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Investigating the failure to best respond in experimental games

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Alempaki, Despoina, Colman, A., Kölle, F., Loomes, Graham and Pulford, B. D. (2022) Investigating the failure to best respond in experimental games. Experimental Economics, 25 (2). pp. 656-679. doi:10.1007/s10683-021-09725-8

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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-021-09725-8

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Abstract

We examine strategic sophistication using eight two-person 3 × 3 one-shot games. To facilitate strategic thinking, we design a ‘structured’ environment where subjects first assign subjective values to the payoff pairs and state their beliefs about their counterparts’ probable strategies, before selecting their own strategies in light of those deliberations. Our results show that a majority of strategy choices are inconsistent with the equilibrium prediction, and that only just over half of strategy choices constitute best responses to subjects’ stated beliefs. Allowing for other-regarding considerations increases best responding significantly, but the increase is rather small. We further compare patterns of strategies with those made in an ‘unstructured’ environment in which subjects are not specifically directed to think strategically. Our data suggest that structuring the pre-decision deliberation process does not affect strategic sophistication.

Item Type: Journal Article
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
Q Science > QA Mathematics
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School > Behavioural Science
Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Games of strategy (Mathematics), Game Theory, Decision making -- Psychological aspects
Journal or Publication Title: Experimental Economics
Publisher: Springer New York LLC
ISSN: 1386-4157
Official Date: April 2022
Dates:
DateEvent
April 2022Published
1 July 2021Available
15 June 2021Accepted
Volume: 25
Number: 2
Page Range: pp. 656-679
DOI: 10.1007/s10683-021-09725-8
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Access rights to Published version: Open Access
RIOXX Funder/Project Grant:
Project/Grant IDRIOXX Funder NameFunder ID
RP2012-V-022Leverhulme Trusthttp://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100000275
ES/K002201/1[ESRC] Economic and Social Research Councilhttp://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100000269
ES/P008976/1[ESRC] Economic and Social Research Councilhttp://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100000269
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