Elzein, Nadine and Pernu, Tuomas K. (2019) To be able to, or to be able not to? that is the question : a problem for the transcendental argument for free will. European journal of analytic philosophy, 15 (2). pp. 13-32. doi:10.31820/ejap.15.2.1

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Abstract

A type of transcendental argument for libertarian free will maintains that if acting freely requires the availability of alternative possibilities, and determinism holds, then one is not justified in asserting that there is no free will. More precisely: if an agent A is to be justified in asserting a proposition P (e.g. "there is no free will"), then A must also be able to assert not-P. Thus, if A is unable to assert not-P, due to determinism, then A is not justified in asserting P. While such arguments often appeal to principles with wide appeal, such as the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, they also require a commitment to principles that seem far less compelling, e.g. the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘able not to’ or the principle that having an obligation entails being responsible. It is argued here that these further principles are dubious, and that it will be difficult to construct a valid transcendental argument without them.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Journal or Publication Title:	European journal of analytic philosophy
Publisher:	University of Rijeka
ISSN:	1849-0514
Official Date:	December 2019
Dates:	Date Event December 2019 Published
Volume:	15
Number:	2
Page Range:	pp. 13-32
DOI:	10.31820/ejap.15.2.1
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access

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