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Free will & empirical arguments for epiphenomenalism

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Elzein, Nadine (2020) Free will & empirical arguments for epiphenomenalism. In: Róna, Peter and Zsolnai, László, (eds.) Agency and Causal Explanation in Economics. Virtues and Economics, 5 . Springer, pp. 3-20. ISBN 9783030261139

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26114-6_1

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Abstract

While philosophers have worried about mental causation for centuries, worries about the causal relevance of conscious phenomena are also increasingly featuring in neuroscientific literature. Neuroscientists have regarded the threat of epiphenomenalism as interesting primarily because they have supposed that it entails free will scepticism. However, the steps that get us from a premise about the causal irrelevance of conscious phenomena to a conclusion about free will are not entirely clear. In fact, if we examine popular philosophical accounts of free will, we find, for the most part, nothing to suggest that free will is inconsistent with the presence of unconscious neural precursors to choices. It is only if we adopt highly non-naturalistic assumptions about the mind (e.g. if we embrace Cartesian dualism and locate free choice in the non-physical realm) that it seems plausible to suppose that the neuroscientific data generates a threat to free will.

Item Type: Book Item
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Series Name: Virtues and Economics
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 9783030261139
ISSN: 2520-1794
Book Title: Agency and Causal Explanation in Economics
Editor: Róna, Peter and Zsolnai, László
Official Date: 2020
Dates:
DateEvent
2020Published
8 November 2019Available
Volume: 5
Page Range: pp. 3-20
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-26114-6_1
Status: Not Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Access rights to Published version: Open Access (Creative Commons)

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