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Issue linkage and issue tie-in in multilateral negotiations

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Conconi, Paola and Perroni, Carlo (2000) Issue linkage and issue tie-in in multilateral negotiations. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. Warwick economic research papers (No.558).

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Abstract

We describe a model of international, multidimensional policy coordination where countries can enter into selective and separate agreements with different partners along different policy dimensions. The model is used to examine the implications of negotiation tie-in - the requirement that agreements must span multiple dimensions of interaction - for the viability of multilateral cooperation when countries are linked by international trade flows and transboundary pollution. We show that, while in some cases negotiation tie-in has either no effect or can make multilateral cooperation more viable, in others a formal tie-in constraint can make an otherwise viable joint multilateral agreement unstable.

Item Type:

Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)

Subjects:

H Social Sciences > HF Commerce

Divisions:

Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics

Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):

International cooperation, International trade, Negotiation in business, Environmental policy

Series Name:

Warwick economic research papers

Publisher:

University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Place of Publication:

Coventry

Official Date:

April 2000

Dates:

Date	Event
April 2000	Published

Number:

No.558

Number of Pages:

Status:

Not Peer Reviewed

Access rights to Published version:

Open Access

Funder:

Economic and Social Research Council (Great Britain) (ESRC), University of Warwick

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