The assignment of powers in Federal and Unitary States
Lockwood, Ben (2000) The assignment of powers in Federal and Unitary States. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. Warwick economic research papers (No.569).
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This paper studies a model where the power to set policy (a choice of project) may be assigned to central or regional government via either a federal or unitary referendum (constitutional rule, CR). The benefit of central provision is an economy of scale, while the cost is political inefficiency. The relationship between federal and unitary CRs is characterized in the asymptotic case as the number of regions becomes large, under the assumption that the median project benefit in any region is a random draw from a fixed distribution, G. Under some symmetry assumptions, the relationship depends only on the shape of G, not on how willingnesses to pay are distributed within regions. The relationship to Cremer and Palfrey's (1996) "principle of aggregation" is established. Asymptotic results on the efficiency of the two CRs are also provided.
|Item Type:||Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)|
|Subjects:||J Political Science > JA Political science (General)|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Decentralization in government, Intergovernmental fiscal relations, Referendum, Constitutional law|
|Series Name:||Warwick economic research papers|
|Publisher:||University of Warwick, Department of Economics|
|Place of Publication:||Coventry|
|Official Date:||June 2000|
|Number of Pages:||33|
|Status:||Not Peer Reviewed|
|Access rights to Published version:||Open Access|
Baron, D.P, “Majoritarian incentives, pork barrel programs, and procedural control”, American Journal of Political Science 35 (1991), 57-90
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