Some first results for noncooperative pregames: social conformity and equilibrium in pure strategies
Wooders, Myrna Holtz, Selten, Reinhard and Cartwright, Edward (2001) Some first results for noncooperative pregames: social conformity and equilibrium in pure strategies. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. Warwick economic research papers (No.589).
WRAP_Wooders_twerp589rev.pdf - Requires a PDF viewer such as GSview, Xpdf or Adobe Acrobat Reader
Official URL: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/resear...
We introduce the framework of noncooperative pregames and
demonstrate that for all games with sufficiently many players, there exist approximate (E) Nash equilibria in pure strategies. In fact, every mixed strategy equilibrium can be used to construct an E-equilibrium in pure strategies — ours is an 'E-purification’ result. Our main result is that there exists an E-equilibrium in pure strategies with the property that most players choose the same strategies as all other players with similar attributes. More precisely, there is an integer L, depending on E but not on the number of players, so that any sufficiently large society can be partitioned into fewer than L groups, or cultures, consisting of similar players, and all players in the same group play the same pure strategy. In ongoing research, we are extending the model to cover a broader class of situations, including incomplete information.
We would be grateful for any comments that might help us improve the paper.
|Item Type:||Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Q Science > QA Mathematics
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Noncooperative games (Mathematics), Conformity, Social influence, Equilibrium (Economics), Game theory|
|Series Name:||Warwick economic research papers|
|Publisher:||University of Warwick, Department of Economics|
|Place of Publication:||Coventry|
|Official Date:||8 August 2001|
|Number of Pages:||42|
|Status:||Not Peer Reviewed|
|Access rights to Published version:||Open Access|
Original version, May 15, 2001; this version, August 8, 2001
|Funder:||Sonderforschungsbereich 303 -- "Information und die Koordination wirtschaftlicher Aktivitäten", Universität Bonn|
 Araujo, A., M. Pascoa and J. Orrillo (2000) “Equilibrium with default and exogenous collateral,” Mathematical Finance.
Actions (login required)