Equilibrium agenda formation
Dutta, Bhaskar, Jackson, Matthew O. and Le Breton, Michel (2001) Equilibrium agenda formation. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. Warwick economic research papers (No.628).
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We develop a definition of equilibrium for agenda formation in general voting settings. The definition is independent of any protocol. We show that the set of equilibrium outcomes for any Pareto efficient voting rule is uniquely determined. We also show that for such voting rules, if preferences are strict then the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with that of the outcomes generated by considering all full agendas for voting by successive elimination and show that the set of equilibrium outcomes corresponds with the Banks set. We also examine the implications in several other settings.
|Item Type:||Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Voting research, Negotiation, Equilibrium (Economics), Social choice, Elections|
|Series Name:||Warwick economic research papers|
|Publisher:||University of Warwick, Department of Economics|
|Place of Publication:||Coventry|
|Official Date:||11 December 2001|
|Number of Pages:||42|
|Status:||Not Peer Reviewed|
|Access rights to Published version:||Open Access|
Original version, September 2001; this draft: December 11, 2001
|Funder:||National Science Foundation (U.S.) (NSF), University of Warwick|
|Grant number:||SES-9986190 (NSF)|
Austen-Smith, D. (1987), "Sophisticated Sincerity: Voting over Endogenous Agendas", American Political Science Review, 81, pp 1323-29.
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