Power indices as an aid to institutional design: the generalised apportionment problem
Leech, Dennis (2002) Power indices as an aid to institutional design: the generalised apportionment problem. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. Warwick economic research papers (No.648).
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A priori voting power analysis can be useful in helping to design a weighted voting system that has certain intended properties. Power indices can help determine how many weighted votes each member should be allocated and what the decision rule should be. These choices can be made in the light of a requirement that there be a given distribution of power and/or a desired division of powers between individual members and the collective institution. This paper focuses on the former problem: choosing the weights given that the power indices and the decision rule are fixed exogenously.
|Item Type:||Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Voting research, Decision making, Power (Social sciences), Choice (Psychology)|
|Series Name:||Warwick economic research papers|
|Publisher:||University of Warwick, Department of Economics|
|Place of Publication:||Coventry|
|Official Date:||August 2002|
|Number of Pages:||27|
|Status:||Not Peer Reviewed|
|Access rights to Published version:||Open Access|
Paper prepared for the workshop on Voting Power Analysis, LSE 9-11 August 2002.
Arrow, Kenneth J. and F. H. Hahn (1971), "General Competitive Analysis, San Francisco, Holden Day.
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