Competitive pricing in socially networked economies
Allouch, Nizar and Wooders, Myrna Holtz (2002) Competitive pricing in socially networked economies. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. Warwick economic research papers (No.639).
WRAP_Allouch_twerp639.pdf - Requires a PDF viewer such as GSview, Xpdf or Adobe Acrobat Reader
Official URL: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/resear...
In the context of a socially networked economy, this paper demon-strates
an Edgeworth equivalence between the set of competitive allocations and
the core. Each participant in the economy may have multiple links with other participants and the equilibrium network may be as large as the entire set of participants. A clique is a group of people who are all connected with each other. Large cliques, possibly as large as the entire population, are permitted; this is important since we wish to include in our analysis large, world-wide organizations such as workers in multi-national firms and members of world-wide environmental organizations, for example, as well as small cliques, such as two-person partnerships. A special case of our model is equivalent to a club economy where clubs may be large and individuals may belong to multiple clubs. The features of our model that cliques within a networked economy may be as large as the entire population and individuals may belong to multiple cliques thus allow
us to extend the extant decentralisation literature on competitive pricing in economies with clubs and multiple memberships (where club sizes are uniformly bounded, independent of the size of the economy).
|Item Type:||Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HF Commerce
H Social Sciences > HM Sociology
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Social networks, Pricing, Edgeworth expansions, Cliques (Sociology), Clubs|
|Series Name:||Warwick economic research papers|
|Publisher:||University of Warwick, Department of Economics|
|Place of Publication:||Coventry|
|Official Date:||24 April 2002|
|Number of Pages:||21|
|Status:||Not Peer Reviewed|
|Access rights to Published version:||Open Access|
This paper was submitted to the Athens General Equilibrium Conference in March of this year and is to be presented there in May 2002.
|Version or Related Resource:||Allouch, N. and Wooders, M.H. (2008). Price taking equilibrium in economies with multiple memberships in clubs and unbounded club sizes. Journal of Economic Theory, 140(1), pp. 246-278. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/29904|
 Belleflame, P. and F. Bloch (2001) “Market sharing agreements and collusive networks,” Presented at at 2001 Warwick Department of Economics Summer Euro Workshop.
Actions (login required)