Conconi, Paola (1999) Can green lobbies replace a world environmental organization? Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. Warwick economic research papers (No.548).

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Abstract

We employ a common agency model to examine how green lobbies affect the determination of trade and environmental policy in two large countries that are linked through trade flows and transboundary pollution. We show that, when governments are not restricted in their ability to use trade barriers, environmental lobbying always results in higher pollution taxes relative to a no-lobbying scenario. Consequently, uncoordinated environmental policies are closer to the effcient Pigouvian solution than internationally coordinated policies. If, however, governments are bound by international trade rules, green lobbies may bias environmental policies downwards and environmental policy coordination is unambiguously effciency-enhancing.

Item Type:	Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Subjects:	J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Environmental protection -- International cooperation, Green movement, Politics, Practical, Lobbying, Campaign funds
Series Name:	Warwick economic research papers
Publisher:	University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Place of Publication:	Coventry
Official Date:	1999
Dates:	Date Event 1999 Published
Number:	No.548
Number of Pages:	18
Status:	Not Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access
Funder:	Economic and Social Research Council (Great Britain) (ESRC), University of Warwick
References:	Aidt, T.S., 1998, Political internalization of economic externalities and environmental Policy, Journal of Public Economics 69, 1-16. Bernheim, B.D. and M.D. Whinston, 1986, Menu auctions, resource allocation, and economic in°uence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 101, 1-31. Charter, D. and J. P. Del¶eage, 1998, The international environmental NGOs: from the revolutionary alternative to the pragmatism of reform, Environmental Politics 7, 26-41. Dixit, A., 1996, Special-interest lobbying and endogenous commodity taxation, Eastern Economic Journal 22, 375-388. Fredriksson, P., 1997, The political economy of pollution taxes in a small open economy, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 33, 44-58. Grossman, G.M. and E. Helpman, 1994, Protection for sale, American Economic Review 84, 833-850. Grossman, G.M. and E. Helpman, 1995, Trade wars and trade talks, Journal of Political Economy 103, 675-708. Olson, M., 1965, The logic of collective action (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA).
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/1628

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