingly argued, institutionalisation can be at odds with the flexibility opposition parties need in order to adapt to changing circumstances. Furthermore, parties can still conduct a range of activities despite weak formal structures, such as rallies or protests.

I argue that there are two main inter-related elements that determine whether a political party can endure: the sustainability of its core, and its ability to emancipate itself from its founder. Of course, the party’s financial viability is also a key factor in its ability to exist, organise, and subsist. Yet, even within a heavily monetised political environment (see Chapter 3), smaller and poorer organisations can outlast larger and relatively wealthier parties. A poorer party may have more limited mobilisation capacity and territorial penetration, but that does not mean it cannot endure. Instead, it is the origin of a party’s resources, not the amount, that – by determining the internal power dynamics within the party – is an important predictor of whether or not a party will endure.
Sustainability of party cores

In Chapter 3, I have discussed what constitutes a party’s core: what the party is formed around, what constitutes its identity, and where it derives its legitimacy from. I have argued that these opposition parties are not empty shells merely revolving around a politician, and that a more complex ‘core’ attracts activists and gives the party a level of cohesion. This is closely related to the concept of ‘value infusion’ in the institutionalisation literature, which ‘refers to the extent to which party actors and supporters [...] acquire an identification with and commitment to the party which transcend more instrumental or self-interested incentives for involvement’ (Randall & Svåsand 2002b: 13; see also Selznick 1957; Levitsky 1998). I have categorised the parties under study here in two party types based upon the kind of core they display: historical values’ trustees (the DP in Uganda and the UNIR-PS in Burkina Faso) and credible change bearers (the FDC in Uganda and the UPC in Burkina Faso). An important question is therefore how sustainable this core is?

A core revolving around the idea of ‘credibility’ and ‘change’ has an intrinsically weak sustainability. On the one hand, the party’s credibility can be lessened as they prove unable to win elections or topple the incumbent, putting them at risk of losing ground to new actors. In Uganda, the FDC has so far been perceived as the most credible opposition to take on Museveni, but the rise of Bobi Wine and internal fractures within the NRM has put this hegemony in doubt (The East African 06/05/2019; New Vision 03/03/2020). A DP activist, when talking about the FDC and Besigye, said that, ‘you can’t contest for four times failing each time; people start losing faith in you’ (int. UG79, Masaka, 19/05/2018). The candidacy of Mbabazi in 2016, which (wrongly) signalled elite fragmentation within the NRM, opened a
discussion over Besigye’s continuing credibility as opposition frontman (Oloka-Onyango 2016; Beardsworth 2018: 105). The election results and the abysmal score of Mbabazi vindicated Besigye’s supporters. Yet the rise of a new popular figure, Bobi Wine, has re-opened these discussions ahead of the 2021 polls (The Observer 04/12/2019; New Vision 30/07/2019; The Observer 24/07/2019), and it is uncertain who will be on the ticket against Museveni in the next elections.

In Burkina Faso, an international analyst argued that the UPC’s leader, Diabré, ‘succeeded at first, but some people stronger than him politically [...] beat him to the punch and overtook him’ (int. BF03, by phone, 23/03/2017). Indeed, the MPP led by Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, Salif Diallo, and Simon Compaoré after their departure from the CDP in January 2014, managed to overshadow Diabré and the UPC after the insurrection and win the post-transition elections in November 2015. They were able to use the same strategy as Diabré, presenting themselves as credible reformers who had distanced themselves from Compaoré over the issue of Article 37. But they were able to overpass the UPC by drawing from more recent and consistent governmental experience, vaster resources, and richer networks than his. Such an outcome is not infrequent. As Kelly (2020: 137) demonstrated in the case of Senegal, it often tends to be defecting regime insiders that manage to defeat incumbents. The initial credibility of opposition parties like the UPC and FDC, who benefitted at first from an insider’s advantage, is therefore difficult to sustain overtime.

On the other hand, while the idea of change may gain traction with time – as the regime loses popularity and/or legitimacy – this focus on change, reform, or turnover cannot long outlive the regime itself. To endure beyond the regime’s survival, the party will have to reinvent itself and rebuild its core. As Stroh (2019: 241) explained:
'When Burkina Faso’s president, Blaise Compaoré, was ousted in 2014, the former ruling party collapsed, although not completely, and the main valence issue that had structured party competition — the authoritarian character of the Compaoré presidency — disappeared with the ex-president'.
family, from my grandfather, have been members of the party. So as a family we understand what the party stands for’ (int. UG52, Gulu, 11/05/2018).

Bob-Milliar (2012b: 680) observed similar sentiments when studying the motivations of party activists in Ghana. This kind of attachment fits with what Randall and Svåsand (2002b: 13) describe as ‘the party’s success in creating its own distinctive culture or value-system’, which can contribute to party cohesion. In the case of UNIR-PS in Burkina Faso, Sankarist values may also be a relatively sustainable core, especially as the figure of Thomas Sankara became increasingly popular among young urban Burkinabè and the new generation of civil society organisations emerging from 2013 such as Balai Citoyen (Bonnecase 2015: 162). However, other factors, detailed hereafter, foster a high level of fragmentation among Burkinabè parties, leading to a proliferation of organisations claiming to defend and uphold these Sankarist values (Harsch 2013: 359).

**Leadership turnover norm**

Turnover, or *alternance*, is an important element of a democracy. Huntington (1993: 267), for example, established a benchmark of democratic consolidation known as the ‘two turnover test’. It has also been one of the chief demands of opposition parties in Uganda and Burkina Faso, with the incumbent’s long tenure decried as a key grievance. Yet the internal appropriation of such a norm by opposition parties themselves, and its application in the form of a leadership turnover within the party, is far from a given. Burkina Faso and Uganda represent two extreme cases on this issue.

Burkina Faso’s partisan landscape does not exhibit a leadership turnover norm at all: no party – even beyond the two cases under focus here – have experienced a
smooth leadership transition. On the contrary, Burkina Faso is a great example of how leadership quarrels can fuel division and weakness. In contrast to other countries in the region, Burkina Faso does not have strong historical parties rooted in the independence struggle, due to a series of military regimes having since disrupted the partisan landscape. A partial exception is the ADF/RDA. The party emerged from the fusion, in 1998, of the RDA – founded in 1946 and originally part of the regional federation of the same name in Francophone West Africa – and the ADF – founded in 1990 by Hermann Yaméogo, the son of Burkina Faso’s first president Maurice Yaméogo.

However, the ADF-RDA’s history has been marked by frequent splits and fusions as well as leadership disputes, and the party was allied with Compaoré from 2000 onwards. In Chapter 3, I have already illustrated the high level of division among Burkinabè parties, with the example of the Sankarist party lineage. This frequency of party splits, often at least partly due to personal ambitions and leadership disputes, is best described by a Burkinabè proverb: ‘one prefers to be the rat’s head rather than the lion’s tail’ (L’Observateur Paalga 15/10/2007b) – politicians prefer to be at the head of their own party, however small it may be, rather than be a lower figure in a larger party. As a civil society figure argued, many Burkinabè parties ‘are the offshoot of their leader, who at a certain time, by his behaviour and activism, managed to gather a number of people around himself’ (int. BF09, Ouagadougou, 06/04/2017). In this context, neither the UNIR-PS nor the UPC have provided the opportunity for a leadership change at the head of the party.

Uganda, on the other hand, displays a rather strong leadership turnover norm within opposition parties. The DP is a success story in that regard: not only has its leadership been passed over peacefully multiple times, but the last two people to occupy the position have not come from the DP’s core constituency. While it is still considered
by many as a Catholic or a pro-Buganda party, the DP has had both a Protestant
president (John Ssebaana Kizito, 2005-2010) and a non-Muganda president (Norbert
Mao, 2010 to date, hails from the North). These leadership changes, despite the
internal frictions they may have caused, demonstrate that institutions have outgrown
the personal influence of an individual, which is necessary for a party to outlive its
founder and have solid foundations.

The emergence and consolidation of this norm within the DP can be observed at
two critical junctures. One is after the death of Benedicto Kiwanuka, an early leader
of the DP and the first Prime Minister of Uganda just before independence. Kiwanuka
was assassinated in the 1970s under Idi Amin’s regime. In the words of a Ugandan
civil society representative, ‘when Kiwanuka was murdered, his family wasn’t
demanding space’ (int. UG15, Kampala, 21/09/2016). This contrasts with what
happened in the other historical party in Uganda, the UPC: after former President
Milton Obote died in exile in 2005, his wife Miria took over the reins of the party, and
today the party is fractured into two factions evolving around their sons, which shows
that the UPC has not managed to come out of the Obote family’s shadow. In the case
of the DP, the party’s leadership passed on to Paul Kawanga Ssemogerere, Kiwanuka’s
former Private Secretary (New Vision 16/03/2012).

Though Paul Ssemogerere remained at the head of the party for over 25 years, he
eventually stepped down in 2005. The same civil society actor explained that
Ssemogerere ‘struggled for a long time, but agreed to hand over to someone he
trusted’ (int. UG15, Kampala, 21/09/2016). Reflecting upon this, a Ugandan

53 One of Obote’s sons, Jimmy Akena, heads a faction which allied with Museveni after the 2016
elections. This decision was criticised by the other faction, led by the party’s disputed president Olara
Otunnu, and by Obote’s eldest son, Tony Akaki (The Observer 10/06/2016).
researcher said: ‘I give credit to Ssemogerere; he could have stayed and become a strong man. He served and he went out.’ (int. UG31, Kampala, 07/12/2016). This set a precedent, and with the transfer of power to Kizito, then to Mao, this precedent has become a solid norm, strengthened by the fact that Ssemogerere and Kizito remain respected elders in the party. The same academic further explained that ‘Ssemogerere and Kizito are pillars of DP now, and the young generation won’t change the rules with these elders around’ (int. UG31, Kampala, 07/12/2016). Even though the election of a party president may fuel tensions and factionalism, as occurred after Mao’s accession to the position, the principle of a turnover at the head of the party is not questioned.

In the case of the FDC, the party’s constitution includes a term-limit: any elected position within the party can only be held for a maximum of two terms. Abiding by this provision, Besigye stepped down from the party’s presidency in 2012 and was replaced by Muntu following competitive internal elections. In 2017, Muntu was defeated by Amuriat. This apparent circulation of elites at the head of the party has, however, been undermined by the fact that Besigye has retained an important – albeit informal – role and influence within the party. Besigye was elected as the party’s flagbearer (i.e. presidential candidate) for every election. There is no limit to the number of times one can be the party’s flagbearer, as it is not a party position per se.

Yet, Besigye’s flagbearer status has been extended beyond the election period, in line with the civil disobedience campaigns launched following the last two polls. Indeed, as I discussed in Chapter 6, the 2011 Walk-to-Work protests and the Defiance campaign launched in 2016 have been an extension of the electoral campaigns, and Besigye has retained real – if unofficial – leadership within the FDC. He is no longer the party’s president, but he is the ‘People’s President’, following the mock swearing-
in ceremony in April 2016. This has meant that, as an international NGO representative explained, the FDC effectively had two leaderships during Muntu’s party presidency:

‘There [was] the formal leadership of Mugisha Muntu, focused on building the organisation and regional structures; and the informal leadership of the party’s founding president Kizza Besigye, focused on activism, defiance to remove Museveni from power.’ (int. UG15, Kampala, 21/09/2016)

The fact that the FDC, despite the norm of leadership turnover officially embraced, has found it difficult to separate the party from the figure of Besigye is directly connected with the party’s core. Indeed, the credibility of the party to deliver change is very much attached to Besigye’s popularity and perceived ‘electability’. This was described by a Ugandan civil society activist as follows:

‘Besigye is known across this country, he has created an individual brand […]
He has gone through the tranches, he has gone to prison, he has been beaten, he has been injured; this creates trust among the people that he is not pretending, he is not playing us.’ (int. UG01, Kampala, 06/04/2016)

To summarise, party cores built on historically grounded values are more sustainable than those revolving around change and credibility, and a leadership turnover norm exists among Ugandan parties but not in Burkina Faso. This makes the DP the most enduring party in my sample: its core is a set of values that became the party’s motto, Truth and Justice, which have contributed to create a partisan identity transmitted within families from a generation to the next, and a strong leadership turnover norm has been set within the party. This means that despite losing ground to the FDC and having faced divisions after Mao’s election as party president, the DP retains entrenched support amongst activists in certain areas – mostly in Buganda but also, to a lesser extent, in Gulu – and is unlikely to disappear any time soon. The UNIR-
PS in Burkina Faso has a similar type of core, but no leadership turnover norm at all, which encourages party fragmentation and therefore a multitude of parties claiming a similar party core of Sankarist heritage. This has made it difficult for the party to tap into the renewed popularity of Sankarist ideas in recent years, as illustrated by the feeble score achieved by the party in the 2015 (post-insurrection) elections.

The FDC’s problem is exactly the opposite: while the party has an established norm of leadership turnover, with term limits inscribed in its constitution, its core is more fragile. In particular, the party’s credibility rests upon the figure of Besigye, which fuels the dual leadership issue and erodes the practical impact of the turnover norm. The FDC’s endurance is therefore dependent on a combination of, on the one hand, many people being tired of Museveni’s rule, and, on the other, the FDC appearing as the most likely to defeat him. Finally, the UPC in Burkina Faso has neither a sustainable core nor a leadership turnover norm, making it more difficult for this party to endure – especially beyond the post-insurrection reconfiguration.

*The money element*

Resources also play a role in a party’s endurance, but are not a necessary or sufficient element to explain it. The DP as an organisation appears to be more likely to endure than the FDC, despite lower resources and a weaker performance. Nevertheless, and as argued in Chapter 5, the origin of a party’s resources and the leverage that it provides to certain actors is an important aspect to consider. Put simply, who contributes financially to supporting the party – either by investing their own resources, or by playing a key fundraising role, matters. Is the party’s leader funding the party, or do local elite have a financial stake too? This can affect the party’s ability to endure in the following manner.
When the party’s resources mostly come from the party’s founder or central leader, this erodes the leadership turnover norm if there is one, or helps to prevent one from emerging. This centralisation of resources, and therefore of leverage, reduces internal democracy but facilitates party cohesion because of the periphery’s dependence on the central leadership. If the party’s core is not sustainable, in other words, if it has not ‘transcended more instrumental or self-interested incentives for involvement’ (Randall & Svåsand 2002b: 13), it increases the risk of defection and co-optation by the regime. When the party’s resources are less centralised, and local elite contribute to maintaining the party as well, the absence of a leadership turnover norm leads to a high likelihood of party splits: local elite who do not have a margin to evolve and progress within the party will be frustrated and attempt to create their own party. If there is a leadership turnover norm, this leads to a higher internal democracy, and helps ensure that a party is more likely to endure.

This thesis has focused on individual opposition parties, but it is important to take a step back and look at the implication of my findings for ‘the Opposition’ more broadly, and particularly to analyse how opposition parties coordinate and cooperate.

7.2 Opposition coordination and cooperation

There appears to be a consensus in the literature that opposition unity is a necessary – though not sufficient – condition of an incumbent defeat (Van de Walle 2006), which has led scholars to investigate electoral coalition-building dynamics (Van de Walle 2006; Arriola 2013; Souaré 2017; Beardsworth 2018). Yet opposition coordination for other purposes than electoral competition has not received the same level of attention, nor has the cooperation between opposition parties and other stakeholders such as civil society organisations. I therefore address these dynamics in this section, with the
overarching aim to analyse how individual parties’ internal dynamics and endurance impacts opposition cooperation and the opposition’s performance overall.

_Electoral coalition-building in Burkina Faso and Uganda_

In neither Burkina Faso nor Uganda has electoral coalition-building been a successful endeavour. The Burkinabè opposition to Compaoré’s regime was characterised by its diversity and divisions, running along ideological lines, personal enmities, and strategic disagreements between confrontation and entryism. In this context, opposition parties were unable to foster cooperation among themselves to tackle Compaoré’s hegemony. As Harsch (2017: 137) explains:

‘On issues of common concern, such as electoral fraud or political repression, the opposition parties usually were able to come together. At times they set up structures to coordinate their activities. But such collaboration usually broke down over ideological, personal, historical, and other differences’.

Few electoral coalitions have been attempted, and none was able to bring together a large enough grouping of opposition parties. Even parties describing themselves as Sankarist have proven unable to present a united front at an election.

In February 1998, a group formed of nine opposition parties, including the PAI, the FFS, and the ADF-RDA, was created to demand democratic reforms (_le faso.net_ 19/02/2008; int. BF08, Ouagadougou, 12/04/2017). It was called the February 14 Group (G14). Created shortly after the 1997 legislative elections, which the opposition claimed were massively rigged, the G14 organised a boycott of the 1998 presidential polls. However, it was unable to present a common front in subsequent elections. This did not prove too detrimental in the 2002 legislative elections, as the reformed PR
system actually benefited small parties, and the opposition managed to obtain 49% of the seats (Santiso & Loada 2003).

Ahead of the 2005 presidential elections, however, the coalition fragmented. Furthermore, nearly all of the parties involved suffered from splits themselves. In the end, the radical wing of the opposition, gathered in a new coalition named ‘Alternance 2005’, officially fronted three different candidates, while other leaders decided to run as well anyway. Another grouping, (ironically) known as the ‘United Burkinabè Opposition’ (OBU), saw both Emile Paré and Laurent Bado contest after disagreements between their respective parties. Finally the ADF-RDA, the largest opposition party since 1997, but who had broken ranks with the G14 in 2000 and joined the unity government, officially backed the candidacy of Compaoré (Loada 2006: 29). In 2010, the opposition once again went to the polls divided, with six candidates running against Compaoré.

In contrast, attempts at electoral coalition building have been a systematic feature of Ugandan elections throughout the NRM regime. However, these coalitions have been marred by internal divisions. Beardsworth (2018: 60) has provided the most detailed study of opposition coalition-building during the NRM regime, and argued that:

‘[D]espite the recognition that coalitions are necessary, they almost invariably collapse when newly-elected party leaders withdraw from the alliance to run their own campaigns and test their electoral viability. When they perform poorly, these party leaders seek to enter into coalitions in later elections but the intra-opposition competition for limited constituencies – due to the NRM’s hegemony – pushes party leaders to negotiate cynically within coalitions, ultimately leading to the collapse of the broader coalition’.
The first two elections held in 1996 and 2001 took place under the Movement system. This meant that candidates could not officially stand on party tickets. In both instances, the main electoral cleavage was around the reintroduction of a multiparty system. In 1996, the DP president, Paul Ssemogerere, who had been part of the NRM broad-based government, but who resigned in 1995 when the no-party system was inscribed in the Constitution, was supported by a coalition including the other historical party, the UPC, in an attempt to unseat Museveni. Though the coalition survived, Ssemogerere only received a quarter of the vote, and made a surprisingly weak showing in the Buganda region (Muhumuza 1997; Beardsworth 2018: 76–79).

In 2001, with the emergence of Besigye from within the NRM, a new alliance was formed, which highlighted internal splits within both the DP and the UPC. While the DP’s leadership officially backed Besigye’s candidacy, a wing of the party fronted a dissident candidate, Francis Bwenge, who received only 0.3% of the vote (Beardsworth 2018: 79–82). The two elections held under the movement system therefore saw the opposition able to build an electoral coalition, despite internal divisions, but unable to actually unseat Museveni.

The return to multipartyism ahead of the 2006 elections did not prove a positive driver of opposition cooperation. The following three electoral cycles have been characterised by initial attempts at coalition-building, and a subsequent collapse of that coalition before the polls could take place. In 2006, despite discussions starting two years before the polls among six opposition parties, the talks broke off over the selection of a common candidate. Besigye ran on the newly-formed FDC ticket, while the new leaders of the DP and the UPC both contested as well (Gloppen et al. 2006; Beardsworth 2018: 82–86).
Similarly in 2011, newly-elected DP president Mao broke away from the attempted Inter-Party Cooperation (IPC) coalition to protect the party’s identity and test his own popular support, while Otunnu contested on behalf of a divided UPC (Beardsworth 2018: 91–99). In 2016, the coalition known as The Democratic Alliance (TDA) once again collapsed after former NRM insider Mbabazi was selected as the joint candidate with the support of smaller parties – including the DP and the UPC – and the FDC pulled out to front Besigye (Beardsworth 2016; Kayunga 2016).

Overall, the opposition managed to build coalitions ahead of elections held under the movement dispensation but failed to unseat Museveni then. Since the return to multipartyism and the creation of the FDC, opposition coalitions have systematically collapsed. All parties involved have suffered from factionalism, which has affected their ability to come together. Smaller parties such as the DP and the UPC have been wary of losing even more ground to the FDC. This led them to pull out of coalitions as an attempt to safeguard what remains of their organisational power and identity. As an FDC activist acknowledged, ‘some parties are so thin in terms of support base that they fear coming together with the rest because they think even the small support base can be taken up’ (int. UG59, Gulu, 13/05/2018). Meanwhile, the FDC see themselves as the only credible challengers to Museveni, and therefore refuse to back a coalition if it is not fronted by their candidate. As Beardsworth (2018: 75) summarises:

‘This stable history of interaction has created and entrenched grievances that have undermined successive coalitions, as party leaders (at various levels) have used coalitions as forums through which to achieve their own particularistic aims, rather than privileging the common aim of removing the incumbent’.

It is quite clear that opposition parties in both Uganda and Burkina Faso have found it difficult to build and sustain electoral coalitions. Party proliferation, leadership
squabbles, and internal factionalism are obvious challenges to opposition cooperation. But as we can see from the Ugandan case, leadership turnover and the endurance of small parties, which are desirable outcomes at the party level, can actually pose a challenge to opposition coordination.

Furthermore, coalition attempts, when they have been made, have focused on the presidential elections. This is understandable, considering the predominance of the executive branch in both countries’ politics. However, this raises the stakes for the individual party leaders during coalition negotiations, as only one of them can stand for president, with no tangible compensation for the others. The IPC framework ahead of the 2011 Ugandan election – supported by Western democracy-promotion organisations – tried to mitigate that by outlining in writing that the other party leaders supporting the IPC flagbearer would be considered for a key post (e.g. Vice President, Prime Minister, Speaker) and that cabinet positions would be equitably distributed (Beardsworth 2018: 91–92). However, this did not prevent the coalition’s collapse.

Electoral cooperation, when it is discussed, remains at the presidential level, and does not encompass legislative or local elections. This leads to opposition parties splitting the anti-NRM vote in lower-level elections (see Beardsworth 16/02/2016), apart from a few exceptions; notably, during recent by-elections in Jinja East, Arua, and Bugiri (Daily Monitor 06/02/2019). Theoretically, legislative and local elections could provide an opportunity for a win-win situation for opposition parties. Parties could compromise and support a joint candidate in each constituency, ensuring balance nationally and playing on each party’s comparative advantage on the ground. This could enable the opposition as a whole to win a larger share of seats in parliament or control a bigger number of local councils. In Burkina Faso, where legislative elections are held under a PR system, joint provincial lists could obtain more support and
increase the opposition’s representation. However, as I have argued in Chapter 5, parties cannot be considered homogeneous and centralised entities: local dynamics are at play as well, and local party elite may end up on the losing side of such a win-win national alliance.

In summary, opposition electoral coalitions can be hampered by parties’ internal dynamics. As Beardsworth (2018) has argued, factionalism and the wish of a newly-elected party president to test their support are particularly detrimental to coalition-building. Relatedly, the endurance of small parties and internal leadership turnover – while desirable outcomes at the level of individual parties – can make it more difficult for electoral coalitions to emerge and be sustained, especially at the presidential level. Recent by-elections in Uganda have illustrated how opposition alliances can be successful at the parliamentary level, but expanding this model for a general election requires consideration of the intra-party relations and tensions at the local level.

Other forms of cooperation: the interaction of formal institutions and protest coalitions

The focus of scholars interested in opposition coordination has tended to be limited to electoral coalition building. Yet opposition parties can and should work together outside of electoral cycles as well. I am interested here in how opposition parties collaborate amongst themselves and with other actors. Specifically, I observe both formal institutions and informal protest coalitions in the two countries. I also discuss how the two dynamics (formal and informal) interact – positively or negatively – with each other.
In Burkina Faso, as mentioned earlier, opposition parties came together into the G14 grouping in February 1998. The purpose of this coalition was to boycott the 1998 presidential elections, but to also make broader demands. After the assassination of Norbert Zongo, the G14 co-founded the Collectif along with civil society organisations, such as radical trade unions, human rights organisations, and professional associations, and took part in the wave of protests that shook the country in 1999. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, these protests were partly successful: Compaoré had to agree to some reform, including a modification to the electoral code that benefited the opposition, and the restoration of presidential term limits. But as we saw earlier, the G14 was broken apart by internal squabbles. For a long time, civil society appeared to be the decisive player in leading the contest against Compaoré.

The relations between civil society and opposition parties, at some point united within the Collectif, were characterised by mistrust. The organisations at the head of the Collectif were radical organisations with ties to the clandestine Marxist-Leninist PCRV (Loada 1999). These organisations have often shown contempt for opposition parties, a feeling strengthened by the parties’ decision to discard the boycott strategy and run in the 2002 legislative elections. This dynamic was illustrated in 2011 with the failure of the political opposition to build upon the social crisis and unite grievances into an anti-incumbent protest. Yet, things changed two years later, and opposition parties then proved able to unite around the issue of term-limits, partly coordinate their action with civil society, and sustain a wave of protests, which ultimately resulted in Compaoré’s resignation (see Chouli 2015; Engels 2015a).

This success was partly due to the institutionalisation of a cooperation framework particular to Burkina Faso: the CFOP. As mentioned earlier, the CFOP (Chef de File de l’Opposition Politique, literally ‘Head of Rank’ of the political opposition)
designates both an institution and a person. The institution regroups all registered political parties – with or without a parliamentary representation – who declare to be opposed to the ruling government. The person is the opposition’s designated spokesperson, a role attributed to the head of the opposition party with the most seats in the National Assembly. The CFOP was instituted in 2000, but it was not until 2009 that it started to exist in earnest. Between 2009 and 2014, the CFOP has been headed by two different figures: Bénéwendé Sankara of the UNIR-PS (2009-2013) and Diabré of the UPC (2013-2014)\textsuperscript{54}.

The CFOP has served as a palliative for the opposition’s fragmentation by increasing polarisation between the majority and the opposition and by amplifying the opposition’s voice and reach (Bertrand 2018). First of all, the CFOP institution and, more broadly, the 2009 Law on the Statute of the Political Opposition was useful in that it clearly defined who was in the opposition. This clarification mattered because of the regime’s tendency to co-opt opposition leaders through patronage and to foster non-genuine competition to appear more democratic. With the new legal framework, political parties had to register with either the opposition or the majority, which limited the government’s ability to outwardly co-opt opposition leaders in exchange for government posts.

Through the CFOP, the opposition was also able to use boycott by presenting a united front and preventing any opportunistic party to stand in as the opposition to serve as a democratic cover. Because the CFOP is acknowledged as the institutional opposition, processes boycotted by the CFOP lose legitimacy, even if other parties

\textsuperscript{54} After the 2015 elections which put an end to the political transition, Diabré was re-appointed as CFOP.
participate. This was the case during the political negotiations organised by the regime following the 2011 wave of mutinies and unrest. Those were attended by several small parties claiming to be in the opposition, but the boycott from the CFOP and the parties it represented, severely curtailed the process’s legitimacy. As a UNIR-PS official explained, ‘We legally had a framework that enabled us to say “since it is not us who are there, it is not the opposition”, and this left Blaise [Compaoré] with a legitimacy problem’ (int. BF17, Ouagadougou, 18/01/2018).

The CFOP also provided the numerous opposition parties an opportunity to come together under one roof, to present a coherent voice against the government without losing their individual identity. Considering their high diversity, the CFOP’s position is more one of fronting a consensual position rather than a real leadership role. A high-ranking UPC official explained: ‘you are not the leader, you are the head of rank, it is not a structure that you command, you are merely a spokesperson’ (int. BF57, Ouagadougou, 19/12/2018). The CFOP must consult the various parties affiliated to the institutions in order to bring up their voice to the majority.

Still, the CFOP institution proved to be an important framework for these various parties to come together, coordinate strategies, and build a united front on key issues. As a Sankarist politician explained, ‘it was a setting where the opposition, regardless of their political leanings, came together and could talk about how Blaise [Compaoré] was going to leave’ (int. BF35, Ouagadougou, 02/07/2018). This meant that even though individual opposition parties have remained poorly structured and fragmented, the CFOP has provided them with a way to work together without compromising their own identity or forcing them to settle their internal differences.
The CFOP provided a more stable, institutionalised framework for cooperation. It was able to accommodate new parties formed by CDP defectors, such as the MPP, and to foster cooperation with civil society organisations and citizen’s movements, who would have otherwise been wary of aligning themselves with the political interests of individual parties. The institution also removed individual ambitions and electoral considerations from the equation by laying out clear rules on who should serve as CFOP, rather than leaving it to inter-party negotiations, and by constraining this role as that of a spokesperson and facilitator, rather than a leader.

In Uganda, various formal and informal processes exist, but instead of reinforcing each other, they tend to be pitted against one another. One institution I will briefly mention is the Interparty Organisation for Dialogue (IPOD), a donor-funded mechanism created in 2010 to bring together political parties with representation in parliament. However, IPOD is not limited to the opposition, it includes the NRM as well. The platform’s activities have also been frustrated by inter-party squabbles, illustrated by the FDC’s absence from IPOD summits (*Daily Monitor* 10/11/2019). I will focus hereafter on the protest coalitions and parliamentary institutions aimed at fostering opposition coordination specifically.

Despite the challenges of building coalitions around elections, as explained earlier, Ugandan opposition parties have been able to come together in times of protest. In particular, the Walk-to-Work protests in 2011 were remarkable in that they brought together the disparate opposition parties, which had failed to sustain a coalition only a few months earlier. Indeed, a pressure group was created in April 2011 by various opposition party figures, known as A4C. Besigye was the lead actor in this drama, but the protests also involved high-figures from other parties, including the DP’s Mao and the UPC’s Otunnu – who were arrested too – as well as activists from various parties
doing the bulk of the mobilisation efforts on the ground. This cooperation was all the more surprising because of the deep animosity between opposition parties ahead of the elections, notably illustrated by the failure of the IPC and the emergence of the Suubi pressure group during the previous election campaign (Beardsworth 2018: 91–96).

In this context, the fact that opposition parties were able to work together during the Walk-to-Work protests, both at the leadership and the grassroots levels, is an interesting feat. It was also the first time that civil society allied with popular protests, which was possible due to the non-partisan nature of grievances and the violent state response (Branch & Mampilly 2015: 134–135). Contrary to the Trop c’est trop coalition in Burkina Faso, where civil society was the main driving force, Walk-to-Work in Uganda was started and driven by opposition parties, with civil society joining in while loudly proclaiming their non-political nature. Branch and Mampilly (2015: 136–137) argued that ‘political parties, and a few key politicians in particular, remained the only agents capable of generating popular political mobilization’, while ‘no prominent individual aside from party leaders was willing to actually take to the streets [...] At no time in April were NGO leaders, church leaders, or business associations seen walking’ (idem: 139).

Yet, despite the high-level coordination within A4C, the protests lacked community-level organisation: there was ‘no one planning day-to-day actions, and, in fact, no organization even as the protests continued’ (Branch & Mampilly 2015: 133). The protest revolved increasingly around the figure of Besigye, and therefore fizzled out when Besigye had to be flown out to Nairobi for medical treatment (Perrot 2014: 426). Other opposition leaders made scattered attempts to carry on the protests, but none caught on (Branch & Mampilly 2015: 141–142). The more recent Defiance campaign and wave of scattered protests that occurred since the 2016 elections have
seen some opposition leaders coalesce, notably a section of DP activists and MPs who rallied behind Besigye in the name of the Struggle. But this has been counteracted by deep divisions within both parties over strategy.

These divisions have also directly weakened the existing formal institutions, such as the LOP and the Shadow Cabinet (see 6.3), in sharp contrast to the Burkinabè CFOP which fostered inter-party cooperation. In 2016, following the disputed presidential elections, while the party’s organs under the leadership of Muntu re-appointed Winnie Kiiza as LOP, a section of the FDC called for a rejection of the official results and the boycott of institutions including Parliament. They also refused the label ‘opposition’ – as they claimed to have won the presidential elections – favouring instead the term ‘minority’. Later on, the pro-defiance faction of FDC, which advocated for extra-parliamentary activism as a way forward after the 2016 elections, announced the formation of a People’s Government. The People’s Government was perceived as an informal government-in-waiting – the supposed nature of the Shadow Cabinet – with an FDC activist explaining:

‘The People’s Government remains a stand-by force. After the 2016 elections, we made clear our victory had been stolen and we would work to reclaim it. The People’s Government ensures there is no vacuum. If we reclaimed our victory, we would be ready to take the mantle of power.’ (int. UG86, Kampala, 26/05/2018)

The People’s Government included non-FDC politicians who supported Besigye’s candidacy, such as Betty Nambooze, the DP Jinja Municipality MP, and Erias Lukwago, the independent Kampala Lord Mayor. Some figures are both in the formal Shadow Cabinet and in the informal People’s Government, with different portfolios, illustrating how these two institutions are distinct but confused.
In summary, while opposition parties have failed to form multiparty electoral coalitions in both Burkina Faso and Uganda, they have at times managed to coordinate and collaborate with civil society organisations. The formation of the G14 and the Collectif in Burkina Faso in the late 1990s and the Walk-to-Work protests led by A4C in Uganda have been rather successful in bringing opposition parties and civil society organisations together along an anti-incumbent cleavage. Contrary to electoral coalitions, which are vote-seeking and therefore necessarily pit party leaders against one another for the flagbearer’s spot, protest coalitions can be more inclusive and cohesive.

Instances of cooperation among parties and between parties and civil society have been the most successful at pushing the regime. In Burkina Faso, in the two instances when civil society and opposition parties formed a coalition and actively cooperated, the regime had to give in, at least partially. Trop c’est trop led to important electoral reforms (though they were later reversed), and the insurrection resulted in Compaoré’s resignation. In both cases, there was a significant coordination of efforts across opposition parties and civil society. This corresponds to the findings of Simons and Tule (cited by Wienkoop (2019: 16)) that incumbents’ attempts to meddle with term limits were successfully fought back when opposition parties and civil society combined forces. We can also see the importance of coordination between politicians, civil society, and other actors from the work of Nasong’o (2007) on the struggle for constitutional reform in Kenya, and Sishuwa (2020) on the term-limit debate in Zambia.

In contrast, the 2011 crisis in Burkina Faso did not bring in any meaningful result for the opposition, because it was too disparate. In Uganda, the Walk-to-Work protests were impressive and occasioned an unprecedented alliance of opposition parties and
civil society organisations. However, the movement lost momentum when Besigye had to step away, showing the lack of sustainable structures to organise the movement.

Finally, while the formal institution of the CFOP in Burkina Faso provided such a structure to foster cooperation and facilitate mobilisation, no similar mechanism exists in Uganda. The LOP and Shadow Cabinet’s prerogatives are confined to the perimeters of Parliament, while informal platforms such as the People’s Government are ill-defined and poorly understood across the board.

7.3 Opposition parties and regime trajectories

Throughout this dissertation, I have analysed opposition parties in Burkina Faso and Uganda from various angles in order to better understand the constraints that they face, how they are organised, and how they operate. I have argued that opposition parties in hybrid regimes should be thoroughly investigated, beyond their attributed weakness, if we are to understand the role that they can play in democratisation processes.

Democratisation can be brought in by two types of processes, or a mix of both: a sudden revolution brought forward by mass mobilisation (Della Porta 2016), or a slower reform of the regime through the strengthening of institutions and democratic norms, exemplified by Lindberg’s (2009) ‘democratisation by elections’ paradigm. These approaches echo the strategic choices that opposition parties face in a hybrid regime, described in Chapter 6: they can participate in the institutions – even though they are set up in a way that gives the incumbent an advantage – or they can use anti-system methods such as protests and civil disobedience. As we have seen, they often use both concomitantly. The regimes of Compaoré in Burkina Faso and Museveni in
Uganda are particularly interesting cases to compare in that regard, considering their diverging trajectories during the period covered by this study.

In Uganda, a section of the opposition has defended a reformist approach – pushing to build party structures, taking part in elections, and biding their time until Museveni is gone. However, these institutions do not appear to be more democratic over time: the electoral commission remains at Museveni’s mercy, the fairness of the elections has not improved since the return to multipartyism, and the level of repression of opposition activities appears to have increased. This shows that the regime is not moving toward more democracy, and instead that Museveni is ‘not even faking it anymore’ (Abrahamsen & Bareebe 2016). This is also demonstrated by the recent downgrading of the country’s status by Freedom House (2019) from ‘partly free’ to ‘not free’.

Meanwhile, others among the opposition have defended a more activist approach, focusing on the ‘Struggle’ and presenting themselves as a liberation movement (The Observer 07/11/2019). By taking to the streets, during the 2011 Walk-to-Work protests or the 2016 Defiance campaign for example, the opposition has faced violence and visible repression. This has led civil society organisations to become more political, and the international community to be wary of endorsing Museveni’s regime. For example, despite ‘pull[ing] its punches’ during a press conference (Cheeseman et al. 29/04/2016), the EU Electoral Observation Mission criticised the conduct of the elections in its report in the following terms:

‘At the same time, the Electoral Commission (EC) lacked independence and transparency, whereupon the elections fell short of international standards for the conduct of democratic elections at key stages. Furthermore, state actors were instrumental in creating an intimidating atmosphere for both voters and
candidates, and police used excessive force against opposition, media and the
general public, justifying it as a “preventive measure”. This violated fundamental
freedoms of movement, expression and assembly, and curbed access to
information.’ (EU EOM 2016)

More recently, the figure of Bobi Wine’s has been well publicised by Western media. The narrative offered by politicised artists plays well among foreign readerships, as the examples of the Balai Citoyen in Burkina Faso and Y en a marre in Senegal previously showed (Wienkoop & Bertrand 16/05/2018). While it is hard to assess Bobi Wine’s real chances on the ground, it is undeniable that his movement and experience have greatly contributed to raising international attention to Museveni’s repressive regime (VOA News 26/12/2019; The Guardian 06/01/2020; Rolling Stone 01/04/2020).

In contrast, in Burkina Faso, Compaoré’s regime appeared to become more open over the years: the repression became less intense (despite not disappearing completely), the opposition gained ground progressively, and the UPC was able to organise with much more ease than older parties could in the previous decades (see Chapter 3). In the words of Loada (2020: 105), ‘the democratic institutions which [Compaoré] had erected to attempt to entrench his power in the end took on a life of their own, and ultimately slipped beyond his control’. It was particularly true of the Constitution and more particularly of its Article 37 providing term-limits, illustrated by the prominence of legalist arguments in activists’ discourse during protests in 2014 (Brett 2020). This is in line with Posner and Young’s (2018) findings that institutions such as term limits do constrain incumbents, and that even when they are unwilling to respect them, they seek to change the rules through legal mechanisms rather than simply ignoring them.
Burkina Faso was, until October 2014, a case of a hybrid regime where opposition parties and other institutions were pushing for reform. Until the last hour, the protests that led to the toppling of the Compaoré regime were not of an insurrectionist nature: they were merely aimed at preventing the vote on the constitutional amendment. The attempt by Bénéwendé Sankara to build upon the 2011 protests to call for Compaoré’s resignation – embolden by the Tunisian revolution – had failed to gain momentum (see 3.1), and the focus in 2014 was very much on protecting term-limits to ensure a more level playing field for the next elections scheduled in 2015. Consequently, when Compaoré announced he was pulling the controversial bill on the evening of 30 October 2014 – after the National Assembly building had been burnt down by protestors – Diabré, as CFOP, initially called for the protestors to go home as their objective had been reached (Harsch 2017: 208). But the masses in the street and other actors within the CFOP saw an opening, and pushed him to call for the immediate resignation of Compaoré (Bonnecase 2015). The opposition had seen an opportunity, and the death of protesters had raised the stakes to a point of no return (Wienkoop & Bertrand 16/05/2018).

The insurrection in Burkina Faso cannot be fully explained by looking solely at opposition parties. The defection of key CDP officials, the historical legacy of a radical and powerful civil society, the army’s decision not to repress protests, and the motivation of the urban masses that actually went and stayed in the streets all need to be considered to understand this event. However, we can still analyse the specific role of opposition parties. In particular, I argue that the fact that they were able to coalesce under the CFOP banner and work with civil society around the issue of term limits allowed participation and protest to feed each other and contributed to this outcome. As I have shown earlier in this chapter, the CFOP institution provided a more stable,
institutionalised framework for cooperation between opposition parties, and for coordination between the political opposition and civil society. The CFOP was bolstered by the UPC’s good results in the 2012 legislative elections, which gave Diabré a stronger hand as CFOP than his predecessor. Opposition MPs provided this status, but also contributed directly to the opposition’s mobilisation capacity by funding the organisation of protests (see 6.3). The defection of Roch Marc Christian Kaboré and his peers and the creation of the MPP gave an impetus to anti-incumbent protest – by providing additional resources, increasing the opposition’s mobilisation capacity, and signalling the vulnerability of the regime – but this energised a movement that already existed.

Uganda and Burkina Faso therefore display different regime trajectories: in Burkina Faso, Compaoré’s regime became less repressive – though not necessarily more democratic – and the opposition was able to gain ground and organise. Compaoré’s attempt to meddle with constitutional term limits led to sustained anti-incumbent protests led by the CFOP, which involved civil society and regime defectors, and culminated in a popular insurrection and political transition. In contrast, Uganda has, since the return to multipartyism, paradoxically displayed a more repressive environment for opposition parties (Keating 2011; Abrahamsen & Bareebe 2016). In spite of this, opposition parties continue to subsist and organise, though they remain fragmented.

**Conclusion**

In summary, this last chapter has looked at two important dynamics contributing to opposition performance in hybrid regimes – party endurance and opposition coordination – and discussed the regime’s trajectory in each country.
Drawing from previous findings outlined throughout this thesis, I have argued that the sustainability of a party’s core and the existence of a leadership turnover norm are two important drivers of a party’s ability to endure. Parties with a sustainable core, such as grounded historical values, and an entrenched leadership turnover norm are most likely to endure. The DP in Uganda illustrates that well: despite losing a lot of ground to the FDC since 2006, it still benefits from a core support base that exists across ethnic, regional, and religious lines; and the leadership and MPs are amongst the most active politicians, even outside of electoral periods. Parties with a sustainable core, but no norm allowing for a circulation of elites, encourages fragmentation and party proliferation, exemplified by the UNIR-PS and the broader Sankarist party family in Burkina Faso.

On the other hand, parties with a less sustainable core, such as those revolving around the ideas of change and credibility, may find it more difficult to endure as their credibility is likely to decrease the longer they stay in opposition – and therefore fail to provide the change promised – and this idea of change is tied to the incumbent, forcing the party to reinvent itself in case of a regime change. Even if the party has a leadership turnover norm, as in the case of the FDC, this norm is eroded by the fact that the party’s core is intrinsically connected to its founder – in that case Besigye. While financial concerns obviously play a role in explaining party endurance, it is not a straightforward relationship. Rather than the amount of money a party has, the origin of these resources matters more, because it influences how leverage is distributed within the party.

While party endurance is a desirable outcome at the level of individual parties, the endurance of small parties is not necessarily a good thing for opposition performance overall. Indeed, as we have seen, in order to credibly challenge the incumbent, the
opposition needs to be united. Smaller but resilient parties have sometimes blocked coalition-building processes in order to protect their organisation’s identity and base, as Beardsworth (2018) found in the case of Uganda. Electoral coalitions are often difficult to sustain due to these concerns, and opposition parties may find it easier to work together without electoral pressures to consider. Indeed, opposition parties have collaborated through formal institutions, such as the LOP and the Shadow Cabinet in Uganda and the CFOP in Burkina Faso. They have also joined forces together and with civil society organisations during protests such as Trop c’est trop in Burkina Faso (1999) and Walk-to-Work in Uganda (2011). In Burkina Faso, the two dynamics have successfully nurtured each other, with the formal CFOP institution spearheading protests that led to the 2014 insurrection and Compaoré’s resignation. In Uganda, the situation has been markedly different, as protest initiatives and parliamentary frameworks have been at odds with each other, and the inter-party cooperation at play has only highlighted intra-party divisions rather than built bridges between them.

Ultimately, the two regimes at hand have followed a different trajectory. In Burkina Faso, the opposition was able to cooperate through the CFOP framework and, in alliance with civil society organisations and regime defectors, to bring down Compaoré’s regime when he attempted to change the Constitution. In Uganda, the regime has been more repressive, while opposition parties have increasingly resorted to protests. However, while the 2011 Walk-to-Work protests saw an effective cooperation of parties and – to a certain extent – civil society, more recent movements have not yet managed to solve the problem of fragmentation.

One reason why opposition parties tend to be dismissed as agents of change is that on many occasions, regime change tends to be precipitated by defecting ruling elite (Kelly 2020). In Burkina Faso, the defection of key CDP figures and the formation of
the MPP were indeed a critical juncture in bringing about the 2014 insurrection (Andrews & Honig 2019; Wienkoop 2019). This dynamic also explains why Mbabazi’s candidacy in the 2016 Ugandan election originally sparked hope in opposition circles, and worry in the NRM camp (Oloka-Onyango 2016: 112). Yet, such a split may not have occurred or had the same impact without a pre-existing opposition that had already been denouncing the regime and mobilising dissent, therefore making it less risky to defect and having already laid the foundations of the insurrection much earlier.
Conclusion:

Studying opposition parties ‘without prejudice’

This dissertation has addressed various aspects of opposition party organisation, but the different nuances of my arguments all revolve around an overarching theme. The categorisation of opposition parties in these regimes as merely weak obscures a more complex story of how they operate and interact, and what their existence and endurance mean for democratisation prospects.

The DP in Uganda is arguably weak: it retains a handful of MPs and support in its historical stronghold of Buganda, but elsewhere the party struggles to even have a local presence. The last time a DP candidate was on the presidential ticket, in 2011, Mao received less than 2% of the vote. Yet, the DP is also the oldest party in Uganda, and provides a rare example of longevity and partial institutionalisation. It retains some weight on the national political board, and ignoring its internal dynamics would prevent us from understanding the outcome of coalition-building processes, as illustrated by Beardsworth (2018).

The Burkinabé opposition has also been characterised by weak electoral results and a low mobilisation capacity, exemplified by their inability to build an anti-incumbent movement from the disparate grievances of the 2011 crisis. Even the UPC, which was able to organise enough of a local presence ahead of the 2012 elections to gain a sizable foothold in the legislature and local councils, had insufficient time to establish solid

organisational roots. And still, it was the political opposition under the leadership of Diabré which managed to topple Compaoré in a surprising twist to the term-limit debate rocking the country in 2014. While it does not by all means mean that these parties were necessarily strong, it does highlight the necessity to analyse opposition parties beyond such a frame.

This conclusive chapter highlights the main findings of my research and its theoretical contribution, and outlines steps for further research. I start by summarising the key arguments developed throughout the seven chapters of this thesis. I then discuss in more detail the way my research contributes to our collective knowledge and understanding of opposition parties and hybrid regimes. Finally, I end with a short discussion of the broader implications of my work, the questions it raises, and the road still ahead.

**Summary of the thesis**

In this dissertation, I set out to understand the role that opposition parties play within a hybrid regime in a broad manner. This endeavour stemmed from the realisation that opposition parties in hybrid regimes across Africa tended to be ignored, or dismissed as weak (Van de Walle & Butler 1999; Randall & Svåsand 2002c; Mozaffar et al. 2003; Rakner & Van de Walle 2009). I believe that, as Riedl (2018: 41) rightly points out, this assumption ‘is an error that has serious consequences for understanding contemporary politics’ on the continent. Despite a growing body of research on opposition parties driven by a new generation of scholars (e.g. LeBas 2013; Beardsworth 2018; Bob-Milliar 2019; Kelly 2020), the question of how opposition parties emerge, operate, and endure within the perimeters of a hybrid regime had yet to be properly examined. With this ambition, I set out to analyse the
role of opposition parties in African hybrid regimes, using a qualitative, comparative, and inductive approach. I decided to go beyond classic regional clusters, and to cross linguistic and colonial lines in order to discuss hybrid regimes in their diversity. I selected two country-cases – Burkina Faso under Compaoré and Uganda under Museveni – and collected empirical data on four specific party-cases – selecting in each country one historical opponent (the DP in Uganda, the UNIR-PS in Burkina Faso), and one more recent party having emerged from the ruling elite (the Ugandan FDC and the Burkinabè UPC).

The core of this thesis was laid out in five parts. First, I started by addressing the challenging context in which these opposition parties exist and operate. This context is characterised by a quasi-fusion of the state apparatus and the ruling party, both under the personal influence of the incumbent, namely Compaoré in Burkina Faso and Museveni in Uganda. This fused incumbent-state has a range of tools at its disposal to hamper opposition forces, from outright repression to subtle co-optation, election rigging, and covert infiltration. The ability of the regime to adjust its reaction, switching between a carrot and a stick depending on the circumstances, increases the level of uncertainty faced by opposition parties who have to adapt to this fluid and insecure environment (Lupu & Riedl 2013).

With these contextual constraints in mind, I then set out to better understand the nature of opposition parties within these regimes. I looked at what these parties were, quite simply, all about: what they were created for, and the source of their identity and legitimacy in the eyes of their leaders and activists. I defined this as the party’s core – a slightly different concept from Lupu’s (2013) party brand or the more widespread notion of party goals (Strøm 1990). The existing types of opposition party foundations in the literature, such as ethnic identities (Horowitz 1985), rebel movements (Manning
1998) or labour movements (LeBas 2013) did not fit with the cases at hand. These parties cannot be reduced to either personal vehicles or clientelist endeavours. An inductive approach enabled me to identify two new types of party cores: historical values and credible change prospects. In the first case, opposition parties are formed to defend a set of historical values that resonate with their membership and, to some extent, to the society at large. This is illustrated by the DP in Uganda, whose motto of ‘Truth and Justice’ is entrenched in party leaders’ and activists’ political engagement. It is also at play in the UNIR-PS in Burkina Faso which is built upon values attributed to Thomas Sankara: integrity, patriotism, hard work. Meanwhile, other parties are built around the idea of change, reform, *alternance* and the credible prospect of delivering on the same. Ironically, newer parties with roots in the ruling elite, such as the Burkinabè UPC and the Ugandan FDC, managed to position themselves as the most credible agents of change, building upon their resources and insider’s advantage.

These findings enable us to understand the nature of political parties beyond the programmatic versus non-programmatic dichotomy. Even though these parties may not have clear traditional ideological leanings and their political manifestoes can be vague or similar to one another, this does not necessarily mean that they do not have an organisational identity and purpose going beyond ethnic ties, clientelist interests, or personal ambitions. Understanding the nature of parties is a necessary complement to the study of party activism motivations (e.g. Bob-Milliar 2012b) and is a key driver of party endurance, as I explained later (Chapter 7).

The next step in my enquiry was to observe opposition party-building processes, and to analyse what these processes tell us about the nature of these parties and the power dynamics within them. The literature provides a few models of party organisation, such as Duverger’s (1981) mass and cadre party models, and Katz and
Mair’s (1995) cartel party. Opposition parties in Uganda and Burkina Faso appear to be elite-driven, yet are faced with the necessity to build local branches across the country to expand their mobilisation capacity. The fact that opposition parties do not have a strong presence across the country, that their local branches are inexistent or non-operational outside of electoral periods, and that they are poorly organised and institutionalised, are some of the reasons why parties are often branded as weak (Randall & Svåsand 2002c: 37).

Observing these parties’ strategies to build local structures, the origin of their financial resources, and their decision-making processes allows us to analyse the relations between ‘the party on the ground’ and ‘the party in central office’ (Katz & Mair 1993). Parties whose financial resources are mostly tied to the party’s central leadership and, later on, an elected elite interested in maintaining their local constituency, may find it difficult to expand their network beyond their regional stronghold. Parties such as the Burkinabè UPC, that co-opt local figures and rely on them investing their own resources in building party structures, may be able to build a party organisation more quickly, but at a hidden cost: local structures may be more loyal to the local party elite than to the central leadership. The relationship between the central and local party elite is a dimension to consider when studying parties’ internal organisation, in addition to factionalism at play at the national level.

I then turned my attention to what opposition parties actually do in hybrid regimes such as Uganda and Burkina Faso. One of the main reasons that opposition parties are considered weak is that they fail to perform classic party functions. But this analysis fails to consider the regime context: the opposition does not try and help sustain the broader system and serve as a loyal opposition within its perimeters. Instead, they are trying to push the boundaries of the system and topple the regime along with the
incumbent, the two being deeply connected. We therefore need a new framework of analysis that encompasses the contribution that these parties can make in this perspective. I identified three key functions opposition parties perform, based upon an analysis of opposition parties’ strategies in Uganda and Burkina Faso. I found that some of the things that opposition parties can do is denouncing the regime, mobilising dissent, and preparing for succession. They do so through a combination of activities, some of them involving their participation in the system (e.g. running for election, sitting in parliament), others a protest against it (e.g. boycott, social movements).

These two approaches can be seen as contradictory and counter-productive: in Uganda, the fact that divided opposition parties were participating and protesting concurrently was used to criticise their inconsistency. However, the case of Burkina Faso demonstrates that protest and participation can be complementary and an effective way to challenge the regime, ultimately contributing to the popular insurrection that forced Compaoré’s resignation in October 2014. This mixed approach illustrates the blurred distinction between a ‘loyal’ and an ‘irresponsible’ opposition within these hybrid regimes. Just like incumbents create and manipulate formal institutions that they mix with informal practices in order to remain in power, opposition parties take part and manipulate these formal institutions and concomitantly use informal, anti-system strategies such as boycott, protests, or civil disobedience to maintain pressure on the incumbent.

In the last chapter of this thesis, I analysed how the nature, organisation, and activities of opposition parties interact and influence individual parties’ capacity to endure, their collective capacity to cooperate, and what this means for the regime’s trajectory. Party endurance, institutionalisation, or adaptability are arguably a necessary condition of democratisation (Randall & Svåsand 2002b; Lindberg 2007).
Meanwhile, opposition unity is seen as necessary to effectively challenge the incumbent, which has led to a growing interest in opposition electoral coalitions (Van de Walle 2006; Arriola 2013; Souaré 2017; Beardsworth 2018). I argue that the endurance of opposition parties is largely informed by the sustainability of their core and the existence of a leadership turnover norm, both of which are influenced by the origins of their financial resources. Parties with a sustainable core and a circulation of elite are more likely to endure, even if they have low resources that restrict their spread. Parties without a sustainable core will be more reliant on their founder’s credibility, which erodes the chances of having a leadership turnover and makes the party less likely to endure beyond its founder’s lifespan. Parties with a sustainable core but no leadership turnover are more prone to fragmentation.

While party endurance is desirable to allow for a stable party system, the endurance of small parties can actually be a challenge for opposition cooperation. Indeed, organisational interests (such as protecting their support base and seats) can come into conflict with the greater good (compromise over seats, supporting a common candidate). This echoes Beardsworth’s (2018) argument that newly-elected party presidents and internal factionalism can block coalition-building processes.

Yet, while opposition coordination has systematically failed or collapsed in both Uganda and Burkina Faso, opposition parties have managed to work together and with other stakeholders – most notably civil society – for non-electoral purposes. While, in Uganda, formal institutions like the LOP have been weakened by the existence of parallel informal structures such as the People’s Government and, more broadly, by internal divisions within the FDC, in Burkina Faso, the CFOP institution has strengthened the opposition’s capacity to coordinate and mobilise, by linking opposition stakeholders within and outside parliament and fuelling a palliative
polarisation of the political landscape. This ultimately led to a regime change in Burkina Faso. Meanwhile, Uganda experienced a reverse trajectory, and has seen its status downgraded to ‘not free’ by Freedom House in 2019 amidst increased repression of political opponents.

These regime trajectories cannot be understood solely on the basis of opposition parties’ actions, and have also been influenced – one way or another – by structural factors and the agency of other stakeholders, including civil society organisations, international organisations and foreign governments, and the incumbents and ruling parties themselves. Yet, the successful mobilisation of Burkinabè opposition parties in the face of democratic backsliding, and the subsequent resignation of Blaise Compaoré, tell us something about how opposition parties can contribute to democratisation. By investing and using institutions such as the CFOP to foster inter-party cooperation, and by using both participation and protest in a mutually reinforcing fashion, Burkinabè opposition parties were able to lead a growing and ultimately successful anti-incumbent movement. They were able to invest in democratic processes and contribute to the protection of democratic norms – including constitutional term-limits and alternance – even while using civil disobedience and popular protests (Chapter 7).

In contrast, in Uganda, opposition parties have so far been unable to make the most of the institutions they participate in, or of the civil disobedience campaigns they have launched. While they certainly face a repressive environment, their internal factionalism and inter-party rivalry have prevented coordination among and beyond opposition parties (Beardsworth 2016). Whereas in Burkina Faso, institutions ‘took on a life of their own, and ultimately slipped beyond [Compaoré’s] control’ (Loada 2020: 105), in Uganda Museveni has managed to retain a firm grip on institutions such
as the judiciary, the electoral commission, or the constitution. He has also responded to the opposition’s use of protests with increasing repression – illustrated by the adoption of legislation such as POMA and the blatant use of violence and arbitrary arrests (Chapter 3). In summary, the difference of outcome for each country’s regime trajectory can be explained by a mix of structure and agency, of both opposition and ruling parties, and by their interaction, in which opposition parties can play a significant – and too often overlooked – role.

**Theoretical contribution**

This thesis makes a broad contribution to the scholarships on African politics, hybrid regimes, and political parties. The study of hybrid regimes has mostly focused on how incumbents create and manipulate formal institutions (e.g. Ottaway 2003; Levitsky & Way 2010a), and little attention has been given to the role opposition parties can perform towards democratisation. Meanwhile, opposition parties across sub-Saharan Africa – when they have not been simply ignored – tend to be considered universally weak (Olukoshi 1998a; Randall & Svåsand 2002c; Rakner & Van de Walle 2009). In contrast to these tendencies, this dissertation has looked – not at what we might expect opposition parties to do – but at the constraints they face, how they operate, and what they actually do.

I have argued that the fusion of the state and the incumbent which creates an unlevel playing field (Levitsky & Way 2010b) makes it impossible to categorise the opposition as either ‘legitimate’ (Parry 1997) or ‘irresponsible’ (Sartori 1966). Instead, the hybridity of the regime makes for a hybrid approach to opposition: opposition parties take part in formal institutions and attempt to manipulate them to their advantage, and concomitantly use informal, anti-system strategies to maintain pressure on the
incumbent. In this context, opposition parties are expected to perform classic party functions (Randall & Svåsand 2002c) and risk involuntarily helping to sustain the regime they oppose by performing legitimation and moderation functions (Albrecht 2005). Yet, as LeBas (2013) has argued, ‘strong’ opposition parties can also prevent the incumbent from retaining total control over the pace of democratisation. I have analysed to what extent they can do so, by addressing the fact that the opposition has been universally considered ‘weak’ in these regimes.

I assessed a range of dimensions of opposition party weakness found in the literature, such as their non-programmatic and short-lived nature, their lack of local structure and organisation outside of election periods, their under-performance, or their fragmentation and inability to unite. I have argued that these opposition parties derive their legitimacy from a certain ‘core’, such as historical values or the credible prospect of change for example, and have a more complex and grounded organisational identity than clientelist, ethnic, or personalistic ties. I have also demonstrated that opposition parties have different approaches to party-building, and that this is associated with different dynamics between the central party and local branches. I have observed a range of activities at the opposition’s disposal, and shown how these parties perform key functions within hybrid regimes. Despite weak organisations and limited national penetration, some parties endure. Opposition parties may not succeed in building electoral coalitions but manage to unite during protests and work together within institutions. By unpacking what opposition parties are formed around, how they are organised and how they operate, it becomes possible to analyse the complex dynamics driving opposition parties’ ability to endure and to coalesce in order to effectively challenge the incumbent.
My overall take is that even small, poorly organised, or ‘weak’ opposition parties should be considered and can play a part in challenging the incumbent’s control over institutions, and therefore contribute to a non-linear democratisation process. In the worst of times, they may be powerless to do more than ‘piss off the regime’ (int. BF28, Bokin, 06/04/2018). In other cases, they might ‘keep the dream alive’ (int. UG89, Constituency, 2016). On better days, they can be ‘the engine pulling the wagons’ of a popular insurrection toppling the regime (int. BF26, Yako, 05/04/2018). This contributes to theories presented by authors such as Bunce and Wolchik (2010: 59) and Loada (2020) that democratic institutions permitted by incumbents, including opposition parties, can take on a life of their own and generate uncontrollable expectations, ultimately testing the resilience of a hybrid regime.

In making this argument, I have made four broad contributions. First, this dissertation contributes to our collective knowledge on African parties. As I have shown in Chapter 1, this topic is still under-explored despite generating growing interest. My research feeds our understanding of African parties by producing empirical knowledge on four specific parties in Burkina Faso and in Uganda, and by uncovering dynamics and raising questions applicable to other cases across the continent. My research feeds into the stream of work by authors such as Elischer, LeBas, Bob-Milliar, Paget, Riedl, and Beardsworth, and contributes to our understanding of what parties are, how they operate, and what they can achieve. In particular, in this dissertation I have brought forward the necessity to look at the internal organisation of parties, including the strategies parties employ to build local branches, and the relations between the central leadership and the local structures. This speaks to the recent work of Paget (2019b, 2020) on Chadema in Tanzania and Beardsworth (2020) on the UPND in Zambia. My research also offers new ways to
analyse opposition parties’ likelihood to endure – bringing forth the importance of parties’ organisational identity, interests, and internal dynamics – and to ponder the opposition’s ability to coalesce through formal and informal networks.

My research addresses a common shortfall that has characterised the limited study of African parties, by going beyond a focus on elections. Because opposition parties are perceived as ephemeral organisations that close shop between elections, their organisation and mobilisation are mostly studied during campaign periods. Elections are, of course, important political moments for opposition parties, and can even be ‘vehicles for change’ (Cheeseman 2010) or bring about ‘Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes’ (Howard & Roessler 2006). Yet, this focus has ignored what opposition parties do between elections, such as taking part in protests and sitting in parliament. My research has used a broader frame and analysed opposition parties’ organisational structures and financial mechanisms beyond the scope of campaigns. I have also looked at these parties’ organisation and operation across the timespan of the regime, allowing me to identify changes of strategy over time. This approach recognises the importance of historical legacies highlighted by Riedl (2014) and LeBas (2013), but also the internal complexities of party organisations.

A second – and related – contribution is to move the debate on African parties beyond their reductionist classifications as weak, ethnic, personalistic, or (non-) programmatic. Hybrid regimes are characterised by a fusion of state institutions and the ruling party at the heart of the unlevel playing field (Levitsky & Way 2010b), which must be considered when assessing the strength or weakness of opposition parties. I demonstrate how this fusion is the source of many constraints facing opposition parties. More broadly, my research has unpacked the notion of opposition weakness by addressing various aspects of opposition parties’ operations that are
generally considered weak. My inductive approach has allowed me to move beyond the programmatic versus non-programmatic classification of parties, and has shown that even parties with a loose manifesto and no clear ideological attachment can have an organisational identity and legitimacy grounded in something that I have called a party’s ‘core’. The parties I have studied here can be seen to be grounded either in historical values, or in the credible promise to bring change. This expands our understanding of what opposition parties stand for, how they emerge, and around what they are formed (e.g. LeBas 2013).

Third, my research contributes to democratisation debates by highlighting the role that opposition parties can play in bringing about regime change. The literature on the democratic transitions of the early 1990s tended to omit opposition parties for the good reason that few of them existed and operated during the military or single-party regimes of the previous decades across the African continent. This led authors such as Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) to focus their attention on civil society movements, incumbents, or the international community. Carothers (2006) later proclaimed political parties to be the ‘weakest link’ of democratisation, echoing the conclusions of Randall and Svåsand (2002c). Yet there cannot be accountability or choice without a credible alternative, which means that any hope for democratisation requires a credible and relevant opposition (Rakner & Van de Walle 2009: 109). This assumption has fed the work of international organisations that support opposition political parties as a way to strengthen or build democracy (Carothers 2006; Rakner & Svåsand 2010). Yet, this assistance has tended to assume that opposition parties can and should perform the same functions as in a consolidated democracy, and has sometimes ignored the specific constraints these parties face and their internal dynamics. As my dissertation shows, recalibrating our understanding of how parties are formed and organised; what their
identity, legitimacy, and endurance is based upon; how they operate; and what they can achieve is necessary in order to improve democracy promotion approaches.

The fourth broad contribution that I make is to the study of hybrid regimes globally, both in terms of findings from my research likely to be replicable beyond my own cases, and in terms of methods and approaches to study such regimes and contexts. Scholars studying hybrid regimes have argued that incumbents allow for the creation of democratic institutions that they manipulate in order to remain in power. Yet opposition parties can in turn manipulate these institutions to push back against the regime and force through some reform. My dissertation contributes to the growing conversation about what parties actually do in these regimes. Bunce and Wolchik (2010) and LeBas (2013) have argued that strong opposition parties could play a part in disrupting the plans of, or even defeating, incumbents in hybrid systems. My research shows that opposition parties perform some important functions within these regimes. By denouncing the flaws of the system, mobilising dissent, and preparing for succession, they constrain – even if in limited ways – the incumbent’s actions. By organising and mobilising support, they show that an alternative is possible. By engaging the regime through a mix of protests and participation, they contribute to expose its authoritarian nature and weaken its foundations.

Several of my findings are likely to be replicated beyond the two cases at hand. The party-building approaches I uncovered (Chapter 5), and their influence on a party’s internal organisation and likelihood to endure, may be significant in other countries. The UPC’s approach to co-opt local elite in a ‘franchising’ approach to party-building echoes the strategies used by other parties in Zambia (Beardsworth 2020) and Tanzania (Paget 2020). The functions that opposition parties perform in Uganda and Burkina Faso (Chapter 6) certainly inform us on opposition functions in hybrid regimes more
broadly. My argument that there is more to the opposition parties I study than the figure of their leaders, ethnic appeals, and empty manifestos (Chapter 4) sheds light on why other opposition parties elsewhere may endure against the odds. The important issues I discussed, including values, history, hope for change, and credibility, are important dimensions of political parties beyond my two case (LeBas 2013; Paget 2019; Sischuwa 2020), suggesting these types of core will matter for other parties than the four I have studied.

This dissertation also has methodological implications for wider debates about hybrid regimes. It demonstrates the need to move beyond conceptual debates about various categorisations and terms used to describe and classify regimes, and to understand how these regimes work and how stakeholders and institutions operate within them, feeding a growing literature interested in explaining how things actually work (Bierschenk and De Sardan 2014; Cheeseman 2018). It also shows the need for more qualitative and inductive research in order to understand how institutions function within these kinds of regimes, something not sufficiently explored in quantitative or normative work. Finally, it argues that we should study opposition parties as meaningful actors, which endure despite the odds and influence of regime trajectories.

Expanding this line of research across and beyond the African continent therefore appears necessary to further our collective understanding of opposition parties and their role within hybrid regimes, and to address the unavoidable limitations of this thesis. Though a qualitative approach has many benefits (Chapter 2), it necessarily limits the scope of data collection to a handful of cases, which has therefore curtailed my capacity to draw generalisations beyond the four parties or two countries at hand. Still, as I have discussed, my research has highlighted dynamics that can certainly
inform our understanding of the role of opposition parties in other hybrid regimes across the continent, and beyond. Additionally, the broad focus of my research, which covered many aspects of opposition parties’ formation, organisation, and operation, has meant that a few of these dynamics could not be adequately addressed to their full measure. This includes issues such as party funding and alternative party identities – two features that I intend to study further in future work.

**The road ahead**

As this conclusion has shown, despite the broad range of issues covered in this dissertation, a lot remains to be uncovered in future research. On the basis of my inductive approach, this section outlines a few dynamics I would be particularly keen to investigate further, so as to better understand how opposition parties interact with other stakeholders and appropriate new political dynamics, and how this affects their role as agents of change.

My work has focused almost exclusively on opposition parties, and more work needs to be done on their interactions with other stakeholders, including civil society organisations, religious and customary leaders, and international partners. As I have alluded to, coordination with civil society organisations – including trade unions, NGOs, student organisations, religious leaders, customary authorities, and others – is essential. As the case of Burkina Faso demonstrates, such coordination is possible, even when civil society and opposition parties have different roots (in contrast to the flagship cases of Zambia and Zimbabwe explored by LeBas (2013)) and when their relations are characterised by mistrust. As the 2011 Walk-to-Work protests showed in Uganda, civil society and religious leaders can become politically engaged and
denounce human rights abuses when the response from the state becomes too repressive.

Meanwhile, the role of international stakeholders, though not addressed in detail here, is important to consider. Museveni’s power has been strengthened by the support, or at least benign neglect, of the international community motivated by strategic interests (Fisher 2013, 2014). Compaoré’s resignation in 2014 happened after France had offered him a way out – a helicopter ride to neighbouring Cote d’Ivoire (Jeune Afrique 04/11/2014). The interaction of opposition parties and regional organisations, such as the African Union, ECOWAS, or the East African Community, would also deserve some attention – for example through an examination of opposition parties’ participation in regional parliaments, legal challenges brought to regional courts, or regional mediation initiatives (see Salih 2013; Ouédraogo 2016; Saidou 2018).

The dynamic and fast-changing nature of political and social dynamics in the countries at hand, and across the African continent more broadly, mean that new developments must be taken into account in future research. For example, the rapid expansion of social media offers new opportunities and challenges to opposition parties (Dwyer and Molony (eds) 2019). Meanwhile, the spread of jihadist insurgencies across the Sahel, affecting Burkina Faso since early 2015, also raises some questions regarding the state’s political response and opposition parties’ appropriation of, and mobilisation around, these issues. Finally, the question of what happens to the regime and to opposition parties after a political transition deserves further investigation: Compaoré’s regime was toppled in 2014, which opened the way for a one-year transition (Chouli 2015), and free and relatively fair elections in November 2015 (Ariotti 2016). The reconfiguration of the institutions and the party
system in the post-Compaoré era should be analysed to understand regime trajectories and democratisation prospects in the long run.

My research has identified findings and analysed dynamics based upon the cases at hand – four parties across Uganda and Burkina Faso. These findings could be further compared with research on other parties and other countries, across and beyond sub-Saharan Africa, in order to refine and strengthen my arguments and our collective understanding about the role of opposition parties in hybrid regimes and in Africa. The growing coverage of African parties in international datasets on political parties, such as the V-Party of the V-Dem Institute or the Political Party Database Project (PPDB), opens the door to further research using a broader range of methods. Meanwhile, further comparative research encompassing additional case studies would build a more comprehensive analysis of how opposition parties influence hybrid regimes’ trajectories and their democratisation prospects.

Through this dissertation, I have heeded the call made by Mamoudou Gazibo (2006: 12) to ‘study African parties without prejudice’. Following his prescription, I set out to observe opposition parties in Uganda and Burkina Faso in an inductive manner, with the purpose to ‘go and see what the field tells us’ (idem). In doing so, I have shown that more inductive research looking to analyse what political parties are and do is necessary. This will, I hope, pave the way for less prescriptive and more contextualised research on African parties and their role as agents of democratisation.


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Appendices

1. List of interviews, discussions, and observed events

*Semi-structured interviews*

int. BF01, Journalist, male, Ouagadougou, 15/03/2017
int. BF02, Journalist, male, Ouagadougou, 17/03/2017
int. BF03, civil society representative, male, Ouagadougou, 23/03/2017
int. BF04, civil society representative, male, Ouagadougou, 27/03/2017
int. BF05, international NGO representative, female, Ouagadougou, 27/03/2017
int. BF06, civil society representative, male, Ouagadougou, 28/03/2017
int. BF07, Researcher and civil society activist, male, Ouagadougou, 05/04/2017
int. BF08, party official, PDS-Metba, male, Ouagadougou, 06/04/2017
int. BF09, Researcher, male, Ouagadougou, 06/04/2017
int. BF10, party official, RDS, male, Ouagadougou, 25/04/2017
int. BF11, party activist, PDS-Metba, male, Ouagadougou, 26/04/2017a
int. BF12, party activist, PDS-Metba, male, Ouagadougou, 26/04/2017d
int. BF13, party official, Le Faso Autrement, male, Ouagadougou, 27/04/2017
int. BF14, foreign sankarist activist, male, Ouagadougou, 13/07/2017
int. BF15, Member of Parliament, UPC, male, Ouagadougou, 11/01/2018
int. BF16, party official, UNIR-PS, male, Ouagadougou, 17/01/2018
int. BF17, party official, UNIR-PS, male, Ouagadougou, 18/01/2018
int. BF18, party official, UNIR-PS, male, Ouagadougou, 22/01/2018
int. BF19, party official, UNIR-PS, female, Ouagadougou, 24/01/2018
int. BF20, party official, UNIR-PS, male, Ouagadougou, 09/02/2018
int. BF21, Journalist, male, Ouagadougou, 10/02/2018
int. BF22, Journalist, male, Ouagadougou, 12/02/2018

* Interviews conducted together.
int. BF23, civil society representative, male, Ouagadougou, 12/02/2018
int. BF24, local official, UNIR-PS, male, Yako, 04/04/2018
int. BF25, party activist, UNIR-PS, male, Yako, 05/04/2018
int. BF26, party activist, UPC, male, Yako, 05/04/2018
int. BF27, local official, UNIR-PS, male, Bokin, 06/04/2018
int. BF28, local official, UNIR-PS, male, Bokin, 06/04/2018
int. BF29, local official, UNIR-PS, male, Bokin, 06/04/2018
int. BF30, Member of Parliament, UNIR-PS, male, Ouagadougou 10/04/2018
int. BF31, party activist, UPC, male, Koudougou, 17/04/2018
int. BF32, party activist, UNIR-PS, male, Koudougou, 17/04/2018
int. BF33, party activist, UNIR-PS, male, Koudougou, 17/04/2018
int. BF34, party activist, UNIR-PS, male, Koudougou, 17/04/2018
int. BF35, party official, FFS, male, Ouagadougou, 02/07/2018
int. BF36, party official, UNIR-PS, male, Ouagadougou, 04/07/2018
int. BF37, party official, ex-UPC, male, Ouagadougou, 05/07/2018
int. BF38, Member of Parliament, UPC, male, Ouagadougou, 05/07/2018
int. BF39, party official, UNIR-PS, female, Ouagadougou, 10/07/2018
int. BF40, party official, UNIR-PS, male, Ouagadougou, 10/07/2018
int. BF41, Member of Parliament, UPC, male, Ouagadougou, 11/07/2018
int. BF42, party official, UNIR-PS, male, Ouagadougou, 19/07/2018
int. BF43, party official, UNIR-PS, male, Ouagadougou, 24/07/2018
int. BF44, Member of Parliament, UNIR-PS, male, Ouagadougou, 26/07/2018
int. BF45, Member of Parliament, UPC, female, Ouagadougou, 31/07/2018
int. BF46, Member of Parliament, UPC, male, Ouagadougou, 02/08/2018
int. BF47, Member of Parliament, UPC, male, Ouagadougou, 08/08/2018
int. BF48, party official, UNIR-PS, female, Ouagadougou, 10/12/2018
int. BF49, party official, UPC, female, Ouagadougou, 14/12/2018
int. BF50, local official, UPC, male, Garango, 17/12/2018
int. BF51, local official, UPC, male, Garango, 17/12/2018
int. BF52, party activist, UNIR-PS, male, Tenkodogo, 17/12/2018

b Interviews conducted together.
c Interviews conducted together.
d Interviews conducted together.
e Interviews conducted together.

int. BF53, party activist, UNIR-PS, female, Tenkodogo, 17/12/2018
int. BF54, local official, UPC, male, Tenkodogo, 18/12/2018
int. BF55, local official, UPC, male, Tenkodogo, 18/12/2018
int. BF56, civil society representative, male, Tenkodogo, 18/12/2018
int. BF57, party official, UPC, male, Ouagadougou, 19/12/2018

int. UG01, international NGO representative, male, Kampala, 06/04/2016
int. UG02, international NGO representative, male, Kampala, 08/04/2016
int. UG03, party official, DP, male, Kampala, 23/04/2016
int. UG04, former Supreme Court justice, male, Kampala, 31/05/2016
int. UG05, international NGO representative, male, Kampala, 14/06/2016
int. UG06, party official, DP, male, Kampala, 21/06/2016
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int. UG19, party official, FDC, female, Kampala, 07/11/2016
int. UG20, party activist, FDC, male, Mukono, 15/11/2016
int. UG21, local official, DP, male, Mukono, 16/11/2016
int. UG22, local official, DP, male, Mukono, 16/11/2016
int. UG23, party activist, FDC, male, Mukono, 17/11/2016
int. UG24, party activist, FDC, male, Mukono, 17/11/2016
int. UG25, party activist, FDC, male, Mukono, 17/11/2016

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int. UG26, civil society representative, male, Kampala, 21/11/2016
int. UG27, Member of Parliament, FDC, female, Kampala, 24/11/2016
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int. UG33, Member of Parliament, NRM, male, Kampala, 08/12/2016
int. UG34, Member of Parliament, DP, female, Kampala, 14/12/2016
int. UG35, party activist, DP, male, Namasuba, 04/05/2018
int. UG36, local official, DP, male, Namasuba, 04/05/2018
int. UG37, local official, DP, male, Namasuba, 04/05/2018
int. UG38, civil society representative, male, Soroti, 07/05/2018
int. UG39, religious figure, male, Soroti, 09/05/2018
int. UG40, party activist, UPC, male, Soroti, 08/05/2018
int. UG41, local official, FDC, male, Soroti, 08/05/2018
int. UG42, party activist, FDC, female, Soroti, 08/05/2018
int. UG43, local official, FDC, female, Soroti, 08/05/2018
int. UG44, local official, NRM, male, Soroti, 09/05/2018
int. UG45, local official, FDC, male, Soroti, 09/05/2018
int. UG46, party activist, FDC, female, Soroti, 09/05/2018
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int. UG52, party activist, DP, male, Gulu, 11/05/2018
int. UG53, local official, Independent, male, Gulu, 12/05/2018
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int. UG58, civil society representative, male, Gulu, 12/05/2018
int. UG59, party activist, FDC, male, Gulu, 13/05/2018
int. UG60, civil society activist, male, Kasese, 15/05/2018
int. UG61, civil society activist, male, Kasese, 15/05/2018
int. UG62, civil society activist, male, Kasese, 15/05/2018
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int. UG86, party activist, FDC, male, Kampala, 26/05/2018
int. UG87, party official, DP, male, Kampala, 28/05/2018
int. UG88, Member of Parliament, Independent, male, Kampala, 30/05/2018
int. UG89, Member of Parliament, DP, female, Constituency, 2016

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* Interviews conducted together.
* Date and place not indicated to protect the interviewee’s anonymity.
Focus group discussions

dis. 1, UNIR-PS party activists, 2 women and 4 men, Yako, 04/04/2018
dis. 2, UNIR-PS party activists, 3 women and 12 men, Minissia, 05/04/2018
dis. 3, UNIR-PS party activists, 7 men, Bokin, 06/04/2018
dis. 4, UPC party activists, 2 women and 4 men, Tenkodogo, 17/12/2018

Observation

obs. 1, DP workshop for newly elected local councillors, Masaka, 09/04/2016
obs. 2, DP training workshop for young leaders, Kampala, 23/06/2016
obs. 3, UYD reunion, Kampala, 23/05/2018
# 2. Codebook

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