Elzein, Nadine (2019) The demand for contrastive explanations. Philosophical Studies, 176 (5). pp. 1325-1339. doi:10.1007/s11098-018-1065-z ISSN 0031-8116.

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Abstract

A “contrastive explanation” explains not only why some event A occurred, but why A occurred as opposed to some alternative event B. Some philosophers argue that agents could only be morally responsible for their choices if those choices have contrastive explanations, since they would otherwise be “luck infested”. Assuming that contrastive explanations cannot be offered for causally undetermined events, this requirement entails that no one could be held responsible for a causally undetermined choice. Such arguments challenge incompatibilism, since they entail that causal determinism is a prerequisite for moral responsibility. However, I argue that for a significant class of choices, even if we stipulate that they are determined, we will be unable to provide a relevant contrastive explanation. Hence causal determinism is no remedy for luck infestation, and compatibilists do not fare much better than incompatibilists in the face of this requirement. This should serve to weaken its philosophical appeal.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Journal or Publication Title:	Philosophical Studies
Publisher:	Springer
ISSN:	0031-8116
Official Date:	May 2019
Dates:	Date Event May 2019 Published 22 February 2018 Available
Volume:	176
Number:	5
Page Range:	pp. 1325-1339
DOI:	10.1007/s11098-018-1065-z
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access (Creative Commons)

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