Status-seeking, income taxation and efficiency
UNSPECIFIED (1998) Status-seeking, income taxation and efficiency. In: International Seminar on Public Economics, DEC 12-14, 1996, BONN, GERMANY.Full text not available from this repository.
It is well-known that status-seeking produces distortions in consumption. Competition to achieve status leads to over-consumption of those goods which confer status. It has been found that taxing such goods may even lead to Pareto improvements. In this paper we extend a model of status, which relies on a signalling equilibrium approach, to include the individual labour supply decision and an income tax. We show that a Pareto-improving income tax can exist even with the simplest tax/benefit scheme. A number of results follow. The model is extended to a two-period analysis, to accommodate the reputation-building element of status achievement, without altering the conclusions. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.
|Item Type:||Conference Item (UNSPECIFIED)|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions|
|Journal or Publication Title:||JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS|
|Publisher:||ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA|
|Number of Pages:||15|
|Page Range:||pp. 99-113|
|Title of Event:||International Seminar on Public Economics|
|Location of Event:||BONN, GERMANY|
|Date(s) of Event:||DEC 12-14, 1996|
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