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Scepticism, responsibility and other prickly topics
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Elzein, Nadine (2013) Scepticism, responsibility and other prickly topics. Analysis, 73 (1). pp. 107-118. doi:10.1093/analys/ans146
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/ans146
Abstract
This paper examines Dworkin's rejection of external scepticism about ethics and his rejection of incompatibilist accounts of moral responsibility. I argue that his rejection of external scepticism is defensible, but that he errs in treating the challenge posed by incompatibilist accounts of moral responsibility as a parallel form of external scepticism. Incompatibilism only appears to be an external challenge if we make certain assumptions about the motivations for incompatibilism, and about the relation between moral responsibility and other values. I argue that we ought to reject these assumptions, and can do so consistent with embracing Dworkin's broader philosophical project.
| Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy | ||||
| Journal or Publication Title: | Analysis | ||||
| Publisher: | Oxford University Press | ||||
| ISSN: | 0003-2638 | ||||
| Official Date: | January 2013 | ||||
| Dates: |
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| Volume: | 73 | ||||
| Number: | 1 | ||||
| Page Range: | pp. 107-118 | ||||
| DOI: | 10.1093/analys/ans146 | ||||
| Status: | Peer Reviewed | ||||
| Publication Status: | Published | ||||
| Access rights to Published version: | Restricted or Subscription Access |
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