The Library
Moral alternatives, physical determinism & Frankfurt-style counterexamples
Tools
Elzein, Nadine (2022) Moral alternatives, physical determinism & Frankfurt-style counterexamples. Inquiry, 65 (20). pp. 1231-1249. doi:10.1080/0020174X.2021.1904642 ISSN 0020-174X .
Research output not available from this repository.
Request-a-Copy directly from author or use local Library Get it For Me service.
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2021.1904642
Abstract
Agents in Frankfurt-style counterexamples only appear to be responsible insofar as they act willingly in the actual sequence, but would need to be manipulated against their will into forming the relevant intention in the alternative sequence. This difference appears ineliminable and unavoidably morally significant. ‘Neo-Frankfurtians’ concede that the sequences must be physically differentiated, but deny their moral differentiation. In contrast, I explore whether the alternatives could be physically undifferentiated, despite their moral difference. The reason there is an ineliminable moral difference is because there is an ineliminable causal one: The agent’s choice must be caused by his own inclinations in one sequence, but by Black’s manipulation in the other. Whether this causal difference entails a physical one depends on whether we suppose causal relations conform to Humean supervenience. The denial of the latter requires us to either reject any broadly Humean view of causation, or else to suppose that we can individuate events or their qualities independently of the physical facts. If these are coherent possibilities, such examples may show that physically differentiated alternatives are not required for moral responsibility. This could support compatibilism, but only if such examples adequately parallel determinism, and I remain sceptical on this point.
Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy | ||||||
Journal or Publication Title: | Inquiry | ||||||
Publisher: | Routledge | ||||||
ISSN: | 0020-174X | ||||||
Official Date: | 2022 | ||||||
Dates: |
|
||||||
Volume: | 65 | ||||||
Number: | 20 | ||||||
Page Range: | pp. 1231-1249 | ||||||
DOI: | 10.1080/0020174X.2021.1904642 | ||||||
Status: | Peer Reviewed | ||||||
Publication Status: | Published | ||||||
Access rights to Published version: | Restricted or Subscription Access |
Request changes or add full text files to a record
Repository staff actions (login required)
View Item |