Government collusion in Janeba’s model of multijurisdictional tax competition
Barton, Lloyd (2001) Government collusion in Janeba’s model of multijurisdictional tax competition. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. Warwick economic research papers (No.600).
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Eckhard Janeba (Dec 2000 “Tax Competition when Governments lack Commitment” American Economic Review 90, 1508-19) has recently suggested a novel approach to modelling the relationship between governments and multinational firms. As part of ongoing research into various aspects of multijurisdictional tax competition, this paper investigates the possibility of allowing for collusion between governments when setting tax rates in the model. The findings show that a self-enforcing agreement is possible, with the beneficial effect of cutting the firm’s excess profits, limiting investment in excess capacity, and raising government revenue.
|Item Type:||Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HJ Public Finance|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Janeba, Eckhard, Taxation, Fiscal policy, Competition, International business enterprises -- Taxation|
|Series Name:||Warwick economic research papers|
|Publisher:||University of Warwick, Department of Economics|
|Place of Publication:||Coventry|
|Number of Pages:||8|
|Status:||Not Peer Reviewed|
|Access rights to Published version:||Open Access|
|Funder:||Economic and Social Research Council (Great Britain) (ESRC)|
Dhillon, A., C. Perroni and K.A. Scharf (1999) “Implementing Tax Coordination” Journal of Public Economics 72, 243-68
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