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Separating equilibria, underpricing and security design

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Bernhardt, Dan, Koufopoulos, Kostas and Trigilia, Giulio (2021) Separating equilibria, underpricing and security design. Journal of Financial Economics . doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.08.021 (In Press)

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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.08.021

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Abstract

Classical security design papers equate competitive capital markets to securities being fairly priced in expectation. We revisit (Nachman and Noe, 1994)’s adverse selection setting, modeling capital market competition as free entry of investors and allowing firms to propose prices for their securities, as happens in private securities placements and bank lending. We identify equilibria in which high types issue underpriced debt, which yields positive expected profits to uninformed lenders, while low types issue steeper securities, such as equity. In addition, pooling equilibria exist in which all firms issue underpriced debt. Introducing pre-existing capital structures provides further foundations for pecking-order theories of external finance.

Item Type: Journal Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HG Finance
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Capital market, Stocks -- Prices , Insider trading in securities, Securities
Journal or Publication Title: Journal of Financial Economics
Publisher: Elsevier Science BV
ISSN: 0304-405X
Official Date: 2021
Dates:
DateEvent
2021Published
24 September 2021Available
12 August 2021Accepted
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.08.021
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: In Press
Access rights to Published version: Restricted or Subscription Access
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