UNSPECIFIED (1998) Status-seeking, income taxation and efficiency. In: International Seminar on Public Economics, BONN, GERMANY, DEC 12-14, 1996. Published in: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 70 (1). pp. 99-113.

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Abstract

It is well-known that status-seeking produces distortions in consumption. Competition to achieve status leads to over-consumption of those goods which confer status. It has been found that taxing such goods may even lead to Pareto improvements. In this paper we extend a model of status, which relies on a signalling equilibrium approach, to include the individual labour supply decision and an income tax. We show that a Pareto-improving income tax can exist even with the simplest tax/benefit scheme. A number of results follow. The model is extended to a two-period analysis, to accommodate the reputation-building element of status achievement, without altering the conclusions. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.

Item Type:	Conference Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
Journal or Publication Title:	JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
Publisher:	ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
ISSN:	0047-2727
Date:	October 1998
Volume:	70
Number:	1
Number of Pages:	15
Page Range:	pp. 99-113
Publication Status:	Published
Title of Event:	International Seminar on Public Economics
Location of Event:	BONN, GERMANY
Date(s) of Event:	DEC 12-14, 1996
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/15278

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