DeMichelis, Stefano and Dhillon, Amrita (2001) Learning in elections and voter turnout equilibria. Working Paper. University of Warwick, Department of Economics, Coventry.

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Abstract

Both complete and incomplete game Theoretic Models of Voter Turnout (Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1983,1985) have the problem of multiple equilibria, some of which seem unreasonable. How can the counter intuitive high turnout equilibria be explained? Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985) suggest that the main reason is that strategic uncertainty istoo low in a complete information model. We show that this is not the main problem with these equilibria{ incomplete information may exacerbate the problem of multiple equilibria. We propose a very intuitive criterion based on voter learning to distinguish reasonable equilibria. This paper makes precise the sense in which the high turnout equilibria in the Palfrey-Rosenthal model are not robust. We show how the model can be used to qualitatively explain several phenomena observed in reality.

Item Type:	Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Subjects:	J Political Science > JF Political institutions (General)
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Voting reseach, Elections, Learning -- Mathematical models, Game theory
Series Name:	Warwick economic research papers
Publisher:	University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Place of Publication:	Coventry
Date:	September 2001
Number:	No.608
Number of Pages:	21
Status:	Not Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access
Description:	September 2001: Preliminary and incomplete
References:	1. Fudenberg, D and David K.Levine, (1998) \The theory of learning in Games", MIT Press. 2. Kandori,M., G.J.Mailath, and R.Rob (1993), Learning, Mutations and Long Run Equilibria in Games, Econometrica, Vol.61, No.1, pp.29{56. 3. Palfrey,T.R. and H. Rosenthal (1983), A strategic calculus of voting, Public Choice, 41, pp.7{53. 4. Palfrey,T.R. and H. Rosenthal (1985), Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty, The American Political Science Review, Vol.79, pp.62{78. 5. Weibull, J.(1995), \Evolutionary Game Theory", MIT Press.
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/1576

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