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What’s wrong with hypocrisy

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Upadhyaya, Kartik (2020) What’s wrong with hypocrisy. PhD thesis, University of Warwick.

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Official URL: http://webcat.warwick.ac.uk/record=b3714912~S15

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Abstract

Hypocrisy seems to be a distinctive moral wrong. This thesis offers an account of that wrong. The distinctive wrong of hypocrisy is not a rational failing, or a deception of others. It is a problem in how we critique, and blame, others, when we ourselves are guilty of similar faults. Not only does it seem wrong to blame others hypocritically; it is also widely remarked that hypocrites ‘lack standing’ to blame. I defend both judgments. When we engage others in response to wrongdoing, there is both instrumental and non-instrumental value in ensuring that those who face similar moral predicaments reason about these predicaments, and the appropriate responses to them, together. Hypocrisy is wrong because it hampers our ability to realise that value. And hypocrites lose standing to blame for a similar reason. Standing depends on the value of particular people engaging in an accountability procedure together, a value which the hypocrite forestalls, by failing to acknowledge wrongdoing in the course of blaming. This account of a duty to blame non-hypocritically helps unpack the relationship between hypocrisy and a range of other defects in a person’s standing. It also responds to a central sceptical challenge to the wrongness of hypocritical blaming. The challenge is that accurate hypocritical blaming can’t be wrong because it is morally good, and indeed is morally better than not blaming others at all. My response: hypocritical blaming is wrong, not because it is morally worse than not blaming at all, but because it is second-best, i.e. worse than non-hypocritical blaming, which enables mutual deliberation about wrongdoing.

Item Type: Thesis or Dissertation (PhD)
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BJ Ethics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Hypocrisy, Character, Social status -- Philosophy
Official Date: 2020
Dates:
DateEvent
2020UNSPECIFIED
Institution: University of Warwick
Theses Department: Department of Philosophy
Thesis Type: PhD
Publication Status: Unpublished
Supervisor(s)/Advisor: Brownlee, Kimberley, 1978- ; Tadros, Victor
Format of File: pdf
Extent: 229 leaves
Language: eng

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