Kovalenkov, Alexander and Wooders, Myrna Holtz (2002) Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. Warwick economic research papers (No.634).

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Abstract

We introduce the framework of parameterized collections of games with and without sidepayments and provide three nonemptiness of approximate core theorems. The parameters bound (a) the number of approximate types of players and the size of the approximation and (b) the size of nearly effective groups of players and their distance from exact effectiveness. Our theorems are based on a new notion of partition-balanced profiles and approximately partition-balanced profiles. The results are applied to a new model of an economy with clubs. In contrast to the extant literature, our approach allows both widespread externalities and uniform results.

Item Type:	Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory Q Science > QA Mathematics
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Group theory, Clubs, Approximation theory, Small groups -- Research, Game theory
Series Name:	Warwick economic research papers
Publisher:	University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Place of Publication:	Coventry
Official Date:	March 2002
Dates:	Date Event March 2002 Published
Number:	No.634
Number of Pages:	41
Institution:	University of Warwick
Status:	Not Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access
Description:	Original version, January 1997; this revision, March 2002
Funder:	Universitats of Catalonia (UCat), Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona (UAdB), Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC)

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