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Status-seeking, income taxation and efficiency
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UNSPECIFIED (1998) Status-seeking, income taxation and efficiency. In: International Seminar on Public Economics, DEC 12-14, 1996, BONN, GERMANY.
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
It is well-known that status-seeking produces distortions in consumption. Competition to achieve status leads to over-consumption of those goods which confer status. It has been found that taxing such goods may even lead to Pareto improvements. In this paper we extend a model of status, which relies on a signalling equilibrium approach, to include the individual labour supply decision and an income tax. We show that a Pareto-improving income tax can exist even with the simplest tax/benefit scheme. A number of results follow. The model is extended to a two-period analysis, to accommodate the reputation-building element of status achievement, without altering the conclusions. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.
| Item Type: | Conference Item (UNSPECIFIED) |
|---|---|
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions |
| Journal or Publication Title: | JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS |
| Publisher: | ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA |
| ISSN: | 0047-2727 |
| Date: | October 1998 |
| Volume: | 70 |
| Number: | 1 |
| Number of Pages: | 15 |
| Page Range: | pp. 99-113 |
| Publication Status: | Published |
| Title of Event: | International Seminar on Public Economics |
| Location of Event: | BONN, GERMANY |
| Date(s) of Event: | DEC 12-14, 1996 |
| URI: | http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/15278 |
Data sourced from Thomson Reuters' Web of Knowledge
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