Galassi, Francesco L. (2002) From drought to flood: environmental constraints and the political economy of civic virtue. Working Paper. University of Warwick, Department of Economics, Coventry.

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Abstract

The paper models co-operative engagement under varying environmental constraints giving rise to different forms of collective action problems, specifically focussing on water management in pre-industrial societies. I show that societies where water availability is strongly seasonal develop no mechanism to encourage society-wide co-operative behaviour because the benefits of water storage are fully excludable. With pre-industrial technology water storage is a pure club good, and optimal club size can be shown to be very small under credible parameter values, converging to 1 in some cases (private good). The social consequences of the environmental constraint include strongly circumscribed co-operation and rent seeking. In contrast, areas where water management involved flood control and irrigation develop society-wide institutions based on self-sustaining co-operative engagement assisted by external policing. The model thus offers an explanation of varying levels of "civic virtue" in different areas.

Item Type:	Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HN Social history and conditions. Social problems. Social reform
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Social choice, Group decision making, Environmental ethics, Natural disasters -- Social aspects, Cooperation
Series Name:	Warwick economic research papers
Publisher:	University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Place of Publication:	Coventry
Date:	2002
Number:	No.643
Number of Pages:	26
Status:	Not Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access
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URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/1543

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