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Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs
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Kovalenkov, Alexander and Wooders, Myrna Holtz (2002) Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. (Warwick economic research papers).

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Abstract
We introduce the framework of parameterized collections of games with and without sidepayments and provide three nonemptiness of approximate core theorems. The parameters bound (a) the number of approximate types of players and the size of the approximation and (b) the size of nearly effective groups of players and their distance from exact effectiveness. Our theorems are based on a new notion of partitionbalanced profiles and approximately partitionbalanced profiles. The results are applied to a new model of an economy with clubs. In contrast to the extant literature, our approach allows both widespread externalities and uniform results.
Item Type:  Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper) 

Subjects:  H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory Q Science > QA Mathematics 
Divisions:  Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics 
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):  Group theory, Clubs, Approximation theory, Small groups  Research, Game theory 
Series Name:  Warwick economic research papers 
Publisher:  University of Warwick, Department of Economics 
Place of Publication:  Coventry 
Date:  March 2002 
Number:  No.634 
Number of Pages:  41 
Status:  Not Peer Reviewed 
Access rights to Published version:  Open Access 
Description:  Original version, January 1997; this revision, March 2002 
Funder:  Universitats of Catalonia (UCat), Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona (UAdB), Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) 
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URI:  http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/1556 
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