Extended Pareto rules and relative utilitarianism
UNSPECIFIED (1998) Extended Pareto rules and relative utilitarianism. SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, 15 (4). pp. 521-542. ISSN 0176-1714Full text not available from this repository.
This paper introduces the "Extended Pareto" axiom on Social Welfare Functions and gives a characterization of the axiom when it is assumed that the Social Welfare Functions that satisfy it in a framework of preferences over lotteries also satisfy the restrictions (on the domain and range of preferences) implied by the von-Neumann Morgenstern axioms. With the addition of 2 other axioms: "Anonymity" and a weak version of Arrow's Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axiom: "Weak IIA" it is shown that there is a unique Social Welfare Function called "Relative Utilitarianism" that consists of normalising individual utilities between 0 and 1 and adding them.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
H Social Sciences
|Journal or Publication Title:||SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE|
|Number of Pages:||22|
|Page Range:||pp. 521-542|
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