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Competitive pricing in socially networked economies

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Allouch, Nizar and Wooders, Myrna Holtz (2002) Competitive pricing in socially networked economies. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. Warwick economic research papers (No.639).

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Abstract

In the context of a socially networked economy, this paper demon-strates
an Edgeworth equivalence between the set of competitive allocations and
the core. Each participant in the economy may have multiple links with other participants and the equilibrium network may be as large as the entire set of participants. A clique is a group of people who are all connected with each other. Large cliques, possibly as large as the entire population, are permitted; this is important since we wish to include in our analysis large, world-wide organizations such as workers in multi-national firms and members of world-wide environmental organizations, for example, as well as small cliques, such as two-person partnerships. A special case of our model is equivalent to a club economy where clubs may be large and individuals may belong to multiple clubs. The features of our model that cliques within a networked economy may be as large as the entire population and individuals may belong to multiple cliques thus allow
us to extend the extant decentralisation literature on competitive pricing in economies with clubs and multiple memberships (where club sizes are uniformly bounded, independent of the size of the economy).

Item Type:

Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)

Subjects:

H Social Sciences > HF Commerce
H Social Sciences > HM Sociology

Divisions:

Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics

Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):

Social networks, Pricing, Edgeworth expansions, Cliques (Sociology), Clubs

Series Name:

Warwick economic research papers

Publisher:

University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Place of Publication:

Coventry

Official Date:

24 April 2002

Dates:

Date	Event
24 April 2002	Published

Number:

No.639

Number of Pages:

Status:

Not Peer Reviewed

Access rights to Published version:

Open Access

Description:

This paper was submitted to the Athens General Equilibrium Conference in March of this year and is to be presented there in May 2002.

Version or Related Resource:

Allouch, N. and Wooders, M.H. (2008). Price taking equilibrium in economies with multiple memberships in clubs and unbounded club sizes. Journal of Economic Theory, 140(1), pp. 246-278. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/29904

Related URLs:

Related item in WRAP

References:

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