Weeds, Helen (1999) Sleeping patents and compulsory licensing: an options analysis. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. Warwick economic research papers (No.577).

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Abstract

Why should a firm wish to create a new technology that it will leave unexploited for some time? Sleeping patents have long been perceived as anticompetitive devices, used by dominant firms to block entry into their market. In a real options framework with both economic and technological uncertainty, we show that a sleeping patent may arise as the result of optimal forward-looking behavior, in the absence of any anticompetitive motive. We also consider the effect of possible measures to enforce the development of sleeping patents and find that these are likely to harm incentives for firms to engage in research.

Item Type:	Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor K Law [LC] > K Law (General)
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Patents -- Research, Intangible property, Licenses, Commercial law, Intellectual property
Series Name:	Warwick economic research papers
Publisher:	University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Place of Publication:	Coventry
Official Date:	23 February 1999
Dates:	Date Event 23 February 1999 Submitted
Number:	No.577
Number of Pages:	34
Status:	Not Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access (Creative Commons)
Funder:	Economic and Social Research Council (Great Britain) (ESRC)
Grant number:	R00429524353 (ESRC)

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