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Towards a mechanistically neutral account of acting jointly : the notion of a collective goal
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Butterfill, Stephen A. (Stephen Andrew) and Sinigaglia, Corrado (2023) Towards a mechanistically neutral account of acting jointly : the notion of a collective goal. Mind, 132 (525). pp. 1-29. fzab096. doi:10.1093/mind/fzab096 ISSN 0026-4423.
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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzab096
Abstract
Anyone who has ever walked, cooked or crafted with a friend is in a position to know that acting jointly is not just acting side-by-side. But what distinguishes acting jointly from acting in parallel yet merely individually? Four decades of philosophical research have yielded broad consensus on a strategy for answering this question. This strategy is \emph{mechanistically committed}; that is, it hinges on invoking states of the agents who are acting jointly (often dubbed ‘shared’, ‘we-’ or ‘collective’ intentions). Despite the consensus, enduring disagreement remains. The disagreement may be a consequence of the strategy; at least this is plausible enough to motivate considering the prospects for an alternative. Our aim is therefore to draw attention to a coherent alternative that is present in the literature but often overlooked. This alternative is \emph{mechanistically neutral}: it avoids invoking states of agents. Implementing the alternative, we introduce the notion of a collective goal and a characterisation of acting jointly which meets criteria standardly used in evaluating other accounts and may have some advantages over those accounts.
Item Type: | Journal Article | |||||||||
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Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) H Social Sciences > HM Sociology |
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Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy | |||||||||
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): | Group identity, Social groups -- Philosophy, Social action | |||||||||
Journal or Publication Title: | Mind | |||||||||
Publisher: | Oxford University Press | |||||||||
ISSN: | 0026-4423 | |||||||||
Official Date: | January 2023 | |||||||||
Dates: |
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Volume: | 132 | |||||||||
Number: | 525 | |||||||||
Page Range: | pp. 1-29 | |||||||||
Article Number: | fzab096 | |||||||||
DOI: | 10.1093/mind/fzab096 | |||||||||
Status: | Peer Reviewed | |||||||||
Publication Status: | Published | |||||||||
Access rights to Published version: | Open Access (Creative Commons) | |||||||||
Date of first compliant deposit: | 16 November 2021 | |||||||||
Date of first compliant Open Access: | 4 March 2022 | |||||||||
RIOXX Funder/Project Grant: |
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