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Equilibrium agenda formation

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Dutta, Bhaskar, Jackson, Matthew O. and Le Breton, Michel (2001) Equilibrium agenda formation. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. Warwick economic research papers (No.628).

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Abstract

We develop a definition of equilibrium for agenda formation in general voting settings. The definition is independent of any protocol. We show that the set of equilibrium outcomes for any Pareto efficient voting rule is uniquely determined. We also show that for such voting rules, if preferences are strict then the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with that of the outcomes generated by considering all full agendas for voting by successive elimination and show that the set of equilibrium outcomes corresponds with the Banks set. We also examine the implications in several other settings.

Item Type:

Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)

Subjects:

H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory

Divisions:

Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics

Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):

Voting research, Negotiation, Equilibrium (Economics), Social choice, Elections

Series Name:

Warwick economic research papers

Publisher:

University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Place of Publication:

Coventry

Official Date:

11 December 2001

Dates:

Date	Event
11 December 2001	Published

Number:

No.628

Number of Pages:

Status:

Not Peer Reviewed

Access rights to Published version:

Open Access

Description:

Original version, September 2001; this draft: December 11, 2001

Funder:

National Science Foundation (U.S.) (NSF), University of Warwick

Grant number:

SES-9986190 (NSF)

References:

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