UNSPECIFIED (1998) On the strategic stability of monitoring: implications for cooperative wildlife management programmes in Africa. PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF LONDON SERIES B-BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES, 265 (1402). pp. 1237-1244. ISSN 0962-8452

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Abstract

Game-theoretic modelling is used to study the design of an agreement among residents to conserve a wildlife resource, by not hunting animals illegally when the community monitors its own behaviour. The analysis demonstrates that such an agreement may be very much costlier for a government to sustain if its incentive structure avoids the payment of monitoring fees, and instead relies on community benefits for conservation, with bonuses for reporting poachers. Conditions are identified for the agreement to be stable against both the temptation to avoid monitoring and the temptation to poach, either with guns or by snaring. In particular, the size of the community must exceed a critical value. Implications are discussed for community-based wildlife management programmes in Africa.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	Q Science > QH Natural history > QH301 Biology
Journal or Publication Title:	PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF LONDON SERIES B-BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES
Publisher:	ROYAL SOC LONDON
ISSN:	0962-8452
Date:	7 July 1998
Volume:	265
Number:	1402
Number of Pages:	8
Page Range:	pp. 1237-1244
Publication Status:	Published
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/15543

Data sourced from Thomson Reuters' Web of Knowledge

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