The Library
Basic desert, conceptual revision, and moral justification
Tools
Tools
Tools
Elzein, Nadine (2013) Basic desert, conceptual revision, and moral justification. Philosophical Explorations, 16 (2). pp. 212-225. doi:10.1080/13869795.2013.787442
Research output not available from this repository.
Request-a-Copy directly from author or use local Library Get it For Me service.
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2013.787442
Abstract
I examine Manuel Vargas's revisionist justification for continuing with our responsibility-characteristic practices in the absence of basic desert. I query his claim that this justification need not depend on how we settle questions about the content of morality, arguing that it requires us to reject the Kantian principle that prohibits treating anyone merely as a means. I maintain that any convincing argument against this principle would have to be driven by concerns that arise within the sphere of moral theory itself, whereas Vargas's argument draws solely on concerns about the expensive metaphysics involved in a libertarian conception of freedom. I argue that this amounts not just to changing the concept of free will by stipulation, but also (more problematically) to changing our moral principles by stipulation.
| Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy | ||||||
| Journal or Publication Title: | Philosophical Explorations | ||||||
| Publisher: | Routledge | ||||||
| ISSN: | 1386-9795 | ||||||
| Official Date: | 2013 | ||||||
| Dates: |
|
||||||
| Volume: | 16 | ||||||
| Number: | 2 | ||||||
| Page Range: | pp. 212-225 | ||||||
| DOI: | 10.1080/13869795.2013.787442 | ||||||
| Status: | Peer Reviewed | ||||||
| Publication Status: | Published | ||||||
| Access rights to Published version: | Restricted or Subscription Access |
Request changes or add full text files to a record
Repository staff actions (login required)
 |
View Item |
