UNSPECIFIED (1998) Extended Pareto rules and relative utilitarianism. SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, 15 (4). pp. 521-542. ISSN 0176-1714

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Abstract

This paper introduces the "Extended Pareto" axiom on Social Welfare Functions and gives a characterization of the axiom when it is assumed that the Social Welfare Functions that satisfy it in a framework of preferences over lotteries also satisfy the restrictions (on the domain and range of preferences) implied by the von-Neumann Morgenstern axioms. With the addition of 2 other axioms: "Anonymity" and a weak version of Arrow's Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axiom: "Weak IIA" it is shown that there is a unique Social Welfare Function called "Relative Utilitarianism" that consists of normalising individual utilities between 0 and 1 and adding them.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions H Social Sciences
Journal or Publication Title:	SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE
Publisher:	SPRINGER VERLAG
ISSN:	0176-1714
Date:	August 1998
Volume:	15
Number:	4
Number of Pages:	22
Page Range:	pp. 521-542
Publication Status:	Published
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/15381

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