Dutta, Bhaskar, Jackson, Matthew O. and Le Breton, Michel (2001) Equilibrium agenda formation. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. Warwick economic research papers (No.628).

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Abstract

We develop a definition of equilibrium for agenda formation in general voting settings. The definition is independent of any protocol. We show that the set of equilibrium outcomes for any Pareto efficient voting rule is uniquely determined. We also show that for such voting rules, if preferences are strict then the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with that of the outcomes generated by considering all full agendas for voting by successive elimination and show that the set of equilibrium outcomes corresponds with the Banks set. We also examine the implications in several other settings.

Item Type:	Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Voting research, Negotiation, Equilibrium (Economics), Social choice, Elections
Series Name:	Warwick economic research papers
Publisher:	University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Place of Publication:	Coventry
Official Date:	11 December 2001
Dates:	Date Event 11 December 2001 Published
Number:	No.628
Number of Pages:	42
Institution:	University of Warwick
Status:	Not Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access (Creative Commons)
Description:	Original version, September 2001; this draft: December 11, 2001
Funder:	National Science Foundation (U.S.) (NSF), University of Warwick
Grant number:	SES-9986190 (NSF)

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