Sleeping patents and compulsory licensing: an options analysis
Weeds, Helen (1999) Sleeping patents and compulsory licensing: an options analysis. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. Warwick economic research papers (No.577).
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Why should a firm wish to create a new technology that it will leave unexploited for some time? Sleeping patents have long been perceived as anticompetitive devices, used by dominant firms to block entry into their market. In a real options framework with both economic and technological uncertainty, we show that a sleeping patent may arise as the result of optimal forward-looking behavior, in the absence of any anticompetitive motive. We also consider the effect of possible measures to enforce the development of sleeping patents and find that these are likely to harm incentives for firms to engage in research.
|Item Type:||Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor
K Law > K Law (General)
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Patents -- Research, Intangible property, Licenses, Commercial law, Intellectual property|
|Series Name:||Warwick economic research papers|
|Publisher:||University of Warwick, Department of Economics|
|Place of Publication:||Coventry|
|Official Date:||23 February 1999|
|Number of Pages:||34|
|Status:||Not Peer Reviewed|
|Access rights to Published version:||Open Access|
|Funder:||Economic and Social Research Council (Great Britain) (ESRC)|
|Grant number:||R00429524353 (ESRC)|
Bar-Ilan, Avner, and William C. Strange. 1998. “A model of sequential investment.” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 22: 437-463.
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