Information and command
Harrison, Mark (2002) Information and command. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. Warwick economic research papers (No.635).
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Information adds value to transactions in three ways: it supports reputations, permits customisation, and provides yardsticks. In the Soviet economy such information was frequently not produced; if produced, it was often concealed; whether concealed or not, it was often of poor quality. In short, the Soviet command system forced economic growth on the basis of a relatively low–value information stock. This may help explain aspects of Soviet postwar economic growth and slowdown, the collapse of the command system, and the persistence of low output after the collapse.
|Item Type:||Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
D History General and Old World > DK Russia. Soviet Union. Former Soviet Republics
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Information behavior -- Soviet Union, Economic development -- Soviet Union, Leadership -- Soviet Union, Communication in politics -- Soviet Union, Soviet Union -- Economic conditions|
|Series Name:||Warwick economic research papers|
|Publisher:||University of Warwick, Department of Economics|
|Place of Publication:||Coventry|
|Official Date:||11 April 2002|
|Number of Pages:||24|
|Status:||Not Peer Reviewed|
|Access rights to Published version:||Open Access|
First draft 26 March 2002; this version 11 April, 2002
Abramovitz, Moses (1986), “Catching Up, Forging Ahead, and Falling Behind”, Journal of Economic History, 46(2), 385–406
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