Harrison, Mark, 1949- (2001) The USSR and total war: why didn't the Soviet economy collapse in 1942? Working Paper. University of Warwick, Department of Economics, Coventry.

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Abstract

The economic dimensions of the Soviet war effort are appraised. The surprising fact is that the Soviet economy did not collapse in 1942. A rational-choice model is developed to illustrate the economic conditions under which a wartime collapse of the economy is rendered more and less likely.

Item Type:	Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions D History General and Old World > DK Russia. Soviet Union. Former Soviet Republics
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	World War, 1939-1945 -- Economic aspects -- Soviet Union, Economics -- Political aspects, Soviet Union -- Economic conditions -- 1917-1945, Soviet Union -- History -- 1939-1945
Series Name:	Warwick economic research papers
Publisher:	University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Place of Publication:	Coventry
Date:	25 April 2001
Number:	No.603
Number of Pages:	23
Status:	Not Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access
Description:	Revised 25 April, 2001
References:	Abelshauser, Werner (1998), “Germany: guns, butter, and economic miracles”, in Mark Harrison, ed., The economics of World War II: six great powers in international comparison, Cambridge, 122–176 Barber, John, ed. (forthcoming), Zhizn’ i smert’ v blokadnom Leningrade. Istoriko–meditsinskie aspekty , St Petersburg Davies, R.W., and Harrison, Mark (1997), “The Soviet military–economic effort under the second five–year plan (1933–1937)”, Europe–Asia Studies, 49(3), 369–406; Davies, R.W., and Harrison, Mark (2000), “Defence spending and defence industry in the 1930s”, in John Barber and Mark Harrison, eds, The Soviet defence–industry complex from Stalin to Khrushchev, London and Basingstoke, 70–98 Dzeniskevich, A.R. (2001), “Banditizm (osobaia kategoriia) v blokirovannom Leningrade”, Istoriia Peterburga, no. 1, 47–51 Filtzer, Don (2000), “Labour discipline and criminal law in Soviet industry, 1945–1953”, paper to VI World Congress of the International Council for Central & East European Studies, Tampere, Finland Goldsmith, Raymond (1946), “The power of victory: munitions output in World War II”, Military Affairs, 10, 69–80 Gorodetsky, Gabriel (1999), Grand delusion: Stalin and the German invasion of Russia, New Haven, CT Harrison, Mark (1996), Accounting for war: Soviet production, employment, and the defence burden, 1940–1945, Cambridge Harrison, Mark (1998), “The economics of World War II: a overview”, in Mark Harrison, ed., The economics of World War II: six great powers in international comparison, Cambridge, 1–42 Harrison, Mark (2000), “Wartime mobilisation: a German comparison”, in John Barber and Mark Harrison, eds, The Soviet defence–industry complex from Stalin to Khrushchev, London and Basingstoke, 99–117 Mills, Geofrey, and Rockoff, Hugh (1987), “Compliance with price controls in the United States and the United Kingdom during World War II”, Journal of Economic History, 47(1), 191–213 Moskoff, William (1990), The bread of affliction: the food supply in the USSR during World War II, Cambridge Murphy, Kevin M., Shleifer, Andrei, and Vyshny, Robert W. (1993), “Why is rent–seeking so costly to growth?”, American Economic Review Papers & Proceedings, 83(2), 409–14 Olson, Mancur (1993), “Dictatorship, democracy, and development”, American Political Science Review, 87(3), 567–76 Overy, R.J. (1994), War and economy in the Third Reich, Oxford Overy, R.J. (1995), Why the Allies won, London Overy, R.J. (1998), “Who really won the arms race?”, Times Literary Supplement, 13 November, 4–5 Polikarpov, V.V. (1998), “Otechestvennoe tankostroenie v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny”, Nevskii Bastion, no. 1, 38–40 Samuelson, Lennart (1996), Soviet defence industry planning: Tukhachevskii and military–industrial mobilisation, Stockholm School of Economics Samuelson, Lennart (2000a), Plans for Stalin's war machine: Tukhachevskii and military–economic planning, 1925–41, London and Basingstoke Samuelson, Lennart (2000b), “The Red Army’s economic objectives and involvement in economic planning, 1925–1940”, in John Barber and Mark Harrison, eds, The Soviet defence–industry complex from Stalin to Khrushchev, London and Basingstoke, 47–69 Simonov N.S. (1996a), Voenno–promyshlennyi kompleks SSSR v 1920–1950–e gody: tempy ekonomicheskogo rosta, struktura, organizatsiia proizvodstva i upravlenie, Moscow Simonov N.S. (1996b), “‘Strengthen the defence of the land of the Soviets’: the 1927 ‘war alarm’ and its consequences”, Europe–Asia Studies, 48(8), 1355–64; Simonov N.S. (2000), “The ‘war scare’ of 1927 and the birth of the Soviet defence–industry complex”, in John Barber and Mark Harrison, eds, The Soviet defence–industry complex from Stalin to Khrushchev, London and Basingstoke, 33–46. Zolotarev, V.A., ed. (1998), “Velikaia Otechestvennaia. Tyl Krasnoi Armii v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny 1941–1945 gg.. Dokumenty i materialy”, Russkii Arkhiv, 25(14), 1–736
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/1580

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