Can green lobbies replace a world environmental organization?
Conconi, Paola (1999) Can green lobbies replace a world environmental organization? Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. Warwick economic research papers (No.548).
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We employ a common agency model to examine how green lobbies affect the determination of trade and environmental policy in two large countries that are linked through trade flows and transboundary pollution. We show that, when governments are not restricted in their ability to use trade barriers, environmental lobbying always results in higher pollution taxes relative to a no-lobbying scenario. Consequently, uncoordinated environmental policies are closer to the effcient Pigouvian solution than internationally coordinated policies. If, however, governments are bound by international trade rules, green lobbies may bias environmental policies downwards and environmental policy coordination is unambiguously effciency-enhancing.
|Item Type:||Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)|
|Subjects:||J Political Science > JA Political science (General)|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Environmental protection -- International cooperation, Green movement, Politics, Practical, Lobbying, Campaign funds|
|Series Name:||Warwick economic research papers|
|Publisher:||University of Warwick, Department of Economics|
|Place of Publication:||Coventry|
|Number of Pages:||18|
|Status:||Not Peer Reviewed|
|Access rights to Published version:||Open Access|
|Funder:||Economic and Social Research Council (Great Britain) (ESRC), University of Warwick|
Aidt, T.S., 1998, Political internalization of economic externalities and environmental Policy, Journal of Public Economics 69, 1-16.
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