Do elections always motivate incumbents?
Le Borgne , Eric and Lockwood, Ben (2000) Do elections always motivate incumbents? Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. (Warwick economic research papers).
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This paper studies a principal-agent model of the relationship between office-holders and the electorate, where the office-holder is initially uninformed about herability (following Holmström, 1999). If office-holder effort and ability interact in the “production function” that determines performance in office, then an office-holder has an incentive to experiment, i.e. raise effort so that performance becomes a more accurate signal of her ability. Elections reduce the experimentation effect, and the reduction in this effect may more than o¤set the positive “career concerns” effect of elections on effort. Moreover, when this occurs, appointment of officials (random selection from the citizenry and tenure) may Pareto-dominate elections.
|Item Type:||Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)|
|Alternative Title:||The career concerns of politicians: efficiency in a representative democracy?|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Business cycles -- Political aspects, Career development, Elections, Voting research, Tournaments (Graph theory)|
|Series Name:||Warwick economic research papers|
|Publisher:||University of Warwick, Department of Economics|
|Place of Publication:||Coventry|
|Number of Pages:||31|
|Status:||Not Peer Reviewed|
|Access rights to Published version:||Open Access|
|Description:||First version, April 2000; this version, November 2000|
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