Social conformity and equilibrium in pure strategies in games with many players
Wooders, Myrna Holtz, Cartwright, Edward and Selten, Reinhard (2002) Social conformity and equilibrium in pure strategies in games with many players. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. Warwick economic research papers (No.636).
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We introduce a framework of noncooperative pregames, in which players are characterized by their attributes, and demonstrate that for all games with sufficiently many players, there exist approximate (e )Nash equilibria
in pure strategies. In fact, every mixed strategy equilibrium can be used to construct an e-equilibrium in pure strategies, an ‘e -purification’ result. Our main result is a social conformity theorem. Interpret a set of players, all with attributes in some convex subset of attribute space and all playing the same strategy, as a society. Observe that the number of societies may be as large as the number of players. Our social conformity result dictates that, given e > 0, there is an integer L, depending on e but not on the number of players, such that any suffciently large game has an e -equilibrium in pure strategies that induces a partition of the player set into fewer than L societies.
|Item Type:||Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)|
|Alternative Title:||Original version, May 15, 2001; this version, April 2002|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
H Social Sciences > HM Sociology
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Noncooperative games (Mathematics), Conformity, Games of strategy (Mathematics), Group theory, Game theory|
|Series Name:||Warwick economic research papers|
|Publisher:||University of Warwick, Department of Economics|
|Place of Publication:||Coventry|
|Official Date:||April 2002|
|Number of Pages:||59|
|Status:||Not Peer Reviewed|
|Access rights to Published version:||Open Access|
|Version or Related Resource:||Revised version of: Wooders, M.H., Cartwright, E. and Selten, R. (2001). Some first results for noncooperative pregames: social conformity and equilibrium in pure strategies. [Coventry] : University of Warwick, Economics Department. (Warwick economic research papers, no.589).|
 Araujo, A., M. Pascoa and J. Orrillo (2000) “Equilibrium with default and exogenous collateral,” Mathematical Finance.
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