Melkonyan, Tigran A., Zeitoun, Hossam and Chater, Nick (2022) The cognitive foundations of tacit commitments : a virtual bargaining model of dynamic interactions. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 108 . 102640. doi:10.1016/j.jmp.2021.102640 ISSN 0022-2496.

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Abstract

People often make, and are held to account for, purely tacit commitments in interactions with other people: commitments that have never been explicitly articulated or agreed. Moreover, unspoken, tacit commitments are often perceived as binding: people often stick to, and are expected to stick to, these commitments, even where it might seem against their interests to do so. If they do not stick to these commitments, they may be punished, and expect to be punished, by others as a result, even if the act of punishment is itself costly for the punisher. These commitments have been widely seen as a crucial underpinning for human collaboration and cooperation. Yet how do such commitments arise, and are they compatible with human rationality? This paper provides a formal, reasoning-based account of tacit commitments based on “virtual bargaining”—a mode of reasoning that joins elements of individualistic and collaborative reasoning. We complement existing accounts by showing that even purely self-interested individuals can, under certain conditions, tacitly commit to punishing counterparts who violate an unenforceable agreement, or to cooperating in dynamic games, including the Centipede game and the finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School > Behavioural Science Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School > Strategy & International Business Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School
Journal or Publication Title:	Journal of Mathematical Psychology
Publisher:	Elsevier
ISSN:	0022-2496
Official Date:	June 2022
Dates:	Date Event June 2022 Published 26 March 2022 Available 28 December 2021 Accepted
Volume:	108
Article Number:	102640
DOI:	10.1016/j.jmp.2021.102640
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access
Date of first compliant deposit:	1 April 2022
RIOXX Funder/Project Grant:	Project/Grant ID RIOXX Funder Name Funder ID SG170033 British Academy UNSPECIFIED ES/P008976/1 [ESRC] Economic and Social Research Council http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100000269 RP2012-V-022 Leverhulme Trust UNSPECIFIED
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